Defense Acquisition: Acquisition Plans for Training Aircraft Should Be
Reevaluated (Letter Report, 09/18/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-172).

GAO reviewed: (1) the Air Force's and Navy's calculations of the
quantity of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft
needed to meet training requirements; (2) the impact of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) procurement schedule on the aircraft's unit price;
and (3) service efforts to design the JPATS cockpit to accommodate
female pilots.

GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force and the Navy used inconsistent data to
calculate the number of JPATS aircraft required for primary pilot
training; (2) the Air Force used an attrition rate that was twice as
high as the historical attrition rate for its existing primary trainer
and the Navy used an attrition rate that differs from the rate that DOD
now cites as accurate; (3) until inconsistencies in the mission capable
rates and attrition rates are resolved, it is unclear how many JPATS
aircraft should be procured; (4) DOD's procurement plan for acquiring
JPATS aircraft does not take full advantage of the most favorable prices
available in the contract; (5) for example, the plan schedules 18
aircraft to be procured during fiscal year 1998 and 12 aircraft during
fiscal year 1999, a total of 30 aircraft; (6) however, GAO found that
these 30 aircraft could be procured more economically if 16 rather than
18 aircraft are procured in the fiscal year 1998 and 14 rather than 12
aircraft are procured in fiscal year 1999; (7) this approach would save
$1.36 million over the 2 fiscal years and permit more operational
testing and evaluation to be completed; (8) furthermore, the procurement
plan does not schedule a sufficient number of JPATS aircraft for
procurement in fiscal year 2000 to achieve lower prices that are
available under the terms of the contract; (9) because concerns had been
raised about the ability of JPATS aircraft to accommodate female pilots,
Congress directed DOD to study and determine the appropriate percentage
of the female pilot population that the aircraft should physically
accommodate; (10) based on its studies, DOD established the requirement
that the JPATS aircraft be able to accommodate 80 percent of the
eligible female pilot population; (11) pilot size determines the
percentage of pilots that can be accommodated in the JPATS cockpit; (12)
planned cockpit dimensions are expected to accommodate about 97 percent
of the eligible female pilot population; and (13) to permit safe
ejection from the aircraft, the ejection seat minimum pilot weight is
116 pounds, which is expected to accommodate 80 percent of the eligible
female pilot population.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-172
     TITLE:  Defense Acquisition: Acquisition Plans for Training 
             Aircraft Should Be Reevaluated
      DATE:  09/18/97
   SUBJECT:  Military training
             Flight training
             Aircraft pilots
             Military aircraft
             Women
             Attrition rates
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Defense cost control
             Defense procurement
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Joint Primary Aircraft Training System
             T-37B Aircraft
             T-34C Aircraft
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Secretary of Defense

September 1997

DEFENSE ACQUISITION - ACQUISITION
PLANS FOR TRAINING AIRCRAFT SHOULD
BE REEVALUATED

GAO/NSIAD-97-172

Trainer Aircraft

(707207)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  JPATS - Joint Primary Aircraft Training System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-277337

September 18, 1997

The Honorable William S.  Cohen
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr.  Secretary: 

As you know, the Air Force and the Navy plan to spend $4 billion on a
new aircraft, referred to as the Joint Primary Aircraft Training
System (JPATS), to train entry level pilots how to fly.  We reviewed
(1) the services' calculations of the quantity of JPATS aircraft
needed to meet training requirements, (2) the impact of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) procurement schedule on the aircraft's
unit price, and (3) service efforts to design the JPATS cockpit to
accommodate female pilots. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Air Force and the Navy plan to use the JPATS aircraft to train
entry level Air Force and Navy student pilots in primary flying to a
level of proficiency from which they can transition into advanced
pilot training.  The JPATS aircraft is designed to replace the Air
Force's T-37B and the Navy's T-34C primary trainer aircraft and other
training devices and courseware.  It is expected to have a life
expectancy of 24 years and provide better performance and improved
safety, reliability, and maintainability than existing primary
trainers.  For example, the JPATS aircraft is expected to overcome
certain safety issues with existing trainers by adding an improved
ejection seat and a pressurized cockpit.  The JPATS aircraft is
expected to be more reliable than existing trainers, experiencing
fewer in-flight engine shutdowns and other equipment failures.  It is
also expected to be easier to maintain because it is to use more
standard tools, and common fasteners. 

To calculate the number of JPATS aircraft required, the Air Force and
the Navy in 1993, used a formula that considered such factors as the
aircraft utilization rate, annual flying hours, mission capable rate,
attrition rate, sortie length, working days, and turnaround time. 
The Air Force calculated a need for 372 JPATS aircraft, and the Navy
calculated a need for 339, for a total combined requirement of 711
JPATS aircraft.  In December 1996, the two services reviewed these
requirements.  At that time, the Navy approved an increase of 29
aircraft, increasing its total to 368 aircraft.  This increased total
requirements from 711 to 740 JPATS aircraft.  The Air Force's Air
Education and Training Command--responsible for pilot
training--determined that the Air Force would need 441 aircraft
instead of 372 aircraft.  However, the Air Force did not approve this
increase. 

The JPATS aircraft shown in figure 1, the T-6A Texan II, is to be a
derivative of the Pilatus PC-9 commercial aircraft.  Raytheon
Aircraft Company, the contractor, plans to produce the aircraft in
Wichita, Kansas, under a licensing agreement with Pilatus, the Swiss
manufacturer of the PC-9.  The JPATS aircraft will undergo limited
modification to incorporate several improvements and features that
are not found in the commercial version of the aircraft, but are
required by the Air Force and the Navy.  Modifications involve (1)
improved ejection seats, (2) improved birdstrike protection, (3) a
pressurized cockpit, (4) an elevated rear (instructor) seat, and (5)
flexibility to accommodate a wider range of male and female pilot
candidates.  These modifications are currently being tested during
the qualification test and evaluation phase, which is scheduled to be
completed in November 1998.  Initial operational capability is
planned for fiscal year 2001 for the Air Force and fiscal year 2003
for the Navy. 

   Figure 1:  JPATS Aircraft, T-6A
   Texan II

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  JPATS Program Office.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Air Force and the Navy competitively selected an existing
commercial aircraft design to satisfy their primary trainer
requirements instead of developing a new trainer aircraft.  This
competitive acquisition strategy, according to Air Force officials,
resulted in original program estimates of about $7 billion being
reduced to about $4 billion upon contract award. 

The Air Force, as executive agent for the program, awarded a contract
to Raytheon in February 1996 to develop and produce between 102 and
170 JPATS aircraft with the target quantity of 140, along with
simulators and associated ground based training system devices, a
training management system, and instructional courseware.  The
contract included seven production options.  Through fiscal year
1997, the Air Force has exercised the first four options, acquiring 1
aircraft for engineering and manufacturing development and 23
production aircraft.  A separate contract was awarded to Raytheon for
logistics support, with options for future years' activities. 
Production is scheduled to continue through 2014. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Air Force and the Navy used inconsistent data to calculate the
number of JPATS aircraft required for primary pilot training.  For
example, in its 1996 calculations, the two services applied mission
capable rates\1 that differed substantially from each other and were
lower than the rate included in the contract to procure the aircraft. 
The Air Force used an attrition rate\2 that was twice as high as the
historical attrition rate for its existing primary trainer and the
Navy used an attrition rate that differs from the rate that DOD now
cites as accurate.  Until inconsistencies in the mission capable
rates and attrition rates are resolved, it is unclear how many JPATS
aircraft should be procured. 

DOD's procurement plan for acquiring JPATS aircraft does not take
full advantage of the most favorable prices available in the
contract.  For example, the plan schedules 18 aircraft to be procured
during fiscal year 1998 and 12 aircraft during fiscal year 1999, a
total of 30 aircraft.  However, we found that these 30 aircraft could
be procured more economically if 16, rather than 18, aircraft are
procured in fiscal year 1998 and 14, rather than 12, aircraft are
procured in fiscal year 1999.  This approach would save $1.36 million
over the 2 fiscal years and permit more operational testing and
evaluation to be completed.  Furthermore, the procurement plan does
not schedule a sufficient number of JPATS aircraft for procurement in
fiscal year 2000 to achieve lower prices that are available under the
terms of the contract. 

Because concerns had been raised about the ability of JPATS aircraft
to accommodate female pilots, Congress directed DOD to study and
determine the appropriate percentage of the female pilot population
that the aircraft should physically accommodate.  Based on its
studies, DOD established the requirement that the JPATS aircraft be
able to accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female pilot
population.  Pilot size\3 determines the percentage of pilots that
can be accommodated in the JPATS cockpit.  Planned cockpit dimensions
are expected to accommodate about 97 percent of the eligible female
pilot population.  To permit safe ejection from the aircraft, the
ejection seat minimum pilot weight is 116 pounds, which is expected
to accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female pilot population. 


--------------------
\1 Mission capable rates are a measure of aircraft readiness to
perform training missions. 

\2 Attrition rates are a measure of aircraft lost or damaged beyond
repair. 

\3 The characteristics of the pilot size include sitting height,
thumb tip reach, buttock-knee length, knee height sitting, eye height
sitting, shoulder height sitting, shoulder breadth range, chest depth
range, and thigh circumference range. 


   CALCULATION OF JPATS
   REQUIREMENTS WAS BASED ON
   INCONSISTENT DATA
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

In 1996, the Air Force and the Navy calculated the number of JPATS
aircraft required using several factors, including projections of
JPATS mission capable rates and projected attrition rates based on
historical experience.  However, the data they used in their
calculations contained various inconsistencies.  For example, the
projections of JPATS aircraft mission capable rates of 91 percent and
80 percent used by the Air Force and the Navy, respectively, to
calculate the requirements differed substantially from each other and
from the 94-percent rate included in the contract for procurement of
the aircraft.  The result of using lower mission capable rates to
calculate aircraft quantities is that more aircraft would be needed
to achieve annual flying hour requirements for training than if
higher rates were used.  Furthermore, the Air Force's projected
attrition rates were not consistent with historical attrition
experience with its existing primary trainer, and the Navy used a
rate that differs from the rate that DOD now says is accurate.  Until
these inconsistencies are resolved, it is unclear how many JPATS
aircraft should be procured. 


      MISSION CAPABLE RATE USED IN
      CALCULATIONS DIFFERED
      SUBSTANTIALLY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

Although the Air Force and the Navy are procuring the same JPATS
aircraft to train entry level pilots and the aircraft will be
operated in a joint training program, they used different mission
capable rates to calculate aircraft requirements.  Specifically, the
Air Force used a 91-percent mission capable rate and the Navy used an
80-percent rate.  Neither of these rates is consistent with the JPATS
contract that requires Raytheon to build an aircraft that meets or
exceeds a 94-percent mission capable rate.  Therefore, we
recalculated the Air Force and the Navy total JPATS aircraft
requirements using the same formula as the Air Force and the Navy,
and substituting the 94-percent contract mission capable rate in
place of the rates used by the Air Force and the Navy.  Table 1 shows
how higher mission capable rates could decrease JPATS aircraft
quantity requirements by as many as 60 aircraft--10 for the Air Force
and 50 for the Navy. 



                                Table 1
                
                Comparison of Mission Capable Rates Used
                  to Calculate Requirements with Rates
                    Contractually Required for JPATS

          Mission capable rates
------------------------------------------
                                               Total JPATS
                                                  aircraft
                                              requirements  Difference
----------------------------------  ------  --------------  ----------
JPATS contract                         94%             362
Air Force used to calculate            91%             372          10
 requirements
JPATS contract                         94%             318
Navy used to calculate                 80%             368          50
 requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------

      ATTRITION RATES WERE NOT
      CONSISTENT WITH HISTORICAL
      RATES AND CONFLICTED WITH
      DOD DATA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

The attrition rate used by the Air Force to calculate the number of
JPATS aircraft needed was more than twice the attrition rate of its
current primary trainer that was placed in service in the late 1950s. 
The Air Force estimated that 1.5 JPATS aircraft would be lost or
damaged beyond repair for every 100,000 flying hours.  However, the
historic attrition rate for the current primary trainer is 0.7 per
100,000 flying hours.  Although DOD advised us that single-engine
trainers such as JPATS are expected to have higher attrition rates
than two-engine trainers such as the T-37B, we note that important
JPATS features are increases in safety and reliability, including
fewer in-flight engine shutdowns and other equipment failures.  In
addition, use of an advanced ground based training system, being
acquired as part of the JPATS program, is expected to result in
greater pilot familiarity with the aircraft's operation prior to
actual flights. 

Data provided by the Navy and DOD regarding attrition rates are
conflicting.  For example, the Navy's calculations in 1996 used an
attrition rate of 1.5 aircraft per 100,000 flight hours to calculate
the required quantity of JPATS aircraft.  To derive this rate, the
Navy factored in the attrition experience of the existing T-34C
trainer, using a lifetime attrition rate of 0.4 per 100,000 flight
hours.  However, in commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated
that the lifetime attrition rate for the T-34C is 2.1 aircraft per
100,000 flying hours and the Navy provided data that it believed
supported this rate.  However, our analysis showed that the data
supported a rate of 3.6 aircraft per 100,0000 flying hours, which
differs from both the Navy and DOD figure. 


   DOD IS NOT TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
   THE MOST FAVORABLE PRICES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The JPATS aircraft procurement plan does not take advantage of the
most favorable prices provided by the contract.  The contract
includes annual options with predetermined prices for aircraft orders
of variable quantities.  Procurement of fewer than the target
quantity can result in a unit price increase from 1 to 52 percent. 
Procurement above the target quantity, or at the maximum quantity,
however, provides very little additional price reduction. 

The contract contains unit price charts for the variation in
quantities specified in lots II through VIII.  The charts contain
pricing factors for various production lot quantity sizes that are
used in calculating unit prices based on previous aircraft purchases. 
The charts are designed so that the unit price increases if the
number of aircraft procured are fewer than target quantities and
decreases if quantities procured are more than target quantities. 

As shown in table 2, lots II through IV have been exercised at the
maximum quantities of 2 (plus 1 developmental aircraft), 6, and 15. 
According to the procurement plan, 18 aircraft are to be procured
during fiscal year 1998 and 12 aircraft during fiscal year 1999,
resulting in a total of 30 aircraft.  All of these aircraft are being
procured by the Air Force.  In fiscal year 2000, the Navy is
scheduled to begin procuring JPATS aircraft. 



                                     Table 2
                     
                      Variation in Unit Prices for Selected
                     Procurement Quantities of JPATS Aircraft

Fiscal year
and
procurement      Minimum      Target     Maximum     Procurement         Planned
lot number      quantity    quantity    quantity            plan      unit price
------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  --------------  --------------
1995 (lot              1           1           1             1\a    $8,873,398\a
 II)
 development
 aircraft
1995 (lot              1           2           2             2\a    $8,004,807\a
 II)
1996 (lot              1           3           6             6\a    $5,019,140\a
 III)
1997 (lot              9          12          15            15\a    $3,148,953\a
 IV)
1998 (lot V)          12          18          22              18      $2,748,590
1999 (lot             12          18          22              12      $2,904,649
 VI)
2000 (lot             22          32          40              26      $2,627,519
 VII)
2001 (lot             44          54          62              58      $2,510,351
 VIII)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Actual numbers of aircraft procured. 

Our analysis shows that DOD can make better use of the price
advantages that are included in the JPATS contract.  For example, as
shown in table 3, 30 aircraft can be procured more economically if
16, rather than 18, aircraft are procured in fiscal year 1998 and 14,
rather than 12, aircraft are procured in fiscal year 1999.  If as few
as 16 aircraft were procured in fiscal year 1998, they could be
acquired at the same unit price as currently planned because the unit
price would not increase until fewer than
16 JPATS aircraft were procured in fiscal year 1998.  Deferring 2
aircraft from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999 would increase the
quantity in fiscal year 1999 from 12 to 14, resulting in a reduction
of the unit price for fiscal year 1999, from $2.905 million to $2.785
million.  This deferral would not only save $1.360 million over the 2
years but also reduce the risk of buying aircraft before the
completion of operational testing by delaying the purchase of two
aircraft and permitting more testing to be completed. 



                                Table 3
                
                  Fiscal Year 1998 and 1999 JPATS Unit
                      Prices at Various Quantities

                             Fiscal year    Fiscal year
                                    1998           1999          Total
-------------------------  -------------  -------------  =============
Planned quantity                      18             12             30
Unit cost                     $2,748,590     $2,904,649
Total cost                   $49,474,620    $34,855,788    $84,330,408
Our alternative                       16             14             30
Unit cost                     $2,748,590     $2,785,200
======================================================================
Total cost                   $43,977,440    $38,992,800    $82,970,240
Savings                       $5,497,180   ($4,137,012)     $1,360,168
----------------------------------------------------------------------
DOD could also save money if it altered its plans to procure 26
aircraft in fiscal year 2000, which is a quantity lower than the
target of 32 aircraft.  The unit price could be reduced by $104,212,
or 4 percent, if DOD procured the target quantity. 

In addition, once the JPATS aircraft successfully completes
operational test and evaluation, the aircraft could be procured at
the more economical, or target, rates.  Our analysis demonstrates
that maintaining yearly production rates at least within the target
range is more economical than production rates in the minimum range. 
As we previously reported, economical procurement of tested systems
has often been hindered because DOD did not provide them with high
enough priority.\4


--------------------
\4 Weapons Acquisition:  Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition
Funding Would Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb.  13, 1997). 


   JPATS AIRCRAFT IS EXPECTED TO
   MEET FEMALE COCKPIT
   ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The JPATS cockpit is expected to meet DOD's requirement that it
accommodate at least 80 percent of the eligible female pilot
population.  Pilot size, as defined by the JPATS anthropometric
characteristics, determines the percentage of pilots that can be
accommodated in the JPATS cockpit.  JPATS program officials estimate
that the planned cockpit dimensions will accommodate approximately 97
percent of the eligible female population anthropometrically.  The
minimum design weight of the JPATS ejection seat (116 pounds) will
accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female population. 

Because concerns have been raised about the ability of JPATS aircraft
to accommodate female pilots, Congress directed DOD to conduct
studies to determine the appropriate percentage of male and female
pilots that could be accommodated in the cockpit.  A DOD triservice
working group studied the issue and concluded that a 32.8-inch
minimum sitting height, instead of 34 inches, is one of several
variables that would allow for accommodation of at least 80 percent
of the eligible female population.  The DOD working group determined
that this change in sitting height would not require major
development or significantly increase program risk.  Thus, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense established 32.8 inches as the new JPATS
minimum sitting height requirement.  In addition, the minimum weight
requirement for the JPATS ejection seat was lowered from 135 pounds
to 116 pounds to accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female
population.  Another study is being conducted to investigate the
potential, at minimum additional cost, for an ejection seat with a
lighter minimum weight limit that might accommodate more than 80
percent of the female pilot trainee population.  Phase one of that
study is scheduled to be completed in the fall of 1997. 


   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

DOD is proceeding with plans to procure a fleet of JPATS aircraft
that may exceed the quantity needed to meet training requirements. 
Until inconsistencies in the data used to calculate JPATS
requirements are resolved, it is unclear how many aircraft should be
procured.  Furthermore, DOD's schedule for procuring the aircraft
does not take advantage of the most economical approach that would
allow it to save money and permit more time for operational testing. 
We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of Defense

  -- determine the appropriate attrition rates and mission capable
     rates to calculate JPATS requirements, taking into account the
     planned improvements in JPATS safety, reliability, and
     maintainability, and recalculate the requirements as appropriate
     and

  -- direct the Air Force to revise the JPATS procurement plan to
     take better advantage of price advantages in the contract, and
     upon successful completion of operational test and evaluation,
     acquire JPATS aircraft at the most economical target quantity
     unit prices provided by the contract. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with our
conclusion that DOD overstated JPATS requirements or with our
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force and
the Navy to recalculate aircraft requirements.  DOD partially
concurred with our recommendation to buy JPATS aircraft at the most
economical target unit prices provided in the contract. 

DOD believed that the Air Force and the Navy used appropriate
attrition rates and mission capable rates to calculate JPATS
requirements and that these rates accounted for improvements in
technology and mechanical reliability.  It noted that we had
incorrectly identified the T-34C aircraft attrition rate as 0.4
aircraft per 100,000 flying hours rather than 2.1 aircraft per
100,000 flying hours.  The Navy provided data that it believed
supported DOD's position, but our analysis showed that this data
supported an attrition rate that differed from both the Navy and DOD
rate.  Furthermore, DOD stated that the 94-percent mission capable
rate cited in the JPATS contract is achievable only under optimal
conditions and that the lower mission capable rates used by the Air
Force and the Navy are based on the maximum possible aircraft use at
the training sites.  Although DOD stated that the Navy used a mission
capable rate of 87 percent, our analysis showed that the Navy used a
rate of 80 percent.  Because of the inconsistencies and conflicts in
the attrition and mission capable rate data between DOD and the
services, we revised our conclusion to state that, until these
discrepancies are resolved, it is unclear how many aircraft should be
procured and revised our recommendation to call for the Secretary of
Defense to determine the appropriate rates and recalculate JPATS
requirements as appropriate. 

DOD agreed that procuring aircraft at the most economical price is
desirable and stated that it will endeavor to follow this approach in
future JPATS procurement.  It, however, noted that competing budget
requirements significantly affect procurement rates of all DOD
systems and that limited resources generally make procurement at the
most economical rates unachievable.  DOD's written comments are
reprinted in appendix I. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

To review service calculations of JPATS requirements, DOD's
procurement schedule for the aircraft, and efforts to design the
JPATS cockpit to accommodate female pilots, we interviewed
knowledgeable officials and reviewed relevant documentation at the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington D.C.;
the Training Systems Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio; the Air Force Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air
Force Base, Texas; the Navy Chief of Naval Air Training Office,
Corpus Christi, Texas; and the Raytheon Aircraft Company, Wichita,
Kansas.  We examined Air Force and Navy justifications for using
specific attrition rates, mission capable rates, and flying hour
numbers in determining aircraft quantities.  We also analyzed the
variation in quantity unit price charts in the procurement contract
to determine the most economical way to procure JPATS aircraft.  In
addition, we reviewed congressional language on cockpit accommodation
requirements and current program estimates of compliance with that
requirement. 

This review was conducted from September 1996 to July 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

As the head of a federal agency, you are required under 31 U.S.C. 
720 to submit a written statement on actions taken on our
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and
the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight no later than
60 days after the date of this report.  A written statement must also
be submitted to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations
with an agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60
days after the date of this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Navy
and the Air Force and to interested congressional committees.  We
will also make copies available to others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 521-4587 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  The major contributors to this
report were
Robert D.  Murphy, Myra A.  Watts, and Don M.  Springman. 

Sincerely yours,

David E.  Cooper
Associate Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 

supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
appendix. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated July 17, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

1.  The Navy, in deriving the projected attrition rate of 1.5
aircraft losses per 100,000 flying hours for Joint Primary Aircraft
Training System (JPATS) aircraft, used a 0.4- lifetime attrition rate
for the T-34C in determining total aircraft requirements.  DOD, in
its response to our draft of this report, stated that the actual
lifetime attrition rate for the T-34C is 2.1; however, the data
provided to support that rate indicated an attrition rate of 3.6
aircraft per 100,000 flying hours.  Because the attrition rate
figures provided to us for the Navy's T-34 differ substantially, the
Air Force's estimated attrition for JPATS aircraft is twice the rate
experienced on the T-37, and the Air Force's Air Education and
Training Command has revised its calculations of requirements, we
believe reassessment of requirements for JPATS aircraft is needed. 

2.  The JPATS production contract specifies the aircraft shall meet
or exceed a 94-percent mission capable rate for the total hours the
aircraft is in the inventory and does not specify the severity of
conditions.  Although the Navy now maintains that its requirement was
for a primary trainer aircraft with an 87-percent mission capable
rate, the Navy used, and continues to use, an 80-percent mission
capable rate in calculating JPATS aircraft quantity requirements. 
The latest JPATS Operational Requirements Document, issued December
1996, shows an 80-percent mission capable rate for the Navy, not 87
percent as indicated in DOD's response to our draft report. 

3.  We recognize that limited resources and competing budget
requirements affect production rates; however, the point we made was
that DOD's procurement plan (the future years defense plan) for
acquisition of JPATS aircraft did not make the best use of the
limited resources that had already been assigned to the JPATS
program.  Our report, on page 6, illustrates how, with fewer
resources, the Air Force could have acquired the same number of
aircraft over a 2-year period.  The illustration is valid, in that it
shows that the DOD procurement plan was not the most effective and
that it should be reassessed.  Indeed, the procurement quantities in
the plan for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 continue to include
insufficient quantities for DOD to take advantage of the most
favorable prices in the contract, and without a reassessment and a
change to the plan, Congress may need to ensure that resources are
used most effectively. 

4.  DOD did not provide us information to show how historical data
for single-engine trainer aircraft were used to predict the JPATS
rate of
1.5 losses per 100,000 flight hours.  We believe that a predicted
attrition rate for JPATS aircraft that is twice that of 40-year old
T-37 trainers does not account for improvements that are to be
incorporated in JPATS aircraft. 

5.  We do not believe it is premature at this time to reassess JPATS
requirements.  We believe reassessment is needed now because

  -- the Navy has provided several different attrition rates, all of
     which are intended to represent T-34 historical experience;

  -- the proposed JPATS attrition rate is twice the historical rate
     of the Air Force T-37; and

  -- the Air Force and the Navy continue to project different mission
     capable rates for JPATS aircraft that are lower than the rate
     the aircraft is required to demonstrate under the contract. 

We agree that, as experience is gained with the JPATS aircraft, the
quantities should also be reassessed periodically. 


*** End of document. ***