Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets Army's Readiness Goal
(Letter Report, 07/23/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-169).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
readiness of the Army's war reserve equipment prepositioned afloat,
focusing on the: (1) extent to which the brigade set of war reserve
equipment, which is prepositioned on ships, meets the Army's readiness
goal; and (2) status of the Army's efforts to establish facilities to
maintain this brigade set of equipment and develop an information system
that accurately measures and reports the readiness condition of war
reserve equipment.

GAO noted that: (1) of the unit sets considered when reporting the
readiness of the brigade set of war reserve equipment, about 25 percent
do not meet the Army's readiness goal for full mission capability; (2)
according to Army maintenance records, some equipment aboard
prepositioning ships had been reported as non-mission capable since
September 1995; (3) one factor that contributed to lower readiness rates
was that some equipment was not fully mission capable when it was
originally loaded on prepositioning ships; (4) other factors include the
deterioration of the equipment while in storage aboard ships and the
limited ability to conduct maintenance on the equipment while in
storage; (5) the Army plans to repair equipment that does not meet
readiness standards by conducting maintenance on prepositioning ships
every 30 months; (6) in addition, Army doctrine calls for logistics
support teams to perform maintenance on prepositioned war reserve
equipment when it is downloaded before a deployment; (7) further, the
Army is currently transferring equipment to prepositioning ships that
have been designed to better control the humidity of the shipboard
environment; (8) the Army has given priority to prepositioned ships in
its plans to redistribute equipment from central Europe; (9) this should
improve the readiness of those unit sets currently lacking equipment
required for meeting the Army's readiness goal; (10) Army maintenance
facilities in Charleston, South Carolina, were originally scheduled to
be completed before October 1996, in time for the facilities to be used
to conduct maintenance on the first full shipload of equipment
prepositioned afloat; (11) however, contracts for development of the
site and construction and renovation of buildings had not been
completed, and the maintenance contractor had to continue to rely on
temporary shelters and had to develop less efficient maintenance
processes; (12) according to Army and contractor officials, the use of
temporary facilities did not prevent the successful completion of the
maintenance mission; (13) basic elements of the Army's automated
inventory system for management of war reserves have been put in place,
including maintenance and readiness reporting software modules; (14) as
of July 1997, the Army was still developing and implementing its
information system; and (15) proposed improvements to the system includ*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-169
     TITLE:  Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets Army's 
             Readiness Goal
      DATE:  07/23/97
   SUBJECT:  Logistics
             Defense contingency planning
             Inventory control systems
             Military inventories
             Combat readiness
             Equipment maintenance
             Military facility construction
             Systems design
             Military vessels
             Military materiel
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Operation Vigilant Warrior
             Army Warfighter Equipment Status Report
             Army Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ship
             DOD Mobility Requirements Study
             Persian Gulf War
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S.  Senate

July 1997

AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING - NOT ALL
EQUIPMENT MEETS THE ARMY'S
READINESS GOAL

GAO/NSIAD-97-169

Afloat Prepositioning

(703159)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-277122

July 23, 1997

The Honorable James M.  Inhofe
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

This report provides information on the readiness of the Army's war
reserve equipment prepositioned afloat.\1 Specifically, this report
discusses the extent to which the brigade set of war reserve
equipment, which is prepositioned on ships, meets the Army's
readiness goal.  It also addresses the status of the Army's efforts
to establish facilities to maintain this brigade set of equipment and
develop an information system that accurately measures and reports
the readiness condition of war reserve equipment. 


--------------------
\1 Afloat prepositioning involves keeping ships continuously stored
with supplies, combat equipment, and support items. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains stocks of supplies and
equipment, called war reserves, to support military units during a
war or mobilization.  War reserves stored within the continental
United States are distributed as needed by airlift or sealift.  War
reserves are also stored, or prepositioned, overseas on land or on
ships near an area of potential conflict.  By prepositioning war
reserves overseas, U.S.  military forces have the ability to respond
quickly to a contingency.  For example, at the beginning of the
Persian Gulf War deployment in August 1990, equipment and supplies
prepositioned aboard ships arrived at the theater more quickly than
if they had been sealifted from the United States.  At that time, the
Army's prepositioning fleet consisted of four ships used primarily
for carrying ammunition and port handling equipment. 

Because afloat prepositioning proved successful during the Persian
Gulf War, DOD's January 1992 Mobility Requirements Study identified a
need for the Army to preposition additional combat, combat support,
and combat service support equipment and supplies aboard ships.\2
Later that year, we reported on the Army's use of prepositioning
ships during the Persian Gulf War and examined Army plans to expand
its prepositioning fleet by adding roll-on/roll-off ships to
accommodate additional equipment to support a brigade.\3 We
recommended that the Army plan for and provide resources for
maintaining its additional equipment on prepositioned ships. 

The brigade set of equipment, which is prepositioned afloat, consists
of 145 individual unit sets of equipment for an armored combat
brigade and combat support and service support units.  Specific
pieces of combat equipment include tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles for 4,500 soldiers.  Combat support and combat service
support equipment for an additional 5,300 soldiers includes multiple
launch rocket systems, self-propelled howitzers, cargo trucks,
tractors, chemical detection and decontamination equipment, and
communications gear. 

The Army's general standard for maintaining equipment is the
Technical Manual -10/-20 standard.  It requires that equipment be
maintained in near-perfect operating condition and capable of
performing all assigned missions.\4 The Army reports the readiness of
unit sets and the brigade set of equipment according to Army
Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting.  This regulation measures
readiness in terms of a lower, fully mission capable standard that
only requires that mission-essential subsystems be available and
operational.  As a result, a vehicle with a cracked windshield might
not meet the -10/-20 standard but could be considered fully capable
of performing its war-fighting mission.  The Army's readiness goal is
that 90 percent of the equipment in the prepositioned brigade set
meets the fully mission capable standard.  For readiness purposes,
the Army reports the status of 51 of the 145 unit equipment sets
prepositioned afloat.  These 51 unit equipment sets are authorized to
contain primary weapon systems or equipment considered critical for
accomplishing and sustaining a unit's mission. 

In August 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated Charleston
Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina as the site for development
of a maintenance base for the brigade set of equipment.  In late fall
1993, the Army began loading available equipment aboard seven
roll-on/roll-off ships that had been added to its prepositioning
fleet.  To maintain the brigade set of equipment, the Army hired
contractors to (1) modify existing maintenance facilities and
construct new facilities at the base, (2) develop and implement a
program for cyclical maintenance operations, and (3) develop an
automated information system to manage maintenance and inventory
operations and report on the condition of war reserve equipment. 

In February 1995, the Army contracted with the developers of the
Marine Corps' inventory system to create an automated inventory
system to meet Army prepositioned war reserve requirements.  This
system is expected to, among other things, maintain an accurate
accountability of items, compare authorized and on-hand quantities,
and report on the maintenance and readiness status of war reserve
equipment.  In March 1996, the Army established the War Reserve
Support Command to manage its war reserve program as a subordinate
command of the Industrial Operations Command and the Army Materiel
Command. 


--------------------
\2 This requirement was revalidated in the 1995 Mobility Requirements
Study Bottom-Up Review Update. 

\3 Military Afloat Prepositioning:  Wartime Use and Issues for the
Future (GAO/NSIAD-93-39, Nov.  4, 1992). 

\4 The Technical Manual -10/-20 standard is based on preventive
maintenance checks and services for each piece of Army equipment. 
The "-10" and "-20" refer to operator- and organization-level
maintenance tasks, respectively. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Of the unit sets considered when reporting the readiness of the
brigade set of war reserve equipment, about 25 percent do not meet
the Army's readiness goal for full mission capability.  As of April
1997, equipment in 13 of 51 reportable unit sets did not meet the
90-percent readiness goal.  Five of those unit sets did not have on
hand authorized primary weapon systems or equipment considered
critical for accomplishing and sustaining the units' mission.  As a
result, these five unit sets had a fully mission capable rating of
zero.  According to Army maintenance records, some equipment aboard
prepositioning ships had been reported as non-mission capable since
September 1995.  These records also erroneously identified some
non-mission capable equipment as repairable aboard ship, although
Army officials said that many repairs could not be made until the
equipment was downloaded. 

One factor that contributed to lower readiness rates was that some
equipment was not fully mission capable when it was originally loaded
on prepositioning ships.  Other factors include the deterioration of
the equipment while in storage aboard ships and the limited ability
to conduct maintenance on the equipment while in storage.  The Army
plans to repair equipment that does not meet readiness standards by
conducting maintenance on prepositioning ships every 30 months.  In
addition, Army doctrine calls for logistics support teams to perform
maintenance on prepositioned war reserve equipment when it is
downloaded before a deployment.  Further, the Army is currently
transferring equipment to prepositioning ships that have been
designed to better control the humidity of the shipboard environment. 
This improved environment should help reduce the amount of
deterioration of equipment while it is stored aboard prepositioned
ships.  Further, the Army has given priority to prepositioned ships
in its plans to redistribute equipment from central Europe; this
should improve the readiness of those unit sets currently lacking
equipment required for meeting the Army's readiness goal. 

Army maintenance facilities in Charleston, South Carolina, were
originally scheduled to be completed before October 1996--in time for
the facilities to be used to conduct maintenance on the first full
shipload of equipment prepositioned afloat.  However, contracts for
development of the site and construction and renovation of buildings
had not been completed, and the maintenance contractor had to
continue to rely on temporary shelters and had to develop less
efficient maintenance processes.  According to Army and contractor
officials, the use of temporary facilities did not prevent the
successful completion of the maintenance mission.  They said the
impact was limited to a slight but unquantifiable increase in the
cost of maintaining the equipment. 

Basic elements of the Army's automated inventory system for
management of war reserves have been put in place, including
maintenance and readiness reporting software modules.  As of July
1997, the Army was still developing and implementing its information
system.  Proposed improvements to the system include linking the
system database to existing Army maintenance management systems and
incorporating a requisitioning capability. 


   NOT ALL EQUIPMENT PREPOSITIONED
   AFLOAT MEETS ARMY READINESS
   GOAL
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

As of April 1997, 13 of the 51 unit sets of equipment that are
assigned to Army prepositioning ships and considered for readiness
reporting, or about 25 percent, did not meet the Army's readiness
goal that 90 percent of available war reserve equipment be fully
mission capable.  Equipment in two unit sets was less than 75 percent
fully mission capable, and five unit sets had a fully mission capable
rating of zero because they did not have on hand any authorized
primary weapon systems or equipment considered critical for
accomplishing and sustaining a unit's mission.  For example, one unit
set designated to support a heavy equipment transport company did not
have any of its authorized trucks or trailers. 

The status of the equipment in April 1997 had significantly changed
from October 1996, when 43 of the 51 unit sets did not meet the
Army's goal.  At that time, equipment in 10 unit sets was less than
75 percent fully mission capable, and 17 unit sets had a fully
mission capable rating of zero because they did not have any of their
authorized reportable equipment on hand.  Army officials attributed
the improvement as of April 1997 primarily to the transfer of key
pieces of equipment considered for readiness reporting from lower
priority units not considered for readiness reporting to higher
priority units that are considered for readiness reporting.\5 The
officials said that maintenance on the equipment between October 1996
and April 1997 also contributed to the increase in the number of unit
sets that met the Army's readiness goal.  Figure 1 compares the
status of equipment sets in October 1996 and April 1997. 

   Figure 1:  Number of Equipment
   Sets That Did Not Meet the
   Army's Readiness Goal in
   October 1996 and April 1997

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  The unit sets that had a fully mission capable rating of zero
did not have any reportable equipment on hand. 

Source:  Our analysis of War Reserve Support Command data. 

According to Army and contractor officials, many of the faults that
render equipment non-mission capable do not require extensive
maintenance to repair.  Army officials said that many of the pieces
of equipment that were considered non-mission capable needed only
replacement of missing fire extinguishers and dead batteries. 
However, our review of maintenance records showed that, as of April
1997, missing fire extinguishers and dead batteries only accounted
for about 11 percent of the total non-mission capable faults reported
for equipment prepositioned afloat.\6

The Army's equipment status data, as of April 1997, showed that
faults rendering specific pieces of equipment non-mission capable had
remained uncorrected since September 1995.  Figure 2 shows the amount
of time that uncorrected faults have rendered equipment prepositioned
afloat non-mission capable and the portion of those faults that the
Army considered to be repairable while in storage aboard
prepositioning ships. 

   Figure 2:  Amount of Time That
   Uncorrected Faults Have
   Rendered Equipment Non-Mission
   Capable (as of Apr.  1997)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Data reflects all ships as of April 1997 with the exception of
one for which data was only available as of January 1997. 

Source:  Our analysis of War Reserve Support Command data. 

According to the Army's April 1997 Warfighter Equipment Status
Report, about 60 percent of the faults that rendered equipment
non-mission capable were repairable aboard ship.\7 However, this
designation is misleading.  Army officials said that many of these
faults are impossible to repair until the equipment is taken off the
ship because of the heavy weight of items and lack of
maneuverability, among other things.  Thus, the information in the
report does not accurately represent the ability of maintenance
personnel to repair faults that render equipment non-mission capable. 


--------------------
\5 This accountability transfer occurred within the automated
information system and did not require actual movement of the
equipment. 

\6 Defective seals and gaskets accounted for an additional 8 percent
of the faults rendering equipment non-mission capable.  The remaining
faults were almost all different and therefore could not be easily
categorized. 

\7 This data reflects the condition of equipment prepositioned afloat
as of April 3, 1997, with the exception of equipment aboard one ship
for which such information was unavailable.  To complete the data set
and include all equipment aboard ships, we used data available as of
January 31, 1997, for that ship. 


      KEY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO
      LOWER READINESS RATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

In October 1995, the Army Inspector General reported that maintenance
standards were not enforced during the initial loading of the brigade
set of equipment aboard Army ships in the fall of 1993.\8 As a
result, during Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, the actual
fully mission capable rate of the equipment downloaded from five of
the seven roll-on/roll-off ships was significantly less than
reported.  According to the report, most of this equipment required
maintenance before deploying, and several pieces of equipment were
not cost-effective to repair.  The report also stated that the
readiness of the deployed equipment improved as a result of Army
maintenance efforts during the operation. 

Also, Army and maintenance contractor officials said that the
tendency of equipment to deteriorate while in storage aboard ships
continually lowers readiness rates.  For example, gaskets and seals
dry rot, tires go flat, equipment rusts, and batteries die. 

Further, Army officials and contractors stated that the ability of
shipboard maintenance teams to conduct inspections and maintenance on
equipment prepositioned aboard ships is limited due to the lack of
accessibility to equipment and environmental concerns regarding the
use of oil and other hazardous substances.  As a result, the teams
are only able to (1) perform minor maintenance, such as replacing
batteries, changing filters, and tightening plugs; (2) make visual
inspections to check for fluid leaks, loss of tire pressure, the
condition of glass, lights, and fire extinguisher, and the presence
of required documentation and inventory labels; and (3) start
vehicles periodically and check their instrumentation.  Because of
the limitations on inspections, Army officials said that the
condition of equipment prepositioned afloat could not be definitively
determined until each ship was fully unloaded and inspected. 


--------------------
\8 Assessment of Army War Reserve Materiel, Army Inspector General,
October 1995. 


      ARMY PLANS TO IMPROVE
      EQUIPMENT READINESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

The Army has recognized the need to conduct repairs on equipment that
deteriorates in storage or does not meet Technical Manual -10/-20
standards.  In addition to planned maintenance cycles every 30
months, Army doctrine calls for an Army Materiel Command logistics
support team to provide limited depot-level maintenance support to
fix many of the uncorrected equipment faults after the equipment is
downloaded and accountability of the equipment is transferred to the
war-fighting units during deployments. 

The Army is currently transferring equipment aboard the seven
roll-on/roll-off ships to five larger temporary ships and then
ultimately to eight new Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships by
2000.  These prepositioning ships have been designed to provide a
better controlled-humidity environment below deck, which should help
reduce the deterioration of equipment while stored aboard the ships. 
The Army plans to inspect the equipment as it is transferred between
ships, repair the equipment that does not meet Technical Manual
-10/-20 standards, and modernize equipment as needed.  In addition,
the eight new ships will more than double the amount of space
available to store equipment prepositioned afloat. 

To improve the readiness of unit equipment sets aboard prepositioning
ships, the Army has given priority to the afloat program in its plans
to redistribute equipment from central Europe.  As the unit sets
aboard prepositioning ships are filled, readiness rates should
improve. 

As of April 1997, equipment on four ships had been fully unloaded. 
According to Army maintenance plans, the equipment aboard the
remaining three ships will be downloaded and restored to -10/-20
standards by June 1998.  However, officials in the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics said that the Army may withhold
$18 million in funding from the fiscal year 1997 afloat
prepositioning program to help pay for operations in Bosnia.  These
officials stated that this reduction could prevent equipment
prepositioned afloat from being maintained at Technical Manual
-10/-20 standards.  As a result, equipment loaded onto prepositioning
ships later this year may be maintained only to the fully mission
capable level. 


   STATUS OF MAINTENANCE FACILITY
   CONSTRUCTION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Army received a total of $45.7 million in fiscal year 1995 and
1996 appropriations for construction of a maintenance facility at
Charleston, South Carolina.  The site preparation and the initial
phase of construction were originally scheduled to be completed
before October 1996--in time for the facilities to be used to conduct
maintenance on the first full shipload of the brigade set of
equipment, which is prepositioned afloat.  However, contractors did
not complete scheduled construction and renovation projects in time. 
As a result, the maintenance contractor had to continue to rely on
temporary shelters instead (see fig.  3) and had to develop less
efficient maintenance processes. 

   Figure 3:  Temporary
   Maintenance Shelters at the
   Charleston, South Carolina,
   Site

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

According to Army officials, the construction delays were primarily
due to poor soil conditions and the removal of unanticipated
hazardous waste, such as asbestos and pigeon droppings, from existing
structures.\9 The officials said that the continued reliance on
temporary maintenance facilities did not delay the successful upload
of fully mission capable equipment.  They also said that the only
discernable impact of these less efficient working conditions was a
slight but unquantifiable increase in the amount of overtime charged
to the contract.  The Army plans to complete the transition of
maintenance operations from the temporary shelters to the permanent
facilities in fall 1997.  In accordance with the original facility
funding plan, the Army requested $7.7 million in fiscal year 1998 for
further construction at the site, making the total estimated cost for
the facility $53.4 million. 


--------------------
\9 According to Army officials in Charleston, pigeon droppings are
considered hazardous waste because exposure may cause histoplasmosis. 
This disease is a fungal infection that most often occurs in the
lungs. 


   STATUS OF WAR RESERVE
   INFORMATION SYSTEM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The Army awarded a contract in February 1995 to develop an automated
inventory system to manage its prepositioned war reserves.  Upgrades
to the system were subsequently developed to collect and report
maintenance and readiness data.  Until July 1996, the Army reported
the readiness of war reserve equipment sets in terms of the full
mission capability of the 20 most important weapon systems.  At that
time, the Army established a requirement for reporting the readiness
condition of the equipment in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1,
Unit Status Reporting. 

In January 1997, the Army began having difficulty developing and
implementing that portion of the information system designed to
report the readiness of war reserve equipment.  For example, the
Army's January 1997 quarterly report was not produced on time and did
not accurately portray the true readiness condition of war reserve
equipment.  These problems were the result of software changes that
had not been adequately evaluated.  Specifically, changes in
equipment data tables caused the software to omit some equipment from
the report.  Army officials said that they resolved software problems
for the April 1997 readiness report by reverting to the equipment
data tables used before the software upgrade. 

As of July 1997, the Army was still developing and implementing its
information system.  The projected total cost of the Army's contract
through September 1997 was about $17 million.  Army officials
estimated that development costs of the system were about $9.5
million and that the costs of the contractors' test, implementation,
operation, and other support efforts were about $7.5 million. 
Proposed improvements to the system include linking the system
database to existing Army maintenance management systems and
incorporating a requisitioning capability. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Because of the tendency for equipment to deteriorate while
prepositioned aboard ships and the inherent limitations in the Army's
ability to conduct maintenance aboard ships, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that
unit sets of equipment that affect the readiness of the brigade set
are filled to their authorized levels and that the equipment is
maintained at the Army's Technical Manual -10/-20 standards before it
is loaded onto prepositioning ships.  These actions would increase
the probability that the Army's goal of 90 percent full mission
capability is achieved. 

To improve the quality of Army equipment status reporting, we
recommend that the War Reserve Support Command, along with intended
users of the Warfighter Equipment Status Reports, establish more
accurate designations for the status of non-mission capable
equipment.  These designations should differentiate among items that
can be repaired aboard ship, items that are to be repaired by the
logistics support team upon download before deployment, and items
that may not be readily repaired and should be replaced. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and stated that several ongoing initiatives are aimed
at improving the readiness of Army equipment prepositioned afloat. 
For example, DOD indicated that a multistage sealift modernization
program would improve readiness by transferring equipment from
existing ships to newer and larger vessels specially designed to
store equipment at sea.  DOD stated that, as equipment is moved
between ships, it will be upgraded to the Technical Manual -10/-20
standards cited in our report.  Also, DOD stated that the Army is
improving an information reporting system to enhance visibility into
equipment readiness.  This action is consistent with one of our
recommendations.  DOD's comments appear in appendix I. 



   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

To determine the extent to which war reserve equipment prepositioned
afloat met the Army's readiness goal and the key factors contributing
to the condition of the equipment, we analyzed monthly Warfighter
Equipment Status Reports developed by the Army's maintenance
contractor and materiel condition status reports used for readiness
reporting developed by the Army's information systems contractor.  We
did not validate the computer-generated data in these status reports;
however, we discussed data reliability and quality with agency
officials, and they stated that the data was reliable and accurately
reflected the condition of war reserve equipment.  We determined the
major factors that contributed to the current condition of the
equipment by interviewing Army and maintenance contractor officials. 
We also interviewed these officials to obtain their views on the
effect of the shipboard maintenance environment and observed
shipboard storage conditions.  We obtained maintenance records and
information on Technical Manual -10/-20 standards and discussed them
with Army and maintenance contractor officials. 

To determine the status of the Army's efforts to establish facilities
to maintain war reserve equipment, we observed ongoing construction
projects, including those at the wharf, staging areas, roadways, and
maintenance facilities.  We also observed the maintenance
contractor's use of temporary maintenance shelters.  We examined
records of construction contractors' performance and interviewed Army
and maintenance contractor officials to determine the effect of the
incomplete facilities on the maintenance cycle.  We obtained cost
data on the construction projects from Army officials. 

To determine the status of the Army's efforts to develop information
systems to accurately measure and report the readiness condition of
war reserve equipment, we obtained and discussed information on the
status of the system with the automated information systems
contractor.  We also talked with Army officials at the Combat
Equipment Group--Asia-- Charleston Naval Weapons Station, South
Carolina; Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations and Plans and for
Logistics, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.; and
the War Reserve Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois. 

We conducted our review from August 1996 to July 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government accounting standards. 



---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Readiness, Senate Committee on Armed Services; the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations; and the Secretaries of Defense and the Army.  Copies
will also be made available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix II. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)APPENDIX I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Sharon A.  Cekala
Elliott C.  Smith
Karen S.  Blum

ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE

Christopher A.  Keisling

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

C.  Douglas Mills, Jr.
John R.  Beauchamp


*** End of document. ***