General and Flag Officers: Number Required is Unclear Based on DOD's
Draft Report (Letter Report, 06/16/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-160).
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) progress in determining its general and flag officer
requirements, focusing on: (1) DOD's draft recommendations; (2) the
estimated cost to implement DOD's draft recommendations; (3) the
criteria the services used in doing their studies; (4) troop strength
compared to general and flag officer requirements; and (5) whether
certain general or flag officer positions may be candidates for
conversion to civilian status. GAO noted that this is an interim report,
since DOD has delayed completion of its mandated report.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's draft does not clearly identify general and
flag officer requirements and does not explain the basis for its
recommendations to increase the number of general and flag officers by
54 active and 32 reserve positions; (2) the draft recommends 1,018
active duty general and flag officers, the service studies recommended
1,096, and the service secretaries recommended only 995; (3) neither the
actual number of general and flag officers needed or the criteria used
to arrive at the number has been explained by DOD, the Army, Navy, or
Marine Corps; (4) in trying to reconcile the different numbers, GAO
found that some of the difference results from the service chiefs'
military judgment, some from perceived political realities not to ask
for too many general and flag officers, and some from the conflicting
draft recommendations from the services and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense; (5) DOD, the services, and the joint community did not
effectively integrate their studies, which led to different assumptions
about how many general and flag officers will be provided by the
services for joint duty; (6) some reserve component study results and
recommendations were also adjusted; (7) GAO estimates the cost of
implementing DOD's draft recommendations would be at least $1.2 million
annually, assuming the services reduce the number of colonels and Navy
captains by the same amount as the increase in general and flag
officers; (8) the criteria and methodology used in the services' studies
are based on widely used job evaluation techniques that have highly
subjective features; (9) the different methodologies together created at
least 27 different definitions of a general or flag officer and,
therefore, some results are not comparable; (10) the data collected did
not attempt to demonstrate the impact of the mandated reduction in
general and flag officers between fiscal years 1991 and 1996; (11) force
structure changes and general and flag officer requirements have not
always been linked; (12) since the early 1980s, in some years, troop
strength dropped and in other years it increased while general and flag
officer authorizations remained constant; (13) in 1993, 3 years after
Congress mandated the latest cut in general and flag officer positions,
DOD completed its Bottom Up Review strategy that further changed the
force structure; (14) the requirements for general and flag officers ma*
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-97-160
TITLE: General and Flag Officers: Number Required is Unclear Based
on DOD's Draft Report
DATE: 06/16/97
SUBJECT: Military officers
Military cost control
Military reserve personnel
Civilian employees
Military downsizing
Personnel classification
Officer personnel
Human resources utilization
IDENTIFIER: DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
DOD Bottom-Up Review
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
June 1997
GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS - NUMBER
REQUIRED IS UNCLEAR BASED ON DOD'S
DRAFT REPORT
GAO/NSIAD-97-160
General and Flag Officers
(703205)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CINC - Commander-in-Chief
DOD - Department of Defense
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-276499
June 16, 1997
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Congress determines the maximum number of general and flag officers
that the military services may have by specifying service-specific
ceilings in title 10 of the U.S. Code. Congress authorized 12 new
general officer positions for the Marine Corps as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.\1 The act
required the Department of Defense (DOD) to study general and flag
officer requirements and recommend changes to the law, if
necessary.\2 The act also required our office to evaluate DOD's
study.\3
DOD has delayed completion of its report, but as requested by the
Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on National
Security, we are issuing this interim report on DOD's progress to
date in determining its general and flag officer requirements. Thus,
we (1) reviewed DOD's draft recommendations, (2) estimated the cost
to implement DOD's draft recommendations, (3) reviewed the criteria
the services used in doing their studies, (4) compared troop strength
to general and flag officer requirements, and (5) determined whether
certain general or flag officer positions may be candidates for
conversion to civilian status. This report discusses the draft DOD
report and recommendations contained in a working draft provided to
us in February 1997 and subsequently revised and provided to us on
May 9, 1997.\4
DOD has delayed completion and release of its report until after it
has an opportunity to determine whether or not to adjust its draft
general and flag officer requirements and recommendations or redo its
study to take into account Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
recommendations.\5
--------------------
\1 P.L. 104-201, section 405, Sept. 23, 1996.
\2 P.L. 104-201, section 1213.
\3 P.L. 104-201, section 1213 (e).
\4 The revised draft was provided after we testified on the initial
draft before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee
on National Security. General and Flag Officers: DOD's Draft Study
Needs Adjustments (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-122, Apr. 8, 1997).
\5 The QDR was required by sections 922 and 923 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for 1997 to study national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plans, and other issues in 1997 and at the start of each newly
elected administration after 1997.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Active duty general and flag officer authorizations fluctuated from
over 2,000 in 1945 to about 1,000 in 1951. In 1967, DOD had about
1,300 authorized active duty general and flag officers, but that
number was reduced to 1,073 by October 1, 1981. A number of studies
of general and flag officer requirements have been done since the
mid-1980s. The most recent DOD-wide study of active duty
requirements was done in 1988 by a contractor, the Hay Group,
Incorporated. The study concluded that the services needed 1,449
general and flag officers. The services adjusted the number to
1,475, which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reduced to
1,436.
Congress left the authorizations at 1,073 until the 1991 National
Defense Authorization Act mandated a reduction to 858 by October 1,
1995. Subsequently, the ceiling was increased to 865. In 1996, the
DOD-wide ceiling had been further increased to 877.
DOD used a four-level structure to manage its 1997 statutorily
mandated study of general and flag officer requirements. The
structure consisted of the Secretary of Defense (the final approval
authority) and the Executive, Steering, and Working Committees. The
Executive Committee, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management Policy) and composed of senior civilian executives,
including the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and
the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, was to provide
oversight and guidance to the study teams. The Steering Committee,
chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military
Personnel Policy and composed of the military service personnel
chiefs and others, was to coordinate service and joint community
study inputs. The Working Committee was established in OSD to
coordinate service and joint community studies, consolidate the draft
recommendations, and write DOD's draft report.
The study was designed to follow six steps. First, each service and
the Joint Staff were to review all active and reserve general and
flag officer positions (including those filled by colonels, Navy
captains, and civilians), and except for the Army, other positions
that did not then require a general or flag officer. Second, the
service secretaries were to review their services' recommendations,
adjust the study results, and forward their reports to the Working
Committee. Third, the Working Committee was responsible for writing
a draft report consolidating service and joint community study
results and recommendations and providing it to the Steering
Committee. Fourth, the Steering Committee was responsible for
reviewing the consolidated draft report and providing it to the
Executive Committee. Fifth, the Executive Committee was responsible
for reviewing the consolidated draft report and forwarding it to the
Secretary of Defense. The active and reserve components, Reserve
Forces Policy Board, OSD (Reserve Affairs), and other officials
either assisted in doing the study or commented on the study.
DOD has stopped its study process at this point to give itself time
to determine the need to adjust its draft recommendations or redo its
draft study to take QDR recommendations into account. The Secretary
of Defense may approve the draft report or a revised report and
submit it to Congress at some time in the future. As a result, the
DOD draft study results and recommendations are considered
preliminary and do not represent DOD's final position.
DOD's draft report recommends that Congress authorize 54 new active
duty general and flag officers, to give the services 1,018. The
draft report also recommends an increase of 32 reserve component
general and flag officers.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
DOD's draft does not clearly identify requirements for general and
flag officers and does not explain the basis for its recommendations
to increase the number of general and flag officers by 54 active and
32 reserve positions. The draft recommends 1,018 active duty general
and flag officers, the service studies recommended 1,096, and the
service secretaries recommended only 995. To date, neither the
actual number of general and flag officers needed nor the criteria
used to arrive at the number have been explained by DOD, the Army,
Navy, or Marine Corps. In trying to reconcile the different numbers,
we found that some of the difference results from military judgment
of the service chiefs, some from perceived political realities not to
ask for too many general and flag officers, and some from the
conflicting draft recommendations from the services and OSD. In
addition, DOD, the services, and the joint community did not
effectively integrate their studies, and this led to different
assumptions about how many general and flag officers will be provided
by the services for joint duty. The draft also recommends an
increase of 32 reserve component general and flag officers. Some
reserve component study results and recommendations were also
adjusted.
We estimate the cost of implementing DOD's draft recommendations
would be at least $1.2 million annually, assuming the services reduce
the number of colonels/Navy captains by the same amount as the
increase in general and flag officers. However, if the services do
not reduce their colonels/Navy captains, DOD's draft recommendations
will exceed $1.2 million annually.
The criteria and methodology used in the services' studies are based
on widely used job evaluation techniques that have highly subjective
features. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff
selected different methodologies for the studies. The different
methodologies together created at least 24 different definitions of a
general or flag officer. Therefore, some results are not comparable.
Also, the data collected did not attempt to demonstrate the impact of
the mandated reduction in general and flag officers between fiscal
year 1991 and 1996.
Force structure changes and general and flag officer requirements
have not always been linked. Since the early 1980s, in some years,
troop strength dropped and in other years it increased while general
and flag officer authorizations remained constant. In 1993, 3 years
after Congress mandated the latest cut in general and flag officer
positions, DOD completed its Bottom Up Review strategy that further
changed the force structure. The requirements for general and flag
officers may further change based on 1997 and subsequent QDRs.
DOD may be able to fill some new general and flag officer positions
if it converts nonmilitary essential positions to civilian status and
transfers the incumbent. For example, we identified a number of
positions that currently require general or flag officers that may be
candidates for conversion.
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE LIMITS ON
GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Congress established four military ranks above the rank of colonel
(for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and captain (for the
Navy). Table 1 displays the pay grade designation, title of rank,
and insignia worn by officers at general and flag officer ranks.
Table 1
Pay Grade, Title, and Insignia Worn at
General and Flag Officer Ranks
Pay Army, Air Force,
grade Marine Corps Navy Insignia
-------- ------------------------ ------------------------ --------
O-10 General Admiral 4 stars
O-9 Lieutenant general Vice admiral 3 stars
O-8 Major general Rear admiral (upper 2 stars
half)
O-7 Brigadier general Rear admiral (lower 1 star
half)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Title 10 U.S. Code and the services.
Congress requires each service to maintain at least 50 percent of its
general or flag officers in the rank of brigadier general/rear
admiral (lower half). Also, no more than 15 percent may serve above
the rank of major general/rear admiral (upper half), and of that
number, no more than 25 percent may be generals/admirals.\6
Finally, Congress provided up to (1) 3 exemptions from the
general/admiral ceiling for officers serving as the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or the Chief of Staff to
the President;\7 (2) 11 exemptions until September 30, 2000, from the
general/admiral grade ceiling for officers in certain senior joint
positions such as a commander in chief of a unified or specified
command;\8 (3) 1 exemption from the admiral ceiling for the current
Superintendent of the Naval Academy until the incumbent leaves the
Navy;\9 and (4) 6 exemptions from the lieutenant general/vice admiral
ceiling for officers in joint positions designated by the
President.\10 Title 10 does not address the grade mix for reserve
general and flag officers (although it did specify the grade that
certain reserve component officers must hold).
Title 10 of the U.S. Code established service-specific ceilings for
active duty general and flag officers that total 877. The law also
authorized 12 general and flag officer positions to be allocated by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the services for joint
duty positions. This authorization, which expires on October 1,
1998, is commonly called the "Chairman's 12."\11
During fiscal years 1996 and 1997, the services can also allow up to
75 colonels/Navy captains to wear the insignia of brigadier
general/rear admiral (lower half) prior to promotion, a practice
known as "frocking."\12 Under 10 U.S.C. � 777, an officer may be
frocked to brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) only if he/she
has been selected for promotion, the Senate has approved the
promotion, and the officer is already serving in or has orders to
serve in a position for which that grade is authorized. Frocked
officers are not paid the salary of the higher rank until promoted.
The number of officers that may be frocked to brigadier general/rear
admiral (lower half) will drop to 55 during fiscal year 1998 and to
35 after fiscal year 1998.\13 Title 10 does not address frocking
above the brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) rank.
Finally, the law authorizes an exemption from both the grade and
number ceiling if a general or flag officer is serving as either the
Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.\14
As shown in table 2, the title 10 ceiling, Chairman's 12, and current
frocking limits combine to authorize 964 general and flag officer
positions, but that number is scheduled to drop by 52 to 912 by
fiscal year 1999 due to the impending expiration of the law providing
for the Chairman's 12 and the mandated reduction in frocking limits.
Table 2
Current and Planned Active Duty General
and Flag Officer Authorization Ceilings
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Ceiling 1997 1999 Net change
------------------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Title 10 877 877 0
Frocking 75 35 -40
Chairman's 12 12 0 -12
======================================================================
Total 964 912 -52
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis based on data provided by OSD and title 10
U.S.C. �� 526, 777.
Title 10 U.S.C. � 12004(a) has authorized up to 422 reserve
component general and flag officers in addition to those on active
duty. However, the law exempted from the ceiling any general or flag
officer serving as a state adjutant general or an assistant adjutant
general or in the National Guard Bureau.\15 The exemption allows for
an additional 178 general or flag officer positions in fiscal year
1997, for a total of 600. Title 10 does not address either the grade
mix or the frocking authority for the reserve components.
--------------------
\6 See 10 U.S.C. � 525.
\7 See 10 U.S.C. � 525(b)(3).
\8 See 10 U.S.C. �� 525(b)(5) as amended by P.L. 104-201 � 404(b).
\9 See 10 U.S.C. � 525 note (P.L. 103-337, sec. 406).
\10 See 10 U.S.C. � 525(b)(4).
\11 See 10 U.S.C. � 526(c).
\12 See 10 U.S.C. � 777.
\13 See 10 U.S.C. � 777(d).
\14 See 50 U.S.C. � 403(c)(3)(C).
\15 See 10 U.S.C. � 12004(b).
DOD AND THE SERVICE DRAFT
REQUIREMENTS ARE UNCLEAR
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
DOD's draft recommends an increase in active general and flag officer
ceilings from 877 to 943 in title 10 and seeks to maintain the fiscal
year 1997 frocking limit of 75 to avoid the loss of 40 authorizations
by fiscal year 1999. DOD's draft report also recommends a new grade
mix for active duty general and flag officers.\16
The service studies concluded that a combined total of 1,096 general
and flag officers were needed but the service secretaries' combined
recommendations would only provide 995. Subsequently, OSD developed
draft recommendations that provide for 1,018 positions, as shown in
table 3.
Table 3
Differences Between Service Study
Results and the DOD Draft
Recommendations
Current title 10
ceiling of 877
plus the
Chairman's 12 Draft
and current recommendation
frocking limit Service of the Secretary
Service of 75 Study results recommendations of Defense
-------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Army 336 353 355 355
Navy 242 328 249 262
Air 299 297 308 314
Force
Marine 87 118 83 87
Corps
================================================================================
Total 964 1,096 995 1,018
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis based on data provided by OSD and the services.
The difference between the 995 authorizations recommended by the
services and the 1,018 recommended by OSD's draft report is accounted
for in the way the services handled recommendations on frocking.
Only the Army recommended maintaining the current frocking limit of
75 (of which its current share is 29) and did not add positions to
its recommended title 10 ceiling to compensate for its loss of 17
Army-specific frocking authorizations by fiscal year 1999. On the
other hand, the other services made no recommendations on frocking,
which would lead to a combined drop of 23 for the Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps between fiscal year 1997 and 1999. At the same
time, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps developed their
recommended new title 10 ceilings with the expected loss of frocking
authority in mind and compensated themselves through higher title 10
ceilings.
In its May 8, 1997, draft, DOD stated that "all services had not
built the loss of frocking into their analyses." However, this is
inconsistent with the documentary evidence the services provided to
us before the proposed freeze on frocking at the current level of 75
was made.
In an August 23, 1996, point paper, the Marine Corps pointed out
that it had recently completed an effort to increase its general
officer ceiling by 14 to 82 (the law provided 12 for a total of
80). The paper also stated, "Within the 14 was included the
ultimate loss of 6 frocking authorizations that resulted from
the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization Bill."
A June 18, 1996, memorandum signed by the Chief of Naval Operations
was used to justify a request to increase the Navy's flag
officer ceiling to 240. That memorandum stated that the "Navy
must receive an increase in flag officer authorizations to
counter the cumulative effect of the reduction in frocking and
flag officers." In 1997, the Navy again recommended an increase
in its flag officer ceiling to 240.
A December 5, 1996, memorandum written by the Air Force General
Officer Matters Office was used as part of the scoring process
in the current study of general officer requirements. The
memorandum stated that "we would subtract the 11 frocked
brigadier generals we are allowed beginning in FY99, and request
authorization for 221 plus 74 joint, for a total of 295." If
DOD's draft recommendation to maintain frocking at 75 is put
forward and adopted, the Air Force would have frocking authority
of 17, not the 11 planned plus the new recommended title 10
ceiling that assumes frocking of 11 not 17.
The Army's 1997 general officer requirements study recommended a
title 10 ceiling of 319 (subsequently changed to 326). It also
stated that "frocking is a very cost effective means to help
close the gap between requirements and authorizations. If we
apply the future frocking constraint of 12 to today's general
officer requirements, the vacancies will increase from 18 to 30.
Therefore, recommend that frocking authorization be held at the
FY 1997 levels."
Therefore, because DOD's draft report recommended maintaining the
current frocking limit of 75 while accepting the services'
recommended new title 10 ceilings, the overall OSD draft
recommendations would lead to a total of 1,018, not the 995
recommended by the services, because 23 positions were counted twice.
Even 1,018 may not be the right number. The service studies
concluded that 1,096 were needed, even though they only recommended
995. The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps did not fully explain the criteria they used to
adjust their recommendations from the study results, leaving unclear
what the right number should be. For example, Kapos Associates,
Incorporated, a job evaluation consultant, concluded that 328 Navy
positions and 118 Marine Corps positions were general or flag officer
positions. Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps fully explained why
they reduced their recommended positions to only 249 for the Navy and
83 for the Marine Corps. OSD, Navy, and Marine Corps officials whom
we spoke with, and documents that we had access to, acknowledged that
it would be difficult to convince Congress to authorize 1,096 general
and flag officers.
--------------------
\16 We discuss the draft recommendations on the grade mix in appendix
I.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
REQUIREMENTS AND
AUTHORIZATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
The services' studies were conducted to identify those positions that
required leadership at general or flag rank. The requirements
process was aimed at determining how many general and flag officers
the services believe are needed--not how many they can have. The
next step was to determine general and flag officers (resources) to
fill those positions identified as worthy of general or flag rank.
Obtaining resources is done through the authorization process.
Congress authorizes general and flag officers by providing them
through (1) limited allotments specified for each service in title
10, (2) exemptions to title 10 limits such as the Chairman's 12, and
(3) frocking. Congressional action deals only with authorizations by
providing general and flag officers and frocking authority up to
congressionally specified limits. The Air Force stated that nothing
in law limits the number of general and flag officers that a service
can say it needs, the law limits the number that are available. We
agree. Table 2 of our report displays the number of general and flag
officers authorized in law--the number available--not the number of
positions the service says require general or flag rank. When we use
the term "authorize," we are referring to the process of
congressional action that provides general and flag officers, not the
process of determining requirements or permitting positions to be
carried on the books as general or flag officer positions, whether or
not enough general or flag officers are available to fill all
positions.
The Air Force believed table 3 of our report inappropriately combines
requirements (which we labeled as "Study results") with
authorizations (which we labeled as "recommendations"). We combined
them (as does the Air Force, as shown by the Air Force's December 5,
1996, memorandum that we quoted previously) within the table because
the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps reports did not clearly state
the number of general or flag officers that would exist if their
recommendations were accepted by Congress. For example, as shown in
table 3, the recommendations of the Secretary of the Air Force would
produce more general officers than the Air Force study concluded were
needed. In table 3, we clearly distinguish between requirements
(determined by the service studies) and general and flag officers
that would be available (if the recommendations of the service
secretaries or OSD are adopted).
The service studies attempted to identify (determine requirements
for) those jobs that require leadership at the general and flag
officer level. But just identifying requirements does not equate to
having the resources to fill them. Thus, OSD made draft
recommendations that, if accepted by Congress, would provide the
resources (general or flag officers) to meet requirements identified
in the service studies. Among the draft recommendations made by OSD
was one to maintain frocking at the current level of 75. That
recommendation covers all of the services. The Marine Corps pointed
out that its support of freezing frocking at 75 "was made to
demonstrate our solidarity and support for our sister service needs."
The Marine Corps also stated that it never intended to benefit from
freezing frocking limits and pledged not to frock any more than three
officers to the rank of brigadier general after October 1, 1997.
JOINT COMMUNITY AND SERVICE
REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT WELL
INTEGRATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
The Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff did not fully integrate
their studies, even though joint community general and flag officers
come from the services. As a result, the Navy, Army, Marine Corps,
and Joint Staff used different assumptions about service
participation in the joint community, leading to incompatible sets of
requirements. For example, the Joint Staff projected that the Army
would nominate 78 general officers for joint duty, while the Army
projected nominations of 70 to 75 and developed the service title 10
and frocking recommendations based on its estimate of joint and
Army-specific needs. Likewise, the Joint Staff projected that the
Navy would nominate 66, but the Navy estimated 68 and developed the
Navy recommendations with its own projections--not the Joint
Staff's--in mind.
The Joint Staff does not need congressional approval to change its
general or flag officer authorizations; it levies its requirements on
the services with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In the
early 1990s, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unilaterally
reduced general and flag officer positions in the joint community
from 280 to 219 to help the services cope with the mandated reduction
in the title 10 ceiling. However, that trend has been reversed. In
1996, the Joint Staff added 11 active duty general and flag officer
positions, which increased the total number of joint community
general and flag officers to 229. The Marine Corps indicated that it
would increase its nominations to the joint community by 4 (and
received the 12 new general officers to help them do that). The
other services had to provide the other eight general and flag
officers from existing authorizations. In 1997, the Joint Staff
recommended adding 15 more active component general and flag
officers, for a total of 244 in the joint community. The joint
community also recommended adding 11 new reserve component general
and flag officers for a total of 44 in the joint community. (See
app. III for the list of joint general and flag officers.)
RESERVE COMPONENT GENERAL
AND FLAG OFFICERS WOULD
INCREASE IF CONGRESS ACCEPTS
DOD'S DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
DOD concluded that current statutory limits do not adequately
recognize the increased role of the reserve components in operations
and the draft report recommended that reserve component general and
flag officer positions be increased by 32, to 454 (632, including the
178 general officers serving as state adjutants general or assistant
adjutants general or in the National Guard Bureau), as shown in table
4.
Table 4
Current and Draft Ceilings on Reserve
Component General and Flag Officers
Current Proposed
Service ceiling ceiling Increase
------------------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Army 207 227 20
Navy 48 53 5
Air Force 157 161 4
Marine Corps 10 13 3
======================================================================
Total 422 454 32
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSD and title 10.
The services and the joint community plan to use the 32 new reserve
component general and flag officers as commanders or deputy
commanders in a variety of operational and support positions in both
the reserves and National Guard, if the recommendation is put forward
and adopted by Congress. Some would command organizations such as
the 81st Infantry Brigade in the Army Reserve. Others would serve as
deputy commanders. For example, the Marine Corps would use two new
reserve general officers as the Deputy Commanders of Marine Forces
Atlantic and Marine Forces Pacific. Lastly, the services and the
joint community would use the new reserve general and flag officers
in organizations in the United States and in foreign locations. For
example, the Joint Staff planned to use one as the Deputy Assistant
Chief of Staff for Operations at United States Forces-Korea and the
Army planned to assign one as the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Planning at the Eighth Army, also in Korea.
We found no evidence of uncoordinated recommendations in the reserve
component portion of the studies, although some study results and
recommendations were adjusted as with the active component. DOD
avoided the problems encountered in the active component studies at
least partly because exemptions and frocking authorities available
for active force management are not used in the reserve component and
no service recommended any change to that.
DOD'S RECOMMENDATIONS WILL COST
AT LEAST $1.2 MILLION ANNUALLY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
We estimate that the cost increase will be about $1.2 million
annually and another approximately $54,000 in one-time costs if
Congress accepts all of DOD's draft recommendations. The cost of
general or flag officers includes a total increase in military
compensation of over $1 million annually over that paid to
colonels/Navy captains and about $180,000 more for allowances
associated with the higher rank such as aides, speechwriters,
entertainment, and the purchase of new china (to which some but not
all general or flag officers are entitled). As an example, the Joint
Staff authorized an increase from colonel/Navy captain to brigadier
general/rear admiral (lower half) for the J-5 of the Special
Operations Command at an estimated annual cost of over $78,400. This
cost includes about $14,200 per year more for military compensation
(salary, allowances, and certain tax advantages) paid at the higher
pay grade and annual military compensation of about $64,200 paid to
an executive officer at the rank of major. While the major who will
be assigned as an executive officer may already be in the service,
that person is already doing something else and a replacement major
will have to backfill as the first major transfers to the joint
position. In addition, the Joint Staff plans to incur a one-time
expense of $24,000 for the purchase of new office furniture and
equipment for the J-5 of the Special Operations Command. Our total
estimate is conservative, however, because DOD provided incomplete
information on the cost of the recommended new reserve general and
flag officers.
Our cost estimate assumes that the services would reduce the number
of colonels/Navy captains by the same number as those promoted to
brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half). DOD's February 1997
draft report indicated that the services would decrease their
colonel/Navy captain authorizations to account for the increases to
brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half). However, the May 1997
revised draft pledged to identify officer reductions in accordance
with the provisions of the Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act,\17 rather than automatically reducing the number of
colonels/Navy captains. The act governs the number of officers who
may be serving above the rank of captain (Army, Air Force, and Marine
Corps) and lieutenant (Navy) and is related to the overall size of
the officer corps, not the number of general and flag officers. If
the services replace officers ranked lower than colonel/Navy captain,
the cost of the draft recommended new general and flag officers could
be much higher than we estimated.
The Marine Corps retained 12 colonel positions and deleted 6 first
lieutenant's positions, 5 captain's positions, and 1 major's position
to account for the new general officers it received in 1996. The
Marine Corps will incur additional military compensation costs of
about $713,000 per year with 12 new general officers over what it
would have with the lower ranked officers.\18
Permitting higher frocking limits, rather than increasing title 10
ceilings, would not cost additional money because frocked officers do
not receive the pay of the higher grade until promoted. On the other
hand, greater use of frocking could mean longer waits for promotion
for frocked officers because more could be in line for promotion to
relatively fewer slots.
--------------------
\17 Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980.
\18 If the additional cost of military compensation for the 12 new
Marine Corps general officers is added to that of the draft
recommended 54 new positions in the other services, the total
additional cost to DOD would be about $1.9 million.
THE SERVICES USED WIDELY
ACCEPTED JOB EVALUATION
TECHNIQUES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The services and the Joint Staff used modified versions of two widely
accepted job evaluation techniques. These systems use criteria to
evaluate jobs for ranking and determining compensation. Job
evaluation attempts to bring objectivity into the inherently
subjective process of determining the value of jobs. In our review
of the scholarly literature, we found that subjectivity is commonly a
part of job evaluation techniques. For example, the factors selected
for measurement are based on subjective judgment and the factors
chosen can influence the results. Also, the process of scoring jobs
is subjective, as are management overrides of the study results.
CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY
USED BY THE ARMY, NAVY, AND
MARINE CORPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1
The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps used criteria developed in the 1950s
and included in a 1986 Marine Corps order that characterizes the
attributes of a general officer.\19 The criteria were expanded and
used by Kapos Associates, Incorporated, in its studies of Navy and
Marine Corps general and flag officer positions in the mid-1980s.
These criteria deal with 25 attributes of general and flag officers
that address such aspects of command as the rank of higher, lateral,
and subordinate commands; the magnitude of personnel and resources
controlled; the visibility of the position to the press, public, or
Congress; and any unusual training or experiences required. The
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps each collected comparable information
about both active and reserve component general and flag officer
positions and used comparable methodologies to evaluate the
positions.
For their recent studies, the Navy and the Marine Corps contracted
with Kapos,\20 and the Army used a self-conducted version of the
Kapos methodology. The Kapos methodology largely consists of
identifying the presence of the general or flag officer attributes at
a specified threshold in positions reviewed. Because some positions
share common attributes, the methodology (1) groups positions into a
set of sectors and subsectors (for example, operations, service
headquarters, and combat development); (2) matches attributes
relevant to each subsector and discards those not relevant; (3)
reviews position descriptions for the presence of relevant
attributes; (4) establishes thresholds above which a position is
ranked as a general or flag officer; and (5) subjectively assesses
positions that fall well above or below the threshold.
--------------------
\19 See appendix II for a detailed description of the criteria and
methodology the services used in doing their general and flag officer
studies.
\20 Kapos did the Marine Corps study in 1996 and the Navy study in
1997.
CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY
USED BY THE AIR FORCE AND
JOINT STAFF
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2
The Air Force and Joint Staff adopted criteria developed by the Hay
Group, Incorporated, in the 1950s. These criteria are (1) know-how,
(2) problem-solving, and (3) accountability of the positions
evaluated.\21 To conduct its 1997 study on general and flag officer
requirements, the joint community (1) accepted as still valid the
1994 and 1996 Hay studies of 229 general and flag officer positions
and (2) scored 24 positions it reviewed on its own in 1997, using a
variation from the Hay methodology. The Air Force conducted its own
study of general officer requirements by using an approach based on
the Hay methodology. The Joint Staff and the Air Force each
collected comparable information about both active and reserve
component general and flag officer positions and used comparable
methodologies to evaluate the positions.
--------------------
\21 The Hay Group evaluated active and reserve general and flag
officer requirements DOD-wide in 1988 and 1992, respectively, and
active duty general and flag officers in the joint community in 1994
and 1996.
DIFFERENT METHODOLOGIES LEAD
TO DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF
A GENERAL OR FLAG OFFICER
AND INCOMPATIBLE RESULTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.3
Differing methodologies make cross-service comparisons difficult,
even when comparing similar positions from one service to another.
For example, matching sectors and attributes has the effect of
producing a different definition of a general or flag officer for
each sector. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps methodology produced at
least 12 different definitions of a general or flag officer while the
Army's groupings produced another 11. The Air Force and the Joint
Staff added another definition by using the Hay methodology. As a
result, the service studies together created at least 24 different
definitions of a general or flag officer and may have led to
inconsistent results that are difficult to compare. For example, the
Defense Logistics Agency requested that its comptroller position be
upgraded from a colonel/Navy captain to a brigadier general/rear
admiral (lower half), but the Joint Staff denied that request. In
contrast, the Air Force used four general officers in similar
financial management positions in the Office of the Secretary of the
Air Force and at the Air Mobility Command. In addition, the Navy
scored its Chief of the Naval Exchange Service as a rear admiral
(lower half), but the Army and the Air Force concluded that their
combined Exchange Service required two general officers (one major
general and one brigadier general).
The Air Force believed that even though differing methodologies were
used, the results were consistent. For example, the Air Force stated
that it believes that the Comptroller of the Defense Logistics Agency
(an O-6 position) is unlike the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (an O-8 position) and the Director, Budget Operations (an O-7)
position (two of the four Air Force general officers serving in
financial management positions and cited in our example above).
While all of the positions involved overseeing budgets, the Air Force
suggested the positions are dissimilar because the Defense Logistics
Agency Comptroller oversees a budget of only about $14 billion versus
budgets of about $75 billion (the entire Air Force budget) and about
$36 billion (a component of the Air Force budget), respectively. We
used that example to illustrate the point that differing
methodologies can produce differing results. However, the size of
the budget may not be sufficient criteria to justify a general or
flag officer, or even a military person. For example, the DOD
Comptroller (a civilian) oversees the entire fiscal year 1997 DOD
budget of about $250 billion (more than 3 times the Air Force
budget).
OSD permitted the services to use their own methodologies for three
reasons. First, DOD's draft report stated that the methodology
chosen had to recognize the unique mission and structure of each
service. Second, according to DOD, there is no single definition of
a general and flag officer and no one way to conduct job evaluations.
Therefore,both methodologies were deemed valid. Finally, using
existing methodologies and recently completed studies saved time, an
important consideration because DOD would have had only about 6
months to complete its study, if it had delivered its report on time.
The Hay Group conducted general and flag officer studies for the
joint community in 1994 and 1996 and Kapos did a similar study for
the Marine Corps in 1996. The results were deemed still valid, and
each wanted to use the results in the 1997 study. OSD officials told
us that selecting one of the methodologies and forcing the joint
community and the Marine Corps to use it would have been duplicative
of work already completed. Also, having off-the-shelf methodologies
available for the Army, Navy, and Air Force saved time since they did
not have to develop and test a methodology.
CHANGING NATIONAL SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT SUGGESTS THE NEED
FOR PERIODIC REEVALUATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Since the late 1970s, DOD has completed a reduction in troop
strength, implemented a defense buildup that peaked in fiscal year
1987, and begun an uninterrupted reduction in troop strength that has
continued into fiscal year 1997. During the period, trends in force
structure changes and general and flag officer authorizations have
not always been linked, as shown in table 5.
Table 5
Troop Strength, Title 10 Active Duty
General and Flag Officer Ceilings, and
Troops to General or Flag Officers in
Selected Fiscal Years (Troop strength in
millions)
Title 10 Number of
active duty troops for
general and each general
Troop flag officer or flag
Fiscal year strength ceiling officer
------------------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
1978 2.06 1,119 1,800
1981 2.08 1,073 1,900
1987 2.17 1,073 2,000
1988 2.14 1,073 2,000
1992 1.77 1,030 1,700
1995 1.52 865 1,800
1996 1.49 877 1,700
1997 1.46 877 1,700
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD.
In October 1993, DOD issued its Bottom-Up Review strategy report that
recommended changes to the force structure needed to implement the
strategy. But that report did not recommend any changes to general
and flag officer authorizations, even though the force structure was
to undergo change. Other changes may also be forthcoming. In 1997
and at the start of every new administration thereafter, the QDRs
could recommend further changes to force structure or mission that
affect the need for general and flag officers.
SOME POSITIONS COULD BE
CANDIDATES FOR MILITARY TO
CIVILIAN CONVERSION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
The services did not fully evaluate the potential for military to
civilian conversions. For example, the Air Force explained that it
asked Air Force field commanders whether any existing general officer
positions could be converted (as did the other services) and all the
Air Force respondents said "no." However, just asking field
commanders whether positions can be converted does not constitute
full consideration of the potential for conversion. DOD has issued
Directive 1100.4, which specifies policies for annual manpower
programs including determining military essential positions by
specifying the characteristics of such positions. None of the
services' methodologies considered the contents of that directive as
part of their studies of general and flag officer requirements.
The need for additional general and flag officers could be reduced by
converting to civilian status general and flag officer positions that
are not military essential. For example, the Navy uses an admiral to
command the Naval Exchange Service, while DOD uses a civilian to
manage the Defense Commissary Agency. Also, the Army uses a
brigadier general as its Director of the Center for Military History,
while the other three services use civilians in similar positions.
In addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Finance and
Accounting Service together use eight general and flag officers
ranked as high as major general or rear admiral (upper half) in
various financial management positions that are also candidates for
conversion based on our criteria.\22 Other general or flag officer
positions in the services and the joint community may also be
candidates for conversion. On the other hand, the Army has
identified three acquisition general officer positions and one
infrastructure manager position for conversion to civilian status.
If some positions can be converted, the services would need fewer new
general and flag officer positions.
--------------------
\22 Our criteria were developed based on DOD's directive for an
earlier report, DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support
Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money
(GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).
CONCLUSION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
DOD's draft recommendation for more general and flag officers does
not explain how many more are needed for active duty. Conflicting
recommendations and unexplained adjustments of the study results
leave unclear what DOD's requirements are for general and flag
officers. On the other hand, job evaluation is essentially a
subjective process and there is room for military judgment. The
services' use of job evaluation methodologies is an attempt to bring
some objectivity to an otherwise subjective process. However, DOD
and the services did not document the reasons for subjective
decisions and draft recommendations flowing from those decisions. In
addition, double counts of some positions raise questions about the
draft recommendations. Also, DOD did not fully consider military to
civilian conversions as a means to free up some general and flag
officers from nonmilitary essential positions and make them available
to fill unmet needs. If positions can be converted, the number of
new authorizations needed would be reduced.
RECOMMENDATIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense modify the draft report to
include
an explanation of the criteria used by the service secretaries to
modify the results of the services' studies and a statement
about whether the numbers represent the actual requirements for
general and flag officers,
an adjustment to the consolidated draft recommendations to
eliminate double-counting,
an evaluation of the potential to convert nonmilitary essential
general and flag officer positions to civilian status, and
a mechanism to reduce the number of colonel's/Navy captain's
positions by the number of general and flag officers added.
MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11
Congress may wish to require DOD to revalidate its general and flag
officer requirements as part of the periodic QDRs.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that it would
take our recommendations under advisement, continue to evaluate its
organizational structure and staffing patterns as a result of the
QDR, and defer finalizing its general and flag officer report at this
time. We agree that it is prudent to wait until after QDR-inspired
organizational or staffing changes are fully considered or
implemented before finalizing general and flag officer
recommendations. DOD's response is printed in its entirety in
appendix IV. DOD also provided some technical comments and we have
incorporated them into the text where appropriate.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :13
We reviewed DOD's 1997 draft report on general or flag officer
requirements; service and Joint Staff studies supporting the draft
report; prior studies of general or flag officer requirements
conducted by Kapos Associates, Incorporated, and the Hay Group,
Incorporated; and other documents supporting some of these studies.
In addition, we interviewed officials and obtained documents from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Officer/Enlisted Personnel
Management), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs),
the General Officer Matters Office or its equivalent in the four
services and the Joint Staff, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and
the National Guard Bureau.
To enhance our understanding of the two methodologies employed by the
services and the Joint Staff, we met with officials of the Hay Group,
Incorporated, and Kapos Associates, Incorporated, and obtained
documents that explained their respective approaches. We also held
discussions with an official of the Rand Corporation. We extensively
searched scholarly literature to understand the basic approaches to
job evaluation that have traditionally been used in the United States
and to identify any analyses that had been conducted on the specific
methodologies employed by either the Hay Group, Incorporated, or
Kapos Associates, Incorporated.
To determine the estimated cost associated with adding new active
duty general and flag officers (who qualify for higher pay) to the
number on duty, we used the estimated cost difference in military
compensation between a colonel/Navy captain and brigadier
general/rear admiral (lower half) provided by the service (for those
services that provided this information) or we estimated the annual
basic pay, allowances, and the tax advantage accruing by virtue of
the nontaxability of the allowances for military personnel using
military compensation data provided by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Directorate of Compensation). We then subtracted the annual
compensation paid to a colonel/Navy captain to determine the
incremental increase in salary for the new general and flag officers.
Next, we asked each of the service and Joint Staff General Officer
Matters Offices (or equivalent) to estimate the cost of any personnel
assistance provided to new general or flag officers and any
additional one-time costs (such as the purchase of new china). We
could only obtain incomplete information for the new reserve general
or flag officers. We added together all available cost estimates to
obtain an estimated total cost.
Due to the mandated short time frame between the date that DOD was to
have issued its report (Mar. 23, 1997) and the date that we were
required to issue our report (30 days after DOD issued its report),
DOD invited us to attend meetings of its Executive and Steering
Committees.\23 We accepted that invitation with the understanding
that we were acting as observers only--not as participants. When
requested, we did provide DOD and service officials with our
preliminary observations to the Executive, Steering, and Working
Committees and the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Finally, at the
invitation of a Rand Corporation official, we attended a meeting to
explain the approaches that we would take in analyzing the
methodology DOD and the services employed in their studies.
We conducted our work from October 1996 to June 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\23 DOD plans to issue its final general and flag officer report
after considering the impact of QDR recommendations on general and
flag officer requirements. We also plan to issue a final report that
evaluates DOD's final report in accordance with the legislation that
requires these two reports.
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :13.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine
Corps; the Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board; the Rand
Corporation; the Hay Group, Incorporated; and Kapos Associates,
Incorporated. We will make copies available to others upon request.
The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. If
you have any questions about this report, please contact me on (202)
512-5140.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations and
Capabilities Issues
DOD'S DRAFT RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO
THE GRADE MIX OF GENERAL AND FLAG
OFFICERS
=========================================================== Appendix I
The mandate that required the Department of Defense (DOD) to study
general and flag officer requirements also required that the study
address any perceived need to change the grade distribution of
general and flag officers. Because the services do not believe the
current authorized grade mix permits them to assign general and flag
officers with high enough grades to certain positions, DOD has
drafted recommended changes to the title 10 active duty grade mix by
replacing the current formula with set numbers of general and flag
officers at each rank. Table I.1 displays the current general and
flag officer grade distribution, by service.
Table I.1
Current Grade Distribution of General
and Flag Officers, Including the
Chairman's 12
Service Authorized O-7 O-8 O-9 O-10
-------------------------- ---------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Army 307 154 106 35 12
Navy 220 110 77 25 8
Air Force 282 141 99 31 11
Marine Corps 80 40 28 10 2
======================================================================
Total 889 445 310 101 33
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: This table includes the current title 10 ceiling of 877 plus
the Chairman's 12. It excludes 1 exemption currently authorized for
an admiral (O-10) who serves as the Superintendent of the Naval
Academy, meaning the O-10 total was actually 34 and the O-9 total was
actually 100, at the time of our review. The exemption will expire
when the current incumbent leaves the service, at which time the
position will revert to an O-9 position.
Source: Our analysis based on data provided by each of the services.
DOD's draft would create an authorization of 127 O-9s overall (with
28 in the joint community) and 34 O-10s overall (with 13 in the joint
community), although all would come from the services. However,
because most joint community general and flag officer positions are
nominative,\1 and it is unknown how many positions would go to any
one service at any given time, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would distribute the 28 O-9 and 13 O-10 authorizations to the
services, thus permitting them to exceed O-9 and O-10 grade ceilings
at the time their nominations are accepted for a given position. As
a result, at any given time, a service may have more O-9s and O-10s
serving on active duty than the limits specified in title 10 for that
service. To avoid exceeding the title 10 ceiling of 943 for general
and flag officers, a service that exceeds its O-9 or O-10 ceiling
using the joint community authorizations would decrease its O-7
and/or O-8 numbers by a commensurate amount. Table I.2 displays the
grade mix that would be authorized if DOD draft recommendations were
approved.
Table I.2
Grade Distribution of General and Flag
Officers If DOD's Draft Recommendations
Are Adopted
Authoriz
Service ed O-7 O-8 O-9 O-10
---------------------------- -------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Army 326 172 114 34 6
Navy 240 127 84 23 6
Air Force 297 155 103 32 7
Marine Corps 80 41 27 10 2
Joint Staff NA\a NA\a NA\a 28\b 13\b
======================================================================
Total 943\c 495\d 328\d 127 34
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable.
\b DOD's draft did not recommend any authorizations in title 10 for
joint community general or flag officers. The draft did recommend
that 28 O-9s and 13 O-10s be authorized in title 10 above the grade
ceilings for the services to use in nominating to the joint community
at those grades.
\c The 75 frocked O-7s, who would be available if the draft
recommendations are put forward and accepted, are not represented in
the table because they are not counted against the title 10 grade
ceilings for general and flag officers.
\d The totals for O-7 and O-8 would be reduced by a combined total of
41 to account for the 28 O-9 and 13 O-10 authorizations that the
joint community would distribute to the services.
Source: Our analysis based on data provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD).
DOD's draft report also identified the positions that would be filled
with generals/admirals or lieutenant generals/vice admirals if its
draft recommendations were adopted. Among the positions that would
be upgraded to lieutenant general/vice admiral is the chief of the
service reserve in each service and chief of the National Guard in
the Army and the Air Force. Title 10 does not specify the reserve
component grade mix, and DOD's draft did not recommend any grade mix
changes to the law.
--------------------
\1 About 66 percent of joint community general and flag officer
positions are "nominative," that is, as a vacancy is projected, an
announcement is issued and the services may nominate an officer to
fill the position. Of the remaining 34 percent of positions, some
are rotated among the services, some are reserved for one service,
and some are reserved for one to three of the services.
THE METHODOLOGIES USED ON THE
STUDIES OF GENERAL AND FLAG
OFFICER REQUIREMENTS
========================================================== Appendix II
The services and the Joint Staff used variations of one or the other
of two job evaluation methodologies that had been used in past
studies of general and flag officer requirements. In this appendix,
we describe the two methodologies.
THE HAY GROUP, INCORPORATED,
METHODOLOGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
The Hay Group uses a proprietary job evaluation methodology conceived
in the 1950s. An organization using this methodology evaluates the
three factors deemed by its developers to be most significant in
distinguishing jobs. The factors are "know-how," "problem-solving,"
and "accountability." The problem-solving factor includes two
subfactors. The know-how and accountability factors include three
subfactors. The company believes that an evaluation of these factors
and subfactors permits an organization's jobs to be ranked based on
difficulty of the position and importance to organizational goals.
According to company literature, the methodology is most commonly
used for studies of salary practices in organizations.
APPLICATION OF THE
METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.1
The Hay methodology is applied in a multistep process. A separate
matrix for each of the three factors is produced with semantic
descriptions of levels of difficulty for each of the subfactors.
Semantic descriptions are intended to correspond to degrees of
difficulty of the subfactors and are tied to higher scores as the
degree of difficulty increases.
KNOW-HOW
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.2
The three subfactors under know-how are "depth and breadth of
specialized knowledge," "managerial know-how," and "human relations
skills." Depth of knowledge has eight levels of difficulty, which
range from "limited" to "specialized mastery" along one axis of the
matrix. Managerial know-how has five levels of difficulty, which
range from "task" to "total management of the company." The human
relations skills subfactor has three levels of difficulty, which
range from "basic" to "critical."
PROBLEM-SOLVING
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.3
The two subfactors under problem-solving are "thinking environment"
and "thinking challenge." Thinking environment has seven levels of
difficulty, which range from "strict routine" to "generally defined,"
and thinking challenge has five degrees of difficulty, which range
from "repetitive" to "uncharted."
ACCOUNTABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.4
The three subfactors under accountability are "freedom to act," "job
impact on end results," and "magnitude." Freedom to act has nine
degrees of difficulty, which range from "limited" to "strategic
guidance;" job impact has four degrees of difficulty, which range
from "ancillary" to "primary;" and magnitude has five degrees of
difficulty, which range from "nonquantifiable" to "medium-large."
Each degree of difficulty has a definition to help interpret the
factors and subfactors. The matrices provide increasing scores for
increasing degrees of difficulty, and the intersection of rows and
columns of the semantic descriptions of the two subfactors becomes
the score for that particular factor. Each position evaluated
receives one score for each of the three factors.
Next, the organization (whose positions are to be evaluated) prepares
position descriptions for a test sample of jobs to be reviewed.
Then, an evaluation committee is selected from the organization whose
positions are to be reviewed. The committee is generally made up of
officials ranked higher than the positions evaluated. The committee
receives training in applying the methodology and then scores the
sample positions. When the Hay Group is executing the methodology, a
Hay consultant leads the committee. The committee members
individually score the positions on each of the three factors and add
them together to produce a total score. To reach a consensus score
for each position, the committee discusses any variations in the
scores. The results of the sample scoring are reviewed by higher
management and Hay consultants for acceptability. Once
organizational management is satisfied with the results of the
sample, the committee evaluates all other positions scheduled for
analysis using the same process. Finally, the positions are ranked
from highest to lowest based on the consensus score for each
position.
Hay Group officials told us that natural cut points between ranks or
grades become apparent based on the scores. DOD can then make a
distinction between colonels/Navy captains and brigadier
generals/rear admirals (lower half) as well as other ranks in the
military.
KAPOS ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED,
METHODOLOGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Kapos Associates, Incorporated, uses a multistep process to evaluate
jobs. The methodology includes up to 25 attributes as criteria, and
each position is evaluated for the presence or absence of these
attributes, at a specified threshold. Our description that follows
used the 1996 study of Marine Corps general officers as an example to
make it easier to understand.
APPLICATION OF THE
METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.1
First, the study team selected all existing service-specific general
officer positions for analysis, regardless of the current incumbent's
rank or whether the position was even filled at the time. The study
team also selected a large enough sample of colonel positions for
analysis to establish the threshold at which a position would be
considered a general officer position. Next, the service was divided
into five sectors that characterize the major types of organizations
within the Marine Corps. The sectors consisted of (1) operations,
(2) combat development, (3) material, (4) service headquarters, and
(5) out of service. Within the Marine Corps, the five sectors were
further subdivided into 15 subsectors that represent groupings of
positions with similar functions and responsibilities. The
subsectors follow.
OPERATIONS SECTOR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.1
Operational component commands
Operational combatant commands
Operational readiness commands
Operational training commands
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT SECTOR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.2
Headquarters
Training installations
MATERIAL SECTOR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.3
Systems command
Logistics bases\1
Bases and stations\2
--------------------
\1 Logistics bases were defined as those that provide logistical
support to the operating forces, including depot and prepositioned
war reserves support.
\2 Bases and stations were defined as large, complex installations
that support operating forces, excluding those that provide depot and
prepositioned war reserve support.
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS
SECTOR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.4
Office of the Secretary of the Navy\3
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Headquarters of the Marine Corps
--------------------
\3 Kapos includes Marine Corps general officers in the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy in both service headquarters and out-of-service
sectors.
OUT-OF-SERVICE SECTOR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.5
Office of the Secretary of Defense and departmental offices
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
Joint commands\4
Combined commands\5
The first four sectors were evaluated using this methodology. The
out-of-service sector analysis consisted largely of (1) accepting the
need for a general officer, (2) estimating the percentage of time
that the Marine Corps would fill particular positions, and (3)
deriving the number of general officers needed based on the amount of
time that the Marine Corps would be estimated to fill positions.
For criteria, Kapos reviewed 16 attributes of a general officer
developed in the 1950s and later included in a 1986 Marine Corps
order. Kapos officials told us that the original set of 16
attributes had gaps and did not fully address all aspects of military
leadership. They expanded the list to 25 items to provide clearer
distinctions and to highlight aspects that could be readily
quantified or categorized for analysis but subsequently used only 21
items in the study.\6 The attributes are divided into four groups.
--------------------
\4 Joint commands are those with representation by two or more U.S.
services (such as the Atlantic Command).
\5 Combined commands are those made up of U.S. and allied forces
(such as the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command).
\6 Kapos dropped (1) isolation of command or remoteness from direct
supervision, (2) number of personnel in the position's immediate
staff, (3) geographic extent of command, and (4) operating budget of
immediate staff because they were deemed nondiscriminating between
ranks.
NATURE OF POSITION
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.6
Level or echelon of the military establishment at which duty is
performed
Rank of the official to whom the position reports
Rank of the majority of lateral counterparts
Span of control (rank, number, and diversity of direct
subordinates)
Special authority that goes with the position by legislation or
regulation
Independent decision-making authority
MAGNITUDE OF
RESPONSIBILITIES
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.7
Number of personnel and commands under the position
Operating budget of command, including subordinate commands
Other money managed, such as military construction funds
Other product throughput
Value of equipment controlled
Value of real estate in the form of land
Value of facilities such as buildings and runways
Value of inventories controlled
SIGNIFICANCE OF DUTIES
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.8
Duties in the international arena entailing independent dealings
with foreign audiences
Duties at the seat of government having an impact on national
defense
Duties involving significant exposure to the public and media
Duties entailing representation before Congress
Duties entailing direct support to the operating forces
SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.9
Unusual breadth of experience required
Special depth of skill or training in other than the primary combat
specialty
Kapos convened four panels of Marine Corps officers to match
attributes that defined a general officer in each subsector and
discarded those attributes that did not. The selected attributes
varied from one subsector to another based on whether the attributes
were deemed applicable to general officer positions within the
subsector and discriminated between colonels' and brigadier generals'
positions. This produced a number of different definitions of a
general officer.
Next, researchers collected data demonstrating the extent to which
the selected attributes were present in each position reviewed. The
information became a position description for each position.
Researchers used statistical methods to determine the threshold for
each attribute above which a position was deemed "general
officer-worthy." For example, within the combat development sector
and headquarters subsector, Kapos applied seven attributes. Among
the seven was the attribute "equipment controlled," and Kapos
determined the dollar-value threshold at which a position in that
subsector would be deemed general officer-worthy. Similarly, Kapos
developed thresholds for each of the other six attributes in the
subsector. Taken together, the set of threshold values became known
as the general officer profile. The profile establishes the number
of attributes that must be present at the threshold level for
positions in the subsector to be deemed general officer-worthy. For
example, in the combat development sector and headquarters subsector,
Kapos concluded that positions required at least six of the possible
seven attributes to be deemed general officer-worthy. Next,
researchers reviewed nine positions within the subsector to determine
which had responsibilities at the general officer thresholds for each
of the seven attributes. Kapos found (1) three positions had six or
seven attributes at the general officer threshold, (2) one colonel's
position had five attributes at the threshold and was considered
potentially general officer-worthy, and (3) five colonels' positions
had one to three attributes at the general officer threshold and were
deemed properly ranked. Similar analyses were conducted of each
position in each subsector using the subsector's unique set of
attributes and general officer threshold.
Some existing general officer positions may have some attributes that
fall below the position profile threshold, known as "outliers." Some
colonel positions may be at the threshold, known as "upspikers."
These positions were recommended for further evaluation by the Marine
Corps to determine whether the positions should be changed to a
higher or lower rank or maintained at their present rank.
The service could overrule the study's conclusion about a given
position. For example, the President of Marine Corps University had
only two attributes at the threshold level in a subsector that
required at least six to be considered general officer-worthy.
However, the Marine Corps decided to maintain the position as a
brigadier general position, even though the study ranked it well
within the colonel range.\7
--------------------
\7 At the time of the study, the Marine Corps had assigned a major
general to the position, even though the position specified only
brigadier general.
JOINT COMMUNITY GENERAL AND FLAG
OFFICER POSITIONS
========================================================= Appendix III
ACTIVE COMPONENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
In 1996, the joint community had 229 active component general and
flag officers. In 1997, the joint community recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that the number be increased by 15 more, to 244.
The existing and recommended 244 active component joint community
positions are listed below.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.1
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY
OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY), WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.2
Director, Special Programs
Director, Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
Director, Joint Advanced Strike Technology
Deputy Director, Joint Advanced Strike Technology
DOD Space Architect
OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY
OF DEFENSE (POLICY),
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.3
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), Chief of Staff
Director, Asia and Pacific Affairs
Director, Inter-American Region
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy and Missions
OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY
OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND
READINESS), WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.4
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Services Operations and
Readiness)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness, Training, and
Mobilization)
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.1
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOINT STAFF, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.2
Director
Vice Director
J-1 MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL
DIRECTORATE, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.3
Director
J-2 INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATE, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.4
Director
Vice Director
J-3 DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.5
Director
Vice Director
Deputy Director, Current Operations
Deputy Director, Current Readiness
Deputy Director, Operations, National Systems Support
Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center
Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center
Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center
Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center
Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center
Deputy Director, Combatting Terrorism (recommended)
J-4 LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.6
Director
Vice Director
Deputy Director, Medical Readiness
J-5 STRATEGIC PLANS AND
POLICY DIRECTORATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.7
Director
Vice Director
Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy
Deputy Director, International Negotiations
Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
J-6 COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
COMPUTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.8
Director
Vice Director
J-7 OPERATIONAL PLANS AND
INTEROPERABILITY
DIRECTORATE, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.9
Director
Vice Director
J-8 FORCE STRUCTURE RESOURCE
AND ASSESSMENT DIRECTORATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.10
Director
Vice Director
Deputy Director, Force Structure and Resources
Deputy Director, Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments
Director, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
(recommended)
Deputy Director, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
(recommended)
INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.11
Chairman
DEFENSE AGENCIES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.1
Director
Deputy for Acquisition/Theater Missile Defense
Assistant Deputy for Theater Missile Defense Programs
Director, National Missile Defense
DEFENSE FINANCE AND
ACCOUNTING SERVICE,
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.2
Deputy Director for Finance
DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
AGENCY, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.3
Director
Vice Director
Commander, Western Hemisphere
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Engineering and Interoperability
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.4
Director
Director, National Military Intelligence Collection Center
Defense Attache, Russia
Defense Attache, China
Defense Attache, Pakistan (recommended)
Defense Attache, India (recommended)
Defense Attache, Brazil (recommended)
Defense Attache, Israel (recommended)
Defense Attache, France (recommended)
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY,
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.5
Director
Principal Deputy Director
Deputy Director for Materiel Management
Executive Director for Distribution
Executive Director for Supply Management
Deputy Director for Acquisition Management
Commander, Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio
Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center
Commander, Defense Industrial Supply Center
Commander, Defense Personnel Support Center
DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS
AGENCY, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.6
Director
Director for Operations
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE
AGENCY, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.7
Director
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING
AGENCY, CHANTILLY, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.8
Director
Director, Customer Support Office
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,
FORT GEORGE MEADE, MARYLAND
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.9
Director
Deputy Director for Plans, Policy, and Programs
Assistant Deputy Director for Operations
Chief, Operations and Targeting Group
ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY,
CHANTILLY, VIRGINIA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.10
Director
UNIFIED COMMANDS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5
ATLANTIC COMMAND, NORFOLK,
VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.1
Commander in Chief (CINC)
Deputy CINC
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3
Director for Logistics J-4
Director for Plans, Policy, and Joint Exercises J-5
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
J-6 (recommended)
Director J-7
Commander, Special Operations Command
Commander, U.S. Defense Forces-Iceland
Director, Joint Interagency Task Force-East
Commander, Joint Task Force-6
CENTRAL COMMAND, MACDILL AIR
FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.2
CINC
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3
Deputy Director for Operations J-3
Director for Logistics J-4/J-7
Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Deputy Director for Plans, Policy, and Programs J-5 (recommended)
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
J-6
Commander, Forward Headquarters Element/Inspector General
Commander, U.S. Military Training Mission (Saudi Arabia)
Chief, Office of Military Cooperation (Egypt)
Commander, Middle East Force (Bahrain)
Commander, Special Operations Command
Chief, Office of Military Cooperation (Kuwait)
Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (Saudi Arabia)
Joint Rear Area Coordinator (recommended)
EUROPEAN COMMAND,
STUTTGART-VAIHINGEN, GERMANY
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.3
CINC
Deputy CINC
Chief of Staff
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3
Deputy Director for Operations J-3
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance J-4/J-7
Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Deputy Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
J-6
Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation (Turkey)
Commander, Special Operations Command-Europe
Commanding General, Combined Task Force "Northern Watch" (Turkey)
PACIFIC COMMAND, HONOLULU,
HAWAII
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.4
CINC
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff/Inspector General
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3
Deputy Director for Operations J-3
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance J-4
Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Deputy Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
J-6
Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
Pacific Command Representative-Guam
Commander, United States Forces-Japan/Commander, 5th Air Force
(Japan)
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Forces-Japan (Japan)
Commander, Special Operations Forces-Pacific
Commander, Alaskan Command/Headquarters Alaskan Air Command (Alaska)
SOUTHERN COMMAND, QUARRY
HEIGHTS, PANAMA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.5
CINC
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3
Director for Logistics J-4 (recommended)
Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Director for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence Systems J-6 (recommended)
Commander, Special Operations Command-South
SPACE COMMAND, PETERSON AIR
FORCE BASE, COLORADO
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.6
CINC
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3
Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Director for Command and Control Systems J-6
Commander, Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (Colorado Springs,
Colorado)
Deputy Commander, Canadian North American Air Defense (North Bay,
Ontario, Canada)
Director for Plans and Policy J-5, North American Air Defense
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE,
FLORIDA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.7
CINC
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff
Director for Operations J-3
Director for Plans, Policy, and Strategic Assessments J-5/J-7
Director for Plans and Policy J-5 (recommended)
Director for Resources J-8
Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command (Fort Bragg,
North Carolina)
Deputy Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command (Fort
Bragg, North Carolina)
STRATEGIC COMMAND, OFFUTT
AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.8
CINC
Deputy CINC
Director for Intelligence J-2
Director for Operations J-3/Director for Logistics J-4
Director, Combat Operations Staff
Director for Plans and Policy J-5
Director, Strategic Target Plans
Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems J-6
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND,
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE,
ILLINOIS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.9
CINC
Deputy CINC
Director for Operations J-3/Director for Logistics J-4
Director for Plans J-5
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
J-6
COMBINED COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6
UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND/UNITED STATES
FORCES-KOREA, SEOUL, KOREA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.1
CINC
Deputy CINC/Commander, 7th Air Force
Chief of Staff/Commander, 8th U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, J-4
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED
POWERS EUROPE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.2
Executive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Logistics
Chief, Policy and Requirements
Chief, Information Systems
ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.3
Deputy Chief of Staff
ACE REACTION FORCES PLANNING
STAFF
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.4
Deputy Director
ALLIED FORCES NORTH EUROPE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.5
Chief of Staff
ALLIED FORCES NORTH WEST
EUROPE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.6
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations
ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.7
Director for Operations
Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe
Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe
ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN
EUROPE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.8
CINC
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans
Deputy Commanding General, Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe
Deputy Chief of Staff for Support
Commander, Strike Forces South
Deputy Commander, Strike Forces South
Commander, Allied Submarines-Mediterranean
Commander, Marine Air Forces-Mediterranean
Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
Chief of Staff, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
Deputy Commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Forces
Deputy Commander, 6th Allied Tactical Air Forces
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION EARLY WARNING
FORCE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.9
Commander
ACE MOBILE FORCES (LAND)
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.10
Commander
ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.11
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff
Commander, Strike Forces Atlantic
Commander, Submarine Bases Atlantic
Commander, Standing Naval Force Atlantic
Deputy CINC, Iberian Atlantic Command
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION MILITARY
COMMITTEE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.12
U.S. Military Representative
Deputy U.S. Military Representative
Deputy Chairman
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES/JOINT
SERVICE COLLEGES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.1
President
Commandant, National War College
Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College
DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
COLLEGE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.2
Commandant
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, LANGLEY, VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.3
Associate Director for Military Support
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
U.S. CONGRESS, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.4
Physician to Congress
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.5
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Applications
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.6
Director, National Security Council Staff (recommended)
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL
WARFARE CENTER
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.7
Director
JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.8
Commander
JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7.9
Program Executive Officer, Cruise Missile/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The Joint Staff scored another 9 positions as general and flag
officer requirements, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
decided not to add those to the 244 positions.
RESERVE COMPONENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:8
The joint community also has 33 reserve component general and flag
officer positions. In 1997, the joint community recommended adding
11 reserve general and flag officer positions to the existing 33.
The 44 existing and recommended positions are listed below.
OSD
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH
AFFAIRS), WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.1
Assistant for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(RESERVE AFFAIRS),
WASHINGTON, D.C.
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2
Military Advisor and Executive Officer, Reserve Forces Policy Board
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix III:10
JOINT STAFF, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:10.1
Mobilization Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff
Assistant to the Director J-4 Logistics (Medical Readiness)
Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Logistics J4
Special Assistant to the Director of Command, Control,
Communications, and Computers (recommended)
Assistant to the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (recommended)
DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
AGENCY, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:10.2
Mobilization Assistant to the Director
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:10.3
Mobilization Assistant to the Director
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY,
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:10.4
Mobilization Assistant to the Director
Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy Director, Acquisition Management
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,
FORT GEORGE MEADE, MARYLAND
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:10.5
Mobilization Assistant to the Chief, Central Security Service
Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy Chief, Central Security Service
UNIFIED COMMANDS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix III:11
ATLANTIC COMMAND, NORFOLK,
VIRGINIA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.1
Chief of Staff
Vice Director of Intelligence
Vice Director of Operations
Vice Director for Logistics
Vice Director for Plans and Policies
Vice Director for Joint Training
EUROPEAN COMMAND,
STUTTGART-VAIHINGEN, GERMANY
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.2
Director of Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs
Crisis Action Team Director
Assistant Political Advisor
Assistant Director of Intelligence J-2
PACIFIC COMMAND, HONOLULU,
HAWAII
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.3
Deputy CINC
Director for Operations (recommended)
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance J-4 (recommended)
Director for Strategic Planning and Policy J-5 (recommended)
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
(recommended)
SOUTHERN COMMAND, QUARRY
HEIGHTS, PANAMA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.4
Deputy CINC for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs
Vice Director for Operations (recommended)
Deputy Director for Logistics (recommended)
SPACE COMMAND, PETERSON AIR
FORCE BASE, COLORADO
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.5
CINC
Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Intelligence
Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Operations
Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Command and Control Systems
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE,
FLORIDA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.6
Deputy CINC for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs
Deputy Director of Operations
STRATEGIC COMMAND, OFFUTT
AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.7
Mobilization Assistant to the CINC
Mobilization Assistant to the CINC
Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Intelligence
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND,
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE,
ILLINOIS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:11.8
Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy CINC
Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Plans and Policy
(recommended)
Deputy Director for Operations and Logistics (recommended)
COMBINED COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix III:12
UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND/UNITED STATES
FORCES-KOREA, SEOUL, KOREA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:12.1
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3 (recommended)
The Joint Staff scored another 6 reserve component positions as
general and flag officer requirements, but the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff decided not to add those to the 44 positions.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================= Appendix III
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix V
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Sharon A. Cekala
William E. Beusse
Brian J. Lepore
William J. Rigazio
Arthur L. James, Jr.
Nancy L. Ragsdale
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Herbert I. Dunn
*** End of document. ***