DOD Training: Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Training Infrastructure
(Letter Report, 03/29/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-93).
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce its
formal training infrastructure, focusing on: (1) the size of the active
forces' formal training infrastructure; and (2) planned, completed, or
ongoing plans to reduce this infrastructure.
GAO found that: (1) the formal military training and education cost per
student increased about $4,200 between fiscal years (FY) 1987 and 1995;
(2) despite a decrease in the training workload, training costs have
increased about $745 million more than normal inflation between FY 1987
and 1995; (3) DOD officials reported that the main reason for the
increase is the use of private-sector and civilian instructors; (4)
planned or ongoing actions to reduce training infrastructure include
reducing the number of locations at which a service teaches a particular
course, increasing interservice training for similar curricula,
increasing the number of private-sector instructors, courses, and
training facilities, and closing or realigning bases that provide formal
training; (5) DOD lacks an overall plan to guide and measure training
infrastructure reduction (6) the number of locations that provide
training decreased from 265 to 172 between FY 1987 and 1995; (7) DOD
estimated that increases in interservice training have resulted in about
$300 million in savings and that future course consolidations and
collocations would result in one-time savings of about $4.4 million and
annual recurring savings of about $7.28 million; and (8) despite
expected base closures and mission realignments, DOD expects that excess
training infrastructure will continue to exist.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-96-93
TITLE: DOD Training: Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Training
Infrastructure
DATE: 03/29/96
SUBJECT: Defense cost control
Military downsizing
Privatization
Education or training costs
Military training
Defense contracts
Base closures
Military facilities
Defense economic analysis
IDENTIFIER: Interservice Training Review Organization Military Training
Structure Review
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
March 1996
DOD TRAINING - OPPORTUNITIES EXIST
TO REDUCE THE TRAINING
INFRASTRUCTURE
GAO/NSIAD-96-93
Training Infrastructure
(703109)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure Commission
DMDC - Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD - Department of Defense
ITRO - Interservice Training Review Organization
O&M - operation and maintenance
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-270976
March 29, 1996
Congressional Committees
One source of funds to pay for the Department of Defense's (DOD)
acceleration of its modernization efforts is to reduce
infrastructure. This report summarizes the status of DOD's efforts
to reduce its formal training infrastructure--a small but important
part of the total infrastructure. More specifically, our objectives
were to determine the (1) size of the active forces' formal training
infrastructure and (2) actions planned, completed, or ongoing to
reduce and/or streamline the training infrastructure.
We conducted this review under our basic legislative
responsibilities. We are addressing this report to the committees of
jurisdiction because it identifies problems and calls for corrective
action that the agency has indicated an unwillingness to take. We
are suggesting that Congress may wish to take the necessary action to
ensure that the agency addresses the problems we have identified.
The scope and methodology of our review are shown in appendix I.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
DOD defines its training infrastructure to include billeting, mess
facilities, classrooms, equipment, software packages, and instructors
used to provide, facilitate, or support training of the military
forces. There are essentially three types of training: unit
training, civilian, and formal training and education for military
personnel. Unit training consists of military mission-type training
performed at the unit level under the control of the unit commander.
Civilian personnel training consists of various training courses
offered to civilian personnel to enhance their job functions. This
type of training does not have a formal training structure and,
therefore, does not have a definable training infrastructure. The
third type of training--formal education and training of military
personnel--has a definable training infrastructure and is managed by
the services' training commands. Our review focused on the third
type of training.
DOD has the following six categories of formal training and education
programs for military personnel.
-- Recruit training: includes introductory physical conditioning
and basic military indoctrination and training.
-- One-station unit training: an Army program that combines
recruit and specialized skill training into a single course.
-- Officer acquisition training: includes all types of education
and training leading to a commission in one of the services.
-- Specialized skill training: provides officer and enlisted
personnel with initial job qualification skills or new or higher
levels of skill in their current military specialty or
functional area.
-- Flight training: provides the flying skills needed by pilots,
navigators, and naval flight officers. It does not include
formal advanced flight training, which is provided by the
services' advanced flight training organizations.
-- Professional development education: includes educational
courses conducted at the higher-level service schools or at
civilian institutions to broaden the outlook and knowledge of
senior military personnel or to impart knowledge in advanced
academic disciplines.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The cost of providing formal military training and education to
individuals increased significantly between fiscal years 1987 and
1995. During this period, the training cost per student increased
from $53,194 to $72,546. After considering the effects of inflation,
the cost per student increased about $4,200. This cost differential,
when multiplied by the fiscal year 1995 training workload, shows that
since fiscal year 1987, training costs have increased about $745
million more than normal inflation, even though the training workload
has decreased. Officials told us that the primary reason that
training had become more expensive was the increased use of
government civilian and private-sector instructors and facilities
rather than military instructors.
DOD and the services have completed several actions to reduce the
training infrastructure, and even more actions will be implemented
over the next several years. The actions are intended to (1) reduce
the number of locations where a particular course is taught, (2)
increase interservice training, and (3) increase the use of
private-sector instructors and facilities. However, an overall plan
to guide and measure the progress of reducing the training
infrastructure is lacking. Additionally, actions by the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission to close and realign bases
where training is conducted are also expected to reduce the training
infrastructure.
The lack of a management information system with reliable cost data
within the various training categories makes it difficult for DOD to
(1) evaluate the overall effectiveness of alternate methods of
providing training and (2) assess whether actions taken to reduce
costs are achieving the expected results. The need for reliable data
and a system for evaluating it has become even more critical because
excess training infrastructure identified in the future will be
difficult to eliminate in the absence of a BRAC-like process.
CHANGES IN DOD'S END STRENGTH
AND TRAINING BUDGET
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Analysis of DOD's end strengths, training workloads, and overall
training budgets between fiscal years 1987 and 1995 showed that end
strengths and training workloads have decreased at much greater rates
than the training budget. Between fiscal years 1987 and 1995, the
number of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force active duty
personnel decreased from about 2.2 million to about 1.5 million--a
reduction of about 30 percent.
During the same period, the training workloads for formal training
and education programs decreased from about 248,000 to about
178,000--a reduction of about 28 percent. However, military
personnel funding, which is used to pay military students,
instructors, and training support and management personnel, decreased
by only about 15 percent, and operation and maintenance (O&M)
funding, which is used to pay DOD civilian and contractor instructors
and to operate, maintain, and support training facilities and
equipment, increased about 30 percent.
Figure 1 shows trends in military end strengths, training workloads,
and funding between fiscal years 1987 and 1995. Training workload
and funding information is broken out by the six formal training and
education categories in appendix II.
Figure 1: Trends in Active
Duty Military End Strengths,
Training Workloads, and
Training Funds--Fiscal Years
1987-95
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Defense Manpower Data
Center.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
As shown above, the decreases in military end strengths and training
workloads are fairly consistent over the period. However, the
funding trends--especially the increase in O&M funds--are at variance
with the downward trends for military end strengths and the training
workloads.
On a per student training year basis, the fiscal year 1987 cost per
student is $53,194 and for fiscal year 1995 is $72,546. When the
fiscal year 1987 rate is inflated to fiscal year 1995 dollars, the
fiscal year 1987 per student cost is $68,354, or about $4,192 less
than the actual cost in fiscal year 1995. This cost differential,
when multiplied by the fiscal year 1995 training workload, shows that
since fiscal year 1987, training costs have increased about $745
million more than normal inflation even though the training workload
has decreased.
Officials told us that the increase in O&M training funding was due
primarily to the increased use of contractor personnel to teach the
courses that were previously taught by the military services and paid
for with military personnel appropriations funds. Other reasons
included (1) increased use of private-sector facilities, (2) civilian
personnel pay increases, (3) increased costs of operating training
bases and facilities, and (4) temporary-duty allowances or permanent
change of station costs for students and training personnel.
Officials attributed the smaller reduction in military personnel
funding mainly to increases in military pay and allowances for
students and military personnel supporting formal training and
education activities.
Cost data was not available that would allow us to determine the
extent to which each of the above reasons affected costs. Without
this type of information, it was not possible to determine whether
decisions affecting the current or planned method of providing
training are the correct decisions or whether some alternative means
of providing the same training would be more cost effective.
ACTIONS TO DECREASE THE
TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Actions already implemented or planned for implementation by the
services, DOD, and the BRAC over the next several years are expected
to further reduce and streamline the training infrastructure for
military personnel by
-- reducing the number of locations at which a service teaches a
particular course;
-- increasing interservice training for similar curricula;
-- increasing the number of private sector instructors, courses,
and training facilities; and
-- closing or realigning bases at which formal training is now
provided.
According to DOD officials, many of the actions to reduce and
streamline the training infrastructure are still ongoing and the
effect of these actions will not be known until after fiscal year
1996. Consequently, we could not quantify either the expected
reduced infrastructure or the savings.
Adding to the difficulties of evaluating DOD's planned and ongoing
actions is the lack of a plan to guide and measure progress in terms
of how much reduction is needed, how will the reductions be achieved,
what will they cost, and when will they be accomplished.
CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF
FORMAL TRAINING LOCATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
The number of locations at which training is provided decreased from
265 to 172 from fiscal years 1987 to 1995, as shown in table 1.
Table 1
Training Locations by Category, Fiscal
Years 1987 and 1995
Tr
ai
ni
ng
pr
og
ra
m FY87 FY95 FY87 FY95 FY87 FY95 FY87 FY95 FY87 FY95
-- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Re 7 4 3 1 2 2 1 1 13 8
c
r
u
i
t
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
On 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5
e-
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
t
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
Of 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 9 9
f
i
c
e
r
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
Fl 1 1 7 5 0 0 9 10 17 16
i
g
h
t
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
Sp 30 21 30 28 7 7 9 10 76 66
e
c
i
a
l
i
z
e
d
s
k
i
l
l
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
Pr 6 5 3 3 17 6 118 54 144 68
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The total training locations refer to the number of sites at which
the course is taught, not the number of individual installations or
bases. Thus, recruit training and officer acquisition could be
taught at the same installation or base. In such a case, each course
would be counted separately.
As shown in the table, the number of formal training locations has
decreased rather significantly, with professional education being the
area where the largest decreases occurred. In certain cases, the
reductions were achieved by redefining the courses and consolidating
the training locations. For example, the Marine Corps decreased the
number of its professional education courses from 17 to 6 by
redefining and renaming the courses and reducing the number of
training locations.
INCREASES IN INTERSERVICE
TRAINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
Since 1972, the services have participated in a voluntary process
conducted by the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) to
identify opportunities to consolidate and/or collocate existing
initial skills training. Between 1972 and 1992, ITRO focused
primarily on individual courses rather than all courses in a
functional training area--families of similar types of tasks and
training courses. DOD estimated that ITRO's recommended
consolidations and collocations of training courses have resulted in
approximately $300 million in savings.
In 1993, in response to a Commission on Roles and Mission
recommendation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed
ITRO to conduct a thorough review of all initial and follow-on
technical training to identify additional areas for consolidation
and/or collocation. ITRO's Military Training Structure Review, which
was completed in 1995, identified opportunities to reduce the number
of training locations for
10 functional areas from 35 to 18, involving 101 courses as shown in
table 2.
Table 2
Military Training Structure Review
Course Consolidations and Collocations
Number Afte
of Prior r Projected
courses to revi implementation
Functional area in area review ew year
---------------------------- -------- ------ ---- ----------------
Air crew 10 3 2 1997
Calibration 13 4 1 1996
Civil construction 37 8 6 1996
engineering
Food service 6 4 2 1995
Helicopter maintenance 2 2 1 1994
Law enforcement 21 2 1 1994
Motor vehicle operator 5 3 1 1996
Supply/logistics 2 2 1 1998
Water survival 1 2 1 1996
Welder 4 5 2 1995
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on DOD projections, most of the recommended course
consolidations and collocations will not be implemented until fiscal
year 1996 or later. DOD estimates that full implementation of the
recommendations for the functional areas would result in a one-time
savings of about $2.4 million and annual recurring savings of about
$680,000. According to Marine Corps officials, when all the training
consolidations are completed, about 77 percent of all Marine Corps
formal school training will be conducted at other service locations.
In addition to these reductions in training locations, ITRO projects
additional savings will be achieved based on its recommendations for
the communications functional area. Although the number of training
locations will remain the same, ITRO projects that its proposed
location changes will achieve a one-time savings of approximately $2
million and annual recurring savings of about $6.6 million. Data,
however, was not available to enable us to confirm those projections.
USE OF PRIVATE-SECTOR
INSTRUCTORS AND FACILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
To date, DOD officials noted that the Navy has been the most active
user of private-sector instructors, replacing about 700 of its
military instructors with contractor personnel and exploring
opportunities to further privatize additional courses and instructor
positions. The Navy's goal is to replace an additional 2,000
military instructors with private-sector instructors.
DOD and service officials told us that the services, on a very
limited basis, contract with community colleges and universities to
provide training to their personnel. However, DOD officials said
that they could not quantify the extent to which the services use
private-sector instructors and facilities. Additionally, DOD and
service officials have expressed concerns about contractor-provided
training in a civilian environment, particularly for newly enlisted
personnel. The service officials believe they need to maintain a
military environment for new personnel. The officials said that the
services are more receptive to contractor-provided training for
follow-on training and professional development education because by
the time the military personnel are ready for these advanced courses,
they have been acclimated to the military environment.
The officials also expressed concerns about the lack of flexibility
in using contractor personnel, noting that factors such as
deployments and changes to training requirements frequently require
changes to training schedules. If contractor personnel are providing
the training, changes of this type result in contract adjustments,
which often translate into more money. Service officials pointed
out, however, that contractor-provided training is advantageous when
the required training equipment is expensive, the training course is
offered infrequently, and the number of attendees is relatively
small.
DOD, as part of a recommendation by the 1995 Commission on Roles and
Missions, is looking for additional opportunities to privatize
training functions. To provide technical assistance in this process,
DOD contracted with the Logistics Management Institute. At the time
we completed our review in January 1996, the effort had not been
completed. Consequently, we could not quantify the additional
opportunities for privatization or the savings that such actions
would produce.
BRAC IMPACTS ON DOD TRAINING
INFRASTRUCTURE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4
Since 1987, BRAC has recommended base closures and mission
realignments that, when fully implemented, will reduce the number of
locations where the services provide formal training for military
personnel. As shown in table 3, the Commission has recommended
25 mission realignments and 17 installation closures that impact
where the services provide formal military training.
Table 3
Impacts of the BRAC Commission
Recommendations on the DOD Training
Infrastructure
To To
ta ta
1988 1991 1993 1995 l 1988 1991 1993 1995 l
-------- ------ ------ ------ ------ == ------ ------ ------ ------ ==
Army 9 3 2 1 15 0 3 0 2 5
Air 4 2 1 0 7 2 2 0 1 5
Force
Navy 0 1 1 1 3 0 2 5 0 7
Marine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Corps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the BRAC actions, DOD senior officials recognized that excess
infrastructure would remain even after completion of the 1995 BRAC
round. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on March 1, 1995,
testified before the BRAC Commission that excess capacity would
remain after the 1995 BRAC. He cited the need for future base
closure authority and said that opportunities remain regarding
cross-servicing, particularly in the area of joint-use bases and
training facilities.\1
Our examination of the 1995 BRAC recommendations identified several
Army training related installations with relatively low military
value that were not proposed for closure because of the up-front
closure costs, despite projecting savings in the long term. The
Navy's analysis indicated that its primary pilot and advanced
helicopter training requirements were 19 to 42 percent below peak
historic levels. However, BRAC 1995 did little to change this
situation because only one Navy air training facility was slated for
realignment, none for closure. Further, the services could not agree
on an alternative for consolidating rotary wing training at one
central location. As a result, they were left with capacity for
rotary-wing training that was more than twice the ramp space needed.
According to service training officials, if downsizing continues, it
will be more difficult to eliminate any excess training capacity that
is identified now that the BRAC process is over.
--------------------
\1 The 1995 BRAC was the last round of base closure reviews
authorized under the 1990 legislation that authorized a special
commission to review proposed closures and realignments.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD
Comptroller, as part of the Department's efforts to improve its
finance and accounting systems, to provide for the centralized
accumulation and tracking of information on institutional training
costs. As a minimum, such information should capture and report the
costs in each category in terms of military and civilian instructors,
student stipends, facilities, contractor-provided services, and base
O&M for the training facilities. This information would allow
decisionmakers to evaluate the cost of each alternative when deciding
the best method for providing training in each category.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a long- range
plan to guide and measure the services' efforts to reduce the
training infrastructure. The plan should identify (1) how much the
training infrastructure should be reduced, (2) how the reductions
will be achieved, (3) what it will cost to achieve the reductions,
and (4) when the reductions will be accomplished. We further
recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a plan that
identifies how DOD will deal with excess installations and facilities
that are being funded by the training account after the BRAC process
is completed.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
DOD did not agree with our recommendations. It said that the
recommendation to improve its finance and accounting system to
accumulate and track cost data on institutional training would incur
additional unnecessary costs, be incompatible with existing financial
data systems, and would require rule-of-thumb allocations of
facilities and training resources.
We agree that the accumulation of such cost data may be incompatible
with DOD's existing systems; however, as it goes forward with its
efforts to improve the existing systems, DOD should make adjustments
to accumulate training cost data. Without such data, DOD cannot
determine whether the current method of providing training is the
most cost effective or whether an alternative method would be more
cost effective. DOD also did not agree with our recommendation for
developing a long-range plan that would set out how much the training
infrastructure should be reduced, how the reductions will be
achieved, what it will cost to achieve the reductions, and when the
reductions will be accomplished. DOD officials said that they
already assess the services' plans for accomplishing their training
requirements as part of the annual budget process and Future Years
Defense Program. They said that the report assumes that further
infrastructure reductions can be made and that the report does not
adequately consider the reduction initiatives already accomplished or
in process. The officials said that they were not convinced that
further reductions are possible and were unsure how to go about
setting long-term reduction objectives. The officials also said that
the report does not recognize factors that could increase the need
for training resources even though there has been a reduction in
military end strength and accessions.
DOD is correct that we believe further training infrastructure
reductions are possible. As our report notes, DOD continues to seek
opportunities for reductions and DOD officials have testified that
further reductions are possible. With regard to a possible need for
additional training resources, even with a reduction in end strength
and accessions, our analysis of the Future Years Defense Program
shows that training costs remain fairly constant with a slight
decrease during the program period. We do not agree with DOD's
position regarding establishing long-term infrastructure reduction
objectives. In our opinion, unless DOD establishes objectives that
set forth how much the infrastructure should be reduced, how the
reductions will be accomplished, what it will cost, and when it will
be accomplished, it will not know when it has reached the optimal
infrastructure size. Reviewing and assessing training requirements
on an annual basis as part of the budget process will not accomplish
these objectives.
Regarding our recommendation that a plan be developed that shows how
DOD will deal with excess training installations after the BRAC
process is completed, DOD said that the report provides little data
and no examples to support this recommendation.
DOD is correct that our report does not identify excess installations
or facilities. It was not our intent to single out specific
facilities as being excess to the training needs. The intent of the
recommendation was to develop a process that DOD could use when it
identifies excess training installations and facilities. Throughout
our review, a common concern expressed by training officials
responsible for managing and providing the training was that after
the BRAC process is completed, there would still be excess training
facilities and installations. The officials said that it will become
extremely difficult to dispose of the unneeded facilities in the
absence of a BRAC-like process. The complete text of DOD's comments
are in appendix III.
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Because DOD has indicated that it will not take action to correct the
problems we have identified, and the problems are significant,
Congress may wish to ensure that DOD address the identified problems.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen and
Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and House
Committee on National Security; and other interested congressional
committees. Copies will also be made available to others upon
request.
Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
List of Congressional Committees
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
To determine the size of the Department of Defense (DOD) training
infrastructure in fiscal year 1995 and what changes have occurred to
it since fiscal year 1987, we interviewed and obtained documentation
from personnel in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense and
the training commands of the four services. In addition, we obtained
and analyzed information from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
on military end strengths, student entrants into the six formal
training and education categories, and funding through the operation
and maintenance (O&M) and the military personnel appropriations. To
identify specific changes in the number of locations where formal
training and education were provided, we compared the breakouts of
the training facilities shown in DMDC's Military Manpower Training
Reports for fiscal years 1987 and 1995.
To identify actions taken since fiscal year 1987 to reduce the
training infrastructure, we interviewed DOD and the services'
training command officials and analyzed information on course
offerings, locations, and attendance for fiscal years 1987 and 1995.
We also obtained and analyzed internal studies performed to identify
opportunities to consolidate and collocate training facilities and
courses. Additionally, we held discussions with responsible
officials to determine what future plans and initiatives DOD has to
further the privatization of military training. Along these same
lines, we assessed the impact of the Base Realignment and Closures'
(BRAC) recommendations on the DOD training infrastructure by
comparing the Commission's recommended closures and realignments to
the list of installations where formal training and education were
being provided in fiscal year 1987. We also held discussions with
service officials to identify the specific actions and training
reorganizations taken by the services to comply with BRAC
recommendations.
We performed our review at the
-- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Exercise and Training
Division, Washington, D.C.;
-- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Readiness, Washington, D.C.;
-- Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air
Force Base, Texas;
-- Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort
Monroe, Virginia;
-- Office of the Chief of Naval Education and Training, Naval Air
Station, Pensacola, Florida; and
-- Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Training and Education
Division, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.
We performed our review from July 1995 to February 1996 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
TRAINING WORKLOADS AND FUNDING FOR
FORMAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING
PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEARS 1987 AND
1995
========================================================== Appendix II
(Dollars in millions)
Percen Percen Percen
t t t
Category 1987 1995 change 1987 1995 change 1987 1995 change
-------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Recruit 52,930 33,178 (37.3) $1,505 $1,084 (28.0) $26.4 $20.6 (22.0)
training .6 .4
One- 13,478 8,966 (33.5) 525.5 214.4 (59.2) 28.3 15.5 (45.5)
station
unit
trainin
g
Officer 17,563 16,149 (8) 373.5 418.5 12.1 113.5 155.5 37.0
acquisi
tion
Speciali 147,94 103,23 (30.2) 4,349. 3,446. (20.8) 610.8 753.5 23.4
zed 4 4 8 0
skill\c
trainin
g
Flight 7,613 4,645 (39) 971.4 670.6 (31.0) 653.5 849.2 30.0
training
Professi 8,619 11,647 26 818.5 1,449. 77.1 187.9 223.8 19.1
onal 7
develop
ment\c
Costs not directly allocated to individual training categories
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct 256.7 162.2 (36.8) 560.8 362.0 (35.4)
support
Base 802.0 731.0 (8.9) 1,337. 2,230. 66.8
training 4 5
support
Training 76.4 76.1 (0.4) 80.1 59.0 (26.3)
managem
ent
support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes the pay of students as well as military instructors.
\b Includes the pay of instructors who are civilian service
employees.
\c For specialized skill and professional development training, the
student workload figures are somewhat understated in 1987 because
they do not include all Air Force programs now reported in 1995. In
addition, some reported data has been realigned to different
reporting categories since 1987; that is, the Air Training Command
Noncommissioned Officer Academy student production was reported as
specialized skill training in 1987 but is now reported under
professional development.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Sharon A. Cekala
Robert J. Lane
Robert L. Self
W. Bennett Quade
Irene A. Robertson
*** End of document. ***