Air Force Maintenance: Two Level Maintenance Program Assessment (Letter
Report, 03/27/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-86).

GAO reviewed the Air Force's implementation of the Two Level Maintenance
(TLM) program, which is its plan to facilitate downsizing by
transferring some repairs from many individual bases to centralized
depots, focusing on whether the program: (1) has achieved the expected
results; (2) has reduced repair turnaround time; and (3) will be an
effective maintenance program for supporting deployed forces.

GAO found that: (1) the Air Force's original prediction that TLM would
reduce the number of personnel by 5,888 and save $385 million was overly
optimistic; (2) the Air Force plans to increase the number of avionics
items in TLM from 1,171 to 1,282 and may add 2 aircraft engines to TLM
during fiscal year 1996; (3) the Air Force failed to include all program
costs associated with TLM in its estimations; (4) TLM has meet its
turnaround time goals for avionics repair; (5) despite express shipments
from bases to depots and rushed repair service at depots, repair
turnaround times for engines have generally not been met; and (6) during
an overseas deployment, the Air Force may have difficulty sustaining and
supporting its forces because TLM will depend on airlift to transport
spare parts and engines between the front and the depots.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-86
     TITLE:  Air Force Maintenance: Two Level Maintenance Program 
             Assessment
      DATE:  03/27/96
   SUBJECT:  Military cost control
             Defense contingency planning
             Spare parts
             Military airlift operations
             Military aircraft
             Military downsizing
             Combat readiness
             Avionics
             Aircraft engines
             Aircraft maintenance
IDENTIFIER:  Air Force Two Level Maintenance Concept
             F-15 Aircraft
             F-16 Aircraft
             B-52 Aircraft
             C-141 Aircraft
             B-1B Mobility Readiness Spares Package
             TF30-111 Engine
             TF-39 Engine
             B-52G Aircraft
             Starlifter Aircraft
             Eagle Aircraft
             Falcon Aircraft
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Secretary of Defense

March 1996

AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE - TWO LEVEL
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

GAO/NSIAD-96-86

Two Level Maintenance

(703102)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  JEIM+ - jet engine intermediate maintenance plus
  MRSP - mobility readiness spares packages
Cover
================================================================ COVER



Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-270867

March 27, 1996

The Honorable William J.  Perry
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr.  Secretary: 

We reviewed the Air Force's implementation of the Two Level
Maintenance (TLM) program.  Our objectives were to determine whether
the program (1) was achieving the anticipated benefits, (2) has
resulted in reduced repair turn around time,\1 and (3) will be an
effective maintenance program for supporting deployed forces. 


--------------------
\1 Repair turn around time is measured from the time an item is
removed from the aircraft until it is repaired and ready for reissue. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The TLM program objectives were to save money by reducing maintenance
staffing, equipment, and base level support without sacrificing force
readiness.  Under TLM, the number of maintenance levels was reduced
from three (organizational, intermediate, and depot) to two
(organizational and depot).\2 Maintenance previously performed at the
intermediate level would be performed at the depot level which, in
turn, would allow the Air Force to significantly reduce the number of
maintenance personnel and equipment at the base level.  However, it
also required that items sent to the depots be repaired and ready for
issue in a timely manner to compensate for the longer repair pipeline
between the customer and the depot. 

In implementing TLM, the Air Force decided that it would not increase
inventories.  Inherent in this decision was the realization that it
would have to

  -- develop a responsive transportation system to quickly move items
     to and from the point of repair,

  -- make necessary changes at the depots to absorb intermediate
     maintenance work that was previously performed at the base
     level,

  -- achieve a balance between spare parts and mission capability
     rates (i.e., determine the acceptable level of risk), and

  -- expand maintenance capabilities at the unit level to perform
     fault diagnostics to avoid sending items to the depot repair
     facility for relatively minor repairs. 

The Air Force tested the program from July 1991 through September 30,
1993.  The tests--Coronet Deuce, Coral Star, and Coral
Thrust--involved F-16 avionics items as well as several engines such
as the F100-220, TF33-103, and TF33-7A.\3

Based on the test results, the Air Force decided to implement TLM Air
Force-wide for selected avionics and engines.  Implementation began
in fiscal year 1994 and is expected to be fully implemented by fiscal
year 1997. 


--------------------
\2 Organizational and intermediate level maintenance is performed at
the base level.  Organizational maintenance is generally preventive
maintenance with some capability to remove and replace defective
items.  Intermediate maintenance, also done at the base level,
involves fault isolation, repair and replacement of defective items,
and repair of electronic circuits.  Depot maintenance involves more
extensive repairs and overhaul of major components and end items. 

\3 These engines are used on the F-15, F-16, B-52, and C-141
aircraft, respectively. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The TLM program is not achieving the full extent of the intended
benefits.  Between the time of the Air Force's first cost and savings
analysis in 1992 and the second analysis in 1993, the estimated costs
to implement TLM had increased and the expected net savings had
decreased--from $385 million to $258 million.  In addition, all
program costs have not been included in the cost/savings analyses. 

For avionics items, the repair turn around time under TLM generally
met the Air Force's established repair turn around standard.  For
engines, however, the repair turn around times are exceeding the
standard by as many as 87 days.  For example, the repair turn around
time standard for the TF30-111 engine, used on the F-111 aircraft, is
41 days, but as of August 1995, its average repair turn around time
was 128 days. 

The use of TLM to support deployed forces in times of conflict will
add to the airlift burden.  Because the deployed forces will not have
in-country intermediate maintenance capability, the forces will be
dependent on airlift for their spare and repair parts.  However,
airlift priorities are controlled by the theater commander not the
Air Force.  As a result, a theater commander could decide that the
need for combat power in the early stages of the conflict has a
higher priority than return of unserviceable items to depot repair
facilities and movement of items from the depots to the theater of
operation.  The need for early sustainment airlift to support TLM is
an issue that has not been fully resolved and is one that could
affect sustainment of the deployed forces. 


   STATUS OF THE PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The Air Force believed that between fiscal years 1994 and 1999, TLM
would result in reducing the number of authorized maintenance
personnel positions in the force structure by 5,888 (5,770 military
and 118 civilians) and saving about $385 million.  The personnel
reductions and savings were predicated on the assumption that 2,023
TLM-designated avionics items and 13 aircraft engines would be
TLM-designated and sent to the depots for repair.  These initial
estimates proved to be overly optimistic.  According to Air Force
documents, as of September 1995, the number of TLM avionics items had
been reduced to 1,171.  Additionally, of all the TLM avionics items
removed from aircraft for repair, only 47 percent of them were sent
to the depots for repair.  The remaining 53 percent are still being
repaired on base.  It was expected that 80 percent of the items would
be repaired at the depots and 20 percent would be repaired at the
base. 

The Air Force also removed three engines from the program because the
engines were not as reliable as initially thought.  Keeping the
engines in the program would have resulted in additional
transportation costs to move the engines to the depots for frequent
repairs. 

According to information provided by the Air Force, it plans to
increase the number of TLM-designated avionics items from 1,171 to
1,282 and is considering adding 2 aircraft engines to the program
during fiscal year 1996.  At the time we completed our review, no
decisions had been made about increasing the number of avionics items
and engines in the program further.  As of September 1995, the
personnel authorizations had been reduced by 1,852 to reflect
anticipated TLM program savings.\4 However, according to Air Force
officials, this does not mean that 1,852 individuals have left the
Air Force or that these individuals have been removed from base level
maintenance positions.  They said that some of the people may still
be at their same locations.  The officials could not provide us the
number of personnel reductions actually achieved as a result of TLM. 


--------------------
\4 Through fiscal year 1999, the total reduction in planned personnel
authorizations is 5,012. 


   INCREASED COSTS AND REDUCED
   SAVINGS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Air Force's initial TLM cost and savings analysis in November
1992 showed that from fiscal years 1994 through 1999, program
implementation would cost about $1.043 billion and savings would be
about
$1.428 billion--a net savings of $385 million.  The major element of
cost was due to the increased workload at the depots (i.e.,
performing intermediate maintenance at the depots versus the base
level), and the major element of cost savings was due to maintenance
personnel reductions at the base level. 

The Air Force later revised its initial analysis in December 1993. 
The analysis showed that implementation costs had increased from
$1.043 billion to $1.468 billion and that total savings had increased
from $1.428 billion to $1.726 billion.  The program costs increased
more than savings.  As a result, the net savings decreased from $385
million to $258 million. 

As shown in table 1, depot repair was the principal factor that
accounted for the major cost increase.  This increase occurred
because the scope of depot intermediate maintenance work had
increased.  When an engine is inducted into the depot intermediate
maintenance facility, it is inspected and all necessary repairs are
performed.  In addition, other maintenance is performed to extend the
operating life of the engine if the engine components are within a
certain threshold for overhaul.  This increased maintenance is
referred to as jet engine intermediate maintenance plus (JEIM +). 

The increased savings was in the area of on-condition maintenance. 
According to Air Force officials, as a result of JEIM +, the time
interval between engine overhauls will be extended.  Thus, the
savings increased from $451 million to $821.8 million. 



                                     Table 1
                     
                        Projected Implementation Costs and
                      Savings From Fiscal Years 1994 Through
                                       1999

                              (Dollars in millions)

                1992        1993    Increase
Category    analysis    analysis  (decrease)      Reason for increase (decrease)
--------  ----------  ----------  ----------  --  ------------------------------
Cost
Depot        $826.05   $1,233.41     $407.36      Increased scope of depot
 repair                                            maintenance work. Additional
                                                   depot maintenance personnel
                                                   and increased avionics
                                                   transportation costs as a
                                                   result of using commercial
                                                   sources.
Transpor       13.65       31.39       17.74      To correct previous
 tation                                            transportation cost estimate
                                                   for TF-39 engine.
Defense        73.42       73.42           0      No change.
 Logisti
 cs
 Agency
DMRD 904      129.76      129.76           0      No change.
================================================================================
Total      $1,042.88   $1,467.98     $425.10
 cost
Savings
Military     $292.80     $237.10    $(55.70)      Additional personnel to
 personn                                           perform base level repair on
 el                                                the three engines removed
                                                   from the program.
Equipmen       20.40       15.00      (5.40)      Need to retain test equipment
 t                                                 for three engines removed
 mainten                                           from the program.
 ance
Equipmen      201.20      201.20           0      No change.
 t
 purchas
 e
On-           451.00      821.80      370.80      Reduced engine overhauls
 conditi                                           resulting from increased
 on                                                scope of maintenance work at
 mainten                                           the depots.
 ance
Base          144.20      144.20           0      No change.
 operati
 ng
 support
Training      157.20      157.20           0      No change.
Civilian      160.80      149.78     (11.02)      Additional personnel to
 personn                                           perform base level repair on
 el                                                the three engines removed
                                                   from the program.
================================================================================
Total      $1,427.60   $1,726.28     $298.68
 savings
================================================================================
Net          $384.72     $258.30   $(126.42)
 savings
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though the 1993 analysis continued to show a net savings by
implementing the program, it did not include all program costs.  For
example, a 1993 Air Force analysis showed that the value of the
mobility readiness spares packages (MRSP) kits\5 would increase about
$543 million to reconfigure the kits from a three level maintenance
configuration to a TLM configuration for five aircraft types.  Table
2 shows the value of the reconfigured kits by aircraft type. 



                                Table 2
                
                Value of Reconfigured MRSP Kits for Five
                              TLM Aircraft

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                MRSP value
                               under three
                                     level      MRSP value
Aircraft                       maintenance       under TLM  Difference
--------------------------  --------------  --------------  ----------
B-52                                $246.1          $691.0      $444.9
C-5                                  195.4           213.8        18.4
C-141                                180.7           219.8        39.1
F-15C                                401.3           423.7        22.4
F-111F                               255.2           273.4        18.2
======================================================================
Total                             $1,278.7        $1,821.7      $543.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to TLM, the kits were configured with shop replaceable items
that would be used by intermediate maintenance units to repair the
line replaceable components.  However, with TLM, there will not be
any intermediate maintenance capability in the theater of operation. 
Consequently, there is no need for the shop replaceable items in the
MRSP kits.  To make the kits compatible to TLM, the kits had to be
reconfigured with higher cost line replaceable components rather than
the lower cost shop replaceable items. 

Air Force officials emphasized that the Air Force did not have to
spend any additional funds to achieve the kit reconfiguration.  They
pointed out that the largest increase in MRSP kit value was for the
B-52 aircraft, which did not have MRSP kits prior to TLM.  Air Force
officials told us that when the mission of the aircraft was changed
from a nuclear to a conventional mission, this necessitated a MRSP
kit, even if the avionics items were not designated as TLM items. 
The officials said that they were able to establish these kits by
redistributing excess inventory that was in the supply system as a
result of retiring the B-52G aircraft.  Therefore, they did not
consider this to be a TLM program cost since they did not have to buy
the inventory needed for kit reconfiguration.  In our opinion,
although no additional funds were spent to achieve the kit
reconfiguration, the $449 million of added value of the MRSP kits
should be considered a TLM program related cost because the added
value was necessitated by the kit reconfiguration to a TLM
orientation. 

A second example of excluded costs involved the assumption about how
many avionics items would be sent to depots for repair.  The 1992
analysis assumed that all TLM avionics items would be returned to
depots for repair.  The 1993 analysis, however, reflected that about
67 percent of the items would be repaired at the depot.  Our review
showed, however, that the revised assumption was not occurring.  As
of September 1995, only 47 percent of the TLM avionics items removed
from the aircraft for repair were being sent to the depots.  Because
the avionics repair workload at depots has not materialized to the
extent it was anticipated, the amount of depot repair costs shown in
the second analysis category is overstated. 

Air Force officials said that having less items being sent to the
depots for repair than expected did not mean that more items were
being repaired at the base level.  They said that better screening
processes at the base level to identify those items that do not need
to be sent to the depot for repair and better fault diagnostic
capability could account for the reduced workload at the depots. 

A third example was the cost for facilities' renovations and minor
construction ($8 million) at the San Antonio and Oklahoma City
depots.  Renovations and construction were required so that the
depots could handle the anticipated increased TLM workload. 


--------------------
\5 MRSP kits are supply kits that are intended to sustain a deployed
unit for a certain numbers of days until the resupply pipeline can be
established into the theater of operation. 


   REPAIR TURN AROUND TIMES FOR
   ENGINE AND AVIONICS ITEMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The decision as to whether a TLM-designated item is repaired on base
or sent to a depot depends on the extent of maintenance required. 
The Air Force criterion is that if avionics items and engines cannot
be repaired at the base level, they must be sent to a depot within 48
and 72 hours, respectively.  This criterion reflects the recognition
that, under TLM, there is a need to reduce the amount of time from
when an item is removed from the aircraft until it is repaired and
ready for reissue.  In this regard, the Air Force has emphasized the
use of express transportation to move items from a base to a depot
repair facility and to expedite the depot repair process.  The Air
Force was concerned that without expedited transportation and repair,
operating bases might have to increase their inventory levels. 

The Air Force has established repair turn around time standards\6 for
TLM items.  Our analysis showed that, for the month of October 1995,
the reported repair turn around times for avionics items averaged
about
10.9 days as compared to the Air Force standard of 8 days.  Officials
said that a large percentage of the avionics items are being repaired
at bases rather than at depots as evidenced by the fact that, as of
September 1995, only 47 percent of the items are being sent to depots
for repair. 

At one depot, an official told us that this low workload has resulted
in about 40 people being transferred from the avionics repair shop to
other depot repair activities.  The official said that in a
contingency situation, the higher generation of unserviceable items
due to high operating tempo coupled with reduced ability of field
units to repair the items could cause the depot workload to double or
triple.  In turn, this level of increase could overwhelm the depots'
repair capabilities and result in increased repair turn around times
for avionics items. 

With regard to engines, the reported repair turn around times show
that the standards generally are not being met.  However, some
officials said that a better measurement of the depots' response to
TLM would be to compare the actual repair turn around times to the
average of the depot and base level repair time prior to TLM
implementation. 

Other Air Force officials said that the pre-TLM averages are not
realistic because they were derived from a 1992 baseline\7 when the
Air Force was experiencing long maintenance delays due to a shortage
of repair parts.  The officials said that it should be noted that
after the Gulf War, the returning aircraft underwent extensive
maintenance and that it was this period that was used to compute the
averages.  Consequently, they said the averages are inflated.  The
results of our comparison of actual repair turn around times to the
Air Force standard and pre-TLM average are shown in table 3. 



                                Table 3
                
                Actual Repair Turn Around Times Compared
                  to Standard Repair Time and Pre-TLM
                 Averages for TLM Engines (as of August
                                 1995)



                                Pre-            Actual    Pre-
                                 TLM             as of     TLM
                              averag  Standa    August  averag  Standa
Engines (aircraft)                 e      rd      1995       e      rd
----------------------------  ------  ------  --------  ------  ------
F100-220 (F-15, F-16)           26.2    19.5      51.0    24.8    31.5
T56 (C-130)                     57.4    19.5      74.5    17.1    55.0
TF39 (C-5)                      77.2    71.5     129.5    52.3    58.0
TF33-7A (C-141)                 89.2    51.0      66.3  (22.9)    15.3
TF33-103 (B-52)                 94.0    46.0      54.0  (40.0)     8.0
TF33-100 (E-3)                 100.0    51.0      38.5  (61.5)  (12.5)
TF33-102 (KC-135)              159.0    56.0      74.5  (84.5)    18.5
F108-100 (KC-135R)             158.0    41.0      44.0  (114.0     3.0
                                                             )
TF30-109 (F-111)               115.0    41.0      93.6  (21.4)    52.6
TF30-111 (F-111)               115.0    41.0     128.0    13.0    87.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force officials told us that the primary reason that the repair
turn around time for engines exceeds the Air Force standard is that
there is a ready supply of engines.  When there is a ready supply of
serviceable engines available for issue, there is no real requirement
to rapidly turn around the unserviceable engines.  Therefore, when an
unserviceable engine or engine component is shipped to the repair
facility, it could be stored until there is a need to repair the
item. 

Our analysis of Air Force-wide engine requirements and available
inventory as of October 1995 confirms that, in most cases, there are
sufficient TLM engines available for issue to meet requirements.  Our
analysis showed that for 8 of the 10 TLM engines there were enough
ready-for-issue engines to meet at least 90 percent of the
requirements and for 7 of the 10 engines, the number of
ready-for-issue engines met or exceeded the requirements (see table
4). 



                                Table 4
                
                 Comparison of TLM Engine Requirements
                  and Ready-for-Issue Inventory (as of
                             October 1995)

                                            Ready-for-  Inventory as a
                                                 issue   percentage of
Engines                   Requirements       inventory    requirements
------------------------  ------------  --------------  --------------
F100-220                            64              42            65.6
T56                                100              92            92.0
TF39                                33              35           106.1
TF33-7A                            103             105           101.9
TF33-103                            32              18            56.3
TF33-100                            19              19           100.0
TF33-102                            25              27           108.0
F108-100                            55              63           114.5
TF30-109                            21              26           123.8
TF30-111                            19              20           105.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Another indication that the Air Force has a sufficient supply of TLM
engines is the fact that it has retired 114 of the TLM engines valued
at $41.1 million during fiscal years 1993 through 1995, as shown in
table 5. 



                                Table 5
                
                   Number of TLM Engines Retired From
                     Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1995

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                                        Number   Value
                                                            of      of
                                                        engine  engine
                                                             s       s
                                                        retire  retire
Engines                                                      d       d
------------------------------------------------------  ------  ------
TF33-7A                                                     49   $15.4
TF33-103                                                    21     5.5
TF33-100                                                    11     3.4
TF33-102                                                    14     5.4
TF30-109                                                    11     5.1
TF30-111                                                     8     6.3
======================================================================
Total                                                      114   $41.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Although not meeting repair turn around times and relying on the
current supply of engines to meet customer needs may not cause a
problem in the short term, it could become a problem over the long
term as more items are designated as TLM items and as the ready
available supply of engines is decreased. 

Air Force officials said that when the program is fully implemented
in fiscal year 1997, the Air Force will analyze the engine supply
situation, and some engines may be eliminated from the inventory.  If
this occurs, the number of engines to be repaired will be reduced and
the maintenance focus will shift to meeting the repair turn around
time or the Air Force will have to buy additional stocks for the base
level.  In the interim, the program has not been fully tested in the
type of restrictive environment that it may be required to operate. 


--------------------
\6 The standards include the time for on-base processing,
transportation to the depot, depot processing, repair, and return to
stock. 

\7 The baseline included data for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
1991 and the four quarters in fiscal year 1992. 


   USE OF TLM TO SUPPORT DEPLOYED
   FORCES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

When Air Force units deploy overseas, they will not take intermediate
maintenance capability with them for the TLM avionics items and
engines.  Instead, the units will have to rely on airlift to
transport their unserviceable TLM assets to the depot for repair. 
Likewise, they will have to rely on airlift for replenishment stocks. 

According to Air Force officials, not deploying the intermediate
maintenance capability will reduce airlift requirements by the
equivalent of 175 C-141 aircraft during the first 30 days of a two
major regional contingency scenario.  Before TLM, the plan was to
airlift the intermediate maintenance capability to the theater
sometime after the initiation of mobilization.  TLM, however, will
require airlift much earlier in the contingency for returning and
replenishing spare parts inventories.  Because airlift is not
dedicated for these purposes, retrograde and resupply will have to
compete with other airlift users. 

Airlift priorities and assignments are controlled by the theater
commander.  In the early stages of a conflict, the commander could
decide that airlift priorities should be devoted to moving more
combat power into the theater rather than spare parts.  If this
occurs at the same time that the Air Force units are seeking
replenishment avionics and engines, sustainability problems could
arise. 

U.S.  Central Command officials told us that airlift has not been
specifically dedicated for returning unserviceable items from the
theater of operation to the United States and for resupplying units
in the theater with needed spare parts.  Command officials, however,
believed that there should be sufficient airlift available for these
purposes.  Other Air Force officials told us that they are not
convinced that there will be sufficient airlift available to meet TLM
needs early in a contingency. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

In view of the unresolved TLM issues and the fact that the program
has not fully achieved its intended objectives and has not been fully
implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to continue to periodically reassess the
cost efficiency and effectiveness of items already in the program as
well as those planned for the program to determine whether the
avionics items and engines are the most appropriate TLM candidates. 
To facilitate the reassessment, the Secretary of the Air Force should
develop

  -- a revised cost and savings analysis that reflects (1) the
     facilities and minor construction costs incurred to ready depots
     for TLM and (2) the fact that the anticipated workload at the
     depots has not materialized;

  -- an assessment of the depots' ability to meet the repair turn
     around times prescribed by the Air Force standard when the
     current inventory of engines is reduced and TLM is fully
     implemented; and

  -- an action plan, in concert with wartime theater commanders, that
     assesses the availability of airlift in the early stages of a
     conflict to fully support the added airlift requirements of TLM. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

The Department of Defense concurred with our findings and
recommendations.  Officials agreed that there should be a continuing
reassessment of TLM candidates to ensure that the right ones are in
the program and that further assessments of capability and inventory
should be conducted.  These assessments have been programmed through
the TLM end-to-end analysis and engine supply reassessment.  The
officials further stated that the Air Force will continue to work
with the Joint Staff and Supported Commanders-in-Chief to determine
effective use of airlift allocation to meet service requirements. 
The full text of the Department's comments are included as appendix
I. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

To determine how the TLM program costs and anticipated savings were
computed, we reviewed Air Force studies and budget documents and held
discussions with Air Force headquarters officials responsible for
program development and implementation.  Also, we compared the costs
and savings identified in the original cost/savings analysis to the
revised cost and savings analysis developed for the fiscal year 1995
budget.  We then held discussions with officials to ascertain the
reasons for cost increases and net savings decreases. 

To determine whether the program has reduced repair turn around time,
we reviewed Air Force reports summarizing repair turn around time and
held discussions with depot officials who monitor and analyze the
data.  For engines, we compared post-TLM repair time data to pre-TLM
repair time data and to repair standards developed by the Air Force. 
For avionics items, we compared actual TLM repair turn around times
to Air Force repair standards. 

To assess the use of TLM to support deployed forces, we reviewed
deployment plans, airlift requirements and held discussions with
officials who plan and implement deployment plans during military
operations.  In addition, we obtained and analyzed cost data showing
the effect of TLM on the configuration of the war reserve kits. 

Our review was performed at the

  -- U.S.  Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;

  -- U.S.  Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

  -- Air Force Logistics Management Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base,
     Alabama;

  -- Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
     Ohio;

  -- Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

  -- Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;

  -- Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base,
     Oklahoma;

  -- San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas;
     and

  -- 1st Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. 

We performed our review from June 1995 to December 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

As you know, the head of a federal agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 
720 to submit a written statement on actions taken on our
recommendations to the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later
than 60 days after the date of this report.  A written statement must
also be submitted to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations
made more than 60 days after the date of the report. 

We are also sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations,
House Committee on National Security, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, House Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight; and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget.  If you or members of your staff have any
questions or would like to discuss the matters in this report in
further detail, please call me at (202) 512-5140.  The major
contributors to this report are shown in appendix II. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Sharon A.  Cekala
Robert J.  Lane


   DALLAS FIELD OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Kimberly S.  Carson
Bonnie S.  Carter

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

Norman L.  Jessup, Jr.
Jeanett H.  Reid


*** End of document. ***