Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile: Need to Define Requirements and
Establish Criteria to Assess Performance (Letter Report, 10/17/95,
GAO/NSIAD-96-7).

GAO reviewed the Army's plans for acquiring the Enhanced Fiber Optic
Guided Missile (EFOG-M) system.

GAO found that: (1) the Army lacks a formal requirement for EFOG-M and
has not prepared comprehensive comparative cost studies because
requirements documents and analyses are not normally required for
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) programs; (2) the Army
should develop the requirement documents because of its prior difficulty
in justifying the systems; (3) Congress has required the Army to certify
that the requirement and analyses exist by December 1, 1995; (4) the
Army has not fully defined EFOG-M performance criteria to evaluate the
system's military value; (5) the ACTD program may not shorten the EFOG-M
acquisition process unless innovative strategies are devised and formal
testing agreements are reached; and (6) resources are not available to
support limited fielding of EFOG-M after the 2-year ACTD evaluation
period.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-7
     TITLE:  Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile: Need to Define 
             Requirements and Establish Criteria to Assess Performance
      DATE:  10/17/95
   SUBJECT:  Advanced weapons systems
             Missiles
             Testing
             Defense contingency planning
             Army procurement
             Documentation
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Procurement appropriations
             Comparative analysis
             Requirements definition
IDENTIFIER:  Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile
             Army Rapid Force Projection Initiative
             DOD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program
             High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
             Fiber Optic Guided Missile
             Non Line-of-Sight Missile
             Non Line-of-Sight Combined Arms
             HMMWV
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

October 1995

ENHANCED FIBER OPTIC GUIDED
MISSILE - NEED TO DEFINE
REQUIREMENTS AND ESTABLISH
CRITERIA TO ASSESS PERFORMANCE

GAO/NSIAD-96-7

Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile

(707090)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ACTD - Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
  CA - Combined Arms
  DOD - Department of Defense
  EFOG-M - Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile
  FOG-M - Fiber Optic Guided Missile
  NBC - nuclear, biological, and chemical
  NLOS - Non-Line of Sight
  OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  RFPI - Rapid Force Projection Initiative

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260257

October 17, 1995

Congressional Committees

We reviewed selected aspects of the Army's plans for acquisition of
the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOG-M) system.  The Army
plans to acquire limited quantities of the system for the Rapid Force
Projection Initiative (RFPI) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) and field them for a 2-year user evaluation.\1
The Army expects the limited acquisition to cost about $280 million,
but, based on the results of the demonstration and evaluation, a much
larger acquisition could occur.  We focused our review on the
acquisition of the EFOG-M system and did not evaluate the ACTD
process.  We conducted this review under our basic legislative
responsibilities but are addressing the report to you because it
discusses matters we believe warrant consideration by your
committees. 


--------------------
\1 An ACTD is a Department of Defense initiative directed toward more
rapidly fielding advanced technologies.  The RFPI is an ACTD to
explore new approaches for a more capable early entry force. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

There is no formal requirement for the EFOG-M, and the Army has not
prepared comprehensive studies comparing EFOG-M's projected cost and
effectiveness to other alternatives.  Requirements documents and
comprehensive analyses are not normally required for ACTD programs. 
But, we believe the EFOG-M requirement should be formally agreed upon
and cost-effectiveness analyzed during the ACTD program because the
Army previously experienced considerable difficulty in justifying the
system's predecessors. 

One purpose of an ACTD program is to evaluate its military value, but
the Army has not yet fully defined EFOG-M expectations in terms that
could be used as a benchmark to assist in the evaluation.  The Army,
before beginning tests and demonstrations, needs to establish the
specific performance values required and desired from the EFOG-M. 

The ACTD program is expected to shorten the acquisition of larger
quantities of systems if required.  However, it may not shorten
EFOG-M's acquisition unless innovative strategies are devised.  One
strategy could involve reducing tests and evaluations during the
larger acquisition by reaching agreements with independent testers
and evaluators regarding their effort in the limited procurement. 

Retaining the limited fielding beyond the evaluation period is an
option, but, at the present time, resources are not available to
support and operate either the limited fielding after the 2-year
evaluation or a larger procurement.  Before making a decision
regarding either limited fielding or the larger procurement, the Army
needs to ensure that (1) the limited fielding is cost-effective and
(2) funding and forces are available for either fielding. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The EFOG-M is being designed to engage armored combat vehicles, other
high value ground targets (such as command, control, and
communication centers), and helicopters beyond the line of sight at
ranges up to
15 kilometers.  The system will consist of a gunner's station and
eight missiles mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle.  The missiles are launched toward a target area based upon
forward intelligence information.  After missile launch, the gunner
can intervene at any time to lock on and engage detected targets. 
The gunner views the flight path and the target via a seeker (located
in the missile) that is linked to the gunner's video console by fiber
optic cable.  Figures 1 and 2 show the EFOG-M fire unit and missile
and the potential EFOG-M deployment concept, respectively. 

   Figure 1:  EFOG-M Fire Unit and
   Missile

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 2:  Potential EFOG-M
   Deployment Concept

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

According to an Army official, the EFOG-M uses the same concept and
some of the same technology as three previously terminated efforts
costing more than $440 million--the Fiber Optic Guided Missile
(FOG-M), the Non-Line-of-Sight Missile (NLOS), and the NLOS-Combined
Arms (CA).  The Army began development work in 1978 to demonstrate
fiber optics guidance and conducted flight tests in 1984 to
demonstrate the technology as an antitank missile (FOG-M).  However,
in late 1986, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved
development not primarily as an antitank weapon but to provide
defense against helicopters (NLOS).  Although the Army had planned to
produce NLOS, OSD decided to terminate the program once its
development was completed because other programs had higher priority
and other systems could accomplish the intended mission.  However,
the Army then terminated the program in January 1991 before
completing development because of excessive cost growth.  The Army
restarted the effort as NLOS-CA in mid-1991, performed concept
analyses, explored alternative acquisition strategies, and sought
approval for engineering and manufacturing development.  But its
development was not approved. 

The Army is now developing the EFOG-M and plans to acquire limited
quantities under an advanced technology demonstration program
designed to demonstrate potential technology enhancements; and the
Army will provide the system and support it for the RFPI ACTD.  RFPI
is exploring new approaches to provide an early entry force that is
significantly more capable against a heavy armored threat. 

The primary objective of an ACTD is to accelerate the application of
new technology to solve military problems.  ACTDs are to (1) evaluate
military utility before committing to acquisition, (2) develop
operational concepts, and (3) rapidly provide operational capability. 
During this process, ACTD programs require much more early user
involvement than expected during normal acquisition program phases. 
Department of Defense (DOD) officials believe ACTD programs will
shorten the acquisition process. 

Under the demonstration program, the Army plans to procure 12 fire
units, 3 platoon vehicles, 300 missiles, and associated equipment at
an estimated cost of about $280 million.  According to Army
officials, the development, demonstrations, and evaluations could
result in one of the following actions: 

  terminating the effort before building the system hardware (not a
     likely option);

  purchasing only the limited quantities and making a decision as to
     whether to leave the residual quantities in the field;

  procuring much larger quantities of the EFOG-M currently being
     developed (3,126 missiles and 120 fire units are being examined
     from an affordability standpoint); or

  substantially modifying the system and procuring larger quantities. 

The Army plans to demonstrate EFOG-M performance and military utility
through (1) simulations, (2) contractor-conducted missile performance
tests, (3) a force-on-force demonstration along with other early
entry systems and potential systems, (4) government check-out missile
firings, and (5) a 2-year user fielding and evaluation of a residual
force.  Table 1 shows the schedule for these events. 



                                Table 1
                
                     EFOG-M Demonstration Schedule

Date                                Demonstration/test
----------------------------------  ----------------------------------
May 1996                            Virtual prototype evaluation

February 1996-January 1998          Contractor missile tests

February 1998                       Force-on-force demonstration

August 1999                         Government check-out firings

August 1999-July 2001               Extended user evaluation
----------------------------------------------------------------------

   THE REQUIREMENT FOR EFOG-M HAS
   NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The Army does not have an agreed-upon requirement for the EFOG-M.  It
has not completed the documentation nor analyses for the EFOG-M
program required for most acquisition programs.  For example, the
Army has not (1) prepared a mission need statement documenting the
mission deficiency, (2) analyzed other alternatives to satisfy the
need, (3) defined the system's operational and performance
requirements, nor (4) comprehensively compared EFOG-M's cost and
operational effectiveness to other existing or developmental systems. 

According to Army officials, that type of documentation, analysis,
and evaluation is not required for ACTD programs.  They said these
changes resulted from defense acquisition reform efforts.  However,
at the current time, U.  S.  Army Training and Doctrine Command
(responsible for determining requirements) officials state (1) the
system is needed for use with early entry forces and (2) the
requirement will be defined during the ACTD. 

But, the Army has experienced great difficulty in maintaining a
stable requirement (completing development programs or justifying
procurement) for EFOG-M's predecessors.  For example, NLOS
procurement was canceled in part because of higher priority programs,
and development of NLOS-CA was disapproved for affordability reasons. 
Regarding its stability, an OSD official stated

     "NLOS-CA has struggled in budget competition within the Army
     because it is such a revolutionary concept.  It simply doesn't
     fit well anywhere within the Army's branch structure and has
     been passed around among air defense (anti-helicopter version),
     artillery, and infantry branches."

Because requirements and/or support for predecessor systems have
disappeared after considerable effort and expenditure of funds, we
believe that the EFOG-M requirement should be agreed upon and
formally documented.  In addition, we believe the system's cost and
operational effectiveness should be comprehensively compared to other
alternatives for satisfying that requirement. 

In its report (104-131, June 1, 1995) on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, the House National Security
Committee expressed concern that the Army is pursuing a weapon system
that provides questionable value and possesses known fiscal risk. 
The committee recommended a provision (sec.  215) that would (1)
require the Secretary of the Army to certify by December 1, 1995,
that a requirement exists for the EFOG-M and whether there is a
cost-effectiveness analysis supporting such requirement and (2) limit
the expenditure of funds for the EFOG-M program to that identified in
the current program plan only ($280 million, based on fiscal year
1995 constant dollars) and deny continuation of the program beyond
fiscal year 1998 if contract obligations are not met. 


   SOME CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING
   PERFORMANCE ARE NOT SPECIFIC
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Army guidance for advanced technology demonstration programs require
establishment of criteria to be met and the RFPI ACTD management plan
recognizes that criteria as the technical goals for the system.  A
DOD instruction states that, to be effective, the criteria must be
specific and quantitative.  Since the ACTD's objective is to judge
the military value of the system, it appears reasonable and prudent
to establish specific measurable standards as a basis for making the
judgment. 

The Army's EFOG-M Advanced Technology Demonstration Plan establishes
exit criteria for evaluating EFOG-M performance (see app.  I).  Some
of these criteria are specific and easily measurable.  For example,
the plan establishes specific minimum criteria that must be
accomplished by mid-1996 for missile reload time, the number of
missiles mounted on each fire unit, and the system response time for
missile launch.  It also provides specific minimum criteria that must
be accomplished by mid-1999 for missile range and set-up time for
system operation. 

However, the criteria for some other operational issues that project
officials consider critical do not provide the specific values to be
attained--a standard to measure against to determine success.  For
example, to demonstrate successful identification of targets, the
minimum criterion to be accomplished in 1996 is "gunner recognition
without diverting the missile and obtain in-flight intelligence."
However, the plan does not identify the minimum required
probabilities of correctly identifying the target--a performance
issue very critical to the effectiveness of the weapon system--either
in 1996 or at the end of the technology demonstration. 

Another criterion extremely important to the basic role and need for
the system is demonstrating that targets can be engaged even though
they are not within the gunner's view.  The criterion states that the
Army is to demonstrate engaging targets not in the line of sight by
mid-1996.  But the criterion does not address the required
probability for engaging each target correctly identified--a key
determinant of the success of the system--either in 1996 or at the
end of advanced technology demonstration in 1999. 

In addition, the minimum criteria for warhead lethality is to "defeat
existing threat tanks and helicopters." But it does not establish and
provide for measuring specific minimum required probabilities of
defeating the tanks or helicopters with a single shot.  However, the
probability of killing a target with a single shot is critical to
determining whether the system is cost-effective and, consequently,
whether it should be procured. 

We believe that in order to accomplish an evaluation of the system,
the criteria for determining a success must be (1) specific and
measurable and (2) representative of the capability needed rather
than the capability available.  In our opinion, if the military value
of the program is to be judged, the criteria for measuring that
value, including specific performance of the missile, should be
established in advance of the tests rather than relying on subjective
judgment of success afterward. 


   FUTURE EFOG-M ACQUISITION COULD
   BE SHORTENED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

ACTD programs are designed to shorten the time required to obtain
operating capability.  But, when asked where EFOG-M would enter the
acquisition process if a larger procurement is desired, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology said that it depends
upon the quality of the ACTD--it could enter at production or it
could go back to the beginning of engineering and manufacturing
development.  However, since the ACTD is scheduled for 6 years, it
appears to us that, unless engineering and manufacturing development
is greatly abbreviated, entering the process at that phase would
accomplish little toward shortening the acquisition process.  One
shortening strategy could involve conducting tests and evaluations
during the limited acquisition in such a fashion to prevent
duplication during a larger procurement. 

For normal Army acquisition programs, development testers (Army Test
and Evaluation Command) plan and conduct developmental testing and
provide safety release of all systems; independent evaluators or
assessors (Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity or Test and
Evaluation Command) determine the degree to which the technical
parameters of the system have been achieved; and operational testers
and independent operational evaluators (Army Operational Test and
Evaluation Command) conduct operational tests and address the
operational effectiveness and suitability of the system.  However,
the roles of development testers, independent evaluators, and
operational testers and evaluators in the RFPI demonstration and
EFOG-M tests and evaluations are not well defined at this time. 

The RFPI ACTD Management Plan is endorsed by the Test and Evaluation
Command but the plan does not specify the Command's role nor the role
of other independent testers in the demonstration.  More detailed
draft plans for conducting EFOG-M tests, conducting the
demonstrations, and acquiring the EFOG-M limited quantities also do
not identify the specific roles.  And discussions with independent
testers and evaluators and with EFOG-M management officials provided
little additional definitive information about the role of the
independent testers and evaluators. 

According to EFOG-M management officials, the contractor has prepared
a draft master test plan for the limited acquisition, and the
contractor will be responsible for the tests.  Project test officials
have sent the plan to the independent testers and evaluators for
comment, but their approval is not required.  The project manager
will approve the test plan, and will consider the independent
comments.  Project management officials said that the testers and
evaluators would be invited to observe the tests, but not control
them. 

However, there are no formal agreements with independent testers and
evaluators as to (1) their role in the testing and evaluation of
EFOG-M or (2) the amount of testing and independent tester and
evaluator involvement required to prevent retesting and reevaluating
the system if a larger quantity is desired.  All acknowledge
receiving the contractor's master test plan.  However, the Army
Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, for example, is only currently
attempting to define its role in ACTD programs.  Its representatives
have participated in RFPI and EFOG-M discussions, and they plan to
provide some informal evaluation.  Army Test and Evaluation Command
representatives have been informed they will be responsible for
safety tests, and they are actively attempting to define their
involvement.  Operational Test and Evaluation Command officials are
aware of the RFPI and EFOG-M programs, but they have not yet defined
their role in the programs.  They believe they will be involved at
the appropriate time.  One RFPI ACTD manager has begun efforts to
provide coordinated evaluation for the virtual prototype evaluation

If, in order to accomplish the ACTD objective, the Army initiates
strategies to ensure that the ACTD reduces the time required to
acquire a larger quantity of systems, we believe there should be
assurances that required tests and evaluations of the system are
conducted in such a fashion during the ACTD program to preclude the
need to repeat the tests and evaluations to support a larger
procurement. 


   RESOURCES FOR FIELDING SYSTEM
   BEYOND THE ACTD ARE NOT ENSURED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Because of the early stage of the ACTD program, the Army has not yet
planned for the personnel and funds to support, operate, and maintain
the EFOG-M beyond the ACTD program.  In addition, the Army has not
yet determined whether a deployment of the residual equipment would
be cost-effective.  According to Army officials, the ACTD could
result in (1) leaving the EFOG-M residual equipment deployed with a
combat unit but not purchasing additional systems or (2) purchasing a
much larger quantity of EFOG-Ms--possibly to equip the entire early
entry force.  Before making decisions regarding retaining the
residual deployment or a larger deployment, the Army should ensure
that it has the force structure and funding needed to operate,
support, and maintain EFOG-M beyond the ACTD program and that the
deployment is cost-effective. 

For the extended user evaluation, the EFOG-M will be assigned to a
company consisting of 3 platoons with a total of 58 personnel.  Each
platoon will have 1 platoon leader vehicle and 4 EFOG-M fire units
(12 per company), and the company will be assigned support vehicles
for resupply of ammunition and fuel.  The EFOG-M contractor will
support and maintain the system during the period. 

Training and Doctrine Command officials informed us that the company
will perform its normal activities during the evaluation.  For
example, if the unit went to training, it would train with the
EFOG-M.  If the unit were deployed for a military contingency, it
would deploy with the EFOG-M as a part of the force. 

The Army Forces Command will provide the personnel to operate and
support the systems during the user evaluation, and the RFPI program
management office will fund the supporting contractor.  However,
Training and Doctrine Command officials informed us that funding or
support beyond the 2-year extended user evaluation period has not
been planned for the residual quantity or for a larger procurement. 
They said such plans would be premature since decisions have not been
made regarding retaining the residual quantity or procuring a larger
amount. 

In addition, although retaining the residual quantity without a
larger procurement is an option, at this time the Army has not
examined the cost-effectiveness of such a deployment.  For example,
we found no evidence the Army has compared (1) the cost of personnel
to operate the system and the cost to establish or contract for
maintenance and logistics support with (2) the cost to accomplish the
mission with other alternatives.  An Army official said the Army
plans to make these comparisons during the ACTD. 

We believe the Army should ensure that such cost-effectiveness
studies are performed as well as ensure that a supporting/operating
force is available before making decisions regarding retaining the
residual deployment.  In addition, before making decisions regarding
a larger deployment, DOD should ensure that the Army has the force
structure and funding planned to operate, support, and maintain the
larger procurement. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We recommend that, before deciding to either acquire more EFOG-Ms or
retain the limited quantity beyond the user evaluation, the Secretary
of Defense require the Army to prepare (1) a formal EFOG-M
requirements document and (2) analyses comparing EFOG-M's cost and
operational effectiveness with other alternatives for satisfying the
requirement, including the weapons of other services if appropriate. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish measurable exit
criteria regarding the most critical EFOG-M performance issues before
beginning the tests, demonstrations, and evaluations. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense evaluate the
feasibility and costs of performing the tests and evaluations to be
conducted during the limited procurement in such a fashion to
preclude the need to repeat them if a larger procurement is desired. 

We further recommend that, before requesting appropriations to
support and operate the EFOG-M equipment beyond the extended user
evaluation period, the Secretary of Defense require the Army to
provide evidence that such a deployment would be cost-effective.  In
addition, before requesting funds for a larger procurement, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the Army has
planned sufficient funding and personnel to support, operate, and
maintain the larger procurement. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD said the report
contained many useful comments and observations and it partially
agreed with the recommendations.  However, it did not agree with the
findings because it believes the report treats EFOG-M as a normal
acquisition program instead of as part of the RFPI ACTD.  We
disagree.  The report is directed toward improving DOD's management
of acquiring EFOG-M for the RFPI ACTD, demonstrating EFOG-M's
utility, and evaluating its military value. 

DOD partially agreed with our draft recommendation to prepare a
formal requirements document and conduct analyses comparing EFOG-M
cost- and operational effectiveness with other alternatives by the
end of the force-on-force demonstration.  DOD stated that it would
prepare a formal cost- and operational effectiveness analysis and
statement of requirement if the results of the ACTD indicates that a
larger quantity of EFOG-M should be acquired.  However, it believed
that the timing should be keyed to the transition decision.  Based on
DOD's comments, we modified the recommendation to provide more
flexibility in the timing of establishing requirements and conducting
a cost- and operational effectiveness analysis.  DOD agreed with the
modified recommendation. 

DOD did not agree with our draft recommendation to establish
measurable exit criteria regarding the most critical EFOG-M
performance issues.  DOD stated that exit criteria are not
appropriate for use with an ACTD.  It further stated that appropriate
testing would be performed to characterize performance and required
levels of performance will be established at the conclusion of the
ACTD.  We disagree with DOD.  The Army has already established exit
criteria for EFOG-M and the RFPI ACTD management plan recognizes that
most of the systems (including the EFOG-M) have approved exit
criteria that describe the technical goals for each system.  Our
recommendation is directed toward making some of these technical
goals more specific and measurable.  We continue to believe that
measurable critical levels of performance should be established
before beginning the tests, demonstrations, and evaluations. 

Because of a misinterpretation, DOD partially agreed with our draft
recommendation to evaluate the feasibility and costs of performing
sufficient tests and evaluations during the limited procurement to
preclude the need to duplicate them during a larger procurement.  DOD
concluded that we wanted them to expand the testing program. 
However, our intent was to preclude the need to repeat tests to
support a larger procurement.  Therefore, we modified the
recommendation to prevent any misunderstanding. 

DOD agreed to provide evidence that the deployment of EFOG-M would be
cost-effective before requesting appropriations to support and
operate the EFOG-M equipment beyond the extended user evaluation
period.  DOD stated that the results of the RFPI ACTD would include
an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of limited fielding with the
inventory procured for the ACTD as well as for an expanded deployment
and that any decision to procure additional units would include full
consideration of funding and personnel levels required to operate and
support the expanded deployment. 

The DOD response and our comments are included in appendix III. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of the report to the Secretaries of Defense and
the Army and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies
will be made available to others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appen dix IV. 

Thomas J.  Schulz
Associate Director, Systems Development
 and Production Issues

List of Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W.  Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives


EFOG-M EXIT CRITERIA
=========================================================== Appendix I

                           Minimum capability to be   Maximum capability to be
Operational capability     demonstrated               demonstrated
-------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------
Capabilities to be demonstrated by mid-1996
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System missile load        Ready to fire 6 missiles   Ready to fire more than 6
                                                      missiles

System missile reload      Reload in benign           Reload in benign
                           conditions in 15 minutes   conditions in less than 15
                                                      minutes

                           Reload in nuclear,         Reload in NBC conditions
                           biological, and chemical   in less than 20 minutes
                           (NBC) conditions in 20 to
                           30 minutes

                           Reload at night and/or in  Reload at night and/or in
                           adverse weather in 20 to   adverse weather in less
                           30 minutes                 than 20 minutes

System response time for   Launch 2 missiles within   Launch 3 missiles within
missile launch             30 seconds                 30 seconds

                           Capable of launching at    Launch more than 2
                           least 2 missiles in        missiles in flight at one
                           flight at one time         time

Mission planning aid       Automated mission          -
                           planning to include
                           missile flight to target
                           area

Positive identification    Gunner recognition         Positive identification
                           without diverting
                           missile; obtain in-
                           flight intelligence

Missile seeker imagery     System capable of          -
exploitation               recording missile seeker
                           video

                           Platoon leader capability  -
                           to observe any of platoon
                           gunner's videos
                           selectively real time

                           Platoon leader capability  Platoon leader capability
                           to passively transmit      to transmit near real time
                           same video to other        seeker data images (freeze
                           gunners in platoon         frame) with 6-digit grid
                                                      coordinates, to company
                                                      commander/higher echelon

                           Capability to              -
                           automatically receive
                           target information
                           through brigade-level
                           command and control
                           systems in use at the
                           time of the demonstration

Gunner control of in-      Gunner capability of       -
flight missiles            making manual in-flight
                           corrections to single
                           launched missiles and for
                           subsequent missiles in
                           the target area in all
                           multiple missile
                           engagements

                           Gunner capability to       -
                           manually switch to next
                           missile in-flight seeker
                           after initial missile
                           lock-on in multiple
                           missile engagements

Receive and provide        Periodic update of         Receive updated target
updated target             missile with current       information and provide to
information to missile     target location as         missile
                           provided by command and
                           control systems

Engage targets not in      Engage targets not in      -
line of sight              line of sight


Capabilities to be demonstrated by mid-1999
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tactical deployment        Air transportable by C-    Sling transportable by CH-
                           130 aircraft               47D helicopter in a march
                                                      order configuration

                                                      Sling transportable by UH-
                                                      60 helicopter (2 lifts)

System deployment          Emplacement within a       Emplacement within a
                           specified number of        specified number of
                           minutes\a                  minutes\a

                                                      Standby to operate mode
                                                      within a specified number
                                                      of minutes\a

                           Cue/alert to launch        Cue/alert to launch within
                           within a specified number  a specified number of
                           of minutes\a               minutes\a

                                                      Hasty march order within a
                                                      specified number of
                                                      minutes\a

                                                      Air droppable using low
                                                      velocity, low altitude
                                                      airdrop procedures

Reliability,               A mean time between        A mean time between
availability, and          operational mission        operational mission aborts
maintainability            aborts of 120 hours for    of greater than 120 hours
                           the fire unit              for the fire unit

                                                      A maintenance ratio equal
                                                      to or less than 0.18 for
                                                      the fire unit

                                                      Maintenance manhours per
                                                      system operating hour for
                                                      the fire unit availability
                                                      equal to or greater than
                                                      0.90

                                                      Missile reliability equal
                                                      to or greater than 0.89

Missile range              Minimum range of 1,000     Minimum range of less than
                           meters                     1,000 meters

                           Maximum range of 15        Maximum range greater than
                           kilometers                 15 kilometers

Protect the force          For the light system       Provide ballistic
                           mounted on the heavy High  protection/survivability
                           Mobility Multipurpose      for crew and vehicle
                           Wheeled Vehicle,           against non-nuclear
                           protection to crew and     indirect artillery above
                           vehicle is not less than   that of host vehicle
                           provided by host vehicle

System location            Automatic azimuth          -
                           orientation and position/
                           location device
                           integrated into fire
                           control system

                           Backup Global Positioning  -
                           System Receiver

Operability                Operate day, night, and    -
                           in adverse weather

Countermeasure             Performance during and     Exceed performance during
susceptibility             after exposure to          and after exposure to
                           battlefield environments   battlefield environments

Warhead lethality          Defeat existing threat     Defeat projected threat
                           tanks                      tanks through the year
                                                      2005

                           Defeat helicopters         -
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The specified number of minutes is classified. 


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================== Appendix II

We obtained information regarding the purposes of the Rapid Force
Projection Initiative (RFPI) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) by (1) reviewing the RFPI ACTD management plan
and (2) discussing the matter with the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Advanced Technology; the Director of Technology, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition; and officials from the RFPI Program Office, U.S.  Army
Missile Command. 

We obtained information regarding the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided
Missile (EFOG-M) system's exit criteria by reviewing the EFOG-M
Advanced Technology Plan and interviewing officials from the Non-Line
of Sight Project Office (responsible for managing the EFOG-M
program), Program Executive Office for Tactical Missiles.  In
addition, we obtained information regarding demonstration, test, and
evaluation plans from discussions with RFPI and EFOG-M project
officials and officials from the (1) Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; (2) Army Test and
Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground and Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama; and (3) Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria,
Virginia. 

We also obtained information regarding EFOG-M system requirements,
force structure requirements, and fielding plans from the U.  S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command's System Manager for Antitank
Missiles and the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Laboratory, Fort
Benning, Georgia, and the Early Entry Lethality and Survivability
Battle Laboratory, Fort Monroe, Virginia. 

We conducted our review from September 1994 through July 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II

See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 1. 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 9. 

Now on p.  11. 

Now on p.  11. 

Now on p.  11. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on pp.  11-12. 


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated September 15, 1995. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  The report does not focus on the EFOG-M program as a normal
acquisition program.  The report is directed toward improving DOD's
management of acquiring a limited number of EFOG-Ms for the RFPI
ACTD.  For example, we believe that the recommendation regarding the
formal agreed-upon requirement is appropriate because requirements
and/or support for three EFOG-M predecessors have disappeared after
considerable effort and expenditure of funds. 

2.  The report does not ignore the primary thrust of ACTDs.  The
draft recommendation was directed at establishing an EFOG-M
requirement by the end of the force-on-force demonstration in
mid-1998, or nearly 4 years into the ACTD program, not at its
inception.  Our intent was to ensure that the Army validated its
requirement for EFOG-M before deciding whether to either acquire a
larger quantity of EFOG-Ms or retain the residual ACTD quantity after
the 2-year evaluation.  Based on DOD's comments, we modified our
recommendation to permit more flexibility in the timing and even
greater user evaluation. 

3.  We disagree that requirements, exit criteria, and
cost-effectiveness analyses must be products of an ACTD.  We
addressed the importance of exit criteria in the agency comments and
evaluation section of the report and the importance of requirements
in comment 1.  A cost-effectiveness analysis can be performed at any
time, not at just the end of the ACTD. 

4.  The report does not recommend force structure planning at this
time; however, it does recommend that such planning occur before a
decision is made to either acquire a larger quantity or retain the
limited quantity after the 2-year evaluation.  DOD agreed with the
recommendation. 

5.  The report neither addresses changes in threat nor prohibits
exploring EFOG-M's effectiveness under early entry conditions. 
However, as modified, it recommends an agreed-upon requirement before
making a decision to either procure a larger quantity or retain the
limited quantity. 

6.  We do not judge EFOG-M because of its history; but, at the same
time, we believe that history should be used to assist in making good
management decisions. 

7.  Our review was not designed to evaluate the ACTD process, but
rather to examine selected aspects of the acquisition of the Army's
EFOG-M system.  Therefore, we cannot comment on the benefits of ACTD
programs. 

8.  Regarding critical decisions, we modified our recommendations to
permit more flexibility in establishing the requirement; however, we
still believe that a requirement should be established before
decisions are made regarding a larger procurement or retaining a
limited quantity.  We also believe that specific measurable exit
criteria, or standards for performance, should be established before
tests, evaluations, and demonstrations. 

9.  DOD's comments and our evaluation are included in the body of the
report. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Raymond Dunham, Assistant Director

ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE

Thomas W.  Gilliam, Evaluator-in-Charge
Erin B.  Baker, Evaluator