Battlefield Automation: Army's Digital Battlefield Plan Lacks Specific
Measurable Goals (Letter Report, 11/29/95, GAO/NSIAD-96-25).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Army's plans to
digitize its battlefield operations.

GAO found that: (1) as part of its battlefield digitization plan, the
Army plans to conduct a series of costly experiments from 1995 to 1997
to demonstrate the utility of a digitized force; (2) specific and
measurable goals are needed to evaluate the achievements of each
experiment, and these goals should be met before proceeding to the next
experiment; (3) the Army is risking investments of almost $400 million
for digital systems needed to conduct increasingly larger scale
experiments through fiscal year 1999; (4) the investment required to
digitize a 10 division Army could be as high as $4 billion; and (5)
since Congress has directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its
digitization plan, the Department of Defense must identify funding for
the Marine Corps to ensure its participation and success in the
digitization program.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-25
     TITLE:  Battlefield Automation: Army's Digital Battlefield Plan 
             Lacks Specific Measurable Goals
      DATE:  11/29/95
   SUBJECT:  Embedded computer systems
             Defense communications operations
             Combat readiness
             Command/control/communications systems
             Military systems analysis
             Army procurement
             Computer software
             Cost analysis
             Ground warfare
             Future budget projections
IDENTIFIER:  Army Digitization Master Plan
             Army Tactical Command and Control System
             Army Combat Service Support Control System
             Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence 
             System
             Army Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
             Army Force XXI Battlefield Command Brigade and Below System
             ATCCS
             Army Mobile Subscriber Equipment
             Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
             M1A2 Tank
             Army Intervehicular Information System
             Army Risk Management Master Plan
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

November 1995

BATTLEFIELD AUTOMATION - ARMY'S
DIGITAL BATTLEFIELD PLAN LACKS
SPECIFIC MEASURABLE GOALS

GAO/NSIAD-96-25

Battlefield Automation

(707078)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  B2C2 -
  DOD -
  DOT&E -
  EPLRS -
  FBCB2 -
  OPTEC -

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-261753

November 29, 1995

Congressional Committees

One of the Army's top priorities is a program to digitize the
battlefield by creating a vast network of computers, sensors, and
communications systems that would provide a common picture of the
battlefield from soldier to commander simultaneously.  Because of the
importance and estimated $4 billion cost of this program, we reviewed
the "Army Digitization Master Plan" to evaluate the Army's efforts to
digitize the battlefield, including the Marine Corps' participation. 
We conducted this review under our basic legislative responsibilities
and are addressing this report to you because we believe it will be
of interest to your committees. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Army's plan to digitize the battlefield is expensive, contains
many risks, and lacks specific, measurable goals for the series of
large-scale experiments that are to be conducted.  The Army is
planning to conduct a series of experiments from 1995 to 1997,
including a brigade-level experiment in 1997 at a cost of $258
million,\1 without having had a successful battalion-level
experiment.  In fact, a battalion-level experiment in 1994 failed to
meet Army expectations.  Specific, measurable goals are needed to
evaluate the achievements of each experiment, and they should be met
before proceeding to the next experiment.  Otherwise, the Army is
unnecessarily risking additional investments amounting to $397
million for digital systems needed to conduct increasingly larger
scale experiments to fiscal year 1999.  Based on Army estimates, the
investment required to digitize a 10 division Army could be as high
as $4 billion.  Also, because Congress has directed the Army to
include the Marine Corps in its plan, the Department of Defense (DOD)
funding for the Marine Corps needs to be identified and assured to
solidify its participation and success. 


--------------------
\1 This includes 1,230 appliques, new software, a new digital radio,
message protocols and standards, simulations and experiments, and
evaluation of the results of the experiments from fiscal years 1995
through 1997. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Automation of the battlefield has been a long-term goal of the Army
because of its promise as a force multiplier:  it produces greater
fighting effectiveness through better use of battlefield resources. 
Digitization of the battlefield is the Army's latest effort to bring
it closer to its long-term goal.  Prior Army efforts focused on
automating command and control at the corps and division levels
whereas digitization extends this automation to the brigade and lower
echelons, including individual weapons platforms. 

Digitization of the battlefield is part of a major effort to reshape
the Army and, thus, it is one of the Army's highest priorities.  The
Army hopes to identify how digitization will improve combat power and
how to change its organizational structure, doctrine, and tactics to
take advantage of digitization. 

Army battlefield digitization started in the 1980s with the
development of five corps- and division-level command and control
systems collectively known as the Army Tactical Command and Control
System.  Their development and fielding have been a struggle.  Two
systems were fielded in 1993 and 1994, with limited capabilities. 
Two other systems are scheduled to undergo operational testing in
1995 and in 1996.  The fifth system is scheduled to undergo its
second operational test in 1996. 

The Army's strategy for digitizing the battlefield uses a bottom-up
approach that experiments echelon by echelon with several digital
systems simultaneously.  It is a massive effort involving brigade-,
division-, and corps-level experiments over the next 5 years. 
Advanced warfighting experiments were performed in 1993 at the
company level, and in 1994 at the battalion level.  Current plans
call for a brigade experiment in February 1997, a division experiment
in February 1998, and a corps experiment in April 1999. 

There are many digital systems to evaluate.  For example, 25 unique
digital systems and more than 120 items of equipment were evaluated
in the battalion experiment.  More than 40 digital systems, including
potentially 1,200 appliques,\2 may be evaluated during the brigade
experiment.  The applique, which began its development when a
contract was awarded on January 6, 1995, will provide digital
capability to weapon systems that do not have any. 

The major feature of the applique will be the situational awareness
that it provides to its users.  A digital map will display the
locations of friendly and enemy forces and update their movement in
near real time.  This common picture will be provided simultaneously
to all units in the brigade, from the command staff to the individual
M1 tanks and other weapons platforms. 


--------------------
\2 "Applique" is the name in general use for what is formally known
as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System.  It
consists basically of a laptop computer, FBCB2 applications software,
a Global Positioning System receiver, and a communications interface. 


   DIGITIZATION PLAN REQUIRES HIGH
   INVESTMENT IN EARLY PHASES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The investment required for what the Army describes as the equivalent
of the concept exploration and definition phase is $272 million
through fiscal year 1997.  For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the
equivalent of the demonstration and validation phase and the
engineering and manufacturing development phase, the cost is expected
to be $125 million, bringing the total development effort to $397
million.  The cost primarily covers the development and acquisition
of the applique and its integration onto many different vehicles,
helicopters, and other platforms.  It also covers the development of
a digital radio and other related products.  These research and
development costs are relatively high because it is expensive to
equip a battalion, a brigade, a division, and a corps with appliques
for experiments.  In the conventional concept exploration and
definition phase, only a few prototypes of a system would be bought
for experiments.  The Army's position is that, although these costs
are relatively high, the resources are needed to demonstrate the
utility of a digitized force. 

Through 2005, the Army estimates that $2.1 billion is needed to field
and sustain Force Package I.\3 About 77 percent of this amount is to
equip the force with appliques.  The cost to equip the rest of the
Army with appliques is not known, but according to Army officials, it
could be $2 billion through 2011.  This is in addition to funds
already programmed for other digital battlefield efforts such as the
five systems that comprise the Army Tactical Command and Control
System and the embedded systems whose costs are born by the weapon
systems themselves. 


--------------------
\3 Force Package I units are the highest priority combat units in the
Army since these units deploy first and require the highest level of
equipment support and training.  The term Force Package I includes
five divisions along with their corps headquarters and combat service
support elements. 


   DIGITIZATION PLAN HAS NUMEROUS
   RISKS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Army faces numerous technical, program, cost, and schedule risks
in implementing its master plan for battlefield digitization.  These
risks are integration, software development, hardware costs, unknown
quantity requirements, communications, and interoperability with
other command and control systems. 


      INTEGRATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

The integration of the applique onto different platforms represents a
technical risk.  The underlying cause of this risk is that each
platform is different and requires a separate solution in terms of
installation kits.  For example, the installation kit that works for
a tank may not necessarily work for an infantry fighting vehicle or a
helicopter. 


      SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

Software development is an additional technical, cost, and schedule
risk in our view because no appliques have been delivered and tested. 
More will be known after a critical design review in August 1995, and
evaluations of interim software currently scheduled for July,
September, and December 1995 and January and May 1996 have occurred. 
During this period, soldiers from Fort Knox will evaluate each
version of software. 

Implementing all software functions and requirements will require
additional engineering; in fact, 30 percent of applique software,
which is needed for the brigade experiment, is estimated to be new
code.  The rest of the software is existing Brigade and Below Command
and Control (B2C2) software\4 and elements of the Forward Area Air
Defense Command and Control, the Combat Service Support Control
System, and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System software,
which have only been demonstrated separately and not as an integrated
system. 


--------------------
\4 An earlier version of this software was used during the battalion
experiment at the National Training Center in April 1994. 


      HARDWARE COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

Applique hardware costs may be understated, depending on (1) how
frequently hardware will be replaced, (2) what mix of computers will
be used in future experiments and fieldings, and (3) whether higher
end machines with more memory and speed will be needed.  The Army may
be required to upgrade applique computers every 2 to 3 years or
sooner to take advantage of industry's technology advancements.  The
Army is still deciding on the proper mix of militarized, ruggedized,
and commercial computers to be used for the brigade experiment. 
Currently, it is moving away from militarized toward ruggedized
computers, which are less costly.  However, the commercial computers,
which are the least costly of the three variants,\5 may not be rugged
enough for the job.  If the brigade experiment shows that more
militarized and ruggedized computers are needed, that would drive up
the costs of future experiments and deployment.  The brigade
experiment may also show that the appliques cannot do the job in
terms of memory and speed.  If so, higher end machines would be
required, which will also increase costs. 


--------------------
\5 The militarized computer costs about $93,000, the ruggedized
computer over $14,000, and the commercial computer about $11,000
based on program unit costs.  Militarized hardware has been
specifically designed for military use under adverse conditions. 
Ruggedized hardware is more robust than commercial computers but less
stringent than militarized hardware. 


      QUANTITY REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4

Cost risk is further aggravated by unknown quantity requirements for
the applique.  Because total quantity requirements are unknown, the
total cost of the applique and the FBCB2 program is unknown.  The
1997 brigade experiment may show that installing an applique in every
tank, helicopter, and weapon system is useful but not affordable. 


      COMMUNICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.5

Army officials have told us that having adequate communications is
key to the 1997 brigade experiment; otherwise, it may have to be
postponed.  The Army is developing a tactical internet that increases
the digital capacity and connectivity of three existing radio based
communications systems.\6 However, the tactical internet is not
expected to be delivered to the Army until May 1996, only 1 month
before the start of training for the experiment.  Consequently, it
represents a significant schedule risk. 

If successful, the tactical internet will provide a short-term
solution to meeting the Army's data distribution needs.  However,
long-term needs will increase as the Army becomes dependent on
automation and adds new digital systems to its inventory.  Because of
this, Army officials told us that they will require two new data
distribution systems, one in the interim to be potentially more
capable but less costly than the current system, EPLRS, and another
one in the future to meet long-term needs.  Developing an interim
digital communications system for a 10 division Army could cost at
least as much as EPLRS, or more than $900 million, and could take
years to field.\7 In our view, the data distribution issue is the
weak link in the Army's plan because a new, interim system will be
needed to meet the increasing communications demands imposed by the
digital battlefield in the next century.  Until it is resolved, we do
not believe the full potential of battlefield digitization or
automation will be realized. 


--------------------
\6 These three systems are the Enhanced Position Location Reporting
System (EPLRS) --a dedicated data distribution system at division and
below, the Mobile Subscriber Equipment--a voice and data
communications system with telephone-like service in the corps and
division areas, and the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
System-- a new generation of combat radios used primarily for voice
communications in all Army units down to the platoon level. 

\7 Cost would depend on the technology, capacity, speed and grade of
service, and the number of subscribers in the network. 


      INTEROPERABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.6

A schedule risk is posed because a number of systems must
interoperate with the applique and be available for integration and
testing prior to the 1997 brigade experiment.  An example would be
the five division- and corps-level systems that comprise the Army
Tactical Command and Control System.  Interoperability has been
demonstrated through a very limited number of messages being
exchanged between these systems.  However, database to database
exchange, which is critical to providing commanders with an accurate,
near real-time common picture of the battlefield, has not been
achieved. 


      ARMY RISK REDUCTION EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.7

In commenting on our report, the Army recognizes the risks that we
discuss and believes that it has taken steps to mitigate them.  These
include (1) the establishment of the Army Digitization Office, which
provides high-level oversight by reporting to the Chief of Staff of
the Army; (2) the establishment of the Digital Integrated Laboratory
to assess interoperability issues; (3) the establishment of a "user
jury" to provide early assessments of applique performance; and (4)
the development of a Risk Management Master Plan.  While these
efforts are commendable, we still believe that the risks are
substantial in number and formidable obstacles to the success of the
digitization of the battlefield and we will continue to monitor the
program to determine whether these risk reduction efforts really
work. 


   EXPERIMENTATION APPROACH IS
   INADEQUATE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The Army's experimentation master plan states what experiments are to
be performed through 1999, but it does not provide specific goals and
clear criteria to support decisions to proceed with the experiments
and buy additional appliques and other equipment.  Thus, there is no
criteria for measuring whether the experiments will be successful. 
As a result, the Army could continue to conduct large-scale, costly
experiments at the brigade, division, and corps level, no matter what
the results would be.  For example, the 1994 battalion-level
experiment lacked specific goals and exit criteria.  Despite poor
results in that experiment, the Army is moving on to a larger scale,
brigade-level experiment in 1997, at a cost of $258 million.  In
addition, the Army's experimentation approach lacks adequate
instrumentation and data collection. 


      EXPERIMENTATION APPROACH
      LACKS SPECIFIC GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

Specific, measurable, and quantifiable goals are needed to evaluate
program achievements and assure program success.  The Army's
Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) stated this
requirement in its report on the 1994 experiment.  Its recommendation
was to "establish entrance criteria for hardware and software to
ensure equipment used by the units is reliable and interoperable, and
insights and data generated on force effectiveness meet established
goals and expectations."

Although the experimentation plan identifies numerous goals, such as
increased lethality, it does not say how much lethality is to be
achieved from the battalion experiment to the brigade and
division-level experiments.  Increased lethality is measured by many
factors, such as the number of enemy troops, artillery pieces, and
helicopters lost in battle.  However, neither numeric criteria nor a
baseline is given for these factors.  The Army intends to determine
effectiveness based on increasing trends in a series of simulations,
technical tests, and field and subfield experiments over the next 5
years. 

The Army does not believe that either pass/fail criteria or a
baseline are necessary at this stage since it is only experimenting. 
However, given that the experiment is expensive and important to its
future, the Army should have measurable goals that it is expecting to
achieve.  Attainment or nonattainment of these goals, rather than
subjective assessments alone, can best show the Army where it must
direct its resources and whether it is appropriate to proceed to the
next experiment. 


      1994 DIGITIZED BATTALION
      EXPERIMENT DID NOT MEET
      EXPECTATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

From April 10 to April 23, 1994, a battalion-level experiment was
conducted at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. 
It was the first experiment to use a digitized battalion task force. 
The experiment did not have (1) specific goals, (2) a specific way to
measure success, or (3) a baseline to compare the digitized
battalion's performance to.  However, some Army leaders expected that
the digitized "blue" force would defeat its nondigitized opponent
called the "red" force.  This did not happen. 

In the absence of specific goals, thresholds for performance, and a
baseline, the Army compared the outcomes of seven nondigitized units
that participated in four training rotations against the same
well-trained red force at about the same time.  Four units were at
the National Training Center prior to April 1994, one at the same
time as the digitized battalion, and two were there after the
digitized unit's exercise.  The comparison showed that the blue force
generally performed no better than the seven other nondigitized blue
forces against the red force.  For example, the loss exchange ratio
(the ratio of enemy losses to friendly losses) of the digitized blue
force was about the same as the seven nondigitized blue forces in
offensive and defensive engagements.  The main reasons for these poor
results were the immaturity of the B2C2 software, its lack of
interoperability with the M1A2 tank's command and control software,\8
and a lack of hands-on training with the digital systems.  Despite
these poor results, the Army decided to proceed to the brigade-level
experiment instead of redoing the battalion experiment because it
would have slowed the digitization effort by a year and cost several
million dollars. 


--------------------
\8 This software is part of the Intervehicular Information System,
which is embedded in the Army's newest tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles. 


      ADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AND
      DATA COLLECTION ARE LACKING
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

Instead of using a more controlled test environment like an
operational test where empirical data can be collected by
instruments, the Army used a warfighting experiment environment and
less instrumentation and data collection.  As a result, OPTEC could
not collect enough data to assess the performance of digitization in
the 1994 battalion experiment.  It reported that

     ".  .  .  additional instrumentation at critical nodes would
     allow increased confidence in experiment outcomes.  It would
     permit a determination of when systems are operational, when
     they are used, how much they are used, who is communicating with
     whom .  .  .  and if the systems are down, is the cause
     hardware, software, radio propagation, or human error.  .  .  . 
     The lack of instrumentation does not provide system developers
     the kind of information they need to troubleshoot problems
     identified during the exercise and make needed fixes."

Objective data is vital in decisions to proceed to the next
experiment and finally to full-rate production and deployment.  The
Army is planning to provide a more controlled environment for data
collection of 100 instrumented vehicles during a 9-month training
period prior to the February 1997 brigade experiment.  However, it is
unclear whether this will be enough in the context of numbers and
critical nodes.  The Army, in conjunction with an independent test
agency, needs to decide specifically what instrumentation is needed
to provide sufficient objective data to support moving the experiment
forward. 


   MARINE CORPS FUNDING ISSUES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Last year, Congress directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in
its plans for the digital battlefield.  This has been done.  Also, in
fiscal year 1995, the Army provided the Marine Corps with $429,000 to
help it launch its digitization program.  The Army will also provide
the Marines--at a cost of about $2.3 million to the Army-- with
enough appliques and installation kits to equip a light-armored
reconnaissance company to participate in the 1997 brigade experiment. 

Despite these efforts, the Marines will have a $4.8 million shortfall
in fiscal year 1996 research and development funds for equipment,
engineering support, and operational demonstrations, which will
affect its preparation for the Army's 1997 brigade experiment.  The
Army says it cannot provide additional assistance to the Marines
because it has no more resources.  Thus, the Marines' participation
in the Army's 1997 experiment appears to be unknown. 

This situation illustrates that the Marine Corps needs assured
funding to solidify its participation and success in all of the
Army's digital battlefield experiments.  These experiments may show
that the Marines need additional appliques and communications systems
to assure its interoperability with the Army in future joint combat
operations.  Thus, the Army; the Navy, which oversees Marine Corps
funding; and DOD need to work together to produce a specific plan to
create and assure Marine Corps funding. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

To help ensure that resources are directed appropriately and the Army
has the data it needs to determine whether it should (1) buy
additional appliques and (2) proceed to the next level of
experiments, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the
Secretary of the Army to develop specific, measurable goals and exit
criteria for each phase of digital battlefield experimentation. 
Further, the Secretary of Defense should independently verify the
goals' attainments. 

To carry out congressional direction, we also recommend the Secretary
of Defense insure that the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps identify resources to support the Marine Corps'
participation and success in the Army's battlefield digitization
effort. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

DOD partially concurred with the recommendations in our draft report. 
While the steps it plans to take on eventually establishing
measurable goals substantially complies with our recommendation, we
still have differences on the timing and specificity of the goals and
the independent verification of the attainment of those goals. 

DOD believes that while it is necessary to have some means to judge
the outcome of these large-scale experiments, it is too early in the
program to have specific goals and measurable standards that have a
pass or fail criteria associated with them.  We disagree and continue
to maintain that specific, measurable goals are needed, even at this
early stage because of the expenses involved, the scale and
progressive nature of the experiments, and their importance to the
Army.  By not establishing specific goals now at this level of
experimentation, DOD and the Army are escalating risk as each
advanced warfighting experiment progresses from the brigade to the
division and finally to the corps levels.  The DOD-supported Army
approach continues the risk associated with acquiring millions of
dollars of appliques and other related developments without knowing
whether previous experiments were successful.  Without some limits
and controls, the Army could spend hundreds of millions of dollars on
these experiments without having an adequate basis to judge whether
it should continue them. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the attainment
of these yet to be established measurable goals needs to be
independently verified by DOD and points to the involvement of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).  We acknowledge
that DOT&E involvement is a very positive step in the direction we
recommend.  However, it is still unclear whether DOT&E will actually
(1) approve of specific, measurable goals early on as we recommend
instead of the general ones that DOD and the Army advocate and (2)
verify the attainment of those goals in each advanced warfighting
experiment. 

DOD's recognition of the Marine Corps' funding issue and its
statement that it is working with the services to resolve it,
essentially complies with the intent of our recommendation.  We
intend to monitor DOD's implementation efforts. 

DOD's comments are addressed in the body of this report where
appropriate and are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along
with our evaluation. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

We performed our review primarily at the Army Digitization Office in
Washington, D.C., and the Program Executive Office for Command and
Control Systems, and the Program Executive Office for Communications
Systems at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.  We also visited the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Armor
Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas; OPTEC, Arlington, Virginia; and the Program
Executive Office for Aviation, St.  Louis, Missouri.  In addition, we
contacted DOD's DOT&E, Washington, D.C.; and the U.S.  Marine Corps
Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia. 

We conducted our review between October 1994 and June 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Copies will also be
made available to others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202)512-6548 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  The major contributors to this
report were
William L.  Wright, Donald F.  Lopes, and Edwin B.  Griffin. 

Louis J.  Rodrigues
Director, Systems Development
 and Production Issues

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W.  Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 

See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 4. 


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated August 25, 1995. 


   GAO COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

1.  We have identified these efforts in the body of our report.  We
believe that the Army's intentions are encouraging.  However, we will
continue to monitor the program to determine whether these risk
reduction efforts really work.  We still believe that the risks are
substantial in number and formidable obstacles to the success of the
digitization of the battlefield. 

2.  The steps the Army plans to take on eventually establishing
measurable goals substantially complies with our recommendation.  We
still have differences on the timing and specificity of the goals and
the independent verification of the attainment of those goals.  DOD
believes that while it is necessary to have some means to judge the
outcome of these large scale experiments, it is too early in the
program to have specific goals and measurable standards that have a
pass or fail criteria associated with them.  We disagree and continue
to maintain that specific, measurable goals are needed, even at this
early stage because of the expenses involved, the scale and
progressive nature of the experiments, and their importance to the
Army.  By not establishing specific goals now at this level of
experimentation, DOD and the Army are escalating risk at higher
levels as each advanced warfighting experiment progresses from the
brigade to the division and finally to the corps levels.  DOD
supported Army approach continues the risk associated with acquiring
millions of dollars of appliques and other related developments
without knowing whether previous experiments were successful. 
Without some limits and controls, the Army could spend hundreds of
millions of dollars on these experiments without having an adequate
basis to judge whether it should continue with them. 

3.  We acknowledge that the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) involvement is a very positive step in the direction we
recommend.  However, it is still unclear whether DOT&E will actually
(1) approve of specific, measurable goals early on as we recommend
instead of the general ones as DOD and the Army advocate and (2)
verify the attainment of those goals in each advanced warfighting
experiment. 

4.  DOD's recognition of the Marine Corps' funding issue and its
statement that it is working with the services to resolve it,
essentially complies with the intent of our recommendation.  We will
continue to monitor DOD's implementation efforts. 

*** End of document. ***