Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive
Office of the President (Letter Report, 10/19/95, GAO/NSIAD-96-20).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the White House's
procedures for issuing access passes and security clearances since
January 20, 1993, focusing on the: (1) steps involved in the access pass
approval process; and (2) internal controls over the access pass and
security clearance processes.

GAO found that: (1) in 1993, White House access passes for new employees
took an average of 346 days from the employees' start date; (2) in 1994,
the average time for access pass approval fell to 98 days; (3) in 1993,
processing delays were primarily attributable to the time individuals
took to complete security clearance forms and to subsequent actions
taken by the Executive Office of the President; (4) there were no
written time standards for completing the various access pass processes,
except for the goals set by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
during 1993; (5) the White House set a standard in March 1994 that gave
each employee 30 days to complete the security clearance forms; (6) the
FBI raised its goal for completing background investigations from 45
days to 60 days in late 1994; and (7) there is potential for
strengthening controls relating to renewing temporary passes, revoking
passes after separation, and granting security clearances.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-20
     TITLE:  Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for 
             the Executive Office of the President
      DATE:  10/19/95
   SUBJECT:  Information disclosure
             Paperwork
             Public service employment
             Internal controls
             Investigations by federal agencies
             Executive orders
             Federal employees
             Personnel records
             Confidential records

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1995

PERSONNEL SECURITY - PASS AND
SECURITY CLEARANCE DATA FOR THE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

GAO/NSIAD-96-20

Personnel Security

(709077)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  SF - Standard Form

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-265771

October 19, 1995

The Honorable William F.  Clinger, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on Government
 Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank R.  Wolf
The Honorable Porter J.  Goss
House of Representatives

You asked us to review the White House's procedures for access passes
and security clearances issued since January 20, 1993.  Because of
reported delays of over a year in issuing passes, you expressed
concerns about how the White House was managing the access pass and
security clearance processes.  As agreed with your offices, this
report presents our (1) analysis of the steps in the access pass
approval process for 1993 and 1994 and (2) observations on internal
controls over the access pass and security clearance processes. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

One of the ways the Secret Service protects the President and other
senior officials is the use of a system of access passes to the White
House complex.  According to the Secret Service, about 7,000 people
have passes allowing access to the White House complex, which
includes the White House, the Old Executive Office Building, and the
New Executive Office Building.  The number varies daily and includes
members of the press, military personnel, Secret Service employees,
as well as employees of the Executive Office of the President,
detailees from other government agencies, volunteers, contractor
employees, and residence staff.  Our review covers staff and
contractors from selected offices of the Executive Office of the
President, totaling 638 individuals. 

The various types of White House access passes\1 fall into two
categories--temporary passes, which are issued initially for 90 days
and can be extended beyond the initial period, and permanent passes. 
The process, as first documented in March 1994, for obtaining a
temporary access pass requires employees to

  complete and submit required paperwork, including the Questionnaire
     for Sensitive Positions Form (Standard Form (SF)-86) and

  undergo limited background checks by the Secret Service and the
     Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

The process for obtaining a permanent access pass generally requires
the following: 

  The relevant Executive Office of the President security office
     reviews the required paperwork and forwards it to the FBI. 

  The FBI conducts a background investigation. 

  The Executive Office of the President reviews the FBI report and
     other information and determines whether to recommend approval
     of a permanent pass. 

  The Secret Service issues the pass, if it has no objections
     relating to protective interest issues. 

See appendix II for a detailed discussion of the above processes. 

The White House allows employees of the White House Office, the
Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development
with permanent White House passes and a need-to-know to have access
to information classified up to the top secret level.  Staff from
other offices within the Executive Office of the President grant
security clearances under Executive Order 10450, as amended.\2

To measure timeliness of the pass process, we analyzed dates in the
process for employees who entered on duty between January 20, 1993,
and September 16, 1994.  These 638 individuals were paid from
appropriations available to 5 offices of the Executive Office of the
President.\3 As agreed with your offices, the scope of our work was
to determine the time it took to obtain passes and analyze time
intervals for selected steps in the process.  The White House
explained the reasons for some of the processing times and we
incorporated these statements as appropriate.  However, we did not
evaluate the reasons for time frame delays or the White House
explanations.  Appendix I describes, in detail, the scope and
methodology of our review. 


--------------------
\1 The Secret Service identified 35 different types of access passes,
including several for access to the White House, several for access
to the Old Executive Office Building, several for access to the New
Executive Office Building, and 3 for members of the press to gain
access to limited parts of the White House complex. 

\2 Executive Order 10450 provides the basic security standards for
agencies to follow.  Executive
Order 12968, issued on August 4, 1995, updated and revised the
government's personnel security program, but did not supersede
Executive Order 10450. 

\3 These included employees who were, according to White House
officials, on track to receive a permanent pass.  The employees
included current and former staff, contractors, and detailees who
worked for one of the following offices within the Executive Office
of the President:  the White House Office, the Office of the Vice
President, the Office of Policy Development, the Office of
Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  Not
included were unpaid volunteers and individuals who were employed for
short periods early in the administration. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Individuals entering on duty during 1993 received final approval for
permanent White House access passes an average of 346 days from their
start date, but the average time of approval fell to 98 days for
staff entering in 1994.\4 According to White House officials, the
White House has not historically tracked time interval data related
to the access pass process, thus we could not compare the information
we analyzed to prior experience. 

Figure 1 shows the relative time needed to obtain a permanent pass in
1993 and 1994 for each process step. 

   Figure 1:  Average Time
   Required to Complete Selected
   Steps in the Permanent Access
   Pass Process During 1993 and
   1994

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  The times for individual steps do not add to the total
processing times because not all individuals were involved in every
step.  Also, no interval is shown for the submission of the SF-86 in
1994 because the SF-86 was signed on average before an individual
entered on duty. 

The longer time needed to process 1993 entrants was primarily
attributable to the time individuals took to complete the SF-86 and
to subsequent actions taken by the Executive Office of the President. 
These actions include the time taken to review the SF-86; and then to
review the FBI investigative report and other reports, and recommend
that a permanent access pass be approved. 

During 1993, there were no written time standards for completing the
various access pass processes, except for goals set by the FBI
relating to its segment of the process.  The White House set a
standard in March 1994 that gave each employee 30 days to complete
the SF-86.  The Treasury, Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations Act for 1995
(P.L.  103-329), enacted in September 1994, made this standard a
legal requirement and also mandated that, with certain exceptions, an
appropriate access pass be recommended for approval within 6 months
after a person entered on duty with the Executive Office of the
President.  The FBI raised its goal for completing background
investigations from
45 days to 60 days in late 1994.  Although the FBI did not always
meet this goal, FBI and Secret Service actions did not substantially
add to the processing time in 1993. 

White House and congressional actions have established process
changes and controls to improve the access pass and security
clearance processes.  For the time intervals and offices we reviewed,
with few exceptions, the time intervals declined, and the procedures
were adhered to.  However, our observations indicate a potential for
strengthening controls in several selected areas, particularly at the
start of a new administration.  The areas related to renewing
temporary passes, revoking passes after separation, and granting
security clearances.  The scope of our work did not address whether
problems occurred as a result of the potential control weaknesses. 
While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is
appropriate to consider improving these controls. 


--------------------
\4 These are the averages for all individuals approved for access
passes.  In the appendixes, we also discuss averages based on
adjustments reflecting cases where an individual deviated from the
steps generally followed in the process.  For example, an individual
may have completed certain paperwork for the process because of prior
employment before entering on duty with the Executive Office of the
President. 


   PROCESSING TIMES WERE LONGER IN
   1993 THAN IN 1994
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The processing time between when a person entered on duty, obtained a
temporary pass, and received Secret Service approval for a permanent
pass was substantially shorter in 1994 than in 1993.\5 The White
House attributed the time reductions in the process to the following
reasons:  the number of individuals entering on duty decreased in
1994; the White House corrected inefficiencies and implemented
computerized tracking; the White House and Congress established time
standards; and staff and officials became more experienced with the
process.  The two steps that most contributed to the lengthy
processing time during 1993 were the time taken by employees to
submit paperwork and the Executive Office of the President to review
it. 


--------------------
\5 Unless otherwise specified, a specific year refers to when an
action began, but did not necessarily conclude. 


      EMPLOYEE TIMELINESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The amount of time individuals took to complete the SF-86 after
entering on duty was reduced from about 100 days to a few days or
less from 1993 to 1994.  According to White House officials, this
change occurred because the White House issued standards in March
1994 that required individuals to submit the SF-86 within 30 days of
entering on duty.  Public Law 103-329 put this 30-day requirement in
law.  Prior to these actions, there were no documented Executive
Office of the President standards for this part of the process. 
However, White House officials said that informal standards existed. 
(See app.  III.)


      AGENCY TIMELINESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

The times needed by the Executive Office of the President to (1)
review the SF-86 for completeness before submitting it to the FBI and
(2) review the FBI's investigative report and other documentation and
recommend to the Secret Service that a permanent pass be issued
declined from 1993 to 1994.  The second step took 174 days in 1993
and 46 days in 1994. 

The FBI was not always able to meet its goal for conducting
background investigations during either 1993 or 1994 and increased
its goal from
45 days to 60 days in late 1994.  FBI officials cited several reasons
for not meeting the goal, including an increased overall caseload and
reduced resources. 

The average number of days it took the Secret Service to approve a
permanent pass after the Executive Office of the President
recommended that a pass be approved decreased from 29 days in 1993 to
7 days in 1994.  The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in
part to the Executive Office of the President not promptly sending
pass requests to the Secret Service and the 1994 average to the time
needed to address questions related to protective interest issues. 
We analyzed information provided by the Secret Service for 1994 that
showed relatively short processing times within the Service, but it
was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons for delay. 
Similar data for 1993 were not available.  (See app.  III.)


   OBSERVATIONS ON CONTROLS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

White House and legislative actions have resulted in a number of
process changes and additional controls designed to improve the
timeliness of the access pass and security clearance processes.  The
data we analyzed show that these changes, with few exceptions, are
being adhered to.  For example, when it was discovered that a career
employee had taken longer than the 6 months allowed under Public Law
103-329 to be recommended for a permanent pass, the Executive Office
of the President initiated action to suspend the employee.  The issue
causing the delay was resolved within a month and a pass was issued. 
Also, most individuals have complied with a March 14, 1994, Chief of
Staff directive to complete the SF-86 within a specified time, up to
30 days, although 11 did not.  As described below, we have several
observations on potential opportunities to strengthen controls. 

First, we noted that the White House procedures and legislative
provisions recognize the possibility of delays beyond employee or
Executive Office of the President control, such as reviews by other
agencies taking several months to complete.  Additional attention may
be warranted to strengthen controls when it is necessary to renew
temporary access passes in these situations.  Temporary passes give
people access to the White House complex while they wait for a
permanent pass and are usually issued to individuals within a few
days of when they enter on duty.  Temporary passes are usually issued
for 90 days but may be extended in 30-day increments.  Individuals
included in our analysis held temporary passes for an average of 341
days prior to obtaining final approval for a permanent pass in 1993
and for 110 days in 1994.  Our discussions with Secret Service
officials and our analyses indicated that during the longer
processing times in 1993, the Service routinely granted eight or more
extensions to individuals for temporary passes as requested by the
Executive Office of the President.  Secret Service officials stated
that during the initial transitions of administrations it was normal
to have more frequent extensions.  (See app.  IV.)

Second, additional attention may be warranted to strengthen controls
to ensure that both temporary and permanent passes are revoked when
an individual leaves, when appropriate.  Of the 638 records we
analyzed, 188 (29 percent) show that the individuals had left their
designated Executive Office of the President organization.  We did
not verify whether permanent passes were voided or returned in these
cases.\6

However, the data showed that seven permanent passes were approved by
the Secret Service after the person left.  In these cases, Secret
Service officials said that they either did not know these people had
left the Executive Office of the President or were told the person
still needed a pass.  The Secret Service has no process to verify an
individual's continued need for a pass.  Secret Service officials
stated that they rely on the White House to notify them when an
individual leaves or a pass should be terminated.  White House
officials stated that they monitor arrivals and departures of staff
closely and that passes are returned unless retention is justified. 
We confirmed that the White House has procedures in this area, but we
did not discuss specific cases.  (See app.  IV.)

Third, procedures may be needed to require interim security
clearances for White House Office staff who later receive access to
classified information if they hold permanent access passes.  Through
December 1994, 381 of 638 records we analyzed show that the person
had been authorized access to classified information.  These included
359 personnel in the White House Office, the Office of the Vice
President, and the Office of Policy Development who could have been
given access to classified information on a need-to-know basis if
they held a permanent White House pass.\7 Also, 22 individuals in the
Office of Administration and the Office of National Drug Control
Policy could have been granted access under Executive Order 10450. 
The first of the permanent White House passes was not approved until
September 30, 1993, and the first of the 22 security clearances was
not granted until June 22, 1993.\8 We asked how the offices conducted
business involving classified information during these 8- and 5-month
periods.  White House officials stated that about two dozen senior
staff received interim clearances during this time.  They also stated
that the overwhelming majority of the classified work done in the
Executive Office of the President is done by the staff of the
National Security Council, which is not one of the offices included
in the data we analyzed.  Procedures for dealing with similar
circumstances in future administrations may be needed.  (See app. 
IV.)


--------------------
\6 We used individual records with specific identifying data excluded
and thus could not follow up on specific cases. 

\7 Secret Service officials stated that their procedures for granting
access passes do not involve security clearance issues. 

\8 In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time he entered
on duty. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

In oral comments on a draft of this report, White House officials
generally agreed with our statistical analysis.  However, they raised
concerns about our observations on the potential for strengthening of
selected controls.  They specifically stated that we had not
identified actual problems resulting from these potential weaknesses. 
We agreed that is the case because the scope of our work did not
extend beyond a review of the process.  We clarified this point in
the report where appropriate. 

Our position is that selected control measures can be improved and
not that a specific problem has occurred.  For example, we discussed
controls over passes and clearances because the procedures we
examined indicated the potential for additional internal controls in
these areas.  Our limited review did not examine either the controls
or their effects in-depth, but we believe that the issues warrant
consideration.  We believe that the need for such controls is most
apparent at the beginning of a new administration; thus our
discussion of them is not based on the existence of documented
problems. 

White House officials also suggested several technical corrections,
which we made as appropriate. 

In oral comments on a draft of this report, Secret Service officials
generally agreed with our report.  They suggested several technical
corrections, which we made as appropriate. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the FBI asked that we
clarify certain information.  We revised the report to reflect the
FBI's comment.  (See app.  V.)


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date.  At
that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional
committees, the White House Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the
President for Management and Administration, the Attorney General,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Director of the Secret Service, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties.  We
will make copies available to others on request.  If you have any
questions concerning this report, please call me on (202) 512-8412. 
Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

David R.  Warren
Director, Defense Management
  and NASA Issues


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

To assess timeliness of processing White House access passes and
security clearances, we examined the time intervals associated with
each processing step; reviewed the process and associated laws,
regulations, policies, and procedures; and interviewed officials from
the Executive Office of the President, Secret Service, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of Government Ethics, and
Defense Finance and Accounting Service. 

To calculate the processing time for passes and clearances, we
collected the following key event dates associated with processing
steps for staff\1 assigned to the White House Office, Special
Assistance to the President (Vice President's Office), Office of
Policy Development, Office of Administration, and Office of National
Drug Control Policy, on or after January 20, 1993, who were paid with
Executive Office of the President appropriated funds and needed a
permanent pass. 

1.  Date the person entered on duty. 
2.  Date the Standard Form (SF)-50 was signed.\2


3.  Date the person took a drug test.\3


4.  Date the person signed the SF-86. 
5.  Date the person was issued a temporary pass. 
6.  Date the FBI initiated a background investigation. 
7.  Date the FBI finished the investigation. 
8.  Date the permanent pass was approved.\4


9.  Date the permanent pass was issued.\5


10.  Date the security clearance was granted.\6


11.  Date the person separated, if applicable. 

For reasons of confidentiality, the White House provided a number and
office designation for individuals covered in our analysis. 

The White House compiled a database containing an identifier and the
key dates, when available,\7 for each of 638 individuals.  Dates were
provided for (1) individuals entering on duty as of January 20, 1993,
through September 16, 1994, and (2) process steps completed by
December 13, 1994.  Dates associated with processing steps involving
the Secret Service and FBI were supplied to the White House by those
agencies.  We received the database containing the key event dates
from the White House in January 1995 and worked with the White House
to correct administrative mistakes found in the database.  We also
verified a random sample of event dates using original personnel
documents and other records. 

We analyzed intervals between key event dates to determine average,
minimum, and maximum processing times as well as trends over time. 
We discussed our analyses with White House, Secret Service, and FBI
officials to determine reasons for individual processing times and
for overall trends.  We also discussed procedures and controls over
granting access passes and security clearances.  In our analyses, we
obtained White House explanations of individual cases and overall
trends, but we did not further examine supporting documentation for
these individual cases, as agreed with the requesters' offices.  The
effects of the limited examinations are noted in the report where
appropriate. 

After the database was finalized, White House officials proposed that
dates for 54 individuals not be included since they reflected
anomalies that skew the analysis.\8 We agree that these individuals
followed a different pattern than the majority of individuals in the
database.  However, they do represent the actual pass approval
process for these individuals; consequently, we present both sets of
data in our detailed analyses. 

Excluding the 54 individuals, in most instances, increased the
average amount of time for an interval.  Some individuals received a
pass when employed by an office that was not subject to this review. 
For example, a person who was employed in January 1993 by the Office
of Management and Budget, an office not included in our analysis,
could have received a permanent pass and then transferred in 1994 to
the White House Office.  As a result, the record would show a 1994
entered-on-duty date and earlier times for all other key event dates. 
The effect of this in our analysis is that when the entered-on-duty
date is analyzed against the other key event dates, the result is a
negative number.\9 In our overall analyses, we added all the time
differences, negative and positive, to calculate an average. 

We conducted our review from May 1994 to August 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------
\1 Staff included long-term contractors, reimbursable detailees
(terms of 6 months or more), and consultants, as well as career and
political appointment staff needing a permanent pass. 

\2 The SF-50 indicates that a personnel action has been completed; in
this case, it relates to the date entered on duty. 

\3 As indicated in appendix III, this is not a formal part of the
access pass process. 

\4 For this interval, we used the date the Executive Office of the
President recommended to the Secret Service that a permanent pass be
approved. 

\5 For this interval, we used the date the Secret Service approved a
permanent pass for issuance. 

\6 Secret Service officials said that this is not part of the access
pass process. 

\7 Dates were not always available for such reasons as staff
separated before a date was met, contractor staff did not receive an
SF-50, drug testing dates were not provided for contractor staff
because such tests are administered by contractors and not the
Executive Office of the President, and not all staff needed security
clearances. 

\8 Of the 54, 45 transferred from a position within the Executive
Office of the President or another government agency to the position
shown in the database, 2 transferred from their position as shown in
the database to another office within the Executive Office of the
President, 5 were originally 90-day hires that became permanent
employees, and 2 had background investigations completed prior to
entering on duty.  We were not able to determine whether these 54
represented all individuals in these situations. 

\9 For example, if an individual entered on duty on January 20, 1994,
and signed the SF-86 on January 17, 1994, the difference would be
calculated as a -3.  The average number of days in the unadjusted
database from entering on duty to signing the SF-86 was -52 days,
whereas in the adjusted database, the average was 3 days. 


THE ACCESS PASS PROCESS
========================================================== Appendix II

This appendix describes the process typically followed by White House
complex employees for obtaining a White House access pass and/or
security clearance, according to agency procedures that were first
issued in March 1994 and the statements of agency officials.  This
process involved activities related to three generally uniform steps: 
(1) initiating pre-employment tasks, (2) obtaining a temporary pass,
and (3) obtaining a permanent pass.  Procedures for employees
requiring access to classified information vary by organization. 
(See app.  IV.)


   STEP 1:  INITIATING
   PRE-EMPLOYMENT TASKS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

The following tasks must be completed concerning each applicant's
appointment: 

  Applicants must undergo a security interview conducted by the
     relevant Executive Office of the President security office. 

  Applicants must submit to a drug test.  It normally takes about 10
     days to get the results, and if the test is positive, the person
     would be disqualified from appointment.\1

  Applicants must undergo an initial name check in which their name,
     date of birth, place of birth, and Social Security number are
     checked through the Secret Service's Workers, Appointment, and
     Visitors Entrance System.  This consists of checks through four
     computer databases:  the FBI's National Crime Information Center
     database, a criminal history database, a Secret Service
     database, and a Washington-area law enforcement database. 
     According to White House officials, the results are usually back
     within a day. 

  Applicants must undergo a more extensive FBI name check.  The
     Executive Office of the President forwards the person's name and
     date of birth to the FBI, which checks the name through the FBI
     Central Records System, computer databases, and the Criminal
     Justice Information Services' database to identify any
     derogatory information and prior arrest records.  The FBI has 60
     million names in its files.  Almost 13,000 name checks were done
     for the Executive Office of the President and associated offices
     in fiscal year 1993, and over 7,200 checks were done in fiscal
     year 1994.  The processing time for this more extensive name
     check typically takes several days, according to White House and
     FBI officials. 


--------------------
\1 In addition to having a drug test as an applicant, a person is
subject to random drug testing once employed by the Executive Office
of the President, in accordance with Executive Order 12564, issued
September 15, 1986, and the Executive Office of the President
Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as amended in December 1992. 


   STEP 2:  OBTAINING A TEMPORARY
   PASS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

Each new employee who is expected to work 90 days or more has 30 days
from the date entered on duty to complete the SF-86, an FBI
investigation consent form, a tax check waiver, and a personal data
statement questionnaire (for employees of certain offices) and
provide other personal data as needed.  This 30-day standard was
established by the White House on March 14, 1994.  Employees not
meeting this standard are to have their access to the White House
revoked and are to be placed on leave without pay until the paperwork
is completed.  Prior to March 1994, there were no written standards
for completing the SF-86. 

If the person has completed the SF-86 and related paperwork, the
results of the initial name check are satisfactory, and the FBI name
check has been submitted, the person is placed on the White House
access list.  This means the person must present positive
identification each time he or she enters the White House complex. 
Prior to this time, the person is allowed into the complex only with
an appointment and identification. 

After a satisfactory FBI name check is returned, the relevant
Executive Office of the President security office recommends to the
Secret Service that a temporary pass be issued to the employee for a
period not to exceed 90 days, although 30-day extensions are allowed. 
The person is fingerprinted by the Secret Service, and the
fingerprints are sent through the national database.  Each new
employee is required to attend a security briefing, and his or her
attendance is documented.  In the case of an extension, the Executive
Office of the President requests the Secret Service to extend the
temporary pass.  After one extension, the Secret Service contacts the
requesting office to provide a rationale for an additional extension,
according to Service officials. 

The SF-86 forms from White House Office, Office of the Vice
President, and Office of Policy Development staff go to the White
House Counsel's office.  A security officer in the Office of
Administration reviews the SF-86s of individuals from the Office of
Administration and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. 
According to White House officials, each SF-86 is reviewed to verify
its correctness and completeness and to determine if any immediate
issues need to be addressed. 


   STEP 3:  OBTAINING A PERMANENT
   PASS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3

Before a permanent pass or a security clearance can be issued, the
FBI, or some other agency, must conduct a full-field background
investigation.  The Executive Office of the President's request to
the FBI for such an investigation includes the SF-86 and related
documents. 

FBI officials told us that their goal for first-time full-field
background investigations was changed in late 1994 from 45 to 60
calendar days.  An updated investigation, which is done every 5
years, has a goal of 90 days.  According to FBI officials, these
goals were changed before 1993 due to FBI staff shortages and an
increased demand for investigations.  The goals had been 35 calendar
days for a first-time investigation and 75 days for a
reinvestigation.  FBI officials explained that the difference in
goals is due to the urgency of completing first-time investigations. 
The FBI estimates that it conducts about 1,000 to 1,500 background
investigations a year for the Executive Office of the
President--about 25 percent of the FBI total. 

According to FBI officials, if the investigation reveals information
that warrants attention, the FBI notifies the White House Counsel's
Office, the White House Office of Personnel Security, or the Security
Office of the Executive Office of the President and might provide an
interim report.  At the completion of its investigation, the FBI
sends an investigation summary to the appropriate reviewing office,
which in turn forwards a copy to the Secret Service.  Depending on
the case, the FBI may also send copies of individual interview
summaries but does not typically send the complete investigative
file. 

According to White House officials, once the reviewing office
receives the FBI background investigation summary, its review process
may involve a wide range of issues.  Such issues may include prior
arrests, credit problems, inability to verify previous employment,
mistakes in paperwork, or employment suitability.  The reviewing
office determines any needed follow-up, such as contacting the
subject for additional information or having the FBI investigate
further.  White House officials said that they rarely found it
necessary to request a follow-up investigation. 

White House officials stated they have several sources of information
available to them during the review process, such as the FBI's
background investigation report; the SF-86; the personal data
statement provided by the employee (if applicable); the tax check
results; financial disclosure information; and the National Crime
Information Center check results.  As information is returned from
the agencies and departments, White House procedures, since March
1994, have required that it be reviewed within
5 days by the White House Counsel's office and the White House
Personnel Security office.  The decision to grant a permanent pass
involves not just security concerns, but also suitability for
continued employment, since the White House may decide, based on its
review, not to permanently hire certain individuals. 

After the reviewing office has resolved any questions, the relevant
security office in the Executive Office of the President sends a
written request to the Secret Service for a permanent access pass for
the employee.  The Secret Service, if it agrees there is no danger to
the President or other Service protectees, issues the permanent pass. 
According to White House and Secret Service officials, during the
period of our review, the White House never directed the Secret
Service to issue a pass in circumstances that it was otherwise
reluctant to do. 

According to White House officials, the process for obtaining a
permanent pass is the same for a volunteer as for an employee or
contractor.  These officials said that most White House volunteers
are citizens who perform duties related to correspondence and do not
have permanent passes, but are allowed entry based on an access list
and identification.  However, they also said that there are about 80
volunteers who work in areas in which a temporary or permanent pass
is more suitable for allowing them to carry out their
responsibilities.  For example, the current and most recent White
House Counsel have accepted no salary. 


ANALYSIS OF KEY EVENT TIME
INTERVALS
========================================================= Appendix III

We analyzed time intervals using both the complete, unadjusted
database and an adjusted database that excluded the 54 individuals
referred to in appendix I.  Most of these individuals transferred
from one position to another position within the Executive Office of
the President. 

White House, FBI, and Secret Service officials provided us with their
explanations regarding the results of our analyses presented in this
appendix and appendix IV.  Our analyses did not include verifying the
accuracy of the explanations. 

Not all records were applicable to include in averaging the interval
comparisons.  Table III.1 shows the number of applicable and
nonapplicable records by category.  Records considered to be
nonapplicable include those in which a person separated prior to one
or more key event dates, action was not completed and therefore
pending as of the closure date of the database, or action was taken
in some other way, such as a person having a background investigation
conducted by an agency other than the FBI.  (Dates were not provided
in these cases.)



                                   Table III.1
                     
                     Applicable and Nonapplicable Records for
                               Specified Intervals


                  Applicab                        Applicab
Interval                le      Nonapplicable           le      Nonapplicable
comparison         records      records            records      records
----------------  --------  --  ----------------  --------  --  ----------------
Date entered on        504      134                    458      126
duty to date the
permanent pass                  --112 separated                 --107 separated
was approved                    --22 pending                    --19 pending
                                --0 other                       --0 other

Date entered on        613      25                     559      25
duty to the date                                                --23 separated
the SF-86 was                   --23 separated                  --0 pending
signed                          --0 pending                     --2 other
                                --2 other

Date the SF-86         600      38                     546      38
was signed to
the date the FBI                --35 separated                  --35 separated
initiated a                     --0 pending                     --0 pending
background                      --3 other                       --3 other
investigation

Date the FBI           522      116                    473      111
finished a
background                      --95 separated                  --93 separated
investigation to                --18 pending                    --16 pending
the date the                    --3 other                       --2 other
permanent pass
was recommended


Date the FBI           574      64                     523      61
initiated a
background                      --50 separated                  --50 separated
investigation to                --11 pending                    --9 pending
the date the FBI                --3 other                       --2 other
finished the
investigation

Date a permanent       504      134                    458      126
pass was
recommended to                  --112 separated                 --107 separated
the date the                    --22 pending                    --19 pending
pass was                        --0 other                       --0 other
approved
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   TIME NEEDED TO BE APPROVED FOR
   A PERMANENT PASS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

The processing time needed for an individual to be approved for a
permanent White House access pass after entering on duty decreased
from 1993 to 1994, as did most of the individual interval time frames
leading up to final approval of a pass.  As shown by table III.2, the
average number of days it took to approve a permanent pass decreased
from 1993 to 1994. 



                              Table III.2
                
                 Average Days From the Date Entered on
                 Duty to the Date a Permanent Pass Was
                     Approved by the Secret Service

                                 Average number of  >Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                           346                 356
1994                                            98                 129
Overall average                                295                 315
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Only 2 permanent passes received final approval prior to September
20, 1993, and of the 400 staff entering on duty during 1993, 250 took
over
300 days to be approved for permanent passes.  Only 1 of 104 staff
entering on duty in 1994 took over 300 days.  White House officials
attributed the longer processing times in 1993 to (1) operational and
administrative inefficiencies and (2) the large volume of staff
entering on duty in 1993.  They said the time decreased in 1994
because (1) fewer people began work, (2) the White House corrected
some inefficiencies in the process, (3) the White House Chief of
Staff and Congress emphasized the pass process and established
standards for it, (4) the White House began using computers to track
the process, and (5) staff and officials became more experienced in
the process. 

With the passage of Public Law 103-329, an employee of the Executive
Office of the President must be placed on leave without pay if the
person has not, within 6 months of commencing employment or by
October 31, 1994, whichever is later, had a background investigation,
if completed, forwarded to the Secret Service for issuance of an
access pass.  Two individuals did not have a permanent pass request
made within the required 6-month time period as of December 13,
1994--the last date covered by our analysis.\1

Six contractors also did not meet the legal deadline, but contractors
were not considered to be subject to the law, according to White
House officials.\2

The following sections describe our analysis related to each time
interval between the date a person entered on duty and the date the
person was approved for a permanent pass.  We also discuss key time
intervals related to the drug test date.  Although the White House
does not consider the drug test to be part of the access pass
process, we include information about the drug test date because our
requesters asked that we analyze that data. 


--------------------
\1 According to White House officials, the first individual was a
career employee with civil service protection whose background
investigation was completed on November 5, 1994.  According to the
officials, proper administrative action was taken on November 18,
1994, to place the individual on leave without pay.  The officials
added that a background issue was subsequently resolved and a pass
was issued to this person within 30 days of the administrative
action.  The second individual was a person who was waiting for
Senate confirmation for a position with the Office of National Drug
Control Policy and had requested that a permanent pass not be issued
until confirmed by the Senate. 

\2 According to White House officials, for purposes of administrative
efficiency, contractors are now treated as if they were subject to
P.L.  103-329.  According to the officials, this change was made at
some time after October 31, 1994, the effective date of the law. 


   COMPLETION OF THE SF-86
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

The first step in obtaining a permanent pass is for the individual to
complete the SF-86 and related paperwork.  Table III.3 shows that the
average number of days needed to complete the SF-86 after entering on
duty decreased from 1993 to 1994. 



                              Table III.3
                
                 Average Days From the Date Entered on
                 Duty to the Date the SF-86 Was Signed

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                           100                 107
1994                                         -52\a                   3
Overall average                                 66                  86
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, signed
their SF-86 52 days prior to entering on duty.  (See app.  I for an
explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in
negative numbers.)

For the period of our review, there were 190 individuals who took
more than 100 days to complete the SF-86, including 36 who took over
300 days.  All but 3 of the 190, and all of the 36, entered on duty
during 1993. 

The White House attributed the time reductions from 1993 to 1994 to
staff compliance with a directive issued by the Chief of Staff on
March 14, 1994.  The directive required that (1) all staff who
entered on duty prior to March 1, 1994, complete their SF-86 by March
18, 1994; (2) all staff who entered on duty between March 1, 1994,
and March 14, 1994, complete their SF-86 by March 31, 1994; and (3)
all staff who entered on duty after March 14, 1994, complete their
SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty.  The White House further
issued guidelines on March 21, 1994, that gave each new employee 30
days from the date the individual entered on duty to complete the
SF-86.  Prior to these instructions, there were no written standards
for completing these documents.  Employees who do not meet this
standard are to have their access to the White House revoked and are
to be placed on leave without pay until they complete the paperwork. 

Eleven individuals (not counting 22 contractors) did not meet the
deadline required by the Chief of Staff's directive or White House
guidelines.  White House officials said that in all of these cases,
the situation was resolved promptly after discovery and the SF-86 was
then submitted in a timely matter, with no one placed on leave
without pay. 

Three of 471 noncontractor employees who entered on duty prior to
March 1, 1994, did not complete the SF-86 by March 18, 1994, as
required.  All 3 signed the SF-86 by March 30, 1994, but took 434
days, 432 days, and 35 days to do so from the date they entered on
duty. 

Employees who entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14,
1994, were required to complete the SF-86 by March 31, 1994.  Two of
six employees did not meet this requirement.  Both signed the SF-86
by April 25, 1994.  These two individuals took an average of 43 days
from the date they entered on duty to complete the SF-86. 

Employees who entered on duty after March 14, 1994, were required to
complete the SF-86 within 30 days of the date entered on duty.  Six
of 73 employees did not meet this requirement. 

  Five of the six were from the Office of National Drug Control
     Policy, and according to White House officials, the five cases
     involved administrative error.  These five people signed their
     SF-86 an average of 60 days after entering on duty. 

  Another entered on duty on May 16, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on
     June 28, 1994, an interval of 43 days.  According to White House
     officials, it was known at the time of entry that this person
     was leaving White House employment.  The person separated on
     October 2, 1994. 

With the passage of Public Law 103-329 in September 1994, Congress
required that employees of the Executive Office of the President
complete the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty or by October
31, 1994, whichever occurred later.  None of the cases in our
database are covered by this provision of the law.  White House
officials told us that they have complied with this provision. 


   EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
   PRESIDENT INDICATORS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3

We analyzed two key event intervals that are the responsibility of
the Executive Office of the President:  (1) the time between when an
SF-86 is signed and the Executive Office of the President forwards it
to the FBI for a background investigation and (2) the time between
when the FBI completes a background investigation and the Executive
Office of the President recommends that a staff member receive a
permanent pass. 

Table III.4 shows that the average number of days needed for the
Executive Office of the President to review submitted SF-86s for
correctness and completeness before forwarding them to the FBI
decreased from 1993 to 1994. 



                              Table III.4
                
                Average Days From the Date an Individual
                    Signed an SF-86 to the Date the
                   Executive Office of the President
                     Forwarded the SF-86 to the FBI

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                            38                  37
1994                                            18                  18
Overall average                                 33                  32
----------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, the Executive Office of the President's review of SF-86s
took over 100 days in 34 of 434 cases, and in 1994, it took over 100
days in only 2 of 155 cases.  White House officials stated that the
unfamiliarity of staff and reviewing officials with the information
requirements of the SF-86 caused reviewing officials to request
additional data, thus delaying the requests for FBI investigations. 

Table III.5 shows that the average number of days for the Executive
Office of the President to recommend approval of a permanent pass
after receiving the FBI's investigative report decreased from 1993 to
1994. 



                              Table III.5
                
                   Average Days From the Date the FBI
                 Concluded the Background Investigation
                to the Date the Executive Office of the
                  President Recommended Approval of a
                             Permanent Pass

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                           174                 175
1994                                            46                  48
Overall average                                127                 125
----------------------------------------------------------------------
During 1993, the Executive Office of the President took over 100 days
to recommend the approval of a permanent pass in 202 of 294 cases,
whereas in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 26 of 217 cases. 
According to White House officials, the longer times were
attributable to waiting for information other than the background
investigation, such as tax checks, and the decrease from 1993 to 1994
resulted from correcting procedural inefficiencies. 


   FBI INDICATORS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4

Table III.6 shows that the average number of days needed by the FBI
to conduct a background investigation increased from 1993 to 1994. 



                              Table III.6
                
                   Average Days From the Date the FBI
                Initiated a Background Investigation to
                     the Date the FBI Concluded the
                             Investigation

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                            56                  56
1994                                            70                  71
Overall average                                 59                  59
----------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 17 (4 percent) of 402
investigations.  In 1994, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 18
(11 percent) of 159 investigations.  The FBI's goal of completing
investigations within 45 days of initiation was not met 66 percent of
the time in 1993 and 87 percent of the time in 1994.  According to an
FBI official, the goal was changed in late 1994 to 60 days.  We did
not assess the impact of the goal change because there were no
records of investigations started and completed during the last
quarter of 1994. 

An FBI official said background investigations exceeded the FBI's
goal for the following reasons: 

  The FBI has a limited investigative and administrative staff in the
     background investigative area, and their overall caseload in
     that area increased. 

  FBI field personnel who conduct background investigations also have
     numerous other investigative and administrative
     responsibilities. 

  Forms submitted early in the period of our review were sometimes
     incomplete. 

  Individuals and documents were not always readily available. 

  Obtaining information from overseas sources slowed the collection
     of information. 

  Issues and/or additional information was identified that needed to
     be addressed. 

  Expediting some investigations slowed the progress of others. 


   SECRET SERVICE INDICATORS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5

Table III.7 shows that the average number of days needed for the
Secret Service to approve a permanent pass after the Executive Office
of the President recommended that a pass be issued decreased from
1993 to 1994. 



                              Table III.7
                
                Average Days From the Date of Executive
                 Office of the President Recommendation
                    to Secret Service Approval of a
                             Permanent Pass

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                            29                  31
1994                                             7                   7
Overall Average                                 12                  12
----------------------------------------------------------------------
During 1993, the Secret Service took over 30 days to approve 34 of
115 passes, whereas in 1994, this occurred in 15 of 388 cases. 

The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the
Executive Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests
to the Secret Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to
address questions related to protective interest issues.  We analyzed
information provided by the Secret Service for 1994 showing that it
took the Secret Service an average of 3 days to approve a permanent
pass after receiving the pass recommendation from the Executive
Office of the President.  This information was not sufficiently
detailed to verify the reasons for delay, and similar data for 1993
were not available. 


   DRUG TEST INDICATORS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6

All 572 noncontract employees included in the unadjusted database
reported for drug tests.  Contractors are responsible for conducting
their employees' drug tests, and we did not separately request the
dates for these tests.  Table III.8 shows that the average number of
days between when the person entered on duty to when the drug test
was taken decreased from 1993 to 1994. 



                              Table III.8
                
                 Average Days From the Date Entered on
                   Duty to the Date the Drug Test Was
                                Taken\a

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                            24                  29
1994                                           -49                 -12
Overall average                                 10                  23
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a A negative number indicates that individuals, on average, took the
drug test prior to entering on duty.  (See app.  I for an explanation
of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in negative
numbers.)

The Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as
amended in December 1992, states that due to the large number of new
employees at the beginning of a new administration, it is impractical
to test all of them prior to their appointments.  According to White
House officials, this meant that applicants were not required to take
drug tests prior to their appointments throughout much of 1993. 

Table III.9 shows that in 1993, individuals typically were issued a
temporary pass prior to taking a drug test.  The adjusted database
shows that individuals taking the drug test in 1994 on average did so
prior to obtaining a temporary pass. 



                              Table III.9
                
                Average Days From the Date the Drug Test
                 Was Taken to the Date a Temporary Pass
                              Was Issued\a

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                            -5                  -3
1994                                           -17                   3
Overall average                                 -6                  -1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a A negative number indicates that individuals, on average, were
issued a temporary pass prior to taking a drug test.  (See above and
app.  I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different
order, resulting in negative numbers.)


OBSERVATIONS ON CONTROLS
========================================================== Appendix IV

White House and congressional actions have established process
changes and controls to improve the access pass and security
clearance processes.  For the time intervals and offices we reviewed,
with few exceptions, the time intervals declined, and the procedures
were adhered to.  However, our observations indicate a potential for
strengthening controls in several selected areas, particularly at the
start of a new administration.  The areas related to renewing
temporary passes, revoking passes after separation, and granting
security clearances.  The scope of our work did not address whether
problems occurred as a result of the potential control weaknesses. 
While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is
appropriate to consider improving these controls. 


   TEMPORARY PASS ISSUANCE DATA
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1

Table IV.1 shows that the average number of days needed for an
individual to be issued a temporary pass after entering on duty
decreased from 1993 to 1994. 



                               Table IV.1
                
                 Average Days From the Date Entered on
                 Duty to the Date a Temporary Pass Was
                                 Issued

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                            19                  26
1994                                         -26\a                  20
Overall average                                 10                  25
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, received
a temporary pass 26 days prior to entering on duty.  (See app.  I for
an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting
in negative numbers.)

Temporary passes allow individuals access to the White House complex
while waiting for a permanent pass.  Although, since March 14, 1994,
individuals should have completed the SF-86 (and other tasks) prior
to obtaining a temporary pass, some did not.  Temporary passes are
initially issued for a period of 90 days and can be extended.  A
number of extensions were granted.  Individuals held these passes for
an average of 341 days in 1993 and 110 days in 1994 before being
approved for a permanent pass. 


      SF-86 OFTEN NOT COMPLETED
      PRIOR TO TEMPORARY PASS
      ISSUANCE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.1

Since March 14, 1994, an individual has been expected to have an
SF-86 completed before receiving a temporary pass.  Of the 439
individuals who signed their SF-86 in 1993, 310 (71 percent) received
a temporary pass prior to signing the SF-86.  White House officials
told us that in the early days of the administration individuals were
not required to complete an SF-86 before receiving a temporary pass. 

Our analysis of the database indicates that two noncontractors were
issued temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had
not yet submitted an SF-86.  White House officials said that these
individuals had both been interns and had a prior SF-86 on file,
which had not been reflected in the database.  Ten contractor
employees were also issued temporary passes after March 14, 1994,
even though they had not yet submitted an SF-86.  White House
officials said that Office of Administration policy at that time was
to not process the SF-86 for contractors until after they had
concluded a probationary period.  The officials stated that this is
no longer the policy. 


      TEMPORARY PASSES WERE OFTEN
      EXTENDED
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.2

Temporary passes are usually issued for 90 days but can be extended. 
Table IV.2 shows the average time between issuance of the temporary
pass and approval for the permanent pass. 



                               Table IV.2
                
                 Average Days From the Date a Temporary
                Pass Was Issued to the Date a Permanent
                Pass Was Approved by the Secret Service

                                 Average number of   Average number of
                                  days--unadjusted      days--adjusted
Year                                          data                data
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1993                                           341                 343
1994                                           110                 114
Overall average                                293                 294
----------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, 361 of 398 individuals took 200 days or more to be approved
for a permanent pass, whereas in 1994, only 5 of 104 individuals
receiving temporary passes took 200 days or more to be approved for a
permanent pass.  White House officials attributed the decrease from
1993 to 1994 to changes in the processing procedures. 

Our discussions with Secret Service officials and our analyses
indicated that during the longer processing times in 1993, the
Service routinely granted eight or more extensions to individuals for
temporary passes as requested by the Executive Office of the
President.  In commenting on a draft of this report, Secret Service
officials stated that during the initial transitions of
administrations it was normal to have more frequent extensions. 

In addition, as of December 13, 1994, the cutoff date for our
analysis,
22 individuals, including 10 contractors, were employed but had not
been approved for a permanent pass.  Two had not received a temporary
pass, and the other 20 held a temporary pass an average of 132 days,
as of the cutoff date.  Of 15 who held temporary passes more than 90
days,

  3 had permanent passes recommended by the Executive Office of the
     President but not yet approved by the Secret Service and had
     waited
     37 days on average since the Executive Office of the President
     recommendation;

  3 had background investigations completed for an average of 58 days
     since the completion; and

  9 were still undergoing their background investigations for an
     average of 57 days. 

Given the potential for repeated temporary pass extensions,
consideration should be given to strengthening controls in this area. 


   DATA RELATED TO STAFF
   SEPARATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2

Out of the database of 638 records, 188 (29 percent) indicate that
the individuals have separated from the office or contractor position
shown in the database.  The individuals left at various stages in the
process of obtaining a permanent pass or security clearance.  Once an
individual leaves Executive Office of the President employment,
according to White House officials, there are procedures to ensure
that the individual turns in the pass.  However, the Secret Service
has no means of verifying an individual's employment status and
continued need for a permanent pass.  Attention to stengthening
controls in this area would be appropriate.  We examined documents
related to these procedures, but did not independently verify whether
permanent passes were voided or returned in these cases. 


      INDIVIDUALS HAVE LEFT AT
      VARIOUS STAGES OF THE ACCESS
      PASS AND SECURITY CLEARANCE
      PROCESS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.1

Of the 188 records that indicate separation, 7 individuals moved from
one office within the Executive Office of the President to another
office.  Four additional records concern two individuals who moved
from one office within the Executive Office of the President to
another office, and then left the second office.  Thus, both
individuals show two departure dates in the database.  The other 177
records are for people who left the Executive Office of the
President. 

All seven individuals who are now with a second office within the
Executive Office of the President were approved for a permanent pass
either with the first office or the second office.  All received a
temporary pass. 

Of the two individuals who worked for and separated from two offices,
one was approved for a permanent pass while with the second office. 
The other individual had a background investigation conducted while
at the second office and left this position 13 days after the
background investigation was completed.  A permanent pass has not
been recommended or approved.  Both individuals received a temporary
pass. 

Of the other 177 people who separated from the Executive Office of
the President,

  67 were approved by the Secret Service for a permanent pass;

  17 were recommended by the Executive Office of the President for a
     permanent pass, which was never approved by the Secret Service;

  43 had a completed background investigation, but were never
     recommended for a permanent pass;

  21 had a background investigation initiated, but never completed;
     and

  29 separated without the FBI initiating a background investigation. 

Concerning this data, White House officials said that in the
overwhelming majority of instances, the departure was unrelated to
the pass process.  The officials also said that, for example, the
fact that an individual left after the background investigation was
completed, but before a recommendation for a pass was made does not
suggest that something in the background investigation precipitated
the departure.  The officials said that similarly, the fact that an
individual departed after the Executive Office of the President
recommended issuance of a pass, but before the Secret Service
approved the pass does not imply that the individual left because the
Secret Service declined to approve the pass.  The officials concluded
by saying that as a general proposition, a detailed exposition of the
relationship between departure dates and various steps in the pass
process suggests a correlation that bears no relationship with
reality. 

Sixty-seven people were approved for a permanent pass. 

  Seven were approved an average of 186 days after they had departed. 
     In five of these cases, according to White House officials, the
     person went to another government agency but continued to need
     access to the White House.  Another case involves a person who
     came back to the White House as a detailee from another agency. 
     We do not have information on the seventh person. 

  Sixty left an average of 125 days after a permanent pass had been
     approved by the Secret Service.  We do not have information on
     how many returned the pass after departure. 

Seventeen people had a permanent pass recommended but never approved. 

  Six had a permanent pass recommended after they left.  One person,
     according to White House officials, left the Office of Policy
     Development but was expected to return in some capacity.  We do
     not have information on the other five individuals.  These six
     individuals separated an average of 44 days before the permanent
     pass was recommended. 

  Eleven left an average of 93 days after a permanent pass had been
     recommended. 

The FBI completed the background investigation for 43 people who
never had a permanent pass recommended. 

  Five had an FBI background investigation initiated and completed
     after they departed.  White House officials told us that the
     background investigation was done in three cases because the
     individuals needed a pass in some other capacity--one as a White
     House detailee, one as a White House volunteer, and one as an
     employee of another government agency.  We do not have
     information on the other two individuals.  These five
     individuals left an average of 164 days before the background
     investigation had been completed. 

  Thirty-three departed an average of 106 days after a background
     investigation had been completed. 

  Five had a background investigation initiated before they departed
     and completed after they departed.  These individuals left an
     average of 23 days before the completion of the background
     investigation. 

Out of the 177 who separated, 171 had temporary passes at the time of
separation and had held the temporary pass for an average of 266 days
prior to departure.  Four individuals received temporary passes an
average of 36 days after their separation, and two never received a
temporary pass. 


      PERMANENT PASS REVOCATION
      PROCEDURE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.2

According to a Secret Service official, the agency depends on each
office of the Executive Office of the President to notify the Service
if an individual is no longer employed and thus no longer needs a
permanent pass.  Without this notification, the Secret Service has no
way of knowing who continues to need access. 

White House officials stated that they maintain a checkout procedure
for employees who leave Executive Office of the President employment,
and unless the White House allows continued access, the employee must
surrender his or her access pass upon separation.  The White House
provided us with a document supporting these procedures.  According
to a White House official, this process is checked by regular reviews
of attrition and accession lists of White House pass holders.  The
official also said that White House pass holder lists are frequently
updated. 


   ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED SECURITY
   INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3

The White House allows employees with permanent White House passes
and a need-to-know to have access to classified information up to the
top secret level.  Generally, executive branch agencies are required
by executive order to follow uniform governmentwide procedures and
apply specific criteria when granting security clearances to
individuals.  Executive branch agencies grant security clearances
under Executive Order 10450, as amended, and at the time of our
review, handled classified data under Executive Order 12356, which
was revoked and replaced by Executive Order 12958 on April 17,
1995.\1 According to White House officials, the White House Office,
the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy
Development are not subject to the requirements of Executive Order
10450 but nevertheless use the same procedures and criteria to issue
the passes that give employees access to classified information on a
need-to-know basis. 

As of December 1994, 381 of 638 records in the database indicate that
the person had been authorized access to classified information. 
These included 359 staff assigned to the White House Office, the
Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development
who have access to classified information on a need-to- know basis by
holding a permanent White House pass.  An additional 22 records
indicate staff assigned to the Office of Administration and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy who have security clearances
granted under governmentwide procedures.  The first of the permanent
White House passes was not approved until September 30, 1993, and the
first of the 22 Office of Administration and Office of National Drug
Control Policy security clearances was not granted until June 22,
1993.\2 We requested data on how the offices conducted business
during these 8- and 5-month periods before security clearances were
granted.  White House officials stated that interim clearances were
provided to about two dozen senior staff during this time.  The
officials further stated that, for reasons of confidentiality, data
on the specific cases was not provided to us.  They also said that
the overwhelming majority of the classified work done in the
Executive Office of the President is done by staff of the National
Security Council, which is not one of the offices represented in the
data we analyzed. 

Given that future administrations may face similar circumstances
during the first few months in office, consideration should be given
to strengthening controls in this area. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V

--------------------
\1 These orders establish uniform requirements for personnel security
programs in the federal government.  A security clearance is a
certification that an individual who requires access to information
classified at a certain level has been found eligible and may be
permitted access to classified information. 

\2 In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time entered on
duty. 


COMMENTS FROM THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
========================================================== Appendix IV


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix VI

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

James F.  Wiggins, Associate Director
Uldis Adamsons, Assistant Director
David J.  Hand, Evaluator-in-Charge
R.  Bruce Brown, Senior Evaluator
Elizabeth G.  Mead, Senior Evaluator

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

Mark C.  Speight, Senior Attorney