Army Acquisition: Javelin Is Not Ready for Multiyear Procurement (Letter
Report, 09/26/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-199).
GAO reviewed the Army's procurement of the Javelin missile system,
focusing on whether the: (1) system meets established criteria for
multiyear production contracts; (2) Army adequately tested the system to
determine its suitability for full-rate production; and (3) Army's
purchase of command launch units during limited production is
appropriate.
GAO found that the Army: (1) has not demonstrated that the Javelin's
design is sufficiently stable for multiyear production; (2) does not
plan to conduct operational testing of the missile until after full-rate
production begins; (3) has extensively redesigned the system since it
was operationally tested in 1993; (4) believes that its planned testing
of the system will be adequate; (5) has conducted only limited testing,
which may not be useful for predicting the system's reliability; and (6)
could acquire fewer units under its low-rate initial production contract
and still sustain the contractor's ability to produce the system.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-96-199
TITLE: Army Acquisition: Javelin Is Not Ready for Multiyear
Procurement
DATE: 09/26/96
SUBJECT: Military procurement
Advanced weapons systems
Missiles
Testing
Military land vehicles
Multi-year procurement
Concurrency
IDENTIFIER: Javelin Antitank Weapon
Dragon Missile
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
September 1996
ARMY ACQUISITION - JAVELIN IS NOT
READY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT
GAO/NSIAD-96-199
Army Acquisition
(707140)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
x - x
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-272415
September 26, 1996
Congressional Committees
The Army is purchasing a new $4-billion man portable, antiarmor
weapon system--known as the Javelin--to replace its aging Dragon
system. Javelin is a joint Army and Marine Corps program expected to
increase the infantry's lethality against advanced armor threats. In
1997, the Army plans to award a multiyear (3 year) production
contract and begin full-rate production.
We reviewed the Javelin program under our basic legislative authority
to determine whether (1) the system meets criteria established for
multiyear production contracts, (2) the Army has adequately tested
Javelin to determine its suitability for full-rate production, and
(3) the Army is using sound economic judgment in purchasing command
launch units during limited production. This report, which contains
a matter for congressional consideration, is addressed to your
committees because they have jurisdiction in this area. We are
suggesting that the Congress may wish to take the corrective actions
that the agency has indicated an unwillingness to take.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The Army plans to award a multiyear contract for Javelin full-rate
production in 1997, even though the system does not meet the criteria
established for multiyear production contracts and the Army has not
yet adequately tested Javelin's suitability for full-rate production.
The Army has not demonstrated that Javelin's design is sufficiently
stable for a multiyear contract, and tests have not shown that the
weapon to be produced during full-rate production is suitable for
combat. The Army expects the multiyear contract and design changes
to decrease system costs. However, if the Army has to modify the
multiyear contract because the system requires further redesign to
meet operational needs, program costs could increase. Therefore, we
believe the Army should (1) not award a multiyear contract for
Javelin production at this time and (2) operationally test the
redesigned Javelin, as required by regulation, before proceeding to
full-rate production.
In addition, the Army decision to award a third low-rate initial
production contract for command launch units was questionable because
(1) the Army plans to replace these launch units with redesigned
units about
3 years after the originals are fielded and (2) the Army is not
purchasing Javelin to address an urgent threat, but rather to improve
warfighting capability. Accordingly, we believe the contract should
be modified to produce as few command launch units as possible.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The Javelin is a man portable, fire-and-forget, antitank weapon
system composed of two major components--a command launch unit and a
round, which is a missile sealed in a disposable launcher container.
(See fig. 1.) For operation of the system, the round is mated with
the launch unit, but the launch unit may also be used in a
stand-alone mode for battlefield surveillance and target detection.
The Army expects Javelin to defeat armored targets out to distances
of 2,000 meters, during the day or night and in adverse weather.
Figure 1: Javelin System
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The Army completed development of the Javelin system in December
1993. However, operational testing showed that the system's design
did not meet operational suitability requirements. As a result, the
Army made numerous design changes to the launch unit and round before
the contractor initiated low-rate production in June 1994.
The Javelin system has experienced significant cost increases since
it was first approved. In the early 1990s, the Army made budget
decisions that stretched Javelin's procurement phase from 6 to 14
years. In addition, the end of the cold war caused the Army and
Marine Corps to reduce Javelin's procurement quantities. Combined,
these actions increased the average cost of the launch unit to about
4.5 times its originally estimated cost and more than doubled the
average cost of the round.
To mitigate these cost increases, the Army is attempting to shorten
the system's procurement phase. Initially, the Army planned to
shorten procurement from 14 to 11 years by using production,
logistics, and multiyear savings to purchase Javelin systems earlier
than planned. On February 13, 1996, the Army announced that Program
Budget Decision 104 added $993 million of additional procurement
funds for fiscal years 1999 through 2001 to reduce Javelin's
procurement phase to 9 years. As the program is currently planned,
these funds allow the Army to complete fielding by fiscal year 2004.
The Army also hopes to reduce Javelin's cost by awarding two
multiyear contracts--one in 1997 and another in 2000. Multiyear
procurement is a method of acquiring up to 5 years' requirements of a
system with a single contract. The procurements help the government
reduce costs and provide incentives to contractors to improve
productivity by investing in capital facilities, equipment, and
advanced technology. However, multiyear contracts decrease annual
budget flexibility. The Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD)
commit themselves to fund multiyear contracts through completion or
pay any contract cancellation charges, which may be substantial.
According to the President's 1997 Budget, the Army and the Marine
Corps plan to purchase 31,269 Javelin rounds and 3,264 command launch
units. The Army's share of the purchase is 26,600 rounds and 2,800
command launch units. The Marines Corps plans to acquire 4,669
rounds and
464 launch units.
JAVELIN'S DESIGN MAY NOT BE
STABLE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The Army has not demonstrated that Javelin's design is sufficiently
stable for a multiyear production contract. By awarding a multiyear
production contract before the design has stabilized and the system
has been thoroughly tested, the Army risks cost overruns and/or
schedule delays that could more than offset the savings produced by
the contract.
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2306b, a military service is authorized to
award multiyear contracts for the purchase of weapon systems if
certain criteria are met. These criteria include the requirement
that the design of the system remain substantially unchanged during
the period covered by the multiyear contract. If the government
awards a multiyear contract for a weapon system with an unstable
design, the government could lose its budget flexibility without
corresponding cost savings because contract changes or termination
costs may substantially increase the cost of the weapon system.
Between the end of development in 1993 and the beginning of low-rate
production in 1994, the Army made 39 design changes to correct
reliability problems. Since 1994, the Army has made a number of
changes to the system's design to reduce production and logistics
costs and expects to continue making changes through the beginning of
full-rate production in 1997. Most of these changes are being
incrementally incorporated into hardware produced under three
low-rate production contracts. The contractor is continuing
production while changes are developed and qualified. As changes are
approved, the contractor incorporates them into units in the
production process.
The Army estimates it will spend approximately $49.4 million from
fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1997 while Javelin is in
low-rate production to redesign various Javelin components. These
changes are expected to reduce production and logistics costs by $329
million. However, because redesigned components are added to the
production line as they are developed and qualified, the contractor
will produce at least one and sometimes two variations of the Javelin
system during each of the three low-rate production runs. According
to current schedules, the last planned changes will not be
incorporated into the production line until after full-rate
production begins in 1997 under the planned multiyear contract.
Javelin tests conducted to date have identified the need for
additional design changes. During the first 8 months of Javelin
round assembly, the round contractor stopped final assembly twice so
engineers could redesign components that failed during testing. In
January 1996, warheads in missiles undergoing production verification
tests failed to function properly. Engineers said the failures
occurred after they made minor changes to the fuzing device's
electronics. However, the warhead failures stopped production for 4
weeks until a remedy could be identified and implemented. In April,
the contractor stopped round assembly for 2 weeks when electrical
problems in the restraint pin mechanisms\1 of two missiles occurred
during a limited user test. The problems prevented one missile from
leaving the launch tube after the gunner pulled the trigger and
caused another to dive into the ground shortly after launch. During
this test, a third missile failed when a short occurred in a
transistor. This missile also failed to leave the launch tube. Army
officials said the restraint pin assembly has been modified to remedy
the problems that occurred during the limited user test. The
contractor is retrofitting already produced missiles with the new
assembly.
Other unscheduled design changes could also be necessary as the Army
continues to test the Javelin system.
--------------------
\1 The restraint pin mechanism holds the missile in place within the
launch tube until the missile is fired.
OPERATIONAL TESTING OF JAVELIN
IS INADEQUATE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Even though it is making over 50 separate changes to Javelin's
original design, the Army does not plan to conduct any operational
tests of missiles with all of the design changes until after
full-rate production begins under a multiyear contract. In the
opinion of Army officials, technical tests and a limited user test
provide adequate information on Javelin's operational capability.
However, technical tests are conducted under controlled conditions
and the limited user test does not test hardware that incorporates
all design changes.
The military services are statutorily required to operationally test
each major weapon system under realistic combat conditions to
determine if the system is operationally effective and suitable for
combat prior to entering full-rate production. The military services
are also required by DOD regulation to retest equipment if the design
changes materially after initial operational testing. Therefore, we
believe the Army must ensure that the redesigned Javelin works as
intended prior to any commitment to full-rate production. In our
view, the best way to accomplish that would be to conduct additional
operational tests using fully redesigned systems.
JAVELIN IS BEING EXTENSIVELY
REDESIGNED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
The Javelin system that will enter full-rate production will be
significantly different from the Javelin that the Army operationally
tested in 1993. To correct reliability failures recognized during
full-scale development, and to reduce the cost of producing and
supporting Javelin, engineers are changing many major components of
the system. Between the end of the early operational testing and the
beginning of low-rate production, the Army made changes to the
round's guidance unit, fuzing mechanism, propulsion unit, control
system, battery coolant unit, and launch tube assembly, as well as
the launch unit's detection device, optics, display screen, and
software. The Army will make additional round and launch unit
changes during low-rate production. According to project office
estimates, about 35 percent of the command launch unit's components
and 23 percent of the round will be redesigned during low-rate
production.
While Javelin's Chief Engineer agreed that the command launch unit
the Army plans to produce during full-rate production will be
significantly different from the original configuration, he said that
the round changes will not be significant. However, tests of
warheads and rounds from the first low-rate production line have
already identified potentially serious problems. Before low-rate
production began, engineers made changes to electronic components in
the warhead fuzing device. When missiles incorporating the changes
were fired, the warheads failed to function properly. Army officials
considered this problem so serious that they stopped round assembly
until engineers identified and implemented a solution. Another
post-development change--buying a liner for the main charge warhead
from a second source--also caused problems. The liner should
collapse and form a jet capable of perforating armor. However, the
new vendor's liner formed a jet that was not compatible with other
Javelin components. Project office engineers believe the jet would
have degraded Javelin's lethality. The engineers modified Javelin
components to correct the problem.
ARMY OFFICIALS THINK PLANNED
TESTING IS ADEQUATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
Army officials told us that technical tests will provide sufficient
proof that Javelin is suitable for combat. However, these
tests--which determine if redesigned hardware (1) performs its
intended function, (2) is compatible with other components of the
system, and (3) can withstand various environmental stresses--are
conducted under controlled conditions. Some technical tests are
planned by the contractor and conducted at its facility. Even if
tests are controlled by the government, test officials try to control
as many variables as possible. For example, an Army operational test
official said that during technical tests, trained technicians handle
the equipment and follow precise guidelines. According to one DOD
systems analyst, hardware may be sufficiently reliable to pass
required technical tests, but still lack the endurance needed for
battlefield conditions.
The Army and the Marine Corps are jointly conducting one limited user
test of Javelin prior to full-rate production. However, this test
will not provide data that the Army can use to assess the suitability
of the full-rate production configuration of Javelin. Soldiers
participating in the test are using command launch units and rounds
coming off the first low-rate production line that do not include all
planned cost reduction changes. The Army does not plan to
operationally test the system with all changes until 1998, over a
year after the Army makes its decision to begin Javelin full-rate
production.
EARLY TESTS INDICATE JAVELIN
ROUNDS MAY NOT MEET
RELIABILITY GOAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
DOD requires that before Javelin proceeds into full-rate production,
flight tests must prove the round is 82 percent reliable. According
to the Army, tests conducted through June 19, 1996, demonstrated the
round should perform as designed 81.5 percent of the time. However,
some of the tests used to predict reliability could have potentially
inflated the reliability score.
By the end of May 1996, the Army had completed 22 planned test
flights under controlled test conditions. The Army did not score
five of the tests for reliability because the tests did not meet the
Army's criteria for a valid reliability test or the purpose of the
flights was to assess round safety. Of the 17 scored tests, 2 were
failures. In one test, the missile overflew its target; in another,
the missile did not leave the launch tube because its launch motor
did not fire.
The Army planned to fire six more rounds as part of a limited user
test. However, after three failures, Javelin's Project Manager
halted the tests to determine the cause of the failures and, if
required, make design modifications. When flight tests were halted,
75 percent of all rounds tested had functioned as intended upon
launch.
Before resuming the limited user test, the Army modified a missile
component and completed 12 unplanned controlled test flights to
verify performance of the design change. Of the 12 flights, 10 were
successful. With the design deficiency corrected, the Army resumed
the limited user test and successfully fired six rounds. According
to the Army, considering the results of all 38 scored tests, 81.5
percent of the rounds tested met established reliability criteria.
However, the last 18 tests may not be useful for predicting
reliability because the Army used a method of selecting the missiles
for these tests that potentially could have affected the test outcome
and inflated the reliability score. Army officials carefully
screened the production records of the missiles selected for the 12
controlled test flights and the 6 final limited user tests. Only
missiles that the Army was highly confident would perform as designed
were retained for testing. Test officials said about one-third of
the missiles were eliminated from the sample.
The Army does not agree that the 18 tests are not useful for
assessing reliability. Project officials said the purpose of
screening the missiles before testing them was to ensure that the
latest configuration was being tested, that subsystem performance
specifications were met, and to review the manufacturing and assembly
process. They acknowledged, however, that these actions increased
the likelihood that the tests would be successful.
The officials said that they do not believe the screening process
prejudiced test results. They said that since the completion of the
limited user test, they have either tested or performed a second
review of the production records for all eliminated rounds. As a
result, the officials said they believe some missiles were needlessly
eliminated from the sample. However, if a test or second production
review indicated an eliminated missile was defective, all missiles at
the contractor's facility were screened for similar deficiencies. In
addition, Javelin's Project Manager said that rounds tested during
lot acceptance test scheduled for October will be randomly chosen and
should further prove the round's reliability.
ARMY CAN PURCHASE FEWER
LOW-RATE PRODUCTION LAUNCH
UNITS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The Army plans to replace all 277 launch units manufactured under the
3 low-rate production contracts about 3 years after they are
produced. The Army is redesigning the command launch unit to reduce
production and logistics costs, and plans to replace all the original
production units because it cannot afford to maintain two
configurations of the launch unit. To minimize replacement costs,
the Army could reduce quantities to be produced under its third
low-rate production contract to a minimum level of production.
During low-rate production, the Army is redesigning the launch units'
electronics and housing and adding built-in-test equipment that it
estimates will reduce each unit's procurement cost an average of
$14,590 and total logistics cost by $45.1 million. The contractor
will not begin producing launch units with all the changes
incorporated until 1997. Javelin's Chief of Logistics said the Army
cannot afford to maintain both the low-rate production and redesigned
launch unit configurations. He said that if soldiers were given
different launch units, the Army would have to maintain inventory and
train personnel to repair both configurations. In addition, the Army
would have to develop and produce test equipment for the low-rate
production configuration because it will not have built-in-test
equipment to diagnose system failures.
Before the Army awarded the third low-rate production contract in
February 1996, we expressed concern about the Army's plan to produce
launch units at a relatively high rate and then replace them only 3
years after the units are fielded. The Deputy Director of DOD's Land
Warfare Office, which is responsible for Javelin oversight, asked the
Javelin Project Manager to delay contract award until his office and
the project office could determine if actions could be taken to
minimize replacement costs. Despite the request, the Project Manager
awarded the contract. He later explained that reducing Javelin
production would delay fielding to infantry battalions that urgently
need an improved antiarmor system. However, officials in the Office
of the Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition said Javelin is not needed to address an urgent threat as
it was before the decline of the Warsaw Pact nations, but rather will
be used to improve overall warfighting capability.
The Army can still modify the third low-rate production contract to
purchase as few as 36 launch units because the contractor has not
begun assembly of the units and the level of production required to
keep the manufacturing facility running is 3 units per month, or 36
units per year.\2 The contract, when originally awarded on February
29, 1996, called for production of 125 units at a cost of about $29
million. According to project office cost officials, reducing the
purchase to 36 launch units would decrease the contract cost by $18.5
million. But, the officials said that purchasing fewer launch units
will increase the per unit cost of the remaining units because the
contractor has already purchased materials and incurred costs in
anticipation of production. However, they agreed that some of the
materials could be used during future production contracts. In
addition, the Army is already decreasing the number of command launch
units being purchased under the contract. The Army has already
decided to cancel production of 17 of these units and may cancel
production of another 12 if 1 infantry battalion returns the 12
launch units that battalion borrowed to participate in the Army's
Advanced Warfighting Experiment.
--------------------
\2 Army officials said that even if production is reduced, the
minimum level of production that will allow the command launch unit
contractor to proceed to full-rate production in fiscal year 1997, as
currently planned, is 72 launch units.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
According to Army estimates, the changes in the Javelin weapon system
should result in a more effective, less expensive weapon. However,
the Army risks these gains by accelerating production and committing
to a multiyear contract before it has demonstrated that the system's
design is stable and operational tests prove the redesigned system is
suitable for combat. The Army has already increased system cost by
purchasing launch units in relatively large quantities before all
design changes were incorporated. But replacement cost can be
reduced somewhat by modifying the third low-rate production contract
to purchase fewer launch units.
Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army
to (1) award annual (vice multiyear) Javelin contracts for the
minimum quantity needed to sustain production until the Army
demonstrates that the system's design is stable, (2) operationally
test the redesigned Javelin before proceeding to full-rate
production, and (3) modify the third low-rate production contract to
reduce command launch unit production from 125 to the contractor's
minimum production level of 3 units per month or
36 total units.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DOD (see
app.I). DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Army to award annual Javelin contracts for the
minimum quantity needed until the Army demonstrates that the design
of Javelin is stable. While DOD agreed that Javelin has undergone a
large number of design changes, in their opinion the stability of the
design has been verified through successful production verification
testing and limited user testing. However, production verification
testing for the Javelin configuration that the Army will produce
during full-rate production is not complete and full-rate production
representative items have not been subjected to any type of
operational test. Until the tests are successfully completed and the
stability of Javelin's design is demonstrated in production, the Army
cannot be certain Javelin's design is stable.
DOD agreed that the redesigned Javelin should be operationally tested
before proceeding to full-rate production. Before a decision is made
in May 1997 to begin Javelin full-rate production, the Army will
complete an operational test program with production representative
hardware.
DOD did not agree that the third low-rate production contract should
be modified to reduce the command launch unit production from 125
units to 36 units. DOD commented that the (1) currently deployed
Dragon antiarmor system cannot effectively engage or destroy modern
armor; (2) savings of reducing the purchase to 36 units will be only
$10 million--not the $18.5-million reduction in contract cost--if
parts salvaged from low-rate production units can be used as repair
parts; and (3) cost of replacing units produced during low-rate
production is more than offset by the benefits of having Javelin in
the contingency forces. Although we agree that Javelin should
improve the Army and the Marine Corps' warfighting capability, Army
officials told us that there is no longer an urgent need for Javelin
as there was before the decline of the Warsaw Pact nations. Without
an urgent need, the Army should purchase only the quantity of command
launch units required to keep the manufacturing facility running.
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We continue to believe that the Army should not pursue a multiyear
production contract for Javelin at this time and should reduce the
number of launch units procured under the third low-rate production
contract. Therefore, we suggest that the Congress consider requiring
that the Army (1) award annual (instead of multiyear) Javelin
contracts for the minimum quantity needed to sustain production until
the Army demonstrates that the system's design is stable and (2)
reduce the command launch unit production to the contractor's minimum
production level of three units per month.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
We reviewed the Army's justification for a multiyear contract and
discussed multiyear criteria with officials in the Army's Javelin
Project Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and the U.S. Marine Corps
Ground Weapons System, Quantico, Virginia. We also obtained
information on quantity requirements and Javelin's design stability
from the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, Washington, D.C., and the Army Material Systems Analysis
Activity, Aberdeen, Maryland.
To determine the adequacy of planned system testing, we obtained and
reviewed test plans and reports from the Javelin Project Office. We
discussed Javelin testing with project office officials and officials
from the Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria,
Virginia; the Office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; and the Army Material Systems Analysis
Activity, Aberdeen, Maryland.
To assess the Army's decision to purchase launch units, we evaluated
production and fielding plans and held discussions with officials in
the Javelin Project Office; the Army Missile Command Acquisition
Center, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; the Office of the Secretary of the
Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Washington, D.C.; and
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from December 1995 to June 1996 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be
made available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report
were Lee Edwards, Barbara Haynes, and John Randall.
Louis J. Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisition Issues
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated August 16, 1996.
GAO COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
1. DOD provided comments on the technical accuracy of the report.
We have reviewed DOD's suggestions and made changes as appropriate.
2. Based on new information provided by DOD as a result of its
review of our report, we no longer question the stability of the
Javelin quantities the Army and the Marine Corps will purchase during
the multiyear contract. At the time of our audit, the Marine Corps
had not formalized their plans to reduce their purchase of Javelin
rounds and it appeared likely that quantities could be reduced during
the period of the multiyear contract. With DOD's assurance that the
Marine Corps' reductions will be known before the multiyear contract
is awarded and that the Army anticipates no changes in their
requirements, we have removed information regarding this issue from
the report.
3. Javelin's design has been in transition since it was
operationally tested in 1993. Each production of Javelin through the
first year of full-rate production will produce a different
configuration of the system. The Army has not completed technical
and operational tests of Javelin with all design changes
incorporated. In addition, early tests have shown that some changes
require additional redesign. By delaying the multiyear contract
until the Army has successfully tested Javelin's design and the
design's stability is demonstrated by production, the government can
reduce the risk that additional redesign will reduce or eliminate
multiyear cost savings.
4. We agree that the Javelin should be a significant improvement
over the aging Dragon system. However, because there is no urgent
threat, we believe that the Army should reduce their third low-rate
production contract to purchase only the minimum quantity necessary
to keep the manufacturing facility running. This will minimize the
costs of replacing these launch units with redesigned units.
*** End of document. ***