Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, and Mine
Clearing (Briefing Report, 02/29/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR).

The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 ended years of
devastating civil war and started Cambodia on the road to building a
democratic civil society. The United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia, established to carry out the accords, supervised the
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, repatriated more than
360,000 refugees, improved human rights conditions, and conducted free
and fair national elections in 1993. The Authority concluded its mission
in late 1993 with the formation of a duly elected government in
Cambodia. This briefing report provides information on Cambodia's
progress since 1993. GAO discusses (1) Cambodia's prospects for holding
free and fair national elections by 1998; (2) its progress in meeting
international human and political rights standards; and (3) its progress
in clearing millions of land mines left over from decades of war.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-15BR
     TITLE:  Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, 
             and Mine Clearing
      DATE:  02/29/96
   SUBJECT:  Elections
             Foreign governments
             Political activities
             Political corruption
             Explosives
             Civil rights
             Economic development
             International relations
             Foreign economic assistance
IDENTIFIER:  Cambodia
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Briefing Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives

February 1996

CAMBODIA - LIMITED PROGRESS ON
FREE ELECTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
MINE CLEARING

GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR

Cambodia

(711138)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  BLDP - Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
  CMAC - Cambodian Mine Action Center
  CPP - Cambodian People's Party
  FUNCINPEC - National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
     Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
  NGO - nongovernmental organization
  RCAF - Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
  UNCHR - United Nations Center for Human Rights
  UNTAC - United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
  USAID - U.S.  Agency for International Development

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-270716

February 29, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman
The Honorable Lee H.  Hamilton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991 ended years of
devastating civil war and started Cambodia on the road to building a
democratic civil society.  The United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC), established to implement the accords, supervised
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, repatriated over
360,000 refugees, improved human rights conditions, and conducted
free and fair national elections in 1993.  UNTAC concluded its
mandate in late 1993 with the formation of a duly elected government
in Cambodia.  This report, which builds on our prior work on UNTAC
and Cambodia (see a list of related GAO products at the end of this
report), provides information about Cambodia's progress since 1993. 
Specifically, we report on (1) Cambodia's prospects for holding free
and fair national elections by 1998; (2) its progress in meeting
international human and political rights standards; and (3) its
progress in clearing millions of land mines\1 left over from decades
of war, which is crucial for economic development and public safety. 
We briefed members of your staff about these issues on November 7 and
December 19, 1995.  This report summarizes and updates the
information we provided at those briefings. 


--------------------
\1 Land mines include antipersonnel and antitank mines, unexpended
and unexploded ordnance, and booby traps.  We reported on mine
clearing and related issues in Unexploded Ordnance:  A Coordinated
Approach to Detection and Clearance Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-95-197,
Sept.  20, 1995). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

By signing the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and various international
conventions in 1992, Cambodia's leaders agreed to support a
democratic resolution to the country's long-standing civil war, to
protect and advance human and political rights and fundamental
freedoms for all Cambodians, and to begin rebuilding the country's
shattered economy and civil institutions.  Cambodia's constitution,
adopted in September 1993, established a multiparty democracy
guaranteeing human rights and the rule of law and seeking economic
development and prosperity.  It commits the government to (1) holding
new national elections by 1998; (2) recognizing and respecting human
rights as defined in the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, and all treaties and conventions
concerning human rights, women's rights, and children's rights; and
(3) promoting economic development.  Achieving sustained progress in
the areas of democratic governance, the protection of human rights,
and economic development (1) is a primary objective of U.S.  foreign
policy in Southeast Asia and (2) was a major factor underlying
international support for the Paris Peace Accords and UNTAC, which
cost an estimated $2.8 billion.  Since the mid-1980s, U.S. 
assistance to Cambodia, including peacekeeping, has totaled nearly $1
billion. 

The U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) had planned to
provide Cambodia about $111 million over 3 years:  $29 million in
fiscal year 1994; $42 million in fiscal year 1995; and $40 million in
fiscal year 1996.  The USAID Mission in Phnom Penh planned to spend
about $8 million to help the Cambodian government plan and prepare
for holding national elections.  USAID also funds efforts to improve
the functioning of the National Assembly, the legal system, and the
press and to protect human rights.  USAID now says that its planned
level of assistance for fiscal
year 1996 will be lower than the $40 million in the executive
branch's initial budget request, and that assistance levels for
Cambodia will be related to congressionally approved levels of
assistance globally. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Since UNTAC ended its mandate in late 1993, Cambodia has made limited
progress (1) toward establishing a framework for holding
constitutionally required national elections by 1998, creating
uncertainty about the prospects for a peaceful, democratic transition
of power; (2) meeting international human and political rights
standards; and (3) clearing mines for economic development and public
safety.  Progress toward those three objectives is key to sustaining
momentum toward democratic governance, the protection of human
rights, and economic development, according to a variety of U.S.,
other foreign government, and Cambodian officials, and
nongovernmental organizations.  Sustaining momentum in these areas
also is key to maintaining domestic and international support for the
Cambodian government. 

Cambodia faces several obstacles to holding constitutionally required
national elections by 1998.  The country currently lacks an electoral
framework and the necessary human and financial resources to support
the election process.  U.S.  and other foreign officials estimate
that creating such a framework will take considerable time and
involve many difficult political decisions, but the Cambodian
government has done little to prepare for national elections at this
time and is falling behind schedule for holding elections by
mid-1998.  Some U.S.  and other foreign officials doubt whether the
Cambodian government can ensure that elections will be held in a
neutral environment where parties can campaign without violent
intimidation and voters will feel secure against retaliation. 
Recognizing concerns that the police and armed forces would interfere
with the elections, Cambodia's First Prime Minister has proposed
putting them under the control of an independent, neutral commission
during the elections.  Other obstacles to free and fair elections
include opposition parties' lack of fair access to the media and
disparity in the relative strengths of the political parties. 

Although conditions have improved since the end of its civil war,
Cambodia has made limited progress in meeting basic international
human rights standards.  According to human rights groups, military
and police forces remain ineffective and corrupt and continue to
violate human rights frequently.  These groups and some U.S.  and
other foreign officials said that few Cambodians had received due
process or fair trials in the past
2 years, in part because prosecutors and judges lacked basic training
to properly investigate, prepare, present, and decide cases.  These
same sources reported that official corruption was widespread and
growing, undermining the rule of law.  Several U.S.  officials noted
that low-level corruption partly reflected the low pay for Cambodia's
bureaucracy, including military, police, and other officials. 

In the area of political rights, recent government actions suggest
increasing intolerance for dissenting opinion, both inside and
outside the government.  One outspoken member was expelled from the
National Assembly for publicly attacking government corruption, and
others said they were threatened if they continued to criticize the
government.  During the past year, the government prosecuted several
members of the press for criticizing government corruption, enacted
press restrictions, and tolerated violent attacks on some press
members. 

The presence of millions of land mines imposes a heavy economic and
social burden on Cambodia, already one of the poorest nations in the
world.  According to several studies, mine-clearing experts, and U.S. 
and foreign officials, these mines (1) deny access to vast tracts of
farmland, forests, and other natural resources, which represents a
huge economic loss, and (2) interfere with the resettlement and
reintegration of refugees.  Nevertheless, the Cambodian government
has cleared little land of mines and devoted few resources to the
task since 1993.  The U.S.  government has provided some funds,
training, equipment, and supplies for mine clearing to the Cambodian
Mine Action Center and the Cambodian armed forces.  Nonetheless,
according to available reports, mine-clearing experts, and U.S.  and
other foreign officials, the Cambodian government's lack of
leadership, planning, and funding for mine clearing are among the
most important factors explaining the lack of progress in this area. 

Further information about elections, human and political rights, and
land mines is provided in briefing sections I, II, and III,
respectively. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The Departments of Defense and State and USAID generally agreed with
the information presented in a draft of this report, but preferred to
focus on the progress Cambodia had made since the signing of the
Paris Peace Accords in 1991 rather than the more limited progress
that has occurred since UNTAC completed its mandate in late 1993.  In
addition, they said that Cambodian society had been shattered by
decades of civil war, but that the country had the potential, with
international assistance and support, to make progress on many of the
problems our report discusses, and noted that Cambodian leaders had
publicly promised to hold elections, respect the rule of law, and
protect human rights.  For example, with regard to human rights, the
Department of State and USAID emphasized the improvements that have
occurred as compared with circumstances that prevailed prior to 1991,
and the Department of Defense said that it is important to note the
persistence of critics who are not intimidated by the government's
return to autocratic methods.  The Department of Defense said that
erecting a framework for conducting a fair election by 1998 is not
entirely outside the realm of possibility, and the Department of
State said that the important issue is to have free and fair
elections, not that they be held as scheduled in May 1998. 

We recognize that decades of civil war and the Khmer Rouge's
genocidal rule had a devastating effect on Cambodian society, and
that the Cambodian government faces serious problems of
institution-building, exacerbated by widespread corruption, a poorly
staffed and trained judicial system, and an ongoing Khmer Rouge
insurgency.  However, using this past as a benchmark for measuring
the current government's progress can be misleading because UNTAC was
principally responsible for improvements between 1991 and 1993.  We
believe that the standards of behavior set out in the provisions of
the Paris Accords implemented by UNTAC, other international
conventions that Cambodia has signed, and Cambodia's constitution are
the appropriate standards for assessing the current government's
progress toward democratic governance and protecting human
rights--not the conditions of genocide and civil war that existed
prior to 1991.  In signing these documents, Cambodia's leaders
promised to abide by their provisions in rebuilding Cambodia. 
However, the evidence shows that since 1993 the Cambodian government
has yet to make much progress toward these goals, and some recent
actions, such as restricting press freedoms and declaring a new
opposition party illegal, are inconsistent with the government's
public commitment to free elections, the rule of law, and the
protection of human and political rights.  Underscoring our concerns
are reports that government forces raided the headquarters of a new
opposition party in late January 1996 and held party members at gun
point. 

Comments from the Departments of Defense and State and USAID are
reprinted in their entirety in appendixes I, II, and III,
respectively, along with our evaluation of them. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

To obtain information for this report, we conducted fieldwork in
Cambodia and Thailand and at the Departments of Defense and State,
the U.S.  Pacific Command, USAID, and the United Nations.  At these
locations, we met with key U.S., Cambodian, other foreign government,
and U.N.  officials and with representatives of a variety of
nongovernmental organizations.  In Thailand, these included the U.S. 
Ambassador, political officer, and military attache; Thai military
officials; and representatives from the United Nations and refugee
assistance groups.  In Cambodia, these included the U.S.  Ambassador,
the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Acting USAID Mission Director, the
USAID democracy programs officer, the U.S.  Pacific Command
Representative, and the Humanitarian Assistance Demining Coordinator;
Cambodia's Secretary of State and President of the Council of
Ministers, foreign advisors, and Members of the Cambodian National
Assembly, including the chairmen of the foreign affairs and human
rights commissions; diplomats at the Australian, British, French, and
Indonesian embassies; representatives of the United Nations
Development Program, the United Nations Center for Human Rights, the
Asia Foundation, several human rights groups, and two policy research
institutions; and foreign civilian and military advisors at the
Cambodian Mine Action Center.  We also reviewed and analyzed many
reports, studies, and other documents about Cambodia, plus the Paris
Peace Accords and other international treaties to which the Cambodian
government is a party. 

We conducted our review from May to December 1995 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to other interested
congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the
USAID Administrator, and other interested parties.  Copies will be
made available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report.  Major contributors to this report were
Tetsuo Miyabara, Michael Rohrback, and Michael Zola. 

Harold J.  Johnson
Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues


Briefing Section I HOLDING FREE
AND FAIR NATIONAL ELECTIONS BY
1998
============================================================== Letter 


   CAMBODIA FACES OBSTACLES TO
   HOLDING NATIONAL ELECTIONS BY
   1998
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Cambodia's constitution requires that the government hold national
elections by 1998.  However, the country currently lacks the
electoral framework (laws, regulations, an independent commission)
and resources (both human and financial) needed to hold elections. 
Although U.S.  and other foreign officials estimate that creating
such a framework will take considerable time and involve many
difficult political decisions, little has been accomplished so far. 
In late 1995, the Cambodian government began drafting an electoral
law.  Discussion at a late October 1995 seminar, sponsored partly by
the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), explored the
relative advantages of different types of electoral systems.  By
December 1995, the government still had not completed a draft
electoral law and was falling behind a proposed timetable for holding
elections in mid-1998 (see table I.1). 



                               Table I.1
                
                National Election Timetable for Cambodia

Event                               Timing
----------------------------------  ----------------------------------
Draft national election law         November 1995 (not met)

Interior Ministry reviews draft     December 1995 (not met)
law

Co-Prime Ministers review draft     January-February 1996
law

Draft law submitted to the          Spring 1996
National Assembly

National Assembly enacts law        Summer 1996

Implement new law (create an        1997
election committee, issue
regulations, train workers,
educate voters)

Hold national elections             May 1998
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Pre-election technical assessment for Cambodia prepared by
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, August 1995. 

According to U.S.  and other foreign officials, Cambodia lacks the
human and financial resources needed to hold an election on the scale
of the one held by the United Nations in 1993.  The U.N.  electoral
assistance unit could help plan and organize the elections, but this
would require a significant financial commitment from the
international community.  Although some international assistance may
be provided, such as election monitors, some U.S.  and other foreign
officials doubt that the international community will support a
costly, large-scale operation to help conduct the elections. 

The Cambodian government currently appoints local officials but has
proposed holding local elections in 1996 or 1997.  Some U.S., other
foreign government, and Cambodian officials support holding local
elections because they would introduce democratic practices at the
local level.  Other such officials oppose holding local elections
because they would divert limited financial and human resources from
the task of holding national elections and/or because antidemocratic
government officials could use local elections as evidence of
democratic progress and then cancel national elections. 


   CAMBODIA FACES OBSTACLES TO
   HOLDING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Even if the Cambodian government holds national elections by 1998,
some U.S.  and other foreign officials and experts doubt they would
be free and fair.  The Interior Ministry is drafting the election law
and may be responsible for organizing the elections.  Ministry
deliberations and work are not open to public oversight and
participation, and the Ministry played a role in the violence and
intimidation before the 1993 elections. 

According to some U.S.  and other foreign government officials,
nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and others, the Cambodian
government cannot ensure that parties could campaign without violent
intimidation and that voters would feel free from retaliation.  The
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was unable
to control key government ministries before the 1993 elections, and
the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) used some of them to sponsor
violence against its political opponents.  Some foreign officials and
reports point out that CPP still controls the Interior Ministry and
its internal security forces, plus the armed forces.  Several NGOs
report that fear of politically motivated violence is a key issue for
members of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Buddhist
Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) but not for CPP members. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State
noted that Prime Minister Ranariddh has proposed establishing an
independent, neutral commission under the King to control the police
and armed forces during the elections to prevent them from
intervening in the elections.  However, we question the effectiveness
of such a commission in controlling the police and armed forces when
UNTAC, with over 20,000 personnel, was unable to control them before
the 1993 elections. 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

UNTAC officials knew that providing Cambodian voters with accurate
information was essential for free and fair elections.  Consequently,
guaranteeing fair access to the media--especially radio, because most
Cambodians are illiterate and television stations have limited
broadcast areas--for all political parties was an essential element
of UNTAC's pre-election strategy.  Several studies conclude that the
1993 elections probably could not have taken place or succeeded
without the flow of information provided largely by "Radio UNTAC."
Unfortunately, Cambodia currently lacks widely-available media
sources of accurate information.  Although more than 30 newspapers
operate in Cambodia, they have limited nationwide distribution and
the quality of their news reporting is unreliable.  Also, the
government tightly controls broadcast media licenses, limiting
opposition parties' access to radio and television.  For example, a
BLDP official told us that the government had turned down the party's
application for a radio station license.  Moreover, as discussed
later, the government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissenting
opinions.  USAID's strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia
recognizes the media's weaknesses; one of its objectives is to
increase media access and professionalism.  In commenting on a draft
of this report, the Department of Defense said that, despite
restricted access to the media, outspoken government critics still
may be able to generate popular support and influence the elections. 

With the possible exception of CPP, Cambodian political parties lack
the leadership, organization, and financial resources to conduct
effective national campaigns, according to U.S.  and other foreign
officials and reports and other documents we reviewed.  Over a decade
of single-party rule has given CPP the opportunity to build a solid
party structure (largely indistinguishable from the government
bureaucracy) at the provincial, district, communal, and village
levels.  Meanwhile, U.S.  officials and NGOs indicate that FUNCINPEC
and BLDP have weak party structures at these levels and are further
weakened by political infighting.  Given their weak party structure
and disunity, several NGOs and others conclude that the parties will
be unable to compete effectively in future elections. 

USAID plans to provide training to strengthen the capabilities of all
political parties to participate in the election.  However, several
observers suggested that CPP, with its generally better organization
and structure, might benefit disproportionately from such training. 
Several U.S., other foreign government, and NGO officials questioned
the wisdom of providing training to strengthen any of the existing
parties because they are undemocratic and authoritarian.  USAID
officials said that they plan to fund training for grassroots civic
organizations instead of established political parties.  The National
Democratic Institute suspended political party training in Cambodia
in 1995 but plans to work with other NGOs to train election monitors
and educate voters. 


Briefing Section II MEETING HUMAN
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS STANDARDS
============================================================== Letter 


   LIMITED PROGRESS IN MEETING
   BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Cambodia has ratified and agreed to abide by all major international
agreements guaranteeing human and political rights, for example, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Yet the
current government has made limited progress since late 1993 in
meeting the basic international human rights standards contained in
these agreements.  Indeed, some U.S., other foreign government, and
Cambodian officials and NGOs conclude that Cambodia's human rights
situation worsened during 1995. 

According to human rights NGOs, the United Nations Center for Human
Rights (UNCHR) office in Phnom Penh, and USAID documents, Cambodian
military and police forces continued to violate human rights
frequently during the past 2 years.  These sources reported numerous
cases of extortion, beatings, robberies, and other violations by
soldiers and police.  USAID and Cambodian officials and others noted
that this problem touches on the larger issue of desperately needed
reforms of the Cambodian bureaucracy, including the provision of
adequate pay for police, military, and other government officials to
reduce or eliminate low-level corruption, which currently is endemic. 

According to human rights NGOs, UNCHR, some U.S.  and Cambodian
officials, and USAID documents (1) few Cambodians had received due
process or fair trials in the past 2 years; (2) prosecutors and
judges lacked basic training and skills for properly investigating,
preparing, presenting, and deciding cases; and (3) trained public
defenders remained scarce.  They also said that official corruption
was widespread and growing, undermining the rule of law, and that the
government had resisted some legislators' attempts to introduce
anti-corruption legislation in the National Assembly. 

Human rights NGOs and UNCHR told us that Cambodia's prisons remain
overcrowded and still fall short of meeting basic international and
humanitarian standards for the treatment of prisoners.  In late 1994,
NGOs reported that they found a secret government prison where
prisoners were tortured and denied basic human needs.  According to
the Department of State, this prison was closed in 1994. 


   RECENT ACTIONS INDICATE
   INCREASING OFFICIAL INTOLERANCE
   FOR POLITICAL DISSENT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

In the area of political rights, recent government actions indicate
increasing official intolerance for dissenting opinion, both inside
and outside the government.  This intolerance has had a chilling
effect on efforts to improve the Cambodian government's effectiveness
and reduce corruption, according to USAID, several foreign government
officials, NGOs, and members of Cambodia's National Assembly. 
Reported examples of increasing intolerance include the following: 

  -- One outspoken member was expelled from the National Assembly for
     publicly attacking government corruption and other problems, and
     other members have been threatened with expulsion if they speak
     out. 

  -- The government closed some newspapers and prosecuted several
     members of the press, enacted restrictions on press freedoms,
     and tightly controlled broadcast licenses.  Several members of
     the press were beaten or killed and their attackers set free. 
     The government attempted to silence the free press by
     criticizing an existing journalists' association and pressuring
     journalists to join a competing association formed and
     controlled by the government.  Government officials justified
     press restrictions by pointing to irresponsible reporting on the
     part of some newspapers. 

  -- Cambodia's co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR
     office in Phnom Penh in response to its criticism of human
     rights abuses, but backed down under international (including
     U.S.  government) pressure. 


Briefing Section III CLEARING LAND
MINES
============================================================== Letter 


   LAND MINES IMPOSE A HEAVY
   ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BURDEN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The presence of millions of land mines denies Cambodians access to
vast tracts of farmland, forests, and other natural resources.  Prior
to 1970, Cambodia was a net exporter of food; it is now a net
importer.  Battambang and Svey Rieng provinces were once the most
productive areas, respectively considered Cambodia's "breadbasket"
and "rice bowl." Mines now make substantial areas in these two
provinces unusable.  The lack of mine-free farmland was one of
several factors that forced UNTAC to cancel plans to provide land to
refugees returning to Cambodia from Thai border camps and is a key
factor in their present poverty and food insecurity.  Only about 20
square kilometers of land have been cleared of mines since 1992,
enough to support only a few thousand refugees (thousands more await
resettlement). 

Land mines also hinder infrastructure reconstruction and development,
which in turn hinders agricultural, industrial, and tourism
development.  For example, before roads or bridges can be repaired,
the surrounding area must be cleared of mines. 

According to some studies, the majority of land mine casualties are
some of Cambodia's most able-bodied workers, young males aged 16 to
35.  Land mine casualties overburden Cambodia's weak medical and
social infrastructure.  Studies show that land mine injuries consume
a disproportionate share of Cambodia's hospital resources.  Cambodia
has the greatest proportion of amputees in the world, according to
several studies and reports. 


   LIMITED PROGRESS MADE IN
   CLEARING LAND MINES
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Several factors explain Cambodia's lack of progress in clearing
mines.  A major factor is the sheer extent of the problem.  An
estimated 4 million to 10 million land mines are widely distributed
throughout the country.  One minefield in southeast Cambodia is 54
kilometers long and contains an estimated 360,000 mines.  Another on
Cambodia's border with Thailand is over 600 kilometers long and
contains an estimated 2 million to 3 million mines.  The following
operational factors compound the problem and make clearing Cambodian
minefields particularly difficult: 

  -- Limited information exists about the exact location of the
     minefields. 

  -- Cambodian minefields are extremely dense by western military
     standards and display little order or pattern. 

  -- Humanitarian mine-clearing operations are costly and
     time-consuming.  One estimate places the cost of clearing a
     single mine at $300 to $1,000. 

  -- The manual mine-clearing techniques used are slow, and attempts
     to clear mines mechanically have so far been unsuccessful. 

  -- The ongoing Khmer Rouge insurgency limits access to some areas,
     and Khmer Rouge forces continue to lay mines. 

Since 1994, U.S.  military forces have trained and equipped several
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) mine-clearing units as part of
the U.S.  government's nonlethal military assistance program to
Cambodia.  U.S.  military officials and others report that
mine-clearing efforts by these units have been hindered by limited
operational funding from the Cambodian government, poor senior
leadership, and lack of a clear mission.  U.S.  military officials in
Cambodia estimated that these units had cleared less than 1 square
kilometer of land. 

Some U.S.  and other foreign officials have urged the Cambodian
government to reorganize, retrain, and reorient the RCAF for a dual
security and reconstruction role, including mine clearing.  Senior
Cambodian government and military officials have proposed some
helpful changes, but their commitment to these proposals is
uncertain.  USAID officials questioned the effectiveness of using the
Cambodian military in a dual role, based on their experience with
dual role militaries elsewhere. 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Cambodian Mine Action Center's (CMAC) mine-clearing efforts have
been hindered from its start by limited funding.  CMAC was
established in June 1992 to create a Cambodian institution to
continue mine-clearing and related activities after the completion of
UNTAC's mandate.  CMAC focuses on mine clearing for humanitarian,
rather than development, purposes.  CMAC reports progress in clearing
mines and reducing mine-related casualties, but experts estimate it
will take decades to eliminate mines from Cambodia, given current
techniques and efforts. 

CMAC was unable to secure sufficient funding from international
donors to complete its initial 30-month, $20 million operating
program, scheduled to end April 30, 1996.  In June 1995, the
U.N.-sponsored trust fund established to finance the program
contained only about $1.5 million, an amount sufficient for about 3
more months of operations.  At that time, there were no plans or
mechanisms in place for obtaining additional donor funding after the
trust fund expired at the end of April 1996, and the Cambodian
government had not budgeted funds to support CMAC once donor funding
ended.  Foreign technical advisers and others said that CMAC could
not operate without the trust fund, additional donor support, and
continued foreign technical assistance.  CMAC officials and its 1994
annual report suggested that providing mine-clearing services on a
reimbursable basis might allow CMAC to generate sufficient revenues
to become self-financing, and noted that the contractor for a
U.S.-funded road building project employs CMAC-trained mine-clearing
teams. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State said
that the United Nations Development Program had agreed to extend the
trust fund for a few years and that the Cambodian government had
pledged to provide $1 million to CMAC in 1996 and a total of $10
million through 2000.  The Department also noted that, given the size
of Cambodia's land mine problem, continued international assistance
will be necessary for some time. 

Cambodia's national development strategy does not directly address
specific mine-clearing objectives, priorities, or requirements
associated with various development objectives.  Also, it has yet to
integrate RCAF, CMAC, or NGO mine clearing, or assign them roles or
tasks.  CMAC has been tasked to develop a national mine-clearing
strategy, but it is not scheduled to complete this task until July
1996. 




(See figure in printed edition.)APPENDIX I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's
letter dated January 5, 1996. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  The obstacles to holding free and fair elections in Cambodia are
not insurmountable; however, the Cambodian government does not appear
to be drafting an election law in a manner that will allow reasonable
time or opportunity for public comment and participation and/or
election preparations.  The Cambodian people were willing to express
their political will at the polls in 1993; however, lack of progress
in overcoming these obstacles may deny them an opportunity to express
their will freely in 1998. 

2.  While some critics persist in speaking out against official
corruption and human rights violations, they express their opinions
in an increasingly hostile environment, which includes the threat of
imprisonment or death.  That they continue to speak out may be more a
tribute to their individual courage than to the state of freedom of
expression in Cambodia. 

3.  We have revised our report to reflect this information. 

4.  Whether the police are more loyal to a faction of the CPP than
the party itself does not alter concerns that they will be used to
sponsor violence against political opponents, as they were in 1993. 
In addition, although the armed forces apparently remained neutral
during two failed coup attempts, nevertheless, some foreign officials
remain concerned that CPP will use the armed forces, or some of its
elements, to sponsor violence against political opponents.  As the
Department of State noted in its comments, First Prime Minister
Ranariddh has proposed establishing an independent, neutral
commission under the King to control the police and the armed forces
to avoid their "improper intervention" in the electoral process. 

5.  We included an estimate of the amount of land cleared of mines by
the RCAF for humanitarian purposes in calculating the total area
cleared.  For clarity, we note that 5 million square meters equals 5
square kilometers. 




(See figure in printed edition.)APPENDIX II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated December 19, 1995. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  We recognize the devastating effects decades of civil war and the
Khmer Rouge's genocidal rule had on Cambodian society.  However,
using this past as a benchmark to measure the current Cambodian
government's progress since UNTAC ended its mandate in 1993 can be
misleading because UNTAC was principally responsible for much of the
improvement in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993.  We believe that the
standards of behavior set out in the Paris Peace Accords, the various
international conventions that Cambodia has signed, and the Cambodian
constitution are appropriate standards against which to measure the
current government's progress--not the conditions of genocide and
civil war that existed prior to 1991. 

2.  Achieving sustained progress toward democratic governance, the
protection of human rights, and economic development in Cambodia were
key factors underlying international support for UNTAC (and the
formulation of the specific components of its mandate) and continue
to be key objectives of U.S.  foreign policy.  Continued progress on
the three specific issues our report addresses--holding free and fair
elections by 1998, meeting international human and political rights
standards, and clearing land mines--is key to sustaining momentum in
those three broader areas, according to many officials and experts we
interviewed.  Failure to successfully address the three specific
issues discussed in this report could undermine international support
for Cambodia, according to these same officials and experts. 

3.  Our report recognizes UNTAC's contributions to improving
conditions in Cambodia. 

4.  While the Cambodian people are eager to express their political
will in national elections, the obstacles we cite regarding free and
fair elections, if unresolved, could deny the Cambodian people an
opportunity to express their will freely. 

5.  While the Cambodian government is officially committed to
democracy and human rights, some recent actions, such as declaring a
newly formed opposition political party illegal, appear inconsistent
with the government's official policy.  USAID's 1995 strategy for
promoting democracy in Cambodia notes that some observers sensed a
return to "traditional authoritarian ways" in 1995. 

6.  Although domestic and international human rights groups work on
improving human rights in Cambodia, these organizations have reported
facing increasing intimidation from government authorities, as the
Department recognizes in its February 1995 human rights report. 
Human rights groups also are concerned that no law authorizes them to
operate in Cambodia and that the government might use this lack of
legal status to curtail their future operations.  As noted in our
report, the co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR office in
Phnom Penh because of its criticism of human rights abuses. 
Recognizing such concerns, USAID's strategy for promoting democracy
in Cambodia targets resources toward the adoption of a legal
framework for the existence and operation of NGOs in Cambodia. 

7.  Although over 50 print and electronic media operate in Cambodia,
the quality of their news reporting is unreliable and they operate in
an environment increasingly hostile to press freedoms.  USAID's 1995
strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia says that the country
lacks an aggressive media to hold the government accountable, and
that the press, although active, lacks the training to be articulate
advocates for the development of democratic institutions and is
vulnerable to government intimidation.  Human Rights Watch reports
that the Cambodian government has engaged in a series of actions to
curtail freedom of the press and stifle the right to hold and express
opinions.  For example, the group reported that after a September
1995 grenade attack on an opposition party congress, government
officials ordered broadcast stations to limit their coverage to a
government-provided script. 

8.  We recognize that Cambodia faces serious problems in building a
democratic society, and that it would be unrealistic to expect the
government to become a model democracy in the 2 years since UNTAC
departed.  However, it is realistic--given UNTAC's costly
intervention and Cambodian leaders' pledges to support democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law--to expect the government to make
sustained progress toward the specific goals this report discusses. 
However, evidence suggests that the Cambodian government has made
limited progress toward these goals over the past 2 years, and
instead may be returning to traditional authoritarian methods.  For
example, government forces reportedly raided the headquarters of a
new opposition party in late January 1996 and held party members at
gun point.  Also, USAID's 1995 strategy for promoting democracy in
Cambodia notes that some observers sensed a return to "traditional
authoritarian ways" in 1995. 

9.  We did not say that the Cambodian government could not hold free
and fair elections by 1998 or protect human and political rights. 
However, evidence indicates that to date the government has not made
much progress toward these goals.  Regarding mine-clearing efforts,
our point is that funding for such efforts remains an issue and the
Cambodian government currently lacks an integrated strategic plan. 

10.  Where appropriate, we have modified our report to say "some U.S. 
officials" or to specify their titles. 

11.  We have revised our report to reflect this information. 

12.  Although the most important consideration is that Cambodia hold
free and fair national elections, several factors highlight the
significance of holding them by May 1998.  First, the maximum term of
the current National Assembly expires in early September 1998, and
elections must be held within 60 days, or no later than early
November 1998.  U.S., other foreign government, and Cambodian
officials emphasized the importance of holding elections within these
constitutional time frames.  Second, holding elections after May 1998
would be difficult because of logistical problems associated with
Cambodia's monsoon season.  UNTAC's decision to hold elections by May
1993 in part reflected such logistical concerns. 

13.  We agree that it is more important that the election law is
drafted thoughtfully, after a thorough, public exchange of views. 
General adherence to the proposed timetable is important precisely
because it allows time for a thorough, public exchange of views
before the need to enact a law and begin election preparations
becomes pressing.  Also, much remains to be done before elections can
be held, including completing a draft law, allowing for public
comment and debate on the draft law, debating and enacting the law in
the National Assembly, creating an election committee, issuing
election regulations, developing an election budget, training
election workers, educating and registering voters, registering
political parties, and mobilizing international support.  Because
additional delays are likely, we are concerned that the Cambodian
government is falling behind schedule at the very start of the
process. 

14.  We have revised our report to clarify the sources of our
information.  While the Department may consider comments regarding
resource constraints speculative, USAID's 1995 strategy for promoting
democracy in Cambodia notes that the agency has neither the staff or
resources necessary to support both national and local elections. 

15.  Although there have been a few exceptions, new laws and policies
generally are finalized in secret by the Council of Ministers, and
there is limited opportunity for National Assembly debate and public
participation once draft legislation emerges from this closed forum,
according to USAID's 1995 strategy for promoting democracy in
Cambodia. 

16.  The new press law allows for continued criminal prosecution of
the media when material "affects national security and political
stability" and allows the government to confiscate or temporarily
suspend publications without court approval.  Human Rights Watch and
other groups are concerned that these provisions undermine the law's
positive features.  Regarding the government's promise to define
national security and public stability in the future, we cannot
assess the potential impact of such uncertain legislation.  However,
some U.S.  and foreign officials, Cambodians, members of the press,
and others say that the absence of a definition creates uncertainty
that has a chilling effect on press freedoms. 

17.  We have revised our report to say that the Cambodian government
has "pressured" journalists to join a government-controlled
association.  We base this statement on information provided by
officials at the U.S.  embassy in Phnom Penh, the Asia Foundation,
the UNCHR office in Phnom Penh, and an NGO newsletter. 

18.  We included the 15.4 square kilometers of land CMAC has cleared
of mines in the total estimate we report.  Using the requirement
established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of 2
hectares of farmland to support a typical refugee family, 15.4 square
kilometers of land would support less than 800 refugee families--not
the 13,000 the Department cites. 

19.  Our report notes that the U.S.  government has supported
mine-clearing efforts in Cambodia by providing funds, training,
equipment, and supplies. 




(See figure in printed edition.)APPENDIX III
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S.  AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on USAID's letter dated February 1,
1996. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  We have revised our report to reflect this information. 

2.  General adherence to the proposed timetable is important
precisely because it allows time for a thorough, public exchange of
views before the need to enact a law and begin election preparations
becomes pressing.  Much remains to be done before elections can be
held, including completing a draft law, allowing for public comment
and debate on the draft law, debating and enacting the law in the
National Assembly, creating an election committee, issuing election
regulations, developing an election budget, training election
workers, educating and registering voters, registering political
parties, and mobilizing international support.  Because additional
delays are likely--given the inexperience of Cambodian officials, the
need for technical assistance, and competing priorities--we are
concerned that the Cambodian government is falling behind schedule at
the very start of the process. 

3.  Although human rights conditions have improved over what existed
prior to UNTAC, we believe that the standards of behavior set out in
the Paris Peace Accords, the various international treaties that
Cambodia has pledged to uphold, and the Cambodian constitution are
the appropriate standards for assessing the current government's
progress in meeting international human rights standards since
1993--not the conditions of genocide and civil war that existed prior
to 1991.  Moreover, some individuals and groups report that human
rights conditions in Cambodia have worsened since UNTAC left.  For
example, in its 1996 annual report, Human Rights Watch concludes that
Cambodia's human rights situation deteriorated markedly during 1995. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
=========================================================== Appendix 0

Peace Operations:  Information on U.S.  and U.N.  Activities
(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb.  13, 1995). 

U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions
(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec.  29, 1993). 

U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Observations on Mandates and Operational
Capability (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993). 

Cambodia:  AID's Management of Humanitarian Assistance Programs
(GAO/NSIAD-91-260, Aug.  28, 1991). 

Cambodia:  Multilateral Relief Efforts in Border Camps
(GAO/NSIAD-91-99FS, Jan.  22, 1991). 

Cambodia:  U.S.  Non-lethal Assistance and Status of the Cambodian
Seat at the United Nations (GAO/T-NSIAD-90-63, Sept.  19, 1990). 

Problems in Processing Vietnamese Refugees from the Dong Rek Camp in
Cambodia (GAO/NSIAD-85-132, Aug.  16, 1985). 

*** End of document. ***