Haiti: U.S. Assistance for the Electoral Process (Letter Report,
07/05/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-147).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to foster
democratic elections and increased respect for human rights in Haiti,
focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of U.S. support for Haitian
elections; (2) whether election assistance funds were properly
controlled and spent; and (3) the progress made in investigating
allegations of politically motivated killings.

GAO found that: (1) in December 1994, the Haitian government appointed a
nine-member provisional electoral council that carried out the 1995
parliamentary, municipal, and presidential elections; (2) the first
rounds of the elections were generally peaceful, but the voting process
was disorganized and had many irregularities; (3) while Haiti's
electoral administration improved after the June 1995 elections, several
weaknesses in electoral administration continued; (4) the electoral
council mandated a shortened electoral calender that diminished the time
available for some civic and voter education activities, eliminated the
computerization of voter registration lists, and precluded aspects of
some assistance programs; (5) sporadic violence, the perceived lack of
commitment to the presidential election, and boycotts of some opposition
parties contributed to an uncertain electoral climate; (6) the United
States spent about $18.8 million in support of Haiti's parliamentary,
local, and presidential elections, other donors contributed about $9
million, and U.S. diplomatic and Agency for International Development
(AID) officials monitored the electoral process closely to resolve or
minimize problems; (7) AID ability to monitor the use of funds provided
to support the electoral council was impeded by grant agreement and
accountability weaknesses; and (8) while Haiti's human rights situation
has improved, it remains tenuous and no progress has been made in the
investigations of alleged political murders.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-147
     TITLE:  Haiti: U.S. Assistance for the Electoral Process
      DATE:  07/05/96
   SUBJECT:  Elections
             Political activities
             Political rights
             Federal aid to foreign countries
             Political corruption
             Technical assistance
             Homicide
             International relations
             Developing countries
             Financial management
IDENTIFIER:  Haiti
             European Union
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House
of Representatives

July 1996

HAITI - U.S.  ASSISTANCE FOR THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS

GAO/NSIAD-96-147

Haiti

(711149)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AIFLD - American Institute for Free Labor Development
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  IFES - International Foundation for Electoral Systems
  IRI - International Republican Institute
  NDI - National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
  OAS - Organization of American States
  USAID - United States Agency for International Development

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-271798

July 5, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin A.  Gilman
Chairman, Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

In response to your request, we reviewed U.S.  efforts to foster
democratic elections and increased respect for human rights in Haiti. 
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the elections in Haiti were
conducted; (2) the nature and extent of U.S.  support for these
elections; and (3) whether election assistance funds for Haiti were
properly controlled and spent.\1 We also assessed the progress Haiti
has made in investigating allegations of politically motivated
killings. 


--------------------
\1 As agreed with Committee staff, this objective was met by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of the
Inspector General conducting an audit of USAID's internal controls
for accounting for U.S.  election support funds in Haiti.  The Office
will report separately on its findings. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

On September 30, 1991, 8 months after his inauguration as Haiti's
first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was
overthrown by a military coup.  On September 18, 1994, after 3 years
of economic and diplomatic pressure, including the threat of direct
U.S.  military intervention, Haiti's military regime relinquished
power and allowed Aristide's return to office in October 1994.  Among
other things, this arrangement allowed for the nonviolent entry of
U.S.  troops and for holding parliamentary elections in a free and
democratic manner.  In accordance with Haiti's constitution
precluding two consecutive presidential terms, President Aristide
indicated that he would hand over power to an elected successor when
his term expired in February 1996. 

From September 1994 through March 1995, the multinational force of
about 20,000 U.S.  troops and 4,100 military and support personnel
from other countries was deployed to Haiti to establish a "safe and
secure environment." On March 31, 1995, responsibility for continuing
the mission was transferred to the U.N.  Mission in Haiti, which had
about 6,900 troops at the time of transfer.  U.S.  troops comprised
about half the U.N.  force. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

During the first round of Haiti's parliamentary and local elections,
held in June 1995, international observers noted various
irregularities; however, the September 1995 run-off election for
parliamentary seats, the August and October 1995 partial elections,\2
and the December 1995 presidential election were less troubled. 
Incidents of violence and intimidation, and uncertainty over
President Aristide's intentions to step aside to a successor, arose
during the election period, however, and administrative difficulties
persisted.  Nevertheless, most observers agreed that the elections
were generally peaceful, citizens were free to vote, organized fraud
was not evident, and technical irregularities did not affect the
outcome of the election.  Rene Preval, the candidate for President
Aristide's coalition, won the presidency by an overwhelming majority
of 87.9 percent. 

The U.S.  government spent about $18.8 million to support the Haitian
elections.  Of this amount, $9.1 million was expended through a U.N. 
trust fund for technical assistance and budget support to the Haitian
temporary electoral council, about $6 million was spent by U.S. 
nongovernmental organizations for election-related activities, and
$3.7 million was spent to support the efforts of the Organization of
American States (OAS) to observe the elections in Haiti.  The U.S. 
embassy and USAID mission closely monitored the electoral process and
worked with grantees and Haitian officials to overcome problems and
minimize delays.  Without the financial and diplomatic support
provided by the United States, it is unlikely that the elections
would have been held in time to inaugurate President Aristide's
successor in February 1996. 

According to USAID's Office of the Inspector General, adequate
controls existed over the use of election support funds granted to
the four U.S.  nongovernmental organizations carrying out
election-related activities in Haiti.  However, the office found
that, as of February 1996, the Haitian electoral council had not yet
fully accounted for more than $2.5 million in advances it received
from the U.N.  trust fund.\3 Additionally, as of August 1995, an
accounting firm had determined that $587,754 in electoral council
expenditures were unjustified under the terms of U.N.  regulations
for allowable expenses. 

The human rights situation remains fragile and continues to concern
the United States and international organizations, despite dramatic
improvements since the period of the coup regime.  A joint OAS and
U.N.  International Civilian Mission concluded that the overall human
rights situation had improved greatly since the intervention of
peacekeeping forces and President Aristide's return.  However, it
also reported on continuing execution-style murders that might
possibly be politically motivated, remaining deficiencies in the
criminal justice system, and possible use of excessive force by the
Haitian National Police.  Despite congressional restrictions on U.S. 
aid until the Haitian government undertakes serious investigations of
extrajudicial and political killings, as of March 1996, the Haitian
government had made no progress in conducting the investigations. 
Haiti's Special Investigative Unit, established in October 1995,
disintegrated during the presidential transition period, and the
investigators were assigned to other tasks.  The unit prioritized the
cases to be pursued, but no investigative work was done, according to
State Department officials.  The State Department is attempting to
reinvigorate the unit through diplomatic efforts and U.S.  technical
assistance contractors. 


--------------------
\2 The electoral council, a nine-member group appointed to administer
the elections, held partial elections in areas in which it determined
that serious technical irregularities in the parliamentary and local
elections had likely affected the integrity of election results. 

\3 As of February 1996, the accounting firm, which reports monthly on
council expenditures, had accounted for expenses only through August
31, 1995.  USAID funded additional staff for the firm in February
1996 to bring the accounting up to date. 


   HAITIAN ELECTIONS:  PROBLEMS
   AND IMPROVEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

International observers documented numerous irregularities in the
first round of parliamentary and local elections, held in June 1995. 
Subsequent runoff and partial elections and the December presidential
election proceeded more smoothly, and the electoral council showed
more willingness to cooperate with its technical assistance advisors. 
Technical weaknesses persisted, however, and a shortened electoral
period precluded some scheduled activities before the presidential
election.  The elections proceeded without violence and Haitians were
free to exercise their voting rights; however, some instances of
violence and intimidation were reported.  Also, President Aristide's
ambiguity about his intentions to step aside to his successor may
have created some confusion among voters and those who might have
financially supported other candidates. 


      ELECTORAL COUNCIL
      ORGANIZATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

In December 1994, the Aristide government appointed a nine-member
provisional electoral council that carried out the 1995
parliamentary, municipal, and presidential elections.  The electoral
council administered elections through nine offices covering Haiti's
geographic departments.  Administration was further delegated to the
133 communal offices as election material distribution and collection
points for the more than 10,000 polling stations, each assigned 5
pollworkers.  Haiti's 1995 electoral law temporarily set the number
of electoral districts at 83, corresponding to the number of seats in
the Chamber of Deputies.  Some districts were combined to share
representation. 


      OBSERVERS NOTED NUMEROUS
      PROBLEMS IN COMPLICATED
      FIRST ROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

The first round of parliamentary and local elections was a large and
complicated undertaking.  The elections were due to be held in
December 1994, but they were difficult to organize within 2 months of
President Aristide's return.  The elections were rescheduled twice
and held on June 25, 1995.  USAID estimates that about 97 percent of
the potential voting population were registered; this is difficult to
substantiate because Haiti lacks current and reliable census data. 
More than 11,000 candidates ran for about 2,200 seats.  These seats
included 18 of the 27-member Senate, all
83 members of the Chamber of Deputies, all municipal councils elected
as cartels of 3 candidates (133 mayors and 266 deputy mayors), and
all 1,695 seats on 565 local community councils.  OAS estimated that
about 40 to
45 percent of Haiti's 3.5-million registered voters went to more than
10,000 polling stations; the International Republican Institute
(IRI)\4 estimated the turnout at 30 to 40 percent, and the electoral
council announced that
51 percent had voted.  The election required more than 17 million
ballots be printed to accommodate the numerous contests and
candidates. 

International observers of several organizations noted that, although
the June 1995 elections were generally peaceful--deadly violence and
intimidation that had historically marred Haitian elections were
largely absent--the voting process was disorganized and had many
technical difficulties and irregularities.  For example, many polling
stations opened late or did not open at all because they had not
received registration lists, ballots, or other election materials due
to confusion over logistics.  Also, the electoral council added
several hundred polling stations just days before the election,
causing confusion in delivering election materials and for potential
voters who did not know where to vote.  Some candidates reported
being on the wrong ballot and some ballots had missing photographs of
candidates and party emblems.  OAS received complaints on 38 ballots
out of the 799 different ballots printed, and reported that 32
complaints had merit and 6 were groundless.  According to USAID, most
ballot problems originated with the electoral council and not the
printer.  One communal electoral council office was burned and
several were damaged by fire after the elections when losing parties
tried to burn the ballots and tally sheets; ballot security both
before and after actual voting was a concern.  Observers and U.S. 
officials noted that pollworkers were inadequately trained to carry
out their responsibilities, and many were not paid on time. 
Observers found no evidence of organized fraud, but generally noted
that the proliferation of ballots and the myriad of candidates were
overwhelming in a largely illiterate country with weak infrastructure
and little experience in election administration. 

Given concerns over serious irregularities and the validity of the
results in certain problem areas, the electoral council decided to
hold makeup elections in those areas.  These partial elections took
place on August 13, 1995, in 21 communal districts.  On September 17,
runoff elections were held for 8 Senate and 65 deputy seats; in
October, additional partial elections were held in areas that had
experienced irregularities.  The Platform Politique Lavalas, the
coalition supported by President Aristide, dominated the election
results, winning 17 of the 18 contested Senate seats, 66 of 83 deputy
seats, and a majority of local seats. 

Alleging that the June elections were marred by fraud, manipulation,
and inefficiency at the hands of the Lavalas-dominated electoral
council, about two-thirds of the almost 30 parties participating in
the June elections boycotted the subsequent partial and runoff
elections and called for an annulment of the June results and
replacement of the electoral council.  Nevertheless, some candidates
of the boycotting parties remained on the ballots, and five
candidates of the three major boycotting parties won deputy seats. 
All but one of the parties that boycotted the parliamentary and
municipal elections extended the boycott through the presidential
election. 


--------------------
\4 IRI is a private, nonprofit organization, funded by grants from
USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy and private donations,
that promotes democracy programs worldwide. 


      ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION AND
      TRANSPARENCY IMPROVED AFTER
      JUNE 1995
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

Our field observations and reports of U.S.  officials and
international observer groups indicated that Haiti's electoral
administration improved with each election after the June race.\5
Much of the improvement was attributed to having fewer candidates and
ballots; the lower voter turnout, while disappointing to observer
groups, made voting procedures and vote counting easier to implement. 
Observers also noted that pollworkers were better trained and
prepared and vote counting at the polling stations went more
smoothly.  Voting materials and registration lists were generally
received on time at the polling stations, and the delivery of ballots
to communal and department electoral offices for vote counting was
more orderly than in June.  In addition, political party pollwatchers
were present at most polling stations and electoral offices. 

The electoral council cooperated more fully with representatives of
the United States, international organizations, and other donors
after the June elections.  The turning point was President Aristide's
appointment of a new electoral council president on July 27. 
According to U.S.  embassy and USAID officials, officials of U.S. 
nongovernmental organizations, and observers' reports, the new
council president made concerted efforts to strengthen the electoral
process and improve relations with the donor community.  The chief of
the U.N.  technical assistance team also noted an improved
relationship with the electoral council and greater willingness to
consider the team's advice.  Enhancing the electoral council's
transparency was the press center established by the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)\6 before the
September 17 run-off election.  The electoral council held regular
press briefings at the center, particularly during election periods;
presented its electoral budget during a press conference; and
televised the lottery held for candidate name placement on the
presidential ballot.  The new council president also held meetings to
coordinate the various civic education activities that the United
States and other donors planned for the presidential election. 


--------------------
\5 We accompanied OAS, IRI, and U.S.  embassy observer teams for the
September 17 and December 17 elections.  We observed voting in
Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Les Cayes, and in
rural areas encompassing most of Haiti's regions. 

\6 NDI is a nonprofit corporation that conducts nonpartisan
international programs to help promote, maintain, and strengthen
democratic institutions.  Its programs are funded by USAID, the
National Endowment for Democracy, and private donations. 


      ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
      PERSISTED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4

Nevertheless, despite the overall technical improvements noted after
the June elections, our observations and the reports of international
observers and U.S.  officials noted several persisting weaknesses in
electoral administration.  On December 17, many polling stations did
not receive electoral registration lists or received inaccurate ones. 
OAS observed 49 polling stations where voters with a valid card were
prevented from voting when their names did not appear on the list and
reported that unlisted voters were observed at 599 polling stations,
mostly in the department covering Port-au-Prince.  IRI observers also
reported irregularities in the electoral lists.  As an emergency
measure, the electoral council president declared at 11 a.m.  that
all persons possessing a valid voting card could vote at the polling
station indicated on the card, even if their names were not listed at
that location.  While increasing the potential for voting more than
once, this was likely mitigated by the pollworkers' notations of
those who voted, as well as the use of indelible ink on each voter's
thumb. 

In addition to the electoral list problems, OAS reported some
additional irregularities that it characterized as serious.  These
included the premature signing of the vote count the morning of the
election in one department, attributed by OAS to inadequate training,
and suspicions of ballot stuffing.  The latter was a concern at
certain polling places with large numbers of recorded votes where no
massive presence of voters had been observed during the day.  OAS
reported these localities to the electoral council.  OAS and IRI
reported numerous other irregularities, generally minor, such as
failure to count unmarked ballots or to post results at the polling
stations.  Overall, OAS reported major irregularities in about 2
percent of the 3,134 polling stations visited and observed minor
irregularities in 29 percent.  Observers generally stated that the
irregularities did not appear to be the result of organized fraud and
did not have a significant impact on the election's outcome.  Rene
Preval won with 87.9 percent of the vote and low voter turnout,
reported by the electoral council at 27.8 percent and estimated
somewhat lower by OAS. 


      SHORT ELECTORAL CALENDAR
      AFFECTED PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.5

Haiti's constitution calls for presidential elections to be held the
last Sunday in the November preceding the scheduled February
inauguration; in 1995, that date would have been November 26.  Due to
several delays in scheduling the parliamentary and local elections,
it was difficult to organize and administer an election by that date
following the last partial elections in October.  December 17 was set
as the latest possible date allowing for vote counting and contesting
and a possible runoff before the February 7, 1996, inauguration. 

The U.N.  technical assistance team produced a detailed electoral
calendar that indicated the optimal time needed was 110 days.  This
calendar included the time required for cleaning up the registration
lists, registering candidates, campaigning, printing and distributing
ballots, counting votes, and announcing and contesting results, for
both a first round and a runoff.  However, the electoral council made
its formal announcement of the December 17 presidential election and
published the electoral calendar on November 6.  A compressed
schedule was therefore necessary.  The U.N.  team subsequently
produced a 60-day calendar that saved time by shortening the period
allowed for some activities and eliminating the computerization of
the voter registration lists.  (According to USAID, it never
considered computerizing the voter registration lists as a viable
option due to the lack of resources.) Due to the compressed schedule,
less than
4 weeks were allowed for candidates to campaign.  Some candidates
told us that they were adversely affected by the compressed schedule
because they had insufficient time to raise funds and organize their
campaigns. 

The shortened electoral period also affected several assistance
programs.  For example, the electoral council's party pollwatcher
program did not take place as planned.  In response to opposition
parties' concerns over technical problems and alleged fraud in the
June elections, the electoral council established an Electoral
Monitoring Unit as an adjunct to the pollwatchers attached to the
individual parties.  The unit was to consist of pollwatchers
nominated by the candidates as a resource pool to monitor the
presidential election and record complaints.  Each candidate was
permitted to nominate 750 names; this figure equated roughly to the
number of polling stations divided by the number of candidates. 
However, the unit was not fully functional because the candidates did
not provide all the planned pollwatchers in time for the election. 
NDI had originally planned to train 610 party pollwatchers at the
departmental and communal levels; in turn, these pollwatchers were to
train the remaining 10,250 needed at the polling station level. 
However, NDI was able to train only 338 participants at the
departmental and communal levels due to the lack of time and the
candidates' inability to submit their full quota of names; several
candidates did not submit any names.  OAS observers reported the
presence of Electoral Monitoring Unit pollwatchers in only 20 percent
of the polling stations. 

The short electoral calendar also did not allow for certain scheduled
civic and voter education activities and, according to some election
observers, may have been one factor causing the low turnout.  For
example, NDI canceled its civic education program because it was
unable to find a suitable Haitian nongovernmental counterpart within
the time available.  This program was aimed at the middle class
which, according to NDI, traditionally has not voted in Haitian
elections.  IRI also canceled plans to train political party
pollwatchers due to lack of time and interest on the part of the
Haitian political parties. 

USAID indicated its belief that the compressed electoral calendar did
not degrade the civic education activities or contribute to low voter
turnout.  USAID said that voter education programs carried out by the
electoral council, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES), the European Union, and the U.S.  Military Information
Support Team provided election information to the voters.  USAID also
noted that Gallup polls taken in November and December 1995 indicated
that 72 percent of the respondents knew where to register, 87 percent
had seen voter education posters and messages, and 79 percent knew
the date of the election.  According to USAID, voter fatigue, a lack
of candidates who captured the public's imagination, and staunch
support for President Aristide were probably more important factors
contributing to low voter turnout than any limitations on voter
education activities caused by the compressed electoral calendar. 
Nonetheless, OAS noted in its presidential election report that the
low turnout can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the
limited impact of the awareness campaign. 


      ELECTORAL CLIMATE WAS
      UNCERTAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.6

The Haitian elections, for the most part, proceeded without serious
incidents, and most observers agreed that the technical
irregularities likely had little impact on the outcomes.  However,
some observers were concerned about less tangible problems within the
electoral environment that, nonetheless, raise questions about the
tenuous nature of democracy in Haiti. 

For example, violence broke out following the November 7 murder of a
Lavalas deputy who was also a cousin of President Aristide.  Aristide
gave an emotional eulogy, denouncing the international community for
not doing enough to disarm those associated with the coup regime and
calling on the people to disarm their communities.  In mid-November,
protests began in Port-au-Prince and other parts of Haiti.  Homes
were burned, roadblocks erected, and individuals and media were
threatened and assaulted, allegedly by Aristide supporters.  On
November 20, Aristide called for a national dialogue, and the
violence abated.  On December 12, the house of presidential candidate
Leon Jeune was attacked by gunfire, but no one was injured.  IRI
investigated and reported on alleged acts of intimidation during the
1995 electoral periods. 

An additional factor in the uncertain electoral climate was
Aristide's perceived lack of commitment to the presidential election. 
While he repeatedly assured the international community that he
intended to hold elections and hand power to his successor, his
public statements on this subject were often vague.  Many supporters
called for him to extend his term for 3 more years to make up the
time he lost in exile.  At the national dialogue meetings, he
indicated he would consider remaining in office if that was what the
Haitian people wanted.  He publicly endorsed Preval
2 days before the election; his earlier statements indicated that he
did not want to influence the outcome of the election early in the
campaign.  However, some observers and opposition leaders were
concerned that President Aristide's ambiguity created confusion among
the voters and those who might financially support Preval's
opponents. 

A third concern was the boycott by some opposition parties and their
assertions that Lavalas, as the party in power, had unfair advantages
over the opposition parties.  IRI said that it had documented
Lavalas' use of state resources to finance its campaign, but this has
not been documented by other observer groups.  Under Haitian law,
parties may receive some government assistance for campaigning, but
funding for the presidential candidates was precluded by Haiti's
precarious economic situation, according to a memorandum from the
Prime Minister to the electoral council.  The Haitian government
provided limited free television and radio air time.  Some observers
also asserted that the absence of several major opposition parties
meant little competition for Lavalas and assured its victory.  Other
officials opined, however, that the opposition was weak and
fragmented and was trying to gain legitimacy through a boycott after
its loss at the June polls. 


   U.S.  SUPPORT FOR HAITIAN
   ELECTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The U.S.  government spent about $18.8 million in financial support
for Haiti's parliamentary, local, and presidential elections.  Other
donors contributed about $9 million.  U.S.  diplomatic and aid
officials also made diplomatic efforts and monitored the electoral
process closely to resolve or minimize problems. 

As of April 15, 1996, USAID grantees spent about $15.1 million to
support Haiti's electoral process from the June 1995 parliamentary
and local elections through the December 1995 presidential election. 
More than half of this assistance--about $9.1 million--was expended
under a grant to the United Nations to finance technical assistance
and budget support to Haiti's electoral council.  Technical
assistance was provided by a team of U.N.  election experts in Haiti. 
The remaining USAID funds were grants to four U.S.  nongovernmental
organizations for election observation, assistance, and support.  IRI
fielded pre-election and election observation missions.  IFES trained
pollworkers and procured a total of 31 million ballots, NDI conducted
political party-strengthening activities, and the American Institute
for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)\7 participated in voter
registration.  IFES, NDI, and AIFLD also conducted various civic
education activities.  In addition, the State Department granted $29
million to OAS for nationwide human rights monitoring and reporting;
about $3.7 million was spent for OAS observation of the 1995 Haitian
elections.  Table 1 summarizes expenditures by each grantee. 



                                Table 1
                
                U.S. Expenditures for Haiti Elections by
                     Grantee, as of April 15, 1996

Grantee                                                   Expenditures
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
United Nations\a                                            $9,100,000
IFES\a                                                       3,928,194
IRI                                                            655,000
NDI                                                            865,000
AIFLD                                                          600,000
OAS                                                          3,700,000
======================================================================
Total                                                      $18,848,194
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a As of April 15, 1996, the United Nations and IFES had not expended
about $292,000 and $60,000, respectively, remaining from grant
obligations. 

Source:  USAID and IFES. 

In addition to financial support, the United States made diplomatic
efforts to assure that the elections were held and a successor to
Aristide inaugurated by February 1996.  Our review of embassy cable
traffic and discussions with embassy officials revealed extensive
U.S.  monitoring of the electoral process and U.S.  efforts to ensure
that problems were addressed and schedule delays minimized.  For
example, the electoral process was often a primary agenda item for
the Ambassador's weekly meetings with President Aristide and for
other meetings between embassy officials and their Haitian
counterparts.  Several high-level U.S.  delegations visited Haiti
during the electoral periods; the Deputy Secretary of State mediated
negotiations between Aristide's Lavalas party and the boycotting
opposition parties in August 1995.  In addition, USAID held daily and
weekly meetings with the U.N.  technical assistance team and U.N. 
Mission in Haiti officials to keep the process on track. 


--------------------
\7 AIFLD is a regional institute of the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) that assists
independent trade unions in Latin America and the Caribbean. 


   ACCOUNTABILITY OVER U.S.  FUNDS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

As of April 1996, the USAID Office of the Inspector General was
conducting an audit of USAID's internal controls for accounting for
U.S.  election support funds for Haiti and will report separately on
its findings.  The Inspector General staff generally found adequate
controls over funds expended by AIFLD, IFES, IRI, and NDI. 

The grant agreement and funding arrangements for U.N.  technical and
budget support to the electoral council contained accountability
weaknesses that impeded detailed oversight and limited USAID's
ability to influence how grant funds were spent.  The United Nations
required the electoral council to hire an accounting firm to maintain
its records and to account for its expenditures through September 30,
1995.  This contract was subsequently extended to account for all
electoral council donor funds and expenditures.  As of February 1996,
the accounting firm had reported on expenditures only through August
31, 1995.  Due to these delays, USAID provided $30,000 for the firm
to hire additional staff for its review.  The Inspector General was
unable to audit the expenditure of funds provided to the OAS for
elections assistance because OAS, as an international organization,
denied U.S.  auditors access to its accounting records.  However, the
OAS internal auditors conducted an audit of OAS funds expended in
Haiti and plans to issue their report this summer. 


      LIMITED USAID LEVERAGE OVER
      U.N.-SPONSORED ELECTION
      PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

USAID's ability to monitor and influence the use of funds provided to
the United Nations for its support to the electoral council was
impeded by the grant agreement's weak accountability and reporting
requirements and a multilateral trust fund arrangement that precluded
detailed donor oversight.  The initial grant agreement had been
negotiated in Washington, D.C., under standard reporting requirements
applying to all U.N.  trust funds.  When additional funds were needed
for the December election, the USAID mission included a clause in the
amendment requiring U.N.  quarterly financial and progress reports
and a trust fund audit.  However, U.N.  officials in New York would
not sign the amendment with the extra conditions.  They maintained
that all trust funds had to comply only with the standard annual
financial reporting requirement.  Although the amendment was signed
without the additional report and audit conditions, USAID mission
officials noted that raising the oversight issue resulted in focusing
more U.N.  attention on the Haiti trust fund.  For example, U.N. 
headquarters requested from the U.N.  Mission in Haiti information on
controls over trust fund advances to the electoral council. 

The Chief of the U.N.  technical assistance team in Haiti said that
the team's role was to provide technical election advice to the
electoral council, which the council was free to consider or reject. 
This assistance was accomplished primarily through the development of
election schedules and budgets and daily contact with electoral
council staff.  USAID officials in Haiti told us that they would have
preferred more proactive efforts by the U.N.  technical assistance
team, but their leverage was limited.  USAID met regularly with the
U.N.  technical assistance team and other U.N.  and OAS officials
involved in the electoral process to attempt to mitigate the team's
passive assistance role, urging both stronger program discipline and
greater financial accountability. 

Weak accountability requirements did not seriously damage the
electoral process, but did weaken USAID's ability to require actions
beyond the limited scope of the grant agreement.  For example, the
U.N.  team declined to implement the recommendations of a joint
August 1995 U.N./USAID study on the election programs in Haiti.  The
study recommended, among other things, that the United Nations
provide financial and management consultants to the electoral council
and assist the council in developing a data base for its operations
and an analysis of lessons learned from the June election.  (Two
weeks before the December presidential election, the U.N.  team
agreed to use a newly arrived French technical assistance contractor
to help the electoral council improve its management.  However, the
contractor was also working on management problems at the council's
departmental office covering Port-au-Prince, and the recommendation
went unimplemented.)

USAID program and Inspector General officials told us that the U.N. 
and the Haitian electoral council cooperated with the Inspector
General's staff by providing (1) records to support some of the
larger U.N.  expenditures associated with its initial election
efforts and (2) summary reports indicating how grant funds were being
spent.  The electoral council granted auditors access to its
accounting records, bank account and disbursement records, and the
reports of its independent accounting firm. 


   HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IMPROVED
   BUT STILL FRAGILE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

As a country with a long history of repressive and brutal military
dictatorships, Haiti has a human rights situation that continues to
concern international human rights observers and the U.S.  Congress
and executive branch.  Human rights experts estimate that at least
3,000 individuals were killed for political reasons by the coup
regime after President Aristide's ouster in 1991.  The number of
politically motivated killings and abuses has decreased dramatically
since the intervention of international forces and the return of
President Aristide, but allegations of political murder and abuse
continue to plague Haiti.  Since October 1994, human rights monitors
have reported that about 20 murders may have been politically
motivated.  Other factors, such as robbery, were ruled out, and all
victims were targeted and killed in execution style.  About half of
these victims had been former army members or otherwise were
considered Aristide opponents. 

A prominent case was the March 1995 murder of Mireille Durocher
Bertin, an attorney and outspoken critic of President Aristide, and
her client.\8 The Haitian government asked the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to assist in its investigation of the Bertin
case.  The FBI concluded its investigation in June 1995, but it was
unable to interview Haitian government and interim police officials
under impartial conditions.  The FBI Deputy Assistant Director
testified that investigators did not find sufficient evidence to
attribute responsibility to specific individuals for the Bertin
murder, but they developed definitive evidence linking the murder to
other recent execution-style killings.\9

The FBI briefed Haitian government investigators on the results of
its investigation in December 1995. 

The Haitian government had made no progress in investigating alleged
cases of political killings as of March 1996.  While it established
an investigative unit specifically to review cases of politically
motivated murders and assigned government attorneys, it had not
provided the support and direction needed, and the unit had not
undertaken any investigative work.  OAS has noted overall improvement
in the human rights situation since the coup regime relinquished
power, but has also pointed out persisting weaknesses in the criminal
justice system and possible excessive use of force by the Haitian
National Police. 


--------------------
\8 On May 17, 1996, the majority leaders of the House and Senate and
chairmen of the House and Senate authorizing committees for foreign
affairs and national security requested that we conduct further work
concerning the investigation of the Bertin killing. 

\9 Statement of William E.  Perry, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, before the House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judiciary, January 31, 1996. 


      SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT
      HAD MADE NO PROGRESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

Responding to U.S.  pressure to bring closure to alleged human rights
violations and congressional restrictions on aid, the Haitian
Ministry of Justice established a Special Investigative Unit in
October 1995.  The unit is charged with investigating cases of
alleged political murders, mostly of prominent political and business
leaders, that took place between 1988 and 1995.  These include more
than 20 cases that occurred following President Aristide's return and
about 30 committed during the coup period. 

The unit was staffed by 10 new Haitian National Police officers with
little training or experience in investigative work.\10 The State
Department has proposed that full staffing capability would be 40
police investigators.  Five civilian police monitors from the U.N. 
Mission in Haiti were assigned to the unit to provide technical
assistance and on-the-job training.  Additionally, the State
Department contracted for two U.S.  investigators to provide
technical assistance and report to the State Department on the unit's
progress and good faith efforts.  The Ministry of Justice assigned an
investigative attorney and a prosecuting attorney to the unit's
cases. 

When we visited the Special Investigative Unit on October 25, 1995,
about 2 weeks after it was established, it had not yet received
dossiers or other case documentation from the Haitian authorities,
the OAS/U.N.  International Civilian Mission, or Haiti's Truth
Commission for human rights investigation.  The OAS/U.N. 
International Civilian Mission subsequently provided the unit summary
information, and the Haitian government provided some case files.  By
December 1995, the unit had 20 dossiers.  At that time, the unit
prioritized the first 18 cases to be investigated and later added the
Bertin case to the list, bringing the priority cases to 19.  Fourteen
of these cases occurred before Aristide's October 1994 return; some
went back as far as 1988. 

As of March 1996, no investigative work had been accomplished. 
According to a State Department official, the unit had fallen into
disuse, and the Haitian investigators had been reassigned to other
cases.  The unit lacked complete documentation on many cases,
particularly forensic data, and Haitian witnesses are traditionally
fearful of providing information to authorities.  Progress on human
rights investigations was slowed after the Prime Minister resigned in
October and the newly elected National Assembly confirmed a new Prime
Minister and cabinet.  According to senior State Department
officials, the primary obstacle to the unit's progress was the lack
of clear direction and support from the Haitian government.  They
expressed the expectation that President Preval would take human
rights investigations seriously and have urged him to do so. 

As of April 22, 1996, according to one State Department official, the
unit's progress had improved significantly in a short period.  This
official stated that a chief for the unit had been assigned, the
prosecuting attorney was working full time with the unit, and the
investigators were conducting routine investigative work, such as
interviewing witnesses and tracking down vehicle license plates. 

USAID has acknowledged that the Special Investigative Unit
accomplished little before the inauguration of President Preval in
February, but said that the Haitian government has demonstrated a
greater commitment to the unit and some progress had been made in
investigating the Bertin murder case under Preval's leadership. 


--------------------
\10 The Haitian National Police replaced the army, which was
disbanded by Aristide on December 24, 1995.  The first class
graduated from U.S.-funded training in June 1995; the last class
graduated in February 1996.  About 40 police officers, including the
10 assigned to the Special Investigative Unit, received about 2 weeks
of detective training. 


      OAS REPORTS PROBLEMS AND
      IMPROVEMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2

The OAS/U.N.  International Civilian Mission has investigated various
human rights issues since its return to Haiti in October 1994,\11
including about 20 execution-style killings since the return of
President Aristide.  We reviewed the mission's reports and
interviewed the Executive Director on each of our four field trips to
Haiti.  Reporting appeared adequate; however, we could not determine
the quality and completeness of investigations because we were denied
access to case files by the Executive Director due to concerns over
witness confidentiality. 

In addition to the execution-style killings, the OAS/U.N. 
International Civilian Mission has monitored cases of "summary"
justice, in which suspected criminals were caught and killed by local
citizens, and abuses by state agents, such as the Haitian National
Police and the interim police.  The mission reported several cases in
which excessive force may have been used, including nine people
killed by Haitian National Police officers since its deployment in
June 1995.  (The Washington Office on Latin America reported similar
findings.) The mission's February 1996 report also concluded that key
deficiencies remain in the criminal justice system.  These include
inadequate training, unethical behavior in certain instances by
police and judicial officials, lack of material resources, and use of
preventive detention.  This detention, when combined with judicial
delays, meant that only 12 percent of prison detainees had been
convicted in a court of law.  The report noted, however, that the
overall human rights situation has improved dramatically since the
period of the coup regime, when thousands of politically motivated
murders and other abuses allegedly took place.  The mission also
observed gradual improvements in the administration of justice,
including penal reform and the establishment of a magistrate academy
for judicial training. 


--------------------
\11 OAS human rights monitors were in Haiti from February through
October 1993, when they were evacuated on security grounds, and from
January through July 1994, when they were again evacuated after the
military regime declared their presence undesirable.  Activities
resumed on October 26, 1994. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

In commenting on a draft of this report, USAID said that the report
overall presents a fair and balanced assessment of U.S.  assistance
for the Haitian elections.  USAID also offered several clarifications
and technical corrections, as well as updated information, that we
have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate.  Appendix I
provides more detailed information on the amounts and types of
election and election-related assistance undertaken by the grantees. 
USAID's comments are reprinted in appendix II.  Although the State
Department indicated that it had no specific comments, its letter is
reprinted in appendix III. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

To obtain information for this report, we traveled to Haiti four
times in 1995 and observed the September and December elections with
teams from OAS, IRI, and the U.S.  embassy.  In Haiti we met with
officials from the U.S.  embassy, USAID, the U.N.  technical
assistance team, the Haitian electoral council, NDI, AIFLD, IRI, and
the OAS Electoral Observation Mission.  We interviewed the U.N. 
Secretary-General's Special Envoy and Chief of Mission in Haiti, the
Chief of the OAS/U.N.  International Civilian Mission, and the Chief
of the U.N.  civilian police monitoring unit.  We also interviewed
leaders of three boycotting opposition parties and the Lavalas party,
five presidential candidates, and an official from the presidential
palace.  We discussed U.S.  election assistance programs in Haiti
with officials of the State Department, USAID, the four
nongovernmental organization grantees, and the Haitian government. 
We also reviewed documentation such as grant agreements and scopes of
work, USAID reports and election updates, embassy cables, election
observation team reports, and election calendars. 

We reviewed issues related to human rights investigations through
interviews with State Department and embassy officials, the OAS/U.N. 
International Civilian Mission Chief, the Human Rights Watch/National
Coalition for Haitian Refugees program officer in Haiti, and U.N. 
civilian police monitors assigned to the Special Investigative Unit. 
We also reviewed embassy cables and correspondence from the Haitian
Ministry of Justice.  We coordinated our work with the staff of the
USAID Office of the Inspector General and shared preliminary findings
throughout the review. 

We conducted our review between August 1995 and March 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 14 days after its issue date.  At
that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of USAID. 
Copies will be provided to others upon request. 


If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-4128.  Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours,

Harold J.  Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues


U.S.  ASSISTANCE FOR HAITIAN
ELECTIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I

As of April 1996, the United States had spent about $18.8 million to
support Haiti's electoral process from the June 1995 parliamentary
and local elections through the December 1995 presidential election. 
These funds were disbursed mostly through the U.S.  Agency for
International Development (USAID), which provided grants to the
United Nations and various nongovernmental organizations for direct
elections support and elections-related support activities.  The
Organization of American States (OAS) spent about $3.7 million from a
State Department grant for election monitoring. 


   DIRECT ELECTION SUPPORT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

More than half of USAID's assistance was provided through a
$9.4-million Elections Support Project grant to a U.N.  trust fund,
which was also financed by other donors, including Canada, the
European Union, and France.  About $292,000 obligated under this
grant remained unspent as of April 1996.  From the trust fund, more
than half was provided to the electoral council for budget support to
administer the elections.  The remainder was spent to cover the costs
of the U.N.  technical assistance team in Haiti, the purchase of some
high-costs items such as vehicles for the electoral council and its
regional offices, and for related activities. 

USAID's Elections Support Project also granted about $3.76 million to
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for ballot
procurement, pollworker training, civic education, and a candidate
registration data base.  IFES had expended all but $60,000 from that
grant as of April 1996.  IFES received an additional pollworker
training grant for $231,926 for the parliamentary elections from
USAID's Bureau for Global Programs.  In what was described as a
"goodwill gesture," IFES also computerized the list of polling
stations for the electoral council for the December presidential
election. 


   SUPPORT FOR ELECTION-RELATED
   ACTIVITIES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

USAID provided additional assistance for election-related activities
to three U.S.  nongovernmental organizations under its Democracy
Enhancement Project.  A total of about $3.6 million was granted to
the International Republican Institute (IRI) for elections
observation; the National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs (NDI) for political party strengthening and civic education;
and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) for
labor union participation in voter registration and civic education. 
These grants date back to 1991 and include other democracy-related
activities; we have focused on the 1995 election activities. 

IRI received a total of $931,132 to train political party
pollwatchers, field election observation missions, and document these
observations.  For the parliamentary and local elections, IRI fielded
five observation missions and wrote two reports, including a report
documenting its assessment of the problematic June elections.  For
the December presidential election, IRI fielded four observer
delegations and produced four election "alerts" and two reports,
including a final report on the presidential election.  According to
USAID, IRI spent about $655,000 on 1995 election activities. 

NDI grant amounts since 1991 totaled about $1.25 million.  NDI's
program for the parliamentary and local elections consisted of the
creation of an Electoral Information Center in September to serve as
a press center and information clearinghouse, a civic education
campaign of radio and television debates (done in conjunction with a
Haitian nongovernmental organization); political party and
consensus-building seminars; and political party pollwatcher
training.  For the presidential election, NDI's program primarily
consisted of a civic education campaign of televised roundtables,
training seminars for journalists, press conferences, and
election-day radio broadcasts from around the country.  Various
organizations, including the electoral council, the U.N.  Mission in
Haiti, the U.S.  Presidential Delegation, and IRI, used the Electoral
Information Center's facilities to disseminate information.  In
August 1995, NDI sent three political party leaders to an
NDI-sponsored conference in Africa on managing election-related
disputes.  According to USAID, NDI spent about $865,000 on 1995
election activities, and about $230,000 remained in total unexpended
grant obligations. 

AIFLD has received $1,485,786 in grant obligations since 1991. 
According to USAID, AIFLD spent about $600,000 on 1995 election
activities that included fielding a monitoring delegation and
supporting the activities of several trade union confederations. 
These funds were administered by AIFLD.  For the parliamentary and
local elections, AIFLD's program consisted of helping to organize a
nonpartisan trade union election commission to plan and execute
election-related activities; a civic education campaign of seminars,
radio advertisements, and candidate forums designed to register
voters and encourage voting; and a union pollwatcher training
program.  AIFLD also fielded an election-monitoring group and
reported on the parliamentary and local elections.  For the
presidential election, AIFLD carried out a civic education program of
radio advertisements, banners, and forums, including holding a
candidate forum designed to familiarize trade union leaders with the
candidates and their views and wrote a report on the presidential
elections. 

According to a USAID report and discussions with mission officials,
USAID was disappointed with AIFLD's election assistance program for
the parliamentary and local elections, saying that it was unable to
measure any output for AIFLD's election work.  Specifically, USAID's
complaints centered on (1) AIFLD's lack of financial and program
reporting; (2) USAID's perception that AIFLD was not carrying out its
program; (3) AIFLD's overhead costs, which USAID viewed as excessive;
and (4) AIFLD's absence from several key donor meetings in May and
August 1995.  USAID also questioned the cost-effectiveness of AIFLD's
June 1995 union pollwatcher monitoring group, saying that AIFLD
delegates received their observer credentials too late to be of any
use.  USAID did not believe AIFLD's claim to have registered 800,000
voters for the June 1995 elections because it was not backed by any
verifiable data. 

In August 1995, USAID commissioned an evaluation of AIFLD's program
in Haiti.  This evaluation concluded that the management of AIFLD's
program was deficient; that it lacked adequate planning, monitoring,
reporting, and accounting systems; and that USAID's money could have
been spent more effectively.  The report also concluded that AIFLD's
program had helped preserve and develop the Haitian trade union
movement, particularly during the years of Aristide's exile and that
AIFLD had played a significant role in registering voters for the
June elections.  The report recommended the establishment of a work
plan, an improved flow of financial and program information, a
short-term focus on civic education, and documentation of
AIFLD-assisted trade union accomplishments.  As a result, USAID
reduced AIFLD's budget for the presidential election and more
narrowly focused the program on civic education.  USAID believes the
resulting program was more successful, particularly AIFLD's
"candidate forum," which gave labor leaders a chance to meet and
discuss substantive issues with the presidential candidates. 

AIFLD officials acknowledged that the parliamentary and local
elections program could have been better managed, but said that USAID
had understated the program's accomplishments.  Specifically, AIFLD
pointed to the establishment of the Trade Union Election Commission,
labor's involvement in the Tripartite Commission discussing
privatization and other issues in Haiti, and its claim to have helped
register 800,000 people during the spring 1995 registration period as
being important accomplishments.  AIFLD officials also said that
USAID's decision to allocate funding for short periods reduced
program effectiveness.  AIFLD admitted that its June 1995 monitors
did not receive observer credentials in time, but stated that they
still served in an unidentified capacity. 


   OAS MONITORING ACTIVITIES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

Between 1992 and 1994, the State Department granted $29 million to
the OAS/U.N.  International Civilian Mission in Haiti for human
rights monitoring.  Since October 1994, the mission has conducted
related programs in the areas of civic education, administration of
justice, and medical services.  About $3.7 million was spent for
election observation and reporting by the OAS Electoral Observation
Mission.  The OAS Electoral Observation Mission brought in outside
observers for the elections, but most of its observers were OAS/U.N. 
International Civilian Mission human rights monitors who were
seconded to election observation.  OAS observers totaled 293, 174,
and 320, respectively, for the June, September, and December
elections. 

Both monitoring units issued regular reports on their findings.  The
OAS/U.N.  International Civilian Mission issued monthly human rights
reports and periodic press releases and progress reports.  The OAS
Electoral Observation Mission issued press releases and reports
following each election and a final report on all elections.  This
unit also informed the electoral council of its findings, but
maintained that its mandate did not include providing technical
assistance or monitoring enforcement. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S.  AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following is GAO's comment on USAID's letter dated May 16, 1996. 

GAO COMMENT

1.  USAID attached to its letter several points of clarification,
technical corrections, and updated information that have been
incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
=========================================================== Appendix I


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

David R.  Martin
Audrey E.  Solis
Patrick A.  Dickriede
Jose M.  Pena, III

DALLAS FIELD OFFICE

Oliver G.  Harter

*** End of document. ***