Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on
Unit Capability (Chapter Report, 10/95, GAO/NSIAD-96-14).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined: (1) how the services
incorporate peace operations into their various training programs; (2)
what effect peace operations have on maintaining combat readiness; and
(3) whether the services have the weapons systems and equipment they
need for these operations.

GAO found that: (1) commanders of ground combat units differ on when
special peace operations should be provided; (2) some commanders include
aspects of peace operations in standard unit training, while others
prefer to maintain an exclusive combat focus until their units are
formally assigned to a peace operation; (3) participation in peace
operations can both enhance and reduce a unit's war-fighting capability;
(4) the extent to which peace operations affect combat capability
depends upon a number of factors, including the type of peace operation,
the type of unit participating, the length of participation, and in
theater training opportunities; (5) whether the services have the
appropriate weapon systems and equipment for peace operations is
determined primarily at the service level; and (6) the services have
identified specific equipment requirements relevant to peace operations,
which include force protection, equipment for military operations in
built-up areas, and nonlethal weapons.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-14
     TITLE:  Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other 
             Factors on Unit Capability
      DATE:  10/95
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Military training
             Military operations
             Military materiel
             Military intervention
             Foreign military assistance
             Military forces
             International relations
             Weapons systems
             Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER:  Airborne Warning and Control System
             Bradley Fighting Vehicle
             DOD Operation Uphold Democracy
             DOD Operation Deny Flight
             DOD Operation Provide Comfort
             Army Battle Command Training Program
             NATO Partnership for Peace Program
             Haiti
             Somalia
             Macedonia
             DOD Operation Able Sentry
             National Security Strategy
             AWACS
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1995

PEACE OPERATIONS - EFFECT OF
TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, AND OTHER
FACTORS ON UNIT CAPABILITY

GAO/NSIAD-96-14

Peace Operations

(701054)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System
  CINC - Commander in Chief
  CMTC - Combat Maneuver Training Center
  DOD - Department of Defense
  JRTC - Joint Readiness Training Center
  MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force
  MFO - Multinational Force and Observers
  TOW - Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260148

October 18, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H.  Bateman
Chairman
The Honorable Norman Sisisky
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security

The Honorable James V.  Hansen
House of Representatives

This report discusses the effect of training, equipment, and other
factors related to the capability of U.S.  military forces to conduct
peace operations and retrain for combat.  We prepared the report at
the request of the former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on
Armed Services.  The information in this report should be useful to
your Subcommittee in its deliberations on the impact of peace
operations on the military. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested
congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the
Navy and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S.  Marine Corps; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also be made
available to others on request. 

If you or others have any questions on this report, please call me on
(202) 512-3504.  Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix II. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.  military has become
increasingly involved in peace operations.\1 As requested by the
former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO
examined (1) how the services incorporate peace operations into their
various training programs, (2) what effect peace operations have on
maintaining combat readiness, and (3) whether the services have the
weapon systems and equipment they need for these operations.  GAO did
not assess whether the United States should participate in peace
operations. 


--------------------
\1 For the purpose of this report, peace operations include
everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement
operations.  In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to
participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has
done for many years.  A broader term, "operations other than war,"
encompasses all of the above activities. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

According to the President's February 1995 National Security
Strategy, the primary mission of U.S.  military forces is to deter
and, if necessary, fight and win conflicts in which the most
important interests of the United States are threatened.  The
National Security Strategy and other defense planning documents also
require U.S.  forces to be capable of performing other missions such
as peace operations.  While skills required for peace operations
overlap with those required for war, there is increasing recognition
within the Department of Defense (DOD) that some special peace
operations training is needed to successfully conduct these missions. 
The May 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, for
example, states that peace operations are integral to the roles of
all services and that these operations warrant appropriate training
and equipping. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Commanders of ground combat units differ on when special peace
operations training should be provided.  Some commanders include
aspects of peace operations in standard unit training.  Other
commanders prefer to maintain an exclusive combat focus until their
units are formally assigned to a peace operation.  In this case, the
amount of notification before deployment to a peace operation becomes
an important factor.  Aviation, naval, support, and special
operations forces perform similar tasks in peace operations and in
war and therefore do not need as much special training. 

Participation in peace operations can provide excellent experience
for combat operations, but such participation can also degrade a
unit's war-fighting capability.  The extent of degradation depends on
a number of factors, such as the type of peace operation, the type of
unit participating, the length of participation, and the
opportunities available for training in theater.  It can take up to 6
months for a ground combat unit to recover from a peace operation and
become combat ready.  The recovery period for aviation units is
relatively short compared with that for ground forces.  Participation
in peace operations may interrupt naval training schedules, but there
is little difference in the naval skills required for peace
operations and for other operations. 

Determining whether the services have the appropriate weapon systems
and equipment for peace operations is an ongoing process taking place
primarily at the service level.  The services have identified
specific requirements in three areas:  (1) force protection, (2)
equipment for military operations in built-up areas, and (3)
nonlethal weapons.  Except for the recent withdrawal operation from
Somalia, few nonlethal weapons have been used to date in peace
operations. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


   COMMANDERS DIFFER ABOUT WHEN TO
   PROVIDE PEACE OPERATIONS
   TRAINING TO GROUND COMBAT
   FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, DOD has provided a number of
education and training opportunities to military personnel to prepare
them for participation in peace operations.  The opportunities can be
divided into three categories:  (1) institutional training and
education conducted at service schools and war colleges, (2)
specialized staff training for personnel likely to plan for and lead
a multinational peace operation or the U.S.  military contingent in
such an operation, and (3) standard unit training conducted at home
stations and at service training facilities.  DOD and non-DOD
organizations have issued a number of reports focused particularly on
institutional and specialized staff training for peace operations. 

At the unit level, training for the unique aspects of peace
operations is conducted at home stations and at service training
facilities.  Military officials believe that well-trained and
disciplined Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units have the
majority of skills required for peace operations, but most officials
agree that some additional training is needed, particularly for
ground combat units.  While most of the basic tasks may be the same
as those needed in combat, the tasks may be performed differently
because of different operating conditions and rules of engagement. 

Commanders of ground combat units likely to participate in peace
operations differ on when special training should be provided.  Some
of these commanders have incorporated some peace operations training
into standard unit training because they believe this approach
ensures they will be prepared for their mission, even if they receive
little advance notice.  In addition, they believe that many tasks and
conditions associated with peace operations are the same ones their
units will encounter on the future battlefield of war.  Other
commanders, who do not include peace operations training in standard
unit training, believe that preparing for a worst-case,
combat-oriented scenario is the best preparation for these
operations.  They believe that any special peace operations training
should be provided after notification of participation. 

When peace operations training is not included in standard unit
training, the amount of notification before deployment becomes an
important factor.  When units are identified in advance for an
operation--such as traditional peacekeeping operations in the Sinai
or in Macedonia--special training has been provided prior to
deployment.  When operations result from developing world conditions,
initial deploying units have had little time for special peace
operations training.  For example, initial forces deploying to Haiti
in 1994 received less than 1 month's notice, as did initial Army and
Marine units that deployed to Somalia in 1992. 

It is difficult to assess the effect that receiving or not receiving
peace operations training can have on a unit's ability to carry out
its mission.  A number of factors are involved in such an assessment,
and information available to date has been mostly anecdotal. 
However, a number of senior military officials have concluded that
familiarizing military personnel with the types of conditions they
may encounter in a peace operation increases confidence, reduces the
likelihood of incidents that may cause political embarrassment to the
United States, and makes sense given the likelihood of having to
respond to one of these operations. 


   PARTICIPATING IN PEACE
   OPERATIONS CAN ENHANCE AND
   REDUCE A UNIT'S COMBAT
   CAPABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

Each peace operation differs in terms of its effect on a unit's
combat capability.  A number of variables determine the extent to
which peace operations affect combat capability.  These include the
type of unit participating, the skills used or not used, the length
of participation, and the in-theater training opportunities. 

Some operations provide excellent experience that can improve the
ability of various types of military units to operate in combat
scenarios.  For example, the tasks performed by some aviation, naval,
ground support, and special operations forces in peace operations are
very similar to what they could expect to do in a combat operation. 
As a result, participation in these operations has enhanced their
capabilities, in many cases.  According to a Marine Corps commanding
general, the skills at greatest risk for atrophy during a peace
operation are technical skills that are not employed in the operation
and maneuver skills that require close coordination and integration. 
(Maneuver skills involve employment of forces on the battlefield
through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to
achieve a mission.) In the 1994/95 Haiti peace operation, for
example, there was no need for artillery, air defense, or
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile fire. 
Military personnel from these specialties who deployed to Haiti and
performed staff, security, and other miscellaneous functions found
that their technical skills for operating artillery and providing air
defense and TOW missile fire were adversely affected.  Even light
infantry forces that do not have the opportunity to fully employ
their skills in an operation face combat skill degradation if they
have no opportunity to practice. 

According to DOD, the greatest impact of participating in a peace
operation comes from removing a unit from its normal training cycle. 
This problem can be exacerbated if a unit is separated from its basic
combat equipment, as has been the case with the U.S.  forces
participating in the Macedonia peacekeeping operation. 

The Secretary of Defense and others in DOD have stated that it is
difficult to estimate the amount of time required to restore a unit's
combat effectiveness across the full range of missions after a unit
participates in a peace operation.  Army commanders generally
estimate a range of
3 to 6 months to fully restore a unit's war-fighting readiness after
a peace operation.  Marine Corps recovery time generally has been
less because its role in peace operations has been of shorter
duration than the Army.  Maneuver and collective skills require the
greatest attention once participation in a peace operation is
completed.  While aviation and naval forces are less affected by
peace operations than ground forces, some time is required to restore
their combat proficiency, albeit significantly less time than for
ground combat forces. 


   DOD IS IDENTIFYING EQUIPMENT
   NEEDS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and
DOD research organizations have been cooperating to identify
equipment and technology requirements relevant to peace operations. 
The three broad classifications of requirements are (1) protection
for personnel in armored and unarmored vehicles against mines and
rocket-propelled grenades; (2) new systems to enable the military to
fight in urban areas; and (3) options other than lethal force to
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions by prospective
opponents.  These requirements also have applicability for combat
operations.  The Navy and the Air Force are not as involved in
identifying technological requirements for operations other than war
because they tend to perform the same types of operations during
peace as they do in war. 

Previous operations demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S.  military
vehicles to land mines and rocket-propelled grenades.  In response,
the Army, and to some extent the Marine Corps, have taken steps to
enhance the protection of vehicles by procuring an armored HUMVEE
that will enhance protection against some mines, testing armored
tiles that can be installed on Bradley Fighting Vehicles to help
protect against rocket-propelled grenades, and contracting for an
armored security vehicle to be used by military police. 

Operations other than war will increasingly involve operations in
built-up urban terrain.  A November 1994 Defense Science Board task
force report identified required capabilities for military operations
in built-up areas and recommended integrating existing and new
technologies under operational doctrine developed specifically for
such operations.  The Army and the Marine Corps are cooperating in
studying urban warfare technology and identifying particular
equipment needs. 

Ongoing research and development efforts into a number of nonlethal
systems may enable U.S.  forces, particularly ground forces, to
minimize civilian casualties, avoid unnecessary property damage, and
help protect U.S.  personnel.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense
is developing a draft policy on the use of nonlethal weapons.  In the
interim, the Army and the Marine Corps have been identifying
appropriate systems and purchasing them commercially or working with
laboratories to develop or acquire the equipment.  In preparation for
its February 1995 operation to protect the withdrawal of U.N.  forces
from Somalia, the Marine Corps acquired and trained personnel to use
nonlethal systems.  Marines used sticky foam, aqueous foam, and road
spikes as obstacles and barriers and brought with them, but did not
need to use, a variety of nonlethal munitions. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:8

This report contains no recommendations. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:9

DOD concurred with a draft of this report.  DOD's comments appear in
appendix I. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

U.S.  military forces are engaged in a number of missions that are
different from most of those of the Cold War period.  The U.S. 
defense strategy calls for the maintenance of military forces that
are flexible enough to accomplish diverse missions.  Peace operations
are among these missions.\1 Within the last 5 years, U.S.  combat
units have participated in peace operations in locations such as
Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, the Sinai, and northern and
southern Iraq. 


--------------------
\1 For the purpose of this report, peace operations include
everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement
operations.  In addition to peace operations, the Department of
Defense (DOD) continues to participate in humanitarian and disaster
relief operations, as it has done for many years.  A broader term,
"operations other than war," encompasses all of the above activities. 


   PRESENT POLICY REQUIRES U.S. 
   FORCES TO BE PREPARED FOR PEACE
   OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

According to the President's February 1995 National Security
Strategy, the primary mission of U.S.  military forces is to deter
and, if necessary, fight and win conflicts in which the most
important interests of the United States are threatened. 
Nevertheless, to support the administration's strategy of engagement,
the United States has adopted a defense strategy that calls for the
maintenance of robust and flexible military forces that can
accomplish a number of missions.  The National Security Strategy and
other defense planning documents have identified peace operations
among the missions that U.S.  military forces must be prepared to
undertake.  According to these documents, U.S.  forces deployed to
these operations should be provided with sufficient capabilities to
fulfill their assigned missions.  In many cases, this may require
specialized training. 


   PEACE OPERATIONS PRESENT UNIQUE
   CHALLENGES TO U.S.  MILITARY
   FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

According to the May 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and
Missions, peace operations warrant appropriate training and equipment
because of the often unique characteristics of these operations.  The
report also states that the difficulty of these operations cannot be
underestimated.  For example, in peace operations, the enemy is no
longer easily identified approaching in a tank or an armored
personnel carrier.  Also, military tasks common to both war and
peace--such as patrolling or escorting convoys--may have a
fundamentally different purpose and be conducted in a vastly changed
environment.  Finally, the use of overwhelming and decisive force,
the central tenet of U.S.  war-fighting doctrine, often has little
relevance to peace operations. 

DOD is still coming to terms with the unique challenges associated
with peace operations.  As part of this effort, the Army recently
published a new field manual to assist commanders and their staffs in
planning and conducting these operations.  Similarly, the Marine
Corps is revising its Small Wars Manual concerning experiences the
naval services have gained in operations other than war since the end
of World War II and is developing a handbook to assist commanders who
may be participating in peace and foreign humanitarian assistance
operations. 


   DOD AND NON-DOD STUDIES HAVE
   IDENTIFIED EDUCATION AND
   TRAINING NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

DOD is increasingly recognizing the importance of providing education
and training for peace operations, particularly at the institutional
level.  Within the last year, a number of DOD and non-DOD reports
have been published that identify and assess the education and
training opportunities DOD provides for peace operations and for
additional operations other than war.  For example, in September 1994
the DOD Inspector General issued a report on specialized military
training for peace operations and a catalog of peace operations
training activities that identify and discuss various U.S.  and
international peace operations training programs, primarily at the
institutional level.  The report identifies gaps in three areas where
U.S.  preparation for peace operations could be enhanced in the near
term:  (1) U.N.  observer training; (2) use of existing U.S.  and
foreign training programs and educational opportunities; and (3)
staff and interagency training, particularly joint task force
training for peace operations.  A February 1995 report prepared for
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) by a
non-DOD organization provides additional detail concerning training
and education requirements for peace operations, assesses current
programs in the U.S.  military, and recommends strategies to enhance
preparedness for such missions. 

In April and May 1995, a two-phase conference and follow-on exercise
on peace and humanitarian operations sponsored by the I Marine
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the U.S.  Department of State, was
conducted at Camp Pendleton, California.  A summary report highlights
the policy, strategy, and operational issues that resulted from the
conference. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services,
asked us to examine (1) how the services incorporate peace operations
into their various training programs, (2) what effect peace
operations have on maintaining combat readiness, and (3) whether the
services have the weapon systems and equipment they need for these
operations.  We did not assess whether the United States should
participate in peace operations. 

To determine how the services incorporate peace operations into their
institutional, staff, and unit training programs, we reviewed
training plans, lessons learned from recent operations, and published
DOD and non-DOD reports on peace operations training.  We
concentrated our efforts on unit training and supplemented
information already available on institutional and staff training. 
We visited the home bases of various Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps units that participated in peace operations and talked
with personnel about the training they received.  We also talked with
officials and personnel at various advanced-level training
facilities, such as the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), to obtain an
understanding of the peace operations training provided.  To
understand the U.S.  Atlantic Command's role in preparing joint
forces for peace operations missions, we talked with command
representatives and reviewed relevant documentation. 

To determine the impact of peace operations on combat readiness, we
reviewed the experiences of combat, support, and special operations
forces who participated in Operations Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Able
Sentry in Macedonia, Deny Flight in Bosnia, and Provide Comfort in
northern Iraq.  We also obtained some information on the experiences
of Army and Marine Corps personnel who had participated in the
1992-93 Somalia peace operations and the impact that these operations
had on the units' ability to return to combat readiness.  We visited
the home bases of units that had participated in peace operations,
and to the extent possible, visited actual operations, such as the
one in Macedonia.  We talked with and obtained documentation from
personnel attached to the Army's 10th Mountain Division (Light), II
Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF), and units from the 1st Armored
and 3rd Mechanized Infantry Divisions in Europe concerning the extent
of combat skill atrophy after participating in peace operations and
the effort required to return to combat readiness.  We visited Air
Force units at their home bases and at their deployed locations in
Aviano, Italy, and Incirlik, Turkey, near Operations Deny Flight and
Provide Comfort.  We talked with and reviewed documentation from
military commanders concerning the combat proficiency of their units
after participating in peace operations and their plans for restoring
full war-fighting capabilities.  We discussed the effect of Navy
participation in Caribbean peace operations with representatives of
various elements of the U.S.  Atlantic Fleet and examined documents
describing the impact of peace operations on Navy training cycles. 

To determine whether the services have the weapon systems and
equipment they need for these operations, we examined reports by DOD
agencies and documents from the military services involved in
identifying technological requirements.  We discussed the involvement
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in identifying new
technologies and also examined a draft policy statement on the use of
nonlethal weapons.  I MEF officials from Camp Pendleton, California,
and from the Marine Corps Combat Development Center in Quantico,
Virginia, provided us with information concerning their experiences
in obtaining, training with, and using nonlethal systems and
equipment during Operation United Shield, protecting the withdrawal
of U.N.  forces from Somalia. 

Our review was conducted at Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
locations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and component and
unified command headquarters within the United States and Europe.  We
contacted by telephone any relevant organizations we did not visit,
such as the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii; the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Fort Bragg,
North Carolina; and the Army Dismounted Battlespace Battle Laboratory
at Fort Benning, Georgia.  In many cases, we received written
responses to our questions.  We did not address the financial impact
on the services as a result of participating in peace operations. 
This issue was addressed in a previous GAO report.\2 We also did not
report on the participation of reserve forces in peace operations. 
While we did some limited examination of reserve component
participation in peace operations, the training provided for these
missions was not significantly different than training for standard
reserve missions.  Except in a few cases, the number of reserve
component forces participating in these operations was relatively
small. 

Our review was performed from November 1994 to September 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------
\2 Peace Operations:  DOD's Incremental Costs and Funding for Fiscal
Year 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-95-119BR, Apr.  18, 1995). 


DOD PROVIDES EDUCATION AND
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE
OPERATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 2

Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, DOD has provided a variety of
education and training opportunities to military personnel to prepare
them for participation in peace operations.  Each service has a
different approach to training its forces for peace operations.  The
services and the regional Commanders in Chief (CINC) have exposed at
least some of their personnel to basic operating concepts through
institutional training and education, specialized staff training, and
unit training.  At the unit level, peace operations training
primarily involves ground combat forces.  Commanders of major ground
combat forces differ on when peace operations should be provided;
some commanders include aspects of peace operations in standard unit
training, and others prefer to maintain an exclusive combat focus
until they are advised that their units are about to deploy to a
peace operation.  Naval and aviation forces perform similar tasks in
peace operations and in war. 


   DOD PROVIDES INSTITUTIONAL AND
   SPECIALIZED STAFF TRAINING FOR
   PEACE OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Each of the services conducts a number of comparable courses at
training facilities and schools in which peace operations are
addressed as part of a progressive program of military training and
education.  The services' officer and noncommissioned officer
courses, command and staff colleges, war colleges, professional
schools for particular military specialties (e.g., infantry,
amphibious warfare, and military police), and joint military
education programs all include some discussion of peace operations in
their curriculums, often as part of a broader discussion of
operations other than war.  Since DOD and non-DOD organizations have
issued a number of reports on this subject, we are brief in
describing DOD initiatives in this area. 

Historically, the Army and the Marine Corps have had the greatest
involvement in peace operations.  They have developed and implemented
the widest variety of programs on peace operations as part of their
institutional training and education.  The Army provides peace
operations training and education at a variety of institutions such
as the

  Army War College;

  Command and General Staff College;

  Army Infantry School;

  Combat Training Centers;

  U.S.  Military Observer Group;

  Army Peacekeeping Institute; and

  School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Peace operations initiatives in the Marine Corps include peace
operations programs at the Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and
Staff College, and the Marine Corps Basic School.  In addition, at
the recent peace and humanitarian conference and staff exercise held
by I MEF and the Department of State, the following recommendation
was made concerning improvement of professional military education: 

     Humanitarian assistance and peace operations require new ways of
     thinking and planning.  Identifying an enemy, finding centers of
     gravity, and applying overwhelming force do not translate
     directly, and so, do not necessarily fit neatly into traditional
     operational planning.  There may not be a direct military
     threat.  In order to prepare military officers for future
     humanitarian operations, professional military education should
     increase emphasis on

      operations other than war case studies,
      humanitarian assistance operation wargaming and situational
     exercises, and
      role-playing scenarios. 

The services and regional CINCs recognize that a key element in the
successful execution of a peace operation is the training of the
commanders and staff who plan and lead the operation both at the
service and the joint task force levels.  Consequently,

  regional CINCs have conducted workshops and seminars to prepare
     their staffs for leading peace operations in their areas of
     responsibility;

  the U.S.  Army Peacekeeping Institute held a peace operations
     training program, at the request of the Chairman of the Joint
     Chiefs of Staff, for command level personnel serving on the
     staffs of Unified Commands, which was attended by interagency,
     Joint Staff, potential joint task force commanders, and the
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

  the Army's Battle Command Training Program and the Center for Army
     Lessons Learned provided mobile training teams, training support
     packages, and operational lessons to prepare staff prior to a
     peace operation deployment;

  the Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups, under CINCs, Atlantic
     Fleet and Pacific Fleet, will provide, starting with a pilot
     planned for November 1995, a 5-day class on peace operations for
     Naval Expeditionary Force staff officers and senior
     noncommissioned officers; and

  the Partnership for Peace program, utilizing peace operations
     training as a venue for military-to-military contact, sponsored
     a 3-week seminar and a large peace operations field exercise
     that included representatives from the U.S.  military and from
     Ministries of Defense and General Staffs of other Partnership
     for Peace countries. 


   UNIT TRAINING PROVIDES KEY
   CAPABILITIES FOR PEACE
   OPERATIONS MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Unit training is conducted at home stations and at training
facilities to help prepare units for their missions.  Unit level
training for peace operations primarily is an issue involving ground
forces--principally infantry and mechanized infantry units.  Naval
and aviation forces, and other ground forces such as special
operations, logistics, and military police units train similarly for
peace operations and for war.  However, even these forces have to
adapt to the different conditions and rules of engagement they
encounter in these operations. 

The extent of additional preparation needed for peace operations
depends on the type of operation and the type of forces assigned to
participate.  Some types of military forces adapt more easily to
peace operations.  For example, support units providing food and
supplies to troops participating in the Somalia peace operation
performed the same functions they would in a more traditional combat
operation but in a less centralized fashion because forces were
spread out over 21,000 square miles.  They also had additional
responsibilities because they had to provide most of their own
security. 

The tasks an infantry unit performs in a peace operation may be
similar to the tasks it would encounter in combat, but they may be
performed differently because the operating conditions, including
rules of engagement, will be different.  The peace operation in
Haiti, for example, required that infantry units conduct mounted and
dismounted patrols day and night, perform cordon and search, carry
out reconnaissance, and provide security.  These tasks are typically
performed in a combat operation.  However, in Haiti the night patrols
were conducted under full illumination, as a show of presence, rather
than in a more stealthy manner, as is the case in war.  Further, in
the cordon and search operations, before the military entered a
building, occupants were given an opportunity to leave peacefully,
and searches were conducted with limited inconvenience to the
populace.  This procedure reduced the level of violence and
collateral damage that is likely to occur in war. 

DOD and non-DOD studies and our own work on this subject indicate
that, even though there can be considerable overlap between skills
required for peace operations and those required in war, personnel
assigned to peace operations missions need some degree of additional
preparation.  Increasingly, military officials have recognized that
peace operations pose a different set of challenges for the military,
particularly ground forces.  The Army's peace operations field manual
states that units selected for these duties may be required to
perform tasks that may be different from their wartime tasks and that
training will be required.  Military officials have noted that forces
must learn to adjust to the unique rules of peace operations, such as
restrained use of force.  In addition, special training is needed to
sensitize forces to local conditions, cultures, and laws, since
ground forces will have extensive contact with the local populace and
with government and nongovernment organizations. 

While aviation forces perform similar tasks in peace operations and
war, they, too, have to adjust when participating in peace
operations.  As a result of the shoot down of two U.S.  Army Black
Hawk helicopters participating in Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey
in April 1994, the Air Force has increased training requirements for
many of the Air Force units participating in peace operations.  For
example, to better prepare for peace operations missions, the
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) crews are undergoing (1)
increased and improved study of the rules of engagement, including
situational exercises, prior to deployment; (2) better predeployment
training, including a certification briefing for their squadron
commanders demonstrating their readiness for flying in the specific
area of responsibility; and (3) increased training at the deployed
location, including another formal, documented certification process. 
In addition, the Air Force has issued guidance for (1) fighter combat
crew training to incorporate theater-specific rules of engagement and
situational training into academic, simulator, and flying training;
(2) major commands to develop a standard training program on theater
orientation; and (3) the fielding of a computer-based aircrew visual
identification training program. 


   GROUND COMBAT COMMANDERS DIFFER
   ON WHEN TO PROVIDE PEACE
   OPERATIONS TRAINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3


      SOME COMMANDERS INCORPORATE
      PEACE OPERATIONS INTO
      STANDARD UNIT TRAINING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1

Traditionally, Army and Marine Corps units begin training for the
unique aspects of peace operations after the units have been notified
of their participation.  However, several commanders of major combat
forces in the Army and the Marine Corps have incorporated some peace
operations training into standard unit training.  They have done so
for several reasons.  First, they believe that as infantry, their
units likely will be the ones tasked to respond to peace operations. 
Second, they believe that regular training for some peace operations
tasks and conditions reduces the preparation time needed prior to
deployment and allows their units to focus on more mission-specific
requirements.  Third, the commanders believe that they will encounter
some of the peace operations tasks and conditions, such as the media,
refugees, and civilian communities, on future complex battlefields. 
Following are descriptions of the training approaches of U.S.  Army,
Europe, units, the 25th Infantry Division (L), and I MEF. 


         U.S.  ARMY, EUROPE
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:3.1.1

The major Army combat units in Europe--the 3rd Infantry Division
(Mechanized) and the 1st Armored Division--have incorporated peace
operations tasks as a regular part of their collective training
events because of current involvement and likely future involvement
in peace operations.  In addition, U.S.  Army, Europe, officials
stated that the training used for peace operations is also part of
what is required to operate successfully on complex battlefields. 
Peace operations training is incorporated both at home stations and
into rotations at the Army's CMTC.\1 In 1993, U.S.  Army, Europe,
incorporated a peace operations training module into each of its
maneuver battalion's annual 21-day CMTC rotations.  This module,
which lasts 2 to 5 days, is mandatory for all U.S.  Army, Europe,
units.  CMTC utilizes a complex battlefield environment to test a
battalion's ability to accomplish missions under two separate U.N. 
mandates--peacekeeping and peace enforcement.  Peacekeeping missions
tested in the module include establishing, operating, and reinforcing
observation posts and checkpoints and securing convoy operations. 
Peace enforcement missions include, for example, monitoring the
separation zone between belligerent parties, attacking and defending. 
As of October 1994, 20 U.S.  Army, Europe, maneuver battalions had
completed the module, and many battalions have gone through the
program twice. 

U.S.  Army, Europe, has identified the following critical tasks as
fundamental to peace operations: 

  conduct patrols,

  establish/operate observation posts,

  set up/operate checkpoints,

  plan for media,

  conduct liaison/negotiate,

  escort a convoy,

  react to an ambush,

  respond to indirect fire,

  establish lodgment,

  provide command and control,

  conduct mine clearance, and

  secure a route. 

CMTC uses these critical tasks in its rotations and suggests that
U.S.  Army, Europe, leaders also use them to prepare and train for
peace operations and evaluate unit readiness.  In addition to
identifying tasks and missions, CMTC developed a Peacekeeping
Operations Mission Training Plan to (1) assist units in home station
training, (2) serve as a training readiness standard for assessing
how well a unit performs its mission essential tasks, and (3)
establish a foundation for predeployment training for units tasked to
support a U.N.-sponsored peace operation.  The training plan combines
the previously identified tasks with corresponding training and
evaluation outlines. 


--------------------
\1 CMTC, in Hohenfels, Germany, is one of the Army's four combat
training centers.  It provides advanced combined arms training for
Europe-based heavy forces in a low- to high-intensity combat
environment. 


         25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
         (L)
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:3.1.2

According to 25th Infantry Division (L) officials, the Division
Commander\2 believed that incorporating some peace operations
training in standard unit training can enhance combat skills and
capabilities, since troops will likely encounter many of these tasks
and conditions on complex future battlefields.  Further, the
Commander believed that by preparing for peace operations in advance,
the Division can focus on more mission-specific requirements once
tasked to respond to a peace operation.  The Commander regularly
included the following elements in the 25th Infantry Division (L)'s
battalion and brigade exercises:  civilians on the battlefield,
interaction with nongovernmental organizations, the media, coalition
and U.N.  forces, and use of crowd control measures. 

From January to April 1995, the Division participated in the Haiti
peace operation with the primary mission of maintaining a stable and
secure environment.  The Division had about 7 weeks' notice of its
deployment and spent about 3 of those weeks planning for the mission. 
Representatives went to Haiti to obtain a clear understanding of the
mission and the operating environment.  The Division also worked
closely with a representative from the Center for Army Lessons
Learned to gain additional perspectives on the operating environment
and training needed, coordinated with the 10th Mountain Division (L),
and received assistance from a JRTC Mobile Training Team. 

The remaining time was devoted to mission-specific training and other
deployment requirements.  According to Division officials, each
infantry battalion spent about 7 days on weapons qualification/close
quarters combat training, 10 days on situational exercises, and 6
days on leader training.  Combat support and combat service support
units spent approximately 10 days on specialized training for Haiti. 
Finally, equipment and order preparation, deployment briefings, and
loading of equipment on the ships consumed the remaining time.  In
its training, the Division concentrated on 31 tasks that had been
identified through mission analysis and coordination with 10th
Mountain Division (L) and Center for Army Lessons Learned
representatives.  Each task was instructed in the classroom,
discussed in relation to the rules of engagement and the uses of
graduated responses, and then the task was practiced under field
conditions in hands-on situational training exercises.  Tasks
included day and night patrols, checkpoint operations, convoy
operations, civil disturbance, military operations in urban terrain,
and political rallies security. 

The Division had not previously participated in a peace operation;
however, one of its brigades had completed a peace enforcement
rotation at JRTC\3 a few months earlier, and the other brigade had
just completed an internal evaluation exercise that included
operations other than war tasks.  According to Division officials,
both experiences provided a good base from which to add other
mission-specific peace operations training and significantly
contributed to their successful performance in Haiti. 

Based upon his experiences in Haiti and the training received at
JRTC, the Commander articulated a 5-pronged training strategy that
would more extensively integrate the tasks and conditions of
operations other than war into standard unit training for light Army
infantry units.  He directed most of his points to the training
conducted at Army combat training centers, in particular JRTC.  They
are as follows: 

  Integrate operations other than war factors into conventional
     training. 

  Periodically participate in a peace enforcement rotation at an Army
     combat training center. 

  Integrate a 1-or 2-day optional peace enforcement package into the
     leadership training program at Army combat training centers. 

  Integrate peace operations into a program of instruction at the
     command and general staff college and at the war college. 

  Dedicate some operations other than war training for leaders in the
     following areas:  intelligence, coalition logistics, measures of
     effectiveness, negotiation skills, country team relations,
     nongovernmental organizations, U.N.  agencies, media management,
     and psychological operations. 


--------------------
\2 The Commander of the 25th Infantry Division (L) at the time we
conducted our work assumed another position within the Army.  The
discussion in this section concerns the period of time when he was
the Commanding General. 

\3 JRTC, Fort Polk, Louisiana, is one of the Army's combat training
centers.  It provides advanced combined arms and joint training for
Army and Air Force contingency forces, located principally in the
United States, in a low- to mid-intensity combat environment. 
Commanders can choose between a combat-oriented or a peace
enforcement exercise for their units.  To date, there have been two
peace enforcement exercises at JRTC, one in 1993 and the other in
1994. 


         I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY
         FORCE
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:3.1.3

The I MEF Commanding General at Camp Pendleton, California, believes
that standard unit training may need to address some aspects of peace
operations that differ from more traditional combat operations, such
as the employment of nonlethal systems and equipment.  Incorporation
of those aspects can be done, he believes, without degrading the
combat capability of U.S.  military forces and may in fact enhance
combat capabilities, based on his past participation in peace
operations.  While the General believes that the most effective
training for peace operations is training centered on basic Marine
fundamentals, he also believes that operations other than war are
here to stay and that the U.S.  military needs to be able to respond
effectively to them. 

The General was tasked with forming the command element of a Combined
Task Force to secure the withdrawal of U.N.  peacekeepers from
Somalia.  Operation United Shield, which began in February 1995,
involved the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit--Special Operations
Capable (which at that time was forward-deployed in the Persian
Gulf), command staff from I MEF, and certain other Air Force, Navy,
and Army personnel.  Standard training in combat and operations other
than war prepared the forces for this operation.  However, when it
became clear that unarmed hostile elements in Somalia could pose a
substantial threat to withdrawing U.N.  forces, the I MEF Commander
trained his forces while en route to Somalia to use nonlethal systems
and equipment to provide a graduated response capability.  (Ch.  4
provides detail on nonlethal systems and equipment.)

As part of its regular training for operations other than war, I MEF
has conducted an exercise in each of the last 2 years, called Emerald
Express, to test, validate, and refine a concept of operations for
conducting emergency humanitarian relief and peace operations.  The
1994 exercise was computer-generated; the 1995 exercise included a
two-phase conference preceding a joint task force-oriented staff
exercise.  According to I MEF officials, the Emerald Express exercise
will enable I MEF to meet its required mission as the joint task
force for a peace or humanitarian operation in the U.S.  Central
Command operating area and will support a number of longer-term
efforts, such as a Commander's handbook for humanitarian assistance
and peace operations. 

The 1995 conference and exercise resulted in a number of
recommendations.  In the area of preparedness and training, the
summary report states that disciplined and adaptable military forces
are well-suited to meet the demands of most missions.  Nevertheless,
the report states that humanitarian assistance and peace operations
require certain skills that justify increased training emphasis, even
though the military currently trains in most of these areas.  In
particular, the report recommends that the military bolster skills in
military operations in built-up (urban) areas, crowd control methods,
and negotiating. 


      SOME COMMANDERS PROVIDE
      PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING
      UPON NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2

Some commanders in the Army and the Marine Corps prefer to place
exclusive emphasis on combat-oriented training.  They believe that
this training is the best preparation for peace operations,
particularly given the potential that violent scenarios may erupt
that will require more combat-oriented skills.  They also believe
that peace operations-specific training can be provided to forces
after they have been notified of their participation in such an
operation.  Following are descriptions of the training approaches of
the 10th Mountain Division (L) and II MEF. 


         10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION
         (L)
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:3.2.1

The Commander of the 10th Mountain Division (L)\4 , which deployed to
Haiti from September 1994 through January 1995 and participated in
the Somalia peace operation in 1992 and 1993, stated that standard
Army training is the best preparation for peace operations.  He
believes that many combat tasks are also applicable to peace
operations.  During unit training at home stations and at Army
training facilities, the 10th Mountain Division (L) focused on combat
training. 

When tasked to respond to a peace operation, the Division has
provided mission-specific training, time permitting, during the
period prior to deployment.  The Division received formal
notification of its Haiti tasking approximately 30 days prior to
deployment.  Based on initial operational plans, the Division was to
make a forced entry.\5 Therefore, preparatory training had a
combat-orientation.  It then assembled a group of officials from the
U.S.  Atlantic Command, the Army, and other U.S.  government
organizations to help prepare the Division for its mission.  In early
August 1994, the Division Commander issued training guidance in
preparation for the Haiti mission, including tasks for particular
emphasis.  These included

  convoy and convoy security,

  security of nongovernment/private volunteer organizations,

  cordon and search,

  embassy security,

  noncombatant evacuation operations,

  aviation deck qualification (to operate from aircraft carriers),

  air assault,

  strike force operations,

  port security, and

  military operations in urban terrain. 

The Division had about 15 days for training once it had analyzed its
mission, built a mission training plan, and accomplished the myriad
of other tasks required to deploy.  The tasks were rehearsed through
the combined joint task force and maneuver forces and then carried
out in company level live fire exercises, day and night, involving
combined arms, AC-130s, and Cobra gunships.  According to Division
officials, the objective was to tune the force to the roughest
situation that might be encountered, such as a night fire fight in
downtown Port-au-Prince.  The soldiers and leaders would then be
ready for whatever might happen. 

Some Division units trained to a limited extent on peace
operations-specific conditions during this period, such as dealing
with the local populace, crowd control, use of cayenne pepper spray
and riot control gear, and specifics concerning the cultural
environment.  Because of the limited preparation time, however, units
primarily stressed standard combat skills.  According to Division
personnel we interviewed, the Division's previous peace operations
experience in Somalia was key to its ability to deal with some of the
challenging peace operations-specific tasks it undertook in Haiti. 
However, in a written response to us about predeployment training,
one brigade official stated that crowd control and country training
(e.g., culture and language) should have been stressed further during
predeployment training. 


--------------------
\4 During our field work, the Commander retired from the Army.  The
discussion in this section concerns the period of time when he was
the Commanding General. 

\5 Due to the last minute agreement reached between the
Carter/Nunn/Powell delegation and Lieutenant General Cedras, Haiti's
military dictator, the landing was executed under peacetime rules of
engagement. 


         II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY
         FORCE
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:3.2.2

In recent peace operations, Marine forces have provided initial force
presence and then were replaced by other forces, usually Army, that
remained for a longer time period.  As a result, some Marine
commanders believe that Marine forces may not need as much special
peace operations training as does the Army.  The Commanding General,
II MEF, believes that standard Marine training should maintain a
strong combat focus rather than include additional peace operations
tasks.  Furthermore, he believes that standard Marine training
already includes some of the tasks Marine personnel may perform in a
peace operation, such as noncombatant evacuation operations, military
operations in urban terrain, and crowd control, and that more
mission-specific training should be provided after notification of
deployment. 

In a case recently with one of his units, the limited notification
time prevented much training prior to deployment, but the unit did
have time once in theater to train to special requirements. 
Specifically, in the summer of 1994, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Marine Division and other Marine forces were tasked to respond to
worsening conditions in Haiti.  With no more than 3 weeks to prepare,
the battalion focused on high-priority training requirements and on
other necessities such as ensuring all personnel had required
immunizations.  The battalion conducted additional training en route
and in the Caribbean area of operation.  According to battalion
officials, the additional training time was beneficial, particularly
since the unit had received limited predeployment training.  The
training included a noncombatant evacuation exercise, a tactical
recovery of aircrew and personnel, live fire and maneuver training,
and some training in civil disturbance and crowd control techniques. 


   NOTIFICATION TIME IS KEY IN
   PROVIDING TRAINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4


      UNITS DEPLOYING TO
      LONG-STANDING PEACEKEEPING
      OPERATIONS RECEIVE SEVERAL
      MONTHS OF ADVANCE TRAINING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1

When units are identified well in advance for an operation, special
training has been provided.  Units involved in long-standing
peacekeeping operations, such as in Macedonia and in the Sinai, have
received extensive predeployment training.  These units are notified
from 4 months to 1 year before their deployment and obtain about 3
months' training depending on the type of unit and its function in
the operation. 

Since July 1993, the U.S.  Army, Europe, has regularly supplied
between about 300 and 500 Army personnel, on a 6-month rotation, to
support Operation Able Sentry in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.  This U.N.  operation requires deployed units to monitor
the border areas of Macedonia, with Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro
and report any development that could undermine confidence and
stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory.  Of the five
deployments since June 1993, four involved mechanized infantry units
and one involved an infantry unit.  A mechanized infantry unit
typically devotes a majority of its time training with the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle.  Since Operation Able Sentry requires basic
infantry skills, the mechanized infantry units train significantly
differently for this operation than they would for a combat operation
involving their Bradley Fighting Vehicles. 

Units deploying to the Sinai as part of a 6-month rotation to the MFO
typically are light infantry units based in the United States.  Their
primary mission in the Sinai is to observe and report all military
activities in the area of operations to all parties to the Treaty of
Peace between Egypt and Israel.  Some of the tasks MFO infantry
battalions perform as part of the mission, and for which they obtain
training, include

  conducting vehicle patrols,

  establishing and occupying temporary observation posts, and

  observing and reporting (1) incidents and possible violations and
     (2) navigation of ships through the Strait of Tiran and within
     the Gulf of Aqaba. 


      TRAINING TIME IS SOMETIMES
      LIMITED FOR SHORT-NOTICE
      DEPLOYMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2

When operations result from developing world conditions, initial
deploying units may not have time to conduct special training prior
to deployment.  For example, the Marine Corps battalion that deployed
to Haiti in August 1994 received 3 weeks' notice.  Units from the
Marine Corps' I MEF and the Army's 10th Mountain Division (L)
received fewer than 3 weeks' notice before deploying to Somalia in
1992.  Initially deploying units to the 1994 humanitarian operation
in Rwanda received less than 2 weeks official notification of their
participation.  Under these circumstances, units tasked to the Haiti
and Somalia peace operations focused on ensuring that priority combat
skills and capabilities were practiced before deployment.  They tried
to obtain additional training
en route to the operation and/or in the operating theater.  A June
1995 interim report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned confirms
that with little advance notice, units designated for a peace
operation spend most of their time executing their deployment
standard operating procedures and have little time left for special
training. 


   ASSESSING IMPACT OF PEACE
   OPERATIONS TRAINING IS
   DIFFICULT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

It is difficult to assess the effect that receiving or not receiving
peace operations training can have on a unit's ability to carry out
its mission in a peace operation.  A number of factors are involved
in such an assessment, including the nature of the operation and the
unit's prior peace operations experience, if any.  In addition,
measures of success for a peace operation are not easily identified. 
The Center for Army Lessons Learned, for example, has provided
after-action reports and lessons learned, based on anecdotal
information, concerning the positive effect of providing training in
the unique aspects of peace operations.  However, there is little
evidence that links the lack of specific training to the failure to
perform a task or to respond effectively to a particular situation. 

Despite this difficulty, a growing number of military and nonmilitary
officials are acknowledging that some training in operations other
than war should be incorporated into standard unit training for units
likely to perform these missions because the time may not be
available prior to deployment.  The Director of the Army Peacekeeping
Institute, for example, stated that he believes a well-trained and
disciplined unit is the best foundation upon which to prepare for a
peace operation, but he stated that he also firmly believes that
additional peace operations specific training is needed and that it
cannot be delayed until the unit is alerted for a mission.  Other
Army and Marine Corps officials with whom we spoke said that
familiarizing military personnel with the types of conditions they
may encounter in a peace operation, on a regular basis, increases
confidence, may benefit combat capabilities, and reduces the
likelihood of incidents that may cause political embarrassment to the
United States. 


PARTICIPATING IN PEACE OPERATIONS
CAN ENHANCE AND REDUCE A UNIT'S
COMBAT CAPABILITY
============================================================ Chapter 3

Combat skills can atrophy if not used or practiced repeatedly.  Each
peace operation offers unique conditions that may affect combat
capabilities differently, depending upon the nature and duration of
the mission and other variables (such as the type of unit involved
and skills employed).  These variables also affect the amount of time
needed to recover war-fighting skills after a peace operation.  The
recovery period is longest for ground combat forces.  According to
various senior military commanders who participated in peace
operations, the erosion of combat proficiency can be alleviated by
(1) selecting units with the most applicable skills for a peace
mission, (2) limiting the length of the deployment by rotating forces
if necessary, and (3) providing quality in-theater training
opportunities. 


   VARIETY OF FACTORS AFFECT
   COMBAT CAPABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

According to DOD, readiness for combat is the highest priority for
U.S.  military forces in order for them to fight and win the nation's
wars, should deterrence fail.  Forces engaged in a peace operation
could be called upon either during or shortly after the operation to
redeploy to a higher intensity conflict where combat skills will be
critical to mission success and the survival of individual service
men and women. 

Each peace operation differs in terms of its effect on a unit's
combat capability.  Some operations provide excellent experience that
can improve the ability of various types of military units to operate
in combat scenarios; others may benefit only certain types of units. 
The following variables determine the extent to which peace
operations affect combat capability and the time needed to recover
from a peace operation: 

  type of unit,

  skills used/not used,

  length of participation, and

  in-theater training opportunities. 


      PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE
      VARYING IMPACT ON MILITARY
      UNITS, WITH GROUND COMBAT
      UNITS MOST ADVERSELY
      AFFECTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

Of the ground combat forces, mechanized infantry, armored units, and
units that are heavily equipment dependent (such as artillery) face
the greatest combat skill erosion when they participate in a peace
operation, particularly when they participate without their equipment
and perform tasks that are significantly different than the combat
tasks to which they train.  This has been the case in recent
operations.  For example, a mechanized infantry unit from the 3rd
Infantry Division in Europe experienced significant combat skill
degradation during its 6-month deployment to Operation Able Sentry in
1994.  Most of the required tasks were different from the unit's
war-fighting tasks.  For example, the major task in Macedonia was to
observe and report.  However, the unit's combat tasks included
breaching an obstacle, attacking, defending, and supporting by fire. 
The unit deployed without its primary tactical vehicle, the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, and did not have access to a Bradley simulator
while in Macedonia.\1 Furthermore, U.N.  guidelines prohibited the
unit from engaging in maneuver or other collective training in
Macedonia.  Lack of training in gunnery and maneuver skills resulted
in degraded combat capabilities.  Upon redeployment, the unit
received the lowest score in its divisionwide Bradley qualification
test.  With 3 months of training, the unit increased its readiness
ranking to satisfactory. 

Infantry units also experience combat degradation, particularly in
maneuver and collective skills, when they participate in a peace
operation.\2 However, the skill degradation is less than for the
heavier, more equipment-dependent units. 

In its comments to a draft of this report, DOD noted that the
greatest impact comes from removing a unit from its normal training
cycle managed by its higher headquarters.  Each of the services
requires repetitive, cyclical collective training events that are
progressive in nature.  At the higher end of this progression,
resources such as training areas and ranges, unit combat equipment,
and access to simulators become critical in maintaining combat
capability.  In most instances, these resources are not available at
deployed peace operations locations.  This problem can be exacerbated
if a unit is separated from its basic combat equipment, as is the
case with Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia.  Further, the quality
of the maintenance on that stay-behind combat equipment during the
deployment is key to the eventual retraining process back to a
war-fighting focus upon return. 


--------------------
\1 Deploying with a simulator would have created a divisionwide
shortage of simulators, according to a Third Infantry Division
(Mechanized) official. 

\2 Maneuver skills involve employment of forces on the battlefield
through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to
achieve a mission.  Collective skills involve more than one unit
operating together. 


         SUPPORT FORCES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.1.1

Commanders of Army and Marine Corps support units that have
participated in peace operations stated that the operations did not
significantly degrade their capabilities.\3 In most cases, their
capabilities were enhanced, they said, because the support
requirements for a peace operation are similar to those for war.  For
example, officials from the 10th Division Support Command of the 10th
Mountain Division (L) stated that the Command's expertise was
enhanced by supporting a real logistics mission.  The primary
limitation to maintaining skills, according to these officials, was
placing units in static locations as opposed to a fluid battlefield
environment, which requires coordinated actions.  Similarly, the
Commander of the 10th Military Police Battalion told us that the
Haiti mission coincided with military police training and doctrine. 
However, some skills directly related to the military police combat
mission, such as attack skills, did deteriorate because they were not
used in the operation. 

The return and maintenance of equipment is an important factor in
restoring combat readiness to support forces, since equipment such as
trucks, engineering equipment, and water purification units is an
integral part of support operations.  After participating in the
Somalia peace operation, for example, some 10th Mountain Division (L)
support units encountered readiness difficulties due to the slow
return of their equipment and its poor condition once returned. 


--------------------
\3 Support forces include engineer, transportation, logistics, and
military police units. 


         SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.1.2

Representatives from special operations units stated that for Civil
Affairs, Psychological Operations, and most Special Forces units, the
skills they use in peace operations are similar to those they expect
to use in war.\4 They point out, however, that the different
operating conditions may require that some of their skills be used
differently.  For example, while message dissemination is a
requirement of Psychological Operations units in both war and peace
operations, the method of dissemination may differ.  Peace operations
require more face-to-face contact with the local population.  While
peace operations have generally enhanced the combat capabilities of
special operations units, representatives noted that the high
operating tempo since the end of Operation Desert Storm has, in some
cases, made it difficult for personnel to attend schools and
accomplish other requirements to maintain special skills (e.g.,
languages and other regional skills). 


--------------------
\4 Special operations forces include Special Forces, Civil Affairs,
Psychological Operations, and Ranger units. 


      PEACE OPERATIONS OFFER
      OPPORTUNITY TO PRACTICE SOME
      COMBAT SKILLS, BUT OTHERS
      MAY ATROPHY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2

Peace operations can provide excellent experience in many of the
skills a light infantry unit might require in a combat operation,
such as command and control, intelligence, logistics, individual and
team training, deployment training, and staff experience.  The
Commanders of the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions (L)
stated that their forces received valuable experience by
participating in the Haiti peace operation and that many capabilities
improved by participation.  In responding to a question from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs concerning his division's combat
readiness, the Commander of the 25th Infantry Division (L) stated
that because of this participation, the Division's overall mission
capability improved from a 7+ score (on a 10-point scale) before
deployment to a
9 afterwards. 

While participating in a peace operation can improve a unit's overall
operating capabilities, certain skills and capabilities may be
degraded because they are not practiced during the operation. 
According to the
I MEF Commander, the skills at greatest risk for atrophy during an
operation other than war are technical skills that are not employed
and maneuver skills that require close coordination and integration. 
In Haiti, there was no need for artillery, air defense, or
Tube-launched, Optically- tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile fire,
nor was there an opportunity to practice those skills at a training
range.  The 10th Mountain Division (L) deployed with some of its
artillery personnel, but they performed staff, security, and
miscellaneous functions.  Since the personnel did not deploy with
their howitzers, they could not engage in fire support activities or
train with their primary mission equipment.  Upon return from Haiti,
artillery units rated lowest (along with air defense) of all 10th
Mountain units in combat readiness.  However, according to unit
commanders, the units recertified their ability to deliver artillery
fire within 6 weeks. 

Even light infantry forces that participate in peace operations do
not always have the opportunity to fully use the skills they might
encounter in war.  For example, the static security mission in Haiti
(guarding the Presidential Palace and other key facilities) required
only limited combat skills; however, commanders rotated military
personnel to the training range on a regular basis where they could
practice to some extent the skills not used in the actual operation. 

Traditional peacekeeping operations, such as those ongoing in the
Sinai and in Macedonia, involve significantly different operating
conditions than can be expected in war, and many combat skills cannot
be exercised.  In the Sinai, for example, U.S.  battalion-size light
infantry units are assigned to the MFO for 6-month rotations to
operate checkpoints and observation posts and conduct reconnaissance
patrols in security zones within the Sinai Desert, Egypt, and Israel
along the international border.  While some skills such as common
soldier skills, individual weapons proficiency, land navigation, and
situation reporting can be practiced during MFO deployments, training
for many combat skills, particularly at the company level and above,
is prohibited under the terms of U.S.  participation in the MFO. 
According to MFO officials, the following training cannot be
conducted during MFO deployments: 

  movement to contact (at company level and above),\5

  military operations in urban terrain,

  crew-served weapons,

  platoon-level patrolling,

  ambushes,

  secure communications, and

  airborne/airmobile operations. 

DOD sources stated that once MFO units return to their home stations,
they generally require a month to restore individual skills and up to
3 months to restore collective skills. 


--------------------
\5 Movement to contact means finding and engaging the enemy. 


      THE LONGER A UNIT
      PARTICIPATES IN A PEACE
      OPERATION THE GREATER THE
      ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMBAT
      SKILLS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3

Unit commanders estimated that missions lasting 4 to 6 months and
longer are more likely to cause more significant degradation of
combat readiness and require more extensive restoration periods than
shorter missions.  The Commanders of the 10th Mountain Division (L)
and the 25th Light Infantry Division (L) attributed the relatively
limited combat degradation of their units during the Haiti operation
in part to their limited participation--about 4 months each. 
Similarly, the average deployment time for Army units participating
in the Somalia operation was 3 to 4 months.  Units remaining beyond
that time experienced more significant combat skill degradation,
according to unit commanders.  Because the Marine Corps' role in
peace operations generally has been of shorter duration than the
Army's, the impact on Marine Corps combat skills has been relatively
minimal, according to Marine officials.  In Haiti, for example, the
Marine Corps' mission was to establish a secure and stable
environment in the Cap-Haitien area of northern Haiti.  Since they
were replaced by Army troops after only about 2 weeks in-country,
commanders said that combat skills deteriorated very little and
recovered quickly once training resumed. 


      ESTABLISHING IN-THEATER
      TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
      REDUCES COMBAT SKILL EROSION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.4

Recent peace operations have provided various opportunities for
in-theater training, particularly in individual skills.  According to
the I MEF Commanding General, for example, commanders need to be
creative and take the initiative with regard to in-theater training. 
He firmly believes that in most cases, in-theater training can be
provided to minimize combat skill loss. 

In Haiti, 10th Mountain and 25th Light Infantry Division (L)
personnel rotated regularly to a sophisticated training facility
constructed at a former Haitian military firing range.  The facility
enabled units to conduct live fire and maneuver training.  According
to 25th Infantry Division (L) officials, infantry companies trained 2
or 3 days every 3 weeks, time permitting, and support unit training
occurred at the squad and team levels as time allowed.  This
prevented skill loss, particularly for infantry personnel assigned
static security missions where they could not utilize all of their
infantry capabilities. 

During the 1992-93 peace operation in Somalia, numerous training
sites were available to reduce combat skill atrophy.  While the sites
were not as sophisticated as the training facility in Haiti, forces
were still able to practice individual weapon skills. 

While in-theater training facilities enable general infantry forces
to maintain many of their combat skills, these facilities typically
have not provided training opportunities, beyond basic soldier
skills, for artillery and mechanized infantry personnel that
participate in peace operations.  Using combat simulators is a way to
obtain this training; however, simulators have not always been
available to deploying units, as in the case discussed earlier of
mechanized units that deployed to Macedonia.  Some Army commanders
are making an effort not to deploy units whose primary mission skills
will degrade significantly by participating in a peace operation. 
Because of a need for personnel, the 10th Mountain Division Commander
used artillery personnel to perform miscellaneous functions in Haiti;
however, they generally did not stay for more than
2 months at a time. 


   RECOVERY PERIOD IS LONGEST FOR
   GROUND COMBAT FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

According to the Secretary of Defense, it is difficult to estimate
the amount of time required to restore a unit's combat effectiveness
across the full range of missions after participating in a peace
operation because restoration time varies greatly depending on the
nature of the operation and the type of unit involved.  While each
peace operation is different, Army commanders generally estimate a
range of 3 to 6 months to fully restore a unit's war-fighting
readiness after a peace operation.  This period includes block leave
(usually 2 weeks), administrative duties, return and maintenance of
equipment, and retraining in combat skills.  In addition, a large
amount of personnel turbulence can occur during this period,
particularly if it is summer.  After returning from an operation,
personnel often move to other units, change jobs, or attend required
training courses at service schools.  This turbulence affects the
ability of the unit to return to combat ready status.  Table 3.1
shows the various phases a unit goes through while returning to
combat readiness. 



                               Table 3.1
                
                 Phases Involved in a Unit's Return to
                            Combat Readiness

               Time
Phase          required\a     Common issues
-------------  -------------  ----------------------------------------
Initial        1-2 weeks      Equipment accountability, weapon
recovery                      maintenance, administrative
                              responsibilities, and family time.

Block leave    2 weeks        Rest and recuperation.

Maintenance    Light combat   Total repair and maintenance of unit
               arms: 30       equipment. May be delayed by slow return
               days, heavy    of equipment.
               combat arms
               and combat
               support: 3-6
               months,
               combat
               service
               support:
               2-6 months

Personnel      3 months       A very large number of permanent changes
restructuring                 of station will occur, changes of
                              position and command at all levels, and
                              many personnel will go to schooling
                              delayed because of the deployment.

Individual     4-6 weeks      Weapon qualification, renewal of basic
training                      military occupational specialty skills,
                              and small unit exercises.

Collective     All combat     Tactical field training, including live-
training       arms and some  fire exercises and gunnery for heavy
               combat         units. This training is in preparation
               support: 8-    for a major combat training center
               10 weeks,      exercise.
               other combat
               support and
               combat
               service
               support: 2-4
               weeks

Transportatio  1-6 months     Most major items of equipment will
n of                          arrive within 30-45 days of shipment,
equipment                     but some do take longer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Center For Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

\a Many of these phases run concurrently. 

The 3-to-6 month recovery period is based on units' rotating or
redeploying from a peace operation absent the requirement to
reinforce other forces involved in a major regional conflict.  Under
more urgent conditions, according to DOD, the recovery period would
almost certainly be shortened by freezing reassignments, curtailing
leave and nonessential temporary duty, and taking other measures.  As
previously noted, the recovery time for Marine ground combat forces
generally has been less because the Marine Corps' participation has
been for shorter duration.  For all ground combat forces, maneuver
and collective skills require the greatest attention once
participation in a peace operation is completed. 

After participating in the Haiti operation, combat skills for Army
ground combat forces were restored in about 3 months.  In assessing
the condition of their divisions following participation, the
Commanders of the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions (L),
whose units were in Haiti for approximately 4 months, believed that
it would take about 3 months for their Divisions to return to combat
ready status.\6

The Commander of the 10th Mountain Division (L) reported the Division
as combat ready on May 1, 1995, about 90 days after returning from
its 4-month deployment to Haiti.  He attributed the relatively quick
recovery period in part to the limited deployment time--from
September 1994 to January 1995, the high level of readiness
beforehand, and the construction of a live fire range in Haiti.  Of
key battlefield capabilities, fire support and air defense, in
particular, required the most training because they were not
practiced in Haiti.  During the restoration period, the Commander
emphasized the need for division and brigade combined arms operations
and synchronization of all operating systems.  In addition,
collective training needed emphasis, with an objective of building up
to rigorous brigade-level combat exercises scheduled for October and
November 1995 at the Army's JRTC.  Although the Division was
designated as combat ready, unit commanders have identified key
mission essential tasks that still require a training emphasis.  In
April 1995, for example, both brigade commanders assessed the
movement to contact, attack, and defend tasks as requiring additional
training. 

The 25th Infantry Division (L), which replaced the 10th Mountain
Division (L) in Haiti, reported some atrophy in skills not practiced
in Haiti such as maneuver (company level and above), combined arms
integration, marksmanship, and rapid strategic deployment procedures. 
Upon redeployment, the Division planned to concentrate its training
effort on these four skills.  Division officials estimated that
battalion size units would be combat ready after one 6-week training
cycle.  Building up to higher level unit readiness would take longer. 
For example, the Commander of the 2nd Brigade, who returned from
Haiti in June 1995, stated that it would take about 3 months for his
brigade to be combat-ready.  The brigade could have been ready in 1
month if it had been able to focus exclusively on training.  However,
other obligations, such as assuming guard and other miscellaneous
duties, supporting National Guard annual training, attending required
schools, and taking leave, meant that the brigade could not train
continually.  Furthermore, the Division was reorganized, which
disrupted the remaining two brigades through downsizing.  According
to the 2nd Brigade Commander, indirect fire (artillery and mortars)
and maneuver integration were the functions most degraded as a result
of the Haiti peace operation.  Although the brigade attained a combat
ready status by the end of August 1995, he estimates that the brigade
will be fully trained in all mission essential tasks by November or
December 1995. 


--------------------
\6 The 10th Mountain Division (L) was in Haiti from approximately
September 1994 through January 1995.  The 25th Infantry Division (L)
replaced the 10th Mountain Division in January, and most remained
until April 1995. 


      AVIATION FORCES LESS
      AFFECTED BY PEACE
      OPERATIONS, BUT COMBAT SKILL
      RESTORATION IS STILL NEEDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

The aviation skills required for war are not substantially different
from those required for peace operations.  However, the flying
conditions are sufficiently different that retraining is required for
most aircrew members to restore combat proficiency.  In March 1995,\7
we reported that peace operations have resulted in (1) missed
training exercises that provide the most realistic combat training;
(2) waivers for aircrews who could not complete required training
events; and (3) shortages of aircraft at home stations, which limit
training opportunities.  The Air Force has taken some measures to
reduce the stress on their aviation units, but the operational
requirements of peace operations still affect their ability to train
for more combat-oriented missions. 

Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not
get the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary
for maintaining combat proficiency.  U.S.  Air Forces in Europe said
that participation in peace operations requires most aircrews to
retrain in one or more combat events, such as air-to-air (basic
fighter maneuvers, air combat, and low altitude intercepts) or
air-to-ground (weapon delivery, surface attack, and terrain following
radar at low levels).  As a result, it can take up to a month to
ready these aircrews for a major conflict.  The Air Force believes
the erosion of combat proficiency is manageable in the short term by
expanding the involvement of other units, particularly from the
United States, to allow participating units time to recover
sufficiently from an operation. 

Due to Operation Deny Flight, F-15E squadrons forward deployed in
Aviano, Italy, had to defer much of their normal training in fiscal
year 1994.  Consequently, as of September 1994, all major
war-fighting skills were degraded, and half the pilots had not
dropped a practice bomb
2 months into the training cycle.  F-15E and F-15C squadrons from
Lakenheath, United Kingdom, said that although 4- to 6-week rotations
help minimize the erosion of combat proficiency, over the long-term
pilots progress more slowly in their training for high-threat
scenarios because of periodic deployments to peace operations.  They
pointed out that postponing or canceling major live-fire exercises,
as was done in 1994, exacerbates the problem.  Because of Operations
Deny Flight and Provide Comfort,\8 the squadrons would need 3 weeks
of combat training to be ready for a major conflict.  According to
Air Force officials at Lakenheath, no major exercise participation
had been deferred or canceled in fiscal year 1995. 

F-15C, F-16, and A-10 squadrons based in Spangdahlem, Germany, also
encountered difficulty in maintaining currency on selected training
events as a result of their participation in peace operations.  The
recovery period for an individual varied from a day or 2, to up to 3
weeks, depending on the length of the peace operation deployment. 
One A-10 squadron commander estimated a 4-week retraining period
would be required to regain full combat readiness.  The only EF-111
squadron in the Air Force participated in Operations Deny Flight,
Provide Comfort, and Southern Watch.\9 EF- 111 crews gained valuable
experience during the operations, but they did not get to practice
low-level flight, terrain following radar, or emergency procedures. 
Squadron officials said several sorties would be needed to prepare
for combat. 

As with the Air Force, representatives of the naval air community
said that peace operations interrupt combat training and that
patrolling no-fly zones, for example, provides minimum combat
training value.  Also, quality training time is difficult to obtain
during peace operations either because of flying restrictions (e.g.,
no bombing runs or low-altitude flight) or because of the lack of
time.  These operations have required naval aviation units to
compress the time typically devoted to combat training. 

Army and Marine Corps helicopter personnel have encountered similar
experiences in peace operations as personnel flying fixed-wing
aircraft.  While they agree that peace operations can erode combat
readiness, they stressed that each operation is different in terms of
skills used and not used.  According to 10th Mountain Division (L)
officials, the Somalia operation provided excellent training in
helicopter attack, assault, and support skills.  The Haitian
operation provided more limited experience.  For example, attack
helicopters in Haiti had a surveillance, force presence, and security
role but did not engage in scenarios using more combat-oriented
skills.  Unlike in combat, they flew high and slowly.  At night they
used lights.  While there were some training opportunities for attack
helicopters to practice low level, instrument, and night flying in
Haiti, as the mission progressed, assault and lift helicopters were
in great demand, and aircrews had little time to engage in more
combat-oriented skills.  Some Army and Marine Corps helicopter pilots
expressed concern that certifications such as flying with night
vision goggles could lapse during peace operations.  However, they
pointed out that recertification could be obtained quickly after
returning to home station. 


--------------------
\7 Peace Operations:  Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect
Response to Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar.  8, 1995). 

\8 Operation Deny Flight is a peace operation in support of the U.N. 
no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The mission of Operation
Provide Comfort is to provide safe havens for the population of
northern Iraq. 

\9 The mission of Operation Southern Watch, a peace operation, is to
monitor the repression of the southern Iraq population. 


      NAVAL TRAINING CYCLE
      DISRUPTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

Peace operations have affected the Navy through lost training
opportunities and disrupted training schedules.  Forward-deployed
Navy and Marine forces are designed so that they can respond rapidly
to contingency operations, such as peace operations, as well as to
war-fighting requirements.  Deployed naval forces regularly
participate in Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard in Southern
Europe and Operation Southern Watch in Southwest Asia.  Recent peace
operations in the Caribbean, however, required that nondeployed ships
and crews be used to meet mission requirements.  In these cases,
ships and their crews were pulled out of basic training and sent to
the Caribbean, generally anywhere from 2 weeks to 3 months, with 1
month being the average.\10 According to the Navy, ships were also
pulled off other operations and other ships had to rapidly fill the
holes, affecting the entire Atlantic Fleet schedule. 

According to the Navy, this domino effect disrupted the entire
training program.  Maintenance and training schedules were
accelerated, shifted, or deleted as a result of participating in
these operations, creating a bow wave of requirements that will carry
through fiscal year 1995 and beyond.  For example, the Navy estimated
that training for the USS Roosevelt carrier battle group was reduced
by 20 percent due to the Caribbean operations.  According to the
Navy, although priority scheduling and a compressed training period
aided the participating ships in attaining predeployment readiness
status, the stress of having ships participate in these peace
operations at the same time they were to be preparing for their
regular 6-month deployments was a factor in the Navy's recent
decision to create a special force to handle naval operations in the
Western Hemisphere. 

Navy officials said it is difficult to quantify the impact of lost or
delayed training opportunities on combat readiness since various
factors affect how a unit performs during its 6-month deployment. 
According to naval officials, some ships pulled from basic training
have not performed as well as other ships on the Combat Systems
Inspection, the Total Ship Survivability Test, and the Operational
Propulsion Planning Exam--the final evaluations before moving on to
intermediate training.  Also, naval officials believe that
participation in these operations has been a significant drain on the
crews and their families because the time ships spend in port has
been reduced.  The time spent in the Caribbean and any make-up
training have come out of this period. 


--------------------
\10 Basic training lasts approximately 6 months and consists of
various aspects such as ship maintenance, independent steaming
operations, propulsion examinations, and missile exercises. 


DOD IS IDENTIFYING EQUIPMENT AND
TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
============================================================ Chapter 4

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and
DOD research organizations have been cooperating to identify
requirements for applying higher technology to operations other than
war as well as to combat.  DOD agencies and offices have issued
several reports\1 that discuss equipment and technology requirements
relevant to such operations.  The requirements center on three broad
classifications:  (1) force protection, (2) equipment for military
operations in urban areas, and (3) nonlethal\2 weapons.  The Army has
conducted much of the research and development toward meeting the
requirements and is cooperating with the Marine Corps in studying how
to apply new technology to urban warfare.  The field is evolving, and
to date the new technology has been used in only one peace operation. 


--------------------
\1 A May 1994 Advanced Research Projects Agency report listed 27
technology requirements for operations other than war.  A November
1994 Defense Science Board task force report identified required
capabilities for military operations in urban areas.  And a
classified 1995 paper by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict listed a
number of existing and conceptual technologies required for low-
intensity conflict. 

\2 We use the term "nonlethal" because it is the most widely used and
accepted term within DOD.  As acknowledged in DOD's draft policy on
nonlethal weapons, use of such weapons may inadvertently result in
fatalities.  The Marine Corps prefers to use the term less lethal
because it believes the term more accurately reflects the nature of
these systems. 


   FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

Because U.S.  military vehicles have been vulnerable to land mines
and rocket-propelled grenades, the Army has been developing ways for
vehicles to provide better protection.  An improved armored HUMVEE
will help protect Army and Marine Corps personnel against some types
of land mines, armored tiles have been tested that can help protect
personnel in Bradley Fighting Vehicles from rocket propelled grenades
and other munitions, and a new armored security vehicle will enhance
the protection of military police.  Research and development
requirements to improve force protection include methods to locate
and neutralize explosives through the use of robotics, unmanned
vehicles, air sampling, chemical trace detection, and imaging. 
Another requirement is better protective armor for individuals
against small arms fire or shell fragments. 


   EQUIPMENT FOR MILITARY
   OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

An Advanced Research Projects Agency report placed priority on the
following requirements to improve the capabilities of U.S.  forces
for operations other than war, which often occur in urban areas: 

  advanced night vision equipment to improve current limitations in
     spatial orientation, range, weight, and power;

  low-signature unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance,
     intelligence gathering, chemical testing, communications, and
     deceptions;

  mission-kill devices to disrupt equipment or weapons;

  invisible soldier technology to avoid detection by sensors or night
     vision devices;

  reduced visibility aircraft to insert and retrieve troops and
     equipment in hostile areas; and

  common language voice recognition translator to translate English
     language voice communications into a foreign language (and the
     reverse) in real time. 

Among the additional desired capabilities--when technology and
resources permit--were antimortar, antisniper, stand-off precision
breaching, underground facilities destruction, and see-through
capability for buildings. 

It is likely that future operations at any level of intensity will
involve urban areas; thus, the Army and the Marine Corps plan to
jointly sponsor a demonstration project (starting in fiscal year
1996) intended in part to show what types of technologies can be
applied to military operations in urban areas.  There are a number of
potential applications of technology to such operations.  The Marine
Corps, for example, is interested in improving its artillery target
acquisition capabilities, perhaps by combining cellular
communications technology with global positioning system technology. 
According to a Marine Corps official, examples of potential
applications of technology to military operations in urban areas
include

  reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition;

  situational awareness;

  communications;

  navigation;

  discriminate application of power;

  antisniper;

  mission planning; and

  combat service support. 


   NONLETHAL WEAPONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

Nonlethal weapons are particularly applicable to the lower end of the
spectrum of conflict:  humanitarian and peace operations.  The
weapons can be used to discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions,
and they can help prevent or limit the escalation of violence or
allow military intervention where lethal force would be undesirable. 
For example, sticky or slippery substances can be used to impede the
mobility of hostile forces, and nonlethal munitions can be used to
control crowds or deal with combatants who are intermingled with
civilians.  Further, nonlethal weapons can help protect U.S.  forces. 
At the higher end of the spectrum, nonlethal weapons may also be
applicable in certain situations to deny an enemy the use of assets
without destroying them or to avoid costly reconstruction of
infrastructure after the conflict. 


      ARMY RESEARCHING
      APPLICATIONS OF NEW
      NONLETHAL WEAPONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1

The Dismounted Battlespace Battle Laboratory at the Army Infantry
School, Fort Benning, Georgia, has the key responsibility within the
Army for identifying user needs for nonlethal weapons throughout the
Army.  Because of its familiarity with the use of nonlethal weapons
in law enforcement, the Military Police School at Fort McClellan,
Alabama, has also played an important role in identifying nonlethal
technology.  Through a Nonlethal Requirements Working Group, the Army
has brought together representatives of the Army Training and
Doctrine Command and the Army Materiel Command to plan for the use of
nonlethal weapons. 

In the near term (1995-97), the Army is researching and developing
technologies such as nonpenetrating projectiles, less-than-lethal
antipersonnel mines, foams and nets that entangle and immobilize
individuals, stun weapons to subdue or immobilize personnel, low-
energy lasers to temporarily disrupt vision, and calmative agents to
incapacitate personnel.  For the long term (1997 and beyond), the
Army has identified technology programs to ensnare vehicles with nets
and meshes, make traction difficult, disable or destroy engines,
prevent the movement of personnel with super adhesives, disorient and
confuse personnel with high-intensity pulse lights, and disorient or
incapacitate personnel with noise. 

Because peace operations usually take place in urban environments
and, therefore, involve combatants and noncombatant civilians,
technology and equipment requirements are predominantly a ground
force issue.  The Air Force and the Navy have not been as involved in
identifying technology that applies to operations other than war
because they operate similarly in peace operations and combat
operations.  However, the Advanced Research Projects Agency report
suggested that technological improvements will be needed to improve
force projection capabilities through all-weather, low-cost strategic
airlift platforms to rapidly transport multipurpose forces.  The
aircraft characteristics would include high speed, high payload,
long-range, and quick turn-around delivery.  The report also suggests
an offshore airlift and sealift capability in terms of a floating
logistics base that can be used for uninterrupted sustainment of
on-shore operations while minimizing the exposure of personnel and
equipment in-theater. 


      MARINES USED NONLETHAL
      WEAPONS IN WITHDRAWAL FROM
      SOMALIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2

The first use of nonlethal equipment by U.S.  forces occurred during
Operation United Shield to safely withdraw U.N.  forces from Somalia. 
In planning for the mission, the force Commander was concerned about
the potential intermingling of combatants with noncombatants in
Somalia, a tactic used by armed militiamen in the past.  He decided
to use nonlethal weapons to avoid harming unarmed civilians and to
keep mobs away from U.S.  or U.N.  positions and activities. 

Marines applied sticky foam, aqueous foam, and road spikes to help
protect the forces withdrawing from Somalia.  These nonlethal weapons
were used as obstacles and barriers to prevent Somalis from coming
into direct contact with U.S.  and U.N.  forces.  A number of other
such weapons were available had the situation required their use. 
For example, the Marines brought stinger grenades and a variety of
nonlethal munitions, including rubber pellet cartridges, bean bag
rounds, foam rubber rounds, and wooden baton rounds.  The Marines
also had lasers for illumination and targeting purposes. 

The Commander obtained approval within the Marine Corps to acquire
and provide training on nonlethal systems.  DOD authorized the use of
selected lower technology nonlethal weapons in Somalia under rules of
engagement similar to those for using lethal weapons.  Because the
nonlethal weapons were not standard and approved systems, Marine
Corps officials reported delays in obtaining approval for using the
equipment and in receiving the rules of engagement.  Some higher
technology items were not approved for use because they were not
fully developed and tested or because of legal and policy concerns. 
These items included blinding lasers (which destroy or degrade optics
or electronic devices) and several antipersonnel systems such as
dazzling lasers, low frequency infrasound, and radio frequency
systems. 

The Marine Corps formed a team that (1) developed and provided
training on nonlethal systems and tactics to a selected battalion and
(2) served as advisors in Somalia.  One company within the battalion
was designated as the primary force to use nonlethal equipment
ashore.  Marines from this company, however, also carried lethal
weapons or lethal ammunition that could be used in lieu of nonlethal
weapons or munitions if the situation required the use of deadly
force.  In addition, other Marines were armed with lethal weapons to
ensure force protection.  The unit equipped with nonlethal weapons
received about 30 days of training on the equipment. 

The Marine Corps learned a number of lessons from its experience with
nonlethal technology in Somalia.  In responding to our questions on
the use on nonlethal equipment, senior I MEF officials who planned
and participated in the operation stated that the experience revealed
shortcomings in the U.S.  capability to identify and deploy military
nonlethal systems.  Specifically, because a joint task force
commander should have a wide range of alternatives to control
belligerents, they stated that nonlethal systems need to be developed
and acquired in sufficient quantities to deploy with a task force. 

In a written response to us, the I MEF Commanding General expressed
the need for separate, distinct, and flexible rules of engagement for
nonlethal weapons and for training exercises to stress rules of
engagement decisions at the tactical level.  According to the
response, limiting the use of less lethal technologies to the same
conditions as deadly force in the rules of engagement caused
confusion at all levels during Operation United Shield and was
self-defeating.  The systems could only be used under the same
circumstances as lethal weapons, which would be when the security
situation had already become critical.  While the Marines made the
situation work, it was not how they would have preferred to operate,
according to the Commanding General.  In responding to a draft of
this report, DOD took issue with I MEF's position on rules of
engagement, stating that there should be one clear, unambiguous set
of rules of engagement. 

Because nonlethal weapons are new and evolving, neither the Marine
Corps nor any other service has doctrine or training standards for
their use.  Consequently, to ensure the availability of nonlethal
equipment and trained personnel for future operations, the officials
recognized the need for doctrine, training, and approved nonlethal
systems. 

The officials also suggested that public information on the
military's use of nonlethal weapons needs to convey that nonlethal
means will be used to control unarmed crowds and will not substitute
for deadly force when it is justified.  Also, personnel using
nonlethal weapons will always be protected by others armed with
lethal weapons.  Lastly, the Marines learned how certain equipment is
best used, and they pointed out that the decision to employ nonlethal
options needs to be made at the lowest possible level due to the
fluidity of situations and short response time. 


      POLICY ON NONLETHAL WEAPONS
      IS BEING DEVELOPED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3

Nonlethal weapons present unique legal and policy concerns.  Because
of these concerns, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has drafted a
policy statement--currently under review--governing the use of
nonlethal weapons.  The draft policy defines nonlethal weapons and
would establish the policy of using them to allow the maximum
possible flexibility in the employment of U.S.  military forces
across the spectrum of conflict.  It points out that nonlethal
weapons might be used in some circumstances to achieve military or
political objectives while minimizing human fatalities and undesired
harm to property or the environment.  In operations other than war,
the draft policy states that nonlethal weapons can be used to
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; limit escalation; take
military action where intervention is desirable but use of lethal
force would be inappropriate; and better protect U.S.  forces once
deployed.  Nonlethal weapons can provide an effective, reversible, or
more humanitarian means of denying an enemy the use of human and
material assets and may also reduce the postwar economic cost of
rebuilding. 

The draft policy places responsibility on the military services for
developing and acquiring nonlethal weapons and developing doctrine,
employment concepts, tactics, training, and logistics support for
fielded systems.  Priority is to be placed on acquiring the
technology to support the following tasks: 

  neutralizing combatants intermingled with noncombatants;

  controlling crowds;

  disabling or disrupting military logistics;

  disabling or disrupting communication, transportation, and energy
     infrastructure; and

  incapacitating/immobilizing weapons or weapon development and
     production processes. 

The military services recognize the need to develop doctrine and
training programs for this rapidly developing technology.  The Army
Training and Doctrine Command has drafted a concept paper for
nonlethal capabilities in Army operations.  It points out that crowd
control in conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian operations is as
likely a task for the Army as is destroying enemy armor and infantry
forces in war.  The paper discusses how the Army will use nonlethal
capabilities as a component of "overwhelming, decisive power" in
military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels and describes implications for doctrine, training, leadership
development, organization, materiel, and support.  Types of
capabilities needed include those that (1) immobilize, disorient,
impair, or disperse people; (2) disable systems; (3) provide security
and surveillance; and (4) attack material support systems and
infrastructure.  The Marine Corps' experience with nonlethal weapons
in Somalia underscored the need to ensure the proper use of nonlethal
equipment in the future.  On the basis of lessons identified from I
MEF, the Marine Corps is considering doctrine for the use of
nonlethal weapons. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

DOD concurred with a draft of this report but noted that it should
include discussions of (1) peace operations training that has been
conducted as part of the Partnership for Peace Program and (2)
reserve force participation in peace operations.  We have revised the
report to include information about training provided by recent
Partnership for Peace initiatives.  We also revised our Objectives,
Scope, and Methodology section to state that we did not report on
reserve component participation in peace operations because the
training provided for these missions was not significantly different
than training for standard reserve missions, and, except in a few
cases, the number of reserve component forces participating in these
operations was relatively small. 

DOD took issue with I MEF's view described in our report concerning
rules of engagement for the employment of nonlethal weapons, stating
that there should be one clear, unambiguous set of rules of
engagement.  We believe that the difference of views within DOD on
this matter underscores the evolving nature of nonlethal technology
and the need for DOD to examine this issue further, particularly with
regard to the operational use of this technology. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Jess T.  Ford, Associate Director
Steven H.  Sternlieb, Assistant Director
M.  Elizabeth Guran, Evaluator-in-Charge
Richard A.  McGeary, Senior Evaluator


   EUROPEAN OFFICE, FRANKFURT,
   GERMANY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

Inez M.  Azcona, Senior Evaluator
David G.  Artadi, Evaluator