Navy Mine Warfare: Budget Realignment Can Help Improve Countermine
Capabilities (Chapter Report, 03/13/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-104).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's efforts to
improve its ability to conduct effective sea mine countermeasures (MCM)
in two simultaneous major regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1)
status of the Navy's research and development projects; (2) readiness of
the Navy's present MCM equipment; and (3) match between the Navy's
planned and on-hand MCM equipment and its MCM requirements.

GAO found that: (1) the Navy must develop different systems to cover
deep- and shallow-water mine clearing operations, and its shallow-water
MCM capability is limited; (2) the Navy has about 18 different projects
to address its MCM weaknesses, but has not set clear priorities among
its mine warfare programs; (3) a long-range plan could help the Navy
maximize its limited financial resources and ensure ongoing funding of
its priority systems; (4) the Navy has experienced delays in new
systems' deployment and has identified shortfalls of at least $99.5
million in its shallow-water projects' development; (5) the Navy's 14
oceangoing MCM ships have long-standing equipment reliability problems
and parts shortages, which hinders mission performance; (6) the Navy is
resolving the ships' problems, but that will take several more years;
(7) the Navy is spending about $1.5 billion for 12 coastal,
non-oceangoing mine hunting ships that are no longer needed, and will
spend an average of $3.6 million annually to operate and maintain each
of them; (8) the Navy plans to acquire a new MCM command, control, and
support ship early in the next century and, in the interim, convert an
older helicopter carrier at a cost of $118 million, but other existing
ships and onshore locations could fulfill mission requirements at a
lower cost; and (9) the Navy could save millions of dollars by
deactivating some of the coastal ships and the command support ship.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-104
     TITLE:  Navy Mine Warfare: Budget Realignment Can Help Improve 
             Countermine Capabilities
      DATE:  03/13/96
   SUBJECT:  Naval warfare
             Military vessels
             Combat readiness
             Defense capabilities
             Command and control systems
             Navy procurement
             Military cost control
             Advanced weapons systems
             Equipment maintenance
             Military research
IDENTIFIER:  Desert Storm
             U.S.S. Princeton
             U.S.S. Tripoli
             Persian Gulf
             U.S.S. Inchon
             Avenger Class Mine Countermeasures Ship
             Osprey Class Mine Hunter Coastal Ship
             MH-53E Helicopter
             Sea Dragon Helicopter
             Ingleside (TX)
             Airborne Mine Hunting Sonar System
             AN/AQS-20 Sonar System
             Airborne Mine Neutralization System
             Semi-Autonomous Acoustic/Magnetic Vehicle
             Navy Distributed Explosive Technology Program
             Shallow Water Assault Breaching System
             Landing Craft Air Cushion
             Navy Explosive Neutralization Advanced Technology 
             Demonstration Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives

March 1996

NAVY MINE WARFARE - BUDGET
REALIGNMENT CAN HELP IMPROVE
COUNTERMINE CAPABILITIES

GAO/NSIAD-96-104

Navy Mine Warfare

(703124)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DET - Distributed Explosive Technology
  DOD - Department of Defense
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  MCM - mine countermeasures
  MCS - mine countermeasures command, control, and support
  MHC - mine hunter, coastal
  SABRE - Shallow Water Assault Breaching System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-271137

March 13, 1996

The Honorable Curt Weldon
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and
 Development
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

In response to your request, this report identifies opportunities for
the Navy to realign its spending priorities to address weaknesses in
its ability to conduct effective sea mine countermeasures.  Operation
Desert Storm highlighted many of the weaknesses that remain today. 
This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy to
address those weaknesses. 

This report is an unclassified version of our December 1995 report. 
In that report, we provided more detail and additional data to
support our findings and recommendations. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations,
Senate Committee on Armed Services, and House Committee on National
Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the
Secretaries of Defense and the Navy.  Copies will also be made
available to other interested parties upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations and
 Capabilities Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Operation Desert Storm highlighted major weaknesses in the Navy's
capability to detect and disarm enemy mines.  The Navy possessed only
a very limited capability at that time to conduct mine
countermeasures at various water depths.  In addition, two Navy
warships, the U.S.S.  Princeton and the U.S.S.  Tripoli, both struck
Iraqi mines in open waters in the Persian Gulf.  The combined damage
to the two ships, which totaled about $21.6 million, was caused by
two mines--one estimated to cost $10,000 and the other about $1,500. 
The Navy has since made a number of organizational changes and
initiated several research and development projects to address the
weaknesses in its mine countermeasures program. 

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development, House Committee on National Security, GAO examined the
steps the Navy is taking to ensure a viable, effective naval force
that will be ready to conduct mine countermeasures in two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts.  Specifically, GAO evaluated
the (1) status of the Navy's research and development projects, (2)
readiness of the Navy's on-hand mine countermeasures assets, and (3)
match between the Navy's planned and on-hand mine countermeasures
assets and its mine countermeasures requirements. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

The Navy uses ships, helicopters, and explosive ordnance units to
detect and destroy enemy mines from deep water up to the beach. 
Until the late 1980s, the primary mission of these forces was to
detect and destroy enemy mines laid along U.S.  coastlines and in
U.S.  harbors.  Subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Union and the
greatly diminished threat to U.S.  coastlines, the Navy redirected
its mine countermeasures program to detect and destroy enemy mines
overseas in support of U.S.  naval and amphibious operations in
regional conflicts.  Current wartime doctrine requires mine
countermeasures forces to be deployable outside U.S.  coastal waters. 

After Operation Desert Storm, the Navy designated the Commander of
the Mine Warfare Command as the operational commander of all naval
mine warfare forces.  His responsibilities include ensuring the
readiness of the mine warfare assets, enhancing the integrated
training of all mine warfare forces, conducting training exercises
with other fleet units, and commanding mine warfare forces when
deployed to military operations. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Critical areas in the Navy's mine countermeasures capabilities remain
unmet, and the Navy is pursuing a number of different projects to
address these areas.  However, it has not established clear
priorities among all of its mine warfare programs to sustain the
development and procurement of its most needed systems. 
Consequently, the Navy has experienced delays in delivering new
systems to provide necessary capabilities.  In addition, the Navy has
identified shortfalls of about $99.5 million in the development of
its shallow water projects. 

The systems and equipment installed on the Navy's ocean-going mine
countermeasures ships have experienced reliability problems and parts
shortages for several years.  As a result, individual ships are not
fully capable of performing their mine countermeasures missions,
although collectively they may be able to carry out particular
missions.  To its credit, the Navy recognizes these shortfalls and
has taken positive steps to improve the reliability and
supportability of its ships.  However, a number of the ships' systems
and equipment are still not as reliable as predicted, and parts
shortages persist. 

At the same time that the Navy is experiencing delays in delivering
critical capabilities, the Navy is spending about $1.5 billion to
acquire 12 coastal mine hunter ships that were designed specifically
to protect U.S.  coastal waters against the Soviet Union but not to
travel across the ocean under their own power.  Each of these ships
will cost the Navy an average of $3.6 million per year to operate and
maintain.  In addition, the Navy has discussed plans to acquire a new
mine countermeasures command, control, and support ship early in the
next century and is spending more than $118 million to convert the
U.S.S.  Inchon for this purpose in the interim.  The Navy estimates
that annual operation and maintenance costs for the U.S.S.  Inchon
will be about $4.5 million.  These command, control, and support
activities can be provided from existing ships and on-shore
locations. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      DELAYS IN RESEARCH AND
      DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
      JEOPARDIZE THE NAVY'S
      ABILITY TO CONDUCT MINE
      COUNTERMEASURES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

No single system can provide the Navy with the capability to conduct
mine countermeasures from deep water to the beach.  Therefore, the
Navy has been developing numerous systems to address the varying
water depths.  However, the Navy does not have a definitive plan that
identifies the additional systems needed in the long term to acquire
necessary shallow water capabilities.  It has pursued these projects
independently of each other and, consequently, has had to make
tradeoffs among them.  The Navy has started and stopped some of these
projects repeatedly over different fiscal years to respond to
changing priorities. 


      RELIABILITY AND
      MAINTAINABILITY PROBLEMS
      AFFECT MISSION READINESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

The Navy now possesses 14 ocean-going mine countermeasures ships and
is experiencing significant logistics challenges to keep them
operational.  The ships have been unavailable at times for training
because of failures of critical systems and equipment.  The
foreign-made engine, in particular, has a history of problems
involving failures of cylinder heads, bearings, crankshafts, and
engine actuators.  These shortages have adversely affected the
overall mission capability of the ships and resulted in parts being
diverted from the production line and removed from some ships for use
in other ships. 

The Navy established an admirals' oversight council in November 1994
to identify corrective actions to address these issues.  However,
officials believe it will be several years before all the
improvements can be made because the Navy will incur additional costs
to address the corrective actions and the ships' schedules will have
to be accommodated. 


      ADDITIONAL SHIPS ARE
      UNNECESSARY FOR MEETING THE
      NAVY'S MINE COUNTERMEASURES
      OBJECTIVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

The Navy began to acquire 12 coastal mine hunter ships in the
mid-1980s to counter the mine threat of the former Soviet Union. 
Because this threat to U.S.  coastal waters was greatly diminished
with the fall of the Soviet Union, the originally intended mission of
the coastal ships no longer exists.  However, instead of removing
some of these ships from the Navy's inventory, as recommended by the
Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General in May 1995, the Navy
is continuing to purchase all 12 ships at a total cost of about $1.5
billion. 

The deployment capability of the coastal ships is limited.  These
ships are not designed to travel across the ocean under their own
power, and they can only operate at sea for a maximum of 5 days. 
Because these ships were not intended to deploy, the Navy designed
them with a very limited ability to communicate with other fleet
units.  It will cost the Navy, on average, $3.6 million per year to
operate and maintain each of the coastal mine hunter ships.  The Navy
did not cancel orders for any of these ships or explore options or
opportunities for removing them from the Navy's inventory.  These
options include deactivating the ships or transferring them to other
allied navies through the foreign military sales program. 

The Navy also tentatively plans to acquire a new command, control,
and support ship early in the next century, even though the Navy can
provide command, control, and support for mine countermeasures
activities from existing naval ships or on-shore locations.  In the
interim, the Navy is spending more than $118 million to convert the
U.S.S.  Inchon to a command ship, even though the ship is already 25
years old.  The Navy began the conversion in March 1995 and is
anticipating a completion about March 1996.  As of August 1995, the
Navy had already committed $99 million of the conversion funds. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

To improve the Navy's readiness to conduct mine countermeasures, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of the Navy develop a long-range plan
to identify the gaps and limitations in the Navy's mine
countermeasures capabilities; establish priorities among the
competing projects and programs, including those in research and
development; and sustain the development and procurement of the most
critical systems.  The Secretary of the Navy should direct particular
attention to those systems required to improve the Navy's shallow
water mine countermeasures capabilities. 

GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the Navy improve the
readiness of ocean-going mine countermeasures ships.  If the Navy
finds that the funds necessary to sustain critical research and
development and improve the readiness of ocean-going mine
countermeasures ships are not available, the Navy should consider
using funds that would otherwise be used to operate and maintain some
of the coastal mine hunter ships. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD partially agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations (see
app.  II).  DOD acknowledged that delays in research and development
projects have had an impact on the Navy's ability to conduct mine
countermeasures and concurred that reliability and support problems
have affected the mission capability of its mine warfare ships. 
Further, DOD partially concurred that the coastal mine hunter ships'
role in overseas locations is limited.  However, DOD did not concur
with GAO's finding that the command, control, and support ship is not
essential.  DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations that the Secretary
of the Navy develop a long-range plan to sustain the development and
procurement of the most critically needed mine warfare systems and
improve the readiness of the Navy's ocean-going mine countermeasures
ships.  However, while DOD acknowledged that cost savings could be
achieved if the planned inventory of coastal mine hunter ships were
reduced, DOD did not agree that such a reduction is a viable option. 

GAO questions the need to operate additional coastal mine hunter
ships given the funding shortages in the mine warfare budget, which
is causing projects addressing unmet mine countermeasures needs to go
unfunded.  Since critical areas in Navy mine countermeasures
capabilities remain unmet, GAO believes these areas should have
higher priority than operating additional coastal mine hunter ships. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

Mine warfare captured the Navy's attention during Operation Desert
Storm when two Navy warships, the helicopter carrier U.S.S.  Tripoli
and the guided missile cruiser U.S.S.  Princeton, were heavily
damaged by Iraqi mines in the Persian Gulf in February 1991.  The
combined damage to these two ships, which totaled about $21.6
million, was caused by two mines--one estimated to cost $10,000 and
the other about $1,500.  Naval mines are extremely economical weapons
and are readily available on the world's arms market. 

The Navy has identified naval mine countermeasures--the ability to
detect and disable enemy sea mines--as a critical element for
establishing maritime superiority to ensure access to ports, keep sea
lanes open, and support amphibious assaults.  During the Cold War,
the major factor in developing mine countermeasures capabilities was
the ability to clear Soviet-laid mines from U.S.  harbors to enable
U.S.  ships to break out of U.S.  ports.  With the fall of the Soviet
Union, however, the threat of enemy mining in U.S.  coastal waters
has greatly diminished.  Changing world conditions have caused U.S. 
defense planning to shift from a concept of global conventional war
to a concept of regional conflicts and crises. 


   LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION
   DESERT STORM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

The 1992 Navy Mine Warfare Plan detailed four critical mine warfare
lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm and the actions taken by
the Navy in response to those lessons.  The first major lesson was
that the Navy lacked a unified command structure.  The mine
countermeasures commander's staff consisted of 23 individuals
assembled from 21 different commands, resulting in a command staff
that was ill-prepared for its task.  Fortunately, the 4 months in
theater before actual clearance operations provided for adequate
command staff and mine countermeasures force training.  The Navy has
since consolidated operational command of all mine warfare forces in
the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, who reports administratively and
operationally to the Commander in Chief, U.S.  Atlantic Fleet.\1 His
responsibilities include ensuring the readiness of the mine warfare
assets, enhancing the integrated training of all mine warfare forces,
conducting training exercises with other fleet units, and commanding
mine warfare forces when deployed to military operations.  The Mine
Warfare Command is located at the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi,
Texas.  Mine warfare ships are homeported nearby at Naval Station,
Ingleside, Texas.  Plans to move all mine hunting helicopters from
Alameda, California, and Norfolk, Virginia, to Corpus Christi have
not been finalized. 

A second lesson learned from Operation Desert Storm was the need to
improve the readiness of mine warfare forces.  Since that time, the
Navy has conducted or participated in about a dozen exercises with
U.S.  and foreign naval battle groups.  Mine warfare training courses
have been expanded for both enlisted and officer personnel, and
career paths for enlisted minemen have been revised to enhance
opportunities for long-term tours of duty in mine warfare. 

Third, the Navy acknowledged the need to identify and acquire the
necessary resources to carry out its mine countermeasures mission. 
In 1994, the Navy took delivery of the last of 14 mine
countermeasures (MCM) ships and acquired the first 2 of 12 planned
mine hunter, coastal (MHC) ships.  In addition, the Navy is
converting a helicopter landing ship to a mine countermeasures
command, control, and support (MCS) ship. 

Last, the Navy recognized that it has very limited systems to counter
mines in various water depths.  Consequently, the Navy has
established several research and development projects to address
these limited capabilities. 


--------------------
\1 During military operations, the Mine Warfare Commander reports to
the appropriate area Commander in Chief. 


   MINES AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES
   FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Sea mines are explosive devices hidden in the sea that can be
detonated either by direct contact or indirectly at a distance by the
acoustic, seismic, or magnetic signatures of passing ships.  The
mines can be floating, moored, bottom-laying, or buried. 
Sophisticated mines are equipped with electronic sensors designed to
ignore certain types of ships and target others or count a specific
number of ships before arming and detonating. 

The various methods for countering mine threats include detection and
avoidance, mine hunting, influence minesweeping, and mechanical
minesweeping.  Mine hunting is the process of detecting, locating,
and identifying mines through the use of sonar.  Influence
minesweeping activates electronic sensors within the mines using
towed magnetic or acoustic sweep gear to detonate mines at a safe
distance.  Mechanical minesweeping involves the physical removal of
mines using sweep wire to drag mines or cutting gear to release and
float tethered mines for later detonation.  The Navy's primary mine
countermeasures forces consist of ships, helicopters, and explosive
ordnance disposal units. 


      MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

The Avenger class MCM ship, the larger and more capable of the two
classes of mine countermeasures ships, is a 224-foot ocean-going mine
warfare ship designed to clear mines in both coastal and offshore
areas.  (See fig.  1.1.) The hull is constructed of wood and
glass-reinforced plastic to maintain a nonmagnetic character, which
is essential to mine clearing operations. 

   Figure 1.1:  An MCM Ship

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Navy.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The MCM is capable of both mine hunting and minesweeping--both
mechanical and influence--and is designed for conducting mine
countermeasures operations worldwide.  Major on-board systems include
the mine hunting sonar, unmanned submersible mine neutralization
vehicle, precise integrated navigation system, and standard
magnetic/acoustic influence minesweeping system.  The MCM ships are
designed to travel at a speed of 13.5 knots.  However, depending on
the distance, the Navy might use heavy-lift ships to transport MCM
ships to a battle site in a timely manner, which would benefit the
MCM ships by reducing engine wear and tear en route to the battle
site. 

The MCM ship program, which is managed by the Mine Warfare Ship
Program Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, cost $1.8 billion over a
period of 10 years.  The first of 14 MCM ships was commissioned in
September 1987, and the last was commissioned in November 1994.  The
MCM ships have a crew of 8 officers and 75 enlisted personnel. 


      COASTAL SHIPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.2

The Osprey class MHC ship, the smaller of the two classes of mine
countermeasures ships, is 188 feet long and designed specifically to
clear harbors and coastal waters.  (See fig.  1.2.) The MHC hull is
constructed of glass-reinforced plastic to provide the necessary
low-magnetic character.  The Mine Warfare Ship Program Office also
manages the MHC ship program. 

   Figure 1.2:  An MHC Ship

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Navy.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The role of the MHC has always been more limited than that of the
larger MCM.  The MHC class of ships was designed primarily to conduct
mine hunting and mechanical minesweeping within U.S.  harbors and
coastal waters.  These ships were originally designed to be
nondeployable coastal mine hunters that would have a maximum mission
capability length of
5 days.  However, the MHCs can be deployed and operated for longer
periods of time, as long as they are provided with fuel and supplies
from a close support ship.  In addition, the Navy has made some ship
alterations to expand the storage capacity of the MHC. 

The MHC ship program, which is in the production phase, will cost
about $1.5 billion.  The first of 12 MHC ships was commissioned in
November 1993 and the second in August 1994.  The Navy took delivery
of the third MHC in April 1995.  Construction of the 12th MHC ship
began in September 1994, and delivery is scheduled in fiscal year
1999.  The MHC ships have a crew of 6 officers and 46 enlisted
personnel. 


      MINE COUNTERMEASURES
      COMMAND, CONTROL, AND
      SUPPORT SHIP
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.3

To provide command and control functions, serve as a platform for
helicopters, and support supply and logistics operations, the Navy
Mine Warfare Command began converting the helicopter landing ship
U.S.S.  Inchon to an MCS ship in March 1995.  When this conversion is
completed in about March 1996, at a cost of more than $118 million,
the U.S.S.  Inchon will be capable of carrying an MCM Group Commander
and staff and supporting long-endurance airborne, surface, and
underwater MCM operations.  (See fig.  1.3.) The U.S.S.  Inchon,
which is 25 years old, has an expected lifespan of about 10 more
years.  The Navy has tentative plans to design and build a new MCS
ship early in the next century. 

   Figure 1.3:  The U.S.S.  Inchon

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Navy.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


      HELICOPTER SQUADRONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.4

The Navy's airborne mine countermeasures assets consist of 24 MH-53E
Sea Dragon helicopters and their related sweep gear.  (See fig. 
1.4.) The Sea Dragon, the largest heavy-lift helicopter in the West,
is capable of towing a variety of minesweeping and mine hunting
countermeasures gear.  The airborne forces enhance surface forces by
providing rapid response and deployment capability as well as the
ability to sweep wider areas of the sea in a shorter time.  These
forces are consolidated in Squadron HM-14 based in Norfolk, Virginia,
and Squadron HM-15 based in Alameda, California.  Each of these
squadrons is made up of 12 MH-53E helicopters.  The Mine Warfare
Command plans to consolidate its airborne mine warfare helicopter
squadrons at Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas.  Squadrons
report operationally to the Commander, Mine Warfare Command. 

   Figure 1.4:  An MH-53E
   Helicopter With Minesweeping
   Gear

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


      EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
      UNITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.5

Fifteen explosive ordnance disposal units of eight personnel (one
officer and seven enlisted) each report operationally to the
Commander, Mine Warfare Command.  These units are made up of
underwater divers and demolitions experts who are trained and
equipped to locate, identify, explode, disable, recover, and dispose
of mines.  Once mines have been located by surface or airborne
forces, the units move in and detonate the mines safely or disable
and retrieve them for future study.  In addition, these units are
capable of supporting surface and airborne mine countermeasures
operations. 


   MINE WARFARE RESEARCH AND
   DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The Navy is pursuing a number of different projects to develop new
mine countermeasures capabilities or improve existing capabilities. 
These programs are largely developed at the Naval Coastal Systems
Station in Panama City, Florida, and administered out of the Program
Executive Office for Mine Warfare in Arlington, Virginia. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development, House National Security Committee, we examined the steps
the Navy is taking to ensure a viable, effective naval force that
will be ready to conduct mine countermeasures in two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts overseas.  Specifically, we
evaluated the (1) status of the Navy's research and development
programs, (2) readiness of the Navy's on-hand mine countermeasures
assets, and (3) match between the Navy's mine countermeasures assets
and its mine countermeasures requirements. 

To determine the status of the Navy's mine warfare research and
development projects, we examined the Navy's operational requirements
documents and met with program managers to gather data on those
systems the Navy is developing to meet its requirements.  Further, we
examined past and projected budget data to identify the funding
history of the projects and estimate the delivery dates of the
projects to the fleet. 

To determine the readiness of ships, we reviewed Status of Resources
and Training System reports, high-priority requisitions, Mine
Readiness Certification Inspections, and other data related to
mission capability.  We discussed problem parts and unreliable
systems with the Mine Warfare Command, the Shore Intermediate
Maintenance Activity, and the Chief of Supply, and we identified
efforts to resolve these problems.  We conducted a detailed analysis
of the Mine Warfare Commander's priority lists of problem systems and
equipment affecting the MCM and MHC ship classes. 

To determine whether the Navy has identified the type and quantity of
assets needed to carry out its mine countermeasures mission, we
discussed the need for mine countermeasures ships and support vessels
with the Commander, Mine Warfare Command.  We also reviewed and
analyzed reports, testimony, and requirements studies published
between 1989 and 1995 by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Center
for Naval Analyses, Naval Audit Service, and Department of Defense
(DOD) Inspector General. 

We visited three MCM ships, the U.S.S.  Defender, the U.S.S. 
Gladiator, and the U.S.S.  Scout, in Ingleside, Texas.  We also
performed our work at the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity,
Ingleside, Texas; the Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas;
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Sea
Systems Command, the Naval Air Systems Command, the Program Executive
Office for Mine Warfare, the Office of Naval Research, the Bureau of
Naval Personnel, and the Office of the Director of Naval Reserves,
Washington, D.C.; the Office of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Fleet Headquarters, Norfolk, Virginia; the Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria, Virginia; and the Naval Coastal Systems Station, Panama
City, Florida. 

We performed our review between July 1994 and July 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


DELAYS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS LIMIT THE NAVY'S ABILITY
TO CONDUCT MINE COUNTERMEASURES
============================================================ Chapter 2

Critical limitations in the Navy's ability to conduct mine
countermeasures at various water depths that were identified during
Operation Desert Storm still exist today, and the Navy is pursuing
several projects to address these limitations.  However, it has not
developed a long-range plan that identifies a baseline of its
systems' current capabilities and weaknesses or establishes
priorities among its competing projects to sustain the development
and procurement of the most needed systems.  One of the significant
limitations demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm was the Navy's
inability to conduct mine countermeasures in shallow waters.  This
capability is one of the Navy's greatest challenges and key
priorities.  The Navy's current plans to bring additional systems on
line beyond 2001 in support of amphibious assaults are uncertain. 


   A LONG-RANGE PLAN CAN DIRECT
   FUNDING TO PRIORITY PROJECTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

The capability to conduct naval mine countermeasures is a critical
element in ensuring that the Navy can project military power from the
sea onto the world's beaches in military operations.  Operation
Desert Storm demonstrated, and subsequent independent studies
conducted by the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of
Sciences (1993) and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (1994) have documented,\1 that no single system can
provide the Navy with the capability to conduct mine countermeasures
at all water depths due to the complexity of mine warfare operations
and the various mines that the Navy may encounter.  Therefore, the
Navy must develop a set of complementary systems and tactics to
effectively carry out its mine warfare operations. 

The mine warfare community is currently developing about 18 different
projects to enhance its capability to conduct mine countermeasures at
all water depths.  These projects include

  enhancing the mine countermeasures ships' and helicopters' mine
     hunting sonars to provide greater area coverage and improve
     their capability to detect and classify enemy mines,

  upgrading the ships' and helicopters' minesweeping systems to
     provide greater output to destroy mines and improve
     serviceability,

  upgrading the ships' mine neutralization system to provide the
     ships with an immediate destruction capability of identified
     mines,

  developing a mine neutralization system for the MH-53E helicopters
     to be used with the airborne mine hunting sonar system, and

  developing the capability to neutralize mines and obstacles in the
     surf zone. 

The Navy's current approach to developing the mine warfare research
and development projects has been inefficient.  According to Navy
officials, many of the projects have had to compete for limited
financial resources, and the Navy has had to make tradeoffs among
them.  The Navy has started and stopped some projects repeatedly over
different fiscal years to respond to changing priorities, and these
repeated starts and stops have resulted in schedule delays.  For
example, officials explained that the airborne mine hunting sonar
system (AN/AQS-20) program has experienced starts and stops that have
resulted in a delay in the system's initial operating capability. 
The Navy began to develop this system in the late 1970s, yet has
still not brought this system on line.  Officials further explained
that the Navy has had to place different management teams on this
project over the years and that the program has suffered from the
lack of continuity in expertise.  Moreover, current procurement plans
for this sonar system will only allow the Navy to fund procurement of
two to three systems per year, despite the fact that mine
countermeasures helicopters deploy in squadrons of four.  According
to mine countermeasures officials, the mine warfare community will
consequently have to maintain support simultaneously for two
different mine hunting systems until all of the helicopters are
outfitted with the upgraded sonar. 

The airborne mine neutralization system program has also experienced
starts and stops since the program began in the mid-1970s.  This
program was dormant during Operation Desert Storm.  It was restarted
in fiscal year 1992 but canceled in fiscal year 1993.  Funds were
restored in fiscal year 1996. 

Sustaining limited financial resources for priority programs will
likely become even more challenging in the future.  The independent
studies conducted after Operation Desert Storm by the Naval Studies
Board of the National Academy of Sciences and the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory concluded that the use of
modeling and simulations could assist the Navy in identifying its
mine countermeasures priorities.  A long-range plan addressing the
gaps and limitations in the Navy's mine warfare capabilities,
especially its shallow water capabilities, could help the Navy
maximize its limited financial resources and ensure sustained funding
of its priority systems. 


--------------------
\1 Reports on these studies are classified. 


   THE NAVY STILL LACKS THE
   ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COUNTER
   MINES IN SHALLOW WATER
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

After Operation Desert Storm, the Navy determined that its inability
to clear mines and other obstacles in shallow waters is one of its
greatest challenges.  The Navy needs to develop this capability
because enemy forces can easily lay mines and obstacles in shallow
waters,\2 since this area is closest to their shorelines and because
surf action causes many mines to partially or totally bury, making
them harder to detect.  Without a shallow water mine countermeasures
capability, the only alternative for amphibious forces would be to
avoid an enemy minefield and make an approach in another area.  The
risk associated with this maneuver, however, is that enemy forces
might intend for U.S.  troops to make an amphibious landing right
into harm's way. 

The Navy cannot operate its mine countermeasures ships in very
shallow water due to the risk of running aground or damaging their
hulls.  The Navy would also have difficulty towing its mine sweeping
gear because of the likelihood that the gear would snag on the bottom
of the ocean. 

The Navy is currently developing six mine countermeasures systems to
clear mines and obstacles in shallow water.\3 Since Operation Desert
Storm, however, the Navy has not added any of these systems to its
fleet.  Moreover, the Navy has not made final decisions about
additional systems to conduct mechanical sweeping, hunt for buried
mines, or perform reconnaissance of mines in very shallow water.  In
addition, the Navy is only developing the capability to counter light
and medium obstacles and has not decided what it will do to counter
heavy obstacles. 

The mine warfare program is experiencing budget constraints, and the
Navy has not fully funded its shallow water mine countermeasures
projects, even though it identified this area as a priority.  The
Navy plans to spend about $317 million between fiscal years 1991 and
2001 in the development of its shallow water projects.  However,
budget documents, as of February 1995, show that unmet requirements
for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 will total about $99.5 million. 
This figure may be understated because the Navy still has to make
final decisions on some projects.  Appendix I shows the Navy's
shallow water mine countermeasures projects and the shortfalls
associated with each project. 

In addition to funding shortfalls, some of these projects are
experiencing technical and developmental delays.  The Navy's
Distributed Explosive Technology (DET) and Shallow Water Assault
Breaching System (SABRE) programs are examples of two of these
projects.\4 Initially, the Navy planned to destroy enemy mines in the
surf zone by deploying these systems from the beach into the water. 
The Navy has since changed its strategy and is now planning to deploy
these systems from the water onto the beach off of Landing Craft
Air-Cushion vehicles.  This change in strategy has resulted in an
initial operating capability delay of about
2 years.  Due to this decision, the Navy had to redesign the rocket
propulsion mechanisms to deliver these systems to the targeted area
and conduct additional testing to examine the impact of launching DET
and SABRE from an unstable platform. 

In another example, the Navy does not anticipate making final
decisions about its Explosive Neutralization Advanced Technology
Demonstration program until fiscal year 1998.  This program is
intended to enhance the capability of the DET and SABRE programs and
increase the safety of Navy personnel either by using an unmanned
glider to deploy the systems or enhancing the capability of Landing
Craft Air-Cushion vehicles to deploy DET and SABRE from a greater
distance. 


--------------------
\2 Obstacles include barriers such as telephone poles, concrete
blocks, steel objects, and barbed wire fences.  They are classified
as light, medium, or heavy.  Enemy forces can place obstacles on the
beach and in the surf zone. 

\3 At the end of fiscal year 1995, the Navy canceled its
participation in the development of a seventh system, the
Semi-Autonomous Acoustic/Magnetic Vehicle, which is a
remote-controlled, high-speed influence sweep. 

\4 DET is a distributed explosive net delivered by rocket motors. 
SABRE is an explosive line charge used with DET to clear mines in the
surf zone. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

DOD agreed that critical limitations in the Navy's ability to conduct
mine countermeasures that were identified during Operation Desert
Storm still exist today.  DOD also agreed with our emphasis on the
complexity of mine countermeasures and the fact that no one system
can handle the mine countermeasures requirement for all types of
mines at all water depths. 


RELIABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY
PROBLEMS AFFECT MISSION CAPABILITY
OF MINE WARFARE SHIPS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Reliability problems and parts shortages continue to affect the
readiness and performance capabilities of the Navy's MCM ships.  The
Navy has been working to overcome shortcomings associated with the
engines, sonars, generators, winches, and other critical systems and
has made progress in resolving some of the more serious problems. 
However, a number of the ships' systems and equipment are still not
as reliable as predicted, and parts shortages persist.  Mine warfare
officials indicated that it would be several more years before all
the necessary improvements could be made to the MCM ships because of
the additional costs to fix the problems and changes in the ships'
schedules.  The MHC ships, some of which are currently being
delivered to the Navy's fleet, are also experiencing similar
reliability and supportability problems. 


   MCM SHIPS ARE NOT FULLY CAPABLE
   OF PERFORMING MINE
   COUNTERMEASURES MISSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

The Mine Warfare Commander is committed to having eight MCM ships
capable of deploying immediately to carry out mine countermeasures
missions in two major regional conflicts occurring nearly
simultaneously.  The Navy uses detailed criteria to objectively
determine whether each ship is fully capable of performing the
wartime mission for which it is designed. 

As of July 1995, no MCM ship was rated fully capable of performing
its mine countermeasures mission.  Instead, Navy status reports show
that MCM ships generally possess the resources and have accomplished
the training necessary to undertake major portions of wartime mine
countermeasures missions.  The Mine Warfare Commander stated that
each MCM ship did not have to be fully capable of performing all
missions.  He said that commanding officers provide a subjective
assessment of their ships' ability to perform their wartime missions
and that the effectiveness rating goal was 80 percent. 

The Commander further commented that some ships' mission
effectiveness ratings could be increased quickly by cannibalizing
missing parts from other ships.  He also said that some ships that
were missing certain systems or equipment could be used for portions
of missions that did not require those systems or equipment that were
inoperable. 

The Commander acknowledged that achieving acceptable mission
effectiveness rates for the MCM ships has been difficult because the
ships' systems and equipment have broken down more often than
expected and the Navy emphasized production schedules and program
costs when building the ships and failed to order sufficient
quantities of spare parts to support the ships after they became
operational.  He agreed that the MCM ships have had serious problems
and that they were continuing to have problems, but he emphasized
that progress was being made and that problems were being fixed. 
However, reliability problems continue to cause some MCM systems to
experience more downtime than the Navy average, result in
high-priority requisitions for mission-essential parts, and affect
crew training. 


      SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT ON MCM
      SHIPS CONTINUE TO HAVE
      ABOVE-AVERAGE DOWNTIME
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

Several of the systems on the MCM ships have experienced periods of
inoperability that exceed the Navy average of 15 days.  These
reliability shortfalls have affected the ships' engines, combat
systems, and other critical systems and equipment for several years. 
The foreign-made engine, in particular, has had a history of problems
involving the cylinder heads, bearings, crankshafts, and actuators. 
Whenever the failure of a ship's system or equipment affects the
ship's primary mission and repair is not possible within 48 hours, a
report is prepared and entered into a tracking system; downtime
exceeding 30 days is categorized as being unresolved for an excessive
period of time.  Downtime can affect the Navy's ability to train its
crews and meet readiness goals.  Management reports, which track
systems and equipment downtime, indicate that downtime for MCM ships
continues to be significant. 


      MCM SHIPS' HIGH-PRIORITY
      REQUISITIONS SHOW NEED FOR
      MISSION-ESSENTIAL PARTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2

The Navy assigns a high-priority code to a ship's order for parts to
repair mission- essential systems and equipment if the ship cannot
perform some or all of its missions while waiting for the replacement
parts.  About 16 percent of all requisitions by Navy ships are
considered high priority.  Each of the MCM ships has experienced
periods in which it could not perform some or all of its missions
while waiting for replacement parts ordered with a high-priority
designation. 

From February 1994 to January 1995, the MCM fleet averaged
392 high-priority requisitions per month, or 28 per month for each
ship.  In some months, over 600 high-priority requisitions for
mission-essential parts were processed.  Table 3.1 shows the number
of total and high-priority requisitions processed from February 1994
to January 1995. 



                               Table 3.1
                
                   Number of Total and High-Priority
                  Requisitions for MCM Ships, February
                       1994 Through January 1995

                                                                 High-
                                         High-  Percent of    priority
                             Total    priority       total  requisitio
                        requisitio  requisitio  requisitio      ns per
Month and year                  ns          ns          ns        ship
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
February 1994                2,053         154           8          11
March 1994                   1,736         220          13          16
April 1994                   4,720         678          14          48
May 1994                     2,203         617          28          44
June 1994                    1,671         495          30          35
July 1994                    3,847         623          16          45
August 1994                  1,574         208          13          15
September 1994               1,691         247          15          18
October 1994                 2,052         212          10          15
November 1994                2,435         418          17          30
December 1994                2,380         227          10          16
January 1995                 3,279         610          19          44
======================================================================
Total                       29,641       4,709          16         337
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Mine Warfare Commander agreed that spare parts shortages,
particularly shortages of those high-priority parts that affect
mission capability, have been a concern since delivery of the first
MCM ship and that the shortages have been made worse because systems
and equipment have not been as reliable as predicted.  The Navy has
been taking extraordinary efforts to correct its MCM supply support
deficiencies.  Over the past year, the overall percentage of
high-priority requisitions for MCM ships had been reduced to the same
percentage as the rest of the Navy (16 percent). 


      MCM SHIPS' CREWS ARE NOT
      FULLY TRAINED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3

The Mine Warfare Commander acknowledged that reliability shortfalls
and inadequate supply support have had negative effects on crew
training.  He said, however, that crew rotation schedules were the
primary cause of some ships not having fully trained crews and that
training was sufficient to meet planned wartime commitments. 

At times, failures in critical systems and equipment have prevented
ships from participating in planned training.  For example, in
September 1994, we monitored an exercise in the Gulf of Mexico
(JTFX-95) from the U.S.S.  Defender and the command center at Corpus
Christi.  We observed that the U.S.S.  Dexterous and the U.S.S. 
Champion had engine problems and were unable to participate in the
exercise and that the U.S.S.  Warrior could only perform some
missions after a lightning strike knocked out its sonar.  The U.S.S. 
Defender was the only ship to participate fully and received a
satisfactory evaluation for its performance in locating training
mines placed in the Gulf of Mexico.  The Mine Warfare Commander said
that the performance of MCM ships in a May 1995 training exercise off
the coast of Denmark (Blue Harrier 95) indicated significant
improvement in the reliability of the ships.  Although the
postexercise evaluation was still underway, the Commander said the
MCM ships' reliability and performance were outstanding. 


   PROBLEMS PERSIST WITH
   RELIABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY
   OF MCM SHIPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

The Navy has identified causes of reliability and supportability
problems, initiated corrective actions, and resolved some of the
problems.  Navy officials commented that the MCM ships are operating
longer periods of time without mission-degrading failures of the
systems and equipment.  However, documents show that the Navy is
still in the process of identifying and quantifying the corrective
actions needed and that technological challenges and funding
shortages will make it difficult to address all of the necessary
improvements. 

The Mine Warfare Command has been concerned about the reliability
shortfalls of its ships' engines, sonars, generators, winches, and
other critical systems and equipment for several years.  In early
1994, the Command established a priority list of key systems and
equipment with problems and gave special attention to implementing
long-term solutions.  The list included 17 problems affecting the
entire class of MCM ships.  The Command has had some success with its
efforts.  For example, improved engine governor drives were expected
to be installed on all MCM ships during fiscal year 1995, and
improved water piping systems will be installed as each ship
undergoes periodic maintenance. 

After delivery of the last MCM in November 1994, the Navy began
giving priority attention to the reliability and supportability
problems affecting MCM ships by establishing an admirals' oversight
council.  The council is giving the highest priority to identifying
and executing solutions to reliability shortfalls and ensuring that
corrective actions are being identified and coordinated among
responsible officials.  Mine Warfare Command officials cited engine
problems, inoperative combat systems, and inadequate supplies of
parts among the key areas that need immediate attention. 


      ENGINE PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

The main propulsion plant on MCM ships, which consists of four
turbo-charged, 600- horsepower diesel engines, has been prone to
catastrophic failures and poor reliability.  The problems were so bad
that during 1994 the Navy considered buying replacement engines. 
However, the Navy determined that this approach was not
cost-effective and decided to fix the engine problems.  Navy
documents indicate that several factors have contributed to the
engine problems, including an undersized water jacket cooler that
causes the engine to overheat; fuel, oil, and exhaust leaks; and a
poorly designed drive train.  In addition, Navy officials said the
fuel injection pump, thermocouple system, and cylinders were failing
at high rates and needed immediate attention. 

The Navy resolved the problem in part by changing the operating
profile of the engines to a cruising speed of 8 knots and replacing
engine governor drives with improved drives.  As of July 1995, the
Navy had redesigned all drive train components and developed improved
return lines, gaskets, clamps, and injection pump valves.  The Navy
plans to install improved versions on all ships by December 1995. 
The Navy is also developing a larger water jacket cooler.  Although
no formal replacement schedule has been developed, the Mine Warfare
Commander estimates that this problem will be corrected by 1997. 

These actions, although helpful, have not solved all of the engine's
problems.  The Navy is still determining how much funding will be
needed to make the required modifications.  The Navy will then have
to seek this funding through future budget requests.  For the long
term, the admirals' oversight council directed the Deputy Program
Manager for Mine Warfare Ship Programs to explore the feasibility of
purchasing replacement engines when the current engines are beyond
economical repair and address the problem of obtaining funding for
the replacement engines. 


      COMBAT SYSTEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

Mine Warfare Command officials identified problems with certain key
mine countermeasures combat systems that need priority attention to
determine their causes and funding for proposed solutions.  Among
these problems, the officials noted that the Navy has not allocated
funds to upgrade the navigation system on its MCM ships.  It is very
important that the ships know precisely where they are so they can
communicate to other ships in the area the exact location of any
mines that are found.  The Navy has an upgraded version of its
AN/SSN-2(V)4 precise integrated navigation system.  According to the
Mine Warfare Commander, funding will be made available, and the Navy
plans to have the system on all MCM ships by December 1997. 


      PARTS SHORTAGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3

Navy officials commented that the admirals' oversight council was
giving priority attention to improving supply support for specific
systems and equipment, and Navy documents show that progress is being
made.  For example, the officials said that parts for the
foreign-made engine would soon be bought exclusively from U.S. 
manufacturers.  Nevertheless, parts shortages are expected to persist
for some time in part because the ships have multiple configurations
of systems and equipment.  For example, the AN/SQQ- 32 sonar suite
has two variants that operate essentially the same but are two very
different systems for maintenance and parts support.  Navy officials
said they were trying to determine if funding could be made available
to standardize combat system configurations and address other key
problems. 

A Mine Warfare Command supply officer identified the most troublesome
spare parts shortages that were continuing to affect operations.  The
officer provided a list of 15 out-of-stock parts that were causing
operational problems and downtime for the engines, minesweeping gear,
air conditioner, sonar system, sewage system, and main control
console.  Table 3.2 lists these parts. 



                               Table 3.2
                
                    Most Troublesome Parts Shortages
                      Affecting Mine Warfare Ships

Part                                System
----------------------------------  ----------------------------------
Turbocharger                        Engine

Cooler core                         Engine lube oil purifier

Belt                                Engine fuel oil purifier

Upper cable section                 Minesweeping gear

Middle cable section                Minesweeping gear

Acoustic power cable                Minesweeping gear

Cable assembly                      Mine neutralization vehicle

6W5 cable                           Mine neutralization vehicle

6W9 cable                           Mine neutralization vehicle

Impeller                            Air conditioner

Transformer                         Air conditioner

Circuit card                        SQQ-30 sonar system

Zinc anodes                         SQQ-30 sonar system

Plasma display                      Main control console

Macerator pump                      Sewage system
----------------------------------------------------------------------

   NEWER MHC SHIPS ARE
   EXPERIENCING SIMILAR
   RELIABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY
   PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

It is too soon to fully assess the capability rates of the entire
class of newer MHC ships because the Navy had received only three
MHCs as of May 1995.  Nevertheless, in early 1994, the Mine Warfare
Command identified five problem areas affecting the entire class of
MHC ships.  The admirals' oversight council has also included the MHC
in the scope of its work. 

The MHCs contain many of the same systems found on the MCMs and
therefore will require the same corrective action in certain cases. 
For example, early versions of the MHC will have to be backfitted
with improved versions of the variable depth sonar and mine
neutralization system.  Later versions will have the improved
versions installed during production.  In other cases, problems may
be even more acute on the MHC.  For example, Navy documents indicate
that communications problems on MHC ships are more serious than those
on MCM ships.  MHC ships, originally designed to hunt mines off the
U.S.  coast, are equipped only with high-frequency radios.  Since the
Navy has decided that MHC ships should now be deployable overseas,
satellite communications will be essential.  The Navy has funding
available in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to correct the deficiencies
with off-the-shelf communications equipment.  However, technicians
are concerned that the MHC ships may not have room for antennas or
additional radio equipment and are exploring the possibility of
replacing the radios with small circuit cards to perform this
function. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

DOD agreed with our finding that reliability and supportability
problems have affected the mission capability of its mine warfare
ships.  According to DOD, the Navy has initiated various actions that
have significantly improved systems reliability.  DOD also commented
that the Navy is incorporating improvements into the newer ships as
they are built to improve their reliability and supportability and
has adopted a revised maintenance philosophy that is enhancing
operational availability. 


THE NAVY IS PROCURING MORE SHIPS
THAN CURRENT REQUIREMENTS DICTATE
============================================================ Chapter 4

The Navy is continuing its MHC procurement program at a total cost of
about $1.5 billion, even though the original mission of the MHCs has
largely diminished with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. 
Further, the Navy is continuing this procurement program at the same
time that it has other unmet critical needs, including the need to
develop its shallow water mine countermeasures programs.  As of
September 1995, 3 of 12 planned MHC ships had been delivered to the
Navy.  The remaining nine ships are currently under construction and
are expected to be completed by fiscal year 1999.  Moreover, the MHC
ship, which the Navy is currently planning to operate as a naval
reserve asset, has fewer capabilities than the larger MCM ships that
already exist in the Navy's fleet. 

In addition, the Navy has plans to acquire a new MCS ship early in
the next century.  In the interim, the Navy is spending more than
$118 million to modify an existing amphibious warfare ship to provide
mine warfare assets with command, control, and support.  The
conversion is expected to be completed about March 1996.  Although it
is essential to provide the necessary command, control, and support
during military operations, it is not necessary to have a ship
dedicated solely for this effort because other ships or shore-based
facilities could provide the function. 

The Navy's current estimate to operate and maintain each MHC is $3.6
million per year.  Further, Navy officials estimate that it will cost
the Navy $4.5 million annually to operate and maintain the MCS ship. 
The savings that would be achieved by removing some of these ships
from the Navy's inventory could assist the Navy in achieving its
other unmet critical mine countermeasures requirements. 


   MHC ROLE IN OVERSEAS LOCATIONS
   IS LIMITED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

The MHC ship was initially intended to protect U.S.  coastlines from
Soviet mines and was not developed with an overseas mission in mind. 
By design, this ship class was not intended to transit across the
ocean under its own power or operate on station for long periods of
time, thereby reducing its ability to be a viable asset in overseas
operations.  In addition to its limited capabilities, the Navy is
planning to make the MHC ship a reserve asset, which will further
limit its role as an overseas asset. 


      MHC SHIP HAS LIMITED WARFARE
      CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1

The MHC ship, which is smaller and has more limited capabilities than
the Navy's larger MCM ships, was designed to protect U.S. 
coastlines.  The MHC ships were not intended to transit the ocean
under their own power and would have to be transported by heavy-lift
ships to be used in overseas contingencies.  Currently, these ships
can only operate at sea for a maximum of 5 days and depend on
shore-based facilities for resupply.  In addition, the MHC ships are
limited in their missions.  These ships were originally designed to
conduct mine hunting operations only, although the Navy has plans to
add a mechanical sweep, which will provide the MHC ships with the
capability to physically remove moored mines. 


      NAVY PLANS FOR THE MHC SHIP
      WILL FURTHER LIMIT ITS USE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2

Mine countermeasures assets have generally been assigned to the Naval
Reserve Force.  The Navy plans to continue this practice by placing
11 of the 12 MHC ships in the Naval Reserve Force, which will further
limit their role in future overseas operations.  Generally, about 15
to 20 percent of the crew, or 8 of 52 personnel assigned to the ship,
will be reservists.  For the ships to serve as platforms to provide
training to reservists, the ships need to be located near the reserve
population serving on those ships.  Therefore, it would be
impractical to position these ships in overseas locations. 


   DEDICATED MCS SHIP IS NOT
   ESSENTIAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

Mine countermeasures crises during the mid-1980s and early 1990s
demonstrated the need to provide mine warfare assets with command,
control, and support.  The Navy's 1992 and 1994-95 mine warfare plans
state that airborne and surface mine countermeasures assets require a
dedicated ship for maintenance and logistics support during overseas
deployments.  The Navy believes that a platform is also necessary for
the mine countermeasures group's commander and staff to enhance
communication with the battle group and theater commanders.  However,
command, control, and support can be provided from other Navy ships
or from shore-based locations. 

Officials at the Mine Warfare Command informed us that the Navy plans
to acquire one new MCS ship early in the next century.  This plan,
however, is tentative because no formal acquisition program is in
place and no budget has been submitted for this effort.  In addition,
the Navy would have to shift the use of assets and rely on
shore-based facilities or other naval platforms for command, control,
and support during two nearly concurrent major regional conflicts
because one MCS ship would not be able to support both
simultaneously. 

The Navy is in the process of modifying the U.S.S.  Inchon, an
existing amphibious warfare ship, as an interim measure to provide
command, control, and support to air and surface mine countermeasures
forces.  The Navy does not plan to have the U.S.S.  Inchon and the
new MCS ship in the fleet at the same time.  The U.S.S.  Inchon,
which is already 25 years old, will only have an increased life span
of about 10 years once it is converted.  The Navy expects that the
conversion will be completed about March 1996 at a cost of more than
$118 million.  As of August 1995, the Navy had already committed $99
million of the conversion dollars. 


   COST SAVINGS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY
   REDUCING INVENTORY OF SHIPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

The Navy estimates that operating and maintaining each MHC ship will
cost $3.6 million annually.  This figure includes the cost for
personnel, unit operations, fuel, direct maintenance, and other
indirect costs.  The Navy could achieve significant savings by
removing some of the ships from its inventory and address its other
critical needs by applying these savings to those programs.  However,
the Navy is not currently exploring other options for the MHC ships. 

In May 1995, the DOD Inspector General reported\1 that the Navy could
deactivate 5 of the 12 planned MHC ships and put to better use $69.2
million that would be required to operate and maintain the ships
during fiscal years 1996 through 2001.\2 In addition, the Inspector
General identified an additional $11 million, or $2.2 million per
ship, that the Navy would unnecessarily spend to upgrade equipment on
the five MHC ships between fiscal years 1996 and 2001.  These
upgrades include improving communications systems and installing
reliability improvements on the propulsion systems. 

The Navy could also declare the ships to be excess capacity and
explore the possibility of transferring the excess MHC ships to
allied countries through the foreign military sales program. 
Although we did not assess the world market for mine countermeasures
ships, we did note during the course of this evaluation that a number
of countries around the world possess mine countermeasures fleets. 

Navy officials further estimate that it will cost $4.5 million
annually to operate and maintain the U.S.S.  Inchon.  As with the
case of the MHC ships, savings could also be achieved if the Navy
were to decide to remove this platform from its fleet.  However,
because the Navy would still have to provide command, control, and
support services from other Navy ships or shore locations and incur
costs in doing so, it is more difficult to estimate the savings to be
achieved. 


--------------------
\1 This report is classified. 

\2 The $69.2 million is based on the Navy's estimate to operate and
maintain five MHC ships per year less any costs to deactivate the
ships. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

DOD partially agreed with our finding that the MHC's short on-station
time and reserve status would limit its role in overseas locations. 
DOD responded that a contract modification was in place that would
increase the at-sea operational time.  However, DOD also responded
that the bulk of the MHC class ships are going to ultimately be
assigned to the reserve forces. 

DOD did not agree with our finding that a dedicated MCS ship is not
essential, stating that the Navy has long held the tenet that a ship
that provides effective command and control needs to be deployed with
the operating forces.  We acknowledged in this report that command,
control, and support are essential during military operations. 
However, we also reported that these functions could be provided from
other Navy ships or shore-based locations.  Therefore, we do not
believe the need for an MCS ship is as great as other more pressing
needs, such as the need to develop the capability to conduct shallow
water mine countermeasures. 

DOD agreed with our finding that cost savings could be achieved by
reducing the inventory of mine warfare ships, but did not agree that
reducing the inventory of ships is a viable option.  As discussed
above, we and others believe that reducing the inventory of ships is
a viable option. 

DOD noted that the actual annual savings associated with not
operating additional MHC ships, projected at $3.6 million each, would
not be completely realized due to decommissioning and deactivation
costs.  As previously noted, the DOD Inspector General included
deactivation costs in estimated cost savings and projected a 5-year,
$69.2 million cost savings after deducting deactivation costs. 


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 5

The experience of Operation Desert Storm revealed significant
weaknesses in the Navy's ability to conduct effective sea mine
countermeasures, and the damage sustained by two Navy warships during
that operation clearly demonstrated the impact that enemy sea mines
and obstacles can play in military operations.  The Navy has since
undertaken a number of projects to improve its mine countermeasures
capabilities.  However, critical limitations and delays in the
delivery of new capabilities remain. 

The Navy is pursuing a number of different projects to enhance
current capabilities and develop new ones; however, it has not
undertaken a total systems approach to identify a baseline of
capabilities, develop alternatives, and establish priorities among
those alternatives.  Many of these projects have historically
experienced starts and stops and are continuing to experience delays
in delivery.  Although the Navy has identified the ability to conduct
mine countermeasures in shallow water depths as a key priority, it
still has only very limited capabilities in this area.  Many of the
shallow water mine countermeasures projects are underfunded. 

The Navy has finished procuring 14 MCM ships.  However, the ships are
experiencing significant reliability problems and parts shortages,
which affect their readiness and performance capabilities.  The Navy
has been working to overcome these shortcomings and has made progress
in resolving some of the more serious problems.  However, mine
warfare officials have stated that it would be several more years
before all the necessary improvements could be made due in part to
limited available funding. 

At the same time, the Navy is continuing to procure 12 MHC ships,
despite the fact that the original mission of the MHC has greatly
diminished.  The Navy estimates that it will cost $3.6 million per
year to operate and maintain each of these ships.  The Navy is also
converting an amphibious ship to serve as an MCS ship.  It will cost
the Navy approximately $4.5 million per year to operate and maintain
this ship.  One of the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm
highlighted the importance of providing mine countermeasures assets
with the necessary support.  However, the functions that this ship
will provide could be provided from other ships or on-shore
locations. 

The Navy cannot afford to support all of its mine countermeasures
projects within its mine warfare budget without continuing to
experience future delays in delivering new capabilities.  However,
opportunities exist to realign the Navy's mine warfare budget to
direct funding toward its most critical needs.  If the Navy were to
deactivate five MHC ships, the Navy would save about $18 million
annually.  These savings, if applied to the Navy's shallow water
program, would greatly reduce the $99.5 million in budget shortfalls
that the Navy has identified in that program.  If the Navy were to
deactivate the MCS ship as well, the Navy could achieve additional
savings, although these savings are more difficult to estimate. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1

To improve the Navy's readiness to conduct mine countermeasures, we
recommend that the Secretary of the Navy develop a long-range plan to
identify the gaps and limitations in the Navy's mine countermeasures
capabilities; establish priorities among the competing projects and
programs, including those in research and development; and sustain
the development and procurement of the most critical systems.  The
Secretary of the Navy should direct particular attention to those
systems required to improve the Navy's shallow water mine
countermeasures capabilities. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Navy improve the
readiness of ocean-going mine countermeasures ships.  If the Navy
finds that the funds necessary to sustain critical research and
development and improve the readiness of ocean-going mine
countermeasures ships are not available, the Navy should consider
using funds that otherwise would be used to operate and maintain some
of the MHC ships. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2

DOD agreed with our recommendations that the Secretary of the Navy
develop a long-range plan to sustain the development and procurement
of the most critically needed mine warfare systems and improve the
readiness of the ocean-going MCM ships.  However, DOD did not agree
that the last five MHC ships should not be operated and added that
the possibility of using cost savings from deactivating these ships
to support other aspects of the Navy's mine warfare program is not an
option. 

We question the need to operate additional MHC ships given the
funding shortage in the mine warfare budget, which is causing
projects addressing unmet mine countermeasures needs to go unfunded. 
Since critical areas in Navy mine countermeasures capabilities remain
unmet, we believe these areas should have higher priority than
operating additional MHC ships. 


NAVY PROJECTED SHORTFALLS IN
SHALLOW WATER MINE COUNTERMEASURES
PROJECTS
=========================================================== Appendix I

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                          Research and
                                           development
                                               funding  Navy projected
                                              profile,     shortfalls,
                                          fiscal years    fiscal years
Project name and description                 1991-2001       1997-2001
--------------------------------------  --------------  --------------
Obstacle Breaching--systems intended             $19.6               0
 to counter light to heavy obstacles
 in the surf zone and on the beach.
Breach Lane Navigation--a sector light             3.7               0
 placed on the beach to guide assault
 crafts through cleared lanes.
Semi-Autonomous Acoustic/Magnetic                8.1\a               0
 Vehicle--a remote-controlled, high-
 speed, influence sweep.
Shallow Water Assault Breaching System            33.5            10.5
 (SABRE)--an explosive line charge to
 clear mines in the surf zone.
Distributed Explosive Technology                  51.2            18.9
 (DET)--a distributed explosive net
 delivered by rocket motors and used
 with the SABRE.
Explosive Neutralization Advanced              109.7\b            52.6
 Technology Demonstration (ENATD)--a
 system to provide greater standoff
 distance and improve accuracy of
 deployment of the DET/SABRE.
Advanced Lightweight Influence Sweep            89.0\c            17.5
 (ALISS)--a towed influence sweep for
 very shallow water.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a This project was canceled at the end of fiscal year 1995.  The
Navy believes this system duplicates the Landing Craft Air-Cushion
vehicle and is testing the feasibility of using that system to
conduct sweeping operations. 

\b The Office of Naval Research will provide the funding for this
program for fiscal year 1993 through mid-fiscal year 1998.  Funding
provided by this office represents $74.6 million of the total.  Due
to budgetary cuts, this program will be delayed about 6 months in
transitioning into the research and development acquisition phase. 
The Navy's Mine Warfare Program Office will assume responsibility for
the continuation of research and development in mid-fiscal year 1998. 

\c The Office of Naval Research will provide the funding for this
program for fiscal years 1993 through 1997.  Funding provided by this
office represents $50.3 million of the total.  Budgetary cuts have
resulted in some refocusing of program development.  The Navy's Mine
Warfare Program Office will assume responsibility for the
continuation of research and development to acquisition beginning in
fiscal year 1998. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)



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(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

Sharon A.  Cekala
Joan B.  Hawkins
David E.  Moser
Janine M.  Cantin
Christina L.  Quattrociocchi
Karen S.  Blum


   DALLAS FIELD OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

Roger L.  Tomlinson
Hugh F.  Reynolds
Rebecca L.  Pierce


*** End of document. ***