M1 Tanks: Status of Proposed Overhaul Program (Letter Report, 04/10/96,
GAO/NSIAD-96-100).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the absence of a
procurement program to modernize the M1 tank fleet beyond the upgrade of
existing tanks and to address new tank threats, focusing on: (1) whether
the current readiness level of the M1 tank is adequate to meet its
war-fighting requirements; (2) whether the operating condition of the
tanks at the National Training Center (NTC) is adequate to meet training
requirements; (3) whether the change in repair parts funding has
adversely affected unit maintenance; and (4) the status of the Abrams
Integrated Management XXI (AIM XXI) program, the Army's proposed M1 tank
overhaul program.

GAO found that: (1) as of March 1995, over 94 percent of the active and
reserve units with M1 tanks reported that their tanks could accomplish
the majority of assigned wartime missions and over 56 percent of the
units reported that their tanks could accomplish all assigned wartime
missions; (2) despite a high operating tempo and maintenance problems,
M1 tanks at NTC have not missed any training days; (3) the inspection
and repair only as needed program, as opposed to an overhaul program,
has not adversely affected unit maintenance; (4) 3 Army division
commanders believed that the change in repair parts funding has not
altered their maintenance approach, but supply system inadequacies did
cause repair part shortages; (5) the costs and benefits of the AIM XXI
program are uncertain; and (6) Army officials support the AIM XXI
program to identify latent deficiencies that would not otherwise show up
during routine readiness inspections, only if the program would not
diminish the funding available for the M1A2 tank modernization effort.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-96-100
     TITLE:  M1 Tanks: Status of Proposed Overhaul Program
      DATE:  04/10/96
   SUBJECT:  Military land vehicles
             Defense contingency planning
             Combat readiness
             Spare parts
             Equipment repairs
             Equipment maintenance
             Inspection
             Military training
             Military cost control
             Advanced weapons systems
IDENTIFIER:  Abrams Tank
             M1A2 Tank
             JCS Status of Resources and Training System
             M1A1 Tank
             Army Abrams Integrated Management XXI Program
             Army Abrams Overhaul Program
             Army M1A2 Upgrade Program
             Army Inspection and Repair Only as Needed Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1996

M1 TANKS - STATUS OF PROPOSED
OVERHAUL PROGRAM

GAO/NSIAD-96-100

M1 Tanks

(703114)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AIM XXI - Abrams Integrated Management
  AMSAA - Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
  IRON - inspection and repair only as needed
  NTC - National Training Center
  SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-271121

April 10, 1996

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Glen Browder
House of Representatives

House Report 104-131 to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 expressed concerns about the absence of a
procurement program to modernize the M1 tank fleet beyond the upgrade
of existing tanks and to address new tank threats that are appearing. 
The report requested that we determine whether the (1) current
readiness level of the M1 tank is adequate to meet its war-fighting
requirements, (2) operating condition of the tanks at the National
Training Center (NTC) is adequate to meet training requirements, and
(3) change in repair parts funding has adversely affected unit
maintenance.  In discussions with members of your staff, we were also
asked to report on the status of the Army's proposed M1 tank overhaul
program, which is referred to as the Abrams Integrated Management XXI
(AIM XXI) program. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Army started fielding the M1 Abrams tank (the Army's main battle
tank) in the early 1980s.  Table 1 shows as of October 1995, there
were about 7,600 M1s (in various configurations) in active and
reserve Army and Marine Corps units and war reserve and prepositioned
storage sites.  Since the initial fielding, the M1 has undergone
several modernization and enhancement upgrades. 



                                Table 1
                
                 Number of M1 Tanks by Configuration as
                            of October 1995

Configuration   Number  Description
--------------  ------  ----------------------------------------------
M1/IPM1          3,141  The IPM1 is the improved version of the basic
                         M1. The IPM1 has an extended turret,
                         increased capacity shock absorbers, and added
                         armor.
M1A1             4,351  The M1A1 has a larger gun (120mm) than the M1;
                         nuclear, biological, and chemical
                         overpressure system; and additional armor
                         protection.
M1A2              87\a  The M1A2, an enhanced version of the M1A1, has
                         depleted uranium armor, digital electronics,
                         an improved commander's weapons station, a
                         positioning navigation system, a commander's
                         independent thermal viewer, an intervehicular
                         information system, a radio interface unit,
                         and a commander's integrated display.
======================================================================
Total            7,579
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a When fielding is completed in about 2004, the M1A2 fleet will
consist of 1,079 tanks, which is sufficient to equip all the early
deploying contingency forces (force package 1) and some of the
forward deployed forces (force package 2). 

The M1 tank was not designed with a depot overhaul maintenance
strategy.\1 The maintenance strategy envisioned that maintenance
would be performed at the organizational, direct support, and general
support levels.  Tank items that could not be repaired at those
maintenance levels would be sent to the depot for repair.  It was
never planned for the entire tank to be completely overhauled, unless
the tank was involved in an accident, suffered battle damage, or
experienced some other catastrophic failure. 

How much maintenance would be performed and where it would be
performed was influenced by the Department of Defense's decision to
change repair parts funding.  Beginning in 1992, Army units had to
use their operation and maintenance funds to buy repair parts and
major components.  Prior to this, units did not pay for major
components, such as engines or transmissions.  These items were "free
issue" to units and there was little incentive to repair them.  It
was easier and cheaper to order a new engine or transmission from the
supply system.  Concerns have been raised that under the new system,
commanders might defer maintenance to conserve unit operation and
maintenance funds. 


--------------------
\1 If a tank has a depot overhaul maintenance strategy, it is shipped
to the depot where it is completely disassembled.  The disassembled
items are inspected and repaired or replaced.  The tank is then
reassembled and considered to be in like-new condition. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

As of March 31, 1995, over 94 percent of the active and reserve Army
units reported that their M1 tanks were ready to perform the majority
of the assigned wartime missions; about 56 percent of the units
reported that their M1 tanks were ready to perform all of their
assigned wartime missions. 

Because of the high operating tempo of the training tanks, the M1
tanks at NTC are experiencing more maintenance problems than tanks in
active Army units.  However, in spite of the maintenance problems,
NTC has fielded the required number of tanks to meet all of its
training requirements.  On average, the NTC M1 fleet maintained an
operational readiness rate of about 82 percent for the 8-month period
that ended December 1995. 

Commanders at three Army divisions that have 834 M1 tanks told us
that the change in repair parts funding had not caused them to alter
their maintenance approach.  The commanders cited some instances in
which they had experienced repair parts shortages.  However, they
emphasized that lack of funds to buy the parts was not the reason for
the shortages.  The parts were generally not available in the supply
system. 

Notwithstanding, some Army officials have proposed a M1 overhaul
program, at a cost of $559,000 a tank, because they were concerned
that latent deficiencies that do not show up during routine readiness
inspections could show up during wartime and affect the tanks'
performance.  Other Army officials, however, are resistant to the
overhaul program because of concerns that the program would take
funds away from the ongoing M1A2 upgrade program.  The Army does not
maintain data that shows the extent, if any, of the latent
deficiencies, nor does the Army have a predictive readiness system
that would show what would happen to operational readiness if there
were no depot overhaul program.  At the time we completed our review,
the Army had not made a decision concerning the proposed overhaul
program. 


   REPORTED READINESS OF THE M1
   TANK FLEET IS HIGH
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

We used the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) report to
assess the readiness of M1 tanks.  SORTS uses C-rating designations
to denote degrees of readiness:  C-1 is the highest readiness rating
and C-5 is the lowest. 

Our analysis of the SORTS data as of March 1995 showed that over 94
percent of the units with M1 tanks reported that their tanks were C-3
(can accomplish the majority of the assigned wartime missions) or
higher and that about 56 percent of the units reported that their
tanks were C-1 (can accomplish all of the assigned wartime missions). 
Table 2 shows the distribution of C-ratings. 



                                Table 2
                
                   Readiness Ratings as of March 1995

                                          Number of M1      Cumulative
C-rating                                    tank units         percent
--------------------------------------  --------------  --------------
C-1                                                 39            55.7
C-2                                                 25            90.9
C-3                                                  2            94.3
C-4                                                  3            98.6
C-5 or lower                                         1           100.0
======================================================================
Total                                               70
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussions with officials at three Army divisions that have 834 M1
tanks confirmed that they were not experiencing any major
readiness-related maintenance or supply problems with their tanks. 
The officials were confident that they could deploy as required and
carry out their assigned missions. 

The M1 tanks at NTC and the M1 tanks that were in prepositioned
storage were also reported to be in a high state of readiness (as
shown in table 3). 



                                Table 3
                
                Reported Readiness Rates of M1 Tanks at
                NTC and in Prepositioned Storage (As of
                             October 1995)

                                  Operational
                         Number     readiness
Prepositioned storage        of          rate
location:                 tanks     (percent)  Comments
-----------------------  ------  ------------  -----------------------
2                           348            99  Equates to C-1
                                                readiness rate
3                           123           100  Equates to C-1
                                                readiness rate
4                           116            81  Equates to C-2
                                                readiness rate
5                           116            96  Equates to C-1
                                                readiness rate
NTC                       109\a          82\b  Equates to C-2
                                                readiness rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The number of tanks at NTC ranged from 89 to 122 during the
8-month period ending December 1995. 

\b The operational readiness rates of the NTC are an 8-month average
as of December 1995. 


   TRAINING NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED
   BY OPERATING CONDITION OF M1
   TANKS AT NTC
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

NTC is authorized 122 M1 tanks (2 battalions) for training.  These
tanks are operated at a higher tempo than tanks in a typical tactical
unit.  For example, each tank averages about 2,300 miles a year,
compared with the Army-wide average of about 630 miles a year.  The
NTC M1 tank fleet averages about 8,400 miles, compared with the
Army-wide average of about 3,500 miles. 

As a result of the high operating tempo, the NTC M1 tanks have
experienced many more maintenance problems than the tanks in the
tactical units.  However, according to NTC officials, the tanks have
not missed any training days due to the maintenance problems.  The
officials said that they are always able to provide the training unit
with the required number of tanks because only one of the two tank
battalions is being used at a time\2 .  Another factor that has
enabled NTC to meet its training requirements is that its tanks are
cycled through the Anniston Army Depot under the Army's inspection
and repair only as needed (IRON) program. 

Under the IRON program, the tanks are inspected and those components
and systems that do not meet the minimum operating characteristics
are repaired or replaced.\3 For example, if an engine does not meet
its
1,350 horsepower characteristic, repairs are performed.  Anniston
officials told us that the NTC tanks generally need a lot of work
when they arrive.  They said, however, that the tanks' condition is
about what could be expected considering the tanks' high usage rate. 

NTC officials and officials from a unit that was training at NTC at
the time of our visit said that the condition of the tanks and the
maintenance problems had not detracted from the realism of the
training.  Unit officials also said that the condition of the NTC
tanks may not be as good as the condition of the tanks at their home
station, but this added to the training realism because, in a wartime
situation, tanks will have maintenance problems and personnel need to
know how to deal with them. 


--------------------
\2 The training unit is issued 58 M1 tanks.  While these tanks are
being used for training, the remaining tanks are being readied for
the next training rotation. 

\3 The average cost of the program is $196,000 a tank, and the
program is expected to be completed in fiscal year 1996. 


   CHANGE IN REPAIR PARTS FUNDING
   HAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED UNIT
   MAINTENANCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Some Army officials have expressed concern that the change in repair
parts funding could lead unit commanders to delay maintenance because
they may not have the funds to buy the needed repair parts.  In prior
reports,\4 we stated that this is generally not the case.  With few
exceptions, the lack of funds to buy repair parts has not been a
problem.  In fact, we have reported that units often transfer funds
intended for repair parts and maintenance to other operation and
maintenance purposes. 

None of the officials we spoke with at three Army divisions cited the
lack of operation and maintenance funds to buy repair parts as a
problem.  The commanders said that the shortages they experienced
were not caused by a lack of repair parts funds, but rather by a lack
of repair parts in the supply system. 

During our visits to the three divisions and NTC, we compiled a list
of repair parts that were in short supply at the units and determined
their supply position at the wholesale level inventory control
points.  The results of our analysis are shown in table 4. 



                                Table 4
                
                  Wholesale Inventory Level for Repair
                Parts in Short Supply at the Unit Level



                                  Serviceabl  Unserviceabl        Back
Repair part                                e             e     ordered
--------------------------------  ----------  ------------  ----------
Rear engine module                         8           653          75
Hydraulic motor\                           0           118         104
Front engine module                       45           740          50
Exhaust seal\a                             0             0       1,116
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The exhaust seal is not a reparable item.  Therefore, there are no
unserviceable items on hand. 

The problems being experienced with the M1 tank's rear engine module
is illustrative of the type of problems the Army faces with the other
parts shortages.  As of December 7, 1995, there were only eight
serviceable M1 tank rear engine modules in the supply system, and all
eight modules were in prepositioned war reserve.  At the same time,
there were backorders for 75 modules, of which 53 were high priority
backorders. 

According to Army officials, there are sufficient engine rear modules
in the supply system, but most of the modules are unserviceable
because of a shortage of repair parts to fix the modules.  The
officials attribute the shortage of repair parts to (1) insufficient
demand forecasting due to Bosnia operations, (2) implementation of an
engine service life extension program before the needed repair parts
were in the system, (3) worsening condition of returns from the field
(the returned items require extensive repairs), and (4) a reduced
number of qualified part suppliers in the industrial base. 


--------------------
\4 Depot Maintenance:  Some Funds Intended for Maintenance Are Used
for Other Purposes (GAO/NSIAD-95-124, July 6, 1995).

Army Training:  One-Third of 1993 and 1994 Budgeted Funds Were Used
for Other Purposes (GAO/NSIAD-95-71, Apr.  7, 1995).

Army Inventory:  Reparable Exchange Items at Divisions Can Be Reduced
(GAO/NSIAD-95-36, Dec.  28, 1994).

Army Inventory:  Opportunities Exist for Additional Reductions to
Retail Level Inventories (GAO/NSIAD-94-129, June 6, 1994). 


   COST AND BENEFITS OF ARMY'S
   PROPOSED M1 TANK OVERHAUL
   PROGRAM ARE UNCERTAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Some Army officials in the maintenance community believe that an M1A1
overhaul program is needed because of the fleet's age and because
there is no new tank production planned.  The officials acknowledge
that reported readiness rates are high.  However, they are concerned
that there may be latent deficiencies in the tanks that are not
detected during readiness inspections and that these deficiencies
could affect the tanks' operational capabilities during a conflict. 

To address the potential latent deficiencies, the officials proposed
a joint proof of principle test program with General Dynamics (the M1
manufacturer) to essentially overhaul the M1A1 tanks.  The proposed
joint effort is referred to as the AIM XXI program, and the officials
believe that it would produce a better-than-original M1A1 tank that
would enhance training, be more reliable, and have sustained
go-to-war capability.  Additionally, the officials believe that the
program would reduce the tank's life-cycle operating and support
costs. 

Under the AIM XXI proof of principle test, the Army would bring 17
M1A1 tanks to the Anniston Army Depot and completely rebuild and
update them with the latest modifications.  The estimated cost of
this effort is $559,000 per tank, about $9.5 million total.  The Army
Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) would compare certain
operational characteristics, for a 9-month period,\5

of the AIM XXI tanks with IRON tanks and with tanks that had not
received any depot level maintenance.  On the basis of evaluation of
the test data, the Army would decide whether to expand the AIM XXI
program.  Appendix I shows the scope of work under these two
programs. 

AIM XXI program officials estimate that over a 20-year life cycle,
the program for the 17 tanks would result in operating and support
cost savings of about $28.8 million, compared with the IRON program. 
However, if the investment cost differential is considered, the
overall savings for 20 years is reduced to about $24.4 million, about
$1.2 million a year. 

AMSAA officials who have responsibility for validating the estimated
savings told us that they could not project cost savings for an AIM
XXI program beyond the proof of principle because any projected
savings would not be data driven.  They said that they believe the
AIM XXI program would result in some operating and support savings,
but they were unsure how much.  The officials also said that they
would be in a better position to estimate the savings after the proof
of principle test was completed and the operational characteristics
of the AIM XXI, IRON, and nondepot maintenance tanks are compared and
evaluated. 

AMSAA and depot officials also told us that the savings calculations
were based on certain assumptions on tank mileage and repair and
maintenance costs that may not be representative of the M1 tank
fleet.  AMSAA officials said that the mileage (1,500) used to compute
the annual operating and support cost was not typical of the usage in
an operating unit, which averages about 630 miles a year. 
Consequently, the estimated savings between AIM XXI and IRON tanks
would be much less and this, in turn, would reduce the life-cycle
savings.  Depot officials also told us that the direct IRON program
costs had been reduced to $196,000 a tank for fiscal year 1996,
compared with the $266,000 used in the analysis.  This reduction
would reduce the investment cost for the 17 IRON tanks to about $3.9
million. 

AIM XXI program officials told us that one of the difficulties they
are facing is that there is no empirical data that shows there are
latent deficiencies in the tanks as a result of not having a depot
overhaul program.  Additionally, the Army does not have a predictive
readiness system to demonstrate that if the tanks are not overhauled,
the tanks will not be able to maintain a high rate of operational
readiness. 

The officials also told us that if the test data proved what they
expected and that if the AIM XXI program was approved, they would
like to begin inducting an average of 66 M1A1 tanks into the depot
beginning in fiscal year 1998 and continue the program for 20 years. 

The concern raised by Army officials and unit commanders about the
AIM XXI program centered on the impact the program could have on the
M1A2 modernization effort.  The officials said that in today's budget
environment the funds for the AIM XXI program would probably come
from some existing program as it was unlikely that the Army would
receive additional budget authority for the program.  They said that
while it would be nice to have overhauled M1A1 tanks, they would much
rather have M1A2 tanks.  Therefore, if the AIM XXI program would
result in M1A2 fielding delays, they would opt for the M1A2 tanks. 

Anniston officials said that because General Dynamics is involved in
both the AIM XXI and M1A2 programs and both programs could be
performed in the same facilities, the M1A2 unit cost should be
reduced.  However, they were not able to estimate the extent of the
cost reduction.\6

Anniston officials also told us that in the absence of the AIM XXI
program or some other heavy armor work, the depot could lose as much
as 50 percent of its heavy armor repair capability and the lost
capability would be difficult to replace in a surge situation.  They
said that when the IRON program is completed in fiscal year 1996, the
depot's workload will consist primarily of component repair. 

The officials also said that, in their opinion, the AIM XXI program
would not only increase the availability, reliability, and
fightability of the M1 tank fleet but also protect industrial base
core capabilities that would be needed in time of conflict. 


--------------------
\5 The operational characteristics would include maintenance actions
per mile, operating cost per mile, availability, and reliability. 

\6 Under the AIM XXI proposal, Anniston would perform about 70
percent of the overhaul effort
(2,700 hours per tank), and General Dynamics Land Systems would
perform about 30 percent of the overhaul (1,300 hours per tank). 
Under the M1A2 program, Anniston performs about 33 percent of the
work (1,560 hours per tank), and General Dynamics Land Systems
performs about 68 percent of the work (3,200 hours per tank). 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

To determine the readiness of the M1 tank fleet, we reviewed data
from the Army's readiness reporting system along with readiness
reports from three Army divisions and the NTC, which we visited
during our review.  We also interviewed brigade and battalion
officials at the three divisions and officials at NTC to obtain their
views on the operating condition of their M1 tanks and the tanks'
ability to perform assigned missions. 

At NTC, we focused on the maintenance of the tank fleet and on
training realism.  We also obtained the views of contractor personnel
who maintain the M1A1 tank fleet. 

To determine whether the change in repair parts funding had affected
the units' ability to maintain the M1 tank, we interviewed Army
division officials at the three divisions.  We also identified parts
that were in short supply and that were (in the opinion of division
officials) affecting the divisions' maintenance capabilities.  We
then obtained the supply position of these items at the wholesale
level and discussed the reasons for the shortages with wholesale
level supply management officials. 

We interviewed Army and contractor officials and reviewed
documentation relating to the proposed AIM XXI overhaul program for
the M1 tank fleet.  We obtained the officials' views on the need for
such a program, along with their proposals to test and implement the
overhaul effort.  We also reviewed the effect of the proposed
overhaul program on future tank repair workload at the maintenance
depot by examining depot workload statistics and forecasts and
obtaining the views of depot officials. 

Our review was conducted at the

  Office of the Project Manager, Abrams Tank System, and the Army
     Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan;

  Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia;

  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Pentagon,
     Washington, D.C.;

  National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;

  Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama;

  1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas;

  1st Cavalry Division and the 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood,
     Texas; and

  Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
     Maryland. 

The Department orally commented that it fully concurred with our
draft report.  We conducted our review from August 1995 to February
1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
and the Army; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
and the Chairmen of the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations and Senate Committee on Armed Services. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions
concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix II. 

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues


SCOPE OF WORK FOR ABRAMS
INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT XXI PROGRAM
AS COMPARED WITH INSPECT AND
REPAIR ONLY AS NEEDED PROGRAM
=========================================================== Appendix I

SUBASSEMBLY                AIM XXI                    IRON
-------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------
AGT-1500 turbine engine    --Complete disassembly     --Limited disassembly
                           and 100-percent            --Limited inspection
                           inspection                 --Minor repair
                           --New high-pressure        --Components replaced as
                           turbine blade assembly     indicated by failure
                           --New high-pressure
                           nozzle
                           --Improved double bellows
                           recuperator (laser welded
                           plate pairs)
                           --New power shaft ring
                           seal
                           --New critical position
                           bearings
                           --New critical position
                           seal

X1100-3B transmission      --Complete disassembly     --Limited disassembly
                           and 100-percent            --Limited inspection
                           inspection                 --Minor repair
                           --New style steering       --Components replaced as
                           pistons (aluminum)         indicated by failure
                           --New governor             --Dynamometer tested to
                           --New pump and motor       abbreviated acceptance
                           cups                       testing procedure
                           --New output shaft
                           --New internal wiring
                           harness
                           --Inspect/replace hanging
                           ring
                           --Non-destructive test of
                           pistons/housings
                           --Complete dynamometer
                           testing

Suspension/track           --100-percent              --Compensating idler,
                           disassembly, clean, and    roadwheel arm, and shock
                           inspect                    absorbers removed and
                           --Replacement of           inspected
                           mandatory replacement      --Replaced only the degree
                           parts                      of disassembly
                           --Replacement of           --Replaced only if
                           compensating idler arm     inspection requires
                           bearings

Optical fire control       --100-percent              --Disassemble only to
                           disassembly, clean, and    degree necessary to
                           finish                     correct deficiency
                           --Replacement of           --Replaced only to degree
                           mandatory replacement      of disassembly
                           parts                      --Visual inspection to
                           --100-percent inspection   degree of disassembly
                           of solder joints,
                           connectors, and
                           electronic components

Electro-hydraulic          --100-percent disassembly  --Disassemble only to
pneumatics                 of slip ring               degree necessary to
                           --Replacement of           correct deficiency
                           mandatory replacement      --Replaced only to degree
                           parts                      of disassembly
                           --100-percent inspection   --Visual inspections to
                           of contact rings, solder   degree of disassembly
                           joints, wipers, brushes,
                           and connectors
                           --Complete cleaning,
                           inspection, and repacking
                           of internal bearings

Thermal components         --100-percent vendor       --Repaired to direct
                           reclamation                support/general support
                                                      level

Electronics                --100-percent              --Disassemble only to
                           disassembly, clean, and    degree necessary to
                           inspect                    correct deficiency
                           --Replacement of           --Replaced only to degree
                           mandatory replacement      of disassembly
                           parts                      --Visual inspections to
                           --100-percent inspection   degree of disassembly
                           of solder joints,
                           connectors, and wiring
                           harnesses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Sharon A.  Cekala
Robert J.  Lane


   KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

James S.  Moores
Darryl S.  Meador


*** End of document. ***