Military Personnel: High Aggregate Personnel Levels Maintained Throughout
Drawdown (Chapter Report, 06/02/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-97).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effects of the
military drawdown on the services' ability to staff active duty combat
and support units.

GAO found that: (1) the services have retained over 95 percent of their
authorized positions despite major personnel reductions; (2) the
drawdown has adversely affected some installations, with shortages
occurring unevenly across the force; and (3) personnel shortages are
likely to continue due to substantial personnel transfers between units,
legislative requirements limiting the services' ability to correct
personnel shortages, and the need to fill joint duty assignments.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-97
     TITLE:  Military Personnel: High Aggregate Personnel Levels 
             Maintained Throughout Drawdown
      DATE:  06/02/95
   SUBJECT:  Human resources utilization
             Reductions in force
             Military compensation
             Personnel management
             Military downsizing
             Combat readiness
             Officer personnel
             Employee transfers
             Personnel recruiting
             Retirement benefits
IDENTIFIER:  JCS Status of Resources and Training System
             DOD Bottom-Up Review
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee
on National Security, House of Representatives

June 1995

MILITARY PERSONNEL - HIGH
AGGREGATE PERSONNEL LEVELS
MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT DRAWDOWN

GAO/NSIAD-95-97

Military Personnel


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260797

June 2, 1995

The Honorable Robert K.  Dornan
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

This report responds to your request that we assess how the military
drawdown has affected the services' ability to staff their active
duty combat and support units.  It concludes that the Department of
Defense (DOD) managed its drawdown in ways enabling it to keep a high
percentage of its authorized positions filled throughout the
drawdown.  The report also identifies factors contributing to
personnel shortages at selected U.S.  military installations and
factors that could lead to personnel shortages in the future. 

This report refers to our earlier recommendations on DOD's civilian
and military force mix and U.S.  participation in peace operations. 
To permit DOD time to respond to these recommendations, we are making
no additional recommendations in this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House Committee
on National Security and Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the
Secretaries of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.  We will also
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Appendix III lists the major
contributors to this report. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The largest military drawdown since the end of the Vietnam conflict
is now about 80 percent complete.  By the end of fiscal year 1999,
the Department of Defense (DOD) will have reduced its military and
civilian personnel by almost a third.  Concerned that this large
drawdown might have degraded readiness, the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, House Committee on National Security, asked GAO
to identify (1) the extent to which the services were able to fill
authorized positions in their active duty combat and support units,
(2) factors contributing to personnel shortages at selected U.S. 
installations and units, and (3) factors that could lead to personnel
shortages in the future.  GAO reviewed personnel trends in the Army,
the Air Force, and the Navy for fiscal years 1987 through 1993.  The
Marine Corps could not provide automated historical data and was
excluded from GAO's data analyses. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

The services used a variety of personnel management tools to achieve
reductions.  They decreased their recruiting, restricted the number
of personnel permitted to reenlist in overstaffed specialties, and
offered early separation to individuals near the end of their first
enlistment.  Congress also authorized financial incentives for early
separation, a reduction in time-in-grade requirements for voluntary
retirements, and a 15-year retirement option for selected military
personnel.  Reductions-in-force were to be used only as a last
resort. 

The services sought to maintain a high percentage of their authorized
positions filled (referred to as fill rates) in each rank and
military specialty.  DOD considers units with personnel fill rates
above 90 percent as able to perform their missions.  Personnel
officials become concerned if fill rates for specific military
specialties fall below 80 percent. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Despite major personnel reductions, the services generally kept over
95 percent of their authorized positions filled throughout the
drawdown.  They also maintained high fill rates for most ranks and
kept over 90 percent of authorized positions filled in a large
majority of their military specialty categories.  The major area of
concern was a continuing shortage of field grade officers (Air Force,
Army, and Marine Corps majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels and
Navy lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains), especially in
the Army where fill rates generally remained between 80 percent and
85 percent.  Although Army and some Air Force personnel trends
improved in fiscal year 1993, aggregate and enlisted personnel fill
rates declined in the Navy.  These trends suggest that the Navy,
which began its drawdown later, may just now be experiencing the
impacts that the Army and the Air Force encountered earlier. 

Many factors that contributed to personnel shortages at units and
installations were directly related to the drawdown and could
dissipate as the drawdown concludes.  For example, not all personnel
in units being withdrawn from Europe and not all those in units
affected by U.S.  base closure and realignment decisions were
required to transfer with their units.  These policies created
shortages in some units and led to multiple personnel transfers. 
Also, some officials permitted personnel in critical shortage
categories to participate in early out programs because they feared
that limiting participation would adversely affect morale. 

Other factors contributing to shortages were less directly related to
the drawdown.  Without changes in operating policies, procedures, and
legislative requirements, such shortages could persist.  For example,
shortages were created because (1) personnel had to be transferred
between units to meet the requirements of operations other than war,
(2) military personnel had to be temporarily assigned to duties
formerly handled by civilians whose positions were eliminated, and
(3) scarce field grade officers had to be assigned to joint duty and
reserve units before other operational positions could be filled. 


   GAO'S ANALYSIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      HIGH PERSONNEL FILL RATES
      MAINTAINED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

The Marine Corps has finished its drawdown, the Army and the Air
Force expect to complete all or most of their reductions by the end
of fiscal year 1996, and the Navy expects to finish by the end of
fiscal year 1999.  The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have
generally kept over 95 percent of their authorized positions filled,
although the Air Force's fill rate dipped to 94 percent in 1990.  The
Army's lowest rate of 97 percent occurred in 1992--the height of its
drawdown.  Aggregate fill rates in the Army and the Air Force
improved by 3 percentage points in fiscal year 1993.  However, this
rate in the Navy, which began its drawdown later, declined by an
equal amount. 

The services also kept a high percentage of their authorized officer
positions filled, except in fiscal year 1992 when the Army's rate
fell to 92 percent.  This decline was offset by an 8-percentage point
improvement the following year, which brought its rate to close to
100 percent.  Aggregate personnel levels for enlisted categories
remained over 95 percent and even exceeded 100 percent in some years. 
For any given year of the drawdown, the services filled over 90
percent of the positions in about three-fourths of their military
specialties. 

The only real area of concern during the drawdown has been continuing
low personnel fill rates for field grade officers.  This shortage was
especially acute in the Army, where fill rates for field grade
officers remained between 81 percent and 83 percent from fiscal years
1988 through 1992 before recovering to 91 percent in fiscal year
1993. 


      SOME UNITS
      DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED
      BY SHORTAGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Despite generally positive aggregate trends, shortages occurred
unevenly across the force, with some units more adversely affected
than others.  Three key factors led to these shortages.  First, the
European drawdown created temporary imbalances at some installations
and units because personnel were permitted to remain in Europe to
complete their assigned tours.  As a result, some units returned to
the United States with as few as one-quarter to one-half of their
authorized personnel.  Some shortages persisted for up to 2 years. 
Similar dislocations were created from base closure and realignment
decisions. 

Second, early separation programs led to some shortages that might
have been avoided.  Although the services restricted personnel in
certain specialties and ranks from separating early, they had only
limited control over the number of participants from any one unit or
installation.  As a result, disproportionate shortages in specific
specialties occurred at some installations and units. 

Third, some installations have not adjusted to civilian personnel
reductions.  At most installations, military personnel were
temporarily assigned to carry out functions formerly performed by
civilians.  Although DOD eliminated 196,000 civilian jobs between
fiscal years 1987 and 1993, the duties performed by those civilians
were not always eliminated.  As a result, some military personnel had
to be temporarily assigned to cut grass, serve as lifeguards, and
work in gymnasiums. 


      OTHER FACTORS SUGGEST
      CONTINUING SHORTAGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

A key factor contributing to shortages is the current high level of
operations other than war, which has required personnel transfers
between units.  According to DOD officials, these transfers have
adversely affected combat readiness, training, and morale in units
that have had to contribute personnel.  Gaining units have also been
affected because transferred personnel do not always possess the
proper specialty required in their new positions.  For example,
infantrymen were trained for use as military police in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. 

Although all services have been affected, the problem is especially
acute in the Army because a large percentage of its support forces
are in the reserves.  To meet the requirements of these operations,
the Army had to deploy most of its active duty support units of some
types and to fill vacancies with personnel from other active units
and reserve volunteers.  Because support units are often not
authorized to be fully staffed in peacetime, the Army had to transfer
personnel between units.  For fiscal year 1994, 31 percent of the
Army's active support units were authorized to have 80 percent or
fewer of their required personnel. 

Shortages in some ranks may also continue as a result of legislative
requirements that limit the services' flexibility in correcting
identified shortages.  For example, the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act and annual DOD authorizations establish the number of
field grade officers each service may have at each rank. 
Additionally, the services have been expected to maintain their
fiscal year 1990 officer-to-enlisted ratios during the drawdown.  As
a result, the services could not always adjust their authorizations
at specific ranks and had to leave some positions vacant or fill them
with lower graded personnel. 

The need to fill joint duty assignments is yet another factor that
has placed increasing demands on the limited pool of field grade
officers.  As of November 1994, the services were assigning between
11 percent and 17 percent of their field grade officers to these
positions.  Because these positions must be filled first, other key
leadership positions must be either left vacant or filled with lower
graded officers. 

In an attempt to improve training in reserve units, the Army is now
required to assign additional active duty officers and senior graded
warrant and noncommissioned officers to reserve units.  During fiscal
year 1994, the Army assigned 899 active duty officers, 99 warrant
officers, and 1,002 noncommissioned officers to reserve units.  Due
to the minimum experience level required, many of the best trained
and most qualified captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels must be
assigned to these positions before active duty positions are filled. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO has made recommendations related to some of its findings in other
reports.  (See pp.  28 and 34.) To permit DOD time to address these
earlier recommendations, GAO is not making any further
recommendations. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD concurred with GAO's findings.  (See app.  I for a copy of DOD's
comments.)


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

The largest military drawdown since the end of the Vietnam conflict
is now about 80 percent complete.  By the end of 1999, the Department
of Defense (DOD) will have cut its major force structure elements
roughly in half and will have reduced its military and civilian
personnel by almost a third.  The sheer size of this drawdown has
particularly challenged DOD to maintain a future military force that
is balanced, prepared, and ready to discharge its mission.  An
important aspect of this challenge has been to avert personnel
shortages that could adversely affect readiness.  The services have
used a variety of tools to conduct the drawdown and preserve
readiness. 


   SERVICES HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL
   PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THEIR
   DOWNSIZING PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

DOD's downsizing program has significantly reduced force structure
and authorized personnel levels.  With respect to force structure,
the services have made substantial reductions, and further reductions
are planned.  In March 1993, the Secretary of Defense began a
DOD-wide review "from the bottom up" to define the appropriate
defense strategy, force structure, modernization programs, and
supporting industrial base and infrastructure to meet U.S.  security
requirements in the post-Cold War era.  The results of this review,
announced in October 1993, continued the downward trend in military
force structure that began in the late 1980s with the improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations.  Table 1.1 compares the actual size of
selected force structure elements in fiscal years 1987 and 1993 with
the levels recommended for fiscal year 1999 by the Bottom Up Review. 



                          Table 1.1
           
           Size of Selected Elements of DOD's Force
                          Structure

             (Fiscal Years 1987, 1993, and 1999)


DOD force structure
element                         1987        1993        1999
------------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Active Army divisions             18          14          10
Air Force fighter wings           25          16          13
Navy carriers                     14          13        12\b
Navy ship battle forces          568         435         346
Marine divisions                   3           3           3
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Numbers include active component forces only and are actual as of
the end of fiscal years 1987 and 1993 and planned as of the end of
fiscal year 1999. 

\b Includes one carrier in the Navy reserve. 

Source:  DOD, Report on the Bottom Up Review (Oct.  1993). 

DOD is making corresponding reductions in the services' authorized
military and civilian personnel levels.  By fiscal year 1999, DOD's
total authorized active duty military personnel will have been
reduced from about 2.17 million in fiscal year 1987 to about 1.43
million, as shown by figure 1.1.  DOD will also reduce its civilian
personnel from about 1.1 million in fiscal year 1987 to about 758,000
by the end of fiscal year 1999. 

   Figure 1.1:  Authorized
   Personnel at Fiscal Year End by
   Service (fiscal years 1987
   through 1999)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Actual personnel through fiscal year 1994; planned personnel
for fiscal years 1995 through 1999. 

Source:  DOD Comptroller data as of February 1995. 

As shown, the services have reduced their forces by different
amounts.  The Army and the Air Force will have each reduced their
personnel by about 30 percent.  The Air Force began a steady drawdown
in fiscal year 1987, and it plans to achieve most of its reductions
(97 percent) by the end of fiscal year 1996.  To deal with budgetary
pressures, the Army began accelerating its drawdown in fiscal year
1992, and it plans to complete its drawdown by the end of fiscal year
1996.  The Navy initiated a long-term, steady downsizing program in
fiscal year 1989, and it plans to complete its drawdown in fiscal
year 1999.  The Marine Corps was required to reduce the least--about
25,500 personnel--and completed its downsizing in fiscal year 1994. 
By fiscal year 1999, the Army and the Air Force will have reduced
their authorized military personnel levels by 37 percent each, the
Navy by 33 percent, and the Marine Corps by almost 13 percent. 


   SERVICES USED VARIOUS PERSONNEL
   TOOLS TO MANAGE THE DOWNSIZING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

The services could have theoretically achieved their mandated
personnel reductions by severely cutting back their recruiting
programs and simply relying on normal attrition and retirements to
reach desired personnel levels.  In the past, it was common for the
services to lose more than 15 percent of their personnel each year
through attrition and retirements, even when their personnel
authorizations remained relatively constant.  However, achieving
reductions in this manner could have created imbalances in certain
ranks and specialties, according to DOD officials.  Thus, the
military services continued their recruiting programs and used a
variety of personnel management tools to target certain ranks and
specialties for reductions.  Their intent was to preserve a balanced
staff in terms of rank and specialties and protect career advancement
opportunities.  Congress, concerned about the impact of force
reductions on military personnel, encouraged the services to use
voluntary means whenever possible to achieve the needed reductions. 


      RECRUITING EFFORTS WERE
      REDUCED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

The services' normal practice is to vary the rate at which they
recruit personnel and assign specialties depending on projected
needs.  During the downsizing program, all of the services reduced,
but did not stop, their recruiting programs.  By continuing their
recruiting programs, the services ensured a steady flow of personnel
for future needs. 


      USE OF EARLY RELEASES
      CONTINUED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.2

Under their normal early release programs, the services allowed
individuals to separate before the end of their first enlistment
period.  Personnel separated under this authority were usually
released in the same year that they were scheduled to separate.  In
fiscal year 1992, with the availability of financial separation
incentives, participation in these programs declined.  However,
because early releases can reduce salary costs for the year in which
they are used and do not involve any severance pay, all of the
services, except the Marine Corps, continued to use this tool to
reduce personnel with less than 6 years of service.  Additionally,
the services used the early release programs to reduce participation
in overstaffed specialties. 


      REENLISTMENT PROGRAMS WERE
      TIGHTENED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.3

The services tightened the requirements for first-term enlisted
personnel to reenlist.  Specifically, greater attention was given to
ensure individuals who wished to reenlist met physical fitness and
weight standards.  Also, personnel in overstaffed specialties who
wished to reenlist had to be willing to train for an understaffed
specialty.  These requirements reduced the number of personnel
allowed to reenlist. 


      INVOLUNTARY METHODS WERE
      USED SPARINGLY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.4

When necessary, the services used a variety of involuntary personnel
management tools.  For example, the services substantially reduced
personnel by continuing their "up or out" policies.  In contrast to
other organizations that hire individuals at various levels depending
on their qualifications and experience, military personnel join at
the entry level and are then promoted.  Thus, the military "grows its
personnel from within." To ensure that they retain only high quality
personnel, the services operate an up or out policy that requires
officers to be promoted within specific time frames.  Also, the
services modified their retention control programs.  These programs
establish the maximum number of years that enlisted personnel in a
given rank can continue in the service before being denied the
opportunity to reenlist.  Each service reduced the maximum years of
service for promotion.  For example, Navy enlisted personnel formerly
had to be promoted to the rank of E-6 (Petty Officer First Class)
within
23 years; this was reduced to 20 years. 

The services also used formal Selected Early Retirement Boards to
select specific personnel for retirement before their normal
mandatory time frames.  These boards, which were used to reduce the
number of officer and enlisted personnel eligible to retire, focused
on specific overstaffed ranks and selected those individuals with the
lowest performance ratings.  Because reductions in force were to be
used only as a last resort, the Air Force and the Army each used
formal reduction-in-force boards only once to involuntarily separate
officers in specific ranks. 


   CONGRESS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL
   TOOLS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

In the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 1991,
1992, and 1993, Congress authorized additional measures to encourage
voluntary separation.  It

  authorized two special categories of separation pay--providing
     either a one-time lump sum payment or annual payments--to induce
     voluntary separations for servicemembers who had completed 6 or
     more, but less than 20, years of service;

  reduced time-in-grade requirements for voluntary retirements among
     officers having already completed the 20 years of total time
     needed to retire;

  provided DOD with the authority to offer a 15-year retirement
     option for selected members of the military, effective in fiscal
     year 1993; and

  extended lump sum separation pay and transition assistance to
     enlisted personnel who were separated. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

Based on concerns that major reductions in DOD spending at a time of
high levels of military activity might degrade readiness, the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on
National Security, asked us to assess how the military drawdown had
affected the services' ability to staff their active duty combat and
support units.  In assessing this key indicator of readiness during
the drawdown, our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to
which the services were able to fill their authorized positions, (2)
factors contributing to personnel shortages at selected U.S. 
installations and units, and (3) factors that could lead to personnel
shortages in the future. 

To obtain background information on drawdown policy, procedures, and
management, we received briefings from officials in Washington, D.C.;
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness; Joint Staff; the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel for
the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; and Headquarters, Marine
Corps.  To identify the roles and responsibilities of major commands
with respect to the drawdown, we interviewed officials of the Air
Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Army Forces
Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, Virginia; Atlantic Fleet, including its air, surface,
and submarine groups, Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia; and Marine Forces
Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

To measure the extent to which the services were able to fill their
authorized military personnel positions during the drawdown, we
obtained data on the services' authorized and actual personnel for
combat and support specialties, by rank and specialty, for fiscal
year end 1987 (the beginning of the drawdown) through fiscal year end
1993 (the latest available data).  The services determined the
specialties typically found in combat units and units that provide
direct support to combat units (support units).  Our analysis
included all enlisted and officer personnel in these categories,
except for warrant officers and general officers.  We excluded
warrant officers because the Air Force does not use them, and their
use in the Army and the Navy varied during the period of our
analysis.  Based on these criteria, personnel in general support
positions, such as those in the Pentagon and in individual or
overhead accounts (transients, trainees, patients, and prisoners),
were excluded from our analysis.  Our analysis included about 82
percent, 92 percent, and 83 percent of the total personnel in the
Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, respectively.  (See app.  I.) The
Marine Corps was unable to provide accurate data because it had not
maintained automated historical data on personnel levels. 
Accordingly, we excluded the Marine Corps from our data analyses. 
However, we discussed the effects of downsizing on Marine Corps
installation and unit personnel levels and included this information
in our report. 

We identified data sources or obtained data from officials of the
Defense Manpower Data Center-West, Monterey, California; Air Force
Military Personnel Center, Randolph Force Base, Texas; Total Army
Personnel Command, Washington, D.C.; U.S.  Navy Enlisted Personnel
Management Center, New Orleans, Louisiana; Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Washington, D.C.; and Headquarters, Marine Corps, Manpower Personnel
Center, Washington, D.C.  Although we did not conduct a reliability
assessment of the computer systems the services used to extract the
data, we reviewed the data to ensure that it was generally consistent
and accurate. 

Our data analyses included statistical analyses of aggregate
personnel fill rates by service for individual ranks and for military
specialties as of the end of fiscal years 1987 through 1993.  In
addition, we analyzed the fill rates for selected specialties to
determine if they declined or remained low during the drawdown.  We
also conducted a separate data analysis to determine variances in
personnel authorizations among Army combat, combat support, and
combat service support units between fiscal years 1991 and 1994. 
Army headquarters provided this data. 

To identify factors contributing to personnel shortages at units and
installations and factors that could lead to shortages in the future,
we interviewed unit commanders and personnel officers and reviewed
pertinent personnel data at selected combat and support units in all
of the military services.  These units included the Army's III Corps
headquarters, 13th Corps Support Command, 6th Aviation Brigade, 3rd
Finance Group, 1st Cavalry Division, and 2nd Armored Division at Fort
Hood, Texas;
XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado; the Air
Force's 7th Wing, 7th Support Group, 7th Logistics Group, and 7th
Operations Group at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; and the Navy's
U.S.S.  Stump, U.S.S.  Saipan, U.S.S.  Hunley, and U.S.S.  Scranton
at Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia, and VF-43 Fighter Attack Wing and
VA-75 Medium Attack Wing at Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia. 

We conducted our work between August 1993 and January 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


AGGREGATE FILL RATES REMAINED HIGH
THROUGHOUT THE DRAWDOWN
============================================================ Chapter 2

Our analysis of DOD data for military personnel in combat and support
specialties for fiscal years 1987 through 1993 indicated that the
services filled over 95 percent of their authorized personnel
positions by using various personnel management tools.  They also
maintained relatively high personnel fill rates for most ranks and
military specialties.  However, the historical shortage of field
grade officers\1 continued during the drawdown. 


--------------------
\1 Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps majors, lieutenant colonels, and
colonels and Navy lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains. 


   ALL SERVICES MAINTAINED HIGH
   PERSONNEL FILL RATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Our analysis of fiscal years 1987-93 personnel data for military
personnel in combat and support specialties\2 showed that the
services were able to keep a relatively high percentage of their
authorized personnel positions filled (referred to as "fill rate")
during the drawdown.  As shown by
figure 2.1, each service maintained an aggregate fill rate of 95
percent or higher for each of the 7 years analyzed with one
exception:  the Air Force's fill rate dipped to 93 percent in 1990. 
The aggregate fill rates of the Army and the Air Force improved in
fiscal year 1993--dramatically in the Army.  The Navy, which
initiated the major portion of its drawdown in fiscal year
1992--later than the other services--experienced a sharp decline in
its aggregate fill rate in fiscal year 1993.  The high Navy fill
rates in the earlier years of the drawdown most likely reflect the
sharp reductions in the number of naval ships, while personnel levels
were declining more slowly. 

   Figure 2.1:  Percentage of
   Authorized Positions Filled at
   Fiscal Year End by Service
   (fiscal years 1987 through
   1993)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Analysis includes personnel in combat and combat support
positions.  It excludes personnel in general support positions. 

Source:  Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data. 

Service personnel specialists could not provide a criterion for an
acceptable aggregate personnel fill rate.  However, in measuring the
readiness of units, the services often use criteria established in
the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)--the readiness
report most commonly referred to by the services.  The services do
not rely solely on SORTS data to assess unit readiness, but rather
supplement it with other data and information.  SORTS measures four
broad indicators of readiness--personnel on hand, training, equipment
on hand, and equipment maintenance.  A unit's overall readiness
rating in SORTS is based on a composite score of all four indicators
coupled with the commanders' subjective judgment.  According to the
SORTS criteria for personnel on hand, units with 90 percent or more
of their personnel are considered prepared to conduct all required
missions.  In terms of actual numbers, the Army's 1987 fill rate of
101.6 percent, for example, represents a surplus of 9,690 personnel
out of 621,418 total authorized positions; its 1993 fill rate of 99.1
percent represents 4,594 vacant positions out of 486,844 total
authorized positions.  The Air Force's fill rate of 94.9 percent in
1992--the height of the drawdown--represents a personnel shortfall of
22,723 out of 447,528 total authorized personnel positions. 


--------------------
\2 Enlisted specialties analyzed included Army military occupational
specialties, Air Force specialty codes, and Navy ratings. 


   FILL RATES FOR MOST OFFICER AND
   ENLISTED CATEGORIES REMAINED
   STEADY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

The Army, the Air Force, and the Navy were able to maintain high fill
rates for officer and enlisted personnel at each rank.  By allowing
early releases, offering early retirements, and restricting the
number of initial enlistments and reenlistments, the fill rate for
each rank has remained fairly constant.  Officer fill rates in the
Air Force and the Navy never fell below 95 percent in the aggregate,
as shown in figure 2.2.  However, the Army's supply of officers
remained below the other services and precipitously dropped by the
end of fiscal year 1992--the height of its drawdown.  In actual
numbers, the shortfall in Army officers increased from 1,063 to 4,648
between fiscal years 1987 and 1992, while total authorized positions
fell from 62,748 to 54,455.  Despite this decline, the supply of Army
officers rebounded in fiscal year 1993, and its aggregate officer
fill rate increased by 8 percent in that single year. 

   Figure 2.2:  Fill Rates for
   Officers at Fiscal Year End by
   Service (fiscal years 1987
   through 1993)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Analysis includes personnel in combat and combat support
positions.  It excludes personnel in general support positions. 

Source:  Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data. 

The greatest shortages in each of the services usually occurred in
field grade officers, the category in which all the services have
historically experienced shortages, as shown by figure 2.3.  However,
the Army experienced the greatest shortages; fill rates remained
between 81 percent and 83 percent between fiscal years 1988 and 1992
before rebounding in fiscal year 1993.  Much of this improvement is
attributable to a 5-percent reduction in authorizations for majors
combined with a 10-percent increase in the number of majors. 

   Figure 2.3:  Fill Rates for
   Field Grade Officers at Fiscal
   Year End by Service (fiscal
   years 1987 through 1993)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This analysis includes field grade personnel in combat and
combat support positions and excludes personnel in general support
positions. 

Source:  Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data. 

Because a minimum number of years of service is required to reach the
field grade officer level, almost all field grade officers were
eligible for early retirement, and many took advantage of this
option.  In addition, the services reduced their time-in-grade
requirements for voluntary retirements among officers who had
completed the 20 years needed to retire.  This requirement change
prompted many other eligible officers to retire.  Because the
services advance their personnel from the entry level through the
ranks, it will take several years for lower rank officers to reach
field grade.  Although the Army had the lowest officer fill rates,
its enlisted fill rates remained between 99 percent and 102 percent,
thereby significantly offsetting these shortages.  The exception
occurred in fiscal year 1992--the height of its drawdown
program--when the fill rate dipped to 97 percent.  As figure 2.4
shows, fill rates for enlisted personnel in each service remained
above 95 percent throughout the period, except for 1990 when the Air
Force's rate dropped to 93 percent. 

   Figure 2.4:  Fill Rates for
   Enlisted Personnel at Fiscal
   Year End by Service (fiscal
   years 1987 through 1993)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Analysis includes personnel in combat and combat support
positions.  It excludes personnel in general support positions. 

Source:  Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data. 

In terms of actual personnel, the Army had a surplus of 10,753 out of
558,670 authorized enlisted positions in 1987.  However, by the end
of fiscal year 1992, it had 12,811 vacancies out of its authorized
469,297 enlisted positions.  The Army experienced a recovery in its
enlisted personnel fill rate by the end of fiscal year 1993, with
432,426 of its 436,720 positions filled. 

For this same period, enlisted personnel levels in the Air Force fell
from a surplus of 4,461 airmen out of 465,005 authorized positions in
fiscal year 1987 to a shortage of 20,092 airmen out of 364,816
positions in fiscal year 1992--a decline of 6.5 percent.  Like the
Army, the Air Force's fill rate for enlisted personnel improved
significantly in fiscal year 1993. 

In contrast to the improvements shown in the Army and the Air Force
in fiscal year 1993, the Navy's fill rate declined by 3 percent in
that year.  Again, this may reflect the fact that the Navy did not
begin the major portion of its drawdown until fiscal year 1992. 
Although inconclusive without further data, these trends suggest that
fill rates in the Navy could ultimately improve as they did in the
Army and the Air Force as its drawdown progresses. 


   FILL RATES HAVE DECLINED IN
   SOME SPECIALTIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

To determine if the services had shortages in specific combat and
support specialties during the drawdown, we analyzed the fill rates
for all specialties in our database.  We excluded officers from our
analysis of specialty fill rates because officer assignments are
often based on factors beyond their specific occupational specialty. 
To account for changes in specialty codes and weapon systems, we
selected only those skills that had authorizations in each year that
our data covered.  Our analysis of the resulting 427 enlisted combat
and support specialties showed a slight decline, as shown by table
2.1.  For example, whereas only 19 specialties had fewer than 80
percent of their authorized personnel in 1987, this number increased
to 34 in 1993.  Moreover, while most specialties maintained fill
rates over 90 percent, the number of specialties with this higher
level of fill rate declined from 363 in 1987 to 302 in 1993. 



                          Table 2.1
           
            Number of Military Specialties in Each
              Fill Rate Range at Fiscal Year End


Fill rate range
(in percents)       1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
------------------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
80 percent or less    19    18    13    16    19    28    34
Between 80 percent    45    64    73    72    73    93    91
 and 90 percent
90 percent or over   363   345   341   339   335   306   302
------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Includes 427 enlisted specialties. 

Source:  Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data. 

The majority of the specialties with fill rates below 80 percent were
prevalent in support units rather than combat units.  For instance,
in fiscal year 1993, 22 of the 34 specialties with fill rates below
80 percent were support specialties.  Many of these support
specialties--such as wire system installers--were in small quantities
in these units.  As a result, the fill rates of these "low density"
specialties fluctuated greatly since a small change in the number of
personnel in the specialty created a large change in the fill rate. 
Support units are sometimes significantly affected by shortages in
these low density specialties because they are frequently authorized
to fill only 90 percent or fewer of their wartime personnel
requirements in peacetime.  (See ch.  4.)


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

The services managed their drawdowns in ways that have preserved
generally high fill rates in the aggregate, for officer and enlisted
categories and for most military specialties.  The Army and the Air
Force, having begun their personnel drawdowns earlier than the Navy,
appear to have weathered the heaviest impacts of their personnel
drawdowns.  Their trends generally improved in fiscal year 1993. 
Shortages in the Navy, on the other hand, may persist since its
drawdown began later.  Its relatively high fill rates until recently
may reflect the significant reduction in the number of ships (and the
related personnel authorizations) in relation to personnel levels,
which were declining more slowly. 

The primary trend suggesting concern during the drawdown has been
continuing shortages of Army field grade officers.  However, even
this statistic improved dramatically by the end of fiscal year 1993. 


DRAWDOWN ADVERSELY AFFECTED SOME
INSTALLATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Although aggregate personnel fill rates have remained relatively high
during the drawdown, personnel shortages have occurred unevenly
across the force, with some installations and units more adversely
affected than others.  Factors contributing to the shortages included
policies related to the relocation of personnel from Europe as well
as base closures and realignments.  In addition, shortages in
critical specialties occurred at some installations because
commanders were reluctant to restrict participation in the early
release programs.  Some military personnel were temporarily assigned
to perform functions formerly done by civilians, whose positions were
eliminated in the drawdown.  Because these factors were directly
related to the drawdown, shortages caused by these factors may
subside as the drawdown concludes. 

Installation and unit officials complained of personnel shortages at
most installations we visited.  However, available information was
generally insufficient for us to determine how pervasive these
shortages were because it did not capture the extent of temporary
duty assignments or the extent to which positions were filled with
personnel without the required rank and/or specialty.  Nevertheless,
officials in all four services at the wide range of installations and
units we visited consistently cited the same types of shortages. 


   EUROPEAN DRAWDOWN AND BASE
   CLOSURES LED TO SOME SHORTAGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

Policies related to the relocation of personnel from U.S.  force
reductions in Europe created personnel imbalances at some military
installations.  According to DOD officials, personnel affected by the
drawdown were permitted to remain in Europe to complete their tours
if they had been in their assignments less than a year.  In some
cases, they were reassigned to another European unit if their unit
was inactivated.  The intent of this policy was to avoid excessive
turbulence.  As a result, units frequently returned to U.S. 
installations with substantially fewer personnel than
authorized--some with as few as one-quarter to one-half of their
authorized personnel. 

To illustrate, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson,
Colorado, received five units from inactivating divisions in Europe. 
Those units arrived with most of their equipment, but with only
one-half of their authorized personnel.  According to the division's
personnel officer, it took almost 2 years to fully staff the new
units, train them, and develop their cohesiveness.  He noted that it
was particularly difficult to fill shortages in combat service
support units because many of the involved support specialties were
understaffed throughout the Army. 

Fort Hood, Texas, received transportation, military police, and
maintenance units from Europe.  Those units arrived with 27 percent,
47 percent, and 63 percent of their authorized personnel,
respectively.  According to III Corps headquarters personnel
officers, filling those units to acceptable levels caused other units
throughout Fort Hood to experience temporary shortages in selected
specialties. 

The bulk of the imbalances created by the European drawdown should be
over by now.  Legislation requires DOD to reduce its forces in Europe
to approximately 100,000 by the beginning of fiscal year 1996. 
However, similar imbalances resulting from U.S.  base closure and
realignment actions are likely to continue.  DOD is currently engaged
in a third round of base closure and realignment decisions that will
necessitate relocating personnel over the next several years. 

As with the European drawdown, personnel affected by base closure and
realignment decisions were not always transferred with their unit if
they had been assigned at the installation for a short time. 
Instead, to avoid excessive family relocations, such personnel were
often reassigned to another position at the installation.  This
practice created shortages in the relocating units. 

Other base closure actions created temporary shortages in some
specialties.  For example, the Air Force experienced a temporary
shortage of active duty navigators because trained replacements were
not available in the proper ranks.  Because the Air Force's navigator
school was scheduled to be closed for 2 years due to a base closure
and realignment decision, the Air Force temporarily filled these
vacancies with staff officers and reservists of different ranks until
appropriate personnel became available. 


   CIVILIAN DRAWDOWN ADVERSELY
   AFFECTED SOME INSTALLATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

In some cases, the services used military personnel to perform
functions previously done by civilians and other military personnel
whose positions were eliminated under the civilian drawdown. 
According to military officials, this shifting occurred because many
tasks formerly conducted by civilians have continued, even though the
positions have been eliminated.  These officials said that civilian
positions have declined at certain installations at the same time
that the number of military personnel assigned to these bases has
increased.  Soldiers have sometimes been given temporary "special
duty" assignments such as cutting grass, serving as lifeguards, and
working in gymnasiums to compensate for the civilian personnel
losses.  In some cases, stopgap measures were taken to temporarily
deal with this problem.  For example, when Dyess Air Force Base lost
civilian personnel positions, local retired Air Force personnel
volunteered to fill the vacancies. 

Some bases gained military personnel due to the European drawdown and
base closure and realignment actions at the same time that their
civilian support personnel were being reduced.  For example, Fort
Hood added a division with two maneuver brigades, an aviation
brigade, a division support command, and other assets, resulting in a
growth in military personnel, yet did not receive additional funding
for civilian personnel.  Between fiscal years 1987 and 1994, its
military personnel grew from 38,000 to 45,000 while its civilian
personnel declined from 3,100 to 2,200.  To compensate for these
losses, military units at the base began providing personnel to
temporarily cover tasks formerly done by civilians.  At the time of
our visit, 1 infantry battalion had 21 infantrymen temporarily
assigned to jobs that would ordinarily have been filled by civilians. 
For example, five were used as lifeguards and four as clerks. 

Fort Carson experienced three reductions-in-force in its civilian
positions between 1988 and 1993 due to budgetary constraints. 
However, after the first two reductions, officials at Fort Carson
soon recognized that some functions previously handled by civilians
needed to continue and proceeded to hire more civilian personnel. 
The division's assistant commander cited the drawdown of civilians,
coupled with an influx of military personnel, as the reason it used
military personnel in these special duty assignments. 

The commander of the civil engineering squadron at Dyess Air Force
Base said that his backlog for installation building maintenance had
increased due to the cutback in civilian employees and losses in
military personnel who separated early or were deployed.  His backlog
increased from 30 days in fiscal year 1992 to 110 to 115 days in
1993.  According to this officer, maintenance personnel were no
longer able to perform routine repairs and maintenance on the
installation's facilities due to the backlog. 

Our discussions with Navy commanders and personnel officers did not
reveal similar shortages.  According to personnel officials in the
Atlantic Fleet Command, the shortage of base support personnel was
partly alleviated by decommissioning ships, which freed up large
numbers of personnel for reassignment.  For instance, according to
Atlantic Fleet statistics, during fiscal year 1993, the fleet had
approximately 10 percent more personnel assigned to shore duty
billets than were authorized. 

Our October 1994 report\1 on DOD's military and civilian force mix
pointed out disparities in the ways civilian personnel were used
between the individual services and highlighted the lack of service
criteria for assigning positions to civilian personnel.  The report
recommended that DOD assess its mix of military and civilian
personnel.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995 requires DOD to review its military support positions and report
to Congress by April 30, 1995, on the potential for converting
military to civilian positions. 


--------------------
\1 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support
Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct.  19,
1994). 


   EARLY RELEASE PROGRAMS LED TO
   SOME PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Because participation in DOD's drawdown programs was voluntary, the
services had only limited control over who left individual units and
installations.  Even though unit commanders had the authority to
recommend that an individual in a critical specialty be precluded
from participating in the programs, they were either unaware of their
authority or reluctant to use it.  As a result, some units had higher
losses than others and critical specialty skills were lost. 


      SOME UNITS WERE
      DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1

Army support units were particularly affected by the early release
program.  The majority of these units are in the reserves, and few
support units of some types exist in the active Army.  In addition,
the majority of the Army's specialties that exist in small quantities
are prevalent in support units.  For these reasons, the impact of
shortages on active Army support units was particularly acute.  To
illustrate, at one Army Corps Support Command, nearly 60 percent of
the soldiers that separated early during fiscal year 1994 were from
one of its nine battalions.  Additionally, 80 percent of the
individuals in the command that left early were in rank E-5.  The
impact of these departures was compounded by the historic 20 percent
to 30 percent turnover rate in support units.  By comparison, the
turnover rate of combat units averages about 10 percent.  The
personnel readiness of this active duty support unit was particularly
important because about 60 percent of the Army's support units were
in the reserves and accessible only in the event of a reserve
call-up. 

Although less affected than the Army, the Air Force also experienced
acute shortages at some installations.  For example, commanders said
that 13 of the 20 eligible personnel career field airmen and one-half
of the airmen in a contracting squadron participated in the program. 
The supply squadron commander at the installation said that
contracting operations at the installation were disrupted for 6
months after these losses. 

The services did not keep statistics on early release program
participants by unit or installation.  However, commanders at the Air
Force and the Army installations we visited told us that these high
concentrations adversely affected their operations. 


      COMMANDERS WERE RELUCTANT TO
      RESTRICT PARTICIPATION IN
      EARLY OUT PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2

To prevent the loss of critical personnel in individual units and
installations, the services allowed unit commanders to recommend that
individuals be precluded from separating early if their departures
would create personnel shortages.  However, some of the unit
commanders were unaware of that authority, while others said they
were reluctant to use it.  These latter commanders told us they were
concerned that denying an individual the opportunity to take an early
out might adversely affect unit morale.  As a result of this
practice, some units--particularly in the Army--lost a
higher-than-average percentage of personnel in critical specialties
during the drawdown. 

The Navy and the Marine Corps were the services least affected by the
early release program because commanders frequently required
personnel to complete their next scheduled deployment before they
could separate early.  Army and Air Force commanders said that,
although they sometimes attempted to dissuade individuals with
critical skills from taking early outs, none had recommended denial
from participation in the program.  However, according to the
personnel officer of the 1st Cavalry Division, commanders did ask
some personnel to delay their departures until their units completed
scheduled deployments to the National Training Center. 

As with the European drawdown, the bulk of the personnel imbalances
created by the early release programs should have already occurred. 
The Army and the Air Force plan to complete their drawdowns in fiscal
year 1996, and the special authorities to offer this option is
scheduled to expire on October 1, 1999. 


   SERVICES LACKED FLEXIBILITY TO
   CORRECT SHORTAGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

Air Force officials noted that the cost of relocating personnel
between installations limited their flexibility in filling vacancies,
even though surplus personnel elsewhere could have been reassigned. 
These officials noted that the impact of personnel shortages was
heightened because mission requirements remained the same or
increased with the transfer of missions from closing installations
without any additional personnel to carry them out. 

Budgetary constraints also forced the Navy and the Marine Corps to
restrict the number of transfers between the east and west coasts and
to assign shorebound personnel to the same port they came from. 
These practices were intended to save relocation costs but reduced
the services' ability to correct personnel shortfalls throughout the
force. 


PERSONNEL SHORTAGES ARE LIKELY TO
CONTINUE DUE TO FACTORS UNRELATED
TO THE DRAWDOWN
============================================================ Chapter 4

Even after the drawdown concludes, certain personnel shortages are
likely to persist for a variety of reasons, including the following: 

  The services primarily structure their forces to meet wartime
     requirements, not the high level of operations other than war
     that have continued for several years.  Because wartime and
     peacetime requirements differ, personnel shortages will continue
     unless current structuring practices change or the current level
     of operations other than war subsides. 

  Staffing decisions must be made within the constraints of
     legislative and other requirements.  As a result, the services
     will be limited in how much they can rectify identified
     shortages in affected personnel categories. 


   OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR HAVE
   REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFERS
   OF ARMY PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

The high level of operations other than war during the past several
years has led to substantial transfers of military personnel to meet
the requirements of these operations.  Vacancies have thereby been
created in the losing units.  The Army has been the most affected due
to the way it has structured its forces and the manner in which it
has staffed its various types of units. 


      PERSONNEL TRANSFERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1

The recent high levels of operations other than war have challenged
all the services in meeting their requirements.  Task forces to
support operations other than war are typically formed with a limited
number of units or personnel.  However, over time, such task forces
have tended to grow and require additional personnel.  In addition,
some operations have continued longer than anticipated, thereby
requiring rotations of new units.  Although entire units are usually
deployed, the services often have had to transfer individuals from
other units to fill the places of individuals who, for various
reasons, could not deploy. 

Individuals also had to be transferred into deploying units if those
units were not authorized to be fully staffed.  For example, in the
case of the operation in Somalia, Forces Command's policy was that
Army units would deploy with the personnel on hand.  However,
commanders in Somalia required that all units be staffed at 100
percent.  As a result, truck drivers were transferred from units
throughout the United States to fill deployed units to 100 percent of
their wartime requirements. 

As requirements increase, personnel with specific skills are also
sometimes added.  One Air Force official noted that such requests are
often for "fully trained" personnel, such as instructor pilots and
navigators, and as a result, units often lose key personnel that are
difficult to replace.  Combat support units are especially affected
by these requests since they have many different specialties and only
a few personnel in each skill.  As a result, losses of even a few
individuals can adversely affect these units. 

The number of requests for individuals with specific specialties to
serve in such operations has dramatically increased, according to
officials at the Marine Corps' Marine Forces-Atlantic Command.  For
example, in fiscal year 1993, the command received requests for 9
individuals in 8 specialties; in fiscal year 1994, it received
requests for 260 people in
87 specialties.  Similarly, Army III Corps officials said that they
fielded requests for about 50 to 60 personnel a month in fiscal year
1993.  The following year, the monthly average was about 130, with a
high of 300 in a single month. 

The division personnel officer at Fort Carson said the division often
lacked flexibility in meeting the needs of task force commanders when
they requested individuals in specific ranks and specialties.  He
added that filling the requests routinely caused turbulence within
affected units.  For example, to support operations in Somalia, one
infantry battalion was asked to provide helicopter door gunners and
maintenance personnel.  Due to the large number of personnel taken
from the battalion, the division had to transfer personnel from other
battalions to preserve personnel readiness. 


      ARMY IS STRUCTURED FOR
      WARTIME REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2

The substantial personnel transfers that have been required to meet
the requirements of operations other than war were due, in part, to
the manner in which the Army structures and staffs its forces. 
Because the Army structures its forces to meet its wartime
requirements, substantial numbers of its support units are in the
reserves.  For example, 97 percent of its civil affairs units, 76
percent of its quartermaster units, 69 percent of its engineer units,
and 63 percent of its transportation units are in the reserves. 
Also, the active Army has few support units of some types.  For
example, the Army has only one active duty civil affairs unit and
only six psychological operations units. 

In the event of a crisis, the Army depends on the President's
authority to call up reserves to support its combat forces.  If the
President does not exercise this authority, the Army must fill
vacancies in its active duty support units with reserve volunteers or
else transfer active duty personnel from other nondeploying units
into deploying units.  These individuals are not always in the needed
military specialty categories.  For instance, the Army had to provide
special training to several infantry companies before deploying them
to work as military police in the refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 

Another related problem is that the Army does not generally authorize
its support units to have all the personnel they would need in
wartime.  The Army is the only service that authorizes the extent of
wartime requirements each of its units may have in peacetime.  Under
this system, the Army has generally authorized support units to have
90 percent or less of their personnel in peacetime.  These units will
receive additional personnel from the reserve components if they are
called up for war or a national emergency. 

In contrast, Army combat units are generally authorized to have all
their personnel in peacetime.  The Army gives staffing priority to
its combat units because they are considered the chief means of
deterrence.  Also, Army officials believe that it is more prudent to
understaff support units, rather than combat units, since it cannot
fully staff all of its personnel requirements. 

As table 4.1 shows, 85 percent of the Army's combat units were
staffed at 100 percent, while only 58 percent of its active combat
support units and 55 percent of its combat service support units were
authorized to be fully staffed. 



                          Table 4.1
           
            Percentage of Active Duty Army Combat,
              Combat Support, and Combat Service
             Support Units at Selected Personnel
           Authorization Levels (Fiscal Year 1994)


                                                     Staffed
                    Staffed    Staffed    Staffed      at 70
                     at 100      at 90      at 80    percent
Unit type           percent    percent    percent  or less\a
----------------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------
Combat                   85         11          3          1
Ccmbat support           58         27         13          2
Combat service           55         13         18         13
 support
------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Data is the authorized level as of the end of fiscal year
1994.  Detail may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

\a Excludes special authorization categories such as cadre status. 
These categories represent less than 2 percent of the Army's active
duty force. 

Source:  Army Force Accounting System, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations. 

These force structuring and staffing practices are long-standing,
dating back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Army began to
rely more heavily on its reserve components.  The impact of these
practices was felt during the Persian Gulf War, when the Army had to
resort to substantial transfers of personnel to meet its support
force requirements.\1 The current high levels of peacetime military
activity, combined with the small number of active duty units of some
types, have led the Army to use a wide array of techniques to meet
the personnel requirements of these operations.  It has had to
transfer personnel between various types of units, assign personnel
who did not possess the desired military specialty, and seek
volunteers from the reserves. 

We recently issued a report on U.S.  participation in peace
operations that also noted the stresses being placed on Army support
forces.\2 That report recommended that the Secretary of the Army
reexamine whether high priority support units should still be staffed
at less than 100 percent of their authorized personnel levels in
peacetime. 


--------------------
\1 Operation Desert Storm:  Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate
Active Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar.  30, 1992). 

\2 Peace Operations:  Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect
Ability to Respond to Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar.  8,
1995). 


   ASSIGNMENTS MUST BE MADE IN
   CONCERT WITH LEGISLATIVE
   REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

Certain legislative requirements establish ceilings on the number of
personnel that the services may have at specific ranks.  The services
must also fill a growing number of joint duty assignments before they
fill other requirements and must also assign substantial numbers of
active duty personnel to reserve units.  These requirements, while
important, have limited the services' flexibility in correcting
shortages because their staffing decisions must remain within these
constraints.  In addition, the continuing shortage of field grade
officers has meant that some positions must be left vacant or be
filled with lower graded personnel. 


      OFFICER AND ENLISTED
      PERSONNEL CEILINGS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

Military personnel legislation has limited the flexibility of the
services in trying to correct identified personnel shortages.  For
example, legislation establishes the percentage of enlisted personnel
in the E-8 and E-9 ranks (senior noncommissioned officers) each
service may have.  Through fiscal year 1994, the services could have
no more than 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of their enlisted
personnel in the E-8 and E-9 ranks.  However, the Army's stated
requirement for personnel in the E-8 rank totals nearly 3 percent of
its authorized enlisted force.  As a result, the Army cannot fill its
E-8 noncommissioned officer requirement.  To alleviate its E-8 senior
noncommissioned officer shortage, the Army was granted temporary
relief from these limitations for fiscal year 1995. 

Similarly, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, as updated
by annual DOD authorization acts, establishes the number of officers
each service may have at each rank.  These ceilings effectively
established the number of field grade officers the services had to
release to reach their mandated personnel levels.  As a result, the
services could not always increase personnel authorizations at a
specific rank, even though shortages were identified.  The services
have historically had a shortage of field grade officers.  These
shortages continued throughout the drawdown because requirements for
personnel at these levels increased without a corresponding increase
in authorized positions, as noted in the following sections. 


      JOINT DUTY REQUIREMENTS HAVE
      INCREASED DEMAND FOR FIELD
      GRADE OFFICERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

Among the highest priorities that the services must fill are Unified
Command\3 and defense agency and activity positions, commonly called
joint duty positions.  These positions often have minimum
requirements regarding the rank, education, specialty, and command
experience of those assigned.  Because the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires officers to
have served in a joint duty position to advance above field grade
ranks, they usually must serve in these positions if they are to be
considered for promotion.  As a result, officers assigned to these
positions are generally those with the highest potential. 

DOD officials said that joint duty requirements have placed
increasing demands on the limited pool of field grade officers
because these positions generally require personnel at these ranks. 
As previously stated, the drawdown has led to a continuing shortage
of these officers.  Part of the difficulty in filling these
requirements stems from the fact that DOD has centralized some
functions in defense agencies and activities that were formerly
conducted by the services.  While reducing requirements in the
services, these actions sometimes increased the demand for these
officers.  Whereas the services sometimes staffed these functions at
less than 100 percent of their authorized positions, these same
functions that became joint duty positions were often required to be
filled at 100 percent.  As a result, the services were sometimes
required to provide more personnel to the joint duty function after
the transfer than when it was a service function. 

As of November 1994, total joint duty requirements accounted for more
than 16 percent of the services' field grade officer authorizations. 
The Air Force had over 17 percent of its field grade officers
assigned to joint duty assignments as of that date.  Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps requirements had assigned 17 percent, 13 percent, and 11
percent of their authorized field grade officers respectively to
joint duty assignments. 


--------------------
\3 Positions controlled by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 


      ACTIVE DUTY ARMY PERSONNEL
      ASSIGNED TO RESERVE UNITS
      INCREASING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.3

Two provisions in DOD authorization legislation required the Army to
assign active duty personnel to provide everyday support and training
to National Guard and Army Reserve units.  The intent of these
provisions was to ensure that reserve units--especially combat
units--would be ready to deploy when called up. 

Under these provisions, the Army assigned 2,000 active duty soldiers,
consisting of 899 officers, 99 warrant officers, and 1,002
noncommissioned officers, to support reserve units in fiscal years
1993 and 1994.  An additional 3,000 active duty soldiers are to be
assigned to support reserve units.  This initiative is scheduled to
be carried out in fiscal year 1995. 

The officers that the Army has assigned to these positions have been
some of its best trained and most qualified captains, majors, and
lieutenant colonels due to the experience requirements for these
positions.  The initiative also required that senior ranked warrant
and noncommissioned officers be assigned to reserve units. 

Congress did not authorize additional active duty personnel to carry
out these provisions.  Although 800 positions were filled by
personnel already supporting reserve units, the remaining 1,200
personnel were diverted from assignments in other active duty units. 
Although this program is important in that it is intended to improve
reserve component training and to increase active-reserve
integration, its requirements have compounded the Army's shortage of
officers and senior noncommissioned officers to meet active component
requirements. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

Personnel shortfalls and imbalances associated with policies related
to the European drawdown and base closure and realignment decisions
appear to be temporary imbalances that will correct themselves as the
drawdown concludes.  Likewise, personnel shortages that resulted from
the services' implementation of early release programs will abate as
the drawdown is completed. 

Nevertheless, certain personnel shortages are likely to persist
because their underlying causes are not directly related to the
drawdown.  The increasing number of active duty officers that the
services must devote to joint duty assignments and reserve
units--although clearly important requirements--leave fewer officers
available to fill other key leadership positions.  Moreover, the need
to temporarily assign military personnel to cover tasks formerly
carried out by civilians could continue until the services arrive at
the appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel.  As noted in
chapter 3, our October 1994 report recommended that DOD examine
whether some military positions should be converted to civilian
positions.  DOD is expected to report to Congress on the potential
for such conversions. 

In addition to these factors suggesting that personnel shortages may
continue, Army force structuring and staffing practices are also
likely to contribute to shortages.  If the current level of
operations other than war continues without a change in force
structure practices, the Army will continue to have to transfer
personnel into deploying units, thereby creating vacancies in other
units.  Not only are these transferred personnel not always of the
appropriate rank or specialty, they also may not have received the
desired training.  Losing units, in turn, are less ready to achieve
their missions due to the vacancies created and the resultant impact
on unit training.  As noted in this chapter, our recent report on
peace support operations raised the issue of the understaffing of
Army support forces and recommended that the Army reassess this
policy with respect to high priority support units. 

Providing additional funding for military personnel may not be the
best solution to the types of shortages identified in this report. 
Even without increased funding, the shortages related to the drawdown
are likely to dissipate once the drawdown concludes.  Moreover,
shortages unrelated to the drawdown could be reduced through other
means, such as changes in operating policies, procedures, and
legislative requirements.  For example, DOD could reduce the need to
transfer personnel to meet the requirements of operations other than
war by structuring its forces to better match these requirements. 
Reducing the military's involvement in such operations or reducing
its level of overseas presence is another alternative that could
reduce the need for such transfers.  Finally, Congress could enact
legislation temporarily waiving from some legislative requirements
for the remainder of the drawdown period.  Both DOD and Congress
would need to weigh the merits of these actions. 

To permit DOD sufficient time to address the recommendations
contained in our two earlier reports previously mentioned, we are not
making any further recommendations at this time. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4


TOTAL PERSONNEL COMPARED WITH
PERSONNEL INCLUDED IN OUR ANALYSES
BY SERVICE, FISCAL YEARS 1987
THROUGH 1993
========================================================== Appendix II



                                         Table I.1
                          
                             Total (Army, Air Force, and Navy)


                          Included                                  Included
Fiscal                      in our                                    in our
  year         Total      analyses       Percent         Total      analyses       Percent
------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
  1987       287,340       212,742          74.0     1,673,862     1,470,191          87.8
  1988       284,516       210,515          74.0     1,642,627     1,429,591          87.0
  1989       282,727       206,886          73.2     1,637,050     1,409,742          86.1
  1990       278,996       200,104          71.7     1,580,156     1,365,852          86.4
  1991       274,110       197,520          72.1     1,520,240     1,326,124          87.2
  1992       254,689       183,303          72.0     1,355,896     1,201,200          88.6
  1993       238,264       175,463          73.6     1,275,938     1,136,442          89.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                         Table I.2
                          
                                            Army


                          Included                                  Included
Fiscal                      in our                                    in our
  year         Total      analyses       Percent         Total      analyses       Percent
------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
  1987       107,964        61,685          57.1       668,410       569,423          85.2
  1988       106,963        60,172          56.3       660,445       564,453          85.5
  1989       106,877        59,172          55.4       658,321       558,469          84.8
  1990       104,862        56,505          53.9       641,341       543,263          84.7
  1991       106,256        56,156          52.9       614,848       529,702          86.2
  1992        95,201        49,807          52.3       511,834       456,486          89.2
  1993        87,845        49,824          56.7       480,379       432,426          90.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                         Table I.3
                          
                                         Air Force


                          Included                                  Included
Fiscal                      in our                                    in our
  year         Total      analyses       Percent         Total      analyses       Percent
------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
  1987       107,338        95,367          88.9       495,244       469,466          94.8
  1988       105,126        93,581          89.0       466,856       437,781          93.8
  1989       103,697        91,300          88.0       462,831       429,754          92.9
  1990       101,046        87,691          86.8       433,846       399,599          92.1
  1991        96,702        86,508          89.5       409,765       380,349          92.8
  1992        90,376        80,081          88.6       375,684       344,724          91.8
  1993        84,073        73,545          87.5       356,126       328,627          92.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                         Table I.4
                          
                                            Navy


                          Included                                  Included
Fiscal                      in our                                    in our
  year         Total      analysis       Percent         Total      analysis       Percent
------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
  1987        72,038        55,690          77.3       510,208       431,302          84.5
  1988        72,427        56,762          78.4       515,326       427,357          82.9
  1989        72,153        56,414          78.2       515,898       421,519          81.7
  1990        73,088        55,908          76.5       504,969       423,030          83.8
  1991        71,152        54,856          77.1       495,627       416,073          84.0
  1992        69,112        53,415          77.3       468,378       399,990          85.4
  1993        66,346        52,094          78.5       439,433       375,389          85.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Total personnel shows actual end strengths at the end of each
fiscal year and excludes cadets and midshipmen.  Our analyses
included authorized personnel positions in combat and support units. 
Specifically excluded from the analyses were general officers,
warrant officers, and personnel in general support positions. 

Source:  DOD Comptroller provided service totals; the individual
services provided data on authorized combat and support positions. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

Sharon A.  Cekala
Carol R.  Schuster
Barry W.  Holman


   DALLAS REGIONAL OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

Thom Barger
Robert D.  Malpass
Andy C.  Clinton
Dorothy M.  Tejada
