Army National Guard: Combat Brigades Ability to Be Ready for War in 90
Days Is Uncertain (Chapter Report, 06/02/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-91).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army National
Guard's combat brigades' war-readiness, focusing on whether: (1) the
Bold Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet
peacetime training goals; (2) the brigades' advisers are working
effectively to improve training readiness; and (3) prospects of having
the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely.

GAO found that: (1) in general, none of the 7 enhanced brigades achieved
the training proficiency required during the first 3 years of the Bold
Shift training strategy; (2) in 1993, combat platoons mastered only 14
percent of their mission-essential tasks and less than one-third of the
battalions met their gunnery goals; (3) the brigades could not meet
staffing and personnel goals, since many personnel were not sufficiently
trained in their individual job and leadership skills; (4) the brigades'
training problems are long-standing and will be difficult to improve;
(5) although training strategy revisions are underway, the improvements
will take years to be effective; (6) the Army advisers' efforts to
improve the Guard's training readiness have been limited by an ambiguous
definition of the advisers' role, poor communications between the Army,
advisers, brigades, and other Guard officials, particularly regarding
training goals, and difficult working relationships between the Army and
the state-run Guard; (7) it is highly uncertain whether the brigades
could be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization, since the Guard's
peacetime training is inadequate; (8) the postmobilization model
estimated that the brigades would need 68 to 154 days of
postmobilization training before deployment, while another model
estimated that the best trained brigades would need 102 days to deploy;
and (9) brigade proficiency reports have generally overstated brigade
readiness levels.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-91
     TITLE:  Army National Guard: Combat Brigades Ability to Be Ready 
             for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain
      DATE:  06/02/95
   SUBJECT:  National Guard
             Army reservists
             Combat readiness
             Armed forces reserve training
             Training utilization
             Defense capabilities
             Mobilization
             Military reserve personnel
             Interagency relations
IDENTIFIER:  Army Bold Shift Initiative
             Persian Gulf War
             DOD Total Force Policy
             DOD Bottom-Up Review
             Army National Guard Project Standard Bearer
             Army Mission Essential Task List
             Bradley Fighting Vehicle
             DOD Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

June 1995

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD - COMBAT
BRIGADES' ABILITY TO BE READY
FOR WAR IN 90 DAYS
IS UNCERTAIN

GAO/NSIAD-95-91

Army National Guard


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  METL - Mission Essential Task List
  RTD - Resident Training Detachment

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260005

June 2, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H.  Bateman
Chairman
The Honorable Norman Sisisky
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K.  Dornan
Chairman
The Honorable Owen B.  Pickett
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

This reports reviews the war-fighting readiness of Army National
Guard combat brigades and their ability to deploy to any regional
conflict within 90 days of mobilization.  It contains recommendations
to the Secretary of the Army. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the House
Committee on National Security; Senate Committee on Armed Services;
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; and Subcommittee on
Readiness, Senate Committee on Armed Services.  We are also sending
copies to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army and will make
copies available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV. 

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
  and Capabilities Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The war-fighting readiness of Army National Guard combat brigades may
be more critical today than ever before.  Changing defense needs due
to the end of the Cold War and budgetary constraints have increased
reliance on Guard combat brigades and on their ability to deploy
within 90 days of mobilization to any number of regional conflicts. 
However, deficiencies revealed during the brigades' mobilization for
the Persian Gulf War raised questions about the training strategies
used and the time required to be ready to deploy.  Accordingly, the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittee on Military
Readiness and the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee
on National Security asked GAO to determine whether (1) the Bold
Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime
training goals, (2) the advisers assigned to the brigades are working
effectively to improve training readiness, and (3) prospects of
having the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

In 1990, the President authorized the mobilization of three National
Guard combat brigades for the Persian Gulf War.  These three brigades
were participants in a war-planning concept, called "roundout" or
"roundup," in which certain high-priority National Guard brigades had
a preplanned wartime role as integral parts of active Army units.  At
that time, the brigades estimated that they would need 28 to 42 days
of postmobilization training to be ready to deploy.  However, the two
brigades that completed training needed 91 and 106 days, and the Army
estimated they would have required an additional 24 days of
posttraining activities before deployment.  None of the Guard
brigades deployed to the Gulf; they remained in a training status
until the war was over. 

In 1991 the Army adopted a new training strategy--called Bold
Shift--that refocused peacetime training goals on proficiency at the
platoon level and below, rather than up through the brigade level,
for mission-essential tasks and gunnery.  The strategy also included
efforts to improve individual job and leader training and implemented
a congressionally mandated program that assigned active Army advisers
to the brigades.  In 1993, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced
the concept of "enhanced brigades," which eliminated the roundout and
roundup roles of the brigades.  Under this concept, 15 National Guard
combat brigades--including 7 former roundout/up brigades--are
designated to augment and reinforce active duty units in the event
that the active units cannot adequately respond to two major and
nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.  GAO's findings are based on
the training proficiency of the seven former roundout/up brigades,
which should have been the best trained because of their higher
priority for resources. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

For the most part, none of the seven former roundout/up brigades came
close to achieving the training proficiency sought by the Bold Shift
strategy during 1992 through 1994, the first 3 years the new strategy
was tested.  The brigades were unable to recruit and retain enough
personnel to meet staffing goals, and many personnel were not
sufficiently trained in their individual job and leadership skills. 
Even if the brigades had made improvements in individual training,
their 23-percent personnel loss rate would quickly obliterate such
gains.  Collective training was also problematic.  In 1993, combat
platoons had mastered an average of just one-seventh of their
mission-essential tasks, compared with a goal of 100 percent, and
less than one-third of the battalions met gunnery goals.  Although
gunnery scores improved for four brigades in 1994, the brigades
reported no marked improvement in the other key areas.  Causes of the
brigades' training problems in many instances date back at least to
the Gulf War, and solutions are likely to be difficult and long term. 
Adjustments to the strategy are underway, but it will be years before
their effectiveness has been proven. 

The new adviser program's efforts to improve training readiness have
been limited by factors such as (1) an ambiguous definition of the
advisers' role; (2) poor communication between the active Army,
advisers, brigades, and other National Guard officials, causing
confusion and disagreement over training goals; and (3) difficult
working relationships.  The relationship between the active Army and
the state-run Guard is characterized by an "us and them" environment
that, if not improved, could undermine prospects for significant
improvement in the brigades' ability to conduct successful combat
operations. 

It is highly uncertain whether the Guard's mechanized infantry and
armor brigades can be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. 
Initial models estimated that the brigades would need between 68 and
110 days before being ready to deploy.  However, these estimates
assumed that the brigades' peacetime training proficiency would
improve to levels near those envisioned by Bold Shift, thus
shortening postmobilization training.  One model, which included the
possibility that the strategy's goals would not be met, estimated
that as many as 154 days could be required to prepare the brigades to
deploy.  An Army contractor is developing a new model, which
estimates that two or three of the better trained brigades could be
ready to deploy in 102 days. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      BRIGADES HAVE NOT MET
      PEACETIME TRAINING GOALS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

During 1993 the brigades achieved fully trained status in about 14
percent of platoon-level mission-essential tasks.  Four of the
brigades' 13 battalions (31 percent) met the tank and Bradley
Fighting Vehicle crew gunnery standards, and another three came
within 4 percentage points of the goal.  Although three of the seven
brigades met the Army's goal of having 85 percent of the reserve
soldiers fully trained, they fell far short of achieving leader
training goals.  An average of about 70 percent of the officers and
58 percent of the noncommissioned officers had completed the
professional military education courses needed to lead and train
soldiers, compared with a goal of 100 percent.  The brigades were
staffed at an average of 94 percent of their authorized personnel
levels, compared with a goal of 125 percent.  The brigades reported
that 12 of 18 battalions (67 percent) met crew gunnery standards in
1994, but proficiency in the other goals was generally about the same
as in 1993. 

Even though brigade officials said that many problems interfered with
their training proficiency, officials in six of the seven brigades
pointed to confusion over which of the hundreds of mission-essential
tasks and subtasks soldiers should train for during peacetime as one
major cause of the problems.  For example, during 1993, Army
evaluators noted that about 21 percent of the combat companies tried
to train for too many tasks or tasks that were less important to
combat operations than others.  Army doctrine recognizes that the
units cannot train for all possible wartime tasks and requires
commanders to select only those tasks that are critical to their
mission. 

The Army revised the Bold Shift strategy and goals in January 1995. 
Brigade task lists, which previously listed between 6 and 19 tasks,
were reduced to 3--attack, defend, and movement to contact--and the
definition of platoon proficiency was changed from fully trained in
all critical tasks to fully or partially trained in at least 70
percent of the critical tasks.  A minimum annual training attendance
of at least 75 percent is now required before a unit can be evaluated
at the fully or partially trained level.  The revisions also included
a mandate for a balanced program of gunnery and critical task
training.  Soldier and leader training continue to be emphasized, but
school attendance during annual training is restricted as a last
resort for soldiers who must qualify for promotion. 


      ADVISER PROGRAM IS HAMPERED
      BY NUMEROUS PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Chief among the many problems that have hampered active Army
advisers' efforts to improve the brigades' training readiness is the
advisers' unclear role.  Army guidance is ambiguous regarding whether
the advisers should identify and resolve training problems or only
assist with training.  As a result, some advisers aggressively
identified training problems and sought corrective action, whereas
others focused more on training processes, such as planning.  When
advisers did attempt to correct training problems, not all Guard
units were responsive to their suggestions.  Since Army National
Guard units are commanded by their respective state governors until
federalized by presidential order, they are not obliged to adopt
advisers' suggestions.  According to some active Army officials, the
advisers' effectiveness is driven primarily by the quality of their
working relationship with the brigades. 

Poor communication was another major impediment to the effectiveness
of the adviser program, causing considerable confusion over Bold
Shift's goals.  Officials in four of the seven brigades and one-half
the active Army adviser teams GAO visited said that they either did
not know Bold Shift's peacetime training goals or were uncertain
about them.  According to brigade officials, Bold Shift's goals were
communicated only in broad, general terms, such as proficiency at the
platoon level. 

Once officials were made aware of the goals, many believed some were
too high to achieve--particularly the fully trained goal for
platoons--and some officials did not attempt to train to the goals. 
Brigade officials also believed the fully trained goal for platoons
held them to a higher standard than the active Army.  Officials in
several active Army divisions confirmed that, in some cases, their
objective was to reach only a partially trained status. 

Officials in both the active Army and National Guard, including
officials from five of the seven brigades, cited the need for more
unified, better coordinated working relationships.  During the Gulf
War, some Guard personnel believed the Army used a double standard of
readiness to keep Guard units from deploying to Iraq.  The "us and
them" environment has continued, with some Guard officials stating
that the active Army does not understand the unique difficulties
faced by their personnel, often expects too much, and excludes them
from decision-making.  Active Army officials said that Guard
personnel often do not understand Army training doctrine and need to
be more objective in assessments of their training proficiency. 


      PROSPECTS FOR THE BRIGADES
      TO BE READY TO DEPLOY
      90 DAYS AFTER MOBILIZATION
      ARE UNCERTAIN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

Mechanized infantry and armor brigades face some of the most complex
training tasks in the Army.  Postmobilization models for these
brigades developed by the Director of Army Training, Army Inspector
General, and Rand Corporation in 1991 and 1992 estimated the brigades
would need
93 to 98, 68 to 110, and 96 to 154 days, respectively, before being
ready to deploy.  (GAO found no models for the Guard's light infantry
brigades.) However, the more optimistic estimates by the Director of
Army Training and Army Inspector General were based on the assumption
that Army initiatives would be successful in improving the peacetime
training proficiency of the brigades to levels near those envisioned
by Bold Shift, thus shortening postmobilization training.  The Rand
model's 154-day estimate is based on the assumption that the
strategy's goals would not be met. 

The Army is studying a new postmobilization model being developed by
Rand.  The model, expected to be completed by the summer of 1995,
estimates that two or three of the better trained brigades, at their
current levels of proficiency, could be trained and ready to deploy
in 102 days.  The new model shortens the training time predicted by
earlier models partly by assuming that training will be conducted at
one site large enough to handle brigade-level exercises against an
opposing force.  Earlier models had assumed the brigades would
perform some training at one site and then move to a second, larger
site for brigade-level exercises.  The model also assumes that 5,000
advisers, 2,800 Army trainers, and opposing forces for the brigades
would be available to provide the training needed.  (Only 2,000
advisers had been assigned as of September 1994; the remaining 3,000
are scheduled to be assigned by September 1997.) However, it is not
clear whether a sufficient number of trainers and opposing force
personnel and large-scale training sites would be available to ensure
that all 15 brigades can be readied to deploy quickly.\1


--------------------
\1 DOD's goal for the deployability of all 15 brigades is classified. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with
National Guard leaders, (1) reassess the brigades' premobilization
training goals to ensure that they are consistent with readiness
requirements and achievable within available training time and
resources; (2) reassess the role of active Army advisers assigned to
the brigades, clearly stipulate whether advisers are to identify and
resolve training problems or only assist with training; and (3)
establish and document an Army plan for preparing the brigades to be
ready to deploy to war.  Other GAO recommendations to the Secretary
of the Army appear in chapters 3 and 4. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations and said
that it had already begun actions to implement them (see app.  I). 
Nevertheless, DOD said that GAO had based some of its conclusions on
changing standards and emerging data and that it was too early in the
implementation of post-Desert Storm initiatives to evaluate
improvement in the Guard brigades' readiness. 

Since the brigades have not yet had a full year to train under DOD's
latest revision to the training strategy for the brigades, GAO agrees
that it is uncertain whether the revisions will be more effective
than earlier approaches.  However, this situation does not diminish
the importance of correcting deficiencies identified by GAO, many of
which are management problems that are not likely to be corrected by
a change in strategy.  Other problems are long-standing and will be
more difficult to solve.  GAO disagrees that its conclusions are
based on emerging data.  This report covers Bold Shift data from the
strategy's inception in 1991 to 1994, the most recent year for which
data exists. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

Over the past 20 years, changing defense needs and budgetary
pressures have led to an increased reliance on the Army National
Guard and other reserve forces to defend the nation.  In the early
1970s, the Department of Defense (DOD), faced with the end of the
Vietnam War and budgetary pressures to reduce active duty personnel
and other costs, introduced the Total Force Policy, which mandated
the integration of active and reserve personnel into one homogenous
fighting force.  The policy placed maximum reliance on the Army
National Guard when they could meet wartime deployment schedules. 
Army National Guard units are commanded by their respective state
governors until federalized by presidential order.  Guard members
have only about 39 days each year to dedicate to training, although
many devote considerably more time.  However, administrative and
other nontraining matters can use a considerable portion of the
39-day schedule. 

In 1990, the end of the Cold War prompted a second major policy
change.  The focus of the nation's defense strategy shifted from
deterrence of global war with the Soviet Union to the projection of
forces quickly to major regional conflicts, such as aggressions
against the Persian Gulf region.  The strategy now includes
operations other than war, such as the Somalia relief effort and
counterdrug operations.  This change in security strategy and
continuing budgetary pressures prompted DOD to develop a plan that
would reduce the Army by 25 percent by fiscal year 1995. 

The role of the National Guard combat brigades has also been
changing.\1 Since the early 1970s, some National Guard brigades were
expected to deploy shortly after active Army units.  These brigades,
known as "roundout" or "roundup" brigades, had a predetermined
wartime affiliation with active Army divisions, providing the last of
three required brigades to round out the division or an extra brigade
to round up the division.  These brigades received higher priority
for resources than other Guard brigades.  In 1992, the Army Chief of
Staff testified that the brigades were expected to be ready to deploy
60 to 90 days after call-up.  In the early 1990s, 7 of the 44 Guard
brigades were in roundout/up roles.  (The seven brigades are listed
in app.  II). 

In 1993, DOD introduced the concept of "enhanced brigades," which
eliminated the Guard's roundout role.  Under this concept, 15 Guard
combat brigades--including the 7 former roundout/up brigades--would
be responsible for reinforcing and augmenting active Army units if
the active units could not handle two nearly simultaneous regional
conflicts, as set forth in the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up
Review.  The 15 brigades include mechanized infantry, armor, armored
cavalry, and light infantry units. 

These changes have resulted in continuing debate between Congress and
DOD over the size and role of active and reserve forces.  In 1991,
the planned total force included 12 active duty divisions and 8
National Guard divisions.  However, Congress was concerned that the
Army was not assigning a large enough role to the reserves.  Congress
approved the Army's plans for reductions in the active force but did
not approve all of the reductions in the reserves.  The 1993
Bottom-Up Review called for
10 active duty divisions and the 15 enhanced brigades, the equivalent
of
5 divisions.  However, in May 1994 the House Armed Services Committee
recommended that the force be reconfigured to eight fully manned
active divisions and four roundout divisions that would be staffed by
both active and Guard units.  The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal
Year 1995 calls for a reevaluation of force structure, including
increased reliance on the reserves and an evaluation of an Army
configured as
12 active duty divisions, a number of which would be rounded out with
National Guard combat units. 


--------------------
\1 Several platoons form a company.  Two or more companies make up a
battalion.  Three or more battalions comprise a brigade. 


   GULF WAR CALL-UP REVEALS COMBAT
   BRIGADE DEFICIENCIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

Training and other related problems revealed during the activation of
three National Guard roundout brigades for the Persian Gulf War--the
first large scale call-up of reserve forces in more than 20
years--raised questions about the training strategies used and the
time needed to be ready to deploy to areas of conflict. 

The brigade commanders estimated that the three units would need 28
to 42 days of postmobilization training to prepare for
mission-essential tasks.  However, the two brigades that completed
training needed 91 and 106 days, and the Army estimated that the
third brigade would have needed 135 days.  The Army also estimated
that an additional 24 days of posttraining activities would have been
needed before the brigades could have deployed.  None of the brigades
deployed to the Gulf; they remained in a training status until the
war was over. 

Reports issued by us and others found that the roundout brigades
suffered from many complex and interrelated problems.  These problems
resulted in (1) the brigades being unable to achieve peacetime unit
proficiency in critical wartime tasks, gunnery skills, individual
soldier and leader skills, and desired personnel staffing levels and
(2) increased postmobilization training time.  (See app.  III for a
list of key reports.)

The brigades' problems prompted us, the Army, and Congress to
recommend improvements in training and readiness and new initiatives
to implement them.  For example, the Army Chief of Staff launched
studies to identify the Army's training support and structure needs
for the 21st century and fully accredit and integrate active Army and
reserve schools providing individual training to soldiers and
leaders.  The National Guard implemented Project Standard Bearer to
give priority for resources to the roundout/up brigades to help
ensure that they would be ready to meet Army requirements when
needed.  In addition, Congress passed legislation that identified 18
different reforms designed to improve National Guard readiness,
including the assignment of 5,000 active Army advisers to reserve
units. 


   BOLD SHIFT STRATEGY REFOCUSED
   TRAINING EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

In September 1991, the Army adopted a new training strategy--called
Bold Shift--to respond to the recommendations and implement the
adviser program and other key initiatives.  The strategy's goals were
to improve the reserve's peacetime training readiness, thereby
shortening the amount of postmobilization training time needed to
prepare the units to be ready to deploy, and the relationships
between reserve and active Army units.  The strategy included
initiatives in seven primary areas:  the restructuring and
realignment of active and reserve units for the new defense
environment, readiness assessments and exercises, unit training,
soldier training, leader training, the involvement of affiliated
active Army units in training, and the assignment of active Army
advisers to the reserves.  The Bold Shift initiatives extensively
changed the way in which the Guard's brigades trained by

  refocusing training on proficiency at the platoon level and below
     in individual skills, gunnery, and mission-essential tasks,
     instead of proficiency at platoon, company, battalion, and
     brigade levels, and emphasizing proficiency for a given task
     before moving on to the next one rather than focusing on a large
     number of tasks;

  emphasizing the importance of individual soldier and leader
     training and providing priority for such courses to personnel in
     the Bold Shift program;

  authorizing, along with ongoing National Guard efforts, certain
     units to recruit over 100 percent of their wartime personnel
     requirements;\2 and

  increasing active Army and National Guard integration and training
     support by assigning active Army advisers to reserve units and
     implementing other initiatives. 

The Army began testing the Bold Shift strategy on the seven former
roundout/up brigades and other reserve units during fiscal year 1992. 
According to the Director of the Bold Shift task force, however, it
may take 5 to 10 years before the impact of the strategy is clearly
known. 


--------------------
\2 The former roundout/up units were authorized to recruit up to 125
percent. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

We reviewed the training results of the seven enhanced brigades that
were former roundout/up brigades to determine whether (1) the Bold
Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime
training goals, (2) the advisers assigned to the brigades were
working effectively to improve training readiness, and (3) prospects
of having the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely.  At
the time we selected the seven brigades for review, they comprised
all of the Army's roundout/up brigades.  Because of their higher
priority for resources, these brigades should have been the best
trained.  Support units, such as artillery, military police, and
engineering units, were not included in our work.  Despite
mobilization problems, many support units deployed on time and served
effectively during the Gulf War. 

Our work at the seven brigades covered five of the seven primary Bold
Shift initiatives.  We obtained data on the brigades' progress in
meeting five key Bold Shift training goals in the areas of soldier,
leader, and unit training and discussed the results with brigade
officials and active Army advisers.  These five training goals were
platoons fully trained in mission-essential tasks; tank and Bradley
Fighting Vehicle crews trained in gunnery; 85 percent of soldiers
fully qualified for their assigned jobs; leaders fully trained in
command, control, and coordination; and personnel strength at 125
percent of required wartime levels. 

To understand the brigades' training policies and approaches, the
training involvement of the affiliated active Army units, and the
adviser program, we visited all seven brigades and held discussions
with brigade commanders and other officials, adviser program team
chiefs and personnel collocated with the brigades, and
representatives from three affiliated active Army divisions.  Adviser
personnel attached to these teams represented about 15 percent of all
advisers assigned to the program in fiscal year 1994.  We conducted
detailed case studies at four of the seven brigades, reviewing
records and holding discussions with brigade personnel down to the
company level.  We selected the four brigades, along with Army and
National Guard officials, so that the various brigade types--light
infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor--and various geographical
areas would be represented in our study.  We relied extensively on
Army data for 1992 and collected data directly from the brigades for
1993 and 1994.  However, 1994 data was limited to areas in which the
brigades reported marked progress.  We did not verify the accuracy of
the Army's data. 

To assess estimates of the amount of time the brigades would need to
be ready for war, we compared estimates by the mechanized infantry
and armor brigades with models prepared by the Director of Army
Training, Army Inspector General, and Rand Corporation.  We discussed
the estimates with officials from each organization and three of the
active Army sponsor divisions associated with the brigades.  We found
no models estimating the time needed for light infantry brigades to
be ready for war. 

We also met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Washington, D.C.; State Area Reserve Commands in Georgia,
Idaho, and South Carolina; the National Guard Bureau, Arlington,
Virginia; the U.S.  Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and
the U.S.  Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. 

We conducted our review from August 1993 to December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report.  These
comments are discussed and evaluated in chapters 2 through 4 and are
reprinted in appendix I. 


BRIGADES HAVE NOT MET PEACETIME
TRAINING GOALS
============================================================ Chapter 2

For the most part, none of the seven former roundout/up brigades came
close to meeting the Bold Shift training goals in 1992 through 1994. 
In 1993, the combat platoons were able to achieve fully trained
status in an average of about 14 percent of their mission-essential
tasks, compared with a goal of 100 percent.  Tank and Bradley
Fighting Vehicle crews in less than one-third of the battalions were
able to meet gunnery goals.  Although three of the brigades met the
goal of having 85 percent of soldiers fully qualified in their
assigned jobs, they fell far short of achieving leader training
goals.  About 70 percent of the officers and 58 percent of the
noncommissioned officers had completed the military education courses
needed to lead and train their soldiers, compared with a goal of 100
percent.  The brigades were staffed at an average of 94 percent of
their authorized personnel strength levels, compared with a goal of
125 percent. 

Even if the brigades were able to meet professional education and
staffing goals, their 23-percent personnel loss rate could quickly
obliterate such gains.  Gunnery scores improved in 1994, but the
brigades told us that they did not make marked improvement in the
other key areas. 

Many training problems faced by the brigades were identified at least
as far back as the Gulf War, and their solutions are likely to be
difficult and long term.  The Army revised the Bold Shift strategy
and goals in January 1995 and has been studying additional training
approaches.  However, it will be years before the effectiveness of
the revisions is known. 


   BRIGADES WERE TRAINED IN FEW
   MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Army doctrine states that peacetime training is to be focused on the
requirements of a unit's wartime mission.  It also recognizes that
units do not have sufficient time to train for all of the hundreds of
potential wartime tasks that may be associated with that mission,
such as maneuvering tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to attack and
defend, and preparing for nuclear attack.  Accordingly, due to
limited training time, unit commanders must identify and train only
those combat tasks that are essential to their wartime mission.  The
Mission Essential Task List (METL) is the formal listing of those
tasks.  Unit commanders plan, execute, and assess training based on
the tasks included on brigade-, battalion-, and company-level METLs
and the supporting tasks identified for platoons and lower levels. 
If commanders determine that their unit cannot execute all the tasks
on the unit's METL to standard, they must request an adjustment to
their mission. 

One of Bold Shift's peacetime training goals is for platoons to be
fully trained in all tasks supporting the company-level METL.\1 Army
data for 1992 and 1993 show that the brigades did not meet this goal
in either year.  Brigade officials said that they were also unable to
meet the goal in 1994.  As shown in figure 2.1, only about 14 percent
of platoon tasks were rated as fully trained by unit commanders or
active duty observers in 1993.  About 25 percent of the tasks were
untrained, and about 61 percent were partially trained.  Figure 2.1
also illustrates that the percent of tasks rated as fully trained
generally decreases at succeedingly higher company, battalion, and
brigade levels.  This outcome should be expected in a strategy that
focuses training at the platoon level and below. 

   Figure 2.1:  Unit Proficiency
   Achieved on Mission-Essential
   Tasks

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Our analysis of mission-essential task proficiency included
only combat elements at company level and below; support elements
were not included.  Data for companies and platoons is from 1993. 
Data for battalions and brigades is for 1993 and 1994. 

METL task evaluations are not precisely defined and contain a measure
of subjectivity.  For example, according to Army officials, partially
trained can mean that the unit can perform the task to 99 percent of
standard or 1 percent of standard.  We identified this problem in
1991 and recommended that the Army develop more definitive criteria
for assessing unit proficiency.\2


--------------------
\1 The Army uses a system of different letters to assess training
proficiency in METL tasks.  An evaluation of T, or trained, means
that the unit can successfully perform the tasks to the Army
standard.  P, or needs practice, evaluations mean that the unit can
perform the task with some shortcomings that are not severe enough to
require complete retraining.  U, or untrained, evaluations mean that
the unit cannot perform the task to the Army standard.  Throughout
this report, P ratings are referred to as "partially trained" to more
clearly differentiate this rating from T, or fully trained, ratings. 

\2 Army Training:  Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always
Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb.  15, 1991). 


      NUMEROUS PROBLEMS HAMPER
      ACHIEVING METL PROFICIENCY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

Brigade officials told us that many problems interfere with achieving
METL proficiency.  For example, time for collective training on METL
tasks is often overshadowed by time needed for administrative and
other nontraining requirements and attendance at individual training
courses.  Several brigades told us that they focused primarily on
gunnery during the 1993 annual training period and devoted little
time to training on METL tasks.  METL training is further hampered by
shortages of suitable local training areas, new equipment training,
and organizational changes. 

In six of the seven brigades, officials ranging from brigade to
company commanders told us that a key problem was confusion over
which of the hundreds of tasks and subtasks should be selected for
training.  The confusion was due to such factors as the lack of clear
guidance from the active Army and Guard officials' inexperience. 
This problem undercut the efficient use of already scarce training
time, as some units were training on tasks that were less important
to combat proficiency and leaving more important tasks untrained. 

During 1993, Army evaluations of the brigades' annual training found
that about 21 percent of the combat companies, excluding those
undergoing new equipment training, suffered from such METL-related
problems.  For example, an Army evaluator found that one company's
task list included battalion- and brigade-level tasks, such as
logistical planning and refueling on the move, which should not be a
part of a company METL.  The evaluator suggested that the company
closely examine its platoon task list as well.  The platoons were
training for tasks, such as performing resupply operations and
crossing chemically contaminated areas, but tasks that supported the
company METL better, such as assaulting an enemy position and
defending, were not trained. 

Some of the METL-related problems date back to before the Gulf War. 
For example, in 1989 we reported that reserve commanders were not
properly developing METLs either because they lacked experience or
guidance from higher headquarters was vague.\3 Also, some units were
using comprehensive lists of combat tasks contained in Army training
manuals rather than identifying only the essential tasks related to
their wartime missions.  About 2 years later, the Army Inspector
General's review of the Gulf War mobilization concluded that the
brigades could not meet training standards in all the required tasks
because they were trying to accomplish too much in the time
allotted.\4


--------------------
\3 Army Training:  Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance
Reservists' Training (GAO/NSIAD-89-140, June 30, 1989). 

\4 Special Assessment:  National Guard Brigades' Mobilization,
Department of the Army Inspector General, June 1991. 


      BOLD SHIFT ADJUSTED IN 1995
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2

In April 1994, the Department of the Army's Enhanced Brigade Task
Force proposed several adjustments to the Bold Shift training
strategy and recommended that the adjustments be tested in two or
three of the brigades over a 3-year period.  One proposal was to
reduce the number of brigade-level tasks from the 6 to 19 tasks
listed on the METLs we reviewed to 3:  movement to contact, attack,
and defend.  According to Army officials, these three tasks comprise
about 85 percent of the critical combat tasks that brigades and lower
echelons must train.  The remaining tasks are primarily those
associated with specialized missions, which could be trained after
mobilization, if needed.  Under the task force's proposal, yearly
training in the test brigades would focus on one of the three tasks
so that training for all three would be completed in 3 years. 
According to Army officials, the training for each of the tasks would
overlap and reinforce the other, so skills would be sustained over
time, even though only one task would be trained each year. 

A National Guard working group is developing the supporting tasks
down through the platoon level for the three brigade tasks.  As of
January 1995, the group had identified a preliminary list of 39
critical tasks for mechanized infantry platoons and 38 for armor
platoons.  Work was still in process for the light infantry units. 
In contrast, during 1993 the number of tasks in the units we reviewed
ranged from 6 to 37 in mechanized infantry platoons and 8 to 101 in
the armor platoons.  Several of the brigades we reviewed were already
developing their own standardized METLs.  Brigade officials said that
standardized METLs helped eliminate confusion and wasted training
time and created savings in the administrative time required to
prepare METLs. 

We compared the preliminary list of critical tasks identified by the
working group with the 1993 assessment results for the brigades'
armor and mechanized infantry platoons and found that they were only
slightly more proficient in the critical tasks than the full universe
of tasks assessed.  For example, about 17 percent of the armor and
mechanized infantry critical tasks were rated as fully trained
compared with an average of 14 percent of all tasks.  About 22
percent of the critical tasks were rated untrained compared with 25
percent of all tasks on the platoon lists.  Sixty-one percent of the
tasks in both categories were rated as partially trained. 

The Army announced revisions to the Bold Shift strategy and goals on
January 30, 1995.  The revisions included focusing unit METLs on the
missions of attack, defend, and movement to contact and defining
platoon proficiency as at least 70 percent of the critical tasks
rated as fully or partially trained.  A minimum annual training
attendance of at least 75 percent is now required before a unit can
be evaluated at the fully or partially trained level.  Basic
principles were retained, such as focusing collective training at the
small unit level and emphasizing achieving proficiency on a given
task before progressing to higher level training. 


   FEW UNITS MET GUNNERY STANDARDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

A second Bold Shift goal was to qualify between 60 and 66 percent of
Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews, depending on the vehicle model, at
the gunnery table VIII level.\5 Tank battalions were expected to
qualify 75 percent of their assigned crews.  According to the Bold
Shift Director, the goal was initially 100 percent, but Bold Shift
officials lowered this goal once they realized that a high degree of
personnel turnover made the goal difficult to meet.  In 1992 only
three of the brigades attempted to qualify at the table VIII level,
with 37 percent of assigned crews qualifying.  In 1993,
4 of 13 battalions met the Bold Shift strategy's gunnery goal, and
three other battalions came within 4 percentage points of the goals,
as shown in figure 2.2.  All six brigades with Bradley vehicles or
tanks attempted to qualify at least some units, with about 64 percent
of the total assigned crews qualifying. 

   Figure 2.2:  Battalion
   Proficiency in Bradley and Tank
   Gunnery

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Our analysis excludes five battalions in new equipment
training and one light infantry brigade that has neither tanks nor
Bradley vehicles. 

The brigades faced a number of difficulties in seeking to meet the
goal.  For example, in 1993 units were able to assemble only about 79
percent of their assigned crews for firing qualification.  According
to brigade officials, many of the personnel were excused to take
individual training courses in their assigned jobs.  Army policy
gives individual training priority over collective training. 
Consequently, in 1993 about 71 percent of the brigade personnel in
our four case study units attended annual training, at which attempts
to qualify in gunnery often take place.  Also, personnel turnover,
which includes personnel leaving the unit and changing jobs within a
unit, makes it difficult to have stable crews who have worked
together long enough to develop a high level of proficiency. 
Finally, brigade officials said that a shortage of suitable local
training areas was a key factor inhibiting their proficiency in
gunnery.  Some brigades must travel to training areas 150 miles away
or more for weekend training. 

Officials in four brigades told us that gunnery results had improved
in 1994, raising the total to 12 of 18 battalions qualifying at the
table VIII level.  However, this improvement may have been at the
expense of combat maneuver skills, as some brigades have had
difficulty balancing gunnery and METL training.  The Army's Enhanced
Brigade Task Force found that the brigades were spending most of
their time on gunnery training and little time on practicing combat
maneuvers with tanks and Bradley vehicles.  Similarly, three of the
brigades with improved 1994 gunnery scores told us that their heavy
focus on gunnery left little time for maneuver training.  Another
brigade focused so heavily on METL training during 1994 that its
crews did not even attempt to qualify at the table VIII level.  As
part of its recommendations for adjustments to the Bold Shift
strategy, the task force suggested that the brigades balance training
in gunnery with the maneuver tasks on unit METLs.  The Army's January
1995 revisions to Bold Shift adopted the task force's recommendation. 


--------------------
\5 The Army structures 12 gunnery tables to develop and test
proficiency in a progressive manner.  For example, table I requires
individual crews to engage stationary targets with a stationary tank
or fighting vehicle.  Table VIII requires individual crews to
demonstrate proficiency against single, multiple, and simultaneous
targets while the crews are stationary and moving. 


   MOST UNITS DID NOT MEET GOALS
   FOR SOLDIER AND LEADER TRAINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Soldier and leader training are critical to successful unit training
in METL tasks, gunnery, and other areas.  Soldiers must be trained in
their assigned jobs, such as infantryman or master gunner, before
units can function well collectively.  Leaders, in turn, must also be
trained so that they may train their soldiers and be tactically
proficient on the battlefield. 

The Army's goal is to have 85 percent of reserve unit soldiers,
excluding those who have not completed basic and advanced individual
training, fully trained in their assigned job.\6

Even though it does not specify a percentage goal, the Bold Shift
strategy's goal was to raise the percentage of brigade soldiers fully
trained for their assigned jobs to about the same level as active
Army soldiers.  In 1992, we reported that about 90 to 97 percent of
the soldiers in the active Army units that replaced the Guard combat
brigades during the Gulf War mobilization were fully trained in their
assigned jobs compared with about 75 to 85 percent in the Guard
brigades.\7 Program officials agreed that the Army's overall goal of
85 percent was an appropriate substitute to use in our analysis. 

As shown in figure 2.3, three brigades met the goal in 1993, and one
other was within 3 percentage points of meeting the goal.  On
average, 79 percent of each brigade's soldiers were fully qualified
for their jobs.  If the soldiers who had not completed basic or
advanced individual training were included in the calculation, the
average qualified rate would drop to about 74 percent. 

   Figure 2.3:  Soldier
   Proficiency in Assigned Jobs

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

According to Bold Shift officials, the goal for leader training was
for all commissioned and noncommissioned officers to complete the
training courses needed to lead their soldiers.  Army National Guard
commissioned officer leader training includes the Officer Basic
Course, the Officer Advanced Course, and courses given at the
Combined Arms and Service Staff School and the U.S.  Army Command and
General Staff College.  The basic course prepares newly commissioned
lieutenants for their first command and is required for promotion to
first lieutenant.  The advanced course prepares captains to command
at the company level.  The Combined Arms and Service Staff School
trains majors to function as staff officers at battalion levels and
above.  The Command and General Staff College prepares lieutenant
colonels to function as staff officers and field grade commanders.\8

Noncommissioned officers have primary responsibility for teaching
soldiers subjects ranging from basic survival skills to specific job
skills.  Therefore, they also need to complete a series of leadership
courses.  The Primary Leadership Development Course is required for
promotion to sergeant, the Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course for
promotion to staff sergeant, the Advanced Non-commissioned Officer
Course for promotion to sergeant first class, and the Sergeants Major
Course for promotion to sergeant major. 

As shown in figure 2.4, no brigade met the Army's leader training
goal.  On average, about 70 percent of commissioned officers and 58
percent of noncommissioned officers in each brigade had completed
these required courses by 1993.\9 Noncommissioned officer completion
rates were relatively low for all four required courses. 
Commissioned officer completion rates were particularly low for the
course given at the Combined Arms and Service Staff School:  an
average of only about 11 percent of the majors in the brigades had
completed the course.  Brigade officials believed this low rate was
due to the fact that the course did not become a requirement for
promotion to major until October 1994. 

   Figure 2.4:  Percent of Leaders
   That Had Completed Professional
   Education Courses

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Brigade 1 figures exclude support units. 

Brigade officials consistently rated soldier and leader training as
major problems affecting overall training proficiency.  Soldier and
leader courses are often difficult to complete due to their length,
which may conflict with home life; inadequate funding to attend the
courses; and too few course openings.  Attendance at individual
training courses also competes with collective training for the
scarce training time available, since the individual courses are
often attended during the 2-week annual training period. 

Soldier and leader training have been major problems for the Guard
brigades since at least the Gulf War.  The Army Inspector General's
report on the Gulf War mobilization concluded that, of all the
weaknesses identified in the brigades, leadership
problems--particularly in the noncommissioned officer and field grade
officer ranks--were the most debilitating.  According to the report,
these leaders could not make routine operations happen routinely
because they lacked the necessary leadership training and peacetime
opportunities to practice. 

One brigade reported marked progress in both soldier and leader
training during 1994, but the remaining brigades reported proficiency
levels about the same as in 1993.  The Enhanced Brigade Task Force
recommended that the Army authorize funding of additional paid days
for brigade personnel to allow extended annual training periods and
more leader training.  The January 1995 revisions to Bold Shift
continued to emphasize soldier and leader training, but school
attendance during annual training is now restricted as a last resort
for soldiers who must qualify for promotion.  No numerical goals were
specified. 


--------------------
\6 Although this standard was established in 1988, it has never been
formalized into regulation.  Thus, many of the brigades did not
maintain historical data on the number of soldiers in or awaiting
training, which is necessary to calculate the qualification rate. 
Consequently, officials had to estimate the number of soldiers in
training for one brigade. 

\7 Army Training:  Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than
Guard Roundout Brigades (GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov.  4, 1992). 

\8 The latter three were not required in 1993 before promotion to the
rank indicated.  However, National Guard Bureau officials told us
that each rank should have had the course indicated to perform their
duties effectively, and completion of 50 percent of the Command and
General Staff College courses is required for promotion to lieutenant
colonel.  Beginning in October 1994, captains were required to have
the Combined Arms and Service Staff School course before promotion to
major. 

\9 These figures include data from one brigade as of August 1994. 


   PERSONNEL RECRUITING GOALS WERE
   NOT MET
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Brigade officials told us that one major solution to the individual
and leader training problem was to allow the brigades to recruit over
100 percent of their authorized personnel strength.  This action was
expected to help the brigades compensate for personnel problems, such
as low soldier qualification levels and turnover.  The extra
personnel could fill in when soldiers or leaders were away at
training courses.  In 1993, the brigades were authorized to recruit
up to 125 percent of their authorized strength.  However, as shown in
figure 2.5, staffing averaged about 94 percent, and only two brigades
were staffed at levels higher than 100 percent. 

   Figure 2.5:  Brigade Personnel
   Strength

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

To exacerbate the staffing problem, the number of personnel leaving
the brigades in 1993 averaged about 23 percent, ranging from about 15
to 38 percent.  Such losses not only make personnel staffing a
never-ending problem, but they can also make gains in individual
training quickly disappear and further lengthen the time required to
be ready to deploy.  According to National Guard Bureau data,
turnover is highest among the soldiers below the sergeant level. 

Brigade officials told us that efforts to increase personnel strength
are often affected by problems such as inadequate recruiting and
retention bonuses and demographic changes.  Moving units to respond
to shifting populations may improve the recruiting base but slows
training in the near term.  One brigade reported raising its
personnel strength from 85 percent in 1993 to 92 percent in 1994, but
the remaining brigades reported strength levels about the same or
lower than in 1993.  One unit that had been able to increase its
strength to about 102 percent reported a drop-off to the
mid-90-percent level.  According to brigade officials, this decline
was due to (1) economic downsizing in the area; (2) a perception
among employers that a strong military was no longer needed, which
resulted in their increased reluctance to allow employees time off to
train; and (3) overworking Guard personnel to compensate for the high
personnel loss rate. 

The Army Inspector General's report on the Gulf War mobilization also
found that personnel strength and turnover problems, which were due
to inadequate recruiting and retention incentives, were major
impediments to rapid training of the brigades.  Because personnel
strength was too low in the brigades that had been mobilized,
personnel from other units had to be brought in to fill critical
vacancies.  The personnel problems lengthened the training time
needed to prepare the brigades to deploy. 

The Enhanced Brigade Task Force recommended that the brigades
continue to be authorized to recruit over 100 percent of their
authorized strength, possibly at 105 to 108 percent.  According to
one brigade official, recruiting high levels of personnel is
expensive, particularly at levels as high as 125 percent.  The task
force also recommended that the brigades' personnel priority group be
raised to authorize recruiting and retention bonuses.  Guard
officials told us that they had been funding such bonuses, in certain
cases, on their own for some time.  However, they were forced to
suspend them in the spring of 1994 due to funding shortages.  The new
Bold Shift training strategy does not address specific goals for
personnel strength, but the current National Guard program authorizes
the brigades to recruit to approximately 104 to 108 percent of their
authorized strength in certain positions. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

We believe the Army's decision to focus platoon training on three
METL tasks is a step in the right direction, since it may help to
reduce the amount of postmobilization training time the brigades will
need to be ready to deploy.  However, due to this and other recent
strategy changes, it will not be known until nearly the end of the
decade whether the brigades' peacetime training proficiency can be
markedly improved.  Solutions to problems in areas such as soldier
and leader training and personnel recruiting and retention appear
difficult and long term. 

The recent changes to Bold Shift attempt to balance competing and
interrelated problems in peacetime training in maneuver and gunnery,
individual training, and personnel staffing with the goal of having
the brigades ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization.  The changes
appear reasonable, but they are unproven.  For example, reducing
authorized personnel levels while mandating an increase in attendance
at annual training could increase problems in individual training and
personnel retention, as soldiers face the choice of reducing their
time at home by attending military training courses or being less
competitive for promotion.  In addition, the changes are susceptible
to other influences, such as funding shortages, which could upset the
balance that is sought. 

Chapters 3 and 4 discuss additional issues and recommendations that
the Secretary of the Army should consider along with the recent
adjustments to the Bold Shift strategy. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

A draft of this report contained a recommendation that the Chief of
Staff of the Army identify and focus training on the combat tasks
considered critical to fulfilling the enhanced brigades' missions. 
In view of the Army's recent modification to the brigades' training
strategy that will focus training on three critical missions, we have
deleted the recommendation from this report.  Also, we have revised
this report to reflect other revisions to the strategy and
premobilization goals. 

In commenting on platoon proficiency in METL tasks, DOD said that its
analysis of figure 2.1 showed a combined 74-percent fully and
partially trained level, and it concluded that this level would be a
successful outcome under the new goals.  However, we believe that
indiscriminately combining partially trained tasks with fully trained
tasks could lead to an overly optimistic view of training
proficiency.  As pointed out earlier, a partially trained rating
could indicate proficiency ranging from 1 to 99 percent of a task. 


ADVISER PROGRAM IS HAMPERED BY
NUMEROUS PROBLEMS
============================================================ Chapter 3

The new adviser program's efforts to improve training readiness have
been limited by factors such as an ambiguous definition of the
advisers' role; poor communication between the active Army, advisers,
brigades, and Guard leadership, which caused confusion and
disagreement over Bold Shift's goals; and difficult working
relationships.  The role of active Army advisers in the state-run
brigade operations has not been clearly defined by the Army. 
Consequently, some advisers were focused less on identifying and
resolving training problems and more on assisting in planning and
other training processes.  Since advisers have no formal authority,
their effectiveness is determined primarily by the quality of their
personal relationships with the brigades.  In many instances,
advisers were not effective in resolving some major training
problems, such as confusion over mission-essential task priorities. 

Poor communication was another major impediment to the effectiveness
of the adviser program, causing considerable confusion over Bold
Shift's goals.  Many advisers and brigade officials said that they
either did not know Bold Shift's goals or were uncertain about them. 
Once they were made aware of the goals, many brigade and active Army
officials, including the advisers, believed that some goals were
unrealistically high and could not be achieved.  As a result of the
confusion and disagreement, some brigades did not attempt to train to
the proficiency level sought by the strategy. 

The Bold Shift program was begun in an environment of strained
organizational relationships between the active Army and Guard.  This
problem has existed since at least the Gulf War, when some Guard
personnel believed a double standard of readiness was used to keep
Guard units from deploying to the Gulf.  The resulting "us and them"
environment provided fertile ground for the confusion and
disagreement over the advisers' role and the Bold Shift strategy's
goals.  The potential effectiveness of other initiatives begun in the
early 1990s to better integrate the active Army and Guard and
strengthen training support and oversight of Guard operations is
unclear due to the changes brought about by the enhanced brigade
concept. 


   ADVISER PROGRAM WAS MANDATED BY
   CONGRESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

To improve integration between the active Army and Guard, Congress
mandated in 1991 that the active Army assign 2,000 full- time
advisers to high-priority Guard and reserve units beginning in
1992.\1 This program was intended to increase substantially the
number of active advisers to the reserves, improve readiness, and
provide a basis for determining the most effective mix of reserve and
active personnel in administering and training reserve units.  Army
personnel assigned to the program have no formal authority over the
reserves.  Congress amended the legislation in 1992 to provide an
additional 3,000 advisers after September 1994.\2

About 700 of the first group of 2,000 advisers are in Resident
Training Detachments (RTD), which are dedicated to and collocated
with specific reserve units.  About 300 RTDs are located at the Guard
combat brigades.  These RTDs generally report to active Army
divisions assigned training associations with the enhanced brigades. 
Most of the remaining 1,300 advisers are organized regionally and
provide general training assistance and assessments of the
operational readiness of Guard and reserve units located in their
region. 

During 1993 and 1994, the RTD teams had a total of 45 to 49 advisers
serving each brigade.  These teams are generally structured with one
major, four captains, one warrant officer, and two sergeants to
service the four to five companies in each battalion.  The RTD teams
are physically collocated at battalion armories, and they
periodically make visits to the companies in the surrounding cities
and towns.  The Army's original plan was to locate about 70 advisers
at each brigade, including about 20 sergeants at the company level. 
However, the company-level advisers were never assigned.  According
to an Army adviser program official, the Army concluded that
clustering a larger number of advisers at the battalion level was
more conducive to team cohesion and command and control than having
small groups of advisers dispersed throughout each state. 


--------------------
\1 Public Law 102-190, section 414, December 5, 1991. 

\2 Public Law 102-484, section 1132, October 23, 1992. 


   ROLE OF ADVISERS HAS NOT BEEN
   CLEARLY DEFINED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

A number of the advisers expressed uncertainty over their role, that
is, whether they are to advise or support.  The legislation
establishing the program termed the active Army personnel assigned
"advisers," and the 1992 Army Memorandum of Instruction on the
program stated that the RTD staff would focus on assessing training
(identifying and resolving problems) as well as assisting in
training.  However, a 1993 Army assessment stated that the program
was set up specifically as a training support, not an adviser,
program.  According to the assessment, the advisers' duties centered
around training, training support, and training management.  The
assessment also stated that the personnel assigned provided advice
when appropriate, even though they were not intended to be advisors
in the historic and usual sense. 

As a result of the ambiguous guidance, some RTD advisers attempted to
evaluate and correct problems, whereas others focused more on
assisting in training processes, such as planning.  According to
active Army and RTD personnel, the advisers' effectiveness is
determined primarily by the quality of their personal relationships
with the brigades.  For example, RTD advisers in several brigades
identified problems, including (1) inadequate METLs; (2) improper
rifle sighting standards; and (3) weaknesses in training objectives,
plans, and exercises.  The advisers subsequently attempted to
initiate corrective actions.  Guard units were responsive to the
advisers' suggestions in some cases, in others they were not.  In one
case, RTD advisers repeatedly made suggestions in writing for nearly
1 year for improvements in a unit's METL, but that unit did not
respond. 

Other RTD advisers said that their active Army division told them not
to become involved in assessing or evaluating training readiness.  As
a result, the advisers focused more on training processes than
training results.  For example, these advisers told us they had
helped prepare the training plans for the brigade but had not seen
the training assessment reports from annual training.  The advisers
also said that, despite their good personal relationships with many
officials throughout the brigade, Guard personnel were very sensitive
to any criticism.  For example, one of the adviser's suggestions for
improvement was picked up by the active Army division to whom the
RTDs report, and the division aggressively called on the brigade for
corrective action.  However, that instance set off a long period of
bad feelings between the brigade and the advisers because the brigade
believed the advisers had publicly criticized them. 

Symbolic of the problems faced by some advisers, RTD advisers at one
location were housed in trailers outside the armories, separate from
the Guard personnel inside the armories.  RTD personnel said that
they had initially shared armory space with the Guard, but the state
area reserve command believed it did not have adequate space to
collocate them.  RTD advisers told us that the physical separation
from the daily conversation of the brigade made it much harder to
identify problems and reinforced a separation between the brigade and
the advisers.  All other brigades we visited were able to collocate
the adviser and Guard personnel. 

In another brigade, RTD and Guard personnel enjoyed a particularly
good relationship.  In fact, unlike the other brigades, Guard
personnel were allowed to provide formal written input to the RTD
performance ratings, which is normally provided only by active Army
personnel.  Also, RTD personnel had been used to temporarily fill
brigade positions, such as executive officer.  However, the RTD
personnel had been so busy with their other duties that they had not
focused on correcting METL problems.  When we brought this situation
to their attention, the advisers acknowledged that they needed to
focus more on improving the unit's METL. 

National Guard and active Army officials had varying opinions about
the proper role for the advisers.  Some active Army officials
believed the RTD advisers could not be effective without some formal
assessment, supervisory, or other clear line of authority over Guard
operations.  Army officials also told us, however, that the
relationship was not strong enough between the Army and Guard to
allow the RTDs to assess or evaluate the Guard units they live with,
and the relationship would worsen if they did.  Alternatively, Army
officials told us that the active divisions affiliated with the
brigades, or the regionally organized adviser teams, should perform
assessments of the brigades, with the RTD advisers' role limited to
training support functions only. 

Some Guard officials stated that they valued the advice provided by
the advisers and could accept that they had some assessment
authority.  However, other Guard officials stated that they did not
need advice from active Army officers.  Some brigade officials called
for more RTD sergeants with technical expertise in gunnery, supply,
and maintenance.  Guard officials valued the up-to-date technical
expertise and hands-on support provided by the sergeants.  However,
since the Army abandoned its original plan to locate about 20 RTD
sergeants at the company level, the current organization provides
five commissioned officers but only two sergeants and one warrant
officer to provide such technical advice to the four or five combat
companies in each battalion. 


   BRIGADES AND ADVISERS WERE
   CONFUSED OVER TRAINING GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Officials in four of the seven brigades, as well as three of the six
active Army adviser teams, told us they either did not know the Bold
Shift strategy's peacetime training goals or were uncertain about
them.\3 Most of the confusion centered on the goal for platoon
proficiency.  For example, even though three brigade commanders
understood the goal for platoon proficiency was that tasks needed to
be fully trained, several commanders believed that platoon tasks
needed to be only partially trained.  Brigade and Army officials
stated that the strategy's goals were communicated only in broad,
general terms through a series of briefings from the Army to the
National Guard Bureau and the brigades.  A more specific
interpretation of the goals--such as platoons fully trained on all
tasks that support the company's METL--were not documented in
training guidance or other documents provided to the brigades.\4

When we reiterated the goals described by Bold Shift officials, many
brigade, as well as advisers and other active Army officials,
believed that some were too high to achieve during peacetime.  These
officials were particularly concerned with the platoon proficiency
goal.  According to these officials, this goal holds brigades to a
higher standard than active Army units.  Officials from several
active Army divisions acknowledged that their goal was to train some
tasks to the fully trained level and others to the partially trained
level.  The Director of the Bold Shift strategy acknowledged that
there was, and still is, a great deal of disagreement over the goals. 

As a result of the confusion and disagreement, brigade training goals
were sometimes focused at lower levels of proficiency than the Bold
Shift strategy's goals.  For example, several brigade commanders told
us that they generally planned platoon training on METL tasks to
reach only the partially trained level and avoid an untrained status
in the tasks.  Another commander told us that they could probably
never get all their leaders fully trained because of high personnel
losses and turnover.  Even though some brigades did not know the
goals, our analysis of 1993 data showed no marked difference in the
training proficiency levels of those brigades and the brigades who
knew the goals. 


--------------------
\3 One brigade was not assigned a team of advisers because it was
considered for dissolution as part of the reduction of the military. 

\4 We identified the specific goals by interviewing the Bold Shift
Director and staff and Guard officials.  We also traced the goals
through a Bold Shift test directive, dated May 1992, and versions of
U.S.  Forces Command Regulation 220-3, dated July 1993 (draft)
through April 1994.  This regulation provides guidance to active Army
units for assessing reserve unit training. 


   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTIVE
   ARMY AND GUARD IS STRAINED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

Advisers and other officials in both the active Army and Guard,
including officials from five of the seven enhanced brigades we
reviewed, cited the need for more unified, better integrated working
relationships. 

Working relationships between the active Army and Guard chains of
command have been strained since at least the Gulf War mobilization. 
For example, a Congressional Research Service report on the
mobilization found that considerable bitterness and recrimination
existed over the Army's decision not to deploy the Guard brigades
that were mobilized for the war.\5 According to the report, active
Army brigades with the same resource and training status ratings as
the three Guard brigades were allowed to deploy immediately, but the
Guard units were required to undergo several months of
postmobilization training.  Some Guard officials believed the
brigades were subjected to a double standard and that this was the
reason for the brigades' lengthy postmobilization training period
rather than any real readiness problems. 

On the other hand, however, the Army Inspector General's report on
the Gulf War mobilization found that the resource and training status
ratings for the brigades overstated their actual level of training
readiness.  For example, most METL tasks were rated as fully or
partially trained, but many units could not demonstrate proficiency
in basic skills, such as sighting the weapons on their tanks. 

During our review, National Guard and active Army officials
repeatedly referred to the continuing "us and them" environment.  For
example, one brigade commander told us that, although he had good
personal relationships with his active Army counterparts, he believed
the Army's decision to eliminate the roundout/up role for the Guard
was actually motivated to keep the Guard out of any combat role and
thus preserve funding for the active Army.  Other Guard officials
told us that the active Army did not understand the unique
difficulties faced by their personnel, often expected too much, and
excluded them from decision-making.  Active Army officials told us
that Guard personnel did not understand Army training doctrine and
needed to learn to be more objective in assessments of their training
proficiency.  According to these officials, the Guard cannot be as
ready as active Army units because it has only 39 days of annual
training compared with about 240 days for active units. 


--------------------
\5 The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War,
Congressional Research Service, October 1991. 


   ENHANCED BRIGADE CONCEPT
   CONFUSES POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
   OTHER INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

The Army and Congress also introduced other initiatives in the early
1990s to better integrate the active Army and Guard and strengthen
training support and oversight of Guard operations.  However, the
potential effectiveness of these initiatives is unclear primarily due
to the changes brought about by the enhanced brigade concept.  For
example, at the time the initiatives were introduced, a wartime tie
existed between the former roundout/up brigades and their active Army
sponsor divisions.  However, the enhanced brigade concept has severed
this relationship. 

One initiative was the attempt under Bold Shift to increase the
training support provided by the active Army divisions with whom the
brigades held a predetermined wartime affiliation.  For example, Bold
Shift attempted to ensure that these active Army sponsor divisions
were located near the brigades.  Instead of just observing and
assessing the brigades' conduct of their own training, Bold Shift
made the sponsor divisions responsible for helping support the
training of the brigades by setting up firing ranges and exercises
and providing other direct assistance. 

Some Guard officials raised concerns that severing the predetermined
wartime ties with sponsor divisions under the enhanced brigade
concept was a step backward from this Bold Shift initiative.  This
wartime interdependence provided a measure of shared accountability
between the Guard brigades, active Army sponsor units, and advisers
who reported to the sponsor units. 

Although the brigades are continuing peacetime training associations
with active Army sponsor units, brigade officials were concerned that
the sponsors have no incentive to provide strong training support,
since the brigades no longer round out or round up the divisions
during wartime.  According to several of the brigades, active Army
support for such things as setting up firing ranges during annual
training has already been reduced.  Army officials told us that the
Guard brigades would lose some of the routine support previously
provided by the active Army sponsors.  However, the sponsors will
continue to provide support during annual training, although some
support roles will now be taken over by the advisers.  The enhanced
brigade concept also lowered the priority of four of the seven former
roundout/up brigades for resources, since that priority was linked to
that of their active Army wartime sponsors. 

Another initiative was to increase sponsor unit oversight of the
brigades, under Congress' Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform
Act of 1992.  According to this legislation, the associated active
Army sponsor units became responsible in 1993 for agreeing or
disagreeing with recommended promotions above the level of first
lieutenant in the brigades.  By 1995 the sponsor divisions were
expected to be responsible for approving training programs, reviewing
readiness reports, assessing resource requirements, and validating
the compatibility of the Guard unit with active Army forces. 
According to officials at active Army sponsor units, the legislation
formalizes informal reviews of training plans and readiness reports
that some active units have been conducting for years as part of
their sponsor role. 

The weakening of incentives for shared accountability and the factors
that influenced some advisers to avoid aggressive evaluation of
brigade problems could also hamper aggressive oversight by the
sponsor units.  For example, the Army Inspector General's report on
the mobilization for the Gulf War found that sponsor units for the
brigades were not challenging brigade Unit Status Reports that
overstated their level of training readiness.  According to sponsor
unit officials, some units do take a critical look at the reports,
but the criteria for assessing training readiness is so subjective
that it is difficult to challenge inflated reports.  Other units
stated that they do not challenge the reports, even if they do appear
inflated.  Instead, they pass their own estimate up through channels
along with the brigade's estimate.  (See ch.  4 for more detail on
this subject.)


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

Any significant improvement in the proficiency levels of National
Guard combat brigades are not likely to be attained without a marked
improvement in the relationship between the active Army and the
Guard.  The "us and them" environment must change if Guard combat
brigades are to meet the expectations set out for them in the
national defense strategy. 

We believe that at least two critical elements are needed to achieve
a smoother relationship between the active Army and the Guard.  The
first element is clear and reasonable peacetime training goals, which
are fully supportive of military needs, accepted by all participants,
and adequately communicated to all parties.  Without goals that are
mutually acceptable and effectively communicated, confusion over
program direction will linger and foster continuing disagreement and
misunderstanding of training readiness.  The second element is a
mutually acceptable role for advisers in Guard brigade operations
that balances the right of National Guard command prerogative with
the need to identify and correct training problems.  In this regard,
we do not believe the effectiveness of the adviser program should be
determined primarily by an individual adviser's ability to succeed in
interpersonal relations. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with
National Guard leaders, direct the Chief of Staff of the Army to

  reassess premobilization training goals for the enhanced brigades
     to ensure that they are consistent with readiness requirements
     and achievable within available training time and resources;

  document the training goals in guidance provided to the brigades;

  reassess the role of advisers assigned to the enhanced brigades,
     clearly stipulate whether advisers are to identify and resolve
     training problems or only assist with training, ensure that
     advisers have the authority necessary to carry out their role,
     and document the advisers' role in memorandums of understanding
     with each state; and

  test additional steps to improve the integration of advisers
     assigned to the enhanced brigades by, for example, (1) providing
     the advisers with formal authority to review and agree or
     disagree with unit training plans and readiness reports, (2)
     including National Guard commanders as intermediate raters for
     all RTD advisers, (3) increasing enhanced brigade personnel
     authorizations to allow RTD active duty officers to augment key
     brigade positions such as executive officers and training and
     operations officers, and (4) restructuring or increasing the
     size of adviser teams assigned to the brigades to provide for
     additional master gunners or other noncommissioned technical
     experts. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:8

DOD agreed with our first three recommendations.  It said that the
Army planned to (1) establish the minimum essential premobilization
training objectives that the brigades must meet in the areas of
gunnery, platoon maneuver proficiency, and command and staff
training; (2) document the goals in regulations; and (3) prepare
detailed guidance that should eliminate confusion about the role of
advisers. 

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to test additional steps to
improve the integration of advisers assigned to the enhanced
brigades.  It stated that it believed the recommendation would
subvert the chain of command and place advisers in an untenable
position.  DOD explained that our report implied that state command
of the Guard units removed the obligation to accept adviser
recommendations, oversimplifying the fact that Guard units must meet
Army standards in all activities to retain federal recognition.  DOD
further stated that advisers could not simultaneously play the role
of adviser and evaluator. 

We agree that the brigades must meet Army standards and that the
brigade commander is ultimately responsible for resolving problems. 
However, the issue addressed in our report pertains to the question
of what role advisers should play to ensure a proper balance between
the Guard's command prerogative and the prompt identification and
correction of training readiness problems. 

We believe that advisers can simultaneously advise and evaluate the
brigades without subverting the chain of command.  Advisers are
uniquely qualified to evaluate unit training and readiness by virtue
of their daily presence at the brigades.  This role would also be
consistent with the responsibility of the active Army unit associated
with the brigades for approving training programs and reviewing
readiness reports, since the advisers report to these active Army
units. 

The feasibility of active duty personnel assisting as well as
evaluating reserve units has been demonstrated by the Marine Corps'
Inspector-Instructor program.  The mission of Inspector-Instructor
personnel is not only to assist units in maintaining a continuous
state of readiness but also to supervise and inspect the units.  In
this regard, Marine Inspector-Instructors have formal responsibility
for monitoring and evaluating unit training and other readiness
aspects.  Although there are significant differences between the
Marine Reserves and the Army National Guard, the former Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, House of
Representatives, testified in 1993 that he intended for the Army
advisers to be used similar to the Marine Inspector-Instructors.\6


--------------------
\6 Hearings on the Link Between Force Structure and Manpower
Requirements, Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, House
Armed Services Committee, Report 103-5, March 1993, pp.  48 and 188. 


PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THE 90-DAY
DEPLOYMENT GOAL ARE UNCERTAIN
============================================================ Chapter 4

It is highly uncertain whether the National Guard combat brigades can
be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization.  Initial
postmobilization models estimated that the brigades would need
between 68 and 110 days before being ready to deploy.  These
estimates, however, assumed that the brigades' peacetime training
proficiency would improve to levels near those envisioned by Bold
Shift, thus shortening postmobilization training.  One model, which
included the possibility that the strategy's goals would not be met,
estimated that as many as 154 days could be required to prepare the
brigades to deploy. 

An Army contractor is developing a new postmobilization model, which
estimates that two to three brigades could be ready to deploy in 102
days.  However, the Army has not endorsed the model, and there are a
number of unanswered questions about the availability of the
resources needed to mobilize all 15 enhanced brigades quickly. 
Although some brigades have reported that they could be ready to
deploy in less than one-half the time predicted in the models, these
reports omit key steps in the postmobilization training process. 


   MODELS PREDICT THAT BRIGADES
   NEED OVER 90 DAYS TO PREPARE TO
   DEPLOY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

Postmobilization models for mechanized infantry and armor brigades
developed by the Director of Army Training, Army Inspector General,
and Rand Corporation in 1991 and 1992 estimated that the brigades
would need 93 to 98, 68 to 110, and 96 to 154 days, respectively,
before being ready to deploy.  However, the more optimistic estimates
by the Director of Army Training and Army Inspector General were
based on the assumption that the brigades would reach a higher level
of proficiency during peacetime training than has been realized.  The
new postmobilization model shortens the training time predicted by
earlier models, in part, by assuming that training would be conducted
at one site large enough to handle brigade-level exercises against an
opposing force instead of some training being performed at one site
and then a second, larger site for brigade-level exercises.  The Army
has not stated whether it endorses these models or believes other
plans for preparing the brigades are needed. 


      INITIAL MODELS ESTIMATE
      68 TO 154 DAYS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1

In February 1992, the Army Chief of Staff testified before the House
Committee on Armed Services that the Army could not have the Guard
brigades ready to deploy with less than 60 to 90 days of
postmobilization preparation time.  The Chief of Staff attributed
this to the brigades' difficulty in reaching a high enough level of
peacetime training proficiency, in only 39 days of training, to be
able to lower the postmobilization time requirements.  In 1993, the
Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review reiterated that the goal for
the enhanced brigades was to have them ready to deploy in 90 days. 

In 1991 and 1992, the Director of Army Training, Army Inspector
General, and Rand Corporation, under contract to the Army, all
produced models analyzing the training and other actions needed to
prepare the mechanized infantry and armor brigades to be ready to
deploy to a war zone.\1 (We found no models estimating the time
needed for light infantry brigades to be ready to deploy.) The models
generally included three basic steps:  mobilization, collective
training on combat skills, and training recovery and preparation to
deploy.  The particular content of each step may vary based on the
particular needs of the mission, an analysis of enemy capabilities,
the type of terrain, and the time available.  The range of tasks and
time required to train for them may also vary based on the level of
proficiency sought and the premobilization training proficiency
achieved. 

The first step, mobilization, included such actions as assembling the
troops, moving them to the mobilization or collective training
stations, and preparing them to move overseas.  Units would perform
administrative and personnel processing at the mobilization and
collective training sites.  Soldiers would receive individual
refresher training in common combat skills, such as map reading and
weapons qualification, as well as their particular job duties.  Wills
and family care plans and other preparations for overseas movement
would be completed, and personnel from other units would be assigned
to fill any vacancies. 

The second step, collective training, included a progression of
training on the unit skills needed from the lowest to highest
echelon.  Two basic phases are involved in this step.  First,
individual tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews, and the platoons
they form when combined, would need to ready themselves to function
as part of a larger group and correct any maintenance problems with
their tanks and Bradleys.  Since some crews may have new personnel,
they might need to practice on simulators before moving to the
gunnery ranges.  The crews would then proceed through the sequence of
gunnery tables up through platoon-level proficiency at
table XII. 

Second, the unit would move up to company-, battalion-, and
brigade-level operations.  Bradley and armor platoons would be
integrated into company teams to practice mission-essential tasks,
such as attacking and defending.  Multiple company teams would then
come together to practice operations under a battalion task force
headquarters.  The battalion task forces might also come together to
form a complete brigade and practice offensive and defensive battles
against an opposing force.  Because of the space requirements for
such a large-scale action, the brigade would generally have to
relocate from its collective training site to one of the few sites
set up to handle brigade operations, such as the National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California. 

The third step, recovery and preparation to deploy, occurs after
training is completed and the unit is back at its mobilization
station.  In this step, the unit would conduct maintenance on its
equipment after its use in training and prepare to load the equipment
for overseas shipment to the war zone. 

The three models established new postmobilization training time
estimates based on the innovations in training set forth by the Bold
Shift strategy.  As shown in table 4.1, the Director of Army Training
and Army Inspector General estimates ranged as high as 8 and 20 days,
respectively, over the goal of 90 days.  However, the Rand
Corporation estimated that as much as 154 days could be required to
prepare the brigades to deploy.  The estimates all assumed that large
numbers of active Army personnel would be available to help the
brigades conduct the training. 



                          Table 4.1
           
               Director of Army Training, Army
           Inspector General, and Rand Estimates of
               the Number of Days Required for
                  Postmobilization Training

                      (Figures in days)

                            Director        Army        Rand
                             of Army   Inspector  Corporatio
Activity                    Training     General           n
------------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Mobilization                       7        7-12       11-15
Collective training            86-91       54-84    78-125\a
Recovery and preparation           0        7-14        7-14
 to deploy
============================================================
Total                          93-98      68-110      96-154
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Rand's baseline estimate was 79 to 128 days.  However, the
estimate assumed that collective training, including a brigade-level
exercise, would be conducted at one site without having to move to
the National Training Center.  The time required to move a brigade
and its equipment to and from the Training Center was estimated by
Rand to add between 17 and 26 days.  We added these days to Rand's
base estimate for comparison with the other models. 

The different estimates were a result of differences in the models'
assumptions and approaches.  For example, unlike the other estimates,
the Director of Army Training model did not set aside a specific
block of time for recovery activities, generally estimated at 7 to 14
days.  According to members of the team that developed the estimate,
they believed enough flexibility was built into the overall schedule
to allow the brigades to complete training, clean up their equipment,
and move directly from the collective training site to the port of
deployment. 

The main reason for the differences, however, was that the Director
of Army Training and Army Inspector General assumed that the brigades
would generally meet the Bold Shift strategy's peacetime training
goals, thereby shortening postmobilization training time.  For
example, both estimates assumed that brigade staffing would be about
110 percent of authorized strength, which would help the brigades to
mobilize with fully trained leaders and about 85 percent of their
soldiers fully trained in their duty specialties.  However, as
discussed in chapter 2, in 1993 the brigades averaged about 94
percent of authorized strength, and only about 70 percent of their
officers and 58 percent of their noncommissioned officers were fully
trained.  The Director of Army Training and Inspector General
estimates also assumed that platoons would achieve premobilization
proficiency in METL tasks and that 70 to 100 percent of the tank and
Bradley crews would be qualified at the gunnery table VIII level. 
However, in 1993 the platoons were fully trained in only about 14
percent of their METL tasks, and about 64 percent of the crews met
table VIII standards. 

The Rand Corporation included estimates for a range of outcomes
resulting from the implementation of the Bold Shift strategy,
including the possibility that the strategy's goals would not be met. 
This assumption increased the Rand estimate for collective training
by 34 to 41 days over the Director of Army Training and Army
Inspector General estimates.  Under Rand's scenario, the units that
had difficulty meeting the goals would suffer high personnel
turnover.  Attendance at annual collective training would be lowered
by attendance at individual training courses, and most annual
training would be devoted to gunnery.  This would leave little time
for maneuver training in METL tasks.  Squad and platoon skills would
be difficult to sustain because of the focus on gunnery, limited time
for weekend training, and difficulties in gaining access to local
training areas.  Company-level training would require more time
because the platoons needed more training time and repeat training. 


--------------------
\1 90/365 Day Post Mobilization Training, Director of Army Training,
April 1992.  Special Assessment of the Mobilization of Army National
Guard Combat Brigades, Army Inspector General, June 1991. 
Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units,
Rand Corporation, 1992. 


      NEW MODEL PREDICTS 102 DAYS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2

The Rand Corporation is currently developing a new postmobilization
training model for the Army, which is expected to be completed during
the summer of 1995.  As of January 1995, the new model was predicting
that the better enhanced brigades--for example, those who had
qualified most of their crews at the gunnery table VIII level and had
75 percent of their soldiers trained in assigned jobs--could be ready
to deploy about 102 days after mobilization.  Army officials told us
they were studying the model and various options for implementing it. 
However, there are a number of unresolved questions about the
availability of the personnel, training facilities, and other
resources needed to ensure that all 15 enhanced brigades can be
trained and ready to deploy quickly. 

The current version of the model is based on the same three steps as
earlier models:  mobilization, collective training, and recovery and
preparation to deploy.  As shown in table 4.2, the times allotted for
mobilization and recovery are similar to the earlier models. 



                          Table 4.2
           
           Comparison of New Rand Postmobilization
                  Model With Previous Models

                      (Figures in days)

                                    Army
                      Director  Inspecto
                       of Army         r  Previous
                      Training   General      Rand  New Rand
Activity                 model     model     model     model
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Mobilization                 7      7-12     11-15        12
Collective training      86-91     54-84    78-125        80
Recovery and                 0      7-14      7-14        10
 preparation to
 deploy
============================================================
Total                    93-98    68-110    96-154       102
------------------------------------------------------------
The largest difference between the former and current Rand models was
in collective training.  The 1992 Rand model estimated that as much
as 125 days could be required in this step, whereas the new model
included only 80 days.  Both models include the progression from crew
and platoon proficiency to company teams, battalion task forces, and
brigade-level exercises against an opposing force.  However, the new
model cuts as much as 26 days off the time by starting collective
training at a site large enough to handle brigade-level exercises
without moving to a second site. 

Under the earlier models, one scenario was for the units to conduct
collective training through company and battalion levels at one
training site and then move to the National Training Center or
another site large enough to handle brigade-level exercises. 
However, the time for moving the equipment and soldiers to and from
the new site was estimated at between 17 and 26 days. 

Army officials told us that postmobilization training would also be
shortened by improved planning for pre- and postmobilization
training.  According to these officials, Bold Shift provided clearer
and better focused peacetime training expectations than the brigades
had at the time of the Gulf War.  In addition, the new
postmobilization model is developing a plan that matches the brigades
with the personnel, training facilities, and other resources needed
to ensure efficient postmobilization training. 

Army officials told us they were studying options to train two to
three brigades at a time.  However, under the model, training three
brigades at a time could require about 300 days to prepare the seven
armor and mechanized infantry brigades.  It is not clear how much
more time would be required to prepare the remaining eight light
infantry and armored cavalry brigades.  Options to shorten the time
to prepare all 15 brigades for deployment appear limited.  For
example, according to Army officials, increasing the number of
brigades in each training group to five and starting the second
group's training before the first was finished would require about 10
sites suitable for brigade-level exercises, 6,800 trainers, 3,000
National Guard assist personnel, and 10 brigades to provide opposing
forces. 

It is also not clear how the Army will provide the large numbers of
personnel and training sites needed to quickly prepare all 15
enhanced brigades to perform their wartime role.  For example, during
the Gulf War, nearly 9,000 active Army personnel were committed to
help train the three Guard brigades that were mobilized.  These Army
personnel performed such functions as running gunnery ranges, helping
with training exercises, and evaluating training proficiency, which
freed the Guard brigades to focus on training.  Active Army personnel
also provided the opposing forces needed for brigade force-on-force
exercises. 

According to Army and Rand officials, the new model assumes that the
5,000 advisers plus an additional 2,800 active Army trainers from
other programs would be available to provide the training needed. 
Under the model, each brigade would require about 1,000 support
personnel:  680 active Army trainers and 300 National Guard personnel
to assist them, as well as another 3,000 personnel to form the
opposing force brigade.  However, only 2,000 advisers had been
assigned as of September 1994, with the remaining 3,000 scheduled to
be assigned by September 1997. 

In addition, Army officials told us that there are currently only two
trained opposing forces in the United States and one in Germany.  The
officials believed that National Guard personnel could be trained to
perform as opposing forces in 1 to 2 years.  According to the
officials, a total of seven training sites are being considered to
provide the space needed for brigade-level exercises.  However, at
least one of these sites has environmental constraints that could
limit its use. 


   BRIGADE ESTIMATES WERE
   SUBJECTIVE AND UNREALISTICALLY
   LOW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

In recent years, all the brigades have reported that they could meet
the 90-day deployment goal.  Brigade estimates of collective training
time reported in Unit Status Reports were, in some cases, less than
half the 86 to 91 days estimated in the Director of Army Training
model.\2

According to brigade officials, postmobilization collective training
estimates were based on current levels of proficiency in individual
training, METL tasks, gunnery, and personnel staffing.  However, the
estimates did not assume that the brigades needed to meet the Bold
Shift peacetime training goals to meet the 90-day postmobilization
goal.  The estimates also excluded brigade-level exercises against an
opposing force at the National Training Center or other site with
sufficient space for such exercises.  These exercises, according to
the Army Inspector General, could add as much as 38 days to training
time.  For example, one brigade reported that it could achieve full
proficiency with only 60 days of postmobilization training, even
though it had been reorganized, had two battalions in new equipment
training that were unable to qualify in gunnery, and had not
conducted a consolidated annual training period with all its units at
the same site for 3 years.  Another brigade estimated it would need
only 37 days of training. 

According to officials from active Army sponsor units, the brigades
can be trained in less than 90 days by omitting such activities as
brigade-level force-on-force exercises.  However, these actions would
increase the risk of a higher number of casualties.  Similar comments
were made by others during the Gulf War mobilization.  For example,
according to a Congressional Research Service report on the roundout
brigades mobilization, one active Army division commander stated that
Guard combat brigades could deploy and fight immediately but with
enormously high risk and at the cost of many casualties.  This
commander believed that it would take about 120 days to get his Guard
brigade fully trained. 

The Army has neither endorsed the deployment models nor included them
in regulations and procedures guiding brigade estimates of
postmobilization requirements.\3 The Army also has no objective
training performance measurement system to analyze peacetime training
proficiency and link it to the number of postmobilization training
days required for the brigades to be ready to deploy.  According to
brigade officials, the estimates in Unit Status Reports are
subjective assessments of the time needed to train.  Army guidance
currently requires the brigades to estimate the training days
required to achieve full proficiency in METL tasks based on
subjective considerations of peacetime training proficiency, the
status of personnel and equipment, the adequacy of nearby training
areas, and the mission. 

Army guidance does not provide commanders with specific information
to help guide their estimates of the number of training days the
brigades would need.  This information consists of (1) objective
measures of peacetime training proficiency, such as the Bold Shift
goals; (2) the general training steps, such as brigade-level
force-on-force exercises, which should comprise postmobilization
training; or (3) objective definitions of the relationship between
various levels of peacetime training proficiency and postmobilization
training requirements.  The Army also has no system to provide
centralized information on the status of training relative to the
Bold Shift goals.  For example, we had to query each brigade
individually down to the company level to obtain information on
proficiency in METL tasks and leader training. 

Brigade and active Army officials told us that, under the current
system, the brigades feel pressured to keep postmobilization training
time estimates at 42 days or less because of that estimate's
perceived linkage with the brigades' ability to perform their wartime
mission.  Army guidance equates the estimated days with the unit's
training status, or "T-level." Estimates over 42 days are T-level 4. 
According to brigade officials, the T-level is equated with the
unit's overall status relative to the training and resources needed
to perform its wartime mission, or "C-level." For example, T-level 4
is equated to C-level 4, which indicates that the unit needs
additional resources or training to undertake its wartime mission. 

Difficulties with the subjective nature of the C-level rating system
have been reported by the Army Inspector General and us for years.\4
For example, 2 years before it reported inflated C-level ratings
during the Gulf War mobilization, the Inspector General reported that
guidance on the translation of required training days into C-levels
might be too vague and that unit commanders had been first deciding
what C-level their units should be and then looking up the associated
number of training days and reporting that number.  According to the
Inspector General, the reports were clearly labeled as status
reports, but unit commanders had perceived them as readiness reports. 
The reports were sent through active Army channels, but the
commanders making the estimates were rarely challenged to show what
and how they would train during the estimated days.  As a result,
C-levels did not reflect the true training proficiency levels in the
units. 


--------------------
\2 The Army requires commanders to complete Unit Status Reports,
which assess the status of their personnel, equipment, and training
in terms of five overall "C-levels." C-1, for example, indicates that
the unit possesses the resources and training to undertake its full
wartime mission.  C-5 indicates that the unit is not prepared to
undertake its wartime mission. 

\3 These models could be included in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit
Status Reporting, July 1993, and the U.S.  Army Forces Command
Mobilization and Deployment Planning System. 

\4 Special Inspection Report:  Readiness Reporting Systems,
Department of the Army Inspector General, July 1989, and Army
Training:  Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable
(GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb.  15, 1991). 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

Given the current level of proficiency in the Bold Shift goals, the
brigades would have difficulty meeting the Army's 90-day goal if
mobilized today under existing modeling approaches.  Also, the
ability to meet this goal in the future rests largely on the success
of untested adjustments to the training strategy and the availability
of substantially greater resources than exist today. 

Existing models make various assumptions regarding postmobilization
training requirements and the supporting resources that will be
necessary, such as trainers and training sites.  However, the Army
has not stated whether it endorses these models or believes other
plans for preparing the brigades are needed.  A credible estimate of
the postmobilization days needed to prepare Guard brigades to deploy
rests largely on answers to these questions.  A more objective system
for brigade commanders to assess peacetime training proficiency and
postmobilization training times may help prevent unrealistic
deployment estimates and higher expectations of training proficiency
than may be warranted. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with
National Guard leaders, direct the Chief of Staff of the Army to

  establish and document an Army plan for preparing the enhanced
     brigades to be ready to deploy to war that (1) is based on
     realistic assessments of peacetime training proficiency and the
     resources available to support postmobilization training and (2)
     stipulates the training steps involved, including when
     brigade-level training against an opposing force is not
     required;

  estimate the timing of the brigades' availability for war based on
     the Army's plan; and

  establish a training performance measurement system to provide (1)
     objective measures of the enhanced brigade's peacetime training
     proficiency, (2) centralized oversight information about the
     status of training relative to those measures, and (3) criteria
     for commanders to follow when estimating postmobilization
     training time requirements. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5

DOD agreed with our recommendations.  It said that (1) ongoing
improvements to the Army's premobilization training strategy, such as
developing an alternate gunnery strategy, would provide the
foundation needed for improved postmobilization planning and (2)
ongoing improvements to the Army's training readiness reporting
system would identify critical training events and resources,
establish objective training proficiency measures, and enable
commanders to correlate training readiness to predeployment time
constraints.  DOD also said that it expected these and other planned
initiatives to be in place by fiscal year 1999 and that the brigades
were expected to be ready to deploy within
90 days at that time.  The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan will
provide specific deployment timelines. 

Nevertheless, DOD said that our conclusion regarding prospects for
the brigades' ability to deploy in 90 days was based on studies that
did not completely reflect a thorough analysis of lessons learned
from the Gulf War mobilizations or enhancements now being applied to
the brigades.  DOD further noted that our report did not include a
1992 study by the Institute for Defense Analysis, which indicated
that units could reduce postmobilization training time 20 to 40
percent by better use of simulation technology.\5

The studies that we used were the most detailed analyses of
postmobilization training requirements made and were based on
extensive analysis of the Gulf War mobilization.  The Army Inspector
General's study, for example, was specifically chartered to assess
the mobilization of the Guard brigades.  Moreover, the Institute for
Defense Analysis used the Inspector General's study and Rand's 1992
study as the baseline for its analysis. 

We did not include a discussion of the Institute's findings because,
according to the report, it represented only an initial effort to
define new conceptual possibilities to improve brigade readiness. 
The report cautions that its 20- to 40-percent savings estimate
should be taken only as demonstrating great promise rather than
documenting proven potential. 

Also, DOD said that during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the
Guard's 48th Brigade was certified as fully trained 91 days after its
mobilization, despite the absence of preexisting postmobilization
plans.  We believe that citing this statistic is misleading. 
Although the brigade did complete mobilization and collective
training in 91 days, it was not ready for deployment at that time. 
For example, the brigade and its equipment were still at the National
Training Center; therefore, the brigade would have needed time to
perform equipment maintenance and ready itself for deployment. 
Rand's current model estimates this time, generally referred to as
recovery time, at 10 days. 

As previously discussed, nearly 9,000 active Army personnel were used
to help train the three Guard brigades that were mobilized.  It is
not clear how the Army will provide the required numbers of personnel
and the training sites needed to quickly prepare the brigades for
deployment.  DOD said it recognized that these factors limited the
number of combat units that could train simultaneously. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I

--------------------
\5 Alternative Approaches to Organizing Training and Assessing Army
and Marine Corps Units, Institute for Defense Analysis, November
1992. 


COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADES INCLUDED
IN OUR REVIEW
========================================================== Appendix II

27th Infantry Brigade (Light), Syracuse, New York\1
48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Macon, Georgia\1
81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Seattle, Washington
116th Cavalry Brigade, Boise, Idaho\1
155th Armor Brigade, Tupelo, Mississippi\1
218th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Newberry, South Carolina
256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Lafayette, Louisiana


--------------------
\1 These are our case study brigades. 


KEY REPORTS ON NATIONAL GUARD
TRAINING
========================================================= Appendix III

Report of the Enhanced Brigade Task Force, Department of the Army,
April 1994. 

Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Secretary of Defense, October 1993. 

Reserve Forces:  Aspects of the Army's Equipping Strategy Hamper
Reserve Readiness (GAO/NSIAD-93-11, Feb.  18, 1993). 

Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: 
Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Rand Corporation, 1992. 

History of Reserve Component Mobilization:  Operation Desert
Shield/Storm August 1990-July 1991, Second U.S.  Army, 1992. 

Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units,
Rand Corporation, 1992. 

Army Force Structure:  Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy,
Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec.  15, 1992). 

Army Training:  Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard
Roundout Brigades (GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov.  4, 1992). 

Structuring U.S.  Forces After the Cold War:  Costs and Effects of
Increased Reliance on the Reserves, Congressional Budget Office,
September 1992. 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:  Final Report to Congress,
Department of Defense, April 1992. 

90/365 Day Post Mobilization Training, Director of Army Training,
April 1992. 

Operation Desert Storm:  Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate
Active and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar.  10, 1992). 

Mobilization of the Reserve Components for Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S.  Army
Combined Arms Command, February 1992. 

Manning Full-Time Positions in Support of the Selected Reserve, Rand
Corporation, 1991. 

Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability, Rand Corporation,
1991. 

Special Assessment of Operation Desert Shield/Storm Mobilization,
Department of the Army Inspector General, December 1991. 

The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, Congressional
Research Service, October 1991. 

National Guard:  Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat
Brigades for Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-91-263, Sept.  24, 1991). 

Army Reserve Forces:  Applying Features of Other Countries' Reserves
Could Provide Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-91-239, Aug.  30, 1991). 

After Action Report:  Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert
Storm, Army National Guard, June 1991. 

Special Assessment:  National Guard Brigades' Mobilization,
Department of the Army Inspector General, June 1991. 

Persian Gulf War:  U.S.  Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves,
Congressional Research Service, March 1991. 

Special Assessment of Training Execution, Department of the Army
Inspector General, February 1991. 

Army Training:  Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always
Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb.  15, 1991). 

Special Inspection Report:  Readiness Reporting Systems, Department
of the Army Inspector General, July 1989. 

Army Training:  Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists
Training (GAO/NSIAD-89-140, June 30, 1989). 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Charles J.  Bonanno, Assistant Director
Karen S.  Blum, Communications Analyst

ATLANTA REGIONAL OFFICE

John W.  Nelson, Evaluator-in-Charge
Harry F.  Jobes, Site Senior
Maria Storts, Evaluator
Gerald L.  Winterlin, Evaluator

