Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed (Chapter
Report, 11/21/94, GAO/NSIAD-95-9).
Of the $6.2 billion the Army plans to spend on aviation modernization
through fiscal year 1999, $4.7 billion is earmarked for two helicopter
programs--the Comanche and the Longbow Apache. GAO found that these
acquisitions are costly, face considerable technical risk, and may not
deliver the promised enhanced capabilities. Moreover, major changes
have occurred in the threat environment and in the force structure that
could substantially change the number and mix of helicopters that the
Army needs to buy. The Defense Department's (DOD) Bottom-Up Review used
different total force structure and unit composition data than did the
Army to determine the size of the Army's attack and reconnaissance
fleet. The Army's estimates of the quantities of helicopters needed are
higher than those subsequently identified by DOD. Therefore, the
validity of the Army's aviation modernization strategy is questionable.
Finally, DOD and Army studies have not fully considered alternative
helicopters and weapon systems that could accomplish many of the planned
roles and missions of the Comanche.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-9
TITLE: Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed
DATE: 11/21/94
SUBJECT: Military aircraft
Helicopters
Combat readiness
Advanced weapons systems
Army procurement
Defense contingency planning
Military cost control
Procurement evaluation
Defense economic analysis
Future budget projections
IDENTIFIER: Comanche Helicopter
Longbow Apache Helicopter
Army Aviation Modernization Plan
Kiowa Helicopter
DOD Bottom-Up Review
Army Long Range Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan
Black Hawk Helicopter
Cobra Helicopter
HELLFIRE Missile
Sidewinder Missile
Army Aviation Restructure Initiative
Huey Helicopter
Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Abrams Tank
Army Advanced Field Artillery System
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
November 1994
ARMY AVIATION - MODERNIZATION
STRATEGY NEEDS TO BE REASSESSED
GAO/NSIAD-95-9
Army Aviation
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
COEA - cost and operational effectiveness analysis
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-257915
November 21, 1994
The Honorable Norman Sisisky
Chairman
The Honorable James B. Hansen
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
In response to your request, this report discusses the validity of
the Army's plan for modernizing its aviation fleet and describes
alternatives to the strategy's proposed armed reconnaissance and
light attack helicopter. It also identifies funding issues
surrounding the Army's decisions to acquire its aviation fleet.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretaries of Defense and the Army and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. Copies of this report will also be made
available to others on request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Louis J. Rodrigues,
Director of Systems Development and Production Issues, who may be
reached on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions.
Major contributors are listed in appendix II.
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Of the $6.2 billion the Army plans to spend on aviation modernization
during fiscal years 1995-1999, $4.7 billion, or about 76 percent,
will be spent on two helicopter programs--the Comanche and the
Longbow Apache. However, significant changes have occurred in the
threat environment and in the force structure that could
substantially change the number and mix of helicopters the Army needs
to buy.
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee,
requested that GAO review how the Army is modernizing its aviation
force, in particular its attack and reconnaissance helicopters.
GAO's objectives were to determine whether (1) the Army's plan for
modernizing its aviation fleet is still valid, (2) there are
alternative aircraft systems to the ones the Army plans to acquire,
and (3) the Army's funding plans include all of the helicopter
systems that it says it needs.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
The foundation of the Army's current aviation modernization strategy
was originally documented in the Army's Aviation Modernization Plan
approved by the Secretary of the Army on November 2, 1992, which was
modified by the February 1993 Aviation Restructure Initiative
prepared by the Army Aviation Warfighting Center. The objectives of
the Army's modernization efforts were to (1) correct deficiencies in
the Army's aviation force structure, particularly in its
reconnaissance and attack capabilities; (2) reduce aviation
maintenance and support requirements; (3) reduce aviation operating
costs; and (4) retire old aircraft. These objectives were to be
achieved within anticipated funding levels.
To carry out its modernization strategy, the Army intends to (1)
procure about 1,300 Comanche helicopters, some with enhancements
provided by the Army's Longbow program, (2) modify 761 existing
Apaches with some or all of the Longbow upgrades, and (3) purchase
approximately 350 Kiowa Warrior helicopters to use until the Comanche
is introduced. The Army plans to use the Apache as an interim armed
reconnaissance helicopter until the Comanche is fielded. Of the $6.2
billion the Army plans to spend on aviation modernization during
fiscal years 1995-1999, $4.7 billion, or about 76 percent, will be
spent on the Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters.
On September 1, 1993, the Secretary of Defense released the results
of the Bottom-Up Review. This review, which evaluated the Department
of Defense's (DOD) modernization efforts, supported the continuation
of the Army's aviation modernization initiative but with a reduced
force structure. The review recommended that the force be cut from
20 divisions to 10 active divisions and approximately 5 reserve
divisions by the end of 1999.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The Bottom-Up Review used different total force structure and unit
composition data than the Army to determine the size of the Army's
attack and reconnaissance fleet. The Army's estimates of the
quantities of helicopters needed are higher than those subsequently
identified by DOD. Therefore, the validity of the Army's aviation
modernization strategy is now questionable.
In addition, the Army overstated expected benefits and understated
technical risks associated with the major systems that comprise its
modernization strategy. While the Army believes that it can
accomplish its modernization objectives, some users--field commanders
and pilots--are concerned that implementation of the current
procurement plan could result in an inappropriate mix and quantity of
helicopters and, therefore, adversely impact their operational
effectiveness.
Additionally, DOD and Army studies have not fully considered
alternative helicopters and weapon systems that could accomplish many
of the planned roles and missions of the strategy's centerpiece--the
Comanche. Decisions to use alternative helicopters could alter the
mix and quantity of helicopters in the Army's projected fleet. The
lack of full consideration of alternatives raises further doubts
about the validity of the strategy.
For its aviation modernization strategy, the Army has chosen to use
most of its available resources to procure Comanche helicopters and
upgrade Apache helicopters while deferring or canceling funding of
other Army helicopter modernization programs, such as medical
evacuation and cargo helicopters, that the Army believes are
important to the performance of its aviation missions. Further, the
Army's Comanche program will be short about $540 million through
fiscal year 2004. To address this shortfall, the Army plans to
streamline the developmental stages of the Comanche program, thereby
increasing the risks associated with entering production before the
program has been tested and shown to meet specifications.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
THE VALIDITY OF THE STRATEGY
IS NOW QUESTIONABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The Army's aviation modernization strategy may no longer be valid.
GAO found that:
The Army's current aviation modernization strategy may overstate
helicopter quantities because (1) the size of the total force
structure in the strategy used as a basis for computation does not
reflect the Bottom-Up Review's recommended reduced force structure
and (2) unit force structure data used by the Army to calculate
helicopter quantities for air cavalry units is much higher than data
used in DOD's Bottom-Up Review.
The two major helicopter acquisitions under the strategy, the
Comanche and the Longbow Apache are costly, face considerable
technical risk, and may not provide the enhanced capabilities
promised. For example, some DOD officials and Army aviation users
consider the Comanche's projected maintenance requirement
unrealistic.
Some users believe that decisions to implement the strategy may not
reflect their views and may adversely impact the operational
effectiveness of some units. For example, some users believe the
decision to move an active attack battalion to the reserves will
reduce the ability to effectively carry out rapid deployment
missions.
ALTERNATIVES NOT ADEQUATELY
CONSIDERED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
In addition, DOD and Army studies have not fully considered
alternative helicopters and weapon systems that could accomplish many
of the planned roles and missions of the strategy's centerpiece--the
Comanche. The Army looked at some alternative helicopters and
aircraft in developing past Comanche cost and operational
effectiveness analyses; however, in developing its current aviation
modernization strategy, the Army did not fully consider alternative
aircraft that can meet the Army's aviation needs. Recent DOD reviews
of force structure and roles and missions also failed to adequately
explore the issue of alternative helicopters or weapon systems in
meeting the Army's aviation needs. Decisions to use alternative
helicopters could alter the mix and quantity of helicopters in the
Army's projected fleet. The lack of full consideration of
alternatives calls into question the validity of the strategy.
In light of the changing resource environment, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, in August 1994, directed the services to develop program
options, including termination, to selected major defense acquisition
programs, one of which was the Comanche. GAO did not examine the
pros and cons of terminating the Comanche, but it did identify three
U.S.-built alternative helicopters that it believes could, if
upgraded, perform many of the Comanche's roles and missions.
ARMY AVIATION STRATEGY
FOCUSES ON TWO KEY
HELICOPTER PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Declining budgets mean that the Army cannot afford to fund all of its
modernization requirements, including those in its Aviation
Modernization Plan. To implement its Aviation Modernization Plan,
the Army has chosen to fund the Comanche procurement and Apache
upgrade programs while deferring or canceling other helicopter
modernization programs, such as medical evacuation and cargo
helicopters, that the Army believes are important to the performance
of its aviation missions. DOD maintains that the Army's
modernization program reflects the tight budget environment and the
priorities placed by the Army on all of its competing programs.
Further, the Army faces an estimated $540 million shortfall in the
Comanche program. To address this shortfall, the Army is proposing
to streamline the Comanche acquisition program. According to Army
officials, under its streamlining proposal, it plans to eliminate
some testing, buy fewer prototypes, and shorten the developmental
phase of the acquisition process by concurrently doing things that
normally should be done sequentially, thereby increasing risks
associated with entering production too soon. Concurrent development
and production have caused DOD significant problems in the past on
other systems. Problems found in developmental testing that have to
be corrected in already produced or concurrently produced models
significantly increase overall program costs.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army revise the Army's
aviation modernization strategy in order to consider (1) the revised
force structure, (2) the validated mix and quantity of helicopters
for each aviation unit, and (3) an analysis of appropriate
alternative capabilities to satisfy the aviation mission's various
roles. This could be done at the same time the next Aviation
Modernization Plan is prepared.
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In reviewing the Army's revised Aviation Modernization Plan currently
planned to be submitted in January 1995, the Congress should consider
whether it adequately addresses the issues raised in this report.
The Congress may also wish to consider requiring the Secretary of the
Army to forego any acquisition streamlining initiatives for the
Comanche program until the revised modernization strategy is
submitted.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7
DOD generally agreed with the thrust of GAO's findings; however, it
asserted that the Army's strategy did incorporate user concerns and
that the Army had adequately considered alternative aircraft in
developing the strategy. DOD pointed out that the revised Army
Aviation Modernization Plan should be issued in January 1995, and
Army leadership intends to provide it to the Congress and the
Secretary of Defense. Also, DOD noted that the Army intends to take
another look at the streamlining proposal. Therefore, DOD did not
believe GAO's recommendation and matters for congressional
consideration were necessary.
GAO has revised the report to incorporate DOD's suggested technical
corrections and to more fully explain the basis for the conclusions
regarding user perceptions. However, after careful consideration of
DOD's comments, GAO continues to believe that its recommendation and
matters for congressional consideration concerning streamlining are
still valid. Although the Army is revising its Aviation
Modernization Plan, neither DOD nor the Army provided any indication
of how the revised plan would address GAO's concerns. Moreover, DOD
provided no analyses that alternative aircraft options had been
studied in developing the Army's aviation modernization strategy.
GAO has, therefore, revised the matters for congressional
consideration to suggest that the Congress carefully review the
Army's plan to ensure that it addresses the issues in this report.
GAO has consistently reported on its concerns with concurrent
development and production of DOD's weapon systems. Therefore, GAO
continues to believe that the Army should postpone any acquisition
streamlining initiatives at least until the Aviation Modernization
Plan is reviewed by the Congress and until the future of the Comanche
program is determined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's review of
selected major acquisition programs and their alternatives.
DOD's comments are addressed in the body of this report where
appropriate and are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along
with GAO's evaluation.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The Army's current aviation modernization strategy was documented in
the Army's Aviation Modernization Plan, which was modified by the
February 1993 Aviation Restructure Initiative and validated by the
September 1993 Department of Defense's (DOD) Bottom-Up Review. In
determining its aviation requirements, the Army has designated the
Comanche helicopter as the centerpiece of its aviation modernization
strategy.
ARMY AVIATION MODERNIZATION
STRATEGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
The Army's latest biennial Aviation Modernization Plan, issued in
January 1993, was to be the Army's aviation modernization guide into
the 21st century. However, as the Army was developing the plan, the
world situation was changing. Evolving national military strategy
expanded the Army's roles in national assistance, humanitarian
assistance, counter-drug activities, peacekeeping operations, and
counterterrorism. The focus of the national warfighting doctrine
changed from a major European war to regional conflicts. The
dependence on foreign-based U.S. troops was replaced by one of
rapidly deploying U.S.-based troops overseas.
The Army's total research, development, and acquisition budget
declined by 36 percent for fiscal years 1990 through 1994. Army
acquisition funding decreased about 50 percent during this time;
however, research and development funding was more stable--remaining
in the $5 billion a year range.
Army officials realized before the 1993 update to the Aviation
Modernization Plan was issued that it would not reflect the global
and budgetary changes taking place. Therefore, the Aviation Center
at Fort Rucker, Alabama, began an effort with the intent of
redesigning the aviation force structure to resolve the problems
associated with downsizing and affordability. The resultant Army's
Aviation Restructure Initiative was issued February 3, 1993.
The current aviation modernization strategy is the product of the
1993 Aviation Modernization Plan and the Aviation Restructure
Initiative. The objectives of the Army's modernization efforts were
to (1) correct deficiencies in the Army's aviation force structure,
particularly its reconnaissance and attack capabilities; (2) reduce
aviation maintenance and support requirements; (3) reduce aviation
operating costs; and (4) retire old aircraft. These objectives were
to be achieved within anticipated funding levels. According to the
Army, modern armed reconnaissance and attack helicopter capabilities
are required to project a force worldwide and achieve battlefield
dominance. A modernized Apache fleet and the Comanche, when fielded,
would provide those capabilities.
To carry out its modernization strategy, the Army intends to (1)
procure about 1,300 Comanche helicopters, some with enhancements
provided by the Army's Longbow program, (2) modify 761 existing
Apaches with some or all of the Longbow upgrades, and (3) purchase
approximately 350 Kiowa Warrior helicopters to use until the Comanche
is introduced. The Army plans to spend $6.2 billion in research,
development, and acquisition funds to modernize its helicopter fleet
during fiscal years 1995-1999. Of that amount, $4.7 billion,
approximately 76 percent, will be spent on the Comanche and the
Longbow Apache helicopters, with which the Army intends to perform
future reconnaissance and attack missions.
The implementation of the strategy is scheduled to begin in fiscal
year 1995 and is split into two phases. Design goals have been
established for the interim time frame--from initiation through the
year 2015--and for the objective force--beyond the year 2015 when the
Comanche is to be fully fielded. As of February 1993, the Army owned
7,914 helicopters, comprising 10 different types. The strategy calls
for 4,965 helicopters, consisting of 5 types--the Chinook, Blackhawk,
Apache, Comanche, and Light Utility Helicopter.
In its September 1, 1993, report, DOD's Bottom-Up Review concluded,
among other things, that the Army should have 10 active and 5 reserve
divisions in order to maintain the capability to win 2 nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts. Regarding the Army's attack
and reconnaissance fleet, the review concluded that the Army's
modernization plan provided significant improvements and a balanced,
deployable, and sustainable fleet. A group of outside experts
evaluated the review's analysis and concluded that the Army's plan to
acquire the Comanche and the Longbow Apache would provide significant
improvements in both reconnaissance and attack capabilities.
According to the review, the life-cycle cost estimate of this option
was $75.6 billion. At the conclusion of the study, the Secretary of
Defense endorsed the Army's aviation modernization strategy with the
Comanche as its centerpiece. The current life-cycle cost estimate
for the Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters, according to
program officials and program documents, is about $157 billion, of
which about $51.6 billion is for research, development, and
acquisition.
DETERMINING ARMY AVIATION
REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The Army's process for determining its aviation requirements and
consolidating them into its budget request involves varying degrees
of analysis at three levels of the Army's organization. The Army
Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, drafts an aviation branch
assessment. This assessment is developed following guidance in the
National Military Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, and Field
Manual 100-5 on Operations and incorporates input provided by Army
aviation users. The branch assessment is a fiscally unconstrained
prioritized list of requirements--perceived deficiencies in the force
that need to be resolved.
The Center sends its assessment to the Training and Doctrine Command
where it is combined with assessments from the Army's 16 other
branches. The Command evaluates the branch assessments and develops
a list of needs for the entire Army. Based on this analysis, the
Command decides what the Army must have to be an effective fighting
force and produces a list of Army-wide aviation requirements--the
Warfighting Lens Analysis.
The Command sends this analysis to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research, Development, and Acquisition. After reviewing the
analysis, they generate the Long-Range Research, Development, and
Acquisition Plan--the Army's fiscally constrained 15-year strategic
plan for procurement. This plan helps form the basis for the Army's
portion of DOD's budget request.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee,
requested that we review how the Army is modernizing its aviation
force, in particular its attack and reconnaissance helicopters, which
represent the major portion of the Army's aviation modernization
investment. Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the Army's
plan for modernizing its aviation fleet is still valid, (2) there are
alternative aircraft systems to the ones the Army plans to acquire,
and (3) the Army's funding plans include all of the helicopter
systems that it says it needs.
We conducted the majority of our review at the U.S. Army Aviation
and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri; the U.S. Army Aviation
Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; DOD and the Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. In addition, we visited Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
and Fort Hood, Texas, to obtain the aviation user's perspective on
requirements. To obtain data on helicopter capabilities, we visited
Bell Helicopter Textron, Fort Worth, Texas; Boeing Defense and Space
Group, Helicopter Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Systems, Mesa, Arizona; and United Technologies,
Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, Connecticut. We also visited the
Comanche Joint Program Office in Trumbull, Connecticut.
To determine whether the Army's helicopter modernization plans were
still valid, we interviewed cognizant Army officials involved in the
aviation requirements setting process. The purpose of these
interviews was to gain a balanced perspective on the requirements
process from those at all organizational levels who are involved in
its implementation. Officials that we talked to who were directly
involved in the process of developing the requirement were located at
the office of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition; the offices responsible for developing requirements data
for input to and preparation of the Warfighting Lens Analysis at the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command; and offices responsible for
preparing branch assessments, which reflect critical inputs to the
requirements process such as threat analyses, doctrine,
organizational structure, training, and equipment, at the Army
Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
We also talked to active unit commanders, pilots, and aviation
maintenance personnel at the brigade, battalion, and squadron levels
who provide input to the process and eventually implement the
decisions the process produces. These individuals represented Force
Package I and Force Package II units. Commanders and pilots in Force
Package I units are those that deploy first and, therefore, require
the highest level of equipment support and training. Commanders and
pilots of Force Package II units are those that immediately follow
Force Package I units in a deployment.
Because these units are among the first to enter a conflict, we
believed that they would be keenly aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of the systems they use in the missions they perform.
Therefore, they could provide valuable insights into the current
mission deficiencies in the Army's aviation systems and how the
Army's planned strategy would address those deficiencies. This
approach was especially important in our assessment of the Comanche's
capabilities to correct deficiencies in the reconnaissance and light
attack missions as there are no production representative prototypes
to evaluate. We were able to obtain users' perceptions on how the
requirements process responded to their observation on needed and
unneeded capabilities in the Comanche helicopter.
We also obtained documentation on the roles, missions, and doctrinal
employment of helicopters and the results of previously conducted
studies or tests that evaluated a helicopter's performance or its
requirement. In addition, we obtained the supporting data used in
the Bottom-Up Review evaluation of force structure options for Army
attack and reconnaissance helicopters. We used this data to perform
our own analysis of aviation requirements for several force structure
options, including the 16-division option considered in the Bottom-Up
Review.
To determine if the Army considered alternative aircraft in
developing its aviation modernization strategy, we interviewed key
Army aviation officials and helicopter contractors involved in the
aviation requirements setting and acquisition process. We developed
a data collection instrument to obtain performance capabilities and
specific mission information on various Army helicopters from both
the Army and contractors, which we used for comparison purposes. We
also obtained Army documentation and studies on various aircraft in
the force structure and underdevelopment. Throughout the review, we
attempted to obtain and evaluate copies of any studies that looked at
alternative strategies. DOD and Army officials were unable to
provide such studies.
To determine whether the Army's funding plans included all of the
helicopters that it said it needs, we interviewed DOD and Army
personnel involved in the budgetary process and responsible for
establishing the short- and long-term funding estimates. We also
interviewed representatives from the Congressional Budget Office, the
Defense Budget Project, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
Brookings Institution to discuss defense budget projections. We
obtained and assessed funding estimates contained in the fiscal year
1995 President's Budget, the fiscal year 1995 Future Years Defense
Program, Selected Acquisition Reports, and Research and Development
and Procurement Cost Driver Reports. We compared this data to the
Army's Aviation Modernization Plan to determine which systems the
Army is funding. In addition, we interviewed Army aviation program
management personnel and obtained data supporting cost estimates
developed for future aviation requirements.
We conducted our review from March 1993 through August 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
VALIDITY OF THE ARMY'S AVIATION
MODERNIZATION STRATEGY IS NOW
QUESTIONABLE
============================================================ Chapter 2
The validity of the Army's aviation modernization strategy is now
questionable. The Army's estimates of the quantities of helicopters
needed are higher than those identified in the DOD's Bottom-Up
Review. The Army's estimates were not based on the same total force
structure and unit composition data as DOD's estimates. In addition,
the Army overstated expected benefits and understated technical risks
associated with the Comanche and the Longbow Apache programs that
represent the bulk of its modernization strategy. While the Army
believes that it can accomplish its modernization objectives, some
users are concerned that their needs may not have adequately been
considered and that implementation of the current procurement plan
could result in an inappropriate mix and quantity of helicopters and,
therefore, adversely impact operational effectiveness.
STRATEGY DOES NOT REFLECT
ANTICIPATED FORCE REDUCTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The total force structure used as the basis for computing
requirements in the Army's aviation modernization strategy is higher
than the force structure used in DOD's 1993 Bottom-Up Review
assessment. While the Army's strategy is based on a force structure
of 20 divisions, the Bottom-Up Review recommended reducing the number
of Army divisions.
The Bottom-Up Review supported the continuation of the Army's
aviation modernization initiative but with a reduced force structure.
It recommended that the Army reduce its force structure to 10 active
and approximately 5 reserve divisions by the end of fiscal year 1999.
According to DOD, decisions regarding the structure of the reserve
component have been left to the Army. The Army is currently basing
its aviation modernization plans on an 18-division force--10 active
and 8 reserve, according to Army Force Organization and Development
officials. The aviation assets required to support the future force,
whether it be 15 or 18 divisions, will be less than what is needed
for the current 20-division structure.
According to Army officials, estimates of the number of helicopters
needed to implement the strategy are very fluid. The overall total
changes as program manager decisions on aspects of the modernization
plan change. For example, estimates of the number of Blackhawks and
Kiowa Warriors changed as program decisions under the Aviation
Modernization Plan and Restructure Initiative changed. To show the
impact of varying force structure assumptions on estimates of
quantitative requirements for helicopters, we obtained and analyzed
aircraft requirements data, including training and float
requirements, for those Army organizational units performing aviation
missions. After we completed our analysis, the Army officials
responsible for providing aviation data to the Bottom-Up Review
validated our computations on the numbers of helicopters affected.
We estimated that the Army would need 4,696 aircraft in the fiscal
years 1995-2015 time frame for a 20-division force. For the same
time frame, 4,539 helicopters would be needed to fill an 18-division
structure and 4,222 helicopters would be needed for a 15-division
force structure.
Our analysis shows that the number of divisions will have little
immediate impact on the helicopter fleet. However, it will
eventually impact the Army's procurement plans for the Longbow
Apache, the Comanche, and the Blackhawk programs as prescribed by the
proposals in the aviation modernization strategy and, ultimately,
estimates of the strategy's cost. Table 2.1 shows aircraft
quantitative requirements for the interim and objective forces based
on our projections.
Table 2.1
Our Estimates of Interim and Objective
Force Aircraft Requirements
Objective Objective
force force
aircraft (8 aircraft (12
Aircraft in aircraft aircraft
Number of the interim cavalry cavalry
divisions structure troop) troop)
------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
20 4,696 4,669 4,956
18 4,539 4,512 4,777
15 4,222 4,195 4,428
------------------------------------------------------------
The Aviation Restructure Initiative reduced the number of Longbow
Apache, Blackhawk, and Comanche helicopters needed to fill the
current 20-division force structure. Table 2.2 shows how additional
division cuts--depending on the structure chosen--could further
reduce the requirement for these systems in the objective force.
Table 2.2
Our Analysis of Impact of Division Cuts
on Selected Helicopter Requirements
Helicopters Helicopters Helicopters
needed for needed for needed for
20 division 18 division 15 division
Helicopters force force force
------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Longbow Apache 761 528 528
Blackhawk 2,252 2,171 2,016
Comanche 0\a 1,520 1,325
------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Comanche is not intended to be fielded until the year 2003.
DIFFERENCES EXIST IN THE
MILITARY ABOUT STRATEGY'S UNIT
FORCE STRUCTURE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
There are differences of opinion throughout DOD and the Army over the
number of helicopters needed to perform the air cavalry troop role in
the Army's objective force. The Office of the Army's Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans and the Army Aviation Center at Fort
Rucker, Alabama, both document the requirement for the air cavalry
troop to be 12 aircraft per troop. This is the basis used under the
Aviation Restructure Initiative and, therefore, the Army's strategy.
However, the Bottom-Up Review performed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, which evaluated the continuation of the
Comanche program, based its decisions on using eight aircraft in the
cavalry troop in the objective force. The Comanche Training and
Doctrine Command System manager's and program manager's offices also
used eight aircraft in a cavalry troop to develop the Comanche's
future tactics, techniques, and procedures. As table 2.1 shows, the
difference between using 8 or 12 aircraft in the cavalry role in the
Army's current 20-division force is 287 aircraft.
Although the Bottom-Up Review eventually recommended a 15-division
force structure, it used a 16-division force structure for its
computations. However, the 16-division structure included 2 more
attack battalions than it should have. It also used 8 helicopters in
a cavalry troop instead of the required 12. These inconsistencies
resulted in DOD underestimating some of the helicopters it needs and
overestimating others.
For example, our analysis shows that using a 16-division force
structure with the required number of 12 helicopters in the cavalry
troop and eliminating the 2 extra attack battalions, the Army would
need 1,378 Comanches. This amount is 192 more than the Bottom-Up
Review estimated the Army needed. The cost of the option would
increase by approximately $6.7 billion, which is the amount needed to
procure the additional 192 Comanches at a unit cost of $35 million.
STRATEGY RELIES ON COSTLY AND
HIGH- TECHNICAL RISK HELICOPTER
DEVELOPMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
DOD's Bottom-Up Review recommended that the Army continue on its
course of developing the Comanche and the Longbow Apache despite this
being the most costly option. According to the review, this option
has a life-cycle cost estimate of $75.6 billion and is more than
$23.6 billion higher than the lowest cost option, which would
terminate the Comanche program but retain the Longbow Apache and
procure additional Kiowa Warriors. The Bottom-Up Review report noted
that this higher cost was "not a significant discriminator, given the
improvements in capability both systems (the Comanche and the
Longbow) provide." However, it also noted that "there were technical
and cost-growth risks associated with this option that need to be
monitored and carefully managed, since both systems are on the
cutting edge of technology . . . ." Since the Bottom-Up Review was
issued, the life-cycle cost estimate has increased to $157 billion,
of which $113 billion is for the Comanche and $44 billion is for the
Longbow Apache.
COMANCHE MAINTENANCE
REQUIREMENTS UNLIKELY TO BE
ACHIEVED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
The Comanche helicopter, which is in the demonstration/validation
phase of its development cycle, is designed to include advanced
avionics and targeting, increased maneuverability, greater firepower,
and cutting edge low observability features. One of the advantages
intended by this advanced technology is that the Comanche will have a
significantly lower maintenance man hours/flight hour requirement
than existing helicopters. However, because this expected
maintenance requirement is considered unrealistic, overall aviation
operation and support costs may be significantly understated.
According to many active unit users, it is unlikely that a
sophisticated aircraft, such as the Comanche, will achieve the
required 2.6-maintenance man hours/flight hour. As a matter of
comparison, DOD has determined the Apache has a 14.5-maintenance man
hours/flight hour average and the less sophisticated Kiowa Warrior a
9.5-maintenance man hours/flight hour average. Realizing that the
Army's requirement was not realistic, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense increased its estimate of the Comanche's maintenance man
hours/flight hour ratio to between 3.2 and 4.9 for the Bottom-Up
Review analysis. In an April 1990 study, DOD's Cost Analysis
Improvement Group developed an independent estimate of
9.0-maintenance man hours/flight hour for the Comanche.
If DOD's higher maintenance man hours/flight hour ratios were used in
the most recent Comanche cost and operational effectiveness analysis
(COEA), the Comanche may not have been ranked the most cost-effective
system. The 1990 Comanche COEA ranked the Comanche third behind the
Longbow Comanche and the Longbow Apache for operational
effectiveness. However, once the Comanche's low maintenance ratio
was applied, the Comanche was ranked first overall. The COEA noted
that the maintenance man hours/flight hour estimates for each
alternative helicopter was the principal support for determining
system costs.
The extent to which the Comanche will be able to meet the planned
2.6-hour requirement will not be demonstrated until the year 2000,
after a significant amount of money has been spent. If the Comanche
is unable to meet this ambitious requirement, the operation and
support costs associated with this system will significantly
increase. In addition, maintenance personnel levels are programmed
based partially on the maintenance man hours/flight hour requirement
for the system. If the actual maintenance man hours/flight hour
ratio is higher than projected, a shortage of necessary maintenance
personnel would result. While this potential shortage would impact
operation and support costs, it would also negatively affect the
effectiveness of units and the affordability of the strategy.
LONGBOW TECHNOLOGY FALLS
SHORT OF SOME EXPECTATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
The Army plans to modify the Apache helicopter to improve its target
acquisition capabilities by adding the Longbow technology
enhancements. The Longbow Apache program includes: airframe
improvements, radar modifications, and a Longbow compatible Hellfire
missile with fire-and-forget capability.
The Longbow system being designed for the Apache helicopter falls
short of achieving the capabilities the Army originally required for
stationary target tracking. The Longbow Apache stationary target
indicator requirements have been reduced.\1 In addition, the value of
the current Longbow technology is questionable, according to an
assessment performed by the Bottom-Up Review panel. The current
Longbow system can detect (locate a target) and classify (determine
whether it is a wheeled or tracked vehicle), but it cannot recognize
(tank or armored personnel carrier) or identify (the type of
tank--Soviet T-72) targets.
Longbow program officials believe that future Longbow developments
could improve the ability of Army helicopters to recognize and
identify targets through the integration of Longbow radar information
with data from a second generation forward looking infrared system.
Accordingly, the Longbow improvements increase the effectiveness and
survivability of the Apache. Demonstration of the Longbow capability
still involves high-technical risk.
--------------------
\1 \1 Acquisition of the Longbow Apache System (Report No. 94-015)
DOD Inspector General, November 9, 1993.
STRATEGY MAY NOT REFLECT USERS'
CONCERNS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
According to DOD, the requirements generation process is a
complicated operation that serves as the basis for the modernization
strategy. The process begins with recommendations from the users at
the lower organizational levels. Those recommendations are then
considered in relation to the overall mission of the Army, the
emerging threat, national military strategy, and available resources.
DOD advised us that while not all specific concerns may be
incorporated, they are considered. DOD indicated that the Comanche
capabilities, for example, were based on real user inputs of the
operational requirements needed to successfully accomplish cavalry
and attack missions within the anticipated combat, environmental, and
geographic spectra. This is not consistent with the views of users
we interviewed.
Although the Army's leadership believes that the current strategy
will accomplish its modernization objectives, some active unit
commanders, pilots, and aviation maintenance personnel at the
brigade, battalion, and squadron levels who provide input to the
requirements setting process are concerned that the process, and
ultimately the resultant modernization strategy, may not have
adequately considered lower level recommendations and users' views.
Some users told us that requirements are often determined by
advocates in the process. They also stated that implementation of
the strategy will change the operational mix of some units and,
therefore, reduce their operational effectiveness.
The difficulty in trying to reconstruct the evolution of decisions
generated by the requirements determination process is that the
principals involved do not document the decisions made. According to
DOD and Army officials, the information exchanged between proponents
at different levels of the process that influence decisions is not
recorded, but can be significant. As DOD said, while the
requirements process may consider all concerns, they may not be
incorporated in the final decision.
CONCERNS ON CAPABILITIES
ACQUIRED UNDER THE STRATEGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1
Active unit helicopter users, the Army's Aviation Center, an Army
test of scout helicopters, and the Warfighting Lens Analysis, in some
instances, support different system procurements and capabilities
than what the Army's aviation modernization strategy supports. For
example, the strategy prescribes using the Apache attack helicopter
as the scout in the attack battalion; however, a number of the attack
battalion pilots and commanders we interviewed stated they preferred
using the Kiowa Warrior in this role. According to some Army
personnel, the fact that user's desires and lower level
recommendations do not always agree with the Army's overall
modernization strategy may be partially due to the advocacy driven
nature and culture associated with the acquisition process.
According to numerous aviation users that we interviewed, they did
not need all of the costly capabilities being designed into the
Comanche to perform their assigned roles. For example, these
aviation users told us that:
The requirement that the Comanche self-deploy across the Atlantic, is
a high-risk operation and, therefore, is not realistic. Examples of
difficulties cited in performing such a mission include: pilot
fatigue, inadequate or nonexistent training, and safety problems.
The majority of Comanches are being procured to fill the cavalry
scout role. However, the Comanche's 170-knot speed will be greater
than what is needed by cavalry scout units that fly slow,
nap-of-the-earth missions.
The Comanche's low-observability requirement serves to increase the
airframe and crew's survivability, while also increasing the
aircraft's effectiveness in accomplishing its mission. However, when
the Comanche is configured for the light attack mission, it requires
the use of external wings. The external wings increase the radar
cross section of the Comanche and, therefore, the Comanche will be
more easily detected by enemy forces.
CONCERNS ON STRATEGY'S
IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2
To reduce maintenance support costs, the strategy proposes limiting
the type of helicopters in aviation attack battalions by taking
Blackhawk helicopters out of these battalions and consolidating them
in general support battalions. Many active users expressed concern
that this will leave the aviation attack battalions without the
ability to perform missions such as recovery of downed air crews
without relying on a separate command structure to supply these
aircraft. For example, active unit users told us that in conducting
air crew rescue missions, the first 30 minutes are critical to the
recovery of pilots and their helicopter. In this time critical
operation, an attack battalion commander will have to request
aircraft from a general support battalion and compete against other
units' needs. In their opinion, obtaining the Blackhawks for an air
crew rescue mission under these circumstances could take longer than
30 minutes. Also, they are concerned that, in the future, the attack
battalions might be deployed without the maintenance support provided
by the general aviation support battalions; thereby, limiting its
ability to perform its assigned missions.
According to division officials, moving one of the 101st Air Assault
Division's three currently active attack battalions to the reserves,
as prescribed in the strategy, will reduce the division's ability to
effectively train to carry out its mission. According to 101st
Division's commanders, placing one of the active attack battalions in
the reserve will make it nearly impossible for the division to
maintain the necessary training and readiness required for it to
perform its rapid deployment mission. According to the commanders,
it is already very difficult to meet the current training demands of
the division with three active attack battalions. It will become
even more difficult to do so with one less attack battalion.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
DOD generally agreed with our findings concerning the strategy's (1)
failure to consider force structure changes in computing helicopter
requirements; (2) reliance on costly and high-technical risk
helicopter development; and (3) potential adverse impact on
operational effectiveness, the military's use of inconsistent unit
force structure data in aviation studies, and that advocates
influence the decision process. DOD questioned our estimates of
helicopter quantities associated with a particular force structure,
noting that such estimates need to be based on a detailed breakout
allowing for training and float requirements. DOD asserted that the
strategy did consider user concerns.
We realize that unit size, mission, training, and float affect the
determination of helicopters needed by the Army. Our analysis is
based on data developed at the unit level and was validated by those
Army officials directly responsible for providing aviation data for
the Bottom-Up Review.
As DOD has acknowledged, the requirements process is complicated;
that is why we have described it in the introduction to the report.
The purpose of our interviews was to obtain a balanced perspective on
the requirements process and resultant strategy from those who are
involved in the final decision and those who provide user input to
the decision process--the pilots and maintainers. We have revised
the introduction of the report to more fully describe the types of
interviews we held and the purpose of those interviews. We have also
modified those sections of the report that discuss these issues to
present a more balanced description of user perceptions of the
process and resultant strategy.
AVIATION MODERNIZATION STRATEGY
DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER
ALTERNATIVES
============================================================ Chapter 3
The Army looked at some alternative helicopters and aircraft in
developing past Comanche COEAs; however, in developing its current
aviation modernization strategy, the Army did not fully consider
alternative aircraft that can meet the Army's aviation needs. Recent
defense reviews of force structure and roles and missions also failed
to adequately explore the issue of alternative helicopters or weapon
systems in meeting the Army's aviation needs.
However, should the Comanche be delayed or not be produced, DOD has
alternative attack and reconnaissance helicopters which, if upgraded,
have the ability to conduct many of the Comanche's roles and
missions. Alternatives may become more affordable and, therefore,
may be more attractive in light of anticipated force structure
changes; they could impact decisions regarding the mix and quantity
of helicopters in the Army's projected fleet.
ARMY PLANS LACK FULL
CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
The Army did not consider alternatives to the Comanche in either the
1993 Aviation Modernization Plan or the Aviation Restructuring
Initiative. Army officials told us that they felt that the issue of
alternatives had been sufficiently addressed in the Comanche's two
COEAs and other earlier studies. While each of the two COEAs looked
at some alternative helicopters and aircraft, they did not consider
all alternative helicopters. Both supported the continued
development of the Comanche. Also, DOD, in two recent force
structure reviews, did not adequately consider alternative
helicopters or weapon systems.
The 1987 Comanche COEA considered alternative aircraft--a tiltrotor
aircraft and modifications to existing helicopters. It noted that
while modifying existing helicopters will cost less, none will meet
all of the Comanche's requirements. The 1990 Comanche COEA
considered modifications to existing Army helicopters and two foreign
helicopters. It noted that "the (Comanche) alternative provides the
Army with the most cost and operationally effective way of
modernizing its light (scout and attack) fleet." Neither analysis
considered the Marine Corps Super Cobra, or alternative weapon
systems, such as fixed-wing aircraft or tactical missile systems.
Two recent defense reviews, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's
review of roles and missions and the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up
Review, looked at force structure alternatives. Each failed to
adequately explore the issue of alternative helicopters or weapon
systems. For example, in addressing the future course of theater air
interdiction missions, the Chairman's review of military roles and
missions focused on fixed-wing aircraft and did not fully acknowledge
other interdiction capabilities such as the Army's Tactical Missile
System or attack helicopters.
The Secretary's Bottom-Up Review of attack and armed reconnaissance
helicopters was limited to three options--different helicopter force
structures--and did not consider fixed-wing aircraft, tactical
missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles. The Marine Corps' Super Cobra
and other non-Army helicopters were also excluded from consideration.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
HELICOPTERS TO PERFORM THE
COMANCHE'S MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
On August 18, 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense--noting the
desire for a military pay increase and improvements in areas such as
readiness, sustainability, and quality of life--directed the services
to develop program options to selected major defense acquisition
programs that he identified in his memorandum. One of those programs
was the Comanche helicopter program. Specifically, the Deputy
Secretary's memorandum stated, "The Army should develop a program
alternative that terminates the Comanche."
We did not examine in detail the pros and cons of terminating the
Comanche as part of this review. However, we have identified three
U.S.-built alternative helicopters that we believe could, if
upgraded, conduct many of the Comanche's roles and missions. Use of
alternative helicopters could alter the mix and quantity of
helicopters in the Army's objective force.
THE MARINE CORPS' SUPER
COBRA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
The Marine Corps' Super Cobra, a substantially improved twin-engine
version of the Army's Cobra helicopter, could perform armed
reconnaissance or attack missions. It can carry several different
weapons, including up to eight Hellfire missiles or two Sidewinder
air-to-air missiles. The Marines are currently planning to upgrade
the Super Cobra helicopter with, among other things, a four-blade
rotor system that is expected to substantially improve flight
performance. With this upgrade, the Super Cobra's maximum airspeed
is expected to increase from 170 knots to 210 knots. Other expected
advantages of the four-blade rotor are a 170-percent increase in
vertical rate-of-climb, a 40-percent increase in payload, and a
70-percent reduction in rotor vibration levels.
THE ARMY'S APACHE AND
LONGBOW APACHE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
The Army's Apache performs many of the missions the Comanche is being
developed to perform. The Comanche is being developed as a
multimission aircraft that can perform both armed reconnaissance and
attack missions. The Apache, the Army's premier attack helicopter,
has demonstrated, during Operation Desert Storm, that it can also
perform armed reconnaissance missions. Also, the Army is planning to
use the Apache as an interim armed reconnaissance helicopter until
the Comanche is fielded. Both helicopters give the Army a lethal
attack capability and vital armed reconnaissance capability.
The Army is currently testing improvements to the Apache, such as the
Longbow fire control and radar system. These improvements will
include greater reliability, fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, and
digitized electronics. If these technology enhancements are
demonstrated, the Army plans to equip 227 Apaches with the Longbow
radar. This technology is expected to improve combat effectiveness
16 fold over the current model. In addition, in the 1990 COEA, the
Longbow Apache was ranked higher, for operational effectiveness, than
the basic Comanche aircraft. Other planned improvements on aircraft
carrying the Longbow radar include enhanced target acquisition and
weapons accuracy, and the ability to hand over targets to other
Apaches.
THE ARMY'S KIOWA WARRIOR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
The Army's Kiowa Warrior is a much improved version of the early
model Kiowas that can perform armed reconnaissance missions. The
Kiowa Warrior incorporates a mast-mounted, stabilized sight that can
be used day or night to laser designate targets, for itself or other
armed helicopters. It is the Army's first helicopter capable of
operating on the digitized battlefield--a capability to be
incorporated into the Comanche. In an armed configuration it can
carry several different weapons, including up to four Hellfire
missiles. Possible upgrades to the Kiowa Warrior include, among
others, a night flying system, integrated helmet display system,
inertial navigation system, digital map display, engine upgrade for
improved hot day performance, conformal auxiliary fuel tanks for
increased range, an upgraded mast-mounted sight, and an improved data
modem. Many users believe the lethality, low observability,
deployability, and speed of the Kiowa Warrior when combined with
certain upgrades or doctrinal changes would resolve many of the
deficiencies the Comanche is expected to resolve.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
DOD disagreed with our assertion that the Army did not adequately
consider alternative aircraft in the development of the strategy.
DOD contends that the 1987 and 1990 Comanche COEAs looked at
alternative aircraft.
Throughout our review of the Army's aviation modernization strategy,
we asked DOD and Army officials to provide copies of studies that
showed that DOD and the Army had looked at alternative aircraft in
the development of the strategy. We have not been provided any such
studies to evaluate. The fact that some aircraft were looked at in
past Comanche COEAs does not address (1) the thrust of our finding or
(2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense's August 1994 call for the Army
to develop a program alternative that terminates the Comanche.
In our opinion, DOD's response reflects the approach that has
previously prevented the Army from fully considering alternatives.
The Army has established the Comanche's projected performance and
capabilities as the baseline standard against which all alternative
aircraft are judged. We continue to believe that in developing the
strategy--especially in today's budget environment, the Army should,
at least, seriously consider the capabilities of other aircraft to
perform the attack and reconnaissance missions called for in the
Aviation Modernization Plan.
ARMY AVIATION STRATEGY FOCUSES ON
TWO KEY HELICOPTER PROGRAMS
============================================================ Chapter 4
Declining budgets mean that the Army cannot afford to fund all of its
modernization requirements, including aviation modernization.
Therefore, the Army is faced with making major decisions on how to
fulfill its mission in the face of reduced resources. To achieve its
mission objectives, the Army has opted to modernize its force through
the acquisition of weapon systems that it states would provide the
necessary technological advantages on the battlefield.
For its aviation modernization strategy, the Army has chosen to use
most of its available resources to procure the Comanche helicopter
and upgrade the Apache helicopter and defer or cancel funding of
other Army helicopter programs. The option the Army has chosen to
modernize its aviation fleet has a life-cycle cost currently
estimated at $157 billion. This acquisition plan excludes an
estimated $15.7 billion in other Army helicopter programs that the
Army's modernization plans have indicated are important to the
performance of its aviation missions.
In addition, the Army is faced with an estimated $540 million
shortfall in the Comanche program. The Army is proposing to
streamline this acquisition program in order to deal with the
shortfall. However, DOD officials have expressed concerns about the
risk associated with the Army's proposal. The Army's plan calls for
eliminating some testing, buying fewer prototypes, and shortening the
developmental phase of the acquisition process by concurrently doing
things that normally should be done sequentially, thereby increasing
risks associated with entering production too soon.
It should be noted that we reported in May 1992 and again in March
1994 that given real and probable development cost increases, an
uncertain operating and support cost environment, and questions about
the role of the Comanche compared to other Army helicopters, the
Congress may wish to reconsider the need to purchase the Comanche.\1
Terminating the program could produce hundreds of millions in budget
savings through fiscal year 1999.
--------------------
\1 Comanche Helicopter: Program Needs Reassessment Due to Increased
Unit Cost and Other Factors (GAO/NSIAD-92-204, May 27, 1992) and
Addressing the Deficit: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work
(GAO/OCG-94-3, Mar. 11, 1994).
HELICOPTER PROGRAMS WERE
CANCELED OR DEFERRED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
According to DOD, the Army cannot fund all of its modernization
programs, and the Army's aviation modernization program reflects the
tight budget environment and the priorities placed by the Army on all
of its competing programs. In deciding to fund the development of
the Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters, Army officials
indicated that they could not afford other aviation program
requirements identified in the Army's Aviation Modernization Plan and
Restructure Initiative. The Army's funding plans, therefore, defer
or cancel about $15.7 billion in other helicopter programs that its
modernization plans indicate are important to the performance of its
aviation missions.
Army officials provided the following examples of aviation programs
that were included in the January 1993 Aviation Modernization Plan
and the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative but are excluded from
the Army's current spending plans.
The Chinook cargo helicopter will have to be modernized because the
Army cannot afford to replace it with a new aircraft program in the
near future. Although various degrees of modernization could be
undertaken, a major modernization program could cost as much as $6.8
billion.
The Army's medical community needs modern medical evacuation
capability to replace its current outdated fleet. The cost to modify
each aircraft could be as much as $1.9 million. The medical
community needs about 400 of these aircraft. Therefore, total
modification costs could be as much as $760 million.
The Army canceled production of the Blackhawk utility helicopter
because of affordability concerns; therefore, there is no production
funding after fiscal year 1996. Based on the Army's previous
modernization plans, 605 aircraft were needed. At a production rate
of 60 aircraft per year, a total of $4.4 billion in funding would be
needed to finish production of this aircraft.
Depending on the modernization option chosen for the Huey utility
helicopter, total program costs range from $705 million to $2.8
billion to modernize up to 1,000 helicopters.
The Light Utility Helicopter was originally intended to replace the
Vietnam era Huey and Blackhawk helicopters that are currently
performing the light utility role. The Army's Aviation Modernization
Plan shows a requirement for 491, and the Aviation Restructure
Initiative shows a requirement of 131. No cost estimates for Light
Utility Helicopter modernization options were available at the time
of our review.
The Congress usually provides funding for the Kiowa Warrior program
as an add on to the Army's budget. If the Army had to fund the total
Kiowa Warrior production requirement, it would need a total of $881
million. Since the Kiowa Warrior retrofit program is a necessary
companion to the production program, program officials plan to
request $89 million for fiscal year 1996 to retrofit 36 aircraft.
FUTURE FUNDING OF DEFERRED
PROGRAMS MAY BE DIFFICULT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Further declines in defense funding and predicted increases in
funding for existing programs may have a significant impact on the
Army's ability to fund canceled or deferred aviation programs.
During fiscal years 1990-1994, the Army's budget declined from $79
billion to $61 billion, a 23-percent reduction. That compares to a
14-percent reduction in DOD's budget during the same time frame.
During the same time frame, the Army experienced a 36-percent
reduction to its research, development, and acquisition funding. DOD
funding for these areas declined by 31 percent. Army officials told
us they expect further reductions in the Army's budget.
Recently, DOD identified an unexpected $20 billion shortfall for
fiscal years 1996-1999. As a result, planning guidance reduced the
Army's overall budget projection by $2.5 billion for those years,
according to Army officials. This $2.5 billion reduction could have
a significant impact on the Army's aviation modernization strategy.
DOD also predicted increases in Army funding requirements during the
fiscal years 2000-2010 time frame in an April 1993 report\2
provided to the Congress on selected Army helicopter modernization
programs. According to this report, aviation's share of the Army's
research, development, and acquisition budget during the fiscal years
2000-2010 time frame may increase from the historical average of
about 14 percent to about 28 percent. DOD's analysis assumed the
Army budget would remain constant at the fiscal year 1999 level.
Army officials we spoke with acknowledged that the Army faces
increased funding requirements in this time frame. This is brought
on by the procurement of major weapon systems such as the Comanche,
Longbow Apache, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abrams Tank, and Advanced
Field Artillery System.
Our recent report on DOD's Future Years Defense Program points out
that more programs have been included in DOD's future years plans
than spending plans will support.\3 As previously discussed, the Army
has documented $15.7 billion in aviation programs that it will not be
able to support and, therefore, has decided to develop its spending
plans for modernizing its aviation fleet around the procurement of
the Comanche and upgrade of the Apache.
--------------------
\2 Tactical Air (Helicopter Portion): Report to Congress Addressing
Comanche Light Armed Scout Helicopter, Apache-Longbow, and Apache-C,
April 1993.
\3 Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to
Billions in Overprogramming (GAO/NSIAD-94-210, July 29, 1994).
STREAMLINING PROPOSAL INCREASES
RISK
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
Despite the Army's effort to cancel or defer some aviation programs
to afford its modernization strategy, the Army is faced with a
current shortfall on the Comanche program estimated at $540 million.
This shortfall exists because of planned reductions in the Army's
funding for fiscal years 1995-2004.
In December 1993, the Comanche's prime contractor team submitted an
estimate of $819 million to complete a streamlined engineering and
manufacturing development phase. That estimate was revised downward
to $540 million when the contracting team "scrubbed" the estimate.
In May 1994, the Army submitted its plan to "streamline" the Comanche
program to the Secretary of Defense for approval. However, according
to program officials, DOD expressed concern regarding the proposed
reduction in prototypes and program schedule slippage that they
believe would cause higher risk associated with the increased
concurrency in the program. The plan proposed merging the prototype
and engineering and manufacturing development phases into one
development phase and having two developmental prototypes and three
low-rate initial production helicopters instead of the original six
developmental prototypes.
The Army acknowledges DOD's concerns that its plan to truncate the
developmental phase will introduce concurrency into the Comanche
acquisition program and, therefore, increase risks associated with
entering production too soon. We have reported on problems
associated with increased risks of concurrent development and
production on other systems.\4 For example, we have reported on
various programs that problems found in developmental testing, which
have to be corrected in already produced or concurrently produced
models, significantly increases overall program cost and may result
in an aircraft that does not meet performance requirements.
Therefore, we are also concerned that the Army's approach will lead
to the same problems that DOD has experienced under those acquisition
programs with concurrent development and production. As previously
mentioned, we have specifically reported on our concerns about the
affordability of the Comanche program.
--------------------
\4 Acquisition Reform: Role of Test and Evaluation in System
Acquisition Should Not Be Weakened (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-124, Mar. 22,
1994).
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
DOD agreed that the Army does not have adequate resources to
implement all of its modernization programs. DOD also said it may
have difficulty in obtaining sufficient future funds for its aviation
programs and that streamlining the Comanche's developmental phase of
acquisition will increase concurrency and its associated risks.
DOD indicated that it was in the process of formulating its fiscal
year 1996 budget and, therefore, specific resource shortfalls for
Army aviation programs cannot be substantiated at this stage.
Likewise, DOD pointed out that the estimated $540 million shortfall
associated with the Comanche program represented the difference
between the Army program manager's cost estimate and the contractor's
rough order of magnitude estimate of the funds needed to execute the
streamlined engineering and manufacturing development phase of the
program through fiscal year 2004. According to DOD, the amount of
the shortfall, if any, has not yet been validated.
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION,
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION, AND AGENCY COMMENTS
AND OUR EVALUATION
============================================================ Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
As it proceeds with its aviation modernization strategy, we believe
the Army needs to resolve several inconsistencies and make a final
decision regarding its total force structure and unit force
composition. The total force structure the Army chooses--15 or 18
division--will have an impact on the number and mix of helicopters in
the Army's future helicopter fleet.
In light of anticipated reductions in future Army budgets and
concomitant force structure changes, we believe alternatives to the
Army's current aviation modernization option may become more
attractive. Should the Comanche be delayed or not produced, we
believe alternative attack and reconnaissance helicopters exist that
have the ability to conduct most, if not all, of the Comanche's roles
and missions.
Like the other services, the Army is faced with a major dilemma--how
does it fulfill its mission in the face of reduced resources. To
achieve its mission objectives, the Army has opted to modernize its
force through the acquisition of weapon systems that it states would
provide the necessary technological advantages on the battlefield.
For its aviation modernization strategy, the Army has chosen to
procure the Comanche helicopter and upgrade the Apache--an option
that can only be funded at the expense of other aviation
modernization programs that the Army's modernization plans indicate
are important to the performance of its aviation missions.
In addition to predicted future funding shortfalls, the Army is
already faced with a funding shortfall in the Comanche program of
about $540 million and, therefore, wants to "streamline" the Comanche
acquisition program. To us, this is just another name for
introducing concurrency to the program and, therefore, increasing the
risks associated with entering production too soon.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army revise the Army's
aviation modernization strategy in order to consider (1) the agreed
upon force structure, (2) the validated mix and quantity of
helicopters for each aviation unit, and (3) an analysis of
appropriate alternative capabilities to satisfy the aviation
mission's various roles. This could be done at the same time the
next Aviation Modernization Plan is prepared.
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:3
In reviewing the Army's revised Aviation Modernization Plan currently
planned to be submitted in January 1995, the Congress should consider
whether it adequately addresses the issues in this report. The
Congress may also wish to consider requiring the Secretary of the
Army to forego any acquisition streamlining initiatives for the
Comanche program until the revised modernization strategy is
submitted.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:4
DOD pointed out that the Army's revised Army Modernization Plan, a
subset of which is the Aviation Modernization Plan, should be out by
January 1995, and Army leadership intends to provide it to the
Congress and the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, DOD felt that our
recommendation and the matters for consideration concerning the need
for a revised strategy were not necessary. DOD also pointed out that
since the Army now intends to take another look at the streamlining
proposal in the third quarter of fiscal year 1995, our matters for
congressional consideration concerning streamlining were unnecessary.
We have revised the report to incorporate DOD's suggested technical
corrections and to more fully explain the basis for the conclusions
regarding user perceptions. However, after careful consideration of
DOD's comments, we continue to believe that our recommendation and
matters for congressional consideration concerning streamlining are
still valid. Although the Army is revising its Aviation
Modernization Plan, neither DOD nor the Army provided any indication
of how the revised plan would address our concerns. Moreover, DOD
provided no analyses that alternative aircraft options had been
studied in developing the Army's aviation modernization strategy. We
have, therefore, revised the matters for congressional consideration
to suggest that the Congress carefully review the Army's plan to
ensure that it addresses the issues in this report.
We have consistently reported on our concerns with concurrent
development and production of DOD's weapon systems. In fact, in our
May 27, 1992, report on the need to reassess the Comanche program, we
raised our concern about concurrency and recommended that the
Secretary of the Army eliminate concurrency to the extent
practicable. At that time, DOD agreed with our recommendation and
noted that it planned to consider the issue in its next scheduled
program review.
We continue to believe that Army "streamlining" initiatives should be
postponed at least until the Aviation Modernization Plan has been
reviewed by the Congress and until the future of the Comanche program
is determined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's review of selected
major acquisition programs and their alternatives.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 5
See comment 1.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 2 and 10-11.
See comment 2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 28.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 29-30.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 5.
Now on pp. 30-31.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 31-32.
Now on pp. 16-17.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 6.
Now on p. 18.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 7.
Now on pp. 18-19.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 19-20.
See comment 8.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 20.
See comment 9.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 20-21.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 21.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 22-23.
Now on pp. 24-26.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 5 and 32.
See comment 1.
Now on pp. 5
and 33-34.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 5
and 33-34.
See comment 1.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated September 20, 1994.
1. We have modified the report to incorporate and address this
comment.
2. Our statement is not meant to evaluate the seriousness of the
threat; it is a description of the world condition within which Army
aviation modernization decisions are being made. The Bottom-Up
Review acknowledges that ". . . the Army is reducing the size of
its helicopter fleet as part of its overall force structure, . .
.".
3. As we stated in the report, program managers believe that
modernization of the Chinook is required and, therefore, they are
requesting funds to start such a program in the fiscal years
1996-2001 budget cycle.
4. The Light Utility Helicopter was originally intended to replace
the Vietnam era Huey and Blackhawk helicopters that are currently
performing the light utility role. However, the Light Utility
Helicopter is still a concept under study, and the Army canceled
Blackhawk production. When the Army canceled production of the
Blackhawk, we believe it put itself in the position of again
considering whether to include most, if not all, 1,000 Huey
helicopters in the extension program to achieve the desired light
utility helicopter capability.
5. We have deleted this information from the report.
6. DOD officials responsible for putting together the Bottom-Up
Review's report told us that they analyzed various force structures,
including a 20-division force structure, but when it became obvious
that the number of Army divisions was going to be reduced, they
turned their focus to a 16-division structure. (Also see comment 1.)
7. The numbers in our analysis show the impact of DOD and Army
decisions on computations of helicopter quantities and, therefore,
the validity of the quantities in the strategy. DOD's response
further highlights the point we are making in the report. DOD
conceded that decisions regarding the number of helicopters in an air
calvary troop are still under consideration. According to DOD,
emerging analysis indicates that 12 or more might be the optimal
number. Once that number and the size of the divisional units are
settled, DOD noted that the number of armed reconnaissance aircraft
needed will be determined. Therefore, the quantities in the strategy
will have to be adjusted.
Additionally, the Bottom-Up Review's estimate of the cost of the
Army's modernization option will have to be adjusted. As previously
discussed, the Bottom-Up Review estimate reflects Comanche
quantitative requirements based on eight aircraft for an air calvary
troop. (Also see comment 1.)
8. DOD lists the planned initiatives the Army is emphasizing to
ensure that the Comanche achieves its low maintenance goal. However,
DOD does not rebut the fact that the Bottom-Up Review and DOD's Cost
Analysis Improvement Group believe the Comanche's maintenance goals
are understated. Also, DOD does not explain why the less
sophisticated Kiowa Warrior has a much higher maintenance rate than
that projected for the more sophisticated Comanche.
9. The report points out that program officials believe Longbow
improvements can increase the effectiveness of Army helicopters. DOD
cited individual capabilities of the Longbow radar and the Hellfire
missile and concluded that, combined, these subsystems increase the
effectiveness and survivability of the Apache.
The individual subsystems may have the capabilities DOD cites;
however, the Longbow Hellfire system has not been fully tested as an
integrated system. Therefore, it is not possible to verify whether
the systems will work together or provide the increased effectiveness
DOD's response implies has already occurred.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Thomas J. Schulz
Derek B. Stewart
Robert J. Stolba
Laura L. Durland
John P. Swain
David B. Best
Gregory K. Harmon
Michael T. Nolan
KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Gary L. Billen
Robert D. Spence
Lauri A. Bischof