Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime
Support Capability (Letter Report, 03/02/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-80).
GAO reviewed whether: (1) the Army could successfully support two major
regional conflicts; and (2) Army National Guard units could be used to
alleviate any potential shortfalls.
GAO found that: (1) the Army would have difficulties supplying certain
types of nondivisional support units for two major regional conflicts;
(2) some support could be made available from National Guard divisions
with similar skilled personnel and equipment; (3) shortfalls were
avoided during the Persian Gulf War because U.S. forces had ample
preparation time before launching a counteroffensive attack; (4) Saudi
Arabia provided extensive host nation support to U.S. forces during the
Persian Gulf War; (5) the Army could face potentially greater
difficulties in a two-conflict situation than those encountered in the
Gulf War; and (6) with little warning, the Army may have to
simultaneously deploy 10 active divisions to two major conflicts in two
major
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-80
TITLE: Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could
Augment Wartime Support Capability
DATE: 03/02/95
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Defense contingency planning
Military operations
Armed forces reserves
National Guard
Military reserve personnel
Military materiel
Army supplies
Defense capabilities
Warfare
IDENTIFIER: Persian Gulf War
Desert Storm
Total Army Analysis Process
DOD Bottom-Up Review
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Secretary of the Army
March 1995
FORCE STRUCTURE - ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD DIVISIONS COULD AUGMENT
WARTIME SUPPORT CAPABILITY
GAO/NSIAD-95-80
Force Structure
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
ABC - test
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259886
March 2, 1995
The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Department of Defense (DOD), in its bottom-up review of the
nation's defense needs in the post-Cold War era, judged that it is
prudent to maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts. In responding to a single
conflict during Operation Desert Storm, the Army had difficulty
providing support units, even though it deployed only a portion of
its total combat force. Because of this experience, we examined
whether (1) the Army might face similar challenges in supporting the
two-conflict strategy and (2) support capability in certain Army
National Guard units could be used to alleviate any potential
shortfalls. This report discusses our detailed findings on these
issues. We reported separately on DOD's bottom-up review.\1
--------------------
\1 Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
(GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review. In
particular, the review outlined an overall defense strategy for the
new era, specific dangers to U.S. interests, strategies for dealing
with each danger, and force requirements. Chief among the dangers
was the threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers.
To counter regional aggression, DOD evaluated various strategy and
force options. DOD selected the two-conflict strategy and determined
the combat forces capable of executing the strategy. For the Army,
these forces consisted of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National
Guard enhanced readiness combat brigades.\2 DOD also provided for
other National Guard combat forces, now organized as eight divisions,
that it does not envision using in a two-conflict situation. These
divisions are expected to perform missions, such as providing
rotational forces for extended crises and protracted peace
operations. These forces are also called upon to meet domestic
dangers, such as natural disasters and civil unrest.
In addition to combat forces, the Army maintains support units to
repair equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide
services, and otherwise sustain combat operations. These units are
(1) divisional support units, which are part of active and National
Guard combat divisions and provide support to divisional units, and
(2) nondivisional support units, which are separate units in the
active component, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve that support
divisional and nondivisional units.\3 The numbers and types of
divisional support units are determined by Army doctrine. For
example, all divisions are doctrinally required to have one military
police company to provide security and law enforcement. For
nondivisional support, the Army determines the numbers and types of
units that are required for its total combat force through a biennial
process, referred to as the Total Army Analysis.\4 The Army then
identifies, based on weighing its priorities, the units that will be
allocated resources-- personnel and equipment. In July 1994, the
Army began the Total Army Analysis process to determine nondivisional
support requirements for the bottom-up review force, and it expects
to complete the analysis in mid-1995.
--------------------
\2 These enhanced brigades are existing National Guard combat
brigades with improved readiness.
\3 Nondivisional support units supplement divisional support units
and also provide unique types of support, such as constructing
facilities or providing specialized medical care.
\4 This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the
simulation of combat to generate nondivisional support requirements,
based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The Army would be challenged to provide sufficient numbers of certain
types of nondivisional support units for two major regional
conflicts. The Army had difficulty providing such units in the
Persian Gulf War--a single regional conflict. In addition, after
completing its most recent Total Army Analysis in March 1993, the
Army decided not to allocate resources to some of the nondivisional
support units required to support its current active force of 12
divisions and allocated resources to other areas. Army officials
expect this trend to continue. Furthermore, an analysis of current
war-fighting plans for responding to two specific regional conflicts
revealed that the Army does not have sufficient types of certain
units required for these plans.
An option for augmenting the Army's nondivisional support capability
is to use existing support capability--units, personnel, and
equipment--in the eight National Guard divisions that DOD did not
include in the combat force for executing the two-conflict strategy.
These divisions contain several support units that are functionally
similar or identical to nondivisional support units that were not
allocated resources during the 1993 Total Army Analysis. These
divisions also have many of the same types of skilled personnel and
equipment that the nondivisional support units have. By using units,
personnel, and equipment in the eight divisions, the Army could
create additional nondivisional support units or augment existing
ones.
ARMY HAD DIFFICULTY PROVIDING
SUPPORT DURING THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
During the Persian Gulf War, a single regional conflict, the Army
deployed virtually all of some types of nondivisional support units
and ran out of some other types of units, even though it deployed
only a portion of its total active combat force--about 8 of 18
divisions. As we reported in 1992,\5 the specific types of units
affected included
quartermaster units, such as water, graves registration, and pipeline
and terminal operation companies;
transportation units, such as heavy and medium truck companies; and
military police units, such as companies that handle enemy prisoners
of war.
DOD, for several reasons, was able to mitigate the potential adverse
impact of shortfalls; for example, (1) U.S. forces had a long lead
time to deploy before conducting a counteroffensive against Iraqi
forces and the counteroffensive was of short duration; (2) Saudi
Arabia provided extensive host nation support, such as transportation
and water; and (3) no second conflict developed at the same time
requiring a U.S. response. In a two- conflict situation, the Army
may face even greater challenges than it encountered during the Gulf
War. As envisioned in the bottom-up review, the Army, with little
warning, may need to simultaneously support at least 10 active
divisions deployed to two major conflicts in two different regions.
--------------------
\5 Operation Desert Storm: Army had Difficulty Providing Adequate
Active and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).
ARMY LACKS UNITS TO SUPPORT
TOTAL COMBAT FORCE AND SPECIFIC
REGIONAL CONFLICT PLANS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
The Army does not have sufficient nondivisional support units to
support its current active combat force. Based on its most recent
Total Army Analysis, the Army decided not to allocate resources to
838 nondivisional units required to support 12 active divisions (see
table 1). Although these 838 units are a small portion of the total
nondivisional support requirement, they represent important
capabilities required to support combat operations.
Table 1
Type and Number of Unresourced
Nondivisional Units
of
unit
Type of unit s
------------------------------------------------------ ====
Aviation 1
Chemical 6
Engineering 54
Medical 31
Ordnance 100
Quartermaster 210
Signal 12
Adjutant General 26
Finance 10
Chaplain 12
Military police 1
Military law 32
Psychological 10
operations
Military 3
intelligence
Maintenance 84
Headquarters\a 16
Transportation 230
============================================================
Total 838
------------------------------------------------------------
\a These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment
command organizations in wartime.
Army officials participating in the ongoing Total Army Analysis
anticipate that the Army, because of competing priorities, will
probably not allocate resources to all of the nondivisional support
units required to support the bottom-up review combat force and the
two-conflict strategy. While the bottom-up review combat force
includes two fewer active divisions than the current 12-division
force, the two-conflict situation described in the bottom-up review
is similar to the war-fighting scenario used in the 1993 analysis.
In addition, mandated reductions in personnel will leave the Army
with fewer personnel available to allocate to required nondivisional
support units.
We analyzed the nondivisional support requirements in two U.S. plans
for responding to regional conflicts for 17 types of units that were
unresourced in the 1993 analysis. These plans were developed by two
separate war-fighting commands, and each plan covered a specific
regional conflict. We found that the Army is short 238 units for one
of the two plans (see app. I). The largest shortfall--a total of
206 units--consisted of five types--medical, engineer, quartermaster,
transportation, and military police units. In analyzing the combined
requirements of the two plans for these five types of units, we found
that the shortfall would increase from 206 to 338 units (see app.
II).
We also found that 654 of the same types of nondivisional support
units were assigned to both of the regional conflict plans--dual-
tasked to support combat operations in both conflicts (see app.
III).\6 Like the shortfalls previously mentioned, the largest number
of dual-tasked units--a total of 464 units--consisted of medical,
engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units.
--------------------
\6 These 654 units relate to only the 17 types of units covered in
our analysis of the single plan and, therefore, do not equal the
total number of units dual-tasked to both plans.
ARMY HAS THE OPTION OF USING
NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS TO
AUGMENT NONDIVISIONAL SUPPORT
CAPABILITY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The eight Army National Guard divisions that DOD does not envision
using during a two-conflict situation contain support capability that
the Army could use to fill nondivisional support needs. At our
request, the Army compared the capability in support units in a
typical National Guard division with the capability reflected in
nondivisional support units that were not allocated resources during
the 1993 Total Army Analysis. This analysis identified several
examples of support units in a National Guard Division that are
similar or identical to unresourced nondivisional support units (see
table 2).
Table 2
Support Units in National Guard
Divisions Identical or Similar to
Unresourced Nondivisional Support Units
National Guard Unresourced
divisional support nondivisional support
Type of unit unit unit
------------ ---------------------- ----------------------
Ordnance Ammunition transfer Ammunition account
point section team
Aviation Attack helicopter Attack helicopter
battalion battalion
Transportati Movement control team Movement control team
on
Military Military police Military police combat
police company support company
Chemical Chemical company Chemical
decontamination
company
Signal Signal battalion Signal battalion
Signal support company Air defense artillery
support company
Maintenance Heavy maintenance Engineer equipment
company repair team or
tactical fire repair
team
Engineer support team Engineer equipment
repair team
Army repair section Tactical fire repair
team
------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, we analyzed Army data on the personnel and equipment
assigned to the eight National Guard divisions and found that these
divisions have many of the same skilled personnel and equipment
needed for nondivisional support units. For example, these divisions
could provide 100 percent of the unresourced nondivisional support
requirements for
321 types of skilled personnel, including helicopter pilots,
communications technicians, repair personnel, military police
officers, intelligence analysts, and petroleum and water specialists;
and
407 types of equipment, including medium trucks, trailers, tractors,
generator sets, chemical and biological masks, radio sets and
antennas, and water supply and purification systems.
Given the previously mentioned similarities, we believe that the Army
should consider using the support capability in the eight National
Guard divisions to augment its nondivisional support capability in
wartime. The Army has the option of using National Guard divisional
support units that are identical or similar to nondivisional support
units to perform the nondivisional mission. Moreover, the Army could
use personnel and equipment in divisional units to either form new
nondivisional support units or augment existing nondivisional support
units, if that is required. The Army has not considered using
National Guard divisions in this manner because these divisions were
planned to be used as follow-on combat forces in the event of a
global war.
Army officials agreed that National Guard divisions are a potential
source for meeting nondivisional support requirements. They,
however, emphasized that a more extensive analysis is required to
determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of this option and
the impact on the divisions of using them in this manner.
RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Army's
ongoing Total Army Analysis, (1) identify the specific unresourced
nondivisional support requirements that could be met using National
Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in
these units and (2) work with the National Guard to develop a plan
for employing this capability.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
DOD concurred with our recommendation but partially concurred with
the report, believing that we failed to address certain concerns.
Specifically, DOD noted that (1) current low resourcing of National
Guard divisions, if unaddressed, would lead to degradations in
personnel, equipment, and training readiness for these units; (2)
nondivisional support units, while similar to divisional support
units, are not trained or equipped to perform the same missions; and
(3) while it may be expedient to access divisional support units to
provide nondivisional capability, this alternative must be weighed
against the value of these divisions for other missions.
In making our recommendation, we recognized that the Army and the
National Guard would need to further examine its feasibility, cost-
effectiveness, and impact on National Guard divisions. Consequently,
we agree that DOD's concerns merit further examination and expect
that any analysis performed by the Army and the National Guard in
accordance with our recommendation would consider these points.
DOD disagreed that the Army lacks units to support its total combat
force and specific regional conflict plans. While DOD acknowledged
that support shortfalls exist for the current 12-division force, it
believes that our analysis of these shortfalls, dual-tasked support
units, and the Army's difficulties in providing nondivisional support
units during the Persian Gulf War implies that the Army could not
support the bottom-up review force and two major regional conflicts.
We did not conclude that the Army could not support the bottom-up
review force and two major regional conflicts. Rather, we showed
that (1) shortfalls for the current 12-division force, a single
regional conflict plan, and the combined requirements of two regional
conflict plans; (2) dual-tasking of units; and (3) the Army's
experience during the Gulf War suggest that the Army would be
challenged in meeting this requirement.
DOD stated that the planned aggregate active and reserve end strength
will give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in
areas of need and that using host nation support, contractors, and
other resources are available alternatives for addressing any
shortfalls. DOD also stated that it is premature to draw conclusions
about possible support shortfalls until the ongoing Total Army
Analysis is completed.
We disagree that the planned end strength will provide the Army the
flexibility to provide more support forces. The changes in end
strength resulting from the bottom-up review represent a net decrease
in end strength for the active component and the U.S. Army Reserve--
those components that provide most of the Army's support units--and
an increase in the National Guard's end strength, which will be used
to retain combat positions. As a result, the Army has less
flexibility for providing more support units. We believe that using
Guard divisional support capability will increase the Army's
flexibility to provide more nondivisional support in areas of need
within the aggregate active and reserve end strength. We agree that
the extent of actual support shortages will not be determined until
the Army completes its ongoing Total Army Analysis. Until DOD knows
the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most appropriate alternatives
for addressing them.
DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
To determine whether the Army might be challenged in supporting two
major regional conflicts, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and
obtained documents at the Department of the Army headquarters and the
National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C; Forces Command, U.S. Third
Army and U.S. Army Reserve Command, located at Fort McPherson,
Georgia; and two war-fighting commands responsible for developing and
executing specific U.S. plans for responding to major regional
conflicts. To document specific shortfalls, we obtained Total Army
Analysis data on unresourced nondivisional support requirements and
compared actual requirements for selected types of nondivisional
support units in two specific regional conflict plans with the
inventory of available units.
To determine whether support capability in Army National Guard
divisions could be used to augment the Army's nondivisional support
capability, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and obtained
documents at the Department of Army headquarters and the National
Guard Bureau. At our request, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations provided data on support units in National
Guard divisions that had similar or identical characteristics to
nondivisional support units the Army decided not to allocate
resources to during its most recent Total Army Analysis, completed in
1993. Using this data and the data from our analysis of personnel
and equipment authorizations for National Guard divisions, we
identified specific matches of National Guard divisional units,
personnel, and equipment to unresourced nondivisional support units.
We conducted this review from October 1993 to October 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the
date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to
the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations with an
agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days
after the date of the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Director of the Army National Guard; the Director, Office of
Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this
report are Sharon Pickup, Barbara Gannon, and Samuel L. Hinojosa.
Sincerely yours,
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
SHORTFALL OF SELECTED
NONDIVISIONAL SUPPORT UNITS
REQUIRED IN A SPECIFIC U.S. PLAN
FOR RESPONDING TO A SINGLE
REGIONAL CONFLICT BY NUMBER AND
TYPE
=========================================================== Appendix I
Type unit Number of unit
------------------------------ ----------------------------
Aviation 4
Chemical 3
Engineer 33
Medical 84
Ordnance 9
Quartermaster 20
Signal 6
Adjutant General 1
Chaplain 3
Finance 0
Military police 40
Military law 0
Psychological operations 0
Military intelligence 2
Maintenance 4
Headquarters\a 0
Transportation 29
============================================================
Total 238
------------------------------------------------------------
\a These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment
command organizations in wartime.
SHORTFALL OF SELECTED
NONDIVISIONAL SUPPORT UNITS
REQUIRED IN TWO SPECIFIC U.S.
PLANS FOR RESPONDING TO REGIONAL
CONFLICTS BY NUMBER AND TYPE
========================================================== Appendix II
Type of unit Number of units
------------------------------ ----------------------------
Medical 96
Engineer 59
Quartermaster 59
Military police 52
Transportation 72
============================================================
Total 338
------------------------------------------------------------
UNITS DUAL-TASKED TO TWO SPECIFIC
U.S. PLANS FOR RESPONDING TO
REGIONAL CONFLICTS BY NUMBER AND
TYPE
========================================================= Appendix III
Type of unit Number of units\a
------------------------------ ----------------------------
Aviation 40
Chemical 32
Engineer 94
Medical 96
Ordnance 32
Quartermaster 94
Signal 25
Adjutant General 20
Chaplain 0
Finance 9
Military police 45
Military law 1
Psychological operations 1
Military intelligence 4
Maintenance 22
Headquarters\b 4
Transportation 135
============================================================
Total 654
------------------------------------------------------------
\a For certain unit types, the numbers in this table are greater than
those shown in table 1. As we reported in 1995, planning factors for
nondivisional support requirements used in the Total Army Analysis
differ from those used by war-fighting commands in developing
regional conflict plans. See Force Structure: Army Support
Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data
(GAO/NSIAD-95-46, Jan. 30, 1995).
\b These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment
command organizations in wartime.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 1-2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 3.
See pp. 7-8.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 3-5.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See pp. 7-8.
Now on pp. 5-7.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 7.