Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations (Chapter
Report, 02/23/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-70).
Since 1988, the Defense Department (DOD) has been closing and realigning
military installations. A major problem is the billions of dollars it
will cost to clean up hazardous waste at these bases. The estimated
cost for cleaning up environmental problems at closing military bases
has risen to $5.4 billion, a figure that GAO believes is understated.
Meanwhile, the full extent of cleanup actions may not be known for
years, and installations may not be cleaned up by the time they close.
Delays in addressing groundwater pollution, landfill contamination, and
unexploded ordnance are hindering the transfer of property to nonfederal
users.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-70
TITLE: Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing
Installations
DATE: 02/23/95
SUBJECT: Environmental monitoring
Military bases
Facility transfer
Defense budgets
Real estate leases
Environmental policies
Hazardous substances
Waste disposal
Environmental law
Cost analysis
IDENTIFIER: DOD Fast Track Cleanup Program
EPA National Priorities List
DOD Installation Restoration Program
DOD Environmental Restoration Program
DOD Base Realignment and Closure Account
DOD Future Years Defense Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
February 1995
MILITARY BASES - ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT AT CLOSING INSTALLATIONS
GAO/NSIAD-95-70
Military Bases
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
BCP - BRAC cleanup plan
BRAC - Base realignment and closure
CERCLA - Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
CERFA - Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act
DERA - Defense Environmental Restoration Account
DOD - Department of Defense
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
NPL - National Priorities List
RCRA - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-256333
February 23, 1995
The Honorable Bill Zeliff
Chairman
The Honorable Karen Thurman
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice
Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
House of Representatives
The Honorable George Miller
House of Representatives
This report addresses concerns that environmental cleanup at closing
military bases is costly and has significantly affected the
Department of Defense's ability to transfer property to nonfederal
users. It summarizes the results of our review of the (1) cleanup
costs, transferability, and reuse of property and (2) progress,
difficulties, and plans to address the problems.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also
make copies available to others on request.
If you have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-8412. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Donna M. Heivilin
Director, Defense Management
and NASA Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Since 1988, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been closing and
realigning military installations. A major problem confronting DOD
is the billions of dollars it will cost to clean up the hazardous
waste contaminating these installations. Congress has been concerned
that this environmental cleanup has significantly affected DOD's
ability to transfer property to nonfederal users. Therefore, the
former Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural
Resources, House Committee on Government Operations, and
Representative George Miller asked GAO to review the (1) cleanup
costs, transferability, and reuse of property by nonfederal users and
(2) progress, difficulties, and plans to address the problems.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
DOD began the first round of base closures and realignments in 1988,
and additional rounds followed in 1991 and 1993. As a result of
these efforts, 123 installations and activities\1 have been
identified to close and realign. DOD will recommend additional
installations for realignment or closure in the 1995 round.
Closed or realigned installations have large amounts of unneeded
property, but this property is not automatically sold. Federal
property disposal laws require DOD to first screen excess property
for possible use by defense agencies and then by other federal
agencies. If no federal agency needs the property, it is declared
surplus and is made available to nonfederal parties, including state
and local agencies and the public. Base closure laws require DOD to
comply with environmental laws for disposing of real property. These
laws require that all relevant parties agree to the extent of cleanup
required before property can be transferred within the federal
government and that property be cleaned up before it can be
transferred to nonfederal users.
In the 1990 base closure law and DOD's authorization act for fiscal
years 1992 and 1993, Congress provided separate accounts to fund
cleanup of closing and realigning installations and appropriated $1.8
billion through fiscal year 1994 for this purpose. In July 1993, the
administration expressed concern that closing military installations
had been cumbersome and slow, with environmental cleanup and other
processes taking many years to complete. At that time, DOD
introduced a Fast Track Cleanup program to accelerate cleanup.
--------------------
\1 The 123 includes installations and activities in DOD's base
realignment and closure budget justification documents for fiscal
year 1995. This number differs from other summary figures for base
closures because of the way DOD aggregated these numbers for budget
purposes.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Congress, DOD, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have
taken a number of actions over the past several years to resolve
environmental cleanup issues at bases that are being closed and
realigned. However, problems still remain with determining accurate
cleanup costs, timing appropriations with cleanup needs, prioritizing
available cleanup funds, and protecting the government's interests
when leasing or transferring property.
Most sites at closing and realigning installations are still being
investigated and studied. Thus, the full extent of cleanup actions
required may not be known for years. Also, installations may not be
cleaned up by the time they close, and major groundwater, landfill,
and unexploded ordnance sites will remain contaminated unless new
technology is developed. Dissatisfied with the slow pace of cleanup
that had occurred, DOD designed the Fast Track Cleanup program in
1993. Although the program has made some progress, improvements
could be made in such ways as adding performance measures to gauge
progress.
Specifically, GAO's work shows the following:
DOD's cost estimate for cleaning up 123 closing and realigning bases
increased to $4.0 billion in its fiscal year 1995 budget request.
However, later, more comprehensive estimates developed by 84
installations for their April 1994 cleanup plans totaled about $5.4
billion. GAO found that even these estimates are understated.
DOD has made all closing and realigning installations eligible for
high priority funding. However, most of the property will remain as
federal lands and may not have to be cleaned up before reuse. In
1994, DOD received authority to use long-term leases so property
could be reused before cleanup is completed, but only a few leases
have been signed.
DOD's cleanup progress has been limited. Most sites at closing and
realigning installations are in the earliest stages of investigation
and study, and major sites may be 10 years or more away from cleanup.
Cleanup technology is often inefficient and not cost-effective.
Also, cleanup technology is not available for certain contaminants.
Consequently, installations may not be cleaned up by the time they
close, and major groundwater, landfill, and unexploded ordnance sites
will remain contaminated unless new technology is developed.
DOD has implemented the Fast Track Cleanup program to address
problems and accelerate the cleanup process. Although certain
elements in the program have achieved desired results, others have
not and opportunities for improvement remain. For example, one
initiative focused on quickly identifying and transferring
uncontaminated property. However, although the services identified
about 121,200 of about 250,100 acres at 1988 and 1991 closing
installations as uncontaminated, the regulators only concurred on
34,499 acres.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
CLEANUP ESTIMATES HAVE
INCREASED AND WILL BE HIGHER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
DOD's estimate for cleaning up bases identified in the 1988 and 1991
rounds increased by $400 million from 1993 to 1995, for a total of
about $2.2 billion. When the cost for the 1993 round installations
was added in, the estimate in DOD's 1995 budget request for 123
installations and activities in three rounds was almost $4 billion.
However, this estimate is probably understated for three reasons.
First, the budget estimates DOD originally submitted were based on
preliminary information. Since it originally developed the estimate,
DOD has discovered additional sites, the cleanup standards have
increased, and new technologies have not materialized as expected.
More recent information provided by 84 affected bases in April 1994
shows estimates to be about $5.4 billion, or $1.6 billion more than
the total estimate for these same installations in the fiscal year
1995 budget request. Second, DOD required more comprehensive
estimates of environmental cleanup and compliance costs in the recent
information. Third, the 1995 budget estimates are for the 6 years
bases have to close, as opposed to the actual cleanup time, which
usually takes much longer. For example, the average cleanup for the
more serious sites can require 10 years, and with long-term
monitoring can extend to 30 years and longer.
Of the nearly $4 billion identified in the 1995 budget, as of
September 1994, $1.8 billion had been appropriated; of that amount,
about $334 million was unobligated, down from $813 million
unobligated as of June 1994. DOD said that high levels of
unobligated funds have occurred because it lacked the expertise
needed to develop better estimates and installations were slow to
obligate funds.
EFFORTS TO FACILITATE
PROPERTY TRANSFER ARE
AFFECTED BY CLEANUP ISSUES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 requires that all property be cleaned up before it is
transferred to nonfederal owners for reuse. Consequently, DOD gives
a high priority for cleanup to installations scheduled to close and
realign in order to allow for quick, nonfederal reuse. DOD also
gives high cleanup priority to sites on the Environmental Protection
Agency's National Priorities List, a register of the nation's worst
contaminated sites. But most closing and realigning bases are not on
this list. For example, of 84 bases that submitted cleanup plans,
only 21 are on the National Priorities List. As a result, the need
for cleanup funding has been accelerated for many installations that
would not have been eligible otherwise. GAO reported in April 1994
that DOD had too many high priority sites, which distracts from
cleaning up the worst sites first.
Much of the property at closing bases will be retained by federal
agencies and can be made available to federal users before it is
cleaned up. For example, DOD is retaining or transferring to federal
agencies about 156,700 acres, or 63 percent of the 250,100 acres on
installations from the 1988 and 1991 rounds. Some of the property is
heavily contaminated with unexploded ordnance. For example, most of
the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana, is being added to a
national wildlife refuge owned by the Department of the Interior's
Fish and Wildlife Service.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act prohibits transferring property to nonfederal ownership until the
necessary cleanup actions have been taken, but the Community
Environmental Response Facilitation Act amended it in 1992 to
expedite transfer. This amendment considers cleanup actions "have
been taken" if they are in place and operating properly and
successfully. Although the amendment allows the property to be
transferred to nonfederal users before cleanup is finished, much of
the property is in the early stages of the cleanup process and little
of it has actually been transferred.
To further facilitate the reuse of property prior to cleanup and
ownership transfer, Congress in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 allowed long-term leases of property to
nonfederal users. As of January 1995, the Air Force had signed six
leases covering 11,169 acres and ranging from 25 to 70 years, and the
other services had leasing actions in process. With leases, the
government is still potentially liable for any hazardous waste the
tenant generates. Other issues affecting leasing are (1) the time
and effort required to complete the documents and processes required
to satisfy federal and state laws and DOD policies and (2) the
obligation of the services to monitor and manage the environmental
aspects of the property.
CLEANUP PROGRESS HAS BEEN
LIMITED, AND IMPROVEMENTS
ARE NEEDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
DOD has made limited cleanup progress for several reasons. First,
the study and evaluation process is lengthy, and cleanups are complex
and, with existing technology, take time. In cleanup plans submitted
for 84 installations in April 1994, 51 identified polluted
groundwater, 67 identified contaminated landfills, and 25 identified
unexploded ordnance contamination among sites to be cleaned up.
Second, some of the contaminated sites are just too large or
prohibitively expensive to clean up, and some of the cleanup methods
are unsure. Decontaminating groundwater is costly, difficult, and
sometimes impossible. At Norton Air Force Base, California, for
example, groundwater contamination extends from the central base
area, southwest in the direction of groundwater flow beneath the
base, and continues beyond the base boundary, possibly affecting
several community water supply wells. One method, called
pump-and-treat, is expensive, can take decades, and still leaves the
water contaminated. At landfills, national cleanup standards do not
exist, and local standards must be negotiated for each site.
Cost-effective technology is not available to clean up unexploded
ordnance, and some areas are so large that it is not even feasible to
consider cleaning it up. For example, unexploded ordnance covers
potentially about 51,000 acres of Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana,
and 7,200 acres of Fort Ord, California. The cleanup plan for
Jefferson Proving Ground estimated that cleanup of unexploded
ordnance could cost from $216 million to $8 billion, depending on
reuse. Third, new technology is frequently not a ready option
because it may involve unacceptable risks or contractors may prefer
other technology based on their past experiences.
IMPEDIMENTS REMAIN TO QUICK
CLEANUPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
To try to overcome these obstacles, DOD established the Fast Track
Cleanup program in 1993. Although the program has addressed
impediments to quick cleanup and transfer of property, certain
actions have not achieved the desired or initially planned results.
Thus, some significant impediments remain. Progress in the program's
five key elements has been as follows:
Environmental impact statements depend on communities submitting
reuse plans, and most of these plans have not been developed.
Restrictive indemnification language has been clarified.
Uncontaminated parcels from the 1988 and 1991 closing installations
have been identified for transfer, but not as much uncontaminated
property has been identified as hoped.
Teams have been established at closing bases to make decisions and
develop cleanup plans, but decisions are still made above the base
level, and base cleanup plans can be improved.
Community cleanup advisory boards that involve the public in the
cleanup program have been established, but can be improved.
DOD has not been able to evaluate the effectiveness of the Fast Track
Cleanup program because it lacks a baseline and performance measures.
Although DOD is developing performance measures, it has not set any
milestones for completion. Right now, it is considering two
measures. First, identify the percentage of closing bases with a
completed environmental impact analysis. However, this is not a
problem that needs to be addressed now. Second, cite the percentage
of property at closing bases that could be made available for reuse.
This does not measure the success of cleanup actions if property is
leased. Neither of these measures address other elements of the
program.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) develop an
environmental program cost estimate that reflects the total financial
impact of realignment and closure actions, (2) approve sites for high
priority environmental funding only when cleanup or compliance is
required or cost-effective for nonfederal reuse to occur, and (3)
establish Fast Track Cleanup program standards that will allow DOD to
assess the program's progress.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
As requested, GAO did not obtain formal comments on this report.
However, GAO discussed its findings with DOD and EPA officials and
included their comments where appropriate.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of realigning and
closing military installations. An initial major round of
installation realignments and closures occurred in 1988, subsequent
rounds followed in 1991 and 1993, and another round is scheduled for
1995. Congress has expressed concern that environmental cleanup
issues related to past activities at these installations are
significantly affecting DOD's ability to transfer these properties to
local communities. This report focuses on that issue; however, other
factors--disagreements between federal agencies, local community
interests, and others over reuse plans, as well as revised laws and
regulations designed to improve the property disposition
process--have also affected property transfers. We have reported
separately on these issues for bases closed in the 1988 and 1991
rounds\1 and are reviewing 1993 closing bases now.
--------------------
\1 Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and
1991 (GAO/NSIAD-95-3,
Nov. 1, 1994).
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
For decades, DOD activities and industrial facilities generated,
stored, recycled, and disposed of hazardous waste, which often
contaminated nearby soil and groundwater. In many instances, these
problems predate existing environmental laws and regulations.
Hazardous waste contamination can significantly contribute to serious
illness or death or pose a hazard to the environment and is extremely
expensive to clean up. Types of hazardous waste found at most DOD
installations include solvents and corrosives; paint strippers and
thinners; metals, such as lead, cadmium, and chromium; and unexploded
ordnance. Contamination usually results from disposal, leaks, or
spills.
Cleanup goals and strategies are usually site specific and depend
upon the cleanup standards, exposure potential, affected population,
and nature and extent of contamination. All of these determine the
threat to human health and the environment. Cleanup efforts at
closing installations are carried out primarily by contractors. DOD
gives the highest priority for cleanup to installations on the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National Priorities List
(NPL), a register of the nation's worst known hazardous waste sites,
and to those scheduled to realign and close.
MILITARY INSTALLATION CLOSURES
IN 1988, 1991, AND 1993
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment
Act (P.L. 100-526), enacted on October 24, 1988, established a
bipartisan commission to make recommendations to Congress and the
Secretary of Defense on base closures and realignments and specified
the conditions and authorities to implement these actions. The
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Part A of title
XXIX of P.L. 101-510) also created an independent commission that
would meet during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995 to review
additional installations DOD recommended for realignment and closure.
DOD is carrying out the approved installation closures and
realignments and is reviewing installations to recommend for
realignment and closure for the 1995 round. Figure 1.1 summarizes
DOD information on installations and activities designated for
closure and realignment in 1988, 1991, and 1993. We have reported
separately on the recommendations and processes for each of these
rounds.\2
Figure 1.1: Summary of Air
Force, Army, and Navy
Installations and Activities in
1988, 1991, and 1993 Rounds
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\2 Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission's Realignment and
Closure Recommendations (GAO/NSIAD-90-42, Nov. 29, 1989); Military
Bases: Observations on the Analysis Supporting Proposed Closures and
Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-91-224, May 15, 1991); and Military Bases:
Analysis of DOD's Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures
and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Federal property that is no longer needed is not automatically sold.
The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 requires
a screening process to determine if property can be transferred to
another government or nonprofit agency. DOD first screens excess
property for possible use by other DOD agencies and then by other
federal agencies. If no federal agency needs the property, it is
declared surplus to the federal government and is made available to
nonfederal parties, including state agencies, local agencies,
agencies caring for homeless people, public benefit agencies, or the
general public.
Also, federal agencies, including DOD, must comply with environmental
laws and regulations when disposing of real property. Pertinent
environmental laws include the following:
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. 9601), also known as Superfund,
authorizes the federal government to respond to spills and other
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, as well as
to leaking hazardous waste dumps. CERCLA provides the framework for
responding to contamination problems. It requires that the
government warrant that all remedial action necessary to protect
human health and the environment has been taken before property is
transferred by the United States to any other person or entity, such
as communities or private parties.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) (42 U.S.C.
6901) was enacted to ensure that solid wastes are managed in an
environmentally sound manner.
The Federal Facilities Compliance Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 note) amended
RCRA and provides that federal facilities may be subject to federal,
state, and local penalties for environmental violations. It also
establishes specific requirements for waste generated by the
Department of Energy and DOD.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321)
governs the environmental assessments and impact statement
preparation for the disposal and reuse of base closure and
realignment installations.
CERCLA and RCRA govern much of the environmental and closure-related
activities at base realignment and closure, or BRAC, installations.
In compliance with CERCLA, EPA reviews DOD information to determine
if the installation should be included on the NPL. The CERCLA
process consists of several stages and may apply to any waste source
and site containing hazardous substances at BRAC installations. (See
app. I.) EPA does not have authority to delegate CERCLA enforcement
to the states. However, CERCLA does call for substantial involvement
by each state in initiating, developing, and selecting remedial
actions to be taken.
RCRA is designed to ensure that solid waste is managed in an
environmentally sound manner and establishes a framework for managing
hazardous waste. All BRAC installations are subject to RCRA because
of practices that generated, stored, treated, or disposed of
hazardous waste. RCRA, as amended in 1992 by the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act, directed EPA to conduct annual inspections of federal
facilities. RCRA allows EPA to authorize states to conduct
equivalent state programs; in these cases, they have the primary
responsibility for implementing corrective actions at a base that is
designated as a treatment, storage, or disposal facility. States
with an authorized hazardous waste program may inspect a federal
facility to enforce compliance with state hazardous waste programs.
DOD ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
DOD established the Installation Restoration Program in 1975 to study
and clean up contaminated sites. In 1984, this program was made part
of the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, and Congress
provided funding through the Defense Environmental Restoration
Account (DERA). In the 1990 base closure law (P.L 101-510), Congress
began providing separate cleanup funding for closing and realigning
installations under the BRAC account.
In May 1993, DOD created the Under Secretary of Defense
(Environmental Security) position to oversee cleanup and other
environmental efforts. In July 1993, the administration expressed
concern that closing military installations had been cumbersome and
slow, with environmental cleanup and other processes taking many
years to complete. At that time, it announced a five-part program to
help accelerate cleanup and community reuse of closing installations.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
The former Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural
Resources, House Committee on Government Operations, and
Representative George Miller, California, requested us to review
DOD's environmental cleanup efforts at installations being closed
under the BRAC process. Specifically, they asked us to review issues
related to the (1) cleanup cost, transferability, and reuse of
property by nonfederal users and (2) progress, difficulties, and
plans to address the problems.
We performed work at the Office of Secretary of Defense, military
services headquarters, and EPA. To determine costs being estimated
for the program, we reviewed DOD's BRAC budget data, including
justification documents submitted to Congress in February 1994. In
addition, we observed BRAC cleanup plan (BCP) training sessions held
in San Francisco, California, in November 1993. Later, we analyzed
cost information in
79 plans prepared by installations with property to be transferred to
nonfederal users. (See app. III.) We also visited closing
installations and environmental cleanup design and construction
management commands to determine how cost data is developed by each
of the services.
(See app. II.)
To determine transferability and reuse, we reviewed BRAC and
environmental laws, DOD and EPA headquarters policies and guidance to
the military services, and environmental cleanup and reuse programs
at BRAC installations. We also reviewed data developed by the
services to identify uncontaminated property that would be available
for quick transfer.
We identified progress and plans to address problems during
discussions with DOD and EPA headquarters, DOD design and
construction management, and closing base officials, as well with EPA
regional officials. In addition, we observed training sessions on
DOD's Fast Track Cleanup program, reviewed data in installations'
BCPs, and visited a number of these installations. Furthermore, we
attended meetings of the Defense Environmental Restoration Task Force
in Austin, Texas; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Charleston, South
Carolina. We also attended several public hearings during visits to
installations, including the California Military Base Reuse Task
Force, installations' cleanup advisory board meetings, and a hearing
on cleanup remedy selection. We visited the California Environmental
Protection Agency, Sacramento, California, and discussed specific
issues with environmental officials of other states.
As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments. However, we
discussed the report's contents with DOD and EPA officials and
incorporated their comments where appropriate. We performed the
review between February 1994 and January 1995 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
SIGNIFICANT COST, FUNDING
PRIORITY, AND REUSE ISSUES NEED TO
BE ADDRESSED
============================================================ Chapter 2
Congress, DOD, and EPA have taken actions over the past several years
to address a number of important matters relevant to resolving
environmental cleanup issues at bases that are being closed and
realigned. However, problems still remain with determining accurate
cleanup costs, timing appropriations with cleanup needs, prioritizing
available cleanup funds, and protecting the government's interests
when leasing or transferring property.
CLEANUP COST ESTIMATES ARE
LIKELY TO CONTINUE INCREASING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
As reported in its fiscal year 1995 BRAC budget justification
document, DOD's total estimate for cleaning up environmental problems
at 123 closing and realigning installations and activities was about
$4 billion. However, more recent data developed by DOD in April 1994
shows that estimates for just 84 installations totaled about $5.4
billion, and costs are likely to go beyond that amount as more
complete data becomes available.
BRAC BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR
CLEANUP WILL CONTINUE TO
INCREASE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
The BRAC accounts were established to be the exclusive source of
funds for environmental restoration projects related to base
closures. The intent was to preclude the cleanup actions from
competing with other sources of funding for environmental cleanup
such as the DERA. DOD's BRAC budget estimates for cleanup cover
6-year periods; thus, the estimate for the 1988 round spans fiscal
years 1990 through 1995; the estimate for the 1991 round spans fiscal
years 1992 through 1997; and the 1993 round spans fiscal years 1994
through 1999. BRAC budget justification documents are to address the
total financial impact of realignment and closure actions.
DOD's estimate in the fiscal year 1995 budget for the 1988 and 1991
rounds increased from the fiscal year 1993 estimate by about $400
million, to about $2.2 billion. In addition, the 1995 budget
estimate included about $1.8 billion for the 1993 round, raising the
total estimate for the first three rounds to almost $4.0 billion for
123 installations and supporting activities. This estimate
represents the total BRAC budget through fiscal year 1999. According
to DOD, these estimates increased because they were based on
preliminary information, and costs depend on the type of contaminants
detected, conditions found, and the cleanup technologies selected.
MORE RECENT INFORMATION
INCREASES ESTIMATES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
More recent information developed by DOD in cleanup plans on 84 of
the 123 installations shows an estimate of about $5.4 billion. This
estimate is likely to increase as more bases are added and all costs
are captured.
In September 1993, as part of its Fast Track Cleanup program to
accelerate cleanup and reuse of BRAC installations, DOD required
installations with property that could be transferred for nonfederal
use to develop comprehensive BRAC cleanup plans and to submit these
plans by April 1994. The military services forwarded 79 such plans,
covering 84 installations, and the estimated cleanup costs in these
plans totaled nearly $5.4 billion. (See app. III.) This is about
$1.6 billion more than the fiscal year 1995 BRAC budget estimates for
these same 84 installations, as summarized in table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Comparison of Total Estimated Cleanup
Costs in BRAC Budget and Cleanup Plans
(Dollars in millions)
Fiscal
year 1995
Number of BRAC Cleanup
cleanup budget plan Differen
plans estimates estimates ce
-------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- --------
Air Force 26 $1,674 $1,207 ($467)
Army 19 693 1,268 575
Navy 34 1,356 2,882 1,526
============================================================
Total 79 $3,723 $5,357 $1,634
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD BRAC Fiscal Year 1995 Budget Estimates, Justification
Data Submitted to Congress (Feb. 1994); BRAC Cleanup Plans (Apr.
1994)
DOD officials told us that the cleanup plans required more
comprehensive cost estimates than the BRAC budget estimates. They
said that total environmental programs at closing and realigning
bases go beyond those costs identified in the BRAC budgets. For
example, some cleanup plans for Army installations needed DERA funds
in addition to BRAC funds. Also, both the Army and Navy plans
identified funding needed for environmental compliance and for the
preservation of natural and cultural resources.
Also, BRAC budget estimates cover only the 6-year period that bases
are allowed to close. However, the average cleanup can take much
longer. The cleanup plans include 14 installations from the 1988
round of closures that estimated they will need $536 million after
the 6-year period. (See app. IV.) For example, the BRAC budget
estimate for the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana, was about
$11 million. The cleanup plan estimated it would cost $233 million,
including $789,000 prior to 1989, $16.1 million in BRAC and other
funding between 1990 and 1995, and $216.1 million in DERA funding
after the 6-year period. The cleanup plan shows that this
$216.1-million figure assumed no change in how the base was being
used, and if another reuse option was selected, the total estimated
cost for this one base could be $2 billion per year for fiscal years
1996 to 1999.
Although the cleanup plans provide a more complete view of
environmental costs at closing bases, they did not generally capture
complete costs. In some cases, long-term monitoring costs may go on
for many years beyond the base cleanup plan estimates. For example,
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire, reported no costs beyond fiscal
year 1999, but officials estimated it will cost $300,000 a year to
monitor the groundwater for an indefinite period beyond 1999.
Similarly, Norton Air Force Base, California, officials estimated
long-term remedial operations will cost $38.9 million through 2010,
but the Air Force's estimate only included monitoring costs through
fiscal year 1999.
Furthermore, the cleanup plan estimates did not include some sites
that have yet to be investigated at the 84 installations. At its
Charleston, South Carolina, complex, consisting of a station,
shipyard, and fleet industrial supply center, the Navy is presently
investigating 39 waste management sites and has identified 330
potential areas of concern that require further study. Assessments
are currently being performed of 118 of the potential areas. The
remaining sites were recently identified during a site inspection,
and the appropriate investigation approaches are being formulated.
The Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Massachusetts, was recently
added to the NPL, requiring the Army to address surface water
contamination cleanup previously not planned or budgeted. EPA is
currently assessing the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground for possible
addition to the NPL, and other installations could be considered for
NPL status in the future.
The Congressional Budget Office reported in January 1995 on
unanticipated cost growth that has occurred for installations
scheduled to close. It observed that cost estimates increased for 34
of 49 installations being closed because (1) DOD discovered
additional sites and contaminants on its installations and (2) new
technologies that could reduce costs have been slow in coming and
gaining acceptance. They also said that stricter cleanup standards
than planned could significantly add to the costs.\3 As part of our
review on DOD's Future Years Defense Program, we reported in July
1994 that DOD's environmental costs may be significantly
understated.\4
--------------------
\3 Cleaning Up Defense Installations: Issues and Options,
Congressional Budget Office (Jan. 1995).
\4 Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to
Billions in Overprogramming (GAO/NSIAD-94-210, July 29, 1994).
SUBSTANTIAL UNOBLIGATED AMOUNTS
IN BRAC ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Of the nearly $4 billion identified for environmental cleanup through
fiscal year 1999 in the 1995 BRAC budget estimate, $1.8 billion had
been appropriated through fiscal year 1994. By June 1994, only about
55 percent of $1.8 billion had been obligated, and about $813 million
was unobligated. However, by September 30, 1994, about $334 million
remained unobligated, as shown in table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Appropriated and Unobligated BRAC
Environmental Funds (as of September 30,
1994)
(Dollars in millions)
Fiscal
year Total
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ==========
Total $302.8 $542.0 $453.4 $515.1 $1,813.3
appropr
iated
Amount
unoblig
ated
BRAC $27.7 $33.1 $62.2 0 $123.0
1988
BRAC 0 30.7 80.1 $66.7 $177.5
1991
BRAC 0 0 0 33.9 $ 33.9
1993
============================================================
Total $27.7 $63.8 $ 142.3 $100.6 $334.4
Percent 9 12 31 20 18
unoblig
ated
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD, Office of the Comptroller
BRAC funds are available to be obligated during the 6-year period
bases have to close. According to DOD officials, however, the
services' perception is that funds should be obligated in the year
appropriated, and high unobligated balances are seen by the services
as a failure to execute their programs. For example, in October
1992, the Army increased the BRAC 1991 account for Fort Ord,
California, by $11.8 million for environmental restoration, stating
that the Army had to obligate its current funds to receive additional
1991 funds DOD had withheld. Between February and September 1993,
$10.8 million was obligated for an existing contract with provisions
that the work would be fully defined and priced later.
In explaining the high levels of unobligated balances, DOD said that
it (1) was probably overly optimistic in the funds requested, (2) did
not have all the necessary expertise to better estimate requirements
and timing, and (3) experienced slow obligation rates by the
installations. DOD officials told us that the unobligated balances
improved between June and September 1994 because the services entered
into cost-reimbursable contracts for the total design and actual
cleanup of installations, instead of contracting separately for
design and cleanup. As indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
cost-reimbursable contracts, they are higher risk to the government
and will require closer oversight of the contractor's operations.
HIGH PRIORITY CLEANUP FUNDING
APPEARS UNWARRANTED FOR MANY
INSTALLATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
DOD gives the highest priority to cleaning up installations on EPA's
NPL and installations scheduled to close and realign. For BRAC
installations in the 79 BRAC cleanup plans, the cost of cleanup for
non-NPL installations is about $3.4 billion, compared to $2.0 billion
for NPL installations. BRAC installations are given a high priority
to facilitate the transfer of property to nonfederal use as soon as
possible. However, most BRAC property will stay under federal
ownership. Also, until 1992, CERCLA required cleanup before property
could be transferred to nonfederal owners, but a 1992 amendment
allows for the transfer of property before cleanup is finished under
certain stipulations. Furthermore, a 1994 law allows for long-term
leases to nonfederal users before cleanup is complete. We reported
that DOD will not be able to efficiently institute cleanup efforts
until it and EPA evaluate the large number of sites currently on the
NPL and at BRAC installations and determine which should be
designated as high priority.\5
--------------------
\5 Environmental Cleanup: Too Many High Priority Sites Impede DOD's
Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-133, Apr. 21, 1994).
HIGH PRIORITY CLEANUP
ACCELERATES DOD'S FUNDING
NEEDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
In 1990, Congress designated the BRAC appropriations account to be
the exclusive source of funding for environmental restoration at BRAC
installations. Congress established this separate cleanup funding
because it was concerned that the higher priority being given to
closing and realigning installations would exhaust all DERA funding.
In the same act, Congress directed that DOD restore any property
excess to its needs as a result of closure or realignment as soon as
possible. High priority funding was necessary for these
installations because CERCLA requires environmental cleanup to be
completed before nonfederal ownership transfer and reuse can occur.
Giving all closing and realigning installations the same status as
NPL installations has significantly increased the number of priority
installations and accelerated the funding DOD needs for high priority
cleanup. Of the 84 installations identified in the cleanup plans, 21
are for NPL installations and receive priority cleanup funding
consideration regardless of whether they close or realign. (See app.
III.) Cleanup estimates in these 21 installations' plans totaled $2.0
billion. However, the other 63 installations would not have been
given high priority status if they were not closing or realigning.
Estimated cleanup costs in plans for these installations amounted to
$3.4 billion, or 63 percent of the nearly $5.4-billion total
estimate. (See table 2.3.) For example, the Long Beach Naval Station
and Hospital, California, are not on the NPL. However, these
installations add an estimated $221 million to DOD's priority
requirements.
Were these non-NPL bases not closing or realigning, they would likely
receive funds only for essential cleanup and compliance activities.
For example, non-NPL installations would likely receive funds to
remove underground storage tanks to meet deadlines in the law, but
asbestos and lead-based paint surveys not subject to a deadline might
be deferred to later years. Army headquarters officials told us
there had never been much DERA funding available to clean up non-NPL
installations, but funds became available once an installation was
identified for closure. Environmental officials at Fort Ord,
California, said that before their installation was on the NPL, they
had trouble competing for DERA cleanup funding.
Table 2.3
BRAC Cleanup Plan Estimates for NPL and
Non-NPL Installations
(Dollars in millions)
Total
------------- ------------- ------------- ===============
BRAC 1988 $257 $841 $1,098
BRAC 1991 1,147 874 $2,021
BRAC 1993 601 1,636 $2,237
============================================================
Total $2,005 $3,351 $5,356
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: BRAC cleanup plans
DOD officials told us that cleanup priority funding was needed for
non-NPL installations because (1) BRAC funding is tied to the 6-year
period allowed for bases to close, (2) legal mandates established by
state law or the courts exist at some bases, and (3) communities are
expecting their installations to be cleaned up as soon as possible.
PROPERTY CAN BE TRANSFERRED
TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
BEFORE CLEANUP IS COMPLETE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
CERCLA allows DOD to transfer property to another service or federal
agency before completing cleanup. However, the proper arrangements
for cleanup must be made, and DOD's potential liability is
significant.
As we reported in November 1994, DOD is retaining most of the
property or transferring it to other federal agencies.\6 It is
retaining about
156,700 acres, or 63 percent of the 250,100 acres on installations
from the 1988 and 1991 rounds. Some of this property is being
retained because of extensive unexploded ordnance contamination. For
example, at the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana, due to
long-term hazardous waste contamination and the potential that
unexploded ordnance could be found all over the installation, it is
impossible to dispose of all the property. The Army was considering
retaining all or part of it under a caretaker program. However, the
U.S. Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service requested
that most of the installation's property be added to a national
wildlife refuge.
Even though these installations will not have to be cleaned up before
the property is transferred, DOD and the receiving agency must agree
on what remedial action will be taken. Consequently, DOD is still
held responsible for the cleanup, which ultimately could involve
substantial costs. According to DOD officials, DOD is responsible
for cleaning up past contamination, regardless of when it is
identified, and meeting the requirements of any new federal or state
cleanup standards and laws. For example, at the Hamilton Army
Airfield, California, ownership of a landfill on property once
auctioned to a private developer has reverted to the Army. Due to
the presence of contamination, the Army will now pay to contain
landfill contaminants and treat the groundwater.
--------------------
\6 Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and
1991 (GAO/NSIAD-95-3,
Nov. 1, 1994).
PROPERTY CAN BE TRANSFERRED
TO NONFEDERAL USERS BEFORE
CLEANUP IS FINISHED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3
About 93,400 (37 percent) of the 250,100 acres at closing 1988 and
1991 installations will potentially be available for transfer to
nonfederal users. CERCLA had prohibited DOD property transfers to
nonfederal ownership until the necessary cleanup action had been
taken, but the Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act
(CERFA) amended CERCLA in 1992 to expedite transfer. Under the act,
remedial action is considered to have been taken if (1) the
construction and installation of an approved remedial design has been
completed and (2) the remedy has been demonstrated to EPA to be
operating properly and successfully. Thereafter, any long-term
pumping and treating or operation and monitoring after the
demonstration does not preclude transferring the property.
Although the CERFA amendment could eventually facilitate the transfer
and reuse of property under CERCLA, most sites at BRAC installations
are in the early investigation and study stages and have not reached
the point where remedies are in place. An EPA headquarters official,
after checking with EPA regions, told us that data is not being
collected, but it is unlikely that much property has been transferred
so far where remedies are in place and operating successfully.
LONG-TERM LEASES ALLOW REUSE
BEFORE CLEANUP
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.4
In general, DOD may only lease property that is under its control,
not currently needed for public use, and not excess property. A
limited exception was available for property found to be excess as a
result of closure or realignment, where a military service determined
that leasing would facilitate economic reuse. However, leases were
subject to limitations, including a term not to exceed 5 years and
DOD's right to revoke the lease at will.
As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994 (P.L. 103-160), Congress authorized the military services to
lease property to facilitate state or local economic reuse without
limiting the length of a lease. As of January 1995, the Air Force
has used the provision to enter into six leases, ranging from 25 to
70 years, for airports and other uses, as shown in table 2.4. The
other services had leasing actions in process.
Table 2.4
Long-Term Leases at BRAC Air Force Bases
Air Force base State Acres Years
---------------------------- ------ -------- ------------
Bergstrom TX 2,516 50
Chanute IL 1,801 Airport -
25
Other -50
George CA 2,300 25
Norton CA 1,289 55
Pease NH 1,720 55
Rickenbacker OH 1,543 70
============================================================
Total 11,169
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Air Force Base Conversion Agency
Although leasing property allows its reuse before cleanup has been
completed, DOD is still liable for environmental cleanup costs.
Thus, leasing still leaves the question of how the government should
be protected from liability for hazardous waste that results from the
current tenant's operations. Even though DOD conducts extensive
environmental surveys and includes numerous provisions in its leases
to limit its liability, DOD nonetheless remains a responsible party
under CERCLA. For example, between 1976 and 1986, the Navy leased
most of its Hunters Point Annex--a deactivated Navy shipyard listed
for closure on the 1991 round--to a commercial business, which
subleased many of the buildings to other businesses. The activities
conducted were primarily commercial ship repair, and the lessee was
later sued by the city of San Francisco for the alleged illegal
disposal of large amounts of hazardous waste. The Navy remained the
owner of the property and, according to the Navy environmental
coordinator, has included these sites in its BRAC cleanup program.
Other issues affecting leases are (1) the time and effort required to
complete the environmental documents and processes necessary to
satisfy federal and state laws and DOD policies and (2) the
obligation of the services to monitor and manage the property and
environmental requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
Although various actions have been taken in recent years, Congress,
DOD, and local communities still face a number of difficult issues
related to (1) obtaining accurate cost estimates for completing
cleanup efforts at closing and realigning bases, (2) determining the
proper timing of appropriations to meet cleanup needs, (3)
determining whether, in view of limited resources and changes in law,
all closing and realigning bases should be given priority funding,
and (4) facilitating the transfer of property to federal and
nonfederal users while ensuring the government's and DOD's interests
are protected.
In particular, we believe high priority funding for environmental
cleanup at closing and realigning installations needs to be
reevaluated because most property will stay under federal ownership,
and property that will be available for nonfederal ownership transfer
can now be leased or reused before it is entirely clean. It appears
that DOD could be more selective and designate priority funding for
NPL installations and other sites where cleanup is required for
nonfederal reuse. This might reduce DOD's requirements for
accelerated funding for nonpriority sites and spread these costs into
more appropriate future budget years.
Also, although property remaining as federal lands does not have to
be cleaned up before transfer, DOD appears to be retaining much of
the responsibility for cleanup. Accordingly, DOD needs to include
these potential unfunded liabilities in its total environmental
program cost estimate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a total
environmental program cost estimate of the financial impact of
realignment and closure actions that reflects
a more complete description of the costs as identified in the
installations' BRAC cleanup plans, including estimates for
compliance, preservation of natural and cultural resources, and
long-term costs associated with cleanup and monitoring; and
unfunded liabilities where property is being retained by the federal
government and cleanup will be deferred.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense approve sites for
high priority environmental funding only when cleanup or compliance
is required or cost-effective for nonfederal reuse to occur.
CLEANUP PROGRESS IS LIMITED, AND
TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED
============================================================ Chapter 3
Most sites at closing and realigning installations are still being
investigated and studied. Thus, the full extent of cleanup actions
required may not be known for years. Also, installations may not be
cleaned up by the time they close, and major groundwater, landfill,
and unexploded ordnance sites will remain contaminated unless new
technology is developed.
Dissatisfied with the slow pace of cleanup that had occurred, DOD
designed the Fast Track Cleanup program in 1993. Although the
program has made some progress, it could be improved in such ways as
adding performance measures to gauge progress.
CLEANUP IS IN THE EARLY STAGES
OF THE PROCESS, AND NEW AND
BETTER TECHNOLOGY IS NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
DOD's guidance for preparing cleanup plans called for installations
to account for all sites requiring restoration and to summarize their
environmental compliance programs. For example, installations
identified cleanup requirements, such as fuels, solvents, unexploded
ordnance, and other contaminants in training and maintenance areas,
landfills, burn pits, fuel stations, wastewater treatment areas, and
at other sites. They reported on programs to remove asbestos, radon,
and lead-based paint from buildings and other structures as well as
inventories of underground storage tanks that held fuel, waste
petroleum, and other products.
The 84 installations included in the cleanup plans reported that most
environmental cleanup work was still in the early stages. For
example, 49 of the installations combined many contaminated sites
into "operable units"\7 for more effective cleanup management. They
reported that work on 165 of 239 units, or 69 percent, was in the
earliest phases--remedial investigation and feasibility study. The
plans estimated that 129 of the 165 units would not complete this
phase until fiscal years 1995 to 1998. Most of the work at the
remaining installations was still in the remedial investigation and
feasibility study phases as well. According to DOD officials,
technology exists for the cleanup of many sites, but it needs to be
made more efficient and cost-effective. We reported that the CERCLA
progress is sluggish because the study and evaluation process is
lengthy, cleanups are complex, existing technology takes a long time,
and the average cleanup can require about 10 years.\8
Contaminated groundwater, landfills, and unexploded ordnance were
identified in many installations' cleanup plans. (See app. III.)
Some large contaminated sites cannot be cleaned up because either
knowledge and expertise does not exist or has technology or cost
limitations. At these sites, interim cleanup actions are being used,
and the sites will remain contaminated unless new removal technology
is developed. Remedies to contain contamination require significant
long-term operation, maintenance, and monitoring efforts as well as
further cleanup actions if contamination recurs. A 1990 EPA study
showed that containment remedies may initially be less expensive to
construct, but the required operation and maintenance and the
potential for failure increase their cost in the long run.
Containment at BRAC installations for major groundwater, landfill,
and unexploded ordnance sites will likely require cleanup efforts
over many years.
--------------------
\7 Operable units can be defined in a variety of ways. Examples of
typical operable units include areas (1) with similar contamination
or waste materials, (2) in a similar geographic location, (3) that
can be cleaned up using similar techniques or timeframes, and (4)
that can be managed under a single remedial investigation or
feasibility study.
\8 Superfund: Progress, Problems, and Reauthorization Issues
(GAO/RCED-93-27, Apr. 21, 1993).
CLEANUP OF GROUNDWATER IS A
PROBLEM AT MOST BRAC
INSTALLATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Decontaminating polluted groundwater, an issue identified in 51 of
the 79 cleanup plans, is costly, difficult, and sometimes impossible.
Once contamination is detected, the uneven flow of groundwater and
the redistribution of the contaminants make cleanup difficult.
According to EPA, the technical challenges of eliminating groundwater
contamination are complex and efforts to speed up the process have
been expensive and achieved limited success.
For example, one of the most commonly used groundwater cleanup
technologies is "pump and treat," where contaminated water is pumped
to the surface for treatment. However, this technology can cost
millions of dollars, take decades, and still leave groundwater
contaminated. Pump-and-treat systems were in place or planned for at
least 24 of the installations identified in appendix III. Figure 3.1
shows an example of a pump-and-treat remediation project.
(See figure in printed edition.)Figure 3.1: Groundwater
Pump-and-Treat Pilot Project, Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire
Pump-and-treat systems may need to be tested over several years to
determine their effectiveness. For example, at two installations we
visited, Norton and George Air Force Bases in California, pilot
systems were in place, but officials said they were operating at
about one-half of the capacity because the groundwater did not flow
as expected. They said the number of wells for these systems will
need to be increased for sufficient water to flow, and even if
successful the systems may need to operate for 30 years or more. At
Norton Air Force Base, groundwater contamination extends from the
central base area, toward the southwest in the direction of
groundwater flow beneath the base, and continues beyond the base
boundary. There are several community water wells near the base
within the anticipated path of the contaminants.
Furthermore, the pump-and-treat technology does not work on some
contaminants, according to EPA. These contaminants include certain
organic compounds, such as chlorinated solvents, polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs), creosote, and some pesticides. They are difficult
to locate and remove and may continue to contaminate groundwater for
hundreds of years, despite best efforts to clean them up.
LANDFILLS MUST BE CLEANED UP
AT MOST BRAC INSTALLATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
Contaminated landfills were identified in 67 of 79 cleanup plans for
closing and realigning installations and may pose some major
environmental threats, particularly for groundwater. (See app.
III.) Although small landfills can be removed and eliminated, it is
not practical to remove all waste and contamination from larger ones.
National standards do not exist for cleaning up most contaminants in
soil, so DOD, EPA, and state regulators negotiate standards for each
site. Large landfills are often treated by placing a protective cap
over the site to contain the waste and prevent further contamination
of the soil, groundwater, and atmosphere. The groundwater conditions
around the landfill must also be assessed to determine whether
contamination exists, and, if necessary, identify the cleanup
measures. Figure 3.2 shows a landfill excavation and a soil removal
project.
(See figure in printed edition.)Figure 3.2: Landfill Excavation
(below) and Soil Removal Project (page 30), Pease Air Force Base, New
Hampshire.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Landfills that close where waste has not been removed are also
subject to EPA requirements for maintenance and groundwater
monitoring 30 years after the landfill is closed. These requirements
were established because of the potential for environmental problems
after closure. EPA or the state must determine that closed
facilities have complied with all regulatory requirements. If not,
the facilities must be brought into compliance.
MORE COST-EFFECTIVE
TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO CLEAN
UP UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
Unexploded ordnance is ordnance that has failed to function as
designed, has been abandoned or discarded, and is still capable of
exploding and causing injury. It results from operations conducted
at weapons test and training ranges and contains explosive,
petroleum, metal, and other compounds that may contribute to soil and
water contamination. If unexploded ordnance is buried below 3 feet,
current technology may not be able to detect it, and it can migrate
to the surface over time. Consequently, surface cleanup may need to
be repeated.
Unexploded ordnance and related waste were identified at 25 closing
installations, including some installations where the contaminated
areas are so large that cleanup technology is not affordable. For
example, unexploded ordnance is potentially present on about 51,000
acres of the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana; 7,200 acres of
the Army's Fort Ord, California; and an unspecified amount of
property at the Navy's Mare Island Shipyard, California. Current
removal technology is labor intensive, costly, and unreliable.
Figure 3.3 shows a portion of a munitions firing range that contains
unexploded ordnance.
(See figure in printed edition.)Figure 3.3: Portion of the Army's
Jefferson Proving Ground Ordnance Range
Note: The smoke in the upper center of the photograph is from the
impact of live munitions.
According to Army ordnance and other officials, new and more
cost-effective technology needs to be developed for cleaning up the
unexploded ordnance. A study at the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground,
which has extensive quantities, types, and dispersion of unexploded
ordnance, found that the cleanup effort would be labor intensive.
For example, the work would require using metal detectors for the
majority of land, mapping the unexploded ordnance, handling or
removing it, and disposing of it. Because the installation
potentially has 51,000 contaminated acres and is heavily forested,
current cleanup technology is not practical or affordable. Although
the cleanup plan included $216 million in estimated costs, the plan
noted that costs could run to $2 billion a year for several years,
and officials said other estimates for cleanup have ranged from $5
billion to $8 billion in total, depending on how the property is to
be reused. Figure 3.4 shows an example of buried unexploded
ordnance.
(See figure in printed edition.)Figure 3.4: Item of Unexploded
Ordnance Found Buried on the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground Range
The closure of military installations and extent of unexploded
ordnance have intensified the need for DOD and EPA headquarters and
states to address many unresolved issues related to unexploded
ordnance. These issues concern costs and cleanup requirements, when
unexploded ordnance becomes a hazardous material, when DOD turns over
control to EPA and states, and which laws apply to cleanup. The 1992
Federal Facilities Compliance Act amending RCRA required EPA to
propose, after consulting with the Secretary of Defense and
appropriate state officials, regulations identifying when military
munitions become hazardous waste and providing for its safe
transportation and storage. The deadline for the proposed
regulations was October 1994. EPA officials told us in January 1995
they missed that deadline and now plan to propose the guidelines in
July 1995.
DEVELOPING NEW TECHNOLOGY
WILL TAKE TIME
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.4
Containing and cleaning up contamination depends on developing new,
affordable technologies, but these technologies will take time to
develop. We recently reported that the process of choosing a new
technology involves many decisionmakers, technical expertise, and
competing interests.\9 The pressure to meet cleanup milestones also
influences the technology evaluation process and the solutions
accepted. The reasons why new technologies are not adopted faster
include the following:
Conflicting priorities prevent the approval of innovative approaches
for cleanup.
Field officials may associate the newer technologies with
unacceptable levels of risk.
On-site contractors may favor particular technologies on the basis of
their own experiences and investments.
In May 1993 testimony, DOD recognized that its environmental program
could be improved by directing cleanup efforts to meet potential
users' needs. DOD said it intended to (1) target environmental
technology to high payback areas, (2) apply research and
demonstration funds to real environmental needs, and (3) get support
from regulators, states, and the public for testing and fielding
innovative technologies.\10 Subsequently, in 1994, DOD began looking
at technologies with high potential and ranking them according to
potential benefits and feasibility. DOD officials said they plan to
begin demonstrating technologies and offer them to EPA and state
regulators for validation in 1995.
--------------------
\9 Department of Energy: Management Changes Needed to Expand Use of
Innovative Cleanup Technologies (GAO/RCED-94-205, Aug. 10, 1994).
\10 Statement of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental
Security), before the Subcommittee on Installations and Facilities,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (May 13, 1993).
FAST TRACK CLEANUP PROGRAM IS
BEING IMPLEMENTED BUT NEEDS
ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
DOD established the Fast Track Cleanup program in July 1993 to
accelerate the environmental cleanup at closing installations. The
program was initiated under the five-part program the administration
designed to expedite the environmental cleanup and economic recovery
of communities affected by installation closures.
Progress in the Fast Track Cleanup program's five key elements has
been as follows:
Environmental impact statements depend on communities submitting
reuse plans, and most of these plans have not been developed.
Restrictive indemnification language has been clarified.
Uncontaminated parcels from the 1988 and 1991 closing installations
have been identified for transfer, but not as much uncontaminated
property has been identified as hoped.
Teams have been established at closing bases to make decisions and
develop the cleanup plans, but decisions are still made above the
base level, and bases' cleanup plans can be improved.
Community cleanup advisory boards that involve the public in the
cleanup program have been established, but can be improved.
The program is not fully implemented, and it is too early to
comprehensively judge its effectiveness. However, DOD has made some
progress in implementing certain elements of the program, but further
development is necessary.
COMPLETING ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
The Fast Track Cleanup strategy paper stated that the process for
preparing an environmental impact statement typically takes
28 to 48 months. The Fast Track Cleanup program requires the
military services to complete the environmental impact statement
within
12 months of a community submitting its final reuse plan. However,
community reuse plans are not completed for many of the installations
submitting cleanup plans. According to service officials, they
anticipate being able to complete the statements within the 12 months
allowed once reuse plans are received.
LAW COVERING INDEMNIFICATION
CLARIFIED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
The Fast Track Cleanup program concluded that indemnification
language in DOD's 1993 appropriations act unintentionally caused DOD
to slow down granting interim leases. DOD's authorization and
appropriations acts for 1993 contained different provisions regarding
the government's liability for the transfer of contaminated property.
DOD viewed the provisions of the appropriations act as exposing the
government to costly claims because of sweeping DOD indemnification
language in the law. In response, DOD stopped entering into any
leases or transferring property for fear of future claims. Congress
subsequently repealed the appropriations language and let the
authorization language stand, which limited DOD's liability to past
problems. DOD has proceeded with efforts to lease and transfer
property.
LIMITED UNCONTAMINATED AND
DESIRABLE PROPERTY
IDENTIFIED FOR NONFEDERAL
TRANSFER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
An issue that arose early in the BRAC process was whether property
could be transferred to parties outside the federal government
without the entire installation being cleaned up. Subsequently,
Congress enacted CERFA in 1992, which allowed an installation to be
divided into parcels that could be considered separately for
transfer. CERFA directs federal agencies to identify uncontaminated
parcels based on the specific requirements set forth in CERFA. For
parcels that are on a NPL installation, EPA must concur with the
results. For parcels on non-NPL installations, appropriate state
officials must concur. The deadline for identifying all parcels on
BRAC 1988 and 1991 installations, including EPA or state concurrence,
was April 19, 1994.
DOD officials told us that CERFA did not work as expected. Although
considerable resources have been spent, the anticipated numbers of
uncontaminated parcels available for quick transfer and reuse have
not been identified. Furthermore, they said that data was not
readily available, but they believed little of the uncontaminated
property that was identified had been transferred. They also said
the developed land on the installations is often the most desirable
for immediate reuse, but this property tends to be contaminated.
However, DOD officials commented that one benefit of the CERFA
process has been that DOD identified the condition of the property at
these installations, and this information will be extremely useful in
leasing and later transferring contaminated property.
DOD records showed that of about 250,100 acres at 1988 and 1991
closing installations, the services identified about 121,200 acres as
uncontaminated; however, the regulators only concurred that 34,499
acres were uncontaminated. Table 3.1 shows uncontaminated acreage at
closing 1988 and 1991 installations that did receive regulatory
concurrence.
Table 3.1
Summary of Uncontaminated Property on
1988 and 1991 Closing Installations
Stat
Service Year Installation e Acreage
---------- ------ ------------------------ ---- --------
Air Force 1988 George Air Force Base CA 2,330
1991 England Air Force Base LA 1,191
1991 Loring Air Force Base ME 4,700
1991 Myrtle Beach Air Force SC 2,126
Base
1991 Williams Air Force Base AZ 3,001
1991 Wurtsmith Air Force Base MI 2,257
============================================================
Total - 15,605
Air Force
Army 1988 Cameron Station VA 58
1988 Coosa River Annex AL 2,586
1988 Defense Mapping Agency - VA 3
Herndon
1988 Fort Des Moines IA 15
1988 Fort Sheridan IL 22
1988 Hamilton Army Airfield CA 500
1988 Presidio of San CA 530
Francisco
1988 Pontiac Storage Facility MI 25
1991 Fort Devens MA 1,878
1991 Fort Ord CA 13,186
1991 Sacramento Army Depot CA 51
============================================================
Total - 18,854
Army
Navy 1988 Naval Station New York NY 26
1991 Construction Battalion RI 7
Center Davisville
1988 Naval Air Station CA 7
Moffett Field
============================================================
Total - 40
Navy
============================================================
Total all 34,499
installati
ons
------------------------------------------------------------
The regulators did not agree that many parcels were uncontaminated
because activities related to compliance--asbestos removal,
lead-based paint surveys, and resolution of issues related to
petroleum--were not completed. Also, state regulators were not
willing to concur because of concerns about the state's potential
liability. At Fort Wingate, New Mexico, the Army identified 17,353
of 21,812 total acres as uncontaminated, but the state regulator did
not concur on any acreage. Likewise, the Air Force identified 1,323
of 3,216 acres at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, as uncontaminated,
but the state regulator did not concur.
Of the 34,499 uncontaminated acres, about one-half is on property the
federal government is retaining and one-half is on property available
for transfer to nonfederal users. However, according to DOD, the
uncontaminated property is usually undeveloped, remotely located, or
linked to contaminated parcels and cannot be used separately. For
example, about 7,000 of the uncontaminated acres at Fort Ord are
considered unusable because, according to DOD officials, the acreage
is in an undeveloped part of the installation that has no access to a
usable water supply. Also, at George Air Force Base, environmental
officials said much of the property identified as uncontaminated
surrounds the runways and cannot be separated from the flightline.
INSTALLATION CLEANUP TEAMS
IN PLACE BUT NOT EMPOWERED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4
The Fast Track Cleanup program concluded environmental decisions were
taking too long to make and required each installation to establish a
team consisting of EPA, DOD, and state representatives that would be
empowered to make decisions quickly. Officials at some closing
installations we visited told us they already had teams but were not
empowered to make decisions at the local level.
EPA issued draft guidance on empowerment to its installation-level
team members in March 1994, but did not mandate that it be followed.
According to EPA officials in January 1995, EPA has delegated to the
regions the necessary authority to make decisions, and the regions
have established procedures to ensure that management approval is
redelegated or provided to the installations' cleanup teams in a
timely manner. The Air Force also issued guidance on empowerment to
its installation-level team members in April 1994. This guidance
delegated some key decision-making authority to mid-level managers,
but not to the installation team members as originally envisioned.
Various DOD and EPA officials told us that their agencies try to
avoid legal problems by reviewing and approving decisions made at the
local level, and states do the same thing. According to Navy
officials, in one case, the state representative for environmental
cleanup at the Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California, decided
in a local meeting on a particular action because the state
environmental agency had approved a similar remedy at the Presidio of
San Francisco, California. However, the state overruled the
installation representative.
CLEANUP PLANS NOT FULLY
DEVELOPED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.5
DOD provided guidance and training on the development of BRAC cleanup
plans. The plans were to provide a comprehensive and consolidated
strategy for expedited environmental cleanup at all BRAC
installations. DOD stated that the cleanup plans should support the
BRAC budget submission. The cleanup plans developed to date are not
of the quality described in the guidance document. DOD officials
told us, for example, that sections in some plans were incomplete and
had not been thoroughly reviewed, and data was viewed as somewhat
unreliable.
A contractor's review of 77 BRAC cleanup plans in June 1994
identified a lack of uniformity in the plans due to (1) different
levels of progress among installations based on the year the
installation was designated for closure, (2) short time frames for
completing the plans, and (3) various installation interpretations of
guidance for the plans. At installations we visited while cleanup
plans were being compiled--Norton Air Force Base, the Jefferson
Proving Ground, and the Army Materials Technology
Laboratory--officials said that they did not have time to develop
complete plans for expediting cleanup and meet reporting deadlines,
so they reported (1) existing information in the cleanup plan format
directed by DOD or (2) the information had to be developed and would
be provided later.
DOD officials recognized that the time available for the services to
develop cleanup plans was not sufficient and now view the April 1994
plans as a first effort. They are considering possible improvements
in developing the BRAC cleanup plans, but have not established
milestones for the services to submit more complete plans.
COMMUNITY CLEANUP ADVISORY
BOARDS STILL BEING FORMED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.6
DOD guidance for the Fast Track Cleanup program directed the military
services to improve public involvement in the environmental cleanup
process. For each installation with property to be transferred or
with sufficient community interest, DOD requires the formation of
cleanup advisory boards comprised of members of the local community
and jointly chaired by a military service representative and a member
of the community. DOD's guidance said these advisory boards are key
to installations being responsive to community concerns.
DOD's goal of having fully functioning cleanup advisory boards in
place may take time. These advisory boards at closing installations
are in the early stages of development. According to the
contractor's review of 77 cleanup plans, about one-third of the
installations had not yet formed cleanup advisory boards. Also, at
installations with boards, only about half of the boards participated
in developing the BRAC cleanup plans.
Furthermore, we reported that EPA, in a similar effort to establish
advisory boards, had not been able to earn the public's trust due to
differing interests, even with the best intentions and community
relations outreach.\11 On the basis of our observations at some of
the BRAC community advisory board meetings we attended and in
discussions with DOD officials, it appears that DOD may face similar
difficulties.
--------------------
\11 Superfund: EPA's Community Relations Efforts Could Be More
Effective (GAO/RCED-94-156,
Apr. 8, 1994).
PERFORMANCE MEASURES NOT
DEVELOPED FOR FAST TRACK
CLEANUP
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.7
DOD officials recognized that the Fast Track Cleanup program lacked a
baseline and performance measures. As a result, they have begun
developing measures for the program, but have not set a target date
for completing this effort. As of December 1994, just two measures
of effectiveness were being considered: (1) the percentage of
closing bases with a completed environmental impact analysis and (2)
the percentage of property at closing bases that could be made
available for reuse.
These measures do not seem to adequately address performance. The
first measure addresses an element that is not considered a problem.
The second measure does not precisely measure environmental cleanup
actions if leases are used. Also, these two measures do not address
program elements concerned with timely decisions being made on
installations' cleanup, the number of installations with fully
developed and effectively implemented cleanup plans, and the extent
and effectiveness of public involvement in the cleanup process.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
Most sites at closing and realigning installations are in the early
stages of the cleanup process. Cleanup is costly, difficult, and
sometimes impossible, and technology does not exist or has serious
limitations when it comes to cleaning up massive amounts of
contaminated groundwater, large landfills, or extensive areas with
unexploded ordnance. Furthermore, new technology will take time to
develop.
The Fast Track Cleanup program is being implemented and has helped
the cleanup process, but some elements of the program need further
development. For example, CERFA has not produced the expected
results. Expectations that installation cleanup teams could be
empowered to make decisions were probably unrealistic, as was the
deadline for installations to develop base cleanup plans. There is a
need to establish standards that will allow DOD to assess the various
measures taken to speed up the cleanup process.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish Fast Track
Cleanup program standards that will allow DOD to assess the steps
taken to accelerate the cleanup process at BRAC installations.
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT PROCESS
=========================================================== Appendix I
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
The initial stage of the cleanup program is an installationwide study
to determine if sites are present that pose hazards to public health
or the environment. Available information is collected on the
source, nature, extent, and magnitude of actual and potential
hazardous substance releases at sites on the installation.
SITE INSPECTION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
The next step consists of sampling and analysis to determine the
existence of actual site contamination. Information gathered is used
to evaluate the site and determine the response action needed.
Uncontaminated sites do not proceed to later stages of the process.
REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
Remedial investigation may include a variety of site investigative,
sampling, and analytical activities to determine the nature, extent,
and significance of the contamination. The focus of the evaluation
is determining the risk to the general population posed by the
contamination.
FEASIBILITY STUDY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4
Concurrent with the remedial investigations, feasibility studies are
conducted to evaluate remedial action alternatives for the site to
determine which would provide the protection required.
REMEDIAL DESIGN
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5
Detailed design plans for the remedial action alternative chosen are
prepared.
REMEDIAL ACTION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6
The chosen remedial alternative is implemented.
INTERIM REMEDIAL ACTION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7
Remedial actions can be taken at any time during the cleanup process
to protect public health or to control contaminant releases to the
environment.
REMEDY IN PLACE AND FUNCTIONING
AS INTENDED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8
The remedial action is functioning properly and performing as
designed. These include such actions as the operation of
pump-and-treat systems that will take decades to complete cleanup.
LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
VISITED
========================================================== Appendix II
AIR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Air Force Center For Environmental Excellence,
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
George Air Force Base, California
Loring Air Force Base, Maine
Mather Air Force Base, California
Norton Air Force Base, California
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire
ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Army Corps Of Engineers, Sacramento District, California
Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Massachusetts
Fort Ord, California
Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana
NAVY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San Diego, California
Naval Air Station, Chase Field, Texas
Naval Complex, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4
Region IX, San Francisco California
NPL STATUS AND SUMMARY OF
CONTAMINANTS AS REPORTED IN 79
BRAC CLEANUP PLANS
========================================================= Appendix III