Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (Letter Report,
12/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-95-67).

The Army's assessment that its stockpile of chemical weapons can be
stored safely until 2004 is questionable.  According to Sandia National
Laboratories, the data on which the Army based its assessment were old
and may no longer be representative of munitions in actual field
storage.  Also, the assessment did not analyze leaking munitions.
Sandia recommended that the Army immediately expand its stockpile
monitoring activities to include propellant samples from nonleaking and
leaking munitions at each storage location.  The Army has established a
working group to review its assessment and has received $4.5 million in
fiscal year 1995 to expand its stockpile monitoring activities.
However, the expanded monitoring activities will not resolve all
questions about the stability of the stockpile.  A contingency plan for
emergency disposal of the M55 rocket is needed because it is the only
munition in the stockpile that cannot readily be reconfigured to remove
its explosive components.  However, the Army has not prepared a plan.
It is studying several courses of action, but more information on the
specific hazards is needed before a plan can be finalized.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-67
     TITLE:  Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile
      DATE:  12/22/94
   SUBJECT:  Munitions
             Military materiel
             Explosives
             Property disposal
             Chemical warfare
             Defense contingency planning
             Property and supply management
             Army facilities
             Safety standards
IDENTIFIER:  Johnston Atoll
             National Defense Stockpile
             Army Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
             M-55 Rocket
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and
Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives

December 1994

CHEMICAL WEAPONS - STABILITY OF
THE U.S.  STOCKPILE

GAO/NSIAD-95-67

Chemical Stockpile


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  ABC - ABCDE

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-259506

December 22, 1994

The Honorable Mike Synar
Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment,
 Energy, and Natural Resources
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

Since 1985, the U.S.  Army has been working to implement
congressional direction to dispose of the U.S.  stockpile of
unitary\1 chemical weapons and agents--a process the Army currently
estimates will cost $8.5 billion.  Because the Army continues to
experience delays in implementing its disposal program and may have
to store the stockpile longer than planned, you asked us to review
the Army's (1) prediction of how long chemical weapons can be stored
safely and (2) contingency plans for disposing of chemical weapons
that become dangerous. 


--------------------
\1 A unitary chemical munition is a munition containing a single,
lethal, chemical agent. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

In November 1985, Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the
Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy its stockpile of unitary
chemical agents and weapons by September 30, 1994.  The weapons are
stored at eight sites in the continental United States and on
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.  (See app.  I for the stockpile
munitions and storage locations.)

To comply with the congressional direction, the Army, DOD's lead
service in chemical matters, developed a plan to burn the stockpile
on-site in specially designed high-temperature incinerators. 
However, because of technical problems and strong citizen opposition
to incineration, the program was delayed.  To date, two of nine
planned incinerators have been built and only one of the two is
operational.  In October 1992, Congress extended the completion date
to December 31, 2004. 

The Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Authorization Act required the Army to
report on the physical and chemical integrity of the stockpile.  This
report,\2 submitted in July 1993, reviewed available inspection data,
laboratory data, and historical stockpile assessment reports and
determined that the chemical weapons stockpile is safe for continued
storage for the near and midterm and uncertain for the long term
(beyond 2004). 

Threats to safe storage of the stockpile include external events such
as earthquakes, airplane crashes, and tornadoes, and internal events
such as leakage of chemical agents from the warhead, accidents during
normal handling and maintenance activities, and autoignition of
propellant.  An accident involving one munition could potentially
affect many munitions.  For example, Army tests have shown that the
ignition of a single M55 rocket within a storage igloo could involve
many of the 4,000 rockets that are typically stored together.  The
effect of an accidental release on a nearby community would depend on
such things as the type and amount of agent released, meteorological
conditions, and the community's proximity to the storage
installation.  Through its Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program, the Army is working to help communities near storage sites
improve their emergency response capabilities. 


--------------------
\2 Physical and Chemical Integrity of the Chemical Weapon Stockpile,
Department of the Army, July 1993. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Army's assessment that the chemical weapons stockpile can be
safely stored until 2004 is subject to question based on the nature
of the supporting data.  According to Sandia National Laboratories,\3
which reviewed the Army report at our request, the data on which the
Army based its assessment were old and may no longer be
representative of munitions in actual field storage.  Also, the
assessment did not include an analysis of leaking munitions.  Sandia
recommended that the Army immediately expand its stockpile monitoring
activities to include propellant samples from non-leaking and leaking
munitions at each storage location.  The Army has established a
working group to review its assessment and received $4.5 million in
fiscal year 1995 to expand its stockpile monitoring activities. 
However, the expanded monitoring activities will not resolve all
questions about the stability of the stockpile. 

A contingency plan for emergency disposal of the M55 rocket is needed
because it is the only munition in the stockpile that cannot readily
be reconfigured to remove its explosive components.  However, the
Army has not prepared a plan.  It is studying several courses of
action, but additional information on the specific hazards is needed
before a plan can be finalized. 


--------------------
\3 Sandia National Laboratories has knowledgeable experts responsible
for ensuring the integrity of nuclear weapons.  The aging problems in
nuclear weapon systems are similar to those that have been and will
be encountered in the chemical weapon stockpile. 


   THE ARMY LACKS DATA TO
   CONCLUSIVELY PREDICT STABILITY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

After reviewing supporting documents for the Army's report, Sandia
identified concerns about the Army's assessment and recommended that
the Army expand and continue its surveillance activities until the
stockpile is destroyed.  The Army has partially complied and is
reviewing the validity of its prediction, but questions may still
remain about the stability of the stockpile. 


      BETTER DATA COULD IMPROVE
      THE ARMY'S PREDICTIVE
      ASSESSMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The Army's assessment that chemical munitions are safe for continued
storage until 2004 is based on Army data on M55 rocket propellant. 
Propellant samples are used to assess chemical munition stability
because propellant is an inherently unstable compound that must be
stabilized to prevent reactions that could lead to a spontaneous
ignition.  Propellant manufacturers add small amounts of stabilizing
compounds that deteriorate over time, and storage life is determined
by monitoring remaining stabilizer content in the propellant samples. 
All munitions stored with propellant, except the M55 rocket, are
having propellant removed from the munition.\4 Reconfiguration of the
munitions should be completed by 1998. 

The Army's assessment is based on M55 rocket propellant samples from
the time of manufacture (1959-65) and from a limited number of field
samples taken from the stockpile in 1980, 1985, and 1989.  No field
samples have been taken since 1989.  In some cases, the Army has only
one or two samples from a particular lot.  In addition, changes in
stabilizer content cannot be verified because different collection
and analysis procedures were used for the original and more recent
analyses.  Sandia's analysis questions how representative the samples
are, compared to actual propellant stored with M55 rockets at the
five storage locations.  The samples are stored at a central location
and are reanalyzed every year.  However, storage conditions and
climatic conditions such as temperature and humidity vary by location
and these differences can affect the rate of propellant degradation. 

As a result of these concerns and similar concerns raised by the
National Research Council, the Army convened a working group in July
1994 to review its safe storage assessment.  The panel is expected to
release its report in January 1995.  According to Army officials,
this report is currently in draft but concludes that there is high
confidence that none of the non-leaking rockets in the stockpile will
undergo autoignition prior to 2004. 

Additionally, the Army requested and received $4.5 million in fiscal
year 1995 to expand its stockpile monitoring activities.  However,
the expanded monitoring activities may still not resolve all
questions about the stockpile's stability because the Army plans to
select additional propellant samples only from rockets stored at
Tooele Army Depot, Utah.  The samples will be selected at the Tooele
depot because it is the only storage site that currently has a
suitable explosive and agent containment facility.  Thus, questions
about variances among storage sites will go unanswered. 


--------------------
\4 The design of the M55 rocket makes separation of the propellant
from the chemical warhead difficult. 


      LEAKING MUNITIONS MAY POSE A
      SIGNIFICANT SAFETY HAZARD
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

According to the Army's report, over time, nerve agents--particularly
the nerve agent GB--become acidic and can corrode the metal warheads
of rockets, mortars, and projectiles.  In some cases, the corrosion
can eat small holes in the metal warheads that allow the agent or
agent vapors to escape.  These leaks can be either external or
internal to the munition. 

External leaks allow an agent to escape outside the weapon or storage
container and are quickly detected by monitoring.  When detected,
such leaks are controlled by placing the leaking munition in a
special airtight container and segregating it.  Army reports showed
that from 1983 through 1993, 1,824 chemical munitions, mostly nerve
agent-filled (GB) M55 rockets, developed external leaks.  Leaking
munitions have been found at all six storage sites that store
munitions.\5

In 1992, the last year data were available, 0.252 percent of M55
rockets in the total stockpile had external leaks and 0.022 percent
of other munitions in the total stockpile had external leaks. 

Internal agent leaks cannot be detected without disassembling the
munition.  When a munition leaks internally, an agent can come in
contact with its explosive components.  Such contact, according to
Army reports, could increase the risk of unanticipated ignitions or
explosions during handling, movement, and disassembling prior to
final destruction.  Possible problems that could result from internal
leaks include accelerated aging of the propellant stabilizer,
formation of sensitive explosive metal salts from reaction of the
agent on burster explosives, corrosion of metallic parts in fuses,
and formation of hazardous metallic salts in the fuse assembly. 
Again, internal agent leaks are most acute with M55 rockets.  In a
1985 assessment of M55 rockets, the Army estimated that 1 to 3
percent had internal leaks.  However, the limited sample size makes
this estimate uncertain. 

The extent of the hazard posed by internal leaks is unknown.  The
Army has never sampled leaking munitions because it considers them
dangerous.  Consequently, the Army has not resolved the questions
about the specific hazards posed by leaking munitions.  Sandia
concluded that "(w)e can not emphasize enough the importance of
evaluating leaking systems because of the questions generated and the
lack of data to validate possible problems associated with these
systems." Further, Sandia pointed out that current Army procedures
for handling leaking munitions (e.g., placing them in a containment
vessel that allows an agent to remain in contact with the various
components for long storage periods) could make problems worse. 

Army officials report that the probability of an agent reaching a
propellant is considered low, but nonetheless they plan to initiate
laboratory tests to investigate the sensitivity of an
agent-contaminated propellant.  These tests should start in early
1995.  However, due to the risks involved in the selection and
handling of agent-contaminated propellant samples, the Army has no
plans to analyze actual field samples because it does not have a
laboratory capable of handling such materials.  Army officials
acknowledge that, depending on the outcome of the laboratory tests,
they may have to develop a capability to select, analyze, and monitor
the condition of actual agent-contaminated propellant samples. 

In addition to uncertainties about problems caused by the interaction
of agent and propellant, a 1985 Army report speculated that agent
contacting fuses and bursters could also be a mechanism for
unanticipated explosive detonation, especially during munition
handling and movement.  While Army officials believe the risks are
minimal, they told us additional analyses may be necessary if the
Army is required to store the chemical weapons beyond 2004. 


--------------------
\5 Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland and Newport Army Ammunition
Plant, Indiana, store only bulk agent. 


   THE ARMY IS NOT PREPARED TO
   DEAL WITH HAZARDOUS MUNITIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

To resolve concerns about propellant stability in M55 rockets, the
Army hired a contractor to study and prepare a report on various
alternatives to allow continued safe storage or disposal of unstable
rockets.  However, the Army has not yet decided which alternative to
develop.  The report, issued in February 1993, identified two
possibilities:  refrigeration of the rocket storage facilities to
prevent stabilizer deterioration; and separation of the rocket
warhead from the propellant- containing rocket motor by unscrewing
the two components at their juncture.  Theoretically, cooling would
reduce the rate at which the propellant stabilizer is used, thus
lengthening the time a rocket could be stored; but, this has not been
scientifically demonstrated.  Separating rocket components would
mitigate the effect of a spontaneous ignition, but because of the
hazards involved, the Army would likely have to design and construct
remotely operated, explosion proof, agent containment facilities at
each storage site.  The two rocket sections could then be stored
separately. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to expand the Army's monitoring program to resolve questions
about the stockpile's stability and develop a contingency plan for
emergency disposal of M55 rockets.  The expanded program should
include an analysis and implementation of the processes that would be
necessary to safely take field samples from all storage sites and
from leaking munitions, and include milestones and required
resources.  The plan should also identify specific methodologies to
be used, and specific milestones and resources. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

To address our objectives, we reviewed Army documents on the chemical
and physical integrity of the chemical weapons stockpile and options
for dealing with M55 rockets that become unstable.  We also discussed
stockpile stability with the Army's contractor for the stability
study and with Army officials at the Army Materiel Command; the
Armament, Munition and Chemical Command; and the Armament Research,
Development and Engineering Center. 

Because of the technical complexity of assessing munition stability,
we also asked the Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories
to review the Army's report to Congress on stockpile stability along
with its supporting documentation.  We asked Sandia to review key
documents used in the Army's stockpile stability report\6 and (1)
provide a critique on the methods used and inconsistencies (if any)
within and between reports and (2) discuss any other potential
hazards that exist or might exist that were not given appropriate
attention in the studies.  Sandia's report was shared with Army
officials responsible for the stockpile. 

To obtain information on the Army's plans for dealing with large
numbers of deteriorated chemical munitions, we held discussions and
obtained information from officials at the Army Materiel Command and
the contractor for the contingency study. 

We conducted our work from January 1993 to December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments on this
report.  However, we did discuss our findings with agency officials,
who generally agreed.  Their views are included where appropriate. 


--------------------
\6 (1) Physical and Chemical Integrity of the Chemical Weapons
Stockpile:  Assessment of the U.S.  Chemical Weapons Stockpile: 
Integrity and Risk Analysis, The MITRE Corporation, July 1993;
(2) Experimental Propellant Degradation Kinetics via Transient
Spectroscopy, U.S.  Army Armament Research, Development and
Engineering Center and Hercules Aerospace Company, July 1990;
(3) Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, 115mm:  Chemical
Agent (GB or VX), M55, Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity,
October 1985; and (4) Technical Memorandum ORDBB-DR4-41,
Compatibility of GB and VX Agents with RDX, Tetryl, Composition B and
70/30 Tetrytol, Artillery, Ammunition and Rocket Development
Laboratory, April 1961. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

As arranged with your staff, unless you announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also be made available
to others on request. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix II. 

Sincerely yours,

Donna M.  Heivilin
Director, Defense Management
 and NASA


CHEMICAL STOCKPILE MUNITIONS AND
LOCATIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I

Storage site                   Weapons and agents stored
-----------------------------  -----------------------------
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD    Ton container (H)

Anniston Army Depot, AL        Projectiles & cartridges
                               (H,GB,VX)
                               M23 mine (VX)
                               Ton container (H,GB)
                               M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Blue Grass Army Depot, KY      Projectiles & cartridges
                               (H,VX)
                               Ton container (H,GB)
                               M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Johnston Atoll                 Projectiles & cartridges
                               (H,GB,VX)
                               M-23 mine (VX)
                               Ton container (H,GB,VX)
                               M55 rocket (GB)
                               Bomb (GB)

Newport Ammunition Plant, IN   Ton container (VX)

Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR         M23 mine (VX)
                               Ton container (H)
                               M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Pueblo Army Depot, CO          Projectiles & cartridges (H)
                               Ton container (H)

Tooele Army Depot, UT          Projectiles & cartridges
                               (H,GB,VX)
                               M23 mine (VX)
                               Bomb (GB)
                               Spray tank (VX)
                               Ton container (H,GB,VX)
                               M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Umatilla Depot Activity, OR    Projectiles & cartridges
                               (GB,VX)
                               M23 mine (VX)
                               Bomb (GB)
                               Spray tank (VX)
                               Ton container (H,GB,VX)
                               M55 rocket (GB,VX)
------------------------------------------------------------

STORAGE CONFIGURATION FOR SOME
MUNITIONS
========================================================== Appendix II



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

David Warren
Tom Howard
Glenn Furbish

PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE

Frederick K.  German
Glenn Knoepfle
Richard Behal
Harry Shanis
Margaret Klucsarits
Travis Thomson
Mark Tremba