    Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (Chapter Report,
    01/31/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-56).

    In its bottom-up review of the nation's defense needs, the Defense
    Department (DOD) concluded that it is prudent to maintain the capability
    to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional wars, and it
    determined the forces, capability improvements, and funding necessary to
    do so. Because the bottom-up review is the basis for the Pentagon's
    planning, programming, and budgeting for the foreseeable future, GAO
    examined key DOD assumptions underlying the two-conflict strategy.  GAO
    raises questions about the redeployment of forces from other operations
    to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic mobility assets
    and Army support forces, deployability of Army National Guard enhanced
    brigades, and planned enhancements to strategic lift and firepower. In
    addition, military commanders believe that DOD's concept for responding
    to two nearly simultaneous conflicts may not be the best approach. For
    example, their estimates of key characteristics of how two nearly
    simultaneous wars might arise and how forces should be deployed differ
    significantly from DOD's estimates, including the timing between the two
    conflicts and the timing of force deployments.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-56
         TITLE:  Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
          DATE:  01/31/95
       SUBJECT:  Strategic planning
                 Defense capabilities
                 Defense contingency planning
                 Defense budgets
                 Military operations
                 Combat readiness
                 Mobilization
                 Mission budgeting
                 Strategic forces
                 Emergency preparedness
    IDENTIFIER:  DOD Future Years Defense Program
                 DOD Bottom-Up Review
                 F-15E Aircraft
                 F-4G Aircraft
                 F-117 Aircraft
                 EF-111 Aircraft
                 B-2 Aircraft
                 Ready Reserve Force
                 Ready Reserve Fleet
                 C-17 Aircraft
                 Persian Gulf War
                 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
                 Army Bold Shift Initiative
                 F-14 Aircraft
                 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
                 DOD Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to Congressional Committees

    January 1995

    BOTTOM-UP REVIEW - ANALYSIS OF KEY
    DOD ASSUMPTIONS

    GAO/NSIAD-95-56

    Bottom-Up Review

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      DOD - Department of Defense
      GAO - General Accounting Office

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-259314

    January 31, 1995

    The Honorable Strom Thurmond
    Chairman
    The Honorable Sam Nunn
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Pete V.  Domenici
    Chairman, Committee on the Budget
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on National Security
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable John R.  Kasich
    Chairman, Committee on the Budget
    House of Representatives

    This report discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) bottom-up
    review and examines assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict
    strategy to determine whether they reasonably support DOD's
    conclusions that the projected force, with capability enhancements,
    can execute the strategy.  The information in this report should be
    useful to your Committees in their deliberations on the future size
    and composition of DOD forces and capabilities.  The report contains
    a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the
    congressionally mandated report on the bottom-up review that must be
    completed by May 1995.

    We are sending copies of this report to other interested
    congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the
    Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S.  Marine Corps; and the
    Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also be made
    available to others on request.

    If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call
    me on (202) 512-3504.  Major contributors to this report are listed
    in appendix II.

    Richard Davis
    Director, National Security
     Analysis

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    ============================================================ Chapter 0

       PURPOSE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

    In its bottom-up review of the nation's defense needs, the Department
    of Defense (DOD), among other things, judged that it is prudent to
    maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
    major regional conflicts, and determined the forces, capability
    improvements, and funding necessary to do so.  DOD used the results
    of the bottom-up review to develop its fiscal year 1995 budget and
    Future Years Defense Program.  Because the bottom-up review is the
    basis for DOD's planning, programming, and budgeting for the
    foreseeable future, GAO examined DOD's assumptions about key aspects
    of the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably
    support DOD's conclusion that the projected force, with capability
    improvements, can execute the strategy.  GAO did not review the
    rationale for DOD's decision to select the two-conflict strategy.

       BACKGROUND
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

    In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review--an assessment
    of U.S.  defense needs in the post-Cold War security environment.  In
    particular, the review outlined an overall defense strategy for the
    new era, specific dangers to U.S.  interests and strategies for
    dealing with each danger, and force structure requirements.  Chief
    among the dangers was the threat of large-scale aggression by major
    regional powers.  DOD evaluated various strategy and force options
    for countering regional aggression.  It also considered requirements
    for conducting (1) peace enforcement or intervention operations in
    smaller-scale conflicts or crises, (2) overseas presence, and (3)
    deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.

    DOD selected the two-conflict strategy option and determined the
    force structure capable of executing the strategy and meeting
    requirements for overseas presence and smaller-scale operations, as
    shown in table 1.  According to its Report on the Bottom-Up Review,
    DOD also estimated the cost of the bottom-up review program and
    matched it against the President's objective for reducing the defense
    budget by $104 billion.  DOD estimated that the program would achieve
    $91 billion in total savings during fiscal years 1995 to 1999 and
    that additional savings would be identified during DOD's normal
    program and budget review.

                               Table 1

                DOD's Bottom-Up Review Force Structure

    Force                          Requirement
    -----------------------------  -----------------------------
    Army                           10 active divisions
                                   15 Army National Guard
                                   enhanced
                                   readiness (combat) brigades\a

    Navy                           11 active aircraft carriers
                                   1 reserve/training aircraft
                                   carrier
                                   45-55 attack submarines
                                   346 ships

    Marine Corps                   3 Marine expeditionary
                                   forces
                                   174,000 active personnel
                                   42,000 reserve personnel

    Air Force                      13 active fighter wings
                                   7 reserve fighter wings
                                   Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-
                                   1, B-2)

    Strategic nuclear forces       18 ballistic missile
                                   submarines
                                   Up to 94 B-52H bombers\b
                                   20 B-2 bombers\b
                                   500 Minuteman III
                                   intercontinental ballistic
                                   missiles (single warhead)
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a These enhanced brigades will be existing Guard combat brigades
    with improved readiness.

    \b These bombers are included in the 184 bombers listed under the Air
    Force.

    DOD also determined it would need to make specific enhancements to
    force capabilities, such as improving strategic mobility--airlift,
    sealift, and prepositioning--and the lethality of U.S.  firepower.
    DOD estimated that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces
    would be in place by 1999, strategic nuclear forces would be in place
    by 2003, and most enhancements would be done by 2000.

    The Secretary of Defense's defense planning guidance for fiscal years
    1995-99 and 1996-2001, issued in September 1993 and May 1994,
    respectively, implemented the bottom-up review's findings.  The 1994
    guidance included an illustrative planning scenario covering two
    nearly simultaneous regional conflicts for DOD to use in developing
    program and budget requirements.  In general, this scenario described
    force levels, deployment schedules, and other aspects of a situation
    involving two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

    Because of concerns about the results of the bottom-up review, the
    Congress, in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act,
    requires the Secretary of Defense to reexamine the bottom-up review's
    assumptions and conclusions regarding force and budgetary
    requirements and report on the review to the President and the
    Congress in May 1995.  DOD must describe the force structure required
    to execute its two-conflict strategy in light of other ongoing or
    potential operations and may also address possible adjustments to the
    two-conflict strategy.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

    DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the
    availability of forces, supporting capabilities, and enhancements
    that it concluded were necessary for executing the two-conflict
    strategy.  Furthermore, some of DOD's assumptions are questionable.
    DOD assumed the following:

      Forces would be redeployed from other operations, such as
         peacekeeping, to regional conflicts, and forces would be
         redeployed between regional conflicts.  However, critical
         support and combat forces needed in the early stages of a
         regional conflict may not be able to quickly redeploy from peace
         operations because (1) certain Army support forces would be
         needed to facilitate the redeployment of other forces and (2)
         logistics and maintenance support needed for specialized Air
         Force aircraft would have to wait for available airlift.

      Certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from
         one conflict to another.  However, two war-fighting commands, in
         an on-going study of the two-conflict strategy, have raised
         questions about shifting assets between conflicts.

      Sufficient strategic lift assets, prepositioned equipment, and
         support forces would be available.  However, the Army lacks
         sufficient numbers of certain types of support units to meet
         current requirements for a single conflict.

      Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed
         within 90 days of being called to active duty to supplement
         active combat units.  However, National Guard combat brigades
         are currently experiencing difficulty meeting peacetime training
         requirements critical to ensuring their ability to deploy
         quickly in wartime.

      A series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic
         mobility and U.S.  firepower, are critical to implementing the
         two-conflict strategy and would be available by about 2000.
         However, some enhancements, such as additional airlift aircraft,
         may not be available as planned.

    In addition, war-fighting command officials believe that DOD's
    concept for responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts--included
    in DOD guidance for developing program and budget requirements--may
    not be the best approach.  For example, their estimates of key
    characteristics of how two nearly simultaneous conflicts might evolve
    and how forces should be deployed differ significantly from DOD's
    estimates, including the timing between the two conflicts and the
    timing of force deployments.  In February 1994, the commands
    initiated a study to examine options for deploying forces and
    supporting capabilities they believe could maximize the use of U.S.
    capabilities.  Command officials emphasized that, in initiating the
    study, they are not suggesting that the United States cannot
    accomplish the two-conflict strategy.  Their analysis is addressing
    many of the variables that DOD made assumptions about during the
    bottom-up review and could therefore provide useful insights to the
    validity of DOD's assumptions.

    In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work
    needs to be done.  DOD has since begun to examine the redeployment of
    forces from other operations, shifting of assets between conflicts,
    availability of strategic mobility and support forces, and use of
    enhanced brigades.  In general, these analyses will not be complete
    until sometime in 1995.  Until DOD fully analyzes its bottom-up
    review assumptions and considers the war-fighting commands' options,
    it will not have a firm basis for determining the forces, supporting
    capabilities, and funding needed for the two-conflict strategy or if
    the strategy should be changed.

       PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

          DOD HAS NOT FULLY ANALYZED
          KEY BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
          ASSUMPTIONS, AND SOME ARE
          QUESTIONABLE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

    DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the
    availability of forces, supporting capabilities, and enhancements
    that it concluded were necessary to execute the strategy to fight and
    win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.  GAO questions
    some of DOD's assumptions.

    Since the bottom-up review, DOD and two war-fighting commands began
    analyzing key aspects of the two-conflict strategy that are related
    to DOD's bottom-up review assumptions (see table 2).

                                         Table 2

                         Status of DOD's Analyses of Key Aspects
                               of the Two-Conflict Strategy

    Aspect of the two-         Related DOD bottom-up      Status of DOD analyses (as
    conflict strategy          review assumption          of Jan. 1995)
    -------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------
    Redeployment               Forces involved in other   In June 1994, the Army
    of forces from other       operations, such as        began a study of the
    operations                 peacekeeping, would be     feasibility of redeploying
                               redeployed to a regional   forces from peace
                               conflict.                  operations to regional
                                                          conflicts. It expects to
                                                          complete this analysis in
                                                          early to mid-1995.

    Shifting assets from one   Certain specialized units  In 1994, the Air Force,
    conflict to another        or unique assets would be  Air Mobility Command, and
                               shifted from the first     two war-fighting commands
                               regional conflict to the   initiated studies of the
                               second conflict.           two-conflict strategy,
                                                          including examining
                                                          shifting assets between
                                                          conflicts. The first two
                                                          studies were completed in
                                                          August and May 1994,
                                                          respectively, and follow-
                                                          on efforts are planned.
                                                          These efforts and the
                                                          commands' study will not
                                                          be completed until
                                                          sometime in 1995.

    Availability of            Sufficient airlift,        In October 1993, DOD
    strategic                  sealift, and               initiated a detailed
    mobility                   prepositioning would be    analysis of mobility
                               available for deploying    requirements for the two-
                               forces to two regions.     conflict strategy. DOD
                                                          expects to identify
                                                          overall requirements by
                                                          February 1995 but will not
                                                          identify the specific
                                                          numbers and types of
                                                          airlift aircraft until
                                                          November 1995.

    Availability of support    Sufficient support forces  In July 1994, the Army
    forces                     would be available for     began analyzing support
                               combat operations in two   requirements for the two-
                               conflicts.                 conflict strategy. It
                                                          expects to complete this
                                                          analysis in mid-1995.

    Deployability of reserve   Army National Guard        In November 1993, the Army
    forces                     enhanced combat brigades   began to study the concept
                               could be deployed within   of enhanced brigades,
                               90 days of being called    including equipment and
                               to active duty and would   training needs. The Army
                               supplement active combat   expects to complete the
                               units.                     equipment study in
                                                          February 1995 and the
                                                          training study in mid-
                                                          1995. Use of the brigades
                                                          is being considered as
                                                          part of the two war-
                                                          fighting commands' study.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As table 2 shows, DOD assumed that forces committed to other
    operations such as peacekeeping would be redeployed to a major
    regional conflict.  However, some of the same Army support forces and
    specialized Air Force combat aircraft used in peace operations, such
    as the F-4G and F-15E, are needed in the early stages of a conflict,
    and it may be difficult to disengage and redeploy these forces
    quickly.  Support forces, such as transportation units that move
    personnel and cargo through ports, could not immediately redeploy
    because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces
    from the peace operation.  While specialized Air Force aircraft and
    their aircrews could easily redeploy, the supplies, equipment, and
    personnel needed to support the aircraft would have to wait for
    available airlift.  Finally, forces might need to upgrade their
    training, equipment, and supplies before redeploying.  The Army is
    currently analyzing the feasibility of redeploying forces from peace
    operations to a major regional conflict and does not expect to
    complete this analysis until early to mid-1995.

    DOD further assumed that certain assets, such as B-2 bombers and
    F-117 stealth fighters, would be shifted between conflicts.  The
    bottom-up review, however, did not analyze the specific types and
    numbers required to be shifted, redeployment timing, or logistical
    requirements.  In 1994, the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command,
    using the 1994 defense planning guidance scenario covering two nearly
    simultaneous regional conflicts, completed preliminary studies of
    specific aspects of the two-conflict strategy that they began after
    the bottom-up review.  Preliminary results of these analyses
    identified the number of assets that would possibly shift from one
    conflict to another and requirements for refueling support.  The Air
    Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for the two-conflict
    strategy, including the shifting of assets.  In February 1994, two
    war-fighting commands began studying options for executing the
    two-conflict strategy, using a different concept for deploying forces
    and supporting capabilities from that reflected in the defense
    guidance scenario.  Among other things, this study will examine
    requirements for shifting assets between conflicts.  The commands do
    not expect to complete this study until sometime in 1995.

    DOD relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements study in
    assessing mobility requirements during the bottom-up review.  This
    study analyzed mobility requirements for various scenarios involving
    single regional conflicts and a scenario involving two concurrent
    conflicts.  Based on the requirements for the single conflict
    scenario deemed to be most demanding, the study recommended the
    acquisition of additional C-17 aircraft and sealift ships and the
    prepositioning of Army equipment on ships.  It stated that this
    recommendation did not provide sufficient capability to handle a
    second conflict.  The bottom-up review endorsed the study's
    recommendation and called for additional prepositioning of equipment
    on land.  However, after completing the bottom-up review, DOD
    initiated a detailed analysis to validate the bottom-up review's
    conclusions about mobility requirements for the two-conflict
    strategy.  This study, according to DOD, was required because of
    significant changes resulting from the bottom-up review and delays in
    DOD's mobility program.  DOD expects to identify overall mobility
    requirements by February 1995 but will not identify the specific
    numbers and types of airlift aircraft until November 1995.

    In addition, DOD assumed that it would have sufficient support forces
    for two conflicts and did not consider the numbers and types of
    support units needed.  For example, in modeling force options, DOD
    used notional Army support forces.  The Army plans to complete an
    analysis of specific support requirements in mid-1995.  Current
    indications are that it would be difficult for the Army to support
    two conflicts.  A 1992 Army analysis shows that the Army cannot
    support its current active force of 12 divisions.  Although the
    bottom-up review active force of 10 divisions is smaller, the Army's
    total number of personnel is also smaller, leaving fewer people to
    fill support units.  Army officials therefore anticipate that its
    analysis of support requirements for the bottom-up review force will
    also reveal shortfalls.  Analysis of two U.S.  plans for responding
    to regional conflicts shows that the Army has insufficient numbers of
    certain units, such as transportation and quartermaster companies, to
    meet the requirements of one plan for responding to a regional
    conflict and the combined requirements of both plans.  However, using
    existing support resources in Army National Guard units may be an
    option for augmenting the Army's support capability.

    Finally, DOD assumed that 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades
    would be trained, organized, and equipped to deploy within 90 days of
    being called to active duty to augment active combat units.  However,
    during the bottom-up review, it did not determine the brigades'
    specific roles during wartime, required enhancements, and ability to
    deploy quickly or when the brigades would actually be needed.  As of
    January 1995, the Army was still developing training and equipment
    requirements, and the two war-fighting commands were studying how and
    when the brigades would be needed in wartime.  GAO concluded on the
    basis of 1992 and 1993 training data for seven existing Guard combat
    brigades that none have met premobilization training and readiness
    goals critical to ensuring timely deployment in wartime.

    DOD's bottom-up review emphasized the importance of several
    enhancements; however, some may not be available by 2000, as
    projected.  For example, to improve strategic mobility, DOD assumed
    that by fiscal year 1999, 80 of 120 planned C-17 aircraft would be
    available and additional equipment would be prepositioned in the
    Persian Gulf area to accelerate the arrival of ground forces.
    Because of cost and technical problems, however, in December 1993,
    the Secretary of Defense limited the procurement of C-17s to 40 and
    deferred a decision to buy more C-17s until November 1995.  In
    addition, according to DOD officials, while DOD had prepositioned
    equipment on ships and nearly completed prepositioning the first of
    two planned brigade sets on land in the Persian Gulf, it had obtained
    only a small portion of the funds required to preposition the second
    brigade set.

    To improve the lethality of U.S.  firepower by about the year 2000,
    DOD planned, among other things, to continue developing antiarmor
    precision-guided munitions, such as the tri-service standoff attack
    missile, and to add limited air-to-ground capability to the Navy's
    F-14 aircraft, referred to as the Block I upgrade.  Because of
    significant developmental difficulties and growth in expected unit
    cost, DOD has canceled the tri-service standoff attack missile
    program.  The Congress has also denied funding for the Block I
    upgrade.  GAO has reported extensively on problems with the
    tri-service standoff attack missile and has raised questions about
    the justification for the Block I upgrade.

          WAR-FIGHTING COMMANDS
          QUESTION DOD'S CONCEPT FOR
          RESPONDING TO TWO NEARLY
          SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICTS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

    Officials from two war-fighting commands believe that DOD's concept
    of how a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts would
    evolve and how the United States would respond--outlined in a May
    1994 defense planning guidance illustrative planning scenario that is
    being used to develop program and budget requirements--may not
    reflect the best approach.  Their estimates of the characteristics of
    two nearly simultaneous conflicts differ significantly from DOD's
    estimates, such as the amount of warning time and amount of time
    separating the two conflicts.  The commands also have a different
    concept of how U.S.  forces and supporting capabilities should be
    allocated and deployed, including the (1) mix of combat forces needed
    in each conflict, (2) timing of force deployments, and (3) allocation
    of strategic mobility assets.

    The commands are not suggesting the strategy cannot be accomplished
    but that DOD's concept may not reflect the best approach.  They
    therefore believe that options other than those depicted in DOD's
    scenario may maximize the use of U.S.  combat and support
    capabilities and may reduce the risks involved in simultaneously
    engaging in combat operations in two regions.  In February 1994, the
    commands initiated a study to examine options for responding to two
    nearly simultaneous conflicts with the bottom-up review force based
    on a scenario that differs from the defense planning guidance
    scenario.  This study will address many of the same aspects of the
    strategy that DOD made assumptions about during the bottom-up review
    and is currently analyzing, including shifting assets from one
    conflict to another, sufficiency of strategic mobility and support
    forces, and the use of enhanced brigades.  (Specific details of the
    commands' concerns about the scenario and their deployment concept
    are classified.) As of January 1995, the commands had reached
    preliminary conclusions and did not expect to complete the study
    until sometime later in 1995.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

    GAO recommends that in the congressionally mandated examination of
    the bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the
    assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other
    operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic
    mobility assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army
    National Guard enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to
    strategic lift and firepower and (2) consider the options being
    examined by the war-fighting commands.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

    DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are included
    in appendix I.  Although DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and
    partially concurred with the report, it disagreed with GAO's overall
    conclusion that it did not adequately analyze assumptions used in
    conducting the bottom-up review.  DOD said that its leadership
    recognized practical limitations on the scope of analysis that could
    be conducted in the time available and fully considered these
    limitations in making decisions about the defense program.  DOD
    further stated that, in raising questions about the bottom-up
    review's assumptions, GAO did not recognize the difference between
    conceptual force planning and war-fighting commands' operational
    planning for using specific forces to undertake specific operations.

    GAO recognizes that the bottom-up review was a broad force planning
    effort that did not develop actual war plans for using specific
    forces.  It did, however, make the judgment that the United States
    would maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly
    simultaneous major regional conflicts and decided the size and
    composition of the force capable of meeting this strategy.  In making
    these decisions, DOD made critical assumptions about factors that are
    key to the successful execution of the two-conflict strategy without
    performing sufficient analyses to test the validity of its
    assumptions.  In fact, DOD and the war-fighting commands, through
    studies initiated after the bottom-up review, are now examining DOD's
    assumptions.

    DOD also disagreed with GAO's specific findings that (1) it did not
    assess requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts,
    (2) it did not fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army
    would be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts.
    DOD's specific comments on these findings and our evaluation are
    discussed in chapter 2.

    INTRODUCTION
    ============================================================ Chapter 1

    In light of the significant changes in the international security
    environment resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
    declining resources available for defense needs, the Department of
    Defense (DOD) has been reexamining U.S.  defense strategy, force
    levels, and budgetary requirements for the post-Cold War era.  In
    1990, the President presented a defense plan reflecting a shift in
    U.S.  strategy from preparing for a global war in Europe against the
    Soviet Union to preparing for major regional conflicts against
    uncertain adversaries.  This plan proposed a significantly reduced
    force structure, or base force, but retained sufficient forces to
    counter a possible reemergence of the Soviet threat.

    Following the change in administrations in 1993, the new Secretary of
    Defense reassessed U.S.  defense requirements in an effort referred
    to as DOD's bottom-up review.  This review, completed in October
    1993, examined the nation's defense strategy, force structure,
    modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for
    the post-Cold War era.  As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD
    continued to focus U.S.  strategy on regional threats; however, it
    de-emphasized the possibility of a reemerging Soviet threat and
    reduced U.S.  forces to levels smaller than the base force.
    According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense called for the
    bottom-up review to be completed in time to be considered in
    developing DOD's fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years Defense
    Program.  Therefore, the review was completed in about 7 months.  In
    the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work
    had to be done.

       THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW OUTLINED A
       DEFENSE STRATEGY AND NEW
       DANGERS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
       ERA
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

    According to DOD's bottom-up review, the United States must pursue an
    overall defense strategy characterized by continued political,
    economic, and military engagement internationally.  This strategy of
    engagement advocates (1) preventing the emergence of threats to U.S.
    interests by promoting democracy, economic growth, free markets,
    human dignity, and the peaceful resolution of conflict and (2)
    pursuing international partnerships for freedom, prosperity, and
    peace.

    The bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing U.S.  interests
    in the post-Cold War era and a specific strategy for dealing with
    each one.  These dangers included (1) the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) regional dangers,
    posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression by major
    regional powers with opposing interests; (3) dangers to democracy and
    reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and
    (4) economic dangers to national security.

    In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, the Secretary of Defense cited
    regional aggression as chief among the new dangers.  To deal with
    regional aggression and other regional dangers, DOD's strategy is to
    (1) defeat aggressors in major regional conflicts; (2) maintain a
    presence overseas--the need for U.S.  forces to conduct normal
    peacetime operations in critical regions--to deter conflicts and
    provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller-scale
    intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian
    assistance, and disaster relief.

          DOD JUDGED THAT THE UNITED
          STATES MUST BE CAPABLE OF
          WINNING TWO NEARLY
          SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL
          CONFLICTS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

    To deal with the threat of regional aggression, DOD judged that it is
    prudent for the United States to maintain sufficient military power
    to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur
    nearly simultaneously.\1 The bottom-up review determined the specific
    forces, capabilities, and improvements in capabilities for executing
    the two-conflict strategy.  In reaching its conclusions, DOD examined
    various strategy and force options for major regional conflicts, as
    shown in table 1.1.

                                        Table 1.1

                           The Bottom-Up Review's Strategy and
                          Force Options for Responding to Major
                                    Regional Conflicts

                                                                    Win two nearly
                                                                    simultaneous
                                    Win one         Win two nearly  conflicts plus
    Military        Win one         conflict with   simultaneous    conduct smaller
    service         conflict        hold in second  conflicts       operation
    --------------  --------------  --------------  --------------  ----------------
    Army            8 active        10 active       10 active       12 active
                    divisions       divisions       divisions       divisions

                    6 reserve       6 reserve       15 reserve      8 reserve
                    division        division        enhanced-       enhanced
                    equivalents     equivalents     readiness       equivalents
                                                    brigades

    Navy            8 carrier       10 carrier      11 carrier      12 carrier
                    battle groups   battle groups   battle groups   battle groups

                                                    1 reserve
                                                    carrier

    Marine Corps    5 active        5 active        5 active        5 active
                    brigades        brigades        brigades        brigades

                    1 reserve       1 reserve       1 reserve       1 reserve
                    division        division        division        division

    Air Force       10 active       13 active       13 active       14 active
                    fighter wings   fighter wings   fighter wings   fighter wings

                    6 reserve       7 reserve       7 reserve       10 reserve
                    fighter wings   fighter wings   fighter wings   fighter wings

                                                    Force
                                                    enhancements
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source:  DOD's Report on the Bottom-Up Review.

    For assessment purposes, DOD focused on two specific scenarios
    involving regional aggression.  In evaluating the strategy and force
    options, DOD also considered requirements for conducting (1) peace
    enforcement or intervention operations in smaller-scale conflicts or
    crises, (2) overseas presence, and (3) deterrence of attacks with
    weapons of mass destruction.

    DOD, for various reasons, chose the strategy of fighting and winning
    two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and related forces
    with enhancements--the third option shown in table 1.1.  For example,
    DOD believed that this option would possibly deter a second regional
    aggressor from attacking its neighbors while the United States was
    responding to another regional conflict.  In addition, fielding
    forces sufficient to win two wars nearly simultaneously would provide
    a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary might one day
    confront the United States with a larger-than-expected threat.

    Finally, DOD believed that this strategy option, forces, and
    enhancements were affordable within expected budget constraints.
    According to its Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD also estimated
    the cost of the bottom-up review program and matched it against the
    President's objective for reducing the defense budget.  DOD estimated
    that the program would achieve $91 billion in total savings and that
    additional savings would be identified during DOD's normal program
    and budget review.  DOD estimated that the projected force would be
    available by fiscal year 1999.  DOD used the results of the bottom-up
    review to develop its fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years
    Defense Program.

    --------------------
    \1 For planning purposes, DOD defined "nearly simultaneous" to be a
    certain number of days between the time that enemy forces mobilize in
    each conflict.  The number of days is classified.

          DOD MADE SEVERAL KEY
          ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ITS CHOSEN
          FORCE OPTION
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

    In concluding that the forces selected for the third option could
    implement its strategy, DOD made several key assumptions about the
    forces' deployability and capabilities, including that

      forces involved in other operations, such as peacekeeping, would be
         redeployed to a regional conflict;

      certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from
         one conflict to another;

      sufficient strategic lift assets and support forces would be
         available;

      Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed
         within 90 days of being called to active duty to supplement
         active combat units; and

      a series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic
         mobility and U.S.  fire power, were critical to implementing the
         two-conflict strategy and would be available by about 2000.

    The specific enhancements included improving (1) strategic mobility,
    through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift;
    (2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers; (3) the lethality
    of Army firepower; and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to
    deliver conventional precision-guided munitions.  Completing these
    enhancements, according to DOD, would both reduce overall ground
    force requirements and increase the responsiveness and effectiveness
    of its power projection forces.

    In most cases, the projected enhancements involved ongoing programs
    to upgrade existing capabilities.  For example, the bottom-up review
    cited the need for additional airlift and sealift assets to improve
    strategic mobility.  DOD had previously identified this need in its
    1991 mobility requirements study and had already programmed funds to
    procure some of the specific assets.

       THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S
       PLANNING GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTED
       DOD'S BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
       CONCLUSIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

    According to the Secretary of Defense, the bottom-up review was a
    comprehensive reassessment that set the framework for defense
    planning for the next 5 years and beyond.  In September 1993 and May
    1994, the Secretary issued his defense planning guidance for fiscal
    years 1995 to 1999 and fiscal years 1996 to 2001, respectively.  This
    guidance formally directed the military services and defense agencies
    to implement the bottom-up review's conclusions.

    The May 1994 guidance included an illustrative planning scenario
    reflecting DOD's concept of how the United States would respond to
    two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.  Among
    other things, the scenario detailed the amount of time between the
    outbreak of hostilities in both conflicts, number and types of forces
    deployed to each conflict, timing of deployments, and projected time
    for completing various combat phases.  DOD directed military planners
    to use this scenario, along with other guidelines in the September
    and May guidance, in developing program and budget requirements for
    DOD's selected strategy and forces.

       THE CONGRESS IS REQUIRING DOD
       TO REEXAMINE THE BOTTOM-UP
       REVIEW
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

    In considering DOD's portion of the President's budget for fiscal
    year 1995, Members of the Congress raised questions about the
    bottom-up review, including the accuracy of its assumptions and
    affordability of its projected force.  As a result, in the Fiscal
    Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress is
    requiring the Secretary of Defense to review the assumptions and
    conclusions of the President's budget, the bottom-up review, and the
    Future Years Defense Program.  The Secretary is required to submit a
    report on the results of its review to the President and the Congress
    in May 1995.  Among other things, this report must describe the force
    structure required to execute DOD's two-conflict strategy in light of
    other ongoing or potential operations and may also address possible
    adjustments to the strategy.

       OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND
       METHODOLOGY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

    We examined DOD's bottom-up review assumptions about key aspects of
    the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably
    supported DOD's conclusion that the projected force, with
    enhancements, can execute the strategy.  In conducting our
    assessment, we did not examine DOD's rationale for selecting the
    two-conflict strategy, the capabilities of potential regional
    aggressors, and the extent to which allied support could reduce the
    need for U.S.  forces.

    To determine DOD's assumptions and conclusions about executing the
    two-conflict strategy, we interviewed knowledgeable officials
    involved in the bottom-up review at the offices of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Resources, and Requirements; the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff; and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
    headquarters.

    We also reviewed relevant documentation, including the final report
    on the bottom-up review and the Secretary of Defense's planning
    guidance, and received briefings on regional dangers from DOD
    officials.  We did not examine DOD's rationale for selecting the
    two-conflict strategy; rather, we focused on examining DOD's
    assumptions on key aspects of the strategy.  DOD denied us access to
    specific information on the inputs and results of its analysis of
    force options.  However, we obtained considerable information on
    DOD's analysis through interviewing knowledgeable officials and
    reviewing available documentation.

    To analyze whether DOD's assumptions reasonably supported DOD's
    conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute
    the two-conflict strategy, we interviewed officials at the
    headquarters of the four military services, the U.S.  Army Forces
    Command, the U.S.  Transportation Command, the Air Combat Command,
    the Army National Guard Bureau, and the U.S.  Army Reserve Command.
    We also reviewed relevant documentation on (1) the use of U.S.
    forces engaged in peacekeeping operations, (2) Army support
    capability, (3) training of Army National Guard enhanced combat
    brigades, and (4) DOD plans for improving strategic mobility and the
    lethality of U.S.  firepower.

    We interviewed officials at two war-fighting commands to obtain their
    views on DOD's assumptions in the bottom-up review, the feasibility
    of conducting the two-conflict strategy, and the defense planning
    guidance implementing the bottom-up review's findings.

    We conducted our review from October 1993 to October 1994 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    DOD DID NOT FULLY ANALYZE KEY
    BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ASSUMPTIONS
    ============================================================ Chapter 2

    Under the bottom-up review's two-conflict strategy, military
    planners, for the first time, are required to plan to deploy forces
    to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.  However,
    in doing the review, DOD did not fully analyze its assumptions
    regarding key aspects of the strategy, such as the ability of forces
    to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between
    conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, and
    deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades.

    Furthermore, we question some of DOD's assumptions.  For example,
    certain support forces needed in the early stages of a regional
    conflict could not immediately redeploy from peace operations because
    they would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces.  The Army
    currently lacks sufficient numbers of certain support forces for a
    single conflict, and National Guard combat brigades are experiencing
    difficulty meeting peacetime training requirements that are critical
    to ensuring timely deployment in wartime.  Finally, some enhancements
    may not be available as planned.

       THE TWO-CONFLICT STRATEGY
       CHANGED THE BASIS OF MILITARY
       PLANNING FOR RESPONDING TO
       REGIONAL CONFLICTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

    The bottom-up review's strategy of maintaining the capability to
    fight and win nearly simultaneous conflicts changed the basis for
    U.S.  military planning.  Specifically, the base force was required
    to be capable of conducting a decisive offense in response to one
    conflict and still be capable of mounting a credible defense against
    an aggressor in another region before the first crisis ended.  As a
    result, war-fighting commanders prepared operational plans for
    regional conflicts with the assumption that no other conflict was
    ongoing or would occur after their conflict began.  They therefore
    assumed that combat and support forces, strategic mobility assets,
    and other capabilities required to execute their plan would be
    available.

    The bottom-up review's strategy envisions that U.S.  forces could be
    engaged in offensive operations in two conflicts nearly
    simultaneously.  This strategy requires DOD to meet the requirements
    of two war-fighting commanders at the same time.  DOD officials
    stated that extensive analysis, beyond that conducted during the
    bottom-up review, is required to consider the implications of
    responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts.  Since the bottom-up
    review, DOD has begun additional analyses.

       FORCES INVOLVED IN OTHER
       OPERATIONS MAY NOT BE
       IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR A
       REGIONAL CONFLICT
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

    According to the bottom-up review, if a major regional conflict
    occurs, DOD will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed
    in the United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence
    missions.  If DOD believes it is prudent to do so, it will keep
    forces engaged in smaller-scale operations, such as peacekeeping,
    while responding to a single conflict.  If a second conflict breaks
    out, DOD would need to deploy another block of forces, requiring a
    further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any forces still
    engaged in smaller-scale operations, and most of the remaining
    U.S.-based forces.

    In determining force requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD
    assumed that forces already engaged in other operations could
    redeploy to a regional conflict.  However, DOD did not analyze the
    feasibility of or requirements for such a redeployment during the
    bottom-up review.  For example, DOD did not consider (1) requirements
    for readiness upgrades for forces before redeployment, (2)
    requirements for diverting airlift and sealift assets to pick up
    personnel and equipment from the operation, and (3) the impact on the
    war-fighting commander involved in a regional conflict if combat and
    support forces engaged in other operations were not immediately
    available.

    DOD did not begin to analyze its assumption on redeploying forces
    from operations other than war until after completing the bottom-up
    review.  In June 1994, the Army initiated a study of the impact of
    peace operations on Army requirements, including the implications of
    redeploying combat and support forces from such operations to
    regional conflicts.  The Army does not expect to complete this
    analysis until early to mid-1995.

    Our work on the impact of peace operations on U.S.  forces suggests
    that it would be difficult for certain support and combat forces to
    disengage and quickly redeploy to a major regional conflict.  For
    example, certain Army support forces and specialized Air Force combat
    aircraft, such as the F-4G and F-15E, deployed to peace operations
    are the same forces needed in the early stages of a regional
    conflict.  However, some support forces, such as transportation units
    that move personnel and cargo through ports, could not immediately
    redeploy because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other
    forces.  Furthermore, while Air Force aircraft and aircrews could
    easily fly from the peace operation to a regional conflict, the
    maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft
    flying--supplies, equipment, and personnel--would have to wait for
    available airlift.  Obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy forces
    from a peace operation would be challenging because already limited
    airlift assets committed to deploying forces to the regional conflict
    would have to be diverted to pick up these forces.

    Finally, forces may need to upgrade their training, equipment, and
    supplies before redeploying.  For example, according to Air Force
    officials, peace operations tend to degrade the overall combat
    readiness of Air Force flight crews.  Similarly, naval aviators also
    find that they lose proficiency in some combat skills through
    prolonged participation in peace operations.  We are reporting
    separately on the impact of peace operations on U.S.  forces.

       THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW DID NOT
       ASSESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
       SHIFTING ASSETS BETWEEN
       REGIONAL CONFLICTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

    According to the bottom-up review, certain specialized units or
    unique assets would be dual-tasked--shifted from the first regional
    conflict to the second conflict.  In prior years, the Air Force had
    enough fighter and bomber aircraft to meet the war-fighting
    requirements of two regional conflicts.  DOD believes that it may not
    have certain assets, such as B-2 bombers, F-117 stealth fighters, and
    EF-111 aircraft, in sufficient quantities to support two conflicts,
    and it therefore may need to shift aircraft from one conflict to
    another.

    Although DOD assumed that dual-tasking would occur, it did not
    analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another.
    For example, in determining force requirements, DOD did not determine
    what specific types and numbers of assets would be required to be
    dual-tasked and when they could be redeployed, or whether sufficient
    logistical support, such as airlift, refueling aircraft, air crews,
    or spare parts kits, would be available for the redeployment.

    DOD officials explained that because a model for two nearly
    simultaneous conflicts does not exist, the modeling to determine
    force requirements during the bottom-up review did not simulate the
    shifting of assets from one conflict to another.  Rather, DOD
    identified the specific number of assets required for each conflict
    and assumed that dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls.

    After the bottom-up review, the Air Force and its Air Mobility
    Command began analyzing the implications and requirements for
    dual-tasking based on assumptions contained in the Secretary of
    Defense's May 1994 defense planning guidance.  Among other things,
    these analyses--completed in August and May 1994,
    respectively--identified the specific assets that would be
    dual-tasked, the timing of redeployment, and refueling aircraft
    needed to support the redeployment from one conflict to another.

    The Air Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for
    dual-tasking, including the availability of aircrews and spare parts
    kits.  Furthermore, in November 1994, at the direction of the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD began a war game analysis
    of several variables of the two-conflict strategy, including
    requirements for dual-tasking.  This analysis is expected to be
    completed sometime in 1995.

    As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting commands are analyzing the
    two-conflict strategy using a different scenario and deployment
    concept from those outlined in the defense planning guidance.  They,
    too, are examining dual-tasking, including how many and what type of
    assets would need to shift and at what point in the conflict such a
    shift could reasonably occur.  Until this analysis is completed,
    currently projected for sometime in 1995, and its results are
    reconciled with ongoing Air Force and DOD studies, the specific
    requirements for dual-tasking will not be known.

       THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW DID NOT
       FULLY ASSESS MOBILITY
       REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
       TWO-CONFLICT STRATEGY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

    According to the bottom-up review, the illustrative planning
    scenarios that DOD used in determining force and strategy options for
    regional conflicts assumed that a well-armed regional power would
    initiate aggression thousands of miles from the United States.  On
    short notice, U.S.  forces from other areas would be rapidly deployed
    to the area and enter the battle as quickly as possible.  Because DOD
    assumed that most of these forces would not be in the region when
    hostilities begin, it emphasized that sufficient strategic
    mobility--airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equipment at
    forward locations--would be needed to successfully execute the
    two-conflict strategy.

    The bottom-up review called for specific enhancements to DOD's
    existing strategic mobility capability--most of which DOD had
    identified in its 1991 mobility requirements study.  This
    congressionally required study determined future requirements for
    airlift, sealift, and prepositioning and recommended a program to
    improve DOD's mobility capability.  In conducting the study, DOD
    analyzed various scenarios involving single regional conflicts and a
    scenario involving two concurrent conflicts.  Based on the
    requirements for the single conflict scenario deemed to be most
    demanding, the study recommended

      increasing sealift capacity for prepositioned equipment and rapid
         deployment of heavy Army divisions\1 and other U.S.  forces by
         (1) acquiring--through new construction and
         conversion--additional capacity equal to 20 large, medium-speed,
         roll-on/roll-off ships; (2) leasing two container ships; (3)
         expanding the Ready Reserve Force from 96 to 142 ships (an
         increase of 46 ships); and (4) increasing the overall readiness
         of the Ready Reserve Force;\2

      increasing U.S.  capability to respond within the first few weeks
         of a regional conflict by prepositioning Army combat, support,
         and port-opening equipment aboard nine of the newly constructed
         or converted large, medium-speed ships (by fiscal year 1997);\3

      improving airlift by continuing the C-17 aircraft program,
         acquiring up to 120 aircraft; and

      improving the capability of the U.S.  transportation system to move
         combat and support units from their peacetime locations to ports
         of embarkation by, among other things, purchasing 233 additional
         heavy-lift rail cars and developing an ammunition loading
         facility on the U.S.  west coast.

    According to the mobility study, the recommended program reflected a
    moderate-risk and affordable mobility force for a single regional
    conflict that would enable DOD to move 4-2/3 Army divisions in 6
    weeks.  It also concluded that its recommended program was not
    sufficient to handle a second concurrent major regional conflict.

    During the bottom-up review, DOD relied heavily on the results of the
    mobility study when considering mobility requirements for the
    two-conflict strategy.  The bottom-up review endorsed the mobility
    study's recommendations, and called for increasing the amount of
    equipment prepositioned on land in the Persian Gulf area.  At the
    time of the bottom-up review, DOD had a battalion-sized set of
    equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf and planned to increase this
    prepositioning to two brigade sets.  DOD believed that the
    prepositioning was necessary because the bottom-up review envisioned
    that forces would need to deploy more quickly than provided for in
    the 1991 study.

    After completing the bottom-up review, DOD initiated a detailed
    analysis of mobility requirements for the two-conflict strategy to
    validate its recommendations in the 1991 mobility study and the
    bottom-up review.  According to DOD, this study was required because
    of significant changes resulting from the bottom-up review and delays
    in DOD's mobility program.  For example, the bottom-up review and
    related defense planning guidance presented a new military strategy,
    changed the overall force structure, and called for enhancements in
    war-fighting capability.  Furthermore, as discussed later, DOD
    experienced delays in acquiring C-17 aircraft.

    By February 1995, DOD expects to complete its study, identifying any
    changes in mobility requirements and necessary adjustments to its
    mobility program.  DOD will then identify the appropriate mix of
    specific airlift aircraft--C-17 and alternatives to the C-17.  DOD
    plans to complete this mix analysis by November 1995.  Until the two
    studies are complete, DOD will not know the overall mobility
    requirements and related costs for its two-conflict strategy.

    --------------------
    \1 The Army has heavy and light forces.  Heavy forces include armor,
    mechanized infantry, and cavalry units, and light forces include
    nonmechanized infantry, airborne, and air assault units.

    \2 DOD now plans to acquire 19, rather than 20, large, medium-speed
    ships, and to expand the Ready Reserve Force by 21, rather than 46,
    ships.

    \3 DOD has since determined that 8, rather than 9, ships were needed
    for this prepositioning.  These
    8 ships will replace 7 of the 12 ships the Army is currently using
    for prepositioning and add additional capacity.

       THE ARMY WOULD BE CHALLENGED IN
       SUPPORTING TWO MAJOR REGIONAL
       CONFLICTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

    During the bottom-up review, DOD assumed that sufficient support
    units would be available to support combat operations in two nearly
    simultaneous major regional conflicts.\4 However, the Army currently
    does not have the units needed to support its overall combat force.
    Furthermore, analysis of current U.S.  plans for responding to
    regional conflicts indicates that the Army lacks sufficient units for
    a particular conflict and would have even more difficulty supporting
    two conflicts.

    --------------------
    \4 Support units include detachments, companies, and teams that
    maintain equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide
    personal services, and otherwise sustain combat operations.

          THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ASSUMED
          THAT SUFFICIENT SUPPORT
          FORCES WOULD BE AVAILABLE
          FOR TWO CONFLICTS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.1

    The bottom-up review did not analyze the specific types and
    quantities of Army support units needed to execute the two-conflict
    strategy.  In modeling force and strategy options, DOD used notional
    numbers to simulate the support forces that would typically deploy to
    support an Army division.  It assumed that the Army would deploy with
    all of the specific support units needed to support its combat
    forces.  According to DOD officials, they did not thoroughly analyze
    support requirements because of the short time frame to complete the
    bottom-up review.

    In September 1994, the Army began analyzing support requirements for
    its two-conflict combat force of 10 active divisions and 15 Army
    National Guard enhanced brigades--existing Guard combat brigades with
    improved readiness.  This analysis was part of its biennial process
    for determining support needs.  The process, referred to as the Total
    Army Analysis, identifies the numbers and types of units needed to
    support a given combat force in a designated scenario and the
    personnel and equipment needed to fill these units.  The Army then
    assesses other priorities, such as combat requirements, risks
    involved if support requirements are not fully met, and decides on
    how many support units to fill, given available funding.  The Army
    planned to complete by mid-1995 its Total Army Analysis of support
    requirements for the two-conflict strategy based on the bottom-up
    review force.

          ARMY DOES NOT HAVE
          SUFFICIENT FORCES TO SUPPORT
          ITS CURRENT COMBAT FORCE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.2

    Although the bottom-up review assumed that the Army would have
    sufficient support forces, the Army cannot support its current active
    force of 12 divisions, and Army officials anticipate that shortfalls
    will also exist for the two-conflict combat force.  In an earlier
    Total Army Analysis of support requirements for the 12-division
    force, the Army was unable to fill 838 support units, including
    engineer, medical, quartermaster, and transportation units.  Although
    these 838 units, as a whole, represent a small portion of the Army's
    total support units, they reflect key capabilities that the Army has
    determined are required to support combat operations.

    While the number of active divisions in the two-conflict force is
    smaller than the current force, the total number of personnel
    allotted to the Army under the bottom-up review is also smaller,
    leaving fewer people to fill support units.  Army officials involved
    in the ongoing Total Army Analysis therefore believe the analysis
    will reveal that the Army cannot fully fill all support units needed
    for the two-conflict strategy and force.

          THE ARMY WOULD HAVE
          DIFFICULTY PROVIDING ALL
          REQUIRED SUPPORT EVEN FOR A
          SINGLE CONFLICT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.3

    In the past, the Army has had difficulty generating sufficient
    support units for deployed combat forces, and it currently does not
    have certain types of units called for in plans for a single regional
    conflict.  In 1992, we reported that in trying to support a combat
    force of about eight divisions during the Persian Gulf War, the Army
    deployed virtually all of some types of support units and exhausted
    some units.\5 For example, the Army deployed virtually all
    prisoner-handling, postal, and medium truck units and all graves
    registration, pipeline and terminal operation, heavy truck, and water
    supply units.

    Because of favorable conditions, such as a long lead time for
    deployment, extensive host nation support from Saudi Arabia, a ground
    offensive of short duration, and the lack of a second conflict
    requiring a U.S.  response, the Army was able to mitigate most of the
    adverse impact of its support shortfalls during the Gulf War.  The
    bottom-up review strategy and force present a greater challenge
    because the Army may need to generate support forces for at least 10
    active divisions deployed nearly simultaneously, with little warning
    time, to two major conflicts.

    Analysis of current U.S.  plans for two particular regional conflicts
    indicates that the Army would face the same types of difficulties it
    encountered during the Gulf War.  Our examination of the requirements
    for 17 types of support units\6 contained in the plans showed that
    the Army (1) lacks a total of 238 units to meet the requirements of a
    single conflict and (2) has tasked 654 units to support combat
    operations in both conflicts.  Table 2.1 shows the number of units,
    by type, that the Army lacks for a single conflict and that are
    assigned to both plans.

                              Table 2.1

               Army Units in Short Supply for a Single
                Regional Conflict and Tasked to Deploy
                           to Two Conflicts

                                                       Number of
                                      Shortfall of    same units
                                       units for a     tasked to
                                            single     deploy to
                                          regional           two
    Type of unit                          conflict     conflicts
    --------------------------------  ------------  ------------
    Aviation                                     4            40
    Chemical                                     3            32
    Engineer                                    33            94
    Medical                                     84            96
    Ordnance                                     9            32
    Quartermaster                               20            94
    Signal                                       6            25
    Adjutant General                             1            20
    Chaplain                                     3             0
    Finance                                      0             9
    Military police                             40            45
    Military law                                 0             1
    Psychological operations                     0             1
    Military intelligence                        2             4
    Maintenance                                  4            22
    Headquarters\a                               0             4
    Transportation                              29           135
    ============================================================
    Total                                      238           654
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment
    command organizations in wartime.

    As shown in table 2.1, the largest shortfalls in units required for a
    single conflict occurred in five types--medical (84 units), engineer
    (33 units), quartermaster (20 units), military police (40 units), and
    transportation
    (29 units), totaling 206 units.  For two plans--each covering a
    different conflict--the shortfall would increase to 338 units.  Table
    2.2 shows a breakdown of this shortfall.

                              Table 2.2

                   Shortfall of Medical, Engineer,
                 Quartermaster, Military Police, and
                  Transportation Units for Two Major
                          Regional Conflicts

                                                    Shortfall of
                                                   units for two
    Type of unit                                       conflicts
    --------------------------------------------  --------------
    Medical                                                   96
    Engineer                                                  59
    Quartermaster                                             59
    Military police                                           52
    Transportation                                            72
    ============================================================
    Total                                                    338
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    We are reporting separately on the Army's ability to provide support
    forces for the two-conflict strategy, including options for
    alleviating possible shortfalls.  The bottom-up review called for 15
    Army National Guard enhanced brigades to execute the two-conflict
    strategy and about 22 other National Guard brigades--now organized as
    8 divisions--for other purposes, including providing the basis for
    rotational forces in extended crises and fulfilling domestic
    missions.  We believe that these divisions include support units,
    personnel, and equipment that the Army may be able to draw upon to
    augment its support capability.

    --------------------
    \5 Operation Desert Storm:  Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate
    Active and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar.  10, 1992).

    \6 These types represent the types of units that the Army was unable
    to fill during its 1992 Total Army Analysis process.

       DOD HAS NOT FULLY DEFINED THE
       CONCEPT OF ENHANCED RESERVE
       BRIGADES, AND QUESTIONS REMAIN
       ABOUT THEIR DEPLOYABILITY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

    The Army's portion of the forces for the two-conflict strategy
    consists of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced
    brigades.  The bottom-up review stated that the enhanced brigades
    were needed to execute the two-conflict strategy and assigned them
    the broad mission of reinforcing active divisions in regional
    conflicts.  For example, DOD envisioned that these brigades would
    deploy to one or both conflicts if operations did not go as planned
    or would replace overseas presence forces redeployed to a regional
    conflict.

    The bottom-up review further stated that, in the future, Guard combat
    brigades would be organized and filled so that they could be
    mobilized, trained, and deployed more quickly.  It committed the Army
    to focus on readiness initiatives directed toward the enhanced
    brigades and established a specific goal to have these brigades ready
    to begin deployment within 90 days of being called to active duty.
    In April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff approved the 15 Guard brigades
    selected--8 heavy brigades and 7 light brigades--as the enhanced
    brigades.

          THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW DID NOT
          FULLY DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF
          AN ENHANCED BRIGADE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.1

    Although DOD assumed that the enhanced brigades would deploy quickly
    to reinforce active divisions in a regional conflict, it did not
    analyze the specific wartime requirements for these brigades.  DOD
    officials stated that in analyzing force options for responding to
    regional conflicts, they used active notional Army brigades and did
    not test the impact on the war fight of deploying reserve enhanced
    brigades.  Furthermore, DOD did not determine basic factors such as
    the (1) specific wartime missions of the enhanced brigades and the
    timing for deploying the brigades, (2) ability of National Guard
    combat brigades to deploy quickly and fulfill combat missions given
    readiness problems experienced during the Gulf War, and (3) specific
    capability enhancements needed to improve the brigades' readiness.

    Because fundamental questions remained about the brigades, the Army
    formed a task force in November 1993 to do an in-depth study of
    alternatives for organizing, tasking, training, and equipping the
    brigades.  In April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff confirmed, based on
    the task force's findings, the bottom-up review's assertion that the
    enhanced brigades would reinforce active forces.  However, the
    brigades' specific missions, such as whether the brigades would
    conduct combat maneuvers, provide security, or perform other tasks,
    are still undefined.  As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting
    commands are just beginning to analyze how and when the enhanced
    brigades might be used in a regional conflict.

    The Army Chief of Staff also determined that the brigades would

      maintain personnel and equipment at the highest readiness level
         during peacetime and be ready to deploy at this level no later
         than 90 days after being called up;

      train with specific divisions or corps in peacetime, but maintain
         the flexibility to operate with any division or corps in
         wartime;

      focus their training on mission-essential tasks involving movement
         (maneuvering) to contact with the enemy, attacks on enemy
         positions, and defense against enemy attacks;

      be of standard Army design for heavy and light brigades and armored
         cavalry regiments; and

      be equipped and modernized in a manner compatible with active
         divisions.

    The U.S.  Army Forces Command was tasked to develop and test a
    training strategy to ensure that the enhanced brigades meet the
    90-day deployment goal.  This strategy will include any necessary
    adjustments to the Army's current training program for Guard combat
    brigades.  Army headquarters elements were tasked to identify the
    requirements and costs associated with equipping the brigades.  As of
    January 1995, the Army expected to complete the equipment study in
    February 1995 and the training strategy in mid-1995.  Once the
    training strategy is completed, the Army envisions that by 1999 it
    will be tested on only 3 of the 15 brigades.  Based on the test
    results, the Army will decide whether to apply the training strategy
    to the remaining brigades.

          ABILITY OF ENHANCED BRIGADES
          TO MEET 90-DAY DEPLOYMENT
          GOAL IS UNCERTAIN
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.2

    The bottom-up review's goal to have enhanced brigades ready to deploy
    within 90 days of being called to active duty is based on Army
    estimates that the brigades will need 90 days of post-mobilization
    training to achieve proficiency in more complex skills at higher
    echelons, such as companies and battalions.  However, these estimates
    assumed that the brigades will have achieved proficiency in basic
    skills at the individual soldier, crew, and platoon level during
    peacetime training.

    During the Persian Gulf War, three Guard combat brigades were
    activated, but the Army did not deploy any of these brigades.
    Instead, they remained in training status until the war was over.  As
    we reported in November 1992,\7 and testified in March 1994,\8 the
    brigades experienced problems in achieving proficiency in basic
    skills at the time of mobilization.  For example,

      many Guard soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs,

      many tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews were not proficient in
         gunnery skills, and

      many commissioned and noncommissioned officers had not completed
         required leadership courses.

    As a result, Guard brigades were trained to achieve proficiency in
    many basic skills, rather than more complex skills, after
    mobilization.  Because the Army believed the brigades were not ready
    to deploy, it substituted active brigades.  Contributing to the
    brigades' training problems was the fact that reserve forces
    generally train only about 39 days each year, and a considerable
    portion of this time can be taken up by administrative matters or in
    traveling long distances to reach training ranges.

    Because of the Gulf War experience, the Army significantly changed
    its strategy for training Guard combat brigades, including
    implementing an initiative called Bold Shift.  This project,
    initiated in September 1991, was designed to focus brigade training
    during peacetime at the basic--individual, crew, and platoon--level.
    Prior to this initiative, peacetime training encompassed both basic
    and complex skills.

    Our ongoing work on the Bold Shift program suggests that Guard combat
    brigades are still continuing to experience problems in achieving
    proficiency in basic skills.  For example, as we stated in our March
    1994 testimony, 1992 training data for seven existing Guard combat
    brigades showed that none had reached pre-mobilization training and
    readiness goals.  Our analysis of 1993 training data confirmed that
    this trend is continuing.  We are reporting separately on the
    specific training problems and progress of Guard combat brigades
    under Bold Shift.

    --------------------
    \7 Army Training:  Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than
    Guard Roundout Brigades (GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov.  4, 1992).

    \8 Military Training:  Lessons Learned and Their Implications for the
    Future (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-128, Mar.  10, 1994).

       SOME BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
       ENHANCEMENTS MAY NOT BE
       COMPLETED WHEN PLANNED OR AT
       ALL
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7

    As discussed in chapter 1, the bottom-up review described several
    specific enhancements to U.S.  capabilities as key to the projected
    force's ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous conflicts,
    including improving strategic mobility and the lethality of U.S.
    firepower.  According to DOD, these improvements would compensate for
    the loss in capability resulting from reductions in forces required
    in the bottom-up review.  Although DOD estimated that most
    enhancements would be done by about 2000, some may not come on line
    as planned or at all.

          AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN
          STRATEGIC MOBILITY
          IMPROVEMENTS AND
          PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT IS
          UNCERTAIN
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7.1

    To improve strategic mobility, DOD's plans included procuring C-17
    airlift aircraft, increasing the number of sealift ships available,
    improving the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force, and
    prepositioning additional equipment on land.  At the time of the
    bottom-up review, DOD assumed that by 1999, 80 of 120 C-17s and 21
    additional Ready Reserve Force roll-on/roll-off ships would be
    available as planned.  By the same time, DOD expected to preposition
    equipment on ships and increase the amount of equipment prepositioned
    on land in the Persian Gulf area from a battalion-sized set to two
    brigade sets, located in two different locations.  War-fighting
    command officials stated that prepositioning this equipment is
    critical to executing the two-conflict strategy.  As of January 1995,
    DOD, as we reported in November 1994,\9 had made progress in
    improving the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Fleet.  It had also
    prepositioned a brigade set of equipment on ships and nearly
    completed prepositioning a brigade set of equipment on land in the
    Persian Gulf area.

    DOD has encountered some problems or funding uncertainties in
    acquiring additional airlift and sealift and prepositioning the
    second brigade set on land.  Specifically, DOD's assumption that 80
    C-17 aircraft would be available by fiscal year 1999 was overly
    optimistic.  Since its inception, the C-17 program has been plagued
    with cost, schedule, and performance problems.  We testified in April
    1994 that total costs continued to grow, delivery schedules had
    slipped, and aircraft had been delivered with unfinished work or
    known deficiencies.\10 In December 1993, the Secretary of Defense
    decided to limit the program to 40 aircraft unless the contractor
    significantly improved management and productivity.  Furthermore, as
    discussed previously, the Secretary also decided to study
    alternatives for a mixed airlift force of C-17s and
    nondevelopmental--commercial or military--aircraft.  DOD expects to
    complete the study in November 1995 and at that time will decide
    whether to procure additional C-17s.  As of October 1994, the
    contractor had delivered 15 C-17 aircraft and planned to deliver the
    remaining 25 aircraft by September 1998.

    As of October 1994, the Department of Transportation had acquired 14
    of the 21 Ready Reserve Force ships planned to be available for DOD's
    mobility program by fiscal year 1999.  It planned to acquire the
    remaining seven ships with funds remaining from fiscal year 1994 and
    requested for fiscal year 1995.  However, during fiscal year 1995
    deliberations, the Congress rescinded $158 million in fiscal year
    1994 funds programmed for the seven ships, but provided $43 million
    in fiscal year 1995 funds.  DOD believes that this funding will be
    sufficient to procure two ships and plans to program funds for the
    remaining five ships in its budgets for 1996 to 1998.

    DOD's plans to preposition the second of two brigade sets of
    equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf are also uncertain.  As of
    January 1995, the U.S.  Central Command had identified a location for
    the second set of equipment and reached necessary agreements with the
    host country.  However, according to DOD officials, the Army had
    obtained funding only for the site survey and the project's design.
    The Army plans to request funding in its fiscal year 1996 budget
    submission for the remainder of the project over a 3-year period
    covering fiscal years 1996-98.

    --------------------
    \9 Ready Reserve Force:  Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other
    Concerns Remain (GAO/NSIAD-95-24, Nov.  8, 1994).

    \10 Military Airlift:  The C-17 Proposed Settlement and Program
    Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-172,
    Apr.  28, 1994).

          CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS TO U.S.
          FIREPOWER HAVE NOT BEEN
          FUNDED AS EXPECTED
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7.2

    The bottom-up review called for various improvements to the lethality
    of U.S.  firepower, including development of precision-guided
    munitions and the addition of air-to-ground attack capability to the
    Navy's F-14 aircraft (referred to as the Block I upgrade).  At the
    time of our review, these improvements were part of DOD's ongoing
    programs and therefore reflected capabilities that were already
    planned.  DOD assumed that sufficient quantities of precision
    munitions for the two-conflict strategy would be available by about
    the year 2000 and the Block I upgrade would be completed by the year
    2003.

    The bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided munitions
    already in the U.S.  inventory, as well as new types of munitions
    still under development, are needed to ensure that U.S.  forces can
    operate successfully in future major regional conflicts and other
    operations.  It noted that they hold the promise of dramatically
    improving the ability of U.S.  forces to destroy enemy armored
    vehicles and halt invading ground forces, as well as destroy fixed
    targets at longer ranges, thus reducing exposure to enemy air
    defenses.  Specific antiarmor precision munitions cited included the
    Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile.

    The Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile will not come on line as
    planned.  Because of significant developmental difficulties and
    growth in the expected unit cost, DOD canceled the Tri-Service
    Standoff Attack Missile program.  We reported extensively on cost,
    schedule, and performance problems with the Tri-Service Standoff
    Attack Missile.\11 Furthermore, we concluded that the Navy did not
    adequately justify the need for the Block I upgrade.\12 During
    deliberations on DOD's fiscal year 1995 appropriation, the Congress
    canceled funding for the F-14 Block I upgrade because of questions
    about its affordability.

    --------------------
    \11 Missile Development:  TSSAM Production Should Not Be Started as
    Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-52, Oct.  8, 1993) and four classified reports
    issued in 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993.

    \12 Naval Aviation:  F-14 Upgrades Are Not Adequately Justified
    (GAO/NSIAD 95-12, Oct.  19, 1994).

       CONCLUSIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8

    The strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous
    conflicts will require a significant change in military planning for
    the deployment and use of U.S.  forces.  However, in the bottom-up
    review, DOD determined the strategy, forces, capability enhancements,
    and estimated costs for accomplishing the strategy without
    sufficiently analyzing key assumptions to ensure their validity.
    Until DOD fully analyzes basic factors, such as whether forces
    engaged in other operations that are needed in the early stages of a
    regional conflict can quickly redeploy, sufficient mobility and
    support forces exist, reserve brigades can deploy when needed or
    improvements in capabilities will be available, it will not have a
    firm basis for determining the forces, supporting capabilities, and
    funding needed for the two-conflict strategy or if the strategy
    should be changed.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:9

    DOD disagreed with our overall conclusion that DOD did not adequately
    analyze the assumptions used in the bottom-up review.  DOD said that
    DOD's leadership recognized practical limitations on the scope of
    analysis that could be done in the time available and fully
    considered these limitations in making decisions about key aspects of
    the long-term defense program.

    DOD further stated that, in raising questions about the bottom-up
    review's assumptions, we did not recognize the difference between
    broad conceptual force planning and detailed operational planning.
    DOD said that it did not develop actual war plans, but rather
    identified broad, but comprehensive, requirements that U.S.  forces
    should be able to meet to carry out crucial elements of DOD's defense
    strategy.  DOD also stated that to ensure adequate force planning, it
    recognized the need to continually refine and update its assessments.
    DOD noted that, to date, follow-on analyses have upheld the basic
    tenets and findings of the bottom-up review.  We were unable to
    confirm DOD's statement regarding the results of the follow-on
    analyses because DOD will not make these results available until the
    studies are completed.

    We recognize that DOD was faced with time limitations in doing the
    bottom-up review, and was therefore restricted in the extent of
    analyses that could be done.  We also agree that the bottom-up review
    was a broad force planning and programming effort rather than a
    war-planning effort.  In fact, in chapters 1 and 3, we clearly
    distinguish between the bottom-up review and detailed future
    operational planning.

    However, in the bottom-up review, DOD made a specific judgment that
    the United States would maintain the capability to fight and win two
    nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and decided the specific
    size and composition of the force capable of meeting this strategy.
    In making these decisions, DOD made critical assumptions about
    factors that are key to the successful execution of the two-conflict
    strategy without performing sufficient analyses to test the validity
    of its assumptions.  In fact, DOD and the war-fighting commands are
    now exploring basic questions about DOD's assumptions, such as
    whether forces involved in smaller-scale operations can actually be
    available when needed to deploy to a regional conflict, whether the
    same combat forces would be needed at the same time in both regional
    conflicts and whether the Army has sufficient support for nearly
    simultaneous combat operations in two conflicts.

    DOD also disagreed with our specific findings that (1) it did not
    assess requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts,
    (2) it did not fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army
    would be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts.
    First, DOD stated that it has ample experience in rapidly deploying
    forces, particularly combat and support aircraft, from one theater to
    another.  DOD said that in its bottom-up review analysis, it made
    judgments about its future ability to shift assets based on that
    experience.

    We agree that DOD has ample experience in redeploying forces from one
    theater to another.  We note, however, that DOD's experience has not
    included redeployments from one major regional conflict to another,
    as envisioned in the bottom-up review and defense planning guidance
    scenario.  Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, the war-fighting
    commands' study has raised questions about shifting assets between
    conflicts.  For these reasons, we continue to believe that the
    bottom-up review did not adequately assess requirements for shifting
    assets between conflicts.

    Second, DOD stated that in assessing mobility requirements during the
    bottom-up review, it relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements
    study.  DOD believes that it understands the vast majority of its
    basic lift requirements and capabilities for responding to two nearly
    simultaneous conflicts.  We agree that the 1991 study provided a
    useful baseline; however, the bottom-up review resulted in
    significant changes in mobility assumptions.  DOD did not begin to
    analyze these changes until after the bottom-up review.  Furthermore,
    the 1991 study concluded that its recommended mobility program was
    not sufficient for two concurrent conflicts.  Until DOD's
    reassessment of mobility requirements is complete, we continue to
    believe that DOD will not know the extent of strategic airlift,
    sealift, and prepositioning needed to support two major regional
    conflicts.

    Finally, DOD stated that the Army demonstrated, as recently as
    Operation Desert Storm in 1991, that it can fully support large-scale
    combat operations in a single major regional conflict.  DOD also
    believes that it is premature to draw conclusions regarding Army
    support shortfalls until the Army completes its ongoing analysis of
    support requirements for the two-conflict strategy.  We recognize
    that the Army was able to support combat operations during Operation
    Desert Storm; however, as discussed in chapter 2, the Army did
    encounter difficulties.  Also, the operation was conducted under
    several favorable circumstances; for example, there was no second
    conflict at the same time.  Furthermore, we did not conclude that the
    Army could not support two major regional conflicts.  Rather, we
    showed that DOD did not analyze the validity of its assumption that
    sufficient support forces would be available and that various factors
    suggest that the Army would be challenged in meeting this
    requirement.  We agree that the Army's ongoing analysis will identify
    specific requirements and shortfalls.

    Additional annotated evaluations of DOD's comments are presented in
    appendix I.

    WAR-FIGHTING COMMANDS QUESTION
    DOD'S CONCEPT FOR RESPONDING TO
    TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICTS
    ============================================================ Chapter 3

    War-fighting command officials believe that DOD's concept for
    responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional
    conflicts--detailed in defense planning guidance that is being used
    to develop program and budget requirements--may not be the best
    approach.  Their estimates of key characteristics of a situation
    involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts and the deployment of
    forces differ significantly from DOD's estimates, including the
    amount of warning time for both conflicts and time between the onset
    of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each
    conflict, and timing of force deployments.  As a result, the commands
    are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S.
    capabilities.  Command officials emphasized that they are not
    suggesting the United States cannot accomplish the two-conflict
    strategy.  Their study is analyzing many of the variables that DOD
    made assumptions about during the bottom-up review, such as shifting
    assets between conflicts and the sufficiency of strategic lift.

       THE MAY 1994 DEFENSE PLANNING
       GUIDANCE OUTLINES DOD'S CONCEPT
       FOR RESPONDING TO TWO NEARLY
       SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

    In May 1994, the Secretary of Defense issued his defense planning
    guidance for the 5-year planning period 1996 to 2001.  This guidance
    provided several illustrative planning scenarios depicting the
    challenges U.S.  forces might face during the planning period and
    generic force packages representing the types of military capability
    needed to address these challenges.  The specific scenarios covered
    single regional conflicts, two nearly simultaneous conflicts, and
    various smaller-scale operations.  They included a detailed summary
    of the situation, enemy objectives and forces, U.S.  objectives and
    forces, projected warning times of enemy attack, a schedule for the
    deployment of U.S.  forces to the conflict area, and assumptions
    governing the circumstances depicted in the scenario.

    According to the defense guidance, the illustrative scenarios, among
    other things, (1) provide a "technical yardstick" to help focus,
    develop, and evaluate defense forces and programs in further detail
    and (2) enable service components to formulate detailed programs that
    provide levels of readiness, sustainability, support, and mobility
    appropriate to the bottom-up review's two-conflict strategy.  For
    example, DOD is using the defense planning guidance scenario for two
    nearly simultaneous conflicts as a basis for its study of mobility
    requirements, and the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command used the
    scenario in examining requirements for dual-tasking assets and
    refueling aircraft (see chap.  2).  The Joint Chiefs of Staff will
    use the defense planning guidance and scenario in apportioning
    specific forces, strategic lift, prepositioning, and other assets to
    war-fighting commanders for accomplishing assigned missions,
    including responding to regional conflicts.

    In general, the defense planning guidance scenario for nearly
    simultaneous conflicts depicted a situation in which a second
    conflict breaks out while the United States is engaged in and
    preoccupied with a major regional conflict a considerable distance
    away.  The scenario envisioned that U.S.  combat and supporting
    capabilities, including strategic mobility, would first be focused on
    responding to the first conflict until indications of a second
    conflict were recognized.  It made several key assumptions, including
    the anticipated warning time, number of days separating the two
    conflicts, forces sufficient to respond to each conflict, additional
    forces available to the war-fighting commanders if adverse conditions
    developed, and the timing of various combat phases.  Specific details
    about the scenario and assumptions are classified.

       WAR-FIGHTING COMMANDS QUESTION
       SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE DEFENSE
       PLANNING GUIDANCE SCENARIO
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

    Two war-fighting commands with responsibility for responding to major
    regional conflicts question whether the defense planning guidance
    scenario being used to develop program and budgetary requirements for
    the two-conflict strategy reflects the best approach.  Specifically,
    they believe that the guidance may not best reflect how two nearly
    simultaneous conflicts would evolve and how the United States should
    respond.  Their overall concern is that the scenario focuses on
    responding to the first conflict and then the second conflict and
    does not sufficiently recognize the value of taking significant
    action to deter the second conflict when the first conflict occurs.
    The specific details of the commands' concerns are classified.

    The commands are also concerned about specific aspects of the
    scenario and its assumptions, including the following:

      The warning time for both conflicts and the separation time between
         the two conflicts are likely to be shorter than DOD envisions.

      DOD's concept for deploying forces may not provide the mix of
         combat and supporting capability that the two commands believe
         is necessary to successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous
         conflicts.

      The scenario does not recognize that both commands have operational
         requirements for some of the same air, ground, and naval forces
         and prepositioned equipment that if deployed to the first
         conflict may not be available when needed for the second
         conflict.

      The apportionment of strategic airlift and sealift assets is
         inadequate and should be based on a different concept for
         deploying forces.

      Both commands will likely require many of the same support forces;
         however, the scenario only addresses combat forces.

      A higher level of mobilization of reserve forces than called for in
         the scenario will likely be required.

    Because of these concerns, the two commands, in February 1994,
    initiated a joint study to assess the feasibility of responding to
    two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts with the bottom-up
    review force.  They are using a scenario and deployment concept that
    differs from the defense planning guidance scenario.  Command
    officials emphasized that, by initiating the study, they are not
    suggesting that the United States cannot accomplish the two-conflict
    strategy.  Rather, they are examining options that they believe (1)
    lessen the possibility that U.S.  forces will be required to engage
    in two major regional conflicts at the same time and (2) put U.S.
    forces in a better position to be successful in both conflicts if
    deterrence fails.  This study will examine various aspects of the
    two-conflict strategy, including the number and type of assets
    required to shift between conflicts and at what point such a shift
    could reasonably occur.

    As of January 1995, the commands had reached preliminary conclusions
    and did not expect to complete the study until sometime later in
    1995.  However, according to command officials, the study thus far
    has validated many of their concerns about the defense planning
    guidance scenario and raised questions about DOD's bottom-up review
    assumptions, including the availability of strategic airlift and
    support forces, shifting assets between conflicts, and how and when
    enhanced brigades would be needed.  Based on their preliminary study
    results, the commands hope to influence DOD and Joint Staff thinking
    in apportioning forces and preparing future defense planning guidance
    for developing program and budgetary requirements.

    Command officials emphasized that their study will not address
    detailed operational planning for executing the two-conflict strategy
    or determine specific operational requirements.  This process will
    occur after the Joint Staff formally apportions forces and missions
    in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--expected to be issued in
    early 1995.  Command officials expect the plan to task them to
    develop plans and deployment schedules for a single regional conflict
    scenario in their respective areas, assuming no other conflicts are
    occurring, and for two nearly simultaneous conflicts, assuming that
    their command is involved in the second of the two conflicts.  In the
    past, commands have been tasked only to prepare a concept summary on
    how they would respond if they were in the second conflict.

    Based on the tasking, the commands will develop operational plans
    followed by detailed deployment schedules for their respective
    regional conflicts.  As part of this process, the commands will
    determine their specific requirements for executing the plans and
    schedules, such as combat forces, mobility, sustainability, and
    munitions.  The commands estimate that it would take about 18 months,
    from the time the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is issued, to
    complete the plans and deployment schedules.

    DOD officials agreed that the commands' concept of executing the
    two-conflict strategy differs from the defense planning guidance and
    that the commands' study could generate a different baseline for
    determining defense requirements, budgets, and plans.  They stated
    that reconciling the differences when the study becomes available may
    be necessary, but until then, the defense planning guidance remains
    the basis of DOD planning for the two-conflict strategy.

       CONCLUSIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

    In developing the defense planning guidance scenario that military
    planners will use to develop program and budget requirements for the
    two-conflict strategy, DOD used a specific concept for deploying
    forces and supporting capabilities.  Key war-fighting commands
    believe that the scenario may not reflect the most effective
    deployment and use of U.S.  capabilities and are analyzing
    alternatives.  Their analysis is addressing many of DOD's key
    bottom-up review assumptions regarding key aspects of the
    two-conflict strategy and could provide useful insights for
    determining the validity of these assumptions.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

    We recommend that in the congressionally mandated examination of the
    bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the
    assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other
    operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic
    mobility assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army
    National Guard enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to
    strategic mobility and U.S.  firepower and (2) consider the options
    being examined by the war-fighting commands.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

    DOD agreed with our recommendations and noted that it is conducting
    detailed studies to address many of the issues raised.  DOD stated
    that it will reflect the results of these studies in its response to
    the congressionally mandated report on the bottom-up review.  As
    discussed in chapter 2, DOD stated that in raising questions about
    the bottom-up review's assumptions, we did not recognize the
    difference between broad conceptual force planning and operational
    planning for using specific forces to undertake specific operations.
    We note that DOD's comments imply that the war-fighting commands'
    study is similar to detailed operational planning.  As discussed in
    chapter 3, the commands are examining options for executing the
    strategy on a macro scale rather than developing specific detailed
    plans and requirements.

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
    COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
    ============================================================ Chapter 3

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    The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    letter dated January 17, 1995.

       GAO COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

    1.  As discussed in chapter 2, our work showed the bottom-up review
    did not analyze in detail the feasibility or requirements of
    redeploying forces engaged in smaller-scale operations to a major
    regional conflict.  As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the
    war-fighting commands, as part of their joint study, are reviewing
    force requirements for different stages of both regional conflicts,
    and the Army is studying the impact of redeploying forces from peace
    operations.  DOD agrees that it did not analyze the problem of
    redeploying assets in detail, and we believe that the ongoing studies
    will provide a better understanding of the feasibility and
    requirements for redeploying forces, including when specific forces
    and support capabilities might be needed in either conflict.

    2.  We agree that redeploying forces from one operation to another
    may not necessarily increase lift requirements.  However, until DOD
    examines the lift requirements for such redeployments, we believe
    that the specific impact is unknown.

    3.  Until the Army completes its study on the impact of redeploying
    forces from smaller-scale operations, the specific support shortfalls
    will not be known.  Until DOD knows the shortfalls, it cannot
    identify the most appropriate options for addressing them.

    4.  We agree that the 1991 mobility requirements study addressed two
    concurrent regional conflicts and was a useful source of analysis
    during the bottom-up review.  We note, however, that the 1991 study
    concluded its recommended mobility program was not sufficient to meet
    the mobility requirements for two concurrent conflicts.  Furthermore,
    the bottom-up review resulted in significant changes affecting
    mobility requirements, such as a new military strategy, a different
    force structure, and enhancements in war-fighting capability.  In
    fact, because of these changes, DOD initiated a study to update the
    1991 study to validate its conclusions in the bottom-up review about
    strategic mobility.

    5.  The changes in end strength have decreased the Army's flexibility
    to provide more support units in areas of need.  The 13,000 person
    decrement represents a net decrease in end strength for the active
    component and the U.S.  Army Reserve--those components that provide
    most of the Army's support units--and an increase in the Army
    National Guard's end strength.  Within its increased end strength,
    the Guard is retaining more combat positions than it retained under
    the base force.  Because of the decreases in end strength in the
    active and U.S.  Army reserve components and the fact that the
    increased Guard end strength is being used to retain combat
    positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing more support
    units within its end strength.

    6.  Our work showed indications that the Army would be challenged in
    supporting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.  We
    agree that the extent of actual shortages will not be determined
    until the Army completes its ongoing Total Army Analysis.  Until DOD
    knows the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most appropriate options
    for addressing them.

    7.  We agree that the bottom-up review defined some parameters of the
    enhanced brigades.  Although the bottom-up review stated that these
    brigades were needed to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, our
    work showed that DOD did not determine basic factors about the
    brigades, such as their wartime missions, deployability, or required
    enhancements.  Although DOD states that the brigades will be fielded
    in significant numbers by the end of the decade, the Army currently
    envisions that by 1999 the training strategy being developed will be
    tested on only 3 of 15 brigades.

    8.  We modified the text to reflect improvements in the Ready Reserve
    Force.  Chapter 2 already notes that DOD has prepositioned a brigade
    set on ships and nearly completed prepositioning a brigade set on
    land.  Availability of sufficient lift, including 80 of 120 C-17
    aircraft by 1999, was a key bottom-up review assumption.  Since its
    inception, the C-17 program has encountered cost, technical, and
    schedule problems that DOD was aware of at the time of the bottom-up
    review.  In fact, because of these problems, the Secretary of Defense
    was contemplating limiting procurement of the aircraft and in
    December 1993 decided to do so.  For these reasons, we believe that
    DOD's assumption was overly optimistic.  In its comments, DOD states
    that delivery of the full complement of airlift aircraft may very
    well be late.

    9.  We modified the text to reflect DOD's comment.

    10.  While DOD states that most other enhancement programs remain on
    track, DOD officials agreed, in discussing their comments, that
    schedules have been delayed in some of these programs such that they
    will not come on line until sometime after 2000.  (The specific dates
    are classified.)

    11.  We modified the text to reflect DOD's comment regarding the two
    phrases.

    12.  We do not suggest that the bottom-up review rules out taking
    actions to deter a second conflict.  In chapter 3, we are merely
    relaying the views of the war-fighting commanders that the defense
    planning guidance scenario does not sufficiently recognize the value
    of taking significant deterrent action.  (The specific basis for
    their views is classified.) We agree that the bottom-up review
    recognized that some assets would be needed in both conflicts, as
    reflected in our discussion on dual-tasking in chapter 2 of the
    report.  Furthermore, in chapters 1 and 3, we specifically
    distinguish between the bottom-up review and the defense planning
    guidance implementing the bottom-up review.  We therefore do not
    agree that the report implies that the bottom-up review proffered
    specific guidance to the commands.

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    ========================================================== Appendix II

       NATIONAL SECURITY AND
       INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
       WASHINGTON, D.C.
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

    Steven Sternlieb, Assistant Director
    Sharon Pickup, Evaluator-in-Charge
    William Wood, Senior Evaluator
    Barbara Gannon, Senior Evaluator
    Samuel Hinojosa, Senior Evaluator
    Nancy Ragsdale, Communications Analyst

       NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

    Richard Payne, Senior Evaluator