    Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to
    Regional Conflicts (Chapter Report, 03/08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-51).

    Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
    impact of peace operations on the U.S. military forces' capability to
    respond to regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1) force structure
    limitations that affect the military's ability to respond to other
    national security requirements while engaged in peace operations; and
    (2) options available for increasing force flexibility and response
    capability.

    GAO found that: (1) peace operations have heavily stressed some U.S.
    military capabilities, including Army support forces and specialized Air
    Force aircraft; (2) because there are relatively few support forces in
    the military's active force, some of these units and personnel have been
    deployed to consecutive operations, the tempo of operations has
    increased, and the time available to prepare for combat missions has
    been reduced; (3) extended participation in multiple or large scale
    peace operations could impede the services' ability to timely respond to
    major regional conflicts (MRC); (4) disengaging support units and
    specialized aircraft from a peace operation and redeploying them to MRC
    could be more difficult than estimated because some of these units would
    not be available to facilitate a redeployment and need training and
    supplies before deploying to another major operation; (5) the options
    available to DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while
    maintaining the capability to respond to MRC include changing the mix of
    active and reserve forces and making greater use of reserves and
    contractors; and (6) the United States needs to determine the resources
    it needs and degree of risk it is prepared to take if it wishes to
    continue participating in sizeable peace operations for extended periods
    and still maintain the capability needed to rapidly respond to
    simultaneous MRC.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-51
         TITLE:  Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect
                 Response to Regional Conflicts
          DATE:  03/08/95
       SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
                 Defense contingency planning
                 Mobilization
                 Defense capabilities
                 Military aircraft
                 Military airlift operations
                 Military forces
                 Strategic planning
                 Operations analysis
                 Emergency preparedness
    IDENTIFIER:  Total Army Analysis Process
                 Israel
                 Sinai Peninsula
                 Somalia
                 Macedonia
                 Bosnia
                 Haiti
                 Rwanda
                 Iraq
                 DOD Operation Provide Comfort
                 DOD Operation Provide Relief
                 DOD Operation Restore Hope
                 DOD Operation Continue Hope
                 DOD Operation Provide Promise
                 DOD Operation Deny Flight
                 DOD Operation Uphold Democracy
                 DOD Operation Southern Watch
                 DOD Operation Sharp Guard
                 EC-130 Aircraft
                 EF-111 Aircraft
                 Airborne Warning and Control System
                 E-3 Aircraft
                 AWACS
                 C-130 Aircraft
                 UH-60 Helicopter

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    March 1995

    PEACE OPERATIONS - HEAVY USE OF
    KEY CAPABILITIES MAY AFFECT
    RESPONSE TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS

    GAO/NSIAD-95-51

    Peace Operations

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      ABCCC - Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
      AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System
      CFP - Contingency Force Pool
      DOD - Department of Defense
      MRC - major regional conflict
      PSRC - Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
      ROWPU - Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
      USAFE - U.S.  Air Forces in Europe

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-259367

    March 8, 1995

    The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on National Security
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable James V.  Hansen
    The Honorable Norman Sisisky
    House of Representatives

    This report discusses the impact that peace operations have on U.S.
    military forces, force structure limitations that may affect the
    military's ability to respond to other national security requirements
    while engaged in peace operations, and options for increasing force
    flexibility and response capability.  We prepared the report at the
    request of the former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on
    Armed Services.  The information in this report should be useful to
    your Committee in its deliberations on the impact of peace operations
    on the military.  The report contains a recommendation to the
    Secretary of Defense concerning the staffing of high-priority support
    units.

    We are sending copies of this report to other interested congresional
    committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the
    Air Force; the Commandant, U.S.  Marine Corps; and the Director,
    Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also be made available
    to others on request.

    If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call
    me on (202) 512-3504.  Major contributors to this report are listed
    in appendix II.

    Richard Davis
    Director, National Security
     Analysis

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    ============================================================ Chapter 0

       PURPOSE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

    Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.  military has become
    increasingly involved in a number of peace operations,\1 such as the
    ones in Somalia and Haiti.  The former Chairman and Ranking Minority
    Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House
    Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to review the suitability of
    the current U.S.  force structure for peace operations.  They wanted
    to know whether the U.S.  military had the capabilities necessary to
    operate effectively in a peace operations environment, while
    maintaining the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous
    major regional conflicts (MRC).  GAO did not assess whether the
    United States should participate in peace operations.  GAO examined
    (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S.  military forces,
    (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military's
    ability to respond to other national security requirements while
    engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force
    flexibility and response capability.

    --------------------
    \1 For the purpose of this report, "peace operations" includes
    everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
    military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement
    operations.  In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to
    participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has
    done for many years.

       BACKGROUND
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

    Recent changes in the international security environment, led by the
    collapse of the Soviet Union, are redefining the role of the U.S.
    military.  In addition to emphasizing the capability to respond to
    two nearly simultaneous MRCs, the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    bottom-up review notes that U.S.  military forces should also be
    prepared for operations short of declared or intense war, including
    peace operations.  According to the bottom-up review, U.S.  forces
    are more likely to be involved in these other- than-war operations.

    As the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased in
    the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S.  military
    participation has changed markedly.  While U.S.  military forces have
    participated in peace operations for many years, notably as part of
    the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, the
    size of the U.S.  military contingent has traditionally been limited.
    Recently, however, the United States has used more military forces,
    of an increasingly varied nature, in peace operations in Somalia,
    Bosnia, Haiti, and Northern and Southern Iraq.  These operations
    often take place for an extended duration, usually occurring in
    austere environments with little or no infrastructure from which to
    base and sustain an operation.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

    Peace operations heavily stress some U.S.  military capabilities,
    including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and
    transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having
    less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions
    and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe.
    Repeated use of these forces, of which there are relatively few in
    the active force, has resulted in some units and personnel deploying
    more than once to an operation or to consecutive operations,
    increased the tempo of operations, and reduced the time available to
    prepare for combat missions.  Because of their forward-deployed mode
    of operations, the Navy and the Marine Corps have not faced the same
    force structure constraints.  However, the increased naval commitment
    to peace operations, combined with the decrease in forward-deployed
    forces, has escalated the tempo of operations and reduced the
    preparation time between deployments for certain naval forces.

    Extended participation in multiple and/or large scale peace
    operations could impede the services' timely response to MRCs because
    certain active component support units and specialized Air Force
    aircraft used for these operations would also be needed initially in
    a MRC.  Contrary to the bottom-up review's assumption, it could be
    difficult to disengage these support units and specialized Air Force
    assets quickly from a peace operation and redeploy them to a MRC.
    First, some of the forces needed in the early days of a MRC would
    also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation.
    Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel
    and equipment from the peace operation.  Finally, some of the forces
    would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to
    another major operation.

    There are a number of options available that could allow DOD to meet
    the demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to
    respond to MRCs.  These options include changing the mix of active
    and reserve forces and making greater use of the reserves and
    contractors.  DOD is currently examining these and other options GAO
    mentions in this report.  If the United States wants to continue
    participating in sizable peace operations for extended periods and
    still maintain the capability to respond rapidly to two nearly
    simultaneous MRCs, it must make choices involving the use of
    resources and the degree of military risk it is prepared to take.

       PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

          PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE
          STRESSED KEY MILITARY
          CAPABILITIES
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

    Peace operations have heavily stressed certain key military
    capabilities, of which there are few in the active component,
    particularly certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and
    transportation units and Air Force specialized aircraft, while having
    less impact on other capabilities such as Army armored combat
    divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft.  Because
    each peace operation is different, the experiences provided and the
    impact on the forces differ.

    Sustaining large-scale peace operations for an extended period of
    time uses a large number of some kinds of active Army support forces
    to establish infrastructure in what is often an austere environment.
    Support forces provide basic necessities--food, water, toilets, and
    showers--to U.S.  military forces and, in many cases, to coalition
    forces and the local population.  If nation building is part of the
    military mission, support requirements increase even further as the
    military builds schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishes
    police and other civil administration services.

    The Army's combat support forces (such as military police) and combat
    service support forces (such as port handlers and quartermaster
    personnel) provide these important support capabilities.  However,
    many of these forces are in the reserve component and, for the most
    part, have not been activated for peace operations.  As a result, the
    responsibility for these operations has fallen on the smaller number
    of forces in the active component.  In some cases, nearly all the
    active units for particular support capabilities have had to deploy
    to specific operations.  For example, 100 percent of the air terminal
    movement control teams and 75 percent of the petroleum supply
    companies in the active component deployed to Somalia.  In many
    cases, certain personnel have had to deploy multiple times to the
    same operation or to consecutive operations.

    The stress of peace operations on the Army has been exacerbated by
    the practice of cross-leveling.  This practice involves maintaining
    support units at about 10 to 20 percent below their authorized
    personnel levels during peacetime and increasing their personnel
    levels during deployment by borrowing personnel from units that are
    not deploying.  Given the decrease in the size of the Army, GAO
    believes that this practice needs to be reassessed.

    The Army's experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that
    could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy sizable forces
    to Bosnia or to other large-scale peace operations throughout the
    world.  While the Army provided approximately a brigade-size force to
    Somalia, it likely would provide a division-size force to
    Bosnia--roughly three times the Army's force in Somalia.  Army
    officials have stated that if the United States sends approximately
    22,000 Army forces to Bosnia, access to the reserve component likely
    would be required for the second 6-month rotation because the large
    support requirement would exceed the number of active forces
    available in certain support capabilities.

    The Air Force has contributed to recent peace operations by providing
    airlift, delivering humanitarian relief, and participating in various
    no fly zone air operations.  Air Force officials stated that these
    operations have provided valuable experience in joint and coalition
    operations.  However, they have placed considerable stress on (1)
    specialized capabilities that only exist in small numbers, such as
    command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance, and radar jamming
    aircraft and (2) forward-deployed units in the European theater,
    where most recent operations have occurred.  Many of these units have
    experienced increased operational and personnel tempo because of
    sustained deployments and have had fewer opportunities for training
    in the broad spectrum of warfare requirements, such as night
    intercept operations and advanced aircraft handling characteristics.
    For example, 48 percent of EF-111 aircrews and 42 percent of active
    component F-4G aircrews received waivers for training requirements
    they were not able to complete during the January-June 1994 training
    cycle.  These waivers were needed because of the crews' extensive
    participation in peace operations.

    In addition, deploying part but not all of a unit to peace operations
    has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force,
    because squadrons are structured to fight in place or deploy as a
    whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are doing for
    peace operations.  Consequently, essential unit personnel and
    equipment have to be shared by the forces at the home base and those
    in the deployed location.

    The traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with a
    command's own resources as much as possible combined with the
    drawdown of forces in Europe have increased the strain on the
    remaining Air Force assets in Europe.  For example, since their
    inception in July and November 1993, the U.S.  Air Force Europe's two
    new F-15E squadrons, designed for delivering precision-guided
    munitions at night in a high-threat environment, have been
    participating continuously in two peace operations--Provide Comfort
    and Deny Flight.  Because of their participation in these operations,
    the squadrons have had to forego major training exercises that would
    have provided them with the most realistic combat training available.
    This training is particularly important for these squadrons because
    they have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical
    air combat exercise since they were established in 1993.  Air Force
    volunteer reservists have been used in peace operations to reduce the
    burden on certain active component units, such as C-130, A-10, and
    F-16 units, but full-time jobs and family obligations prevent
    reservists from devoting extensive amounts of time to the operations.
    Many of these problems are now being addressed by heavier reliance on
    U.S.-based active, reserve, and Guard units that have deployed to
    Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of this
    burden.

    Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the
    Marine Corps because they are normally forward deployed throughout
    the world.  Certain Navy and Marine Corps units, however, have
    experienced increased operating tempo and decreased time between
    deployments due to their increased participation in these sustained
    operations and to the reduced force structure available to respond to
    them and other forward deployment requirements.  For example, a
    Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23, 1994, from a
    6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of Somalia, was
    sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S.  operations off
    the coast of Haiti.  Navy officials told GAO that increased
    operational tempo has resulted in reduced U.S.  naval participation
    in certain training and exercises, less time for intermediate
    maintenance and repair, and reduced U.S.  naval presence in certain
    geographic areas.

          PARTICIPATION IN PEACE
          OPERATIONS MAY DELAY
          SERVICES' RESPONSE TO MAJOR
          REGIONAL CONFLICTS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

    According to the bottom-up review, military forces needed for peace
    operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use
    in the event of one or more MRCs.  Certain key Army support units and
    specialized Air Force aircraft used in recent peace operations have
    been identified as being needed in the early stages of a MRC.
    However, it may be difficult to disengage these forces from the peace
    operation and redeploy them quickly to the MRC.  This is significant
    because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to
    deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as
    possible to halt the invasion.

    During the Somalia operation, the Army used a large percentage of
    certain support forces needed in the early stages of a MRC, such as
    forces for opening ports and airfields.  In certain cases, nearly 100
    percent of the contingency support forces for particular capabilities
    had deployed to Somalia and hence were unavailable for deployment
    elsewhere.  For example, during the course of the operation, the Army
    used all its contingency support forces attached to general supply,
    air terminal movement control, medium truck (petroleum), cargo
    transfer, and water purification units.  Some of these support
    capabilities, of which there are few in the active component, would
    also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation
    theater and hence would not be immediately available for the MRC.
    The Army has recognized this as a challenge and is currently
    examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, a
    biennial process to determine nondivisional support requirements.
    The Army expects to complete this analysis by mid-1995.

    The Air Force is in a similar situation.  Many of its special
    capability units have been participating in peace operations on a
    fairly continuous basis, yet DOD plans to use some of these units in
    both MRCs.  While the aircraft and aircrews could easily move to
    another location, the supplies, equipment, and personnel associated
    with the support of the aircraft would have to wait for available
    airlift.

    On the other hand, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones
    and other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S.
    forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S.  military to respond
    quickly to regional contingencies.  This was the case in Operation
    Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, where having U.S.  aircraft already
    operating from Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition
    response to Iraq's threatened aggression against Kuwait.

          A NUMBER OF OPTIONS ARE
          AVAILABLE FOR EASING THE
          STRAIN OF PEACE OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

    There are options available for reducing the strain of continued
    military participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace
    operations while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to
    MRCs.  DOD has a number of ongoing analyses that are examining such
    options.  These options have their own advantages and disadvantages
    and will require choices on the use of the nation's resources.  While
    there are costs associated with some of these options, GAO has not
    examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund them.

    One option involves increasing the number of support forces on active
    duty and decreasing the number of combat forces.  The Army maintains
    limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty
    and substantial active combat capability.  While changing the mix of
    active combat and support forces would make more support forces
    available for peace operations, it would decrease available active
    combat forces for regional conflicts.  Alternatively, GAO has
    recently reported that DOD may be able to increase the number of
    combat and combat service support forces without decreasing the
    number of combat forces by making more use of civilian employees.

    Another option involves greater use of the reserves.  This would ease
    the strain on Army support forces and on Air Force airlift and combat
    forces.  The disadvantage of this option would be the disruption to
    reservists' lives, which ultimately could affect the willingness of
    Americans to join the reserves.  The President called up
    approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military
    intervention in Haiti.  Prior to that call-up, the President's
    Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority had been invoked only once since
    its 1976 enactment--for the Gulf War.  Reserves were not called up
    for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Somalia in
    1992.  DOD is examining the issue of making greater use of the
    reserves for peace operations.

    Other options include making greater use of contractors to augment
    support forces, using worldwide Air Force assets rather than regional
    assets to support peace operations, and changing forward presence and
    deployment goals to relieve the strain on naval forces.  Although no
    one option addresses all the problems GAO has identified, a
    combination of these options could substantially ease the problems.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

    Congress, concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense
    budget, has directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of
    the President's budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years
    Defense Program.  The review is to consider peace operations and
    directs among other things that the report describe in detail the
    force structure required to fight and win two MRCs nearly
    simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations.
    Consequently, GAO is not making recommendations regarding reassessing
    the impact of participation in peace operations in this report.

    On another matter, however, GAO believes that because of the Army's
    significantly reduced size, the staffing of support forces at 10 to
    20 percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed.
    Consequently, GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense
    direct the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis
    2003, to reexamine whether high priority support units that would
    deploy early in a crisis should still be manned at less than 100
    percent of their authorized strength.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

    DOD's comments on a draft of this report appear in appendix I.  DOD
    generally agrees that peace operations have stressed certain military
    capabilities but disagrees with GAO's conclusion that participation
    in peace operations could delay the timely response of U.S.  forces
    to MRCs.  Regarding GAO's recommendation, DOD states that a review of
    Army support requirements is underway as part of Total Army Analysis
    2003.

    DOD agrees that there are only a small number of certain active
    support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace
    operations and MRCs.  However, it believes that GAO's resultant
    conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S.  forces would
    respond to a MRC.  GAO's conclusions in this regard focus on certain
    critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically
    certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft.  GAO
    reached its conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities
    have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and its planned
    use in future conflicts.  GAO agrees that most combat forces would be
    readily available to respond to a MRC.

    DOD specifically disagrees with GAO's discussion of specialized
    aircraft.  DOD's comments on specialized aircraft and GAO's
    evaluation are discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

    INTRODUCTION
    ============================================================ Chapter 1

    With the end of the Cold War, the number, scope, and size of
    operations other than war have increased dramatically, and the United
    States has become an active participant in some of these operations.
    Senior administration officials have testified that multilateral
    peace operations are an important part of this administration's
    national security strategy,\1 albeit not the centerpiece of U.S.
    foreign policy.  These officials have stated that the United States
    must be willing to act to preserve peace and stability in order to
    advance and protect U.S.  interests in the world.  This in turn
    demands that the United States encourage the successful conduct of
    multilateral peace operations and, when it is in the United States'
    interests, participate in these operations.

    --------------------
    \1 For the purpose of this report, "peace operations" includes
    everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
    military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement
    operations.  In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to
    participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has
    done for many years.

       DEMAND HAS INCREASED FOR U.S.
       MILITARY RESPONSE TO PEACE
       OPERATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

    U.S.  military forces have been participating in peace operations for
    almost 50 years, with limited numbers of personnel.  However, as the
    number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased
    dramatically in the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S.
    participation have changed markedly.  Recently, the United States has
    used much larger numbers of combat and support forces to respond to
    events in a number of locations, including Somalia, Macedonia,
    Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq.  (See table 1.1) For example, while
    the United States has approximately 1,100 military personnel
    committed to the Multinational Force and Observers for the 12-year
    operation on the Sinai Peninsula,\2 starting in December 1992 it
    deployed approximately 26,000 to Somalia and approximately 20,000 to
    Haiti beginning in September 1994.

    While U.S.  participation in peace operations has increased, the size
    of the armed forces has declined over the past 8 years.  From a
    post-Vietnam War peak of 2.2 million in fiscal year 1987, the active
    armed forces have been reduced to an authorized level of 1.5 million
    in fiscal year 1995.

                              Table 1.1

                 U.S. Participation in Selected Peace
                              Operations

                                                       Approxima
                                                              te
                                                         maximum
                Time        Country or                 number of
    Operation   period      region      Mission           forces
    ----------  ----------  ----------  -------------  ---------
    Multinatio  1982 -      Sinai       Sinai buffer       1,100
    nal Force   present                 force between
    and                                 Egypt and
    Observers                           Israel

    Provide     1991 -      Northern    Provide safe       1,500
    Comfort     present     Iraq        havens for
                                        population of
                                        northern Iraq

    Provide     1992 -      Somalia     Provide           26,000
    Relief/     1994                    security and
    Restore                             support for
    Hope/                               relief
    Continue                            efforts
    Hope

    Provide     1992 -      Bosnia      Provide            1,000
    Promise     present                 humanitarian
                                        assistance

    Deny        1992 -      Bosnia      Support U.N.       2,000
    Flight      present                 no fly zone
                                        over Bosnia-
                                        Herzegovina

    Southern    1992-       Southern    Monitor           14,000
    Watch       present     Iraq        repression of
                                        southern Iraq
                                        population

    Sharp       1993 -      Adriatic    Prevent arms      11,700
    Guard       present     Sea         from entering
                                        the former
                                        Yugoslavia

    Uphold      1994 -      Haiti       Secure            20,000
    Democracy   present                 conditions
                                        for the
                                        return of
                                        democracy
    ------------------------------------------------------------

    --------------------
    \2 The Multinational Force and Observers is a buffer force of 11
    nations, deployed to supervise a demilitarized zone in the Sinai.
    The force's mission is to ensure that Israel and Egypt abide by the
    provisions of the Peace Treaty pertaining to the Sinai.

       PEACE OPERATIONS REQUIRE
       EXTENDED FORCE COMMITMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

    Peace operations tend to be sustained rather than short-term
    operations and sometimes have required extended force commitments
    from the U.S.  military services.  U.S.  military forces continue to
    maintain a 12-year commitment to the Multinational Force and
    Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, a 3-year commitment to Operation
    Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and were committed to Operation
    Restore Hope in Somalia for almost 2 years.  Numerous units provide
    forces during these operations and are rotated to ensure a ready
    presence.  During Operation Restore Hope, the Army rotated forces to
    and from Somalia approximately every 4 months.  The Air Force tends
    to rotate its aircrew more frequently.  In peace operations such as
    Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch, it
    rotated forces every 3 months.  In addition to the forces deployed,
    additional forces are preparing to deploy or have recently
    redeployed.

       FORCE DRAWDOWN HAS INCREASED
       CHALLENGE OF RESPONDING TO
       PEACE OPERATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

    The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S.
    military in responding to extended peace operations.  All four
    services have experienced reductions in personnel and equipment that
    have forced military planners to reevaluate how the services will
    respond to peace operations and major regional conflicts (MRC).  For
    example, with the reduction in the number of overseas bases and
    forward-deployed forces in Europe, the Army and the Air Force have
    returned part of their Cold War-era European force structure to the
    United States and decommissioned some units.  The forces that
    remained in the force structure, which once could have responded to
    peace operations from forward locations, now may have to be augmented
    by forces from the United States.

       OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
       METHODOLOGY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

    The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee
    on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services,
    asked us to review the suitability of the current U.S.  force
    structure for peace operations.  They wanted to know whether the U.S.
    military had the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a
    peace operations environment, while maintaining the capability to
    respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs.  We did not assess whether
    the United States should participate in peace operations.  We
    examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S.  military
    forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the
    military's ability to respond to other national security requirements
    while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing
    force flexibility and response capability.

    To determine the impact of peace operations on U.S.  military forces,
    we held discussions with personnel who participated in recent peace
    operations.  We also reviewed after-action reports and situation
    reports and conferred with service, unified command, and Office of
    the Secretary of Defense officials to identify the units involved,
    their level of participation, the types of capabilities provided, and
    the problems encountered in providing these capabilities.  In
    addition, we reviewed the before- and after-deployment personnel and
    equipment readiness reports of some participating units and
    interviewed (1) officials responsible for the readiness of these
    forces and (2) some of the forces that participated in these
    operations.

    To determine the effect on the Army of participating in peace
    operations, we reviewed the experiences of combat and support forces
    who participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and in a number
    of other smaller operations such as the Multinational Force and
    Observers in the Sinai.  However, we focused our efforts primarily on
    Operation Restore Hope, the largest Army peace operation deployment
    to date.  We also reviewed the plans for employment of Army forces in
    Bosnia should a peace plan be implemented.  The operations in Rwanda
    and Haiti took place after we completed the bulk of our work, so we
    were not able to fully address them.

    As a means of determining the effects of peace operations on the Air
    Force, we selected four of the specialized U.S.-based platforms
    identified by the Air Force as most affected by participation in
    peace operations, reviewed data concerning their participation, and
    interviewed aircrew and maintenance personnel involved in the
    missions.  Similarly, we analyzed data and met with military
    personnel concerning heavily tasked Air Force units based in Europe.
    We concentrated our efforts on peace operations involving relatively
    large numbers of Air Force units, such as Operations Provide Comfort
    in Northern Iraq, Southern Watch in Southern Iraq, and Provide
    Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia.

    For the Navy, we compared pre-Desert Storm Sixth Fleet aircraft
    carrier deployments in the Mediterranean area with current Sixth
    Fleet deployments where the U.S.  Navy is supporting Operations Deny
    Flight and Sharp Guard.  We also briefly reviewed Navy participation
    in Haiti and Cuban operations in the Caribbean.  We focused on the
    Marine Corps' participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
    since it was the largest Marine Corps participation to date in a
    peace operation.

    To determine whether there are force structure limitations that may
    affect the military's ability to respond to other national security
    requirements while engaged in peace operations, we held discussions
    with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and unified command and
    service officials, including officials associated with MRC planning.
    Using the national security requirements in the bottom-up review as
    our criteria, we obtained data describing the capabilities necessary
    to respond to a MRC within the initial days of conflict.  We then
    compared this with the capabilities that had recently been used in
    peace operations and the total number of the same capabilities
    available in the active force.  We also discussed the actions that
    would be necessary to disengage from a peace operation in order to
    deploy to a MRC with officials from each of the military services.

    To identify options for increasing force flexibility and response
    capability for peace operations, we reviewed pertinent documents and
    interviewed senior service, unified command, and other Department of
    Defense (DOD) officials to obtain information concerning proposed
    initiatives and options.

    During the course of this review, we did not examine the adequacy of
    the funding for DOD's participation in peace operations or the impact
    of participation on DOD's planned spending.  We are examining these
    issues as part of a separate request of the Subcommittee on Military
    Readiness, House Committee on National Security, and will report the
    results separately.

    Our review was conducted primarily at Army, Navy, Air Force, and
    Marine locations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
    component and unified command headquarters within the United States
    and Europe.  We contacted by telephone any relevant organizations we
    did not visit, such as the 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis,
    Virginia; the Military Police Center and School at Fort McClellan,
    Alabama; the 57th Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the 27th
    Operations Group at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; the 552nd
    Operations Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and the 7th Air
    Command and Control Squadron at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

    Our review was performed from August 1993 to July 1994 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We obtained
    DOD comments on a draft of this report.

    RECENT PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE
    STRESSED KEY MILITARY CAPABILITIES
    ============================================================ Chapter 2

    Peace operations have affected each of the military services
    differently.  These operations heavily stress some U.S.  military
    capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as
    quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force
    aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army
    armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat
    aircraft outside Europe.

    In the Army, a large percentage of certain support capabilities in
    the active component have been used for peace operations.  Most of
    these support capabilities are in the reserves and, for the most
    part, the reserves have not been activated for use in peace
    operations.  The adverse impact on these support forces has been
    further exacerbated because the Army frequently borrows people from
    one unit to supplement another that lacks sufficient personnel to
    deploy and assigns some personnel to the same operation more than
    once, or to consecutive operations, because of the high demand for
    their capability.

    In the Air Force, peace operations have placed considerable stress on
    the relatively limited number of forces providing specialized
    capabilities and on forward-deployed units in the European theater.
    The increased flying hours necessary to support these operations have
    resulted in extended temporary duty in excess of established goals,
    increased aircraft maintenance, cannibalization of home station
    aircraft, and missed training.

    Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the
    Marine Corps.  However, forward-deployed naval forces have
    experienced increased operating tempo and, in some cases, reduced
    time to prepare for deployments, both of which have limited the
    forces' availability for training.  Naval officials point out,
    however, that in many cases, peace operations have exposed the naval
    services to unique experiences in joint and coalition operations.

       CERTAIN ARMY SUPPORT FORCES IN
       THE ACTIVE COMPONENT BEAR HEAVY
       BURDEN
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

    Certain kinds of Army combat support and combat service support
    capabilities, including quartermaster and transportation companies,
    are critical in peace operations.  The need to establish and provide
    continued infrastructure support for U.S.  military forces, coalition
    forces, and the local population is the key reason support forces are
    needed in peace operations.  The type and amount of support differs
    with each operation, depending on the mission and the nature of the
    operating environment.  Peace operations often occur in austere
    locations where there is limited electric power, roads, water, port
    facilities, and air fields.  As such, support forces have played an
    important role in establishing and sustaining a working
    infrastructure, not only for U.S.  forces but also for coalition
    forces and the local population.  In Somalia, for example, the Army
    encountered an environment completely devoid of any useful
    infrastructure and had to refurbish or build even the most basic of
    facilities.  If nation building is part of the military mission,
    support forces are additionally burdened with tasks such as building
    schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishing police and
    other civil administration services.

    Operational and environmental challenges further tax support forces.
    In Somalia, for example, the area of responsibility for U.S.  and
    coalition forces consisted of approximately 21,000 square miles in
    the southern half of the country, with U.S.  military and coalition
    forces dispersed over considerable distances throughout the country.
    As shown in figure 2.1, Mogadishu is more than 200 miles from Kismayo
    (a key Army location) and about 200 miles from the Marine base in
    Bardera, which in turn is about 200 miles from Kismayo.  Support
    forces had to frequently move between these locations to deliver
    food, water, fuel, and other supplies.  To the extent possible,
    decentralized support operations were established at various
    locations throughout the country to reduce the time spent moving
    between locations.  In some cases, however, this posed even greater
    stress on support forces because they had to divide already limited
    support assets.  For example, the 10th Mountain Division's 710th Main
    Support Battalion divided some of its water teams so that they could
    provide water purification capabilities at additional locations.

       Figure 2.1:  Area of
       Responsibility for U.S.  and
       Coalition Forces in Somalia

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  10th Mountain Division After Action Report:  U.S.  Army
    Forces, Somalia.

    Combat forces also have played a significant role in peace
    operations.  However, because more of these forces are in the active
    component, a larger number of them have been available for peace
    operations.  Armored combat divisions have had limited involvement.

          ARMY USES A LARGE PERCENTAGE
          OF SOME SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
          TO MEET PEACE OPERATIONS
          REQUIREMENTS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

    The Army's capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceeds
    that of any other military service or nation.  Yet, most of these
    support capabilities are in the reserves and, except for volunteers,
    the Army has been authorized to draw on reserves for peace operations
    only once--in September 1994 for the operation in Haiti.  Without a
    presidential decision to call up reserve forces, the Army has had to
    draw upon the smaller number of active forces and reserve volunteers
    to meet support requirements.  In some cases, nearly all the active
    units for a particular support capability deployed to a peace
    operation.  For example, 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies
    in the active force structure deployed to Somalia.  Similarly, 67
    percent of the medium petroleum truck companies and 100 percent of
    the air terminal movement control teams deployed to Somalia.  Table
    2.1 provides a list of selected Army capabilities within
    quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and miscellaneous support
    units that experienced heavy deployments to Somalia.

                              Table 2.1

                   Selected Army Support Units That
               Experienced Heavy Deployments to Somalia

                                  of
                                acti               Percentage of
                                  ve      Number    active units
                                unit    deployed     deployed to
    Type of unit                   s  to Somalia         Somalia
    --------------------------  ====  ----------  --------------
    General supply company\a       4         5\b             100
    Air terminal movement          1           1             100
     control detachment\c
    Petroleum supply company       4           3              75
    Medium truck company           3           2              67
     (petroleum)\d
    Cargo transfer company         3           2              67
    Light-medium truck company    10           6              60
    Fire-fighting truck            7           4              57
     detachment
    Water purification ROWPU\e     4           2              50
     detachment
    Perishable Subsistence         2           1              50
     Team\f
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a A company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

    \b The additional unit comprised volunteer reserves.

    \c Detachments are not limited to a certain number; according to Army
    officials, they range from 2 to 60 personnel.

    \d While there are other medium truck companies for transporting
    petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities.

    \e ROWPU--Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit.  This particular
    detachment is capable of producing drinkable water from any water
    source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce
    drinkable water from fresh water sources.

    \f This team deployed about 65 people.

    Source:  Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army.

          ARMY'S CROSS-LEVELING AND
          MULTIPLE ROTATION PRACTICES
          TAX THE ALREADY OVEREXTENDED
          SUPPORT FORCES
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2

    To prioritize scarce resources, many of the Army's active support
    units are assigned fewer people in peacetime than are required to
    perform their wartime missions.  If the Army's early-deploying
    support units were needed for war, the Army would supplement the
    units with people and equipment from other active and reserve units.
    After the Army restructured its forces in the mid-1980s, we reported
    that its goal was to authorize combat units, which are the chief
    means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime
    requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of 90
    percent of their wartime requirements.\1 In discussions with XVIIIth
    Airborne Corps officials, the most ready and resourced of all the
    Army corps, we were advised that units deploying to Somalia needed
    100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment in order
    to meet operational requirements.  Most units did not have the
    people, and many did not have the equipment to satisfy this
    requirement.  For example, almost half of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps'
    First Corps Support Command units were authorized 90 percent or less
    of their authorized people, and several support units were authorized
    80 percent or less of their authorized people.  Other corps support
    commands, such as the Third Corps', which provided initial corps
    support for operations in Somalia, are resourced at an even lower
    level than the XVIIIth Airborne Corps.

    The Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units deploying to
    Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force
    structure.  This practice is known as "cross-leveling."
    Cross-leveling has occurred at both the division and corps level.
    For instance, the 210th Forward Support Battalion, an element of the
    10th Mountain Division, took people and equipment from the Division's
    46th Forward Support Battalion and the 710th Main Support Battalion
    before deploying to Somalia.  The 710th Main Support Battalion also
    supported the 46th Forward Support Battalion's deployment, thereby
    creating a domino effect within the 10th Mountain Division.
    According to the 710th commander, the battalion deployed with fewer
    than all its people and equipment.  Thus, the remaining people were
    burdened to make do with less.

    People from some units rotated more than once to the same peace
    operation or deployed to consecutive peace operations and/or
    participated in domestic relief operations because of the high demand
    for their particular capability.  For example, almost all of the
    people from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps' 364th Direct Support Supply
    Company that deployed to Hurricane Andrew also deployed to Somalia
    within the next year.  Other units within the XVIIIth Airborne Corps
    had similar experiences.  According to Army officials, support
    personnel from other Army units rotated more than once to Somalia.
    The 10th Mountain Division, which responded to the Hurricane Andrew
    relief operation and to Operation Provide Hope in Somalia, also
    deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in September 1994 to
    provide the predominant Army force in support of this peace
    operation.  According to Army officials, approximately 40 percent of
    the participants in the Haiti operation also participated in the
    Somalia operation less than 1 year ago.

    Cross-leveling and frequent deployments in turn affect the ability of
    a unit's non-deployed elements to meet their operational
    responsibilities.  A combat support group headquarters has
    considerable responsibility, particularly as part of the XVIIIth
    Airborne Corps.  When the approximately 150 of 180 military personnel
    from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps's 507th Combat Support Group
    Headquarters deployed to Somalia for several months, they left
    approximately 30 headquarters personnel at Fort Bragg, along with the
    group's three battalions, without any additional augmentation.  The
    headquarters was still responsible for (1) supporting the group's
    three battalions, (2) supporting the Multinational Force and
    Observers rotation, (3) conducting logistics operations missions on
    the installation, and (4) preparing quarterly training briefs to
    XVIIIth Airborne Corps.  In addition, several of the remaining
    personnel had to participate in two emergency deployment and
    redeployment exercises and conduct testing and a major briefing for
    the Army Chief of Staff.  In order to cope with the absence of so
    many headquarter personnel, many operational requirements were
    decentralized to the battalion level.  In some cases, remaining
    headquarter personnel (1) took on responsibilities typically assigned
    to more senior personnel, and (2) doubled and tripled workloads
    throughout the deployment period.

    --------------------
    \1 Army Force Structure:  Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New
    Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec.
    15, 1992).

          RESERVE FORCES CONTAIN KEY
          SUPPORT CAPABILITIES, BUT
          THEY HAVE NOT OFTEN BEEN
          ACTIVATED FOR PEACE
          OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3

    Until recently, the President has elected not to activate reserve
    personnel for use in peace operations.  Therefore, only reserve
    volunteers have participated in most peace operations.  This policy
    has posed particular difficulties because, as shown in table 2.2,
    many of the support capabilities most heavily relied upon in recent
    operations reside predominantly in the reserves.

                              Table 2.2

               Percentage of Selected Support Forces in
               the Reserve Component (as of April 1994)

                                                   Percentage of
                                                        units in
                                                         reserve
    Support capability                                 component
    --------------------------------------------  --------------
    Quartermaster                                             76
    Engineer                                                  69
    Transportation                                            63
    Psychological operations                                  75
    Civil affairs                                             97
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    The Army relied on many reserve volunteers in the Somalia operation.
    While Army volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are
    not always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and
    training required for the peace operation.  Furthermore, individual
    volunteers do not meet the Army's requirement for units, in which a
    group of individuals are trained and organized to perform a mission
    as a cohesive entity.  For example, when Army planners needed a
    postal unit for operations in Somalia, they created a unit from
    available volunteers.  This process proved to be time-consuming,
    taking 1 month to create a 49-person postal unit.

    The recent initiative for using reserve volunteers for the
    peacekeeping operations in the Sinai has been time-consuming due to
    planning and procedural processes associated with activating
    approximately 420 reserve personnel.  The reserve volunteers will be
    ready to deploy to the Sinai by January 1995 after completing 3 to 6
    months of training.  More senior personnel will train longer.  While
    there has been no shortage of volunteers for the current deployment,
    Army officials are concerned that they will not be able to recruit
    enough volunteers to continue this on an annual basis.  Therefore,
    the Army is considering the use of volunteers for every third
    rotation.

          FUTURE OPERATIONS COULD
          FURTHER BURDEN SUPPORT
          CAPABILITIES IN THE ACTIVE
          COMPONENT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.4

    The Army's experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that
    could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy forces to
    Bosnia or to other peace operations throughout the world.  The Army
    will likely send at least a division-size force to Bosnia if a peace
    plan is signed.  This could have almost three times the impact on the
    Army as the Somalia operation, which generally required one-third the
    number of forces designated for Bosnia.

    Military police units, in particular, have been kept extremely busy
    as a result of peace operations.  In September 1994, 40 percent of
    the military police combat support companies stationed in the United
    States were deployed to Guantanamo Bay supporting the Cuban and
    Haitian refugee operation.  Three other companies were deployed to
    Suriname, Honduras, and Panama, leaving just 13 companies to patrol
    nine installations in the United States.  According to an Army
    official, this is a problem because many installations require more
    than one military police combat support company for patrol duties.
    Because the increase in military police deployments, mostly due to
    the refugee crisis, has exceeded the number available in the Army's
    force structure, Army infantry units have been used to help meet
    military police deployment requirements.  For example, upon
    completion of their rotation to Guantanamo Bay, military police
    companies will return home while rifle companies rotate to Cuba.
    According to an Army official, while rifle companies will undergo 2
    weeks of training to perform the military police function, the
    training will not provide them with the full breadth of skills that
    military police possess.

    The Army will continue to face challenges in responding to sizable
    peace operations if reserve forces are not activated.  The need for
    reserve activation depends on a variety of factors, such as the size
    of a peace operation and the number of such operations ongoing at one
    time.  For example, Army officials stated that if the United States
    participates in enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an Army
    deployment of approximately 22,000 soldiers, access to the reserve
    component could be required for the second 6-month rotation because
    the large support requirement exceeds the number of active forces
    available in certain support capabilities.\2 According to Army
    officials, reserve forces would also likely be required if a number
    of smaller size peace operations were ongoing at one time.

    On September 15, 1994, the President authorized the Secretary of
    Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to call to active duty
    about 1,900 Selected Reserve military personnel in the Army, Navy,
    Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to support operational
    missions in Haiti.  The call-up included reservists in specialties
    such as tactical airlift, aerial port operations, military police,
    medical support, and civil affairs.  These specialties are those that
    maintain most of their capabilities in the reserve component.  In
    regard to this activation, the Secretary of Defense stated that DOD
    ".  .  .  cannot conduct operations involving significant numbers of
    personnel and amounts of equipment being moved without using the
    Reserves."

    --------------------
    \2 Civilian contractors could provide support in specific
    capabilities, such as petroleum and medium truck companies.  Their
    introduction, however, requires a stabilized operating environment,
    and this may not be the case in Bosnia.  Furthermore, using civilian
    contractors to provide this support is costly.

       PEACE OPERATIONS STRESS CERTAIN
       AIR FORCE UNITS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

    Since Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force has responded to
    numerous, and often simultaneous, peace operations throughout the
    world on a sustained basis.  While these operations have provided
    valuable experience in joint and coalition operations, they also have
    taxed the Air Force's specialized capabilities and the units that are
    forward deployed in the European theater, where most recent
    operations involving the Air Force have occurred.  The Air Force's
    participation in these operations has resulted in extended tours of
    duty, missed training, increased maintenance on aircraft, and
    cannibalization of aircraft.  There are some reports that the
    stresses on personnel are affecting morale and families.  The Air
    Force has used reserve force volunteers to relieve part of the
    operational burden on these forces.

          INCREASING NUMBER OF PEACE
          OPERATIONS STRESS
          SPECIALIZED FORCES IN THE
          ACTIVE COMPONENT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1

    The Air Force's specialized support aircraft provide reconnaissance,
    surveillance, command and control, and other capabilities that are
    often not available from other services or nations.  This report
    focuses on four of these specialized aircraft, all of which (except
    two E-3B/C aircraft) are based in the United States--the EC-130E
    Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), for command,
    control, and communications, and on-scene tactical battle management;
    the EF-111 Raven, for suppression of enemy air defenses; the E-3
    Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), for surveillance and
    command and control; and the F-4G Wild Weasel, for suppression and/or
    destruction of enemy radars.

    The Air Force has relatively few of these specialty aircraft in the
    active component,\3 and they are being used in an increasing number
    of peace operations, most of which require a sustained presence.  For
    example, as shown in table 2.3, in June 1994 more than 40 percent of
    available E-3 AWACS, EC-130E ABCCC, and active component F-4G
    aircraft were being used in peace operations.

                              Table 2.3

                  Percentage of Selected Specialized
               Aircraft Used in Peace Operations (June
                                1994)

                                          Number         Percent
                                     deployed to     deployed to
                          Number           peace           peace
    Aircraft         available\a      operations      operations
    ------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
    EC-130E                    7               3              43
     (ABCCC)
    EF-111                    25               7              28
    E-3                     17\b               7              41
     (AWACS)
    F-4G                      19              14              74
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a This column indicates the average number of aircraft available for
    mission-ready training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994.
    Excluded are test aircraft and aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or
    intermediate phase maintenance.

    \b Four additional aircraft were not available for peace operations
    during this period because they were assigned to the initial
    qualification training squadron.

    --------------------
    \3 The EC-130E ABCCC, EF-111, and E-3 AWACS are found only in the
    active component.  Only the F-4G aircraft are in both the active and
    reserve components.

             INCREASE IN FLYING HOURS
             HAS STRESSED AIRCRAFT AND
             HOME STATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.1.1

    Participation in multiple peace operations by a limited number of
    specialized U.S.-based assets has resulted in increased flying hours
    for those aircraft involved.  This has led to additional wear on the
    aircraft and more frequent intermediate and phase maintenance.  For
    example, aircraft in the only F-4G squadron in the active component,
    the 561st fighter squadron, are undergoing major phase maintenance
    every 4 to 6 months versus every 7 to 8 months 1 year ago.
    Similarly, EF-111 maintenance officials noted that maintenance teams
    now must work longer to achieve desired results over a shorter time
    span than normally required.

    In order to support increased peace operation flying hour
    requirements and maintain the operational effectiveness of forward-
    deployed forces, the home station has had to share key operational
    and support personnel with the deployed portion of the squadron.  At
    times, the home station has gone without certain equipment and
    supplies to ensure that deployed forces can operate effectively.  For
    example, the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron, the only EC-130E
    ABCCC squadron in the force structure, had to cannibalize home
    station aircraft and use their parts to support the squadron's
    forward-deployed aircraft when parts were not available from other
    sources.

             AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL ARE
             EXCEEDING RECOMMENDED
             TIME ON DUTY
    ------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.1.2

    Due to the extended nature of these operations, participating forces
    periodically rotate their aircrews, maintenance personnel, and
    aircraft in order to maintain a continuous ready presence in theater
    and reduce stress on aircraft and personnel.  The Air Combat Command
    has established 120 days as the recommended maximum number of
    temporary duty days that Air Combat Command personnel should accrue
    in a year.  However, because of the increasing number of peace
    operations, personnel associated with specialty aircraft have spent
    an increased number of days on temporary duty, away from their home
    bases.  In 1994, personnel for the EF-111 and the F-4G approached the
    Air Combat Command's recommended maximum number of temporary duty
    days in a year--120.  According to one of their senior commanders,
    the F-4G's deployment schedule for 1994 indicates that many
    individuals will be on temporary duty for about 180 days.  According
    to squadron officials, the increased number of temporary duty days
    has affected the morale of Air Force personnel participating in peace
    operations and their families.  Some Air Force personnel believe that
    this increase in temporary duty days is contributing to increased
    instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force, although
    no direct link has yet been formally documented.

             AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL MISS
             TRAINING NECESSARY TO
             PREPARE FOR HIGH-THREAT
             COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
    ------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.1.3

    Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not
    get the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary
    for maintaining combat efficiency.  For example, while deployed in
    support of Operation Provide Comfort, F-4G aircrews conducted lethal
    suppression of enemy defenses but were unable to remain proficient in
    formation take-off and landing events, night intercept operations,
    and advanced aircraft handling characteristics.  In addition,
    according to squadron officials, aircrews maintained weapons
    qualifications at minimum proficiency while participating in peace
    operations.  Without this training, aircrews do not meet the
    technical requirements needed to qualify for participation in a
    high-threat, combat environment.

    On a selected basis, wing commanders can waive certain training
    requirements for aircrew participating in operations that prevent
    them from completing all required training.  According to senior Air
    Force officials, the number of waivers granted recently has far
    exceeded those granted prior to Air Force involvement in these
    sustained operations.  During the January through June 1994 training
    cycle, 30 of the 71 aircrew personnel of the only F-4G squadron in
    the active component required a waiver for at least one Graduated
    Combat Capability event.\4 Similarly, 29 of the 61 aircrew in the
    only EF-111 squadron required one or more waivers for events to which
    they could not train.  Squadron officials attribute most, if not all,
    of these waivers to extensive participation in peace operations.  The
    Operations Group Commander, to whom the EF-111 squadron reports,
    considers the events waived to be critical mission areas.  According
    to the commander, if a large number of aircrew personnel are not
    flying the required number of sorties required by the Air Combat
    Command, overall squadron and wing combat capability will suffer.

    While there were no waivers received by E-3 AWACS aircrews for the
    training cycle ending June 30, 1994, squadron officials said that
    they still have training concerns.  The AWACS Operations Group
    Commander noted that the quality of the training conducted from home
    station and/or at exercises is significantly greater than that logged
    on deployed sorties.  However, in general, approximately 50 percent
    of the aircrews' training requirements were accomplished on deployed
    sorties.  While the training was completed, the commander believes
    that the aircrews did not receive the quality training they needed.
    As a means of ensuring quality training in the future, an Air Combat
    Command task force is reviewing Graduated Combat Capability training
    regulations.  In addition, according to Air Force officials, the
    number of deployed E-3 AWACS aircraft will be reduced so that there
    will be more available at the home station for training.  The
    reduction will be felt in the drug interdiction program.

    --------------------
    \4 General Graduated Combat Capability events are training events
    necessary to prepare mission-ready pilots for combat and all possible
    missions in their respective aircraft.  This training is broken into
    three increments known as Graduated Combat Capability levels A, B,
    and C.  The levels are defined by the number of sorties, specific
    weapons qualifications, and other sorties and events as determined by
    the major command.

          EUROPEAN-BASED AIR FORCE
          ASSETS CARRY HEAVY BURDEN IN
          SUPPORTING PEACE OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2

    Since 1991, the end of Operation Desert Storm, three peace operations
    requiring substantial and sustained Air Force participation have
    occurred in the European theater of operations--Operations Provide
    Comfort, Provide Promise, and Deny Flight.  These operations,
    combined with reductions in the U.S.  Air Forces in Europe's (USAFE)
    force structure--from 8.8 to 2.3 fighter wing equivalents\5 --and
    corresponding squadron relocations, have resulted in many of the same
    conditions experienced by specialized U.S.-based assets participating
    in these operations, such as increased flying hours, high temporary
    duty rates, and missed training opportunities.

    In addition, because recent peace operations have occurred in parts
    of the European theater where the Air Force has not maintained a
    permanent presence, a significant number of USAFE personnel have been
    required to build and maintain infrastructure from which to base
    forces.  Weapons training deployment facilities in Aviano, Italy, and
    Incirlik, Turkey, had to be expanded greatly in order to accommodate
    the large numbers of military personnel supporting Operation Deny
    Flight and Operation Provide Comfort.  The Air Force constructed tent
    cities in these two locations to provide additional housing and other
    services for deployed personnel.

    With the reduction of forward-deployed squadrons in the European
    theater, considerable portions of some USAFE capabilities have been
    dedicated to peace operations.  For example, USAFE has two F-15E
    squadrons designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night
    in a high-threat environment.  For more than a year, about 14
    aircraft from both squadrons, which have a combined total of about 48
    aircraft, have been participating in Operations Provide Comfort and
    Deny Flight.  The F-15E's night navigational and targeting system and
    high resolution radar have been valuable in identifying ground
    targets during these operations.  Similarly, USAFE has one A-10
    squadron, which provides close air support and forward air control.
    Twelve of its 21 aircraft have been participating in Operation Deny
    Flight for more than a year.  According to Air Force officials,
    although all the squadrons' aircraft were not involved in the
    operation at any one time, peace operations affect entire squadrons
    because they are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole
    unit rather than in smaller packages.

    Recent peace operations in the European theater have also placed a
    heavy demand on USAFE's C-130 Hercules, which provides intra-theater
    airlift capabilities.  The Air Force has only one active C-130
    squadron in the European force structure, and almost the entire
    squadron--17 of 19 aircraft--has been participating in peace
    operations in the European theater.  Operation Provide Promise's
    missions into Bosnia have required the heaviest use of C-130 assets.
    The squadron's capabilities were supplemented by reserve aircraft
    from the United States; nevertheless, the squadron had to curtail
    training in certain skill areas in order to fly scheduled airlift
    missions between bases to deliver supplies and participate in
    Operation Provide Promise.

    USAFE, which had primary responsibility for responding to these
    operations since they have occurred within its area of
    responsibility, met operational requirements with its own forces as
    much as possible.  This is traditional Air Force practice.  Where
    USAFE did not have the necessary assets (such as the E-3 AWACS) or
    had shortfalls (such as in C-130s), it sought augmentation from
    outside Europe.  To the extent other USAFE assets could have been
    augmented with active-duty units from the United States, such as in
    the case of the F-15E aircraft, some of the adverse impact of
    participation in these peace operations might have been mitigated.
    In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force
    has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying
    more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental
    United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and
    Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden.

    --------------------
    \5 A fighter wing equivalent generally comprises 72 combat aircraft.

             SPLIT OPERATIONS CREATE
             LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL
             CHALLENGES FOR SQUADRONS
             SUPPORTING PEACE
             OPERATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.1

    Deploying to peace operations from bases in Europe or the United
    States has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air
    Force because essential unit equipment and personnel have to be
    shared by the forces at the home base and in the deployed location.
    These split operations have had a significant impact on home bases,
    which sometimes have had to make due with a reduced number of
    maintenance and operational personnel and essential unit equipment to
    ensure that the deployed forces maintain a high state of readiness.
    Even if a squadron deploys less than half of its aircraft, the effect
    on the home base is still significant because key operations and
    maintenance personnel and equipment must deploy to support the
    aircraft.  According to Air Force officials, split operations
    challenges exist because Air Force squadrons are still structured to
    fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller
    packages as they are doing for peace operations.  According to
    squadron personnel, split operations impede squadron-wide
    communication processes and long-term squadron planning, and tax
    senior squadron leaders who often have to perform the jobs of their
    absent colleagues in addition to their own.  According to one
    squadron commander, it is difficult to plan the future vision for the
    squadron because the squadron's senior leaders are geographically
    separated.

    Split operations create other personnel challenges as well.
    Operations and maintenance personnel rotate between the home station
    and the peace operation.  For example, according to USAFE officials,
    aircrews from USAFE's A-10 squadron deploy to Operation Deny Flight
    for an average of 6 to 9 weeks and remain at the home station for
    varying periods of 2, 5, or 7 weeks.  Maintenance personnel remain
    deployed for 90 days.  While at home station, personnel must train
    and attend to squadron administrative responsibilities.  According to
    the squadron commander, this allows personnel minimal time for leave
    and attending to family responsibilities before rotating again to the
    peace operation.

             AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS OFTEN
             HAVE TO FOREGO NECESSARY
             TRAINING BECAUSE OF PEACE
             OPERATION DEMANDS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.2

    Many USAFE squadrons participating in peace operations on a sustained
    basis have found it difficult to attend major training exercises at
    the same time they are participating in a peace operation.  According
    to squadron and wing officials we talked with, the squadrons do not
    have enough people or equipment to support the peace operation, home
    station requirements, and the training exercise concurrently.
    Because of their participation in peace operations, both of USAFE's
    F-15E squadrons have had to reduce their level of involvement or
    cancel their participation altogether in training exercises.  For
    example, the squadrons were not able to participate in major tactical
    air combat exercises, such as Maple Flag, a Canadian exercise similar
    to Red Flag, which would have provided them with realistic combat
    training.  This type of training is particularly important for these
    F-15E squadrons since they were established in 1993 and have not had
    the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air combat
    exercise.

    While USAFE squadrons have not deployed all their forces to peace
    operations, the forces remaining at the home station often find it
    difficult to maintain enough aircraft to conduct home station
    training.  For example, beginning with its initial deployment in July
    1993, USAFE's only A-10 squadron provided 12 of its 21 aircraft on
    hand to support Operation Deny Flight.  Of the remaining nine, two
    were undergoing phase maintenance inspections at the home station;
    one was undergoing depot repair; and one was used for spare parts in
    support of forward-deployed aircraft.  Thus, only five of the
    remaining aircraft were available for pilot training sorties at the
    home station.  Because of the limited number of available aircraft,
    the remaining aircrews were only able to fly the minimum number of
    hours needed to maintain mission-ready status.  On the occasions when
    an additional aircraft had to be dedicated to Operation Deny Flight,
    the squadron did not have enough aircraft available to meet training
    needs.  According to squadron officials, this was also true for USAFE
    F-15E, F-15C, F-16, and C-130 aircrews.

    The Commander of USAFE's A-10 squadron identified four training
    events that could not be accomplished at Operation Deny Flight
    because of various restrictions in the operating theater.  These
    events also were difficult to accomplish at home station because of
    environmental and other restrictions on low-level flight (below 500
    feet), target marking, full scale-weapons delivery, and certain types
    of approaches.  Had the squadron not been participating continuously
    in Operation Deny Flight, it would have had the opportunity to deploy
    elsewhere for this training.

    As is the case with certain U.S.-based squadrons, aircrews from
    Europe-based squadrons participating in peace operations have also
    had to obtain waivers for training requirements they were not able to
    satisfy during the last training cycle.  According to the squadron
    and wing officials we interviewed at home stations and deployed
    locations, pilot proficiency in a low-threat environment is at an
    all-time high due to the nature of the missions over Bosnia and
    Northern Iraq.  However, proficiency in high-threat, low-altitude
    mission profiles has suffered and will continue to suffer as long as
    training opportunities and peace operation mission taskings remain at
    their present levels.  As shown in table 2.4, for example, all of the
    aircrews in USAFE's two F-15E squadrons obtained waivers for one or
    more training events they were not able to accomplish during the
    6-month training cycle ending June 30, 1994.  Aircrews received
    waivers in areas such as Night Weapons Delivery, Air Combat
    Maneuvers, Air Combat Tactics, and Basic Fighter Maneuvers.

                              Table 2.4

                Number of Training Waivers Granted to
                USAFE Personnel Participating in Peace
                     Operations (as of June 1994)

                                                      Percentage
                                     Number of 51-   of air crew
                                 series regulation     receiving
    USAFE platform               waivers granted\a       waivers
    ---------------------------  -----------------  ------------
    F-15E                                      737           100
    A-10                                        55            55
    F-15C                                       38            66
    C-130                                        0             0
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a These 51-series regulations are Multi-Command Regulations for
    major training and include training unique to each airframe.  Events
    within these regulations are waived at the major command level, such
    as the Air Combat Command.

    As mentioned earlier, USAFE's only C-130 squadron had to curtail
    training in order to meet its peace operation and normal operational
    requirements.  However, after March 1994, its operational
    requirements for Operation Provide Promise declined significantly.
    As a result, C-130 aircrew did not require training waivers for the
    training cycle ending June 30, 1994.  At the height of Operation
    Provide Promise, squadron aircrew required training waivers for two
    consecutive periods ending June 30 and December 31, 1993.  For these
    training cycles, 42 and 52 percent of squadron cockpit crew required
    102 and 127 training waivers, respectively.  Squadron aircrew
    received training waivers in critical areas such as night vision
    profiles and assault approaches.

    In September 1994, the newly appointed USAFE Commander acknowledged
    that USAFE units were having difficulty accomplishing their training
    tasks because they are supporting peace operations.  He noted that
    operations such as Deny Flight and Provide Comfort are competing for
    combat training time and causing combat skills to atrophy.  According
    to the Commander, fighter pilots need to practice intercepts, bomb
    dropping, and air-to-air combat, yet they do not typically get this
    experience during the course of a peace operation.  He stressed that
    USAFE can no longer continue to accept degraded levels of training.
    As noted earlier in this chapter, the Air Force is now relying more
    on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United
    States to relieve some of the operational burden.

          RESERVES PROVIDE OPERATIONAL
          RELIEF TO CERTAIN FORCES IN
          THE ACTIVE COMPONENT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3

    Air Force reserve volunteer participation in peace operations has
    more than doubled since fiscal year 1991.  Reserve forces have
    participated in such major operations as Restore Hope, Provide
    Comfort, Provide Hope, and Southern Watch, as well as other smaller
    international peace operations and domestic disaster relief
    operations.  In some cases, reserves have been needed to meet mission
    requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill.  For example,
    since there is only one F-4G squadron in the active component and it
    is participating in Operation Provide Comfort and Southern Watch,
    reserve F-4Gs have had to provide augmentation to Operation Southern
    Watch.  In particular, the 190th Air National Guard Fighter Squadron
    deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Southern Watch in
    December 1993, within a year of returning from another Southern Watch
    deployment.  According to squadron officials, the 190th Fighter
    Squadron was deployed 12 out of 18 months during this time period.

    In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief
    to active forces.  For example, from November 15, 1993, to January
    15, 1994, and again during the summer of 1994, reserve A-10 personnel
    and aircraft from the United States relieved USAFE's A-10 squadron so
    that its personnel could attend scheduled training at Nellis Air
    Force Base.  Operational relief for other USAFE aircraft was provided
    by F-16, KC-135, C-141, and C-5 reserve aircraft from the United
    States.  In addition to providing this operational relief, reserve
    forces still have had to meet most of their individual and unit
    training; attend exercises; and satisfy other operational
    responsibilities for local, state, and federal agencies, such as
    providing assistance in weather reconnaissance, disaster relief,
    aeromedical evacuations, and counternarcotics.

    The majority of C-130s are in the reserves.  Given Operation Provide
    Promise's extensive C-130 requirements and USAFE's relatively small
    number of C-130s, reserve aircraft and personnel were looked to for
    meeting mission requirements.  Initially, reserve aircraft and
    personnel augmented USAFE's only C-130 squadron.  However, in January
    1994, because an increasing number of U.S.-based aircraft and
    personnel were needed, the Air Force formed another squadron, known
    as the Delta squadron.  This squadron consisted of reserve and active
    C-130 aircraft and personnel that operated out of Germany.  Aircrew
    and maintenance personnel rotated every 2 to 3 weeks.  The reserve
    deployments allowed the active component C-130 squadron in Europe to
    reduce its flying hours and subsequently increase its mission capable
    rates.  As of May 1994, volunteer Air Force reservists flew
    approximately 62 percent of the airlift sorties in support of
    Operation Provide Promise.  However, while reservists generally are
    willing to participate in these operations, Air Force Reserve and
    National Guard officials noted that this level of reserve
    participation in peace operations is affecting the willingness of
    reserves to volunteer for exercises.  As of May 1994, however, the
    need for reservists to support Provide Promise dropped as operational
    demands diminished.

       NAVAL FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN AS
       TAXED BY PEACE OPERATIONS AS
       OTHER SERVICES, BUT OPERATIONAL
       STRESS IS INCREASING
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

    Certain Navy and Marine Corps units have experienced increased
    operating tempo and reduced time to prepare for deployments due to
    their participation in peace operations.  The ability to obtain
    necessary training while participating in these operations is also
    becoming an increasing concern.  However, peace operations have
    provided the naval services with unique experiences in joint and
    coalition operations that in many cases may be more valuable than
    training exercises.

          NAVAL SERVICES EXPERIENCE
          HIGH OPERATING TEMPO IN
          PROVIDING FORCES FOR PEACE
          OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1

    The Navy and Marine Corps in peacetime are inherently crisis- and
    contingency-oriented forces and have conducted peace operations in
    littoral areas since their creation.  Navy and Marine Corps force
    structure is designed so that the naval services can maintain a
    forward presence and rapidly respond to crises, as well as the
    war-fighting requirements of MRCs.  The peacetime role of
    forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces
    covers the spectrum of military involvement--from single-ship port
    visits, maritime interdiction and blockades, humanitarian relief
    missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S.  nationals, to major
    amphibious operations.

    According to naval officials, in attempting to meet both the
    requirements of peace operations and normal peacetime presence
    commitments, naval forces have exceeded established operating tempo
    standards for forward-deployed forces in the Central Command,
    European Command, and Pacific Command areas of operation.  The
    officials indicated that this was due in part to participation in
    peace operations involving Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia and in part to
    the reduction in force structure and forward-deployed forces
    available to respond to the same or greater number of operational
    commitments.  While the Navy and Marine Corps have tried not to
    extend deployments beyond 6 months, the operating tempo has increased
    during deployments.  This is reflected, for example, by an increased
    number of steaming days incurred by Navy aircraft carriers operating
    in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas in 1993 versus 1989 (the year
    before Operation Desert Shield).

          PARTICIPATION IN PEACE
          OPERATIONS AFFECTS TRAINING
          OF NAVAL FORCES
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2

    Sustained commitments to particular peace operations, such as
    Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe and Operation
    Southern Watch in Southwest Asia, require a sustained presence of
    surface ships and an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea and Arabian
    Gulf.  This often reduces U.S.  naval participation in certain
    exercises and training.  For example, in written responses to our
    questions the Navy stated that several exercises have been canceled
    in the European and Central Commands' areas of operation, severely
    limiting training in anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations,
    and command and control.  These capabilities would be needed in a
    major regional conflict.  Table 2.5 compares Sixth Fleet aircraft
    carrier deployments in 1989 and 1993 and shows a decrease in the
    number of days devoted to training exercises and an increase in the
    number of days devoted to all other operations.\6

                              Table 2.5

                 Comparison of Calendar Year 1989 and
                  1993 Sixth Fleet Aircraft Carrier
                     Operations and Exercise Days

                                        for  exer
                                  operation  cise
    Year            in theater            s     s     in port
    -------------  -------------  ---------  ----  -------------
    1989                490             218   124       148
    1993                368             299     5       64
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a Days steaming comprises days in operations and days in exercises.

    Postponed or canceled training has not always had a negative effect
    on naval forces, however.  Naval officials stress that peace
    operations provide unique opportunities for realistic joint and
    coalition experience and in many cases may be better than exercises.
    For example, naval forces may receive better training by
    participating in a multilateral peace operation involving maritime
    and air interdiction, such as Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight
    in Europe, than by participating in a scheduled exercise with one or
    two other nations.  Similarly, Marine support forces in Somalia
    obtained valuable experience building infrastructure and providing
    other logistical support to U.S.  and coalition forces.

    If naval forces are pulled out of training required before a major
    deployment, they have to compress their training period and then work
    longer hours to catch up when they return to port.  Some of the ships
    that have participated in the Haiti operation were taken out of
    single-ship basic training, such as damage control drills.  The Navy
    considers interrupting this training less damaging to overall mission
    effectiveness than taking ships out of intermediate or advanced
    training that requires operating with more than one unit.  Much of
    the basic training can be done at sea, even while a ship is
    participating in an operation.  As more ships were dedicated to
    support Cuban migrant interdiction, however, training opportunities
    decreased because more of a ship's crew was involved in migrant
    sighting, recovery, screening, care, and feeding.  When the ships
    return to port, therefore, they have to perform in-port maintenance,
    training, and many administrative and operational inspections
    simultaneously to remain on schedule for their next major 6-month
    deployment.  This has resulted in crewmen working longer hours and
    has left less time for them to spend with their families prior to a
    major deployment.

    Naval officials also told us that peace operations are resulting in
    reduced intermediate training, such as that at instrumented ranges
    for missile and gun shoots.  U.S.  European Command officials noted
    that naval aviators participating in these operations are
    experiencing many of the same challenges as the Air Force in terms of
    training and operational tempo.

    Participation in sustained peace operations and a reduction in
    forward-deployed forces has also contributed to reduced U.S.  naval
    presence in certain geographic areas where U.S.  forces had been able
    to visit on past deployments.  Among the results has been a reduced
    level of participation in bilateral exercises and training with
    countries that may not be participating in peace operations and fewer
    port visits and military-to-military exchanges.  Quantifying the
    effects of this reduction in presence is difficult since the
    political and diplomatic factors at issue are somewhat intangible.
    Naval officials have noted, however, that some nations dedicate
    considerable resources preparing for the opportunity to participate
    in an exercise with the U.S.  Navy.  When exercises are canceled,
    countries do not get the experience operating with technologically
    superior U.S.  systems and therefore may not be capable of doing so
    in the future should the need arise.

    Table 2.5 also shows the decrease in the number of days aircraft
    carriers spent in port during Sixth Fleet Mediterranean deployments
    in 1989 and 1993.  The reduced number of days in port has affected
    the Navy's ability to conduct intermediate maintenance on its ships
    and equipment.  According to U.S.  Navy officials in Europe, there
    has been a 20-percent reduction in the Navy's ability to conduct
    intermediate maintenance in this theater, which requires time in
    port.  They are concerned that continued delays in conducting
    intermediate maintenance may degrade equipment readiness and service
    life, particularly since peace operations tend to expose equipment to
    more wear and tear than would be expected during normal peacetime
    operations.

    According to the Navy, its participation in peace operations has not,
    thus far, had a harmful impact on its ability to perform other more
    traditional missions.  Thus, naval units have been able to meet a
    variety of demands by moving within or across command
    boundaries--such as between the European and Central Commands--in
    response to emerging crises.  The Navy has generally been able to
    maintain its policy mandating that deployments not exceed 6 months
    and that the period between deployments be twice as long as the last
    deployment.  The Navy had to break this policy in some cases,
    however, so that ships could be made available to support Somalia
    operations.  While in 1993 there were 5 of these cases, through
    September 1994 the Navy had 15 cases in which it had to break this
    policy.  According to the Navy, the 1994 cases were due chiefly to
    operational requirements regarding Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and
    counter-drug missions.  The Marine Corps faces similar challenges.
    For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23,
    1994, from a 6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of
    Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S.
    operations off the coast of Haiti.

    According to service officials, the Navy and Marine Corps have not
    found it necessary to rely upon volunteer reserve forces in peace
    operations to the same degree as the Army and Air Force.  Naval
    forces are structured for daily peacetime forward presence operations
    that require a complete range of combat forces and capabilities be
    readily available for immediate response.  As a result, the majority
    of these forces and capabilities are in the active component.  The
    function of the Navy and Marine Corps reserve is to augment the
    active component forces.  Nevertheless, there are certain
    capabilities that reside exclusively, or nearly so, in the Naval
    Reserve and are essential to many peace operations.  These
    capabilities include units and individuals involved in cargo
    handling, Navy air logistics, medical fleet hospitals, and mobil
    construction battalions.  Recent Navy support to peace operations has
    included the Naval Reserve in search and rescue and maritime patrol
    support for Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, as well as
    construction support for operations in Somalia.  According to naval
    officials, reliance on these limited, yet important, combat support
    and combat service support capabilities may increase as the Navy's
    commitment to future peace operations continues to expand.

    --------------------
    \6 The U.S.  Sixth Fleet's area of operation includes the
    Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black seas.

          SHORT DURATION OF MARINE
          CORPS PARTICIPATION IN
          SOMALIA OPERATION HAD
          LIMITED IMPACT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3

    Marine Corps forces, chiefly from the First Marine Expeditionary
    Force, supported operations in Somalia from December 1992 through
    early May 1993.  Later, other Marine forces provided offshore
    support.  While Marine Corps forces have participated in a variety of
    peace operations, their participation in Operation Restore Hope in
    Somalia represented their largest peace operation commitment.  Early
    in the operation, the Marine Corps provided the predominant number of
    forces, including initial entry and sustainment forces.  At its peak
    in January 1993, there were over 11,000 U.S.  Marine forces in
    Somalia.  However, by February 1993, the U.S.  Army gradually assumed
    the majority of the support responsibilities for U.S.  and coalition
    forces, and the Marine Corps began to redeploy.

    The deployment of Marine forces to Somalia resulted in certain
    support units' devoting a significant percentage of their capability
    to the operation, leaving minimal support available at the home base
    for use in other operations.  For example, approximately 95 percent
    of the 1st Marine Division's Combat Engineer Battalion and half of
    the Division's Headquarters Battalion deployed to Somalia.  The
    absence of the Headquarters Battalion required a secondary planning
    staff, the 11th Marines, to handle division operations until the main
    battalion returned.  While the 11th Marines, which functions normally
    as an artillery unit, could have handled a contingency similar in
    size and scope to the riots in Los Angeles or the Northridge
    Earthquake, it did not have the capacity to orchestrate a response to
    a MRC, according to Marine officials.  Had another conflict occurred
    while these forces were in Somalia, the Marines would have to have
    looked to one of the other two Marine Expeditionary Forces to
    respond.  However, since the Marine Corps' major ground participation
    was limited to several months and other forces were available for
    crisis response elsewhere, the operation had a limited impact.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

    DOD generally agrees that recent peace operations have stressed key
    military capabilities and states that it is already examining various
    means to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations
    and operations other than war.  DOD further states that high
    temporary duty rates and heavy use of specialized aircraft are force
    management issues that have been addressed by better use of worldwide
    assets, heavier involvement of the reserves, and the purchase of
    additional and replacement aircraft.  We describe DOD efforts to
    address the stress peace operations have placed on key military
    capabilities at several points in the report and modified the report
    based on DOD's comments and further discussion with DOD officials.

    DOD disagrees with our characterization of the demand peace
    operations have placed on specialized Air Force aircraft.  It
    believes that we have painted an inaccurate and misleading picture
    about the degree to which such Air Force capabilities are devoted to
    peace operations.  Our report clearly states that the aircraft we
    cite (see table 2.3) were the average number of aircraft available
    for mission ready training or deployment to a contingency in June
    1994 and that the number excluded test aircraft and/or aircraft
    undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance.  We
    recognize that the Air Force has more aircraft in its inventory than
    those available at any one time.  However, we believe that in
    evaluating how peace operations affect military capabilities the
    appropriate focus is the number of aircraft available for use at any
    one time.

    PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS
    MAY DELAY SERVICES' RESPONSE TO
    MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS
    ============================================================ Chapter 3

    As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD concluded that military
    forces needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of
    forces identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs.  Some of
    the Army and Air Force forces used in recent peace operations,
    including certain Army support units such as port and terminal
    services units and petroleum handling units that exist in small
    numbers in the active Army and specialized Air Force aircraft, such
    as the E-3 AWACS, are also needed in the early stages of a MRC.
    Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and redeploying them
    to the MRC quickly may be difficult.  Also difficult would be
    obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy the forces, retraining
    forces to restore their war-fighting skills, and reconstituting
    equipment.  These difficulties are significant because in the event
    of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy and enter
    battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion and minimize U.S.
    casualties.

       BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ENVISIONS
       PEACE OPERATIONS AS SECONDARY
       MISSION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

    In 1993, the Secretary of Defense conducted the bottom-up review, a
    reassessment of U.S.  defense requirements.  This review, completed
    in October 1993, examined the nation's defense strategy, force
    structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources
    needed for the post-Cold War era.  The Secretary's report on the
    bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing the U.S.  interests,
    chief among them being regional aggression.  To deal with regional
    aggression and other regional dangers, DOD's strategy is to (1)
    defeat aggressors in MRCs; (2) maintain overseas presence to deter
    conflicts and provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller
    scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian
    assistance, and disaster relief.  To deal with the threat of regional
    aggression, DOD concluded that it is prudent for the United States to
    maintain sufficient military power to fight and win two MRCs that
    occur nearly simultaneously.  According to the report on the
    bottom-up review, while deterring and defeating major regional
    aggression will be the most demanding requirement of the new defense
    strategy, U.S.  military forces are more likely to be involved in
    operations short of declared or intense warfare.  The forces
    responding to these other operations will be provided largely by the
    same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs and
    overseas presence.

    DOD's report on the bottom-up review states that if a MRC occurs, DOD
    will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the
    United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence
    missions.  Unless needed for the conflict, other forces that are
    engaged in smaller scale operations like peacekeeping will remain so
    engaged.  If a second conflict breaks out, the bottom-up review
    envisioned that DOD would need to deploy another block of forces,
    requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any
    forces still engaged in smaller scale operations, and most of the
    remaining U.S.-based forces.  In determining force requirements for
    the two-conflict strategy, DOD assumed that forces already engaged in
    peace operations could rapidly redeploy to a regional conflict.

          CONGRESS DIRECTS REVIEW OF
          BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

    In the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress expressed
    concern about the bottom-up review and the defense budget.  Regarding
    peace operations, Congress found that U.S.  forces are involved in a
    number of peace operations, there was a possibility of even larger
    future involvement, and many of the forces participating in peace
    operations would be required early on in the event of one or more
    MRCs.  Consequently, Congress directed that DOD review the
    assumptions and conclusions of the President's budget, the bottom-up
    review, and the Future Years Defense Program.  The review is to
    consider the various other-than-war or nontraditional operations in
    which U.S.  forces are or may be participating and directs among
    other things that the report describe in detail the force structure
    required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously in light of
    other ongoing or potential operations.  Congress also stated that the
    President should be willing to increase defense spending if needed to
    meet new or existing threats.

       KEY FORCE CAPABILITIES RELIED
       ON FOR BOTH PEACE OPERATIONS
       AND MRCS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

    We found that certain Army support forces as well as specialized Air
    Force aircraft and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and stocks
    that would be needed early in a first MRC have been engaged in peace
    operations.

          ARMY SUPPORT FORCES
          DESIGNATED FOR EARLY USE IN
          A MRC ARE USED IN PEACE
          OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

    The Army identified 5-1/3 active combat divisions and associated
    support forces that are needed in the early stages of a MRC.  An
    additional 3-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support
    forces--follow-on forces--would either be deployed later in a MRC or
    could provide part of the response for a second MRC.

    The support units that accompany active combat forces are organized
    into seven packages.  The first three packages, called Contingency
    Force Pool (CFP) 1-3, support the first 5-1/3 divisions.  While the
    fourth package, CFP 4, does not support the first 5-1/3 divisions
    directly, it rounds out the theater support that would be required
    for these early deploying forces.  The follow-on 3-1/3 divisions are
    supported principally by CFP 5-7.

    Army planners try to avoid using forces designated for early
    deployment to a MRC for contingencies such as peace operations.
    Although planners have been able to minimize the use of these forces
    in peace operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of
    the Army's CFP 1-3 support forces in large-scale and/or multiple
    peace operations because there is a limited number of such forces in
    the active component.

    In the Somalia operation, 50 percent of the active support forces
    used were from CFP 1-3 units.  Specifically, 92 percent of
    quartermaster forces, 69 percent of engineering support forces, 64
    percent of miscellaneous support forces, and 65 percent of
    transportation forces deployed to Somalia were CFP 1-3 units.  As
    shown in table 3.1, certain support capabilities within those areas
    had an even higher percentage of CFP 1-3 units.

                              Table 3.1

               Selected Active Support Units Within CFP
                     1-3 That Deployed to Somalia

                                                      Percentage
                                                       of active
                                        Active CFP       CFP 1-3
                                         1-3 units    capability
                                       deployed to   deployed to
    Type of unit      CFP 1-3 units        Somalia       Somalia
    ---------------  ---------------  ------------  ------------
    General supply          3                    3           100
     company\a
    Air terminal            1                    1           100
     movement
     control
     detachment\b
    Medium truck            2                    2           100
     company
     (petroleum)\c
    Cargo transfer          1                    1           100
     company
    Water                   1                    1           100
     purification
     ROWPU\d
     detachment
    Perishable              1                    1           100
     subsistence
     team\e
    Petroleum               4                    3            75
     supply company
    Light-medium            3                    2            67
     truck company
    Fire fighting           4                    2            50
     truck
     detachment
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a A company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

    \b A detachment is not limited to a certain number; according to Army
    officials, it ranges from 2 to 60 personnel.

    \c While there are other medium truck companies for transporting
    petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities.

    \d ROWPU--Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit.  This particular
    detachment is capable of producing drinkable water from any water
    source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce
    drinkable water from fresh water sources.

    \e This team deployed about 65 people.

    Source:  Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army.

    Similarly, should a peace plan be signed and U.S.  military forces
    deploy to Bosnia to support the implementation of this plan, the Army
    likely would need to draw on support forces, including CFP units, to
    meet support requirements.  For example, approximately 64 percent of
    the total number of forces planned to deploy are support forces, and
    approximately 14 percent of those forces will likely come from CFP
    1-3 units.

          AIR FORCE WILL NEED
          SPECIALIZED AIRCRAFT FOR
          MRCS THAT ARE ALSO USED IN
          PEACE OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

    The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized and
    unique capability aircraft, such as the EF-111, F-4Gs, E-3 AWACS,
    EC-130 ABCCC, and F-15E in the early days of a MRC.  The Air Force's
    experience in Operation Desert Storm documents the early demand for
    these aircraft.  For example, approximately 63 percent of the F-4G
    aircraft were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm at the
    beginning of the hostilities.  According to the bottom-up review,
    some of these aircraft are so important to a MRC's success and are of
    such limited number in the active force structure that they are
    tasked to both MRCs, even in the case of nearly simultaneous MRCs.
    Recent peace operations have required varying numbers of the Air
    Force's specialized and unique capability aircraft on a fairly
    continuous basis.  For June 1994, we calculated that approximately 46
    percent of these aircraft were involved in Operations Provide
    Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch.

    According to DOD officials, participation in the enforcement of no
    fly zones and other operations that require the forward deployment of
    U.S.  forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S.  military to
    respond quickly to regional contingencies.  These officials said that
    this was the case in Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994,
    where having U.S.  aircraft already operating from Saudi Arabia
    greatly facilitated the initial coalition response to Iraq's
    threatened aggression against Kuwait.

          NAVAL SERVICES USE
          FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES FOR
          PEACE OPERATIONS AND MRCS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3

    U.S.  naval forces are structured to respond to regional
    contingencies with their forward-deployed carrier battle groups and
    amphibious-ready groups, which rotate on a regular basis between home
    ports and regional theaters.  The Navy and the Marine Corps respond
    to many types of operations, from MRCs to peace operations, with the
    same forward-deployed forces.  Generally, this has not been a problem
    because of the flexibility and rotational nature of naval forces.
    However, to respond to recent peace operations in the Caribbean Sea,
    the Navy has had to use its non-deployed forces, which were training
    and conducting maintenance in preparation for their upcoming
    scheduled 6-month deployments.

          ARMY AND MARINE CORPS USE
          PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AND
          STOCKS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4

    The Marine Corps and the Army have prepositioned equipment and stocks
    afloat for use in the event of a MRC.  The Marine Corps has relied on
    prepositioned equipment and supplies stored on their Maritime
    Prepositioned Ships for a quick contingency response capability.
    Equipment and supplies that the Marines used in Somalia came from 4
    of the 13 Maritime Prepositioned Ships that are organized into three
    squadrons positioned throughout the world.  Each squadron is designed
    to provide enough ground combat and combat support equipment and
    supplies to sustain about 17,300 Marines for 30 days.  The equipment
    and supplies aboard these ships are also needed to support other
    conflicts in which U.S.  Marine forces are involved.  To the extent
    these ships have been off-loaded to support a peace operation, their
    equipment and supplies are unavailable to respond to a MRC.

    Similarly, the Army has prepositioned equipment afloat to facilitate
    the rapid deployment of a heavy Army brigade.  Ships from the Army's
    Prepositioning Afloat Program, which contains 12 ships with combat
    and support equipment and supplies, were recently positioned for use
    in supporting the Rwanda humanitarian operation.  Five of these
    ships, containing support equipment and supplies, were positioned off
    the coast of Africa to support this operation if necessary.  The need
    to unload these ships' equipment and supplies never arose.  In early
    October 1994, all 12 of these ships were sent to Southwest Asia to
    support U.S.  forces responding to Iraqi troop movements.  Had the
    five ships positioned off the African Coast been unloaded to support
    the Rwanda operation, their supplies and equipment likely would not
    have been available for use in Southwest Asia.

       DISENGAGEMENT FROM PEACE
       OPERATIONS AND REDEPLOYMENT TO
       MRCS WOULD BE DIFFICULT
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

    U.S.  military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they
    needed to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace
    operations to a MRC.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
    and Requirements stated in June 1994 that the United States would
    "liquidate" its commitments to peace operations in the event of two
    simultaneous regional conflicts.  Discussions with service officials
    and review of data concerning the types and number of forces
    committed to peace operations indicate that disengagement from one or
    more sizable peace operations and redeployment of forces to a MRC on
    short notice could be difficult.

    Obtaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges
    encountered in redeploying forces from one or more peace operations
    to a MRC.  In order to redeploy ground personnel and equipment from
    the peace operations, the already limited number of airlift assets
    flying from the United States to the MRC would have to divert to the
    peace operation, in some cases pick up personnel and equipment, and
    take them to the MRC.  The Air Force has not yet fully studied the
    implication of such a redeployment and hence could not quantify the
    impact of this delay on the Air Force's ability to meet MRC
    deployment requirements.  Air Force officials did say that it would
    make a difficult situation even worse.  According to Air Force
    officials, the Air Force's tactical forces would also encounter an
    airlift problem in moving from a peace operation to a MRC.  While
    aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation to another,
    the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft
    flying--supplies, equipment, and personnel--would have to wait for
    available airlift.

    Another challenge that would be encountered is that certain Army
    contingency support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea
    movement control personnel, and petroleum handlers) needed in the
    early days of a MRC, would still be needed within the peace operation
    theater to facilitate the disengagement and redeployment.  As a
    result of our analysis comparing the support capabilities needed in
    the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency support capabilities
    deployed to Somalia, we found that in some cases 100 percent of some
    of these active component support forces were used in the Somalia
    peace operation.  Had a MRC arisen during this time, immediate access
    to reserve component forces would have been necessary.  According to
    DOD officials, the Army has recognized this as a challenge and is
    currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis
    2003, which it expects to complete in mid-1995.\1

    According to Navy officials, the response of Navy ships to a MRC
    would depend more on their overall distance to the crisis location
    than on the operations they were currently conducting.  With some
    peace operations, however, Navy ships may not be directed to
    disengage quickly and move to a MRC.  A senior Navy official noted,
    for example, that it took approximately 7 months to resolve a crisis
    in Liberia in 1990-91 and until that time the amphibious ready group
    was not directed to participate in Operation Desert Shield/Desert
    Storm.

    Each service faces challenges with reconstituting its forces in terms
    of training, equipment, and supplies in order to deploy directly to a
    MRC.  Army officials have expressed some concern that participating
    in peace operations may degrade combat unit readiness for combat
    operations because of the inability to practice certain individual
    and collective wartime skills.  In Somalia, for example, while the
    combat forces received extensive experience in military operations
    conducted in an urban environment, they were not able to practice
    collective training skills.  According to 10th Mountain Division
    officials, in some cases it took approximately 3 to 6 months to bring
    these skills back to a level acceptable for combat operations once
    they returned from Somalia.  Army officials also noted that while
    peace operations offered the opportunity to practice and enhance
    logistic skills, logistics training provided in Somalia did not
    substitute completely for the training that would result from a
    prepared training exercise, such as those at the National Training
    Center.  In the latter, the support forces would work with combat
    forces as they would in high-intensity combat operations.  Marine
    Corps ground forces had similar experiences in Somalia.

    According to Air Force officials, peace operations tend to degrade
    the overall combat readiness of Air Force flight crews that
    participate in these operations on a sustained basis because they
    often restrict night and low-level flight operations and do not
    provide experience in other combat skills such as night intercept
    maneuvers.  Similarly, naval aviators find that they lose proficiency
    in some combat skills, such as air combat maneuvering, through
    prolonged participation in peace operations.  As with the Air Force,
    naval aviators who participate in these operations on a sustained
    basis are not as able to get to combat ranges where they can practice
    their full breadth of combat capabilities.

    The reconstitution of equipment used in peace operations may also
    hinder a timely disengagement and redeployment to a MRC.  The
    extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the harsh
    environmental effects encountered in certain peace operations, has
    required extensive maintenance before the equipment can be used
    again.  For example, upon their return from Somalia, the 10th
    Mountain Division's AH-60 helicopters had to enter depot level
    maintenance as a result of the harsh desert environment and the
    extensive use of these helicopters in Somalia.

    --------------------
    \1 This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the
    simulation of combat to generate nondivisional support requirements,
    based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

    DOD disagrees with our conclusion that participation in peace
    operations could impede the timely response of U.S.  forces to MRCs.
    It agrees that there are only a small number of certain active
    support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace
    operations and MRCs.  However, it believes that our resultant
    conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S.  forces would
    respond to a MRC.  Our conclusions in this regard focus on certain
    critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically
    certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft.  We
    reached our conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities
    have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and their
    planned use in future conflicts.  We agree that most combat forces
    would be readily available to respond to a MRC.

    In its comments DOD states that, on the basis of the recent response
    of U.S.  forces to the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait
    while U.S.  forces were engaged in Haiti, it does not see any
    evidence that significant support unit shortfalls exist.  It further
    states that the participation of certain Air Force aircraft in peace
    operations in that part of the world facilitated the response to
    Iraqi movements.  Since these events occurred after we had completed
    our audit work, we were not in a position to analyze them.

    CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
    ============================================================ Chapter 4

    Participation in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations could
    impede the ability of U.S.  forces to rapidly respond to MRCs because
    of several factors.  First, certain critical support forces needed in
    the early days of a major regional conflict would also be needed to
    facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation.  Second, airlift
    assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel and equipment
    from the peace operation.  Finally, some of the forces would need
    training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major
    operation.

    Forces with capabilities that exist in limited numbers in the active
    Army and would be needed in the early stages of a MRC have been used
    repeatedly in peace operations.  Similar-type units that are not
    engaged in peace operations may not be able to respond quickly or
    effectively to MRCs because they are assigned fewer people than
    authorized and they may have loaned some people to the units engaged
    in the peace operations, which exacerbates an already difficult
    situation.

    Specialized aircraft that exist in limited numbers in the active
    force structure and their crews are also being used more frequently
    in peace operations.  The Air Force anticipates needing almost all
    its specialized aircraft in the early days of a MRC.

    Some forces in each service are missing training and exercises that
    affect their overall combat readiness and their ability to redeploy
    directly to a MRC.  Numerous waivers have been issued for aircrews
    that have not been able to complete required training due to the
    demands of peace operations.  Naval forces involved in peace
    operations are spending almost all their time at sea conducting
    operations and so have been unable to participate in some exercises
    and training.

    Peace operations are also likely to have a long-term impact on the
    people who participate in them although it is difficult to quantify
    that impact.  In 1994 personnel for specialized aircraft have
    approached the Air Force's recommended maximum number of temporary
    duty days away from home station in a year--120.  In the case of the
    F-4Gs, squadron personnel are likely to exceed the recommended
    maximum by 50 percent.  There are reports that increased temporary
    duty days for Air Force personnel are affecting their morale and
    their families and that it is contributing to increased instances of
    divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force.  Naval personnel,
    unable to perform as much maintenance, training, and operational
    inspections while at sea, are working longer hours in port and have
    less time for their families prior to a major deployment.

    A June 1994 Defense Science Board Report on Readiness notes that the
    amount of time individuals are away from home has been affected by,
    among other things, the rapid force drawdown and a higher level of
    contingency operations.  This has increased deployment frequency and
    placed new strains on personnel.  The report further notes that
    family separation has always been a major, if not the number one,
    retention variable.

       OPTIONS FOR EASING THE STRAIN
       OF PEACE OPERATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

    There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of
    participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations
    on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly
    respond to MRCs.  These options have their own advantages and
    disadvantages and will require choices on the use of the nation's
    resources.  Although no one option addresses all the problems we have
    identified, a combination of these options could substantially ease
    the problems.  While there are costs associated with some of these
    options, we have not examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund
    them.  DOD is currently examining a range of such options.

          CHANGE THE MIX OF ARMY
          COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1

    One option involves increasing the availability of support forces for
    peace operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces
    on active duty.  At present, the Army has placed many support
    functions in the reserve component.  For example, many units that
    open and operate ports overseas are in the reserve component.  This
    capability was placed in the reserve component during the Cold War,
    and DOD expected that when forces were needed in wartime it would be
    able to quickly access and deploy these reserve forces.  However,
    many of these forces that are in the active component have been
    required in peace operations because the Army has not been authorized
    to involuntarily access reserve units in most peace operations.
    While the Army maintains limited numbers of certain types of support
    capability on active duty, it maintains substantial combat capability
    in the active component.  More support forces could be made available
    for peace operations if the Army maintained fewer combat forces and
    redirected those resources to maintaining more support forces.
    According to Army officials, this is one of the issues that is being
    examined as part of the Total Army Analysis, which should be
    completed by mid-1995.

    Alternatively, DOD may be able to increase the number of combat and
    combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat
    forces by making more use of civilian employees.  We recently
    reported that the services use thousands of military personnel in
    support functions, such as personnel management and data processing,
    that are typically performed by civilian personnel and do not require
    skills gained from military experience.\1 We further reported that
    replacing these military personnel with civilian employees would
    reduce peacetime personnel costs and could release military members
    for use in more combat-specific duties.

    --------------------
    \1 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support
    Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct.  19,
    1994).

          MAKE GREATER USE OF THE
          RESERVES
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2

    Making greater use of the reserves would ease the burden on Army
    active support forces and Air Force airlift and combat forces.
    Authority to call up the reserves rests with the President.  There
    are three provisions of Title 10 of the U.S.  Code that provide
    access to large numbers of reservists, one of which is section
    673b--Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC).  This section
    provides access to 200,000 members in the Selected Reserve for up to
    270 days and would only require the President to notify Congress that
    he was making the call-up.

    DOD policy guidance regarding the use of reserves for peace
    operations requires that maximum consideration be given to the use of
    volunteers before involuntary activation is ordered.  The President
    called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September
    1994 military intervention in Haiti.  Prior to that call-up, PSRC had
    been invoked only once (for the Gulf War) since its 1976 enactment.
    The reserves were not activated for the operations in Grenada in
    1983, Panama in 1989, or Somalia in 1992.  According to senior Army
    officials, a request went from the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    for involuntary access to reserves for Somalia.  The request
    ultimately was never presented to the President.  An April 1994 DOD
    report on accessibility of reserve forces notes that using PSRC
    authority would raise sensitive domestic and foreign policy concerns
    that require time to resolve before the President could be expected
    to decide on when large numbers of reservists should be ordered to
    active duty.

    Prior to the Haiti intervention, DOD had stated in its April 1994
    report on accessibility of reserve forces that the decision to not
    invoke PSRC in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia supported the perception
    that PSRC has evolved into a de facto mobilization authority.

    As DOD's report on the reserves notes, gaining involuntary access to
    reserve personnel for any mission is a sensitive matter.  A reserve
    call-up has the potential to disrupt the lives of reservists, their
    families, and their employers or customers.  According to DOD, the
    assumption of many reservists is that reservists would be called up
    for service only when vital interests of the United States are
    threatened.  This is based on Cold War experiences and certain
    post-Cold War contingencies such as Desert Storm.  U.S.  Army Reserve
    Command officials advised us of their concern that involuntary use of
    the reserves for peace operations would be disruptive to reservists'
    lives and ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to
    join the reserves.

    The Office of Reserve Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, is examining the limits and impediments to volunteerism and
    how to expand their use.  That office has identified several
    impediments, including statutory requirements involving the lack of
    some benefits for reservists on duty for less than 31 days, the lack
    of employer support, and the lack of funds to pay the costs of
    reservists on active duty, which currently is not included in the
    annual defense budget, that must be eliminated if DOD is to rely on
    expanded use of volunteers.  DOD reports that it is addressing a wide
    range of proposals for mitigating these and other impediments.

          MAKE GREATER USE OF
          CONTRACTORS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.3

    DOD could also use contractors to augment support forces.  The Army
    is already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many
    of the support services typically provided by its combat service
    support personnel.  In Somalia, for example, the Army used the
    logistics civil augmentation program, which uses a civilian
    contractor to provide construction services and general logistic
    support.  This reduced the Army support requirement.  The Army has
    also tasked this contractor with developing a worldwide logistics
    civil augmentation plan and a specific plan for a potential future
    deployment to Bosnia.  The Bosnia plan describes the military support
    the contractor personnel can provide and the types of military units
    it can replace.

    Use of the contractor entails additional costs that, in Somalia, were
    paid first from the Marine Corps' and then the Army's operations and
    maintenance budget.  In addition, Army officials said that in
    Somalia, the contractor needed to use Army equipment to perform its
    tasks, which required taking equipment from Army units.

          USE WORLDWIDE MILITARY
          ASSETS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.4

    The use of worldwide military assets could ease the strain on
    military forces.  Peace operations had a number of negative impacts
    on USAFE because USAFE followed its traditional practice of meeting
    operational requirements with its own forces as much as possible.
    While USAFE's two F-15E squadrons and one A-10 squadron were heavily
    engaged in supporting peace operations, there were several
    active-duty F-15E and active-duty A-10 squadrons based in the United
    States that might have been able to ease the strain if they could
    have taken turns rotating aircraft and personnel to those operations.
    In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force
    has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying
    more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental
    United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and
    Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden.

          CHANGE FORWARD PRESENCE
          GOALS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.5

    At present, one of the Navy's principal missions is to maintain
    forward presence around the world.  Forward presence is also a key
    component of national military strategy as described in the report on
    the bottom-up review.  However, the extent of forward presence
    necessary is a matter of judgement for the Navy and the Joint Staff.

    DOD could change the required level of forward presence to relieve
    the strain on naval forces.  This would require a significant
    military and diplomatic policy decision.  It could also result in
    reduced crisis response capability and less opportunity to
    participate in multilateral exercises.

          ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.6

    The alternative to using defense resources differently is to accept
    the status quo and so continue to treat peace operations as a
    secondary mission.  The risk of accepting the status quo is that it
    would continue the strain on the military as a result of its
    participation in peace operations and could adversely affect the
    military's ability to respond to a MRC if one should occur while
    military forces were engaged in a sizable peace operation or several
    smaller ones.

    Whether the risk is acceptable in part depends on the frequency with
    which the United States engages in sizable peace operations and the
    duration of these operations.  Each operation is different in terms
    of size, operating environment, and duration.  For example, the
    operation in Somalia required large numbers of ground forces in an
    austere environment for over a year, while the Rwanda operation
    required smaller numbers of ground and airlift forces for several
    months.  Estimates for a potential Bosnia deployment call for even
    larger numbers of ground forces in an austere environment for about 2
    years.  Other operations, such as enforcement of the no-fly zones
    over Iraq and Bosnia, have required aviation assets for an extended
    period but few ground forces.

    Whether the risk is acceptable also depends on the extent to which
    the services can mitigate the risks.  For example, the services might
    be able to use civilian contractor logistics support, or use some of
    the other options we have identified.  Ultimately, however, if
    policymakers believe that the likelihood of U.S.  involvement in
    large scale, extended duration operations is low, the risk may be
    much more acceptable than if they believe that the likelihood is
    high.

       RECOMMENDATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

    Concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget, Congress
    directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the
    President's budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years
    Defense Program.  DOD is to review peace operations and report in
    detail on the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs
    nearly simultaneously while responding to other ongoing or potential
    operations.  Consequently, we are not making recommendations
    regarding reassessing the impact of participation in peace operations
    in this report.

    We recently reported on the bottom-up review's assumptions concerning
    the broader force structure issues, including the redeployment of
    forces from other operations to MRCs, the availability of strategic
    mobility, and the deployability of reserve combat forces.\2

    On another matter, however, we believe that because of the Army's
    significantly reduced size the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20
    percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed.
    Consequently, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
    Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to
    reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early
    in a crisis should still be staffed at less than 100 percent of their
    authorized strength.

    --------------------
    \2 Bottom-Up Review:  Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
    (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan.  31, 1995).

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

    DOD states that it is addressing the matter we raise in our
    recommendation as part of Total Army Analysis 2003.  If the Army
    fully assesses the issue of staffing high priority support units as
    part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, we believe that the intent of
    our recommendation would be met.

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
    COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
    ============================================================ Chapter 4

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    See comment 1.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  2 and 12-14.

    See comment 2.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  4 and 17-21.

    See comment 3.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  4 and 21-23.

    See comment 4.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  23-24.

    See comment 5.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  4-5 and 24-25.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  5 and 25-29.

    See comment 6.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  5-6 and 29-35.

    Now on pp.  6 and 35-39.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  6-7 and 41-46.

    See comment 7.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    See comment 8.

    See comment 9.

    See comment 10.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    See comment 11.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  6-7 and 46-48.

    See comments 7
    through 11.

    See comment 12.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  7-8 and 51-54.

    See comment 13.

    Now on pp.  54-55.

    See comment 14.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    Now on pp.  8-9 and 55.

    See comment 15.

    The following are GAO's specific comments on the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) letter dated February 7, 1995.

       GAO COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

    1.  We make one recommendation in our report, regarding the need to
    reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early
    in a crisis should be manned at less than 100 percent of their
    authorized strength.  DOD's response to that recommendation appears
    on the last page of its written comments.

    2.  We agree that in recent years there has been a proliferation of
    terms used to describe military operations other than war.  We also
    agree that the United States has participated in disaster relief and
    humanitarian relief operations for many years and have revised our
    report to reflect this fact.  Regarding our revised definition of
    peace operations, we are using the same definition used in the DOD
    Inspector General's September 1994 report entitled Specialized
    Military Training for Peace Operations.  The peace operations
    identified in table 1.1 of our report are included in the Secretary
    of Defense's January 1994 Annual Report to the President and Congress
    except for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, which was authorized
    after the date of the Secretary's report.

    3.  DOD disagrees with our conclusions regarding the extent that
    peace operations may have stressed military capabilities.  DOD
    specifically focuses its comments on our discussion of how peace
    operations have stressed specialized aircraft, noting that there were
    other aircraft in addition to the aircraft we enumerate as available.
    Our report states that the aircraft cited in table 2.3 were the
    average number of aircraft available for mission ready training or
    deployment to a contingency in June 1994 and that the number excluded
    test aircraft and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or
    intermediate phase maintenance.  The aircraft we list were the ones
    available for immediate use.  We have revised our report to state
    that forward deployment of U.S.  forces, including aircraft, can
    enhance the ability to respond to regional conflicts.

    4.  Our discussion focuses on support forces that participated in
    peace and domestic relief operations, not installation support.  We
    have revised our report to clarify the impact of cross-leveling and
    frequent deployments on the ability of a unit's non-deployed elements
    to meet their operational responsibilities.

    5.  We have clarified our discussion of the Army's use of reserve
    volunteers.

    6.  As discussed in comment 2, the Secretary of Defense's Annual
    Report characterizes the operations identified by DOD in this comment
    as U.S.  forces acting in support of U.N.  peace operations.  We have
    revised our report to exclude the E-3 AWACS aircraft used in the drug
    interdiction program from our count of such aircraft used in peace
    operations.  While we agree that participating in peace operations
    provides aircrews valuable practical experience, as we discuss in
    chapter 2, aircrews flying extended hours in these operations
    sometimes do not get the opportunity to train to the broad range of
    skills necessary for maintaining combat efficiency.

    7.  DOD does not believe that the use of significant percentages of
    types of support units in Somalia represents the existence of a
    shortfall in capabilities.  DOD states that substitute units or
    capabilities are available in almost all cases and that recent
    contingency operations, specifically the initial deployment of U.S.
    forces to deter potential Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S.
    forces were involved in Haiti, verify the correctness of U.S.  force
    posture.  Our report discusses the use of a large proportion of
    certain types of support forces in Somalia that are designated for
    early deployment to a MRC because there is a limited number of such
    forces in the active component.  As DOD points out, there are options
    available for some support missions, such as the use of contractors.
    However, these options may not be immediately available.  We discuss
    several alternatives that would allow DOD to meet the demands of
    peace operations while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond
    to MRCs.  Until DOD takes steps to ease the strain on active duty
    forces it will have to initially rely on active duty units to rapidly
    respond to a MRC.

    8.  Our discussion focuses on the early availability of certain Army
    support forces, Air Force specialized aircraft, and Army and Marine
    Corps afloat prepositioned equipment.  We agree that infantry units
    engaged in peace operations are likely to have adequate time to
    redeploy to a MRC.

    9.  The changes in end strength have decreased the Army's flexibility
    to provide more support units in areas of need.  The 13,000 person
    decrement represents a net decrease in end strength for the active
    component and the U.S.  Army Reserve--those components that provide
    most of the Army's support units--and an increase in the Army
    National Guard's end strength.  Within its increased end strength,
    the National Guard is retaining more combat positions than it
    retained under the base force.  Because of the decreases in end
    strength in the active and U.S.  Army reserve components and the fact
    that the increased National Guard end strength is being used to
    retain combat positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing
    more support units within its end strength.

    10.  We state that aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one
    operation to another and have revised the report to state that
    forward deployment of U.S.  forces, including aircraft, can enhance
    the ability to respond to regional conflicts.  Regarding redeploying
    maintenance and logistics units from a peace operation to a MRC, we
    state that the Air Force has not yet fully studied the airlift
    implications of redeploying forces from a peace operation to a MRC
    and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay on the Air
    Force's ability to meet MRC deployment requirements.  We agree that
    redeploying forces from one operation to another may not necessarily
    increase lift requirements.  However, until DOD examines the lift
    requirements for such redeployments, we believe that the specific
    impact is unknown.

    11.  We have revised the report to reflect this information.

    12.  As discussed in chapter 3, our analysis comparing the support
    capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the
    contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia indicated that
    in some cases 100 percent of some of these active component support
    forces were used in Somalia.

    13.  We agree that feasibility, cost, and, impact of each option must
    be considered.  Chapter 4 discusses some of the difficulties that
    could be associated with these options and recognizes that there are
    costs associated with them.

    14.  We are not making a blanket statement about the adequacy of
    current force structure to respond to a MRC while U.S.  military
    forces are engaged in a sizable peace operation or several smaller
    ones.  Our report identifies certain limited capabilities that could
    affect a timely response to a MRC and states that peace operations
    have had less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat
    divisions and general purpose combat aircraft outside Europe.  As DOD
    notes, U.S.  forces quickly responded to the possibility of Iraqi
    aggression against Kuwait while U.S.  forces were engaged in Haiti.
    Since these events occurred after we had completed our audit work, we
    were not in a position to analyze them.

    15.  DOD partially agrees with our recommendation, but it states that
    it is addressing the matter we raise as part of Total Army Analysis
    2003.  We believe that if this action is completed, it would meet the
    intent of our recommendation and we have revised our recommendation
    to reflect this.

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    ========================================================== Appendix II

       NATIONAL SECURITY AND
       INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
       WASHINGTON, D.C.
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

    Jess T.  Ford, Associate Director
    Steven H.  Sternlieb, Assistant Director
    M.  Elizabeth Guran, Evaluator-in-Charge
    Brenton E.  Kidd, Evaluator
    Joseph W.  Kirschbaum, Evaluator
    Lisa M.  Quinn, Evaluator

       EUROPEAN OFFICE, FRANKFURT,
       GERMANY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

    Inez M.  Azcona, Senior Evaluator
    David G.  Artadi, Evaluator