Missile Development: Status and Issues at the Time of the TSSAM
Termination Decision (Letter Report, 01/20/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-46).

The Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) program--a $13.7 billion
effort to develop and acquire a stealthy, conventional, medium-range
cruise missile--has been plagued by significant technical problems, cost
growth, and schedule delays. In May 1994, the Defense Department began
restructuring the program after a series of flight test failures and
unresolved technical problems. On December 9, 1994, the Secretary of
Defense announced plans to cancel the program because of significant
development difficulties and growth in the expected unit cost for each
missile. This report provides pertinent information on the history and
status of the TSSAM program at the time of the Secretary's announcement
for use by Congress as it reviews the termination decision.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-46
     TITLE:  Missile Development: Status and Issues at the Time of the 
             TSSAM Termination Decision
      DATE:  01/20/95
   SUBJECT:  Testing
             Contract termination
             Product performance evaluation
             Military cost control
             Ballistic missiles
             Advanced weapons systems
             Cost overruns
             Defense procurement
             Research and development contracts
             Weapons research
IDENTIFIER:  Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
             Multiple Launch Rocket System
             B-52 Aircraft
             B-2 Aircraft
             F-16 Aircraft
             F-18 Aircraft
             B-1B Aircraft
             F-22 Aircraft
             B-1 Aircraft
             F-111 Aircraft
             Standoff Land Attack Missile
             AGM-130 Bomb
             Joint Standoff Weapon
             HAVE NAP Missile
             Air-Launched Cruise Missile
             MLRS
             ALCM
             
**************************************************************************
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

January 1995

MISSILE DEVELOPMENT - STATUS AND
ISSUES AT THE TIME OF THE TSSAM
TERMINATION DECISION

GAO/NSIAD-95-46

TSSAM Missile Development


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CEB - Combined Effects Bomblet
  COEA - Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
  DOD - Department of Defense
  SLAM - Standoff Land Attack Missile
  SLAM-ER - Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response
  TSSAM - Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-259275

January 20, 1995

Congressional Committees

In May 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD) began restructuring the
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) program after a series of
flight test failures and unresolved technical problems.  This
restructuring called for (1) eliminating planned production of the
missile's Combined Effects Bomblet (CEB) variant, (2) acquiring up to
15 additional operational test missiles, and (3) extending the
development program.  This report discusses TSSAM's reliability;
increasing unit production costs; changes in the number of variants
and quantities to be acquired, including plans to buy more test
missiles; and the availability of alternative systems.  We provided a
draft of the report to DOD on November 18, 1994. 

On December 9, 1994, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to
cancel the TSSAM program because of significant development
difficulties and growth in its expected unit cost.  Because this
report provides pertinent information on the history and status of
the TSSAM program at the time of the Secretary's announcement, we
believe that it will be useful to Congress as it reviews DOD's plan
to cancel the program. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The TSSAM program has been a $13.7 billion effort to develop and
acquire a low observable (i.e., stealthy), conventional, medium-range
cruise missile.  The TSSAM program began as a tri-service development
program in 1986, with the Air Force as the lead service.  TSSAM was
planned to be a low-cost cruise missile able to deliver several
different munitions, some with great accuracy, at a standoff range of
over 100 nautical miles.  TSSAM was to be carried and launched by Air
Force bombers, Navy and Air Force fighter aircraft, and the Army's
Multiple Launch Rocket System.  Six TSSAM variants were to be
developed and produced by Northrop. 

The TSSAM program has been marked by significant technical problems,
cost growth, and schedule delays.  In 1993, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense (1) not allow the TSSAM program to proceed into
low-rate initial production until all critical pieces of the CEB
variant had been developed and adequately tested and (2) direct that
the TSSAM program office demonstrate the more difficult and
challenging performance characteristics of the TSSAM system before
approving the start of low-rate initial production.\1

Subsequently, Congress approved $160.9 million in fiscal year 1994
funding for long lead items in anticipation of a low-rate initial
production decision, and the Air Force requested about $373.9 million
for fiscal year 1995 to begin low-rate initial production of 48 CEB
variant TSSAMs.  Successive flight test failures, lingering technical
concerns, and continuing manufacturing problems, together with
program cost growth and increasing budget constraints, preceded the
Air Force's May 1994 decision to postpone TSSAM low-rate initial
production until at least 1996.  Later that month, the Air Force
proposed the restructured TSSAM program. 

In 1994, three variants remained in the TSSAM development program. 
The CEB variant was being developed for the Air Force to attack soft
targets in a dispersed area but was not going to be produced.  Two
unitary warhead variants--one for the Navy and the other for the Air
Force--were also being developed and were going to be produced.  Four
launch platforms, the B-52, B-2, F-16, and F-18, remained in the
program, and the B-1B was to be added at a later date.  In September
1994, we reported that because TSSAM was still not ready to begin
production, the Air Force's $373.9 million fiscal year 1995
procurement request could be denied and its $160.9 million fiscal
year 1994 procurement appropriation could be rescinded.\2


--------------------
\1 Missile Development:  TSSAM Production Should Not Start as Planned
(GAO/NSIAD-94-52,
Oct.  8, 1993). 

\2 1995 Defense Budget:  Potential Reductions and Rescissions in
RDT&E and Procurement Programs (GAO/NSIAD-94-255BR, Sept.  8, 1994). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Unsuccessful flight test results, particularly over the last 2 years,
made attainment of TSSAM's very high reliability requirement
questionable.  The program office and Northrop initiated a
reliability improvement program to address this concern, but
demonstration of whether problems had been resolved would have taken
several years. 

The acquisition of more test missiles would have added nearly $300
million to the program's estimated development cost but provided
little, if any, assurance of TSSAM performance and reliability before
the critical early production decisions.  Buying these test missiles
in fiscal year 1995 would have been premature.  The 1994 reviews of
cost reduction measures and alternative systems could have resulted
in major design changes or, as the Secretary of Defense recommended,
a decision to terminate the program. 

The total TSSAM program cost increased from an estimated $8.9 billion
in 1986 to $13.7 billion in 1994, and the total number of missiles to
be produced decreased by over 50 percent.  During the same period,
estimated procurement unit costs increased from $728,000 to over $2
million.  TSSAM's increasing cost was a factor that convinced the
Army to end its participation in the program in February 1994 and had
been driving the Navy and the Air Force to reconsider whether they
could still afford TSSAM.  To address the services' concerns over
TSSAM's high cost, DOD directed the Air Force in September 1994 to
conduct an analysis of TSSAM's estimated production costs to identify
measures that would reduce costs by up to 50 percent. 

Declining budgets and changes in threat had prompted the services to
consider alternative systems.  DOD's March 1994 Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) concluded that TSSAM was the most
cost-effective weapon among several alternatives, principally because
of its success in high-threat situations.  However, the analysis
showed some alternative weapon systems performed well in less
demanding situations and might be adequate to meet existing national
security requirements. 


   TSSAM RELIABILITY WAS UNCERTAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

TSSAMs were required to have very high reliability when delivered to
Air Force and Navy units and fully integrated into the services'
operations.  In general, high reliability in cruise missiles is
achieved through careful design; meticulous attention to detail
during assembly and manufacturing; and exhaustive ground and flight
testing to identify weak components, faulty processes, or
manufacturing errors.  Nearly all TSSAMs launched were expected to
fly to and hit their intended targets. 

Of the 22 TSSAM flight tests conducted since 1990, 13, or about 59
percent, were considered to be successful; that is, the missile flew
the full mission and met its primary test objectives.\3 The eight
flight test failures occurred for a variety of reasons, such as a
loose screw or a pinched wire.  Many of these failures were
attributed to faulty components and manufacturing process errors. 
Since November 1992, only 6 of 12 flight test attempts, or 50
percent, succeeded. 

In addition, TSSAM flight testing began before the missile system and
its subsystems completed qualification testing (i.e., certification
that the missile could meet performance requirements for production). 
As of October 1994, the missile system and 11 of its 27 critical
subsystems had not completed qualification testing, and some of the
essential reliability improvement ground testing for critical TSSAM
subsystems had still not been completed.  At that time, the
completion dates for subsystem and system qualification testing were
May 1995 and December 1996, respectively. 

Program officials told us that flight test failures were an expected
and necessary part of developing a complex cruise missile weapon
system.  Early in the test program, the program office predicted
flight test success and failure rates using an analysis of the TSSAM
design and the experience of other similar programs.  The officials
pointed out that the program's 59 percent flight test success rate
was consistent with program expectations and the success rates of
other cruise missile programs for that point in the development
process.  However, TSSAM's required reliability was much higher than
that demonstrated by these other systems.  TSSAM's flight test
success rate needed to improve significantly before the Defense
Acquisition Board's review before low-rate initial production. 
Approximately 20 flight tests had been scheduled between November
1994 and November 1995, and nearly all would have needed to be
successful for TSSAM to meet the program's expectations, duplicate
the success of other cruise missile programs, and achieve TSSAM's
higher reliability requirement. 

DOD, Northrop, and the services expressed concern that TSSAM might
not achieve its high reliability requirement.  For example, Navy
officials told us that they were confident TSSAM would meet its
performance requirements, but they were concerned that faulty
components and manufacturing process errors would prevent TSSAM from
achieving its required reliability.  Air Force officials were also
concerned that problems with parts would go undetected despite
exhaustive tests performed during missile assembly and before each
flight.  The officials pointed out that, until they saw positive
results from many more flight tests, system reliability would remain
a concern and be an area of risk for the program. 

Independent government and contractor teams examined the TSSAM
development program in 1992 and 1993 and concluded that not enough
was known about all of the environments in which the missiles had to
operate, the inherent reliability of critical subsystems, and the
degree of control maintained over the processes under which the
missile had to be manufactured.  The teams recommended verifying the
flight conditions imposed by TSSAM launch platforms, establishing a
reliability improvement program, and conducting more intensive ground
testing before flight testing. 

In response to these recommendations and the services' concerns, the
program office conducted a series of flight tests on each of TSSAM's
launch platforms and verified the critical forces to be encountered
by the missile.  The results showed that the missile's design was
appropriate for the flight environments measured.  In addition, the
program office and contractor established programs to enhance
component and subsystem ground testing and improve missile
manufacturing and assembly processes.  These efforts were intended to
identify problem parts and process errors before delivery of the
missiles. 

Program officials believed these efforts, together with the
maturation of the TSSAM design, would improve TSSAM's reliability
over the next several years.  These officials also believed that the
efforts needed to be continued throughout the development program and
into production to ensure that TSSAM could meet its high reliability
requirement.  The program officials cautioned, however, that
improvements in flight test success would not be seen immediately,
since the improvement program was just getting underway and nearly
all of the subcontractor parts were already delivered. 


--------------------
\3 Three flight test aborts were not included in this calculation. 
Two aborts occurred because of problems with the missiles before
launch, and one occurred because of a problem with the launch
platform. 


   NEED FOR MORE TEST MISSILES WAS
   QUESTIONABLE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Program officials said that the procurement of up to 15 more test
missiles would allow them to conduct additional flight testing, which
was expected to provide greater confidence in TSSAM's performance and
reliability.  They also said more test missiles would allow them to
use some of the existing operational test missiles for extended
development testing and the new missiles for completing operational
testing.  Buying more test missiles was also expected to provide
other benefits, such as avoiding a production break for critical
subcontractors and facilitating the transition from development to
low-rate initial production. 

The program office estimated the cost of an additional 15 test
missiles and associated support efforts to be about $300 million. 
The acquisition would have involved about a 2-year extension to the
TSSAM development program and changes to the basic development
contract and schedule.  Even though the TSSAM Program Director and a
Northrop official agreed to these conditions, the agreement was
verbal and, as of November 1994, the contractor had not provided an
estimate of the associated costs. 

Although more successful flight tests might have helped build
confidence in the missile, the TSSAM Chief of Test said that under
the existing contract, Northrop was obligated to demonstrate TSSAM
performance and that if more missiles were needed to do so, the
contractor must manufacture them at no additional cost to the
government.  Even with the many test failures, the test chief was
confident that the missile would meet its performance requirements. 
The test director also told us that more flight test successes would
have helped build confidence in TSSAM's reliability and its readiness
for production. 

Even if more test missiles had been procured in mid-1995, the test
results to be obtained from the new missiles would have not been
available until 1999 because it would have taken about 3 years to
manufacture them and 1 to 2 years to test them.  The TSSAM production
program envisioned low-rate initial production to begin in fiscal
year 1997, with production continuing for 14 years.  By the time
operational test results from the additional missiles were available,
the government would have procured three production lots of TSSAMs
and made a commitment to order the fourth lot.  Therefore, the
acquisition of more test missiles would have provided little, if any,
assurance of TSSAM performance and reliability before the critical
early production decisions. 

When program officials initially proposed acquiring 15 more test
missiles in May 1994, they believed that the missiles, if ordered by
September 1994, would benefit several critical subcontractors who
were reaching the end of their production effort for the development
program and would experience a lengthy break in production before
production missile orders were received.  Program officials estimated
that a production break would result in the loss of expertise and
cost about $200 million to restart the program and requalify
production processes.  They believed acquiring the new test missiles
would help sustain some subcontractor expertise until TSSAM
production began. 

However, acquiring the additional test missiles would not have
provided help to most subcontractors, since nearly all parts
manufactured by TSSAM subcontractors had already been delivered, and
the program office, as of November 1994, did not expect to reach an
agreement with Northrop on the new test missile order until June
1995.  By the time Northrop had passed orders for parts and supplies
to its subcontractors and vendors, a gap of several months to 1 year
would have occurred in the subcontractor base. 

The procurement of more test missiles could have also presented some
risks if it was not timed properly.  The Air Force was conducting a
comprehensive study to reduce TSSAM's production cost.  The study was
focusing on potential changes to system and subsystem designs to
reduce costs.  If significant design changes were made after the new
test missiles were acquired, those missiles would have been in the
wrong configuration and would have needed to be modified at an
additional cost.  Also, DOD and the services were examining
alternative systems that might have been acquired instead of TSSAM. 


   TSSAM COSTS HAD INCREASED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Low cost was a top priority for the TSSAM program when it began in
1986.  At that time, DOD estimated that TSSAM engineering and
manufacturing development would cost $2.3 billion and that production
of 9,050 missiles would cost $6.6 billion, for a total program cost
of $8.9 billion (in then-year dollars).  TSSAM's initial operational
capability for the Air Force was originally to occur in 1990, and all
missiles were to be delivered by 1997. 

After years of development problems and associated schedule delays,
the TSSAM program's cost changed significantly.  Development costs
had more than doubled, and estimated production costs were 30 percent
higher for less than half the missiles originally planned.  The
September 1994 estimate for TSSAM development increased to $5.1
billion, and production of
4,156 missiles was estimated at $8.6 billion, for a total program
cost estimate of $13.7 billion, as shown in figure 1. 

   Figure 1:  Changes in the TSSAM
   Program's Cost Estimates

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The combination of decreased quantities and higher production costs
resulted in an estimated 183-percent increase in the TSSAM
procurement unit cost, from an estimated $728,000 in 1986 to
$2,062,000 in 1994 (in then-year dollars).  Figures 2 and 3 show the
changes in planned procurement quantity and estimated procurement
unit cost, respectively, since 1986. 

   Figure 2:  Changes in TSSAM
   Planned Procurement Quantity

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 3:  Changes in TSSAM
   Estimated Procurement Unit Cost

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

In addition, development delays and cost growth led the services to
stretch out the planned production time frame and reduce the content
of the program.  Under the September 1994 restructured program, the
first TSSAM would have been delivered in fiscal year 1999 and the
last in fiscal
year 2011, about 12 years later than originally planned.  Also, of
the six original TSSAM variants, only the two unitary variants would
have been produced.  Table 1 shows the TSSAM program variants,
missions, and procurement quantities as of April 1986 and September
1994. 



                           Table 1
           
            Changes in Planned Quantities of TSSAM
                           Variants


Variant      Planned mission          Apr. 1986   Sept. 1994
-----------  ---------------------  -----------  -----------
Army
------------------------------------------------------------
APAM         Anti-personnel, anti-          350            0
              materiel
BAT          Anti-armor                   1,450            0

Navy
------------------------------------------------------------
Unitary      Precision land and           2,250          525
              sea attack

Air Force
------------------------------------------------------------
CEB          Attack area or soft          1,400            0
              targets
BKEP         Runway buster                  800            0
Unitary      Precision land attack        2,800        3,631
============================================================
Total                                     9,050        4,156
------------------------------------------------------------
Representatives from all three services expressed concern about the
affordability of TSSAM.  In early 1994, the Army terminated its
involvement with TSSAM, citing TSSAM's high cost as one of the
factors in its decision to terminate.  In mid-1994, because of cost
growth, schedule slippages, and declining budgets, both the
Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force deleted TSSAM funding from
their fiscal year 1996 budget submission to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.  However, after the program was restructured,
they added funding for TSSAM to their fiscal year 1996 budget
requests. 

Air Force officials at the Air Combat Command told us that declining
procurement budgets in the mid- to late 1990s forced them to choose
among the programs they needed to accomplish the command's mission. 
While the Air Force had a requirement for a weapon having the
characteristics offered by TSSAM, they expressed frustration with
continuing TSSAM schedule delays and said that TSSAM was expected to
cost twice as much as they were willing to pay for it.  The officials
further stated that, given the cost and uncertainty surrounding the
TSSAM program, they considered B-1 bomber upgrades, the F-22
development program, and the continuation of the F-111 program to be
more important. 

To address the concerns of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force over
TSSAM's high cost, DOD directed the Air Force in September 1994 to
perform a comprehensive, independent analysis of TSSAM's procurement
cost.  The purpose of this analysis is to identify measures that
would reduce TSSAM production costs by up to 50 percent.  Among the
areas to be examined were requirements and specifications changes,
system design, materials, manufacturing processes, and the
acquisition plan.  The team was to report its results by December 31,
1994.  The results were expected to provide a firm basis for either
completing the program or pursuing alternative systems. 


   SERVICES ARE EXAMINING
   ALTERNATIVES TO TSSAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

DOD's March 1994 COEA concluded that TSSAM was the most
cost-effective of several missiles examined for a broad band of
potential applications.  The missile's cost-effectiveness was largely
due to its projected ability to penetrate enemy air defenses in a
high-threat environment.  Even though TSSAM would have cost more than
other systems, it performed better against time-sensitive,
well-protected, and defended targets. 

Despite the results of the March 1994 COEA, the services began
examining alternative weapon systems because of TSSAM's flight test
failures, lengthy development delays, high cost, and reduced
capabilities.  In August 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
directed the Air Force and the Navy to propose alternative systems in
the event that TSSAM was terminated. 

The services identified less capable and apparently less costly
systems as an alternative to TSSAM in the near term and expressed
support for a future program to meet their long-term requirements. 
These systems could be effective in less demanding situations and
might prove adequate to meet current national security requirements. 
They also appeared to be more readily available than TSSAM would have
been.  However, the services did not appear to have adequate data on
cost, performance, and availability of the alternative systems.  The
estimates that were available on cost and the amount of time that
would be needed to actually field these systems were not considered
to be reliable. 

The COEA presented some cost and performance estimates for several of
these alternatives, but service officials disagreed with (1) the
methodologies to estimate the costs to acquire or modify these
systems, (2) some of the performance estimates, and (3) the threat
scenarios.  The Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the team that
performed the COEA to further examine some of these issues.  This
examination was to compare more systems, reassess some systems
already included in the analysis, and include revised threat
scenarios.  This examination was to be completed by the fall of 1995,
but interim results were expected in the spring of 1995. 

The Army has been developing a modified Tactical Missile System to
fill the role once identified for TSSAM.  Army officials advised us
that, even though its range and payload were less than TSSAM's, the
existing system could be modified at less cost to meet requirements. 

Navy officials were confident TSSAM would perform as expected once
the missile was fully developed and the manufacturing process was
optimized.  They said, however, that TSSAM was more robust and costly
than necessary for the conflicts they anticipated for the foreseeable
future.  Accordingly, they were evaluating a proposed expanded
response version of the Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded
Response (SLAM-ER) to replace TSSAM.  They said that even though
SLAM-ER might not be quite as capable as TSSAM, it could meet minimum
operational requirements at a lower cost.  They expected lower
production costs largely because existing Harpoon missiles could be
modified into the SLAM-ER configuration instead of having to build an
entirely new missile.  They also believed the SLAM-ER could be
fielded sooner than the TSSAM.  On December 16, 1994, DOD announced
that, because of its plan to terminate the TSSAM program, the Navy
would procure additional SLAM missiles in fiscal year 1996 and would
retrofit SLAM missiles with SLAM-ER kits in fiscal years 1997 through
2001. 

The Air Force has no readily available alternative to TSSAM. 
However, officials at the Air Combat Command told us the acquisition
of a combination of AGM-130 munitions, Joint Standoff Weapons, Have
Nap missiles, and modified Air Launched Cruise Missiles could provide
near-term alternatives to TSSAM but that a new standoff missile
weapon system with TSSAM's characteristics would be needed in the
long term.  They also said the alternatives might prove to be less
capable and more costly than projected. 



   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

DOD provided official oral comments on a draft of this report.  DOD
generally agreed with our findings, but it indicated that the
recommendation in our draft to postpone the acquisition of more test
missiles was now moot because DOD no longer planned to buy additional
test missiles in view of the Secretary of Defense's decision to
cancel the program.  Accordingly, we dropped our recommendation. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

We reviewed TSSAM acquisition plans, results of ground and flight
tests, cost estimates, cost and effectiveness analyses, budget
requests, and plans to acquire additional operational test missiles. 
We also reviewed program management directives and status reports,
changes to the development contract, and contract performance and
funding status reports.  We discussed TSSAM's cost, acquisition
strategy, and the program's technical, performance, and manufacturing
difficulties with Army, Navy, and Air Force officials at the TSSAM
Joint Program Office at Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.  We
discussed the TSSAM requirement and alternatives with officials from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Navy and Air Force Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., and the Air Force's Air Combat Command at Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia. 

We performed our work from December 1993 to November 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; the
Secretaries of Defense, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix I. 

Louis J.  Rodrigues
Director, Systems Development

List of Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W.  Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Thomas J.  Schulz, Associate Director
Raymond Dunham, Assistant Director
Karen S.  Blum, Communications Analyst


   CINCINNATI FIELD OFFICE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

Matthew R.  Mongin, Evaluator-in-Charge
Thomas C.  Hewlett, Evaluator
Arthur L.  Cobb, Evaluator