Force Structure: Army's Support Requirements Process Lacks Valid and
Consistent Data (Letter Report, 01/30/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-43).
The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process is used to determine the required
support forces needed to sustain combat divisions and brigades. Support
forces included such units as transportation, maintenance, military
police, and quartermaster. GAO found that the Army lacks adequate
procedures governing the development and review of logistical data in
the TAA process. Until recently, the Army regulations only focused on
the management and validation of one type of logistical data--planning
factors. These regulations were not followed, however, allowing outdated
or unreliable information to be used in TAA. The Army has changed its
regulations to require that all logistical data in the Army Force
Planning Data and Assumptions document be validated and that the
Combined Arms Support Command centrally manage the process. Although
this is a step in the right direction, GAO believes that more guidance
is needed to ensure the validity of all logistical data and sufficient
oversight of the process. The data and assumptions that Army programmers
used in the TAA process sometimes differ from what Army component
planners use for war plans. These differences contribute to vastly
different requirements. Since TAA requirements are the basis for
resourcing decisions, these differences need to be identified and
evaluated to ensure that there are valid reasons for them.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-43
TITLE: Force Structure: Army's Support Requirements Process Lacks
Valid and Consistent Data
DATE: 01/30/95
SUBJECT: Army supplies
Defense contingency planning
Combat readiness
Logistics
Army personnel
Armed forces abroad
Data integrity
Data collection operations
Defense capabilities
Ground warfare
IDENTIFIER: Total Army Analysis Process
Desert Storm
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Honorable
Ike Skelton, House of Representatives
January 1995
FORCE STRUCTURE - ARMY'S SUPPORT
REQUIREMENTS PROCESS LACKS VALID
AND CONSISTENT DATA
GAO/NSIAD-95-43
Force Structure Requirements
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
TAA - Total Army Analysis
DOD - Department of Defense's
AFPDA - Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions
DCSLOG - Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
CASCOM - Combined Arms Support Command
ARCENT - U.S. Army Central Command
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259184
January 30, 1995
The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Skelton:
This report responds to your request as the former chairman of the
Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, that we evaluate the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA)
process to determine if its results are based on valid data and
assumptions. The TAA process is used to determine the required
support forces to sustain combat divisions and brigades. Support
forces include units such as transportation, maintenance, military
police, and quartermaster. This report focuses on logistical data
and related assumptions used in the process.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
During Operation Desert Storm, the Army deployed all or nearly all of
certain support units such as transportation and military police
units. As threats to U.S. security interests evolve and defense
budgets shrink, it is important that the Army accurately identify the
support forces it requires. TAA is the Army's biennial process to
determine required support units and recommend the type and number of
support units that the Army should include in its budget. The
requirements generated in this process are dependent on a variety of
inputs and guidance, including scenarios derived from the Defense
Planning Guidance,\1 wargaming assumptions, and logistical data that
are developed for use in the computer modeling. For purposes of this
report, logistical data include planning factors, consumption rates,
and other data. Planning factors cover 9 of the Department of
Defense's (DOD) 10 classes of supply; for modeling purposes, these
factors are usually expressed in pounds per person per day.
Consumption rates include such factors as the number of soldiers
admitted to a hospital per day and the number of prisoners captured
per day. An example of other logistical data would be the amount of
support that allies can provide to offset U.S. requirements. While
planning scenarios are largely given to the Army, logistical data
must be developed by the Army. These data are compiled in the Army
Force Planning Data and Assumptions document (AFPDA). Once the data
are finalized--during TAA force structure conferences--the Concepts
Analysis Agency conducts the computer modeling, which generates unit
requirements based on a set of rules that determine the number of
support units needed. After requirements are determined, additional
force structure conferences are held where Army officials decide
which units can be filled within the projected resource levels.
Figure 1 highlights key elements of the TAA process for developing
requirements and making force resourcing decisions.
Figure 1: The TAA Process
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) is
responsible for developing the logistics data in the AFPDA. In
practice, some of this responsibility has been delegated to the
Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), which is the Army's
integrator for some combat service support issues. Biennially,
DCSLOG and CASCOM update the logistics portions of the AFPDA by
tasking the major commands, Army component commands,\2 and schools to
validate the logistical data related to their areas of expertise.
For example, school representatives are tasked to validate data based
on their perspectives on doctrine; component commands are tasked to
provide their perspectives on unique data and issues related to their
theater. The logistical data are presented to workshops to gain
group acceptance. They are then sent forward to the TAA force
structure conference, where the data are approved.
--------------------
\1 The Defense Planning Guidance translates the President's National
Military Strategy into defense planning goals. It has illustrative
planning scenarios by theater.
\2 Army component commands are service components of the theater
Unified Commands. For example, U.S. Army, Europe, is the Army
component of the European Command and U.S. Army Central Command is
the component of the Central Command.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The Army lacks adequate procedures governing the development and
review of logistical data used in the TAA process. Until recently,
Army regulations only focused on the management and validation of one
type of logistical data--planning factors. However, these
regulations were not followed. As a result, some data used in TAA
were outdated or unreliable. The Army has revised its regulations to
require that all logistical data in the AFPDA be validated and that
CASCOM centrally manage the process. Although this is a step in the
right direction, we believe that further guidance is needed for
ensuring the validity of all logistical data, and to ensure that
there is sufficient oversight of the process.
The data and assumptions that Army programmers use in the TAA process
are sometimes different from what Army component planners use for war
plans. These differences contribute to vastly different
requirements. Since TAA requirements are the basis for resourcing
decisions, these differences need to be identified and evaluated to
ensure that there are valid reasons for the differences.
MORE PROCEDURES NEEDED TO
IMPROVE VALIDITY OF LOGISTICAL
DATA
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Army documents describe the AFPDA update as a systematic review and
validation of key data used in TAA. However, Army regulations
related to TAA primarily focused on the validation and management of
planning factors. Effective May 1994, the Army broadened its
regulation to include additional logistical data found in the AFPDA.
This change should help to improve the validity of logistical data,
but additional procedures are needed to correct the problems we found
with the AFPDA update process.
REGULATIONS GOVERNING AFPDA
UPDATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Before May 1994, Army regulation 700-8 specified responsibilities for
the development and management of logistics planning factors. The
Army Logistics Center, CASCOM's predecessor, was responsible for
managing the development, validation, and collection of planning
factors, and was to recommend factors to DCSLOG for approval.
However, DCSLOG and CASCOM officials did not believe that the
development and management of other logistical data for use in the
AFPDA, such as theater specific data provided by component
commanders, were covered in this or any other regulation prior to May
1994.
In 1993, the Army Audit Agency found the Army's management of
planning factors to be inadequate, and recommended changes to the
process. The recommended changes included tasking responsible
activities to (1) update planning factors periodically and (2)
validate methodologies and assumptions used to develop planning
factors. In 1994, the Army revised its regulations to improve the
management of planning factors. These revisions included specifying
time frames for updates to take place and incorporating internal
control responsibilities to guide the development of planning
factors. The regulation was also changed to include other logistical
data and to link the development of logistical data to the AFPDA.
While the regulation gave DCSLOG the overall responsibility for
logistical data management, the day-to-day management for logistical
data was delegated to CASCOM.
PREVIOUS PROCESS DID NOT
ENSURE VALID DATA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The Army's TAA process relied heavily on commands and schools to
review and validate the accuracy of logistics data. Commands and
schools were requested prior to the TAA workshops to review and
validate logistics data. However, we found that some data had not
been validated, were outdated, or were not supported by documented
studies. Because the process was poorly documented, we could not
determine how widespread these problems were. Further, no
organization was responsible for ensuring that the data validations
occurred and were derived from consistent and sound methodological
studies.
Our review of available documentation for several past TAAs showed
that some data had not been validated in several years. Although
some school officials believed the AFPDA contained outdated data,
actions were not undertaken to validate or change the data. For
instance, officials with the ordnance school, which develops doctrine
for maintenance units, expressed concern in 1989 that rates for
equipment that is expected to be abandoned and the rates for vehicles
expected to be damaged in combat had not been updated in 4 years and,
thus, were unlikely to be accurate. These rates primarily affect the
number of maintenance units. In another instance, the Army engineers
submitted workload factors that were outdated and had not been
validated prior to the January 1992 TAA workshop. These factors
measured the number of hours it takes to construct such structures as
railroads, bridges, and pipelines. A new study was done only after
concerns were raised about the validity of these factors during the
AFPDA workshops.
We found data that were not supported by documentation. At the U.S.
Army Central Command (ARCENT), for example, officials that provided
data for TAA in 1992 had not maintained documentation that would show
how the data were developed. This lack of documentation reduces
assurance that the data are valid and can cause problems during
future updates if key personnel change. For example, U.S. Army,
Korea, officials told us that they did not know how data on the
Korean theater had been developed because there were no files or
individuals who could explain the prior year's validation process.
We found that while the Army sought consistency and accuracy in the
logistical data update process, no organization ensured that a
reasonable methodology was used by the commands and schools nor that
studies or supporting models used to develop the data were valid. We
found that neither CASCOM nor DCSLOG had overseen the validation
process. According to a DCSLOG official, DCSLOG has not routinely
reviewed the methodology used by various proponents who submit
factors and data to the process. This official stated that only if a
factor looked unusual would it generate an inquiry back to the
proponent to ask how that factor was developed. CASCOM officials
stated that they had no regulatory requirement to review the
methodology of proponents who developed logistical data.
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES NEEDED
TO ENSURE DATA ARE VALIDATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
The Army's revised regulation governing the development and
validation of logistical data for the TAA process is an improvement.
The revised regulation requires CASCOM to examine the AFPDA to ensure
data consistency, adherence to doctrine, necessity, identification of
sources, and rationale of methodology. It also specifies time frames
for the AFPDA updates, thus putting the commands and schools on
notice when the data validation will be required. CASCOM officials
stated that they have not yet defined their role regarding overseeing
the update of AFPDA data. Therefore, CASCOM had not told the
commands and schools what will be required of them. We believe that
CASCOM should establish procedures that would specify how commands
and schools are to validate and maintain all logistical data in the
AFPDA. Specifically, major commands, Army component commands, and
schools should be directed to ensure that their data are based on
sound analytical studies and assumptions and that the methodological
bases for those data and assumptions are documented. Moreover,
CASCOM's guidance should specify what CASCOM will require from
commands and schools to exercise its oversight responsibility.
According to DOD, CASCOM is already developing procedures to improve
the update process and should complete a review of the adequacy of
existing data by the end of 1996.
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN TAA AND
ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDERS' WAR
PLANS CAUSE DIFFERENT
REQUIREMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
According to Army regulations, theater-specific data are best
obtained from Army components most familiar with the region and
involved in the theater war-planning process. However, we found that
the current level of participation by Army component commanders does
not ensure that data and assumptions used by TAA are similar to data
that component commands use to develop their war plans. The result
is that the required force structure developed in TAA does not agree
with theater war plans.
ARMY COMPONENT PLANNERS ROLE
IN TAA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
Army component commands should have an important role in the TAA
process. During development of the AFPDA, Army regulations instruct
the Army components to review, revalidate, and submit theater-unique
logistics data. Specifically, they are to provide data such as
support provided by allies, theater stockage policies, and theater
consumption factors. Also, as part of the TAA process, Army
components identify theater-unique requirements that may be different
from current doctrinal rules. This identification is required
because the Army recognizes that each theater is unique and that the
Army component commands are the most familiar with their area.
In practice, however, Army components sometimes believe that their
role in the process is insufficient to affect the process. Thus,
Army component officials said they don't always consider developing
data for TAA as a priority. Therefore, some commands do not always
send representatives to workshops where data are discussed and
adopted. In other instances, component command representatives at
the workshops have not challenged data that is inconsistent with
their plans.
TAA DOES NOT ALWAYS REFLECT
SAME REQUIREMENTS AS THEATER
WAR PLANS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
TAA requirements for military theaters sometimes differ from those in
theater war plans. Some differences can be attributed to the fact
that TAA provides a longer-term force structure outlook than theater
war plans.\3 Other differences, however, result from TAA and war
plans being derived from different assumptions, logistical data, and
computing methods.
For example, according to U.S. Army, Europe, officials, TAA
requirements developed in 1992 did not match planning efforts in the
European theater because the two processes used different scenarios.
TAA modeled a northern region scenario for Europe, whereas U.S.
Army, Europe, used a southern region scenario in its war plans. The
TAA's northern region scenario was based on the Defense Planning
Guidance. U.S. Army, Europe, officials believe that TAA-generated
requirements are based on an unrealistic scenario. U.S. Army,
Europe, officials told us that conflicts in the southern region are
more probable than the northern region; and thus, believe
establishing requirements for that region is prudent. Further, force
structure requirements for the southern region are more challenging
than for the northern region because of the more mountainous terrain,
lack of infrastructure, and the lack of host nation capability. As a
result, U.S. Army, Europe's, requirements and the TAA requirements
for Europe differed greatly. U.S. Army, Europe, officials stated
that these difference still exist in the current TAA update cycle.
In another example, we compared TAA support requirements developed in
1992 for Southwest Asia with ARCENT's operational requirements. The
analysis showed that some support areas, such as medical,
maintenance, and military police differed significantly. Table 1
summarizes some of the differences between ARCENT requirements based
on TAA and war plans.
Table 1
Comparison of ARCENT's TAA and War Plans
Requirements
Comparison of
ARCENT ARCENT TAA's
requirement requirement requirement
based on from war to war plans
Unit type TAA plans (in percent)
--------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Combat support 18 31 58
hospitals
Maintenance 8,260 2,767 299
positions
Military 77 107 72
police
companies
Prisoner of war 3 17 18
battalions
Escort guard 1 24 4
companies
Guard companies 7 28 25
------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in the table, ARCENT plans require 31 combat support
hospitals, which would require 18,817 positions, and TAA requires 18
hospitals, which would require 10,908 positions--a difference of 13
hospitals and
7,909 positions. The ARCENT medical planner believes TAA uses
disease and non-battle injury rate much below what the Command
believes are likely in its region, resulting in lower patient
estimates and fewer hospitals. A CASCOM official responsible for
medical units was unaware that ARCENT used a different method to
determine requirements for combat support hospitals. However, this
official believes that the TAA method is more precise.
The table also shows that TAA has about 8,260 general support
maintenance positions, while ARCENT plans envision 2,767 positions--a
difference of 5,493 positions. TAA requirements were developed in
response to a protracted Central European scenario that involves
equipment overhaul in theater. Because ARCENT does not envision a
protracted conflict in the Southwest Asia region, ARCENT plans to
perform most major repairs in U.S. depots. ARCENT officials said
that they have not yet been successful in convincing TAA
decisionmakers to adopt the ARCENT concept. However, a CASCOM
official familiar with maintenance unit issues said that ARCENT has
not surfaced this issue in TAA workshops or conferences.
The table also shows differences between TAA and ARCENT war plans for
combat support military police companies. ARCENT plans require 107
of these companies, whereas TAA requires 77 companies--a difference
of
30 companies and 5,280 positions. The ARCENT Military Police planner
stated that requirements are different because TAA modeling does not
adequately reflect theater geography and concentration of troops in
determining requirements for these police companies. CASCOM
officials stated that TAA has not addressed these issues because
ARCENT has not raised them at workshops and conferences.
--------------------
\3 Army components develop their war plans for the next few years
based on Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. TAA develops the Army's
future program force structure based on the Defense Planning
Guidance. For example, the current TAA is developing requirements
extending out to fiscal year 2003.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following
actions:
Require CASCOM to establish procedures that specify (1) how major
commands, Army component commands and schools should validate and
maintain data for the AFPDA and (2) what CASCOM will require to
exercise its oversight responsibility.
Establish procedures and identify the differences in theater planning
requirements and TAA requirements to ensure that there are valid
reasons for differences or
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
DOD generally concurred with our findings and our recommendation that
procedures are needed to ensure that data are valid. DOD noted that
CASCOM is in the process of establishing procedures to improve the
validation of data used in TAA. DOD disagreed with our
recommendation that the Army identify differences between theater
planning and TAA requirements to ensure that the reasons for the
differences are valid. DOD believes that the two processes were
designed for different purposes and yield different but consistent
results.
We recognize that there are differences between the process used to
compute requirements for the TAA and theater commands. These
differences largely result because TAA computes requirements further
in the future than do theater commands, which may result in different
assumptions such as the level of unit modernization, threat, and
budget levels. However, the examples we have cited are not related
to these factors. Rather, the differences result from fundamentally
different views about how certain functions will be performed or at
what rate events will occur. Thus, we continue to believe that
differences between the two processes should be identified to
determine if they are valid.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
We conducted this review from July 1993 to September 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Defense;
the Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and interested congressional committees and individuals.
Copies will be sent to other interested parties upon request. Please
contact me at (202) 512-3504, if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are Robert
Pelletier, Rodell Anderson, and Blake Ainsworth.
Sincerely yours,
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
To determine how Army assumptions and data used in the TAA process
were developed, we reviewed available documentation from past TAAs
and interviewed officials at the Department of the Army Headquarters,
Washington D.C; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S.
Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Combined Arms Support
Command and Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia; Transportation
School, Fort Eustis, Virginia; Engineer School and Center, Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the Medical School and Center, Fort Sam
Houston, Texas.
To gain a perspective on Army component commands' participation in
TAA and the relationship between TAA and operational planning, we
interviewed personnel and reviewed related documents at the U.S.
Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. Army,
Central Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia; the U.S. European
Command at Stuttgart, Germany; U.S. Army, Europe, at Heidelberg,
Germany; and Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia. We also
discussed 8th U.S. Army's role in TAA with logistics planners in
Seoul, Korea.
To assess TAA and theater requirements for Southwest Asia, we
reviewed ARCENT's major operations plan and troop list for the region
and compared it with TAA modeling results and other TAA-related
requirements and resourcing documents.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 3-4.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 4-5.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 5-6.
Now on p. 6.
See comment 2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 6-8.
See comment 3.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 8.
Now on p. 8.
See comment 3
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated December 19, 1994.
GAO COMMENTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
1. We continue to believe that the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA)
process did not ensure valid data, based on the problems we found
with the process. DOD describes improvements made during the current
TAA; we did not review the improvements, and thus, we cannot comment
on them. However, as DOD acknowledges in its response, additional
procedures are needed to ensure that data are validated.
2. Our information is based on numerous discussions with theater
command representatives at Army Central Command and U.S. Army,
Europe. These individuals indicated that theater command
participation is not comprehensive and conscientious enough to ensure
that theater perspectives are considered in the process.
3. We recognize that there are differences between the process used
to compute requirements for the TAA and theater commands. These
differences largely result because TAA computes requirements further
in the future than do theater commands, which may result in different
assumptions, such as the level of unit modernization, threat, and
budget levels. However, the examples we have cited are not related
to these factors. While DOD believes that the TAA process includes
sufficient open forums in which force requirements are reviewed by
representatives of theater commanders, many theater representatives
believe their perspectives are not always included in the TAA
process. Because we did not have access to these debates, we could
not ascertain to what degree theater perspectives are raised or how
differences are resolved. Therefore, we continue to believe that
differences between the two processes should be identified to
determine if they are valid.