Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed (Chapter Report,
12/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-95-22).

The military has overstated its future recruiting challenges--the number
of eligible high-school graduates is actually expected to grow steadily
in coming years--and current recruiting operations are plagued by
inefficiencies, with half the network of 6,000 recruiting offices
supplying just 13.5 percent of enlistees. Moreover, the military
services plan to add more recruiters even though fewer recruits are
needed to support the smaller military force resulting from downsizing.
Although many studies have suggested ways to consolidate or eliminate
layers of management to cut costs, the services have been reluctant to
change existing organizational structures.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-22
     TITLE:  Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed
      DATE:  12/22/94
   SUBJECT:  Military personnel
             Personnel management
             Personnel recruiting
             Hiring policies
             Human resources utilization
             Attrition rates
             Military enlistment
             Public relations
             Military recruiting
             Military cost control
IDENTIFIER:  All Volunteer Force
             DOD Youth Attitude Tracking Survey
             Armed Forces Qualifications Test
             Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
             DOD Delayed Entry Program
             DOD Recruiting Facilities Management Information System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Honorable
David Pryor, U.S.  Senate

December 1994

MILITARY RECRUITING - MORE
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES NEEDED

GAO/NSIAD-95-22

Military Recruiting


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AFQT - Armed Forces Qualification Test
  ASVAB - Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
  BMT - Basic Military Training
  DEP - Delayed Entry Program
  DOD - Department of Defense
  MEPCOM - Military Entrance Processing Command
  MEPS - Military Entrance Processing Station
  RV - recruiting vehicle
  USAREC - U.S.  Army Recruiting Command
  YATS - Youth Attitude Tracking Survey

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-257481

December 22, 1994

The Honorable David Pryor
United States Senate

Dear Senator Pryor: 

This report responds to your request that we examine Department of
Defense recruiting operations and identify areas in which military
recruiting costs could be reduced. 

Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we
plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its
issue date.  At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees; the Secretaries of
Defense, the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; the Commandant, U.S. 
Marine Corps; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
other interested parties.  Copies will also be made available to
others upon request. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.  If you
or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call
me on (202) 512-5140. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been recruiting
fewer people to support a smaller military force.  Concerned about
the size of DOD's recruiting budget and the efficiency of its
recruiting operations, Senator David Pryor asked GAO to survey
military recruiting policies and practices and highlight areas in
which DOD could reduce its recruiting costs without adversely
affecting its ability to meet military personnel requirements. 
Specifically, GAO's objectives were to evaluate (1) recruiting
challenges the services face in the size of the youth market and its
propensity to join the military, (2) the services' future plans for
recruiting staffs and organizations, and (3) the services' management
of their recruiting facilities.  GAO concentrated on recruiting for
active-duty enlisted personnel, which represented $1.1 billion of the
$1.3 billion budget for fiscal year 1994. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

During the first several years following the creation of the
All-Volunteer Force, the military services had generally positive
results in attracting new recruits.  However, by 1979, the services
were achieving only 90 percent of their numerical goals, and the
quality of new recruits had declined significantly.  In the early
1980s, Congress and the services took several actions to make
military service more attractive.  Congress granted a raise in
military pay, authorized the services to offer new recruits financing
for education, and allowed the services to spend more money on
advertising.  The services, in turn, reemphasized to their recruiters
the importance of attracting recruits who had high school diplomas
and who achieved scores in the upper ranges on standardized military
tests.  By 1986, all services were meeting or exceeding their
numerical enlistment objectives, and recruit quality had reached
historically high levels.  These levels were maintained and, starting
in 1990, increased significantly again. 

The services target 17- to 21-year-old high school graduates as prime
candidates for enlistment.  The services believe that individuals in
this age group are more likely to consider the military as a viable
option.  The services also direct recruiting efforts toward parents,
coaches, and teachers, who may influence prospective recruits'
decisions to enlist. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Although the services have requested additional funds from Congress
to meet what they perceive as future recruiting challenges, GAO's
review indicates that the services have overstated the potential
challenges.  As evidence of future difficulties, the services cite
decreases in the number of potential recruits and in the propensity
of youths to join the services.  However, the number of people in the
market is expected to grow steadily until at least 2000, and the
percentage of the market DOD needs to meet its personnel requirements
has steadily dropped.  In addition, DOD's surveys of youths'
propensity to join the services have not in the past been good
indicators of who actually enlists. 

GAO has identified the following areas in which DOD may not be
maximizing the cost-effectiveness of its recruiting resources: 

Currently, about one out of every three recruits does not complete
the first term of enlistment.  This rate of attrition significantly
increases the number of people the services need to recruit each
year.  The services have successfully completed various isolated
experiments to reduce attrition; however, these efforts have not
resulted in DOD-wide initiatives. 

Even though the services need fewer recruits because they are
downsizing, some recruiting commanders are increasing or plan to
increase their numbers of recruiters.  However, adding recruiters at
this time may not be cost-efficient. 

Numerous DOD and service studies have recommended ways to consolidate
or eliminate layers of management to reduce costs, but the services
have been reluctant to change existing organizational structures. 

DOD maintains an extensive network of about 6,000 recruiting offices
around the United States to obtain geographic representation for the
services.  However, 50 percent of these offices provide just 13.5
percent of the recruits.  Technological advances have made the need
for a number of these offices less critical. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      SERVICES MAY HAVE OVERSTATED
      FUTURE CHALLENGES IN
      RECRUITING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

DOD and the services are concerned about what they believe are recent
decreases in the size of the recruiting market.  They also believe
that, in the foreseeable future, their ability to attract quality
personnel may be limited by a reduction in the propensity of young
people to join the military (as measured by the annual Youth Attitude
Tracking Survey).  In fact, the Army and Navy recruiting commanders
believe that they may need to lower their current targets for the
quality of their enlistees if the services are to meet their
requirements for numbers of personnel. 

When placed in historical perspective and viewed in the context of
predicted trends, the services' concerns appear to be overstated. 
First, although the size of the youth population shrank between
fiscal years 1980 and 1989, it is now projected to grow steadily
until at least 2000.  Second, the percentage of the market population
DOD needs to meet its requirements has steadily dropped and may reach
a modern-day low by 2000.  Third, though reported propensity to
enlist in the military has dropped in recent years, about half of the
enlistees come from the groups who express negative intentions to
join the military.  Finally, even as propensity to join the military
has dropped in past years, the services have been able to exceed
DOD-established benchmarks for recruit quality. 

Between 1980 and 1984, the services were able to improve the quality
of their recruits and reduce first-term attrition from about 37
percent to around 29 percent.  Attrition since has risen to over 34
percent.\1 Much of this attrition occurs in the first months of
active duty.  This rate of attrition significantly increases the
number of people the services need to recruit each year.  The
services have, through various local experiments, found ways to
reduce attrition, but their efforts have not been initiated DOD-wide
or even throughout any of the services. 


--------------------
\1 GAO obtained data on attrition from the Defense Manpower Data
Center.  These data represent attrition for personnel enlisted
annually from 1974 through 1989 for a 4-year commitment.  The 1989
group completed their enlistments in 1992.  For this period, DOD-wide
annual attrition ranged between 29 percent and 39 percent. 


      SERVICES HAVE RESISTED
      ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

The services have not implemented DOD or service proposals that
involve a rethinking of recruiting organizations and functions.  Some
of these proposals have involved eliminating recruiting management
layers and consolidating recruiting organizations or functional
areas, such as logistics, market research, and advertising.  However,
the services have been reluctant to change existing methods.  The
services have consistently rejected any merging of recruiting across
service lines because they believe that, as the Comptroller of the
Army stated in responding to one such DOD proposal, "there are
tremendous differences in recruiting for each of the Services, most
of which are irreconcilable."

The services have cut personnel from all levels of recruiting in
response to congressional direction to do so in 1992.  At the time of
our review, approximately 22,000 personnel in all services were
involved in recruiting.  However, some of the services now plan to
add recruiters to their staffs.  Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
recruiting commanders believe that these additions are necessary to
meet future recruiting goals.  This report presents evidence to the
contrary, in that historical trends indicate that the relationship
between numbers of recruiters and accessions is unclear because (1)
quota systems discourage recruiters from exceeding quotas for
enlistees; (2) the services have not historically reduced numbers of
recruiters as accession needs have decreased; (3) numbers of
accessions per recruiter have declined over the years; and (4)
service studies suggest that after a certain number of recruiters are
in place, it is more cost-effective to invest in more advertising. 


      DOD HAS CLOSED AND REALIGNED
      RECRUITING OFFICES, BUT
      ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
      EXIST FOR SAVINGS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

During the late 1980s, DOD and the services began to reduce
recruiting facilities' costs by closing or collocating recruiting
offices and eliminating excess space.  However, DOD and the services
have not questioned their assumption that to recruit equitably, the
services should maintain a recruiting presence in most geographical
areas, even if the recruiting offices are unproductive or marginally
productive.  For example, rather than close marginally productive
offices, the Air Force has stretched its recruiting resources thinly,
maintaining 645 recruiting offices that are staffed with only 1
active-duty Air Force recruiter. 

The services have begun to explore various alternatives to fixed
recruiting facilities that could enable them to identify, contact,
and respond to inquiries from potential recruits.  These
alternatives, some of which involve advances in technology, call into
question the traditional functions of the recruiting office. 

The lease cost for DOD's nearly 6,000 recruiting facilities is about
$86 million for fiscal year 1994.  GAO's analysis indicates that
around $13 million of this amount is spent on separate offices for
supervisors.  In addition, 50 percent of DOD's recruiting offices,
which require the assignment of about 2,800 recruiters and cost about
$13.3 million annually to lease, produce just 13.5 percent of
accessions. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries
of the military services to (1) use the results of current studies,
and undertake additional efforts if necessary, to develop a more
cost-effective mix of available recruiting resources; (2)
aggressively test ideas to reduce first-term attrition; (3) continue
efforts to streamline the current recruiting bureaucracy, eliminating
layers where possible; (4) revalidate the recruiting quota systems,
which currently deter recruiters from maximizing the numbers of
enlistments; (5) encourage the development and expansion, as
appropriate, of new concepts in the management of military recruiting
facilities; and (6) routinely incorporate more in-depth cost-benefit
analyses in decisions to maintain or establish new recruiting offices
and to evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining offices in less
productive areas of the country. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that GAO had
provided a broad overview of very complex issues but did not
acknowledge the full scope of DOD's initiatives to achieve
recruitment goals cost-effectively.  DOD stated that it is committed
to using modern and effective business practices to attract and
enlist young people and plans to give priority to its ongoing
evaluation of recruiting organizational structures, consolidation of
resources, and adaptation of new technologies. 

DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations concerning the mix of
recruiting resources, the quota systems, and recruiting offices. 
While DOD also concurred with the need to reduce first-term
attrition, streamline the bureaucracy, and encourage new concepts in
the management of recruiting facilities, it did not want to commit to
major changes before reviewing the results of several evaluative
efforts recently started. 

GAO appreciates the need for DOD to complete certain current
initiatives before changes are initiated in some areas.  However, GAO
continues to believe that (1) more aggressive efforts than those
cited by DOD are needed to lower attrition on a DOD-wide basis in
order to minimize the resources required to support the services'
recruiting and training operations; (2) the services should
reevaluate the need for management layers that previous studies have
concluded could be eliminated, particularly since the Office of the
Secretary of Defense-directed study to examine the consolidation of
logistics support functions for the service recruiting commands could
result in reduced workloads at those layers; and (3) if tests prove
successful, expansion of the experimental process for consolidating
recruiting facilities in large metropolitan areas should be pursued
rapidly. 

DOD comments and GAO's evaluation of them have been incorporated
throughout this report.  DOD's comments are presented in their
entirety in appendix II along with some added GAO notes. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

During the past several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
been downsizing its forces substantially and recruiting fewer
personnel to support a smaller All-Volunteer Force.  At the same
time, total expenditures for military recruiting have also been cut. 
For fiscal
year 1994, the services' recruiting budget for active-duty officers
and enlisted personnel is $1.3 billion.  The cost of recruiting
189,600 active enlisted personnel accounts for about $1.1 billion of
this total. 


   ADVENT OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER
   FORCE NECESSITATED CHANGES IN
   MILITARY RECRUITING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

During the first several years following the creation of the
All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the military services generally had
success attracting volunteers.  However, the recruiting situation
deteriorated rapidly beginning in 1977.  In fiscal years 1975 and
1976, the services had actually exceeded their numerical goals for
recruiting volunteers, yet by 1979, they were achieving only 90
percent of their goals.  Moreover, the quality of new recruits had
declined significantly. 

Quality is measured in terms of (1) educational level (for example,
high school or general equivalency degrees) and (2) performance on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which is a composite of 4
of the
10 components of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB).  The services use the recruit's educational level as a
predictor of attrition and AFQT scores as indicators of overall
eligibility to enter the services and of qualifications for specific
military jobs.  AFQT scores are stratified into six
levels--categories I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IV, and V--and are used as
indicators of trainability.  Recruits placed in categories I, II, and
IIIA represent those who test in the top 50th percentile; those
placed in categories IIIB, IV, and V are those in the bottom 50th
percentile. 

In 1975 and 1976, about 5 percent of new recruits had scored in
category IV of the AFQT.  By fiscal year 1980, over 35 percent were
in this category.  Concern over recruit quality peaked in 1980, when
DOD reported that it had made an error in scoring the ASVAB in 1976. 
Because of DOD's mistake in the formula for scaling scores to
establish norms, applicants who had tested in the lower ranges of the
ability distribution were given inflated scores between 1976 and
1980.  This meant that for 4 years, the services had been enlisting
individuals of poorer quality than they wanted. 

Congressional concern over recruit quality was demonstrated in fiscal
year 1981, when Congress passed legislation establishing the
following parameters: 

65 percent of nonprior-service recruits\1 must be high school
graduates;

after September 30, 1982, no more than 20 percent of annual
accessions can be individuals who score in category IV of the AFQT;

category IV individuals who are enlisted must be high school
graduates; and

category V individuals are not eligible for military service. 

Also during the early 1980s, Congress increased military pay and
recruiting budgets to offer bonuses and funding for education for
service applicants and approved increases in advertising expenditures
to attract higher quality recruits. 

By 1986, all services met or exceeded their overall enlistment
objectives.  Recruit quality was at historically high levels.  The
percentage of recruits with high school diplomas increased from 72
percent during the 1964-73 draft period to 92 percent in 1986.  Also,
64 percent of new recruits in 1986 scored in the top categories of
the AFQT.  This percentage was up from 38 percent in 1980. 


--------------------
\1 According to the specific language in the legislation, this
provision applies only to male recruits. 


   RECRUITING PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

While the services use advertising as a tool to increase prospective
applicants' awareness of and propensity to enlist, the services
believe that face-to-face contact with a military recruiter is
necessary to actually enlist applicants.  To provide this contact,
the services maintain recruiting offices throughout the country and
overseas.  Recruiting officials believe it is essential that
recruiters be uniformed representatives of their respective services
and that they accurately and positively portray military life.  In
many cases, recruiters are applicants' sole source of information on
the benefits of their services.  Recruiters provide information on
military jobs, associated training, financial incentives, terms of
enlistment, and the unique lifestyles offered by the services. 
Recruiters convey their message by several means, such as making
presentations at area high schools, canvasing places of employment,
and contacting prospective enlistees directly.  The Army estimates
that a recruiter makes over 100 contacts to enlist a single quality
recruit.  In some services, recruiters are evaluated on the numbers
and qualifications of individuals they enlist. 

Once applicants have decided to enlist in a military service, the
recruiter schedules them for processing at the nearest Military
Entrance Processing Station (MEPS).  At the MEPS, applicants take the
ASVAB--if they have not already taken it at a high school or other
testing site--and are given medical examinations.  They also meet
with representatives of their chosen service.  These service
representatives provide lists of military occupations for which the
applicants are qualified on the basis of their AFQT scores and
certain other factors, such as medical or moral qualifications.  For
example, applicants who are colorblind would not be eligible for
positions requiring perfect eyesight; however, they could still
enlist. 

Once an applicant has chosen a military job, the service
representative at the MEPS draws up a contract for either the Delayed
Entry Program (DEP) or immediate active or reserve duty.  Nearly all
applicants join the DEP; that is, they do not immediately report for
active duty until up to 1 year later.  The services require several
months to complete background investigations and await applicants'
completion of high school and receipt of transcripts.  During their
time in the DEP, enlistees are members of the inactive reserve, and
they are required by the services to report to their recruiters
periodically.  Recruiters may monitor their enlistees' progress in
high school and attempt to sustain the enlistees' interest in the
service.  At the completion of the DEP, the enlistee returns to the
MEPS, undergoes a short medical examination, and is sworn into the
service.  After recruits are sworn in, they are shipped to basic
training locations. 


   SERVICES TARGET 17- TO
   21-YEAR-OLD YOUTHS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

All the services target 17- to 21-year-old high school graduates who
score in the upper categories of the AFQT.  The services believe that
individuals between 17 and 21 years of age are more likely to
consider joining the military than they are at any other age.  Since
1990, 83 to 88 percent of those who joined the services each year
have been in this age group.  The services have also found that
individuals who graduated from high school and score in the upper
categories of the AFQT do better on a variety of military performance
measures than their lower scoring counterparts.  The services also
believe that quality recruits are less likely to pose discipline
problems and are more likely to complete their first terms of
enlistment. 


   SERVICES USE ADVERTISING TO
   ENCOURAGE ENLISTMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

The military services have a variety of marketing and advertising
techniques at their disposal to attract members of their target
market.  In addition to the individuals the services ultimately hope
to enlist, the target market includes people who may influence a
prospective recruit's decision to enlist.  These "influencers"
include parents, coaches, and teachers.  Service advertising is
designed to appeal to both potential applicants and their
influencers.  Each service employs an advertising agency to develop
and/or execute advertising programs.  Advertising methods range from
the most visible and expensive form--paid national television--to
public service announcements, national and local radio spots, and
mass mailings. 

DOD's advertising budgets increased through the mid-1980s.  In
particular, between fiscal years 1980 and 1986, advertising
expenditures for active enlisted recruiting grew from $149.3 million
to $180.7 million, an increase of 21 percent in constant 1994
dollars.  Advertising expenditures as a percentage of the total DOD
recruiting budget remained relatively stable during the period,
ranging from 10 to 11 percent.  From their peak in fiscal year 1986,
however, active enlisted recruiting budgets were cut significantly
for all four services, from $180.7 million in fiscal year 1986 to
$73.8 million programmed for fiscal year 1994, a decline of almost 60
percent.  Advertising as a percentage of the total DOD recruiting
budget fell below 7 percent by fiscal year 1994. 

The services have studied advertising and its relationship to
propensity and have observed that the decline in youth's propensity
to enlist in the military corresponds to the decline in advertising
budgets.  According to an Army official, reductions in advertising
budgets have reduced the services' ability to generate a positive
public image and counter negative perceptions created by media
coverage of downsizing and conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia.  The
services believe that sufficient continuous advertising will have a
direct effect on reversing the decline in propensity. 


   RECRUITING TRENDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

Budgets for recruiting active enlisted personnel peaked in 1986 at
about $1.6 billion (in constant 1994 dollars)--a 23-percent increase
over the 1980 total of about $1.3 billion.  From 1986, the budgets
fell to a low of $1.1 billion in 1994--a reduction of about 31
percent.  For fiscal year 1995, DOD has requested over $1 billion. 
Figure 1.1 shows the four services' active enlisted recruiting
budgets from 1980 to 1995. 

   Figure 1.1:  Services'
   Recruiting Budgets for Active
   Enlisted Personnel

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Data for 1995 are budget requests as of June 1994. 

Between 1980 and 1994, annual enlistments for active force personnel
also dropped, by over 50 percent (see fig.  1.2). 

   Figure 1.2:  Annual Accessions
   for Active Enlisted Personnel

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Data for 1995 are DOD accession targets as of June 1994. 

Because funding between 1980 and 1994 went down about 15 percent and
accessions of active-duty enlisted personnel went down over 50
percent, the average cost per accession rose--from $3,261 in 1980 to
$5,401 in 1994, an increase of over 65 percent.  In fiscal year 1994,
the Army had the highest cost per accession at $6,956, and the Air
Force the lowest at $3,440.  The Marine Corps' cost per accession
stood at $5,127, and the Navy's at $4,655.  Figure 1.3 shows active
enlisted costs per accession from 1980 to 1995. 

   Figure 1.3:  Cost per Accession
   for Active Enlisted Personnel

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Costs are calculated based on projected data for 1995 as of June
1994. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6

DOD concurred with all of the information discussed in this chapter
with the exception of our calculation of the costs per accession for
the period 1980 through 1995.  DOD commented that we distorted the
overall cost savings associated with the services' recruiting
programs by basing our evaluation of the cost per accession only on
basic recruiting costs.  Further, DOD stated that certain fixed costs
would increase the average cost per recruit during a drawdown and
that projecting costs for force-sustainment level recruiting would
present a much more accurate assessment of recruiting. 

We believe that our analysis of cost per accession is both valid and
proper.  Computing an average by dividing the total costs associated
with a particular output is a generally accepted method for
identifying and tracking trends in most organizations and operations. 

Further, although DOD suggests that increases in the cost per
accession can be attributed to its drawdown, our analysis shows that
the cost per accession has generally been on an upward trend since
1980 and that a substantial part of each service's increase occurred
before the drawdown started. 

Regarding a projection of costs for force-sustainment level
recruiting, DOD did not provide the data required to make such a
projection.  Moreover, on the basis of our analysis of the costs and
types of costs associated with DOD's recruiting operations, we doubt
that sustainment-level recruiting would have a major impact on the
average cost per accession.  We believe that cost increases resulting
from, among other things, additional military pay for more
recruiters, increased training and support for more recruiters, and
additional advertising would largely offset the lowering effect that
would result from increased accessions. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:7

Concerned about the size of DOD's recruiting budget and the
efficiency of its recruiting operations, Senator David Pryor asked us
to survey military recruiting operations and identify areas in which
DOD could reduce its recruiting costs without adversely affecting its
ability to meet military personnel requirements.  Specifically, GAO's
objectives were to evaluate (1) recruiting challenges the services
face in the size of the youth market and its propensity to join the
military, (2) the services' future plans for recruiting staffs and
organizations, and (3) the services' management of their recruiting
facilities.  This report focuses on the largest consumer of
resources--recruiting for active enlisted personnel. 

To obtain a general overview of recruiting results and
cost-effectiveness, we reviewed DOD and service research studies in
the area of military recruiting.  We met with representatives of
organizations such as the Rand Corporation and the Army Research
Institute, which also study recruiting. 

We interviewed officials from DOD's Office of Accession Policy; the
Army, the Air Force, and the Navy recruiting commands; and the
Military Entrance Processing Command to obtain their views on the
evolution and current status of recruiting and problems they have
experienced or foresee in adjusting to budget cuts and military
downsizing.  We also interviewed officials from the Naval Audit
Service and the Congressional Budget Office. 

We did very limited work on Marine Corps' recruiting because during
our review, the Naval Audit Service was auditing the Marine Corps
Recruiting Command, and the Command was undergoing major
restructuring.  We have, however, included the Marine Corps in most
of the data and in narrative, where possible. 

To identify areas for potential cost savings, we obtained data on (1)
accessions by service and DOD-wide between fiscal years 1980 and
1994, (2) the quality of recruits between fiscal years 1980 and 1993,
(3) individual service budgets, (4) recruiters and support personnel,
(5) recruiting offices by county and their associated costs between
fiscal years 1991 and 1994, and (6) attrition by service and DOD-wide
for active-duty personnel between fiscal years 1974 and 1989. 

We conducted our review between July 1993 and August 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


FUTURE CHALLENGES IN RECRUITING
MAY HAVE BEEN OVERSTATED
============================================================ Chapter 2

In a 1994 congressional testimony, the services' recruiting
commanders stated that additional recruiting funds were essential to
successfully recruit the numbers and quality of enlisted personnel
they would need in the future.  They expressed concern about a
decrease in the size of the youth population and in youths'
propensity to enlist in the military over the past decade.  They
believe that recruiting will be more difficult than it has been in
the past and that advertising dollars are crucial in overcoming these
problems.  Two of the services' recruiting commanders also stated
that upcoming recruiting difficulties may force their services to
lower the current standards for the quality of their enlistees if the
services are to meet their requirements for numbers of personnel. 

We found these concerns to be overstated because (1) the size of the
target recruiting population is growing; (2) DOD does not need as
large a percentage of the market to meet its requirements as it has
in the past; (3) although propensity to enlist in the military has
dropped in recent years, about half of the enlistees have come from
the groups who expressed negative intentions to join the military;
and (4) even as propensity has dropped in recent years, the services
have maintained recruit quality well above DOD-established
benchmarks. 

During the 1980s, the services improved the quality of their recruits
and therefore reduced first-term attrition from about 37 percent in
1980 to around 29 percent in 1984.  Attrition has since risen to over
34 percent.\1 These attrition rates significantly increase the
numbers of personnel DOD must enlist each year.  The services have
undertaken various experiments that have been successful in reducing
attrition, but these efforts have not resulted in DOD-wide
initiatives. 


--------------------
\1 We obtained data on attrition from the Defense Manpower Data
Center.  These data represent attrition for personnel enlisted
annually from 1974 through 1989 for a 4-year commitment.  The 1989
group completed their enlistments in 1992.  For this period, DOD-wide
attrition ranged from a high of 39 percent to a low of 29 percent. 


   SERVICES' CONCERNS WITH SIZE OF
   YOUTH POPULATION ARE OVERSTATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee's
Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee, the services' recruiting
commanders outlined the challenges their services face in meeting
recruiting targets, strategies for meeting these challenges, and
funding needs.  All the commanders shared the view that recruiting is
more difficult than it has been in the past and that advertising
dollars are crucial to overcoming a reduction in the services' target
population and youths' lowered propensity to join the military. 

During the testimony, the Commander of the Navy Recruiting Command
stated that "the pool of 17 to 21 year-old males and females has
decreased significantly over the past decade.  .  .  and is now at
its lowest point since the inception of the All Volunteer Force." The
Air Force Recruiting Service Commander stated that the market of
those qualified to enter the Air Force was 85 percent of what it was
in the early 1980s. 

Our review indicated that the services' concern about a shrinking
market may be overstated.  It is true that the target recruiting
population decreased between 1980 and 1989, from 20.5 million to 17.6
million.  Since fiscal year 1989, however, this population has
increased, and continued growth is projected until at least the year
2000, when it is

   Figure 2.1:  Size of the Youth
   Population Between 1980 and
   2000

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Figures for 1980-89 are based on 1980 census data; figures for
1990-2000 are based on 1990 census data. 

Source:  Defense Manpower Data Center. 

In addition, the percentage of the total target population that the
services must recruit to meet their accession needs has been
decreasing, with some fluctuations, since fiscal year 1980--from
nearly 2 percent to around 1 percent in fiscal years 1994 and 1995
(see table 2.1).  DOD projects that by 2000 the fraction of youth
needed for recruiting will likely reach an historical low. 



                          Table 2.1
           
            Percentage of the Youth Population DOD
            Needed to Meet Accession Requirements

                                               Percentage of
                                                  population
                       Size of                     needed to
                        target      Accession           meet
Fiscal year         Population    requirement    requirement
---------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
1980                20,493,049        389,861           1.90
1981                20,327,668        367,240           1.81
1982                20,087,350        338,223           1.68
1983                19,539,986        330,815           1.69
1984                19,006,339        328,457           1.73
1985                18,415,983        316,676           1.72
1986                17,953,275        333,550           1.86
1987                17,740,140        316,826           1.79
1988                17,773,315        286,763           1.61
1989                17,586,928        293,896           1.67
1990                18,626,642        232,306           1.25
1991                18,354,717        206,617           1.13
1992                18,257,698        202,752           1.11
1993                18,256,680        206,927           1.13
1994                18,318,454        189,619           1.04
1995\a              18,409,902        195,421           1.06
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Figures for 1995 are projections as of June 1994. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 


   NEGATIVE PROPENSITY GROUPS
   PROVIDE ABOUT HALF OF DOD
   ACCESSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

The services consider propensity to enlist in the military, as
measured by the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), to be a
crucial measure of the difficulty of the recruiting environment.  The
services have found a correlation between positive propensity and
actual enlistment, and they believe that the higher the percentage of
youth who express a propensity to enlist, the easier it is for
recruiters to access personnel.  The military services have stated
that youths' propensity to enlist in the military is at its lowest
point in many years.  They believe that this drop indicates that
recruiting will be even more difficult in the future.  Though youths'
propensity to enlist in the military is indeed down, the services'
data on propensity historically has not always been a reliable
indicator of who actually enlists in the military. 

Each year for the last 18 years, DOD has sponsored a YATS to gather
information from American youth on their perceptions of the military
and their future plans in general.  Approximately 10,000 men and
women between the ages of 16 and 24 are interviewed for 30 minutes by
telephone.  The questionnaire focuses primarily on enlistment
propensity.  Youth are asked several questions about the likelihood
of their serving in the active or reserve military services in the
near future.  They are asked how likely they are to join the
military, and each service in particular, in the next few years. 
Those who answer that they "definitely" or "probably" will enlist are
categorized as indicating "positive propensity"; those who answer
that they will "probably not" or "definitely not" or "don't know" are
categorized as indicating "negative propensity." Each year, DOD
distributes the results of this survey to the individual services. 

Positive propensity to enlist in a military service has been falling
for several years.  Positive propensity to enlist among 16- to
21-year-old males decreased by almost 17 percent (from 32 percent to
26.6 percent) between 1989 and 1992.  Service officials have
attributed the drop to a number of factors, including a decrease in
advertising, a lack of knowledge on the part of the public that the
services are still hiring, concern over the dangers of military
service due to conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia, and concern over DOD
budget cuts that are perceived as making the services an unsafe
career choice. 

However, propensity data are not always reliable indicators of what
people will do.  According to a Rand study, though those who indicate
positive propensity are indeed more likely to join the military,
about half of DOD enlistees have come from the groups that expressed
negative intention.  This is because those in the negative propensity
group represent a much larger percentage of the population and a much
greater pool.  The Army, for example, projected that over 70 percent
of its enlistments for 1993 came from those who had expressed
negative propensity to join the military.  It also projected that
almost 42 percent of Army enlistments in 1993 came from the group who
said they would definitely not join, while less than 9 percent of
enlistments came from the group stating they would definitely
consider enlisting. 

The services' concerns about perceptions that the military is not
hiring, that it is now too dangerous, or that budget cuts make the
military unattractive as a career option have not been validated by
YATS data.  In the 1993 survey, for example, 81 percent of
respondents said that they thought the services were still
recruiting, despite downsizing.  This figure is up from 79 percent in
1992.  In addition, 56 percent of respondents in 1993 said that
budget cuts would not affect their attitude toward enlistment, up
from 54 percent in 1992.  Finally, the percentage of respondents who
stated that danger was the single main reason for not considering
enlistment fell from 1990 to 1992. 


   DESPITE DROPS IN PROPENSITY,
   QUALITY HAS REMAINED WELL ABOVE
   BENCHMARKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Despite drops in propensity in recent years, recruit quality has
remained well above DOD-established benchmarks.  Even so, in recent
congressional testimony, the Army and Navy recruiting commanders
expressed the fear that their services might have to lower enlistment
quality targets to meet upcoming accession needs.  The Army's
recruiting commander stated that the Army may need to reexamine
whether it will be able to sustain its current quality standards for
new enlisted recruits as it approaches fiscal year 1996, when its
accession goals are expected to increase.  Similarly, the Navy's
recruiting commander believes that it may be necessary to review the
Navy's targets for recruit quality in light of future recruiting
challenges. 

To help analyze the services' quality requirements, DOD, in
conjunction with the National Research Council, concluded that having
90 percent high school graduates and 60 percent scoring in categories
I through IIIA were benchmarks to which the services should aspire. 
Historical records of recruit quality indicate that the services have
generally remained above these benchmarks since the mid-1980s.  The
percentage of enlistees who have high school diplomas and who score
above the 50th percentile on the AFQT has grown steadily (see fig. 
2.2).  In fact, 1992 represented the highest point since 1980 for
recruit quality. 

   Figure 2.2:  Increase in the
   Quality of Recruits Since 1980

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

As recruit quality has improved, the services' targets have
correspondingly increased.  These targets have tended to move upwards
to match the actual results each service has experienced.  For
example, DOD's 1985 report on its quality requirements for the 5-year
period 1985-89, basically reflected the recruiting results of 1984. 
Stated requirements for high school graduates ranged from 80 to 95
percent, with an average of 88 percent for DOD.  The requirements for
enlistees in categories I through IIIA averaged 61 percent.  The
percentage of category IV recruits ranged from 4 to 12, with a DOD
average of 9 percent.  In the early 1990s, as the services were even
more successful in acquiring quality recruits, the targets moved
upward to reflect that experience. 

Table 2.2 shows the services' current targets for recruit quality. 
All are well above DOD's benchmarks of 90 percent high school
graduates and 60 percent scoring in AFQT categories I through IIIA. 



                          Table 2.2
           
            Legislative, DOD, and Service Targets
                     for Recruit Quality

             (Percentages of enlisted accessions)

                                   Scorers in
Benchmark/         High school  categories I-     Scorers in
target               graduates           IIIA    category IV
---------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
Legislative                 65            Not            <20
 requirement                       applicable
DOD benchmark               90             60            Not
                                                  applicable
Army target                 95             67             <2
Navy target                 95             62              0
Air Force                   99             80             <1
 target
Marine Corps                95             63             <1
 target
------------------------------------------------------------

   ATTRITION HAS INCREASED DURING
   THE LATE 1980S
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Between 1980 and 1984, the attrition rate for enlisted personnel
during their first term dropped from about 37 percent to 29 percent. 
However, this rate has since risen to over 34 percent.  First-term
attrition is costly to the services because replacements must be
recruited and trained at an average cost of over $20,000 each.  As
the services successfully lower attrition rates, their enlistment
needs and demands on recruiters correspondingly decrease.  Though the
services have done studies of the causes of attrition and have
conducted experiments to lower the attrition rate, they have not been
able to lower it below its current plateau.  At present, about one of
three recruits does not complete his or her first enlistment term of
duty, which typically is 4 years.  Much of this attrition occurs in
the first months of active duty.  Figure 2.3 shows attrition rates
from 1974 to 1989, which was the last year for which there was
complete data on personnel who completed their first terms. 

   Figure 2.3:  Historical Changes
   in First-Term Attrition Rates

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Researchers have investigated several factors that influence
attrition during the first term of enlistment.  These include
educational credentials, gender, age, race, enlistment term, and
military occupational specialty.  According to DOD and the services,
the most important of these variables in determining a recruit's
attrition rate is educational attainment.  Most researchers equate
high school degrees with lower attrition rates.  A second predictor
of lower attrition rate is AFQT scores.  Those who score in the upper
50th percentile of the AFQT have historically also had lower
attrition rates.  While the services have reduced attrition rates
slightly by recruiting higher quality recruits, marginal increases in
quality appear to have limited potential for further reducing
attrition. 

Despite a considerable number of studies of attrition, DOD and the
services have not been able to define accurate predictors of
attrition beyond educational credentials and AFQT scores.  That is,
DOD and the services have not successfully isolated causal linkages
between recruiting methods and targets and first-term attrition. 
Although research has been done to define better predictors of
attrition and provide information to recruiting staff on attrition
from basic military training, the services have not successfully
lowered attrition rates below their current plateau. 

To reduce attrition from Basic Military Training (BMT), the Air Force
Recruiting Service attempts to ensure that recruits are physically
prepared for BMT; encourages recruiters to identify applicants'
medical conditions that would prevent their success in BMT; and
provides to groups, squadrons, flights, and recruiters feedback on
graduation rates and numbers of honor graduates from BMT.  According
to recruiting officials, these actions have had positive effects on
BMT attrition rates.  However, they were not able to tie these
effects directly to decreased attrition. 

In the fall of 1993, the Air Force Recruiting Service did a study to
determine the reasons for that year's increase in BMT attrition. 
(The rate rose from about 6 percent in fiscal year 1992 to about 9
percent in fiscal year 1993.) The study showed that lower recruit
quality (in terms of AFQT scores) played a very small role in the
increase.  The study instead attributed most of the increase in BMT
attrition to losses for medical reasons.  The primary reason for
higher medical losses, according to the study, was stricter
application of medical standards by BMT medical personnel.  According
to Air Force Recruiting Service officials, the Air Force is now more
lenient in releasing recruits from BMT because it is concerned about
preventing training deaths. 

The Air Force is conducting research on better ways to use ASVAB
subscores to predict attrition.  The Air Force now uses ASVAB
subscores that measure mechanical, administrative, general, and
electronic ability.  The Air Force hopes to find alternate subscores
that are more predictive of attrition for various skills.  Another
program that may offer promise to all the services in lowering
attrition during BMT is the nonprior service orientation now offered
by the Oklahoma Army National Guard and Air National Guard units. 
The program began in 1988 as an attempt to reduce BMT attrition
rates.  The Air National Guard's BMT attrition rate at that time was
17 percent, one of the worst rates in the nation.  As a result of
this program, that rate has remained at less than 1 percent for 6
years. 

The orientation lasts only 2 days and is taught at the Oklahoma
Military Academy.  After recruits have joined the Guard but before
they attend BMT, they are put through a simulation of basic training,
including some lectures, but mostly marching, drills, and physical
training. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

In commenting on this chapter, DOD concurred with our findings on
attrition and the services' success in increasing and maintaining
recruit quality rates.  However, DOD disagreed with certain
observations concerning the size of the youth population and some of
our observations about propensity. 

DOD took issue with our analysis of youth population trend data,
based on 1980 and 1990 Census Bureau information, which indicates
that the size of the pool bottomed out in 1989 instead of 1993, as
according to DOD.  The information contained in this report was the
most current available when we performed our analysis.  More
importantly, DOD acknowledged our key point about youth population;
that is, the size of the pool is projected to increase in future
years. 

DOD addressed other factors it believes adversely affect any analysis
of the youth population and the services' ability to recruit
sufficient numbers.  Specifically, DOD commented that (1) the youth
population will grow only 1 percent between 1994 and 1996, while
projected accessions will grow about 13 percent; (2) a change in the
demographic characteristics of the youth population, for example, an
increasing percentage of Hispanics, indicates increasing recruiting
challenges; and (3) an increase in the percentage of high school
graduates going to college and those who are medically or morally
unfit to serve will reduce the numbers available to recruit. 

However, based on findings contained in a May 1994 RAND Corporation
study, "Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications:  Preliminary
Analysis and Recommendations," the factors DOD cites appear to be
moot in terms of their impact on the size of the pool of quality
youth for recruitment.  This study estimated the potential supply of
high quality enlistees for 1994 and for fiscal year 1996 and compared
these estimates with the pre-drawdown levels of fiscal year 1989. 
The study found that the prospective supply equals or exceeds that of
pre-drawdown levels and concluded that the supply of high quality
youth to recruit for military service should be adequate. 

Regarding propensity, DOD commented that we had reflected some of the
difficulties associated with recruiting in a negative propensity
environment but did not present a complete and accurate view of the
situation.  DOD stated that propensity is not intended to identify
who will enlist but is a much broader tool for determining how much
effort and resources will be required to meet recruiting objectives. 
DOD also stated that the 1994 RAND study confirmed that the lower the
propensity of a youth population to enlist, the more resources would
be required for each enlistment. 

We agree that propensity data is useful for gaining insights on the
recruiting environment; however, we continue to believe that the
services' concerns about propensity trends have been overstated in
the recent past.  Our view is supported by the recent RAND study,
which concentrates on the high quality component of the youth
population, that is, those individuals who are the services' prime
target for recruiting. 

In the RAND study, propensity for the quality component of the youth
population was reestimated to correct a sampling change, implemented
in the 1991 YATS survey, which had the unexpected effect of lowering
positive propensity rates.  Overall, the study concluded that the
trends from 1989 to 1993 suggest that the propensity of high quality
youth to enlist was stabilizing.  Specifically, propensity to enlist
increased during the Persian Gulf crisis, declined between 1991 and
1992, then leveled off or increased slightly between 1992 and 1993,
which placed the 1993 rate near or above that of the late 1980s.  In
other words, the propensity of high quality youth to enlist exceeded
or equaled the pre-drawdown level during 1990-93. 

The study also observed that (1) about 75 percent of the male youth
population expressed a negative propensity to enlist; however, this
group accounts for about half of all enlistees because of its large
size and (2) the potential supply of youth for enlistment will move
up or down with the propensity level, but the supply level would not
change in proportion to the change in the propensity level; that is,
a 10-percent drop in propensity would lead to only about a 3-percent
drop in potential supply. 


OPPORTUNITIES TO STREAMLINE
RECRUITING STAFFS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Military budgets and accession requirements have been dropping for
several years, as the size of U.S.  military forces has been reduced. 
During this time, a number of initiatives to reduce the size of
recruiting staffs have been implemented, and several proposals to
streamline recruiting organizations have been made. 

Most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 (which was enacted in October 1992) required the services to
reduce by 10 percent the numbers of personnel carrying out recruiting
activities in the active forces and the National Guard.  This cut was
to be taken by the end of fiscal year 1994 from 1992 levels.  The
services initially responded by cutting personnel from all levels of
recruiting, but some are now planning increases in staff.  Our review
indicates that increasing the number of recruiters may not be
necessary. 

Although the military services have reduced the size of different
recruiting management layers, the basic recruiting structure remains
intact.  Past DOD, service, and congressional proposals include the
elimination of certain recruiting command management layers; the
consolidation of common logistical support functions into one support
command; the establishment of a joint DOD recruiting organization;
the consolidation of each service's reserve, active, and Guard
recruiting; and the consolidation of medical recruiting activities. 
While such proposals have been discussed, few have been implemented,
generally because the services have been reluctant to change
organizations and methods that have worked in the past. 


   SERVICES' PLANS FOR FUTURE
   STAFFING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required
the services to cut their 1992 recruiting staffs by 10 percent by the
end of fiscal year 1994.  However, the fiscal year 1995 National
Defense Authorization Act repealed this required reduction.  While a
few of the services had stated at the time of our review that they
had no specific plans to respond to a repeal, three of the services
believed that additions to recruiting staffs would be necessary in
the near future. 

In response to the 1993 authorization act, all the services planned
to cut recruiting staffs by at least the required 10 percent. 
However, because these cuts were to be made by the end of fiscal year
1994, at the time of our review, most of the services' cuts had not
been finalized. 

The Air Force is the only service that anticipates no near-term
increases in recruiting staff.  The Air Force Recruiting Service
Commander believes that no additions to recruiting staffs are
necessary unless accession goals rise substantially.  Because the
Navy had begun a 17-percent rather than a 10-percent cut to its
recruiting personnel, it has now decided to incrementally add back
360 people to its recruiting force by the end of the year.  The
Marine Corps and the Army believe that additions to recruiting staffs
will alleviate difficulties they foresee in the future.  The Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has authorized 5,350 recruiters
for fiscal year 1995.  This represents about a 27-percent increase
(1,150 recruiters) over the earlier planned fiscal year 1994 level. 


   ADDING RECRUITERS MAY NOT BE
   NECESSARY TO MEET FUTURE
   ACCESSION GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

We do not believe that more recruiters are required to meet projected
accession targets.  The services' belief that they need to add
recruiters suggests that current accessions per recruiter are
maximized.  Our analysis, however, indicated that the relationship
between numbers of recruiters and accessions is unclear because (1)
the recruiters' quota system places artificial constraints on their
numbers of accessions; (2) the services have not historically reduced
numbers of recruiters as accession needs have gone down; (3) the
numbers of accessions per recruiter have declined over the years; and
(4) service studies suggest that after a certain number of recruiters
are in place, it is more cost-effective to invest in more
advertising. 

According to Army officials, the quota system rewards recruiters and
recruiting organizations for achieving the missions they are assigned
by headquarters.  Overproduction is not rewarded.  In fact, in the
current system, a recruiter's overproduction during one year could
result in a rise in the recruiter's quota for the next year.  The
higher quota in subsequent years would require more work from the
recruiter and increase the possibility of the recruiter's missing the
quota and receiving a career-damaging performance evaluation.  These
effects of the quota system and past performance suggest that
recruiters could produce more recruits than they are currently.  Army
officials told us that the Army is experimenting with changes to the
quota system to reward overproduction. 

Recruiter productivity has also been negatively affected by the fact
that most of the services have not reduced their numbers of
recruiters as accession needs have decreased.  The number of
accessions per recruiter fell by almost half from 1980 to 1994
DOD-wide (see fig.  3.1).  This decrease is the direct result of a
substantial drop in the numbers of enlisted accessions (over 50
percent), while the numbers of recruiters dropped only slightly (13
percent). 

   Figure 3.1:  DOD- wide Trends
   in Accessions per Recruiter

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Numbers of accessions per recruiter demonstrated wide variations by
service between fiscal years 1980 and 1994.  The decline in
accessions per recruiter was most striking in the Army, where it fell
by over 60 percent.  The Navy's accessions per recruiter fell over 34
percent, and the Air Force's by almost 35 percent.  Marine Corps'
accessions per recruiter, on the other hand, increased slightly.  The
Marine Corps, unlike the other services, reduced its recruiting force
as its accessions decreased. 

Several recent Army studies suggest that after a certain point,
adding more recruiters may not result in added accessions.  A
preliminary study recently done for the Army by the Naval
Postgraduate School suggests that the number of recruiters is only
slightly correlated with the number of accessions.  An internal Army
Recruiting Command study concludes that the number of recruiters is
negatively correlated with the number of accessions.  Both studies
found much higher correlations between advertising budgets and
numbers of accessions. 


   CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS HAVE
   BEEN REJECTED BY THE SERVICES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Over the years, various proposals have been made to consolidate
various recruiting functions for all the services.  The services,
however, have consistently rejected any merging of recruiting across
service lines because they believe that, as the Army's Comptroller
has stated in responding to one such DOD proposal, "there are
tremendous differences in recruiting for each of the Services, most
of which are irreconcilable."

A Defense Management Review in fiscal year 1990 proposed two
alternatives involving the consolidation of service recruiting
organizations and functions.  The first was to merge the services'
recruiting organizations into one command.  Recruiting offices would
remain service-unique and be staffed by individual service
recruiters.  DOD estimated that implementation of this proposal could
have resulted in a savings of $27 million in fiscal year 1993 and
over $240 million through fiscal year 1997.  The second alternative
proposed the consolidation of support functions, including
advertising, under a recruiting support command.  Implementation of
this alternative was estimated to save about $13 million in fiscal
year 1992 and over $150 million through fiscal year 1997. 

In written comments, none of the service recruiting organizations
favored consolidating their recruiting headquarters functions. 
Rather than responding with thorough analyses and rebuttals to the
management review, the services dismissed the proposal out of their
reluctance to alter methods that had succeeded for them in the past. 
For example, the Army's response was that "a major, radical change to
our way of doing business--combined with the turbulence of personnel
reductions while entering an era of uncertainty--will surely disrupt
mission accomplishment." The Navy's position was that "creating a
single recruiting bureaucracy would eventually erode [the] strong
identification with service, reduce the recruiter's emotional
involvement, and create an atmosphere where quantity, not quality, is
the major objective." Accordingly, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
rejected the proposal and stated that "to jeopardize the recruiting
success we have enjoyed in recent years would be unconscionable."

While the services rejected combined service recruiting entirely,
they acknowledged that there might be some merit in consolidating
various support functions, such as the procurement and management of
vehicles, telecommunications, and recruiting facilities.  The
services did not support the consolidation of advertising.  In
January 1994, DOD officials began to reconsider the issue of
consolidating support functions for the recruiting commands.  DOD has
tasked the Military Entrance Processing Command with taking the lead
on a task force to study the concept.  The task force was scheduled
to begin its work in October 1994. 

Another consolidation idea that DOD has discussed but not acted on is
joint medical recruiting.  Although some DOD officials believe that
joint medical recruiting would help the services solve problems in
attracting qualified medical personnel, most service recruiting
commands are opposed to this concept.  Some services believe that
their needs for medical personnel differ from those of the other
services and that it would therefore not be feasible to recruit
jointly. 

Though the Air Force and the Navy initiated their own proposals for
consolidating active and reserve recruiting, they ultimately rejected
these proposals in favor of continuing their proven successful ways
of doing business.  In January 1992, the Air Force began a formal
discussion on combining its active, reserve, and Guard recruiting in
response to (1) a Senate report on the National Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993 directing the services to consider consolidating
their recruiting functions\1 and (2) Air Force program policy
guidance.  After extensive meetings involving Air Force recruiting
personnel at all levels, the working group proposed three options
that involved combining active and reserve recruiting.  Two options
involved staffing savings of 191 personnel; a third involved staffing
savings of 234.  Despite the staffing savings proposed by these three
options, the Air Force decided to make no changes.  On March 2, 1993,
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Installations,
justified the Air Force's decision as follows: 

     "Based on the significant successes of the AF's Active and
     Reserve recruiting organizations relative to the other Services;
     on the significant differences between their missions; on the
     significant savings and streamlining steps already taken and on
     the significant potential for reductions in recruiting quality
     and quantity should consolidation be further pursued, all
     efforts to consolidate Active, Reserve, and/or Air National
     Guard recruiting organizations should be terminated."

In June 1993, the Navy also completed a study of the feasibility of
consolidating active and reserve recruiting.  This study, like the
Air Force's, was initiated at least in part as a result of
congressional interest in possibilities for cost savings.  Also like
the Air Force, the Navy decided not to merge what it says are two
very different programs.  Navy officials told us that Navy Reserve
enlistment requirements are almost exclusively for experienced
prior-service personnel, while the active Navy targets those without
prior service. 


--------------------
\1 This provision was not included in the House version of the bill
or the law that was eventually enacted. 


   SERVICES HAVE REJECTED
   PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE
   RECRUITING MANAGEMENT LAYERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

As the military services' recruiting organizations have downsized,
they have reduced the size of different management layers, but they
have not eliminated any.  Their recruiting structures, therefore,
remain intact.  For example, the Air Force has reduced its numbers of
recruiting groups, squadrons, and flights.  The Navy has reduced its
numbers of recruiting districts and zones.  The Air Force, the Army,
and the Navy have considered but rejected proposals to eliminate
similar management layers to improve efficiency and save costs. 
While the particular proposals thus far circulated may not represent
optimum recruiting organizations, potential economies of scale and
other efficiencies may be available through the elimination of
command structure layers.  (Fig.  3.2 shows the various service
recruiting management layers.)

   Figure 3.2:  Organizational
   Recruiting Levels for the
   Military Services

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Numbers of recruiting offices and substations are taken from
the Recruiting Facilities Management Information System as of June
21, 1994.  They include (1) battalion, district, and squadron
offices; (2) company, zone, and flight offices and Marine Corps
recruiting stations; (3) full-time recruiting offices; and (4)
part-time recruiting offices. 

Navy officials told us that though the Navy has considered
eliminating management layers, it ultimately determined that no layer
could be eliminated without negatively affecting the recruiting
organization's overall operations.  The area level, in particular,
has constantly been under consideration for elimination.  However,
considering that span of control difficulties already challenge the
Navy Recruiting Commander, Navy officials concluded that if the areas
were eliminated, the Navy would not have adequate command and control
over its 31 districts.  The Navy believes that taking such a big step
would severely reduce recruiting efficiency. 

As part of their study of the feasibility of consolidating active and
reserve Air Force recruiting organizations, various options--all
recommending the elimination of the group level--were developed.  The
Air Force's final decision was to maintain its 4 groups, each
typically staffed with
18 officer and enlisted personnel and 1 civilian.  Air Force
Recruiting Service officials told us that eliminating the groups
would have positioned the Recruiting Service Commander as the direct
supervisor for 29 squadron commanders.  In the officials' opinion,
this direct supervision would have been an unmanageable task and,
functionally, would have required too much direct involvement by
Recruiting Headquarters in operational issues. 

An internal Army command study concluded that the elimination of the
Army brigade level would enhance efficiency and save money.  The same
study also identified areas of competing and overlapping
responsibilities and redundant functions in the command.  Brigade
officials disagreed with the internal study's findings and
recommendations and stated that their level is necessary for command
and control of field operations. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

In commenting on this chapter, DOD stated that we had failed to
recognize the depth of the services' cuts since the drawdown and that
to meet increased 1996 recruiting goals, most services must add a
complementary mix of recruiters, advertising, and enlistment
incentives.  According to DOD, this mix is determined with the help
of analytical models and informed judgment. 

We recognize that the services have made overall cuts in the numbers
of personnel associated with recruiting.  However, before DOD expands
its recruiter staff, it should reevaluate its efforts to improve
recruiters' productivity and quality of life through more investments
in advertising and (as discussed in the next chapter) evolving
technology.  The recent RAND study recommends a hedging strategy
pending the outcome of additional research to determine how
recruiting resource management and recruiting practices--areas which
are important in the recruiting process--have changed during the
drawdown.  While this study initially recommended that DOD augment
advertising and ask Congress to remove the ceiling on recruiters, it
also recommended that the implementation and effects of any increases
in advertising or in the number of recruiters be carefully monitored. 


CLOSING AND REALIGNING MORE
RECRUITING OFFICES WOULD CREATE
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SAVINGS
============================================================ Chapter 4

In general, DOD's policy is to acquire and maintain the fewest
recruiting facilities at the lowest cost adequate to support the
recruiting mission.  However, DOD and the services have not
questioned the one principle that drives the establishment of
recruiting offices throughout the United States and overseas:  that
to recruit equitably, a physical recruiting presence in widespread
geographical areas must be maintained, even to the point of
maintaining offices that have produced few new recruits annually. 
The military services currently operate nearly 6,000 recruiting
stations in leased facilities located throughout the United States,
its possessions, and overseas at a cost of more than $86 million
annually in direct lease costs.  Since 1989, the services have
reduced the number of recruiting facilities by 25 percent and total
facilities costs by 12 percent by closing and collocating offices and
reducing the amount of office space that is leased in excess of what
is authorized.  Alternatives to fixed facilities, some of which
include evolving technologies and modern sales techniques, appear to
be changing the role and diminishing the importance of the
traditional recruiting office. 


   FULL-TIME RECRUITING OFFICES
   AND EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

Full-time recruiting offices are leased by the services and used by
recruiters to prospect for new recruits, administer aptitude
screening tests, assess applicant qualifications, prepare applicant
documentation, store and display recruiting literature and publicity
material, and conduct routine administrative tasks.  These offices
are now located to maximize their (1) access to public
transportation, (2) pedestrian traffic, (3) visibility, and (4)
proximity to schools and other areas where military-aged men and
women congregate. 

The evolution of computer and communication technologies appears to
be changing some of the conditions underlying the role and need for
the number of fixed facilities required in the past.  For example,
the services believe that recruiting offices must be located in areas
of high visibility to make the offices more accessible to walk-in
traffic and to provide a form of advertising.  However, officials
told us that the percentage of accessions gained from walk-in traffic
is quite low.  The services have found that these individuals
generally do not have other employment options available to them and
are not qualified to enlist.  This fact apparently represents a
change from the past, as evidenced by the following statement from
the Army Recruiting Command's recruiting manual: 

     "Since the advent of the AVF [All Volunteer Force], prospecting
     [for recruits] has become a critical element of our success.  In
     the days of the draft, it was not uncommon for applicants to
     walk into a recruiting station ready, willing, and able to
     enlist.  Today's environment is much different."

DOD and the services have recognized that the realities of the
marketplace are changing the role of the recruiter and the recruiting
office.  For example, the Army is currently studying ways to enhance
recruiter productivity and reduce reliance on permanent facilities
through the development and introduction of state-of-the-art sales
management and processing equipment.  These include the use of
portable telephones and fax machines as well as laptop computers that
provide interactive sales presentations at any location, including an
applicant's home.  According to the Army, these systems will allow
recruiters to move their recruiting activities away from recruiting
stations and into schools, other public areas, and homes and provide
full support for recruiters where most recruiting occurs, that is,
away from the recruiting station.  Such systems should permit the
number of stations to be reduced.  Army officials told us that the
fixed recruiting office could then be used simply to pick up messages
or to meet with supervisors. 


   RECRUITING FACILITIES' COSTS
   HAVE DROPPED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

Since fiscal year 1989, the number of recruiting facilities and the
cost of maintaining them have dropped.  In 1989, over 8,000
recruiting offices were leased; currently, about 6,000 offices are
leased.  In 1989, the total facilities program cost was $118.4
million; in 1994, the cost is $104.2 million.  The reductions in
space and cost were made possible by closing and collocating offices
and eliminating excess space.  These efforts were the result of
actions taken by the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee. 

Program officials recognize the need to continue to improve the
management of the facilities program and intend to (1) continue the
cost/excess space reduction program, (2) implement consolidation
efforts wherever applicable, (3) validate all high-cost offices, and
(4) review and revise space standards. 


      COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESS
      OFFICE SPACE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

The Corps of Engineers has been directed, as Executive Agent for
acquiring and maintaining recruiting facilities, to establish and
execute a program that reduces the cost of rent through the
elimination of excess space.  The Corps' guidance and a DOD directive
establish uniform policies and procedures for acquiring space for
recruiting offices at all levels.  DOD and the Corps of Engineers
stipulate how much square footage is authorized for each type of
office and the types of personnel who will occupy it.  According to
the Corps of Engineers' guidance, every effort should be made not to
exceed the net authorized footage by more than 25 percent for
multi-person recruiting facilities or by more than 50 percent for
full-time one- or two-person recruiting offices.  DOD and the Corps
recognize that it is not always possible to acquire space that
exactly fits authorized footage, but they discourage excess space
through these limitations. 

Although many recruiting facilities occupy less space than authorized
by the Corps of Engineers, our analysis of information in the
Recruiting Facilities Management Information System showed that
overall the services maintain excess office space.  For example, in
fiscal year 1994, the services were maintaining more than 1,000,000
square feet of office space over the amount they were assigned.  Our
calculation, which was based on the average cost per square foot,
showed that this excess space costs over $17 million to maintain. 
According to DOD, the estimated 1,000,000 square feet of space
includes space required for common areas, such as hallways and
bathrooms, and that an average of 25 percent of the net authorized
space is allowed for common areas.  DOD estimated that the total
office space for recruiting facilities currently exceeded the net
authorized by
33 percent or 8 percent over that allowed for common areas. 
According to DOD, the 8 percent costs approximately $5 million. 


      THE PHILADELPHIA PROJECT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

On January 28, 1994, DOD initiated a pilot project in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, as part of its effort to further reduce facility costs. 
DOD chose Philadelphia for this project because recruiting offices in
the area had extensive amounts of excess space, were poorly located
or deteriorating, or were involved in unresolved disputes with
landlords. 

The pilot project involved comparing the cost of the 15 existing
recruiting facilities with 2 alternatives.  Under the first
alternative, the 15 offices in the Philadelphia area would be
collocated into 6 new ones.  (The option excludes from consolidation
offices for battalions, districts, Marine Corps officer stations, the
Army company commander, and nurse recruiters.) Under the second
alternative, some already established stations would be upgraded,
some new stations would be opened, and others would be closed. 

DOD's annual cost for the 15 facilities is about $398,000.  Option 1
would cost DOD about $326,000 after the first year, a savings of
approximately $71,000 annually, assuming there are no yearly
increases in rent or services.  Option 2 would cost about $314,000
after the first year, for an annual savings of about $96,000. 

Although several revisions have been made as a result of comments
from the services and others, DOD is seriously considering
collocating the
15 recruiting offices into 6 offices.  We were told that the concept
of the Philadelphia project might in the future be considered for the
cities of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. 


   SERVICES ARE CONSTRAINED BY
   PRINCIPLE OF GEOGRAPHIC
   COVERAGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

One basic assumption underlying the military services' recruiting
philosophies appears to drive much of their fixed recruiting costs. 
The services believe that they must recruit equitably across the
geographic expanse of the country, and to do so they maintain 6,000
recruiting offices throughout the country.  They maintain these
offices despite the fact that some offices have not been productive. 
For example, according to some Air Force recruiting officials, the
Air Force would not need recruiting offices in many areas of the
country to meet its quota for 30,000 enlisted accessions per year. 
However, because it accepts the principle of national coverage, the
Air Force stretches its recruiting resources thinly.  According to
the Commander of the Air Force Recruiting Service in congressional
testimony on April 14, 1994, 981 full-time recruiter offices were
distributed in all 50 states and in several overseas locations, 645
of which had only
1 active-duty Air Force recruiter. 

If DOD needs to achieve further savings, it could consider closing
supervisory offices and offices in the least productive areas of the
country and using alternative recruiting methods.  The services are
beginning to identify alternatives to leased facilities that would
enable recruiters to be as productive but at less cost. 


      SUPERVISORY OFFICES ARE
      COSTLY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1

According to DOD, the lease cost for its nearly 6,000 facilities is
about $86 million for fiscal year 1994.  Our analysis of information
in the Recruiting Facilities Management Information System covered
$76 million of this amount.  Of the total number of facilities the
services maintained in fiscal year 1994, about 420 were separate
offices for recruiters' immediate supervisors, and over 100 were
separate offices for the next higher level of supervisor.  Offices
for immediate supervisors cost $7.7 million, and offices for the next
level of supervisors cost $5.3 million, for a total of $13 million
annually. 

It is DOD's policy to assign recruiters' supervisors separate office
space to ensure fair treatment of their recruiters.  The services, as
a general rule, encourage this policy.  According to a DOD official
who manages the facilities program, all the Army's, and about half of
the Navy's and Air Force's supervisory personnel occupy separate
office space.  The Marine Corps, on the other hand, locates its
supervisors in the same offices as its recruiters. 

According to a DOD official who manages the facilities program,
because of base closures and realignments, DOD has located some of
its "main stations" in space that is federally owned or is leased. 
Main stations are the offices of those one level above the
recruiter's immediate supervisor. 

If the services were to either collocate supervisors with recruiters
or relocate supervisors to existing offices on military bases or less
expensive space, DOD could reduce its facility leasing costs. 


      SERVICES MAINTAIN OFFICES IN
      RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE
      AREAS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2

The services have closed some recruiting offices in relatively
unproductive areas and moved offices to new locations.  They also
have concentrated offices in areas of high productivity.  But the
services' policy of maintaining national coverage limits how much
more they can do to reduce facilities' costs.  The relative
productivity of recruiters (in terms of the numbers of recruits they
produce over a period of time) does not appear to be a primary
criterion for maintaining recruiting offices in their current
locations. 

Our analysis of the relative cost of recruiting offices in various
counties in the United States was based on data from two sources: 
the Military Entrance Processing Command's database of accessions per
county for the United States and the Recruiting Facilities Management
Information System, which contains the costs of facilities.  The
Command's data did not include information on accessions per
recruiting station.  Therefore, we tracked accessions by county and
calculated the cost of facilities in each county.  Our database
contained accessions from the 1,036 counties in the United States
where recruiting offices are located. 

Our analysis showed that recruiting productivity is highest in areas
of high population density.  It also showed that offices in the most
highly productive counties account for the bulk of the services'
accessions.  For example, according to our analysis, recruiting
offices in the most productive 25 percent of the counties accounted
for about 70 percent of all accessions for the first 5 months of
fiscal year 1994.  Conversely, offices in the least productive 25
percent of counties produced less than 4 percent of DOD's accessions
for the period.  Offices in the least productive 50 percent of
counties generated about 13.5 percent of accessions. 

If DOD wanted to further reduce its recruiting costs, it could
consider closing or consolidating offices in its least productive
counties and rely on one or more of the alternatives to maintaining
fixed recruiting offices.  For example, if the services had closed
offices in the least productive
25 percent of counties, they could have saved about $5 million in
1994 lease costs.  The 1,100 recruiters in these offices could have
been reassigned to other recruiting locations.  If the services had
closed offices in its least productive 50 percent of counties, it
could have saved $13.3 million in annual lease costs and reassigned
2,800 recruiters. 

Our analysis also showed that between fiscal years 1991 and 1993, a
large number of counties produced only one recruit per year.  This
trend continued into fiscal year 1994, as almost 28 percent of the
counties in our analysis produced only one recruit during the first 5
months.  Figure 4.1 shows the most and least productive counties in
the United States for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1994.  County
lines are drawn for the
1,036 counties in the United States where recruiting offices are
located.  In areas where no county lines are drawn, there are no
recruiting offices, or Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM)
data were incomplete. 

   Figure 4.1:  Relative
   Productivity of Counties in the
   United States in Numbers of
   Accessions

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  GAO'S analysis of
   MEPCOM data.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Lease costs for recruiting offices tend to increase with population
density.  However, the distribution of productivity leads to wide
disparities in the cost per recruit.  For example, in the first 5
months of fiscal year 1994, the lease cost per recruit ranged from
$18 to $14,355.  As expected, unit costs decrease with increasing
productivity.  The office where the cost per recruit was lowest
produced 26 recruits during the period; the two offices where the
cost per recruit was highest produced only 1 each.  The least
productive 25 percent of counties had an average lease cost of almost
$900 per recruit, while the most productive 25 percent of counties
had an average cost of $350 per recruit. 


      ALTERNATIVES TO
      FIXED-STATION RECRUITING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3

Service officials have suggested a number of alternatives to
maintaining recruiting offices in unproductive areas without
sacrificing either the quality or quantity of recruits.  We discuss
two examples in this report. 

Army recruiting officials told us that in certain less productive
areas, a fixed recruiting presence may not be needed.  Instead, the
Army could use teams of traveling recruiters using recreational-type
vehicles to visit these areas on a periodic basis preceded by local
advertising.  This is called the "wolfpack" concept.  Similar to this
method is the idea of "island recruiting," whereby small recruiting
stations in relatively nonproductive areas would be consolidated. 
These ideas have been discussed among nonpolicy-making officials in
the Army Recruiting Command; they have not been fully developed or
endorsed by upper level officials.  Currently, the Army's Recruiting
Support Command uses recreational-type vehicles to make presentations
to potential recruits.  However, the presenters do not take
enlistment applications. 

In an effort to close "itinerary stops," or part-time recruiting
offices that are used only 1 or 2 days per week, the Air Force
Recruiting Service has considered the use of "Recruiting Vehicles
(RV)" as mobile recruiting stations.  An RV, which would contain
computers and communications gear, would allow recruiters to visit
communities in areas not conveniently located near fixed recruiting
stations.  The Air Force Recruiting Service told us it cannot afford
these RVs at present.  Air Force officials believe that, in the
current budget environment, the earliest they envision even a test
program using these vehicles would be 4 or 5 years from now.  In the
meantime, it continues to lease facilities for offices that are
unproductive or marginally productive. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

While acknowledging that representation across America is a
consideration of some military services, DOD stated that there are no
efforts to ensure "equitable" geographic representation.  DOD further
stated that the number of recruiters and location of recruiting
offices are based on the population of potential recruits in a
specific geographic area and that potential recruiter productivity is
the primary concern in locating recruiters. 

Although at an agencywide level DOD may not have any efforts to
ensure geographic representation, individual service recruiting
command officials told us that their decisions concerning where to
open or close recruiting offices are based on two principles:  first,
to offer enlistment opportunities to all qualified Americans,
regardless of where they live; and second, to make recruiters
physically available to offer those opportunities to potential
recruits.  As indicated by our analysis of the productivity of
recruiting offices as now located, adherence to these principles may
be putting DOD in a situation where it is not capitalizing on more
cost-effective ways to recruit. 


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 5

Despite DOD's downsizing of forces, the military services still need
to recruit thousands of quality men and women each year.  To do this,
the services rely on a recruiting system built around public
awareness through advertising and enlistments through personal
contacts. 

The services predict that their recruiting goals will be more
difficult to achieve in the future because of smaller target markets
and the reduced propensity of young people to join the military.  In
addition, continued high attrition of first-term recruits keeps
enlistment goals high.  To compensate, the services are asking for
more funds for advertising and more recruiters. 

We believe the services have overstated the difficulties they may
experience in meeting enlistment goals.  The number of people in the
recruiters' target market is predicted to grow over the rest of the
decade, and the percentage of the market that DOD needs to enlist is
decreasing.  Although overall positive responses to DOD's propensity
survey are at their lowest levels in 15 years, these results do not
necessarily indicate that accession targets (for both quantity and
quality) will not be met.  In addition, DOD appears not to have made
serious attempts to tackle the first-term attrition problem despite
promising results from several isolated studies. 

We also believe that the services have not done all they can to make
their current recruiting operations more efficient and have not given
serious consideration to past recommendations aimed at eliminating
organizational layers.  Some services suggest adding recruiters as
the principal means to achieve future enlistments, despite (1)
indications in studies that additional investments in advertising
could be more cost-effective than additional recruiters and (2) the
fact that recruiters are not as productive as they could be because
of current quota systems.  Finally, DOD seems to recognize that fixed
recruiting facilities are no longer crucial for contacting and
enlisting potential recruits, yet it has not been aggressive in
adopting cost-efficient alternatives involving the consolidation of
facilities in urban areas and the closing of facilities in less
productive areas. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the military services to take the following steps to make their
recruiting programs more cost-effective before they request more
funds for additional recruiters or advertising: 

in allocating resources, use the results of current studies, and
undertake additional efforts if necessary, to develop a more
cost-effective mix of available recruiting resources, including
advertising, recruiters, bonuses, and other elements affecting
recruiting;

aggressively test ideas to reduce first-term attrition;

continue efforts to streamline the current recruiting bureaucracy,
eliminating layers where possible;

revalidate the recruiting quota systems, which currently deter
recruiters from maximizing their numbers of enlistments;

encourage the development and expansion, as appropriate, of concepts
such as the "Philadelphia project," in the management of military
recruiting facilities; and

routinely incorporate more in-depth cost-benefit analyses in
decisions to maintain or establish new recruiting offices and to
evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining offices in less
productive areas of the country. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2

DOD concurred or partially concurred with our six recommendations and
responded that it is committed to using modern and effective business
practices to attract and enlist young people and therefore plans to
continue to give priority to the ongoing evaluation of recruiting
organizational structures, consolidation of resources, and adaptation
of new technologies.  While DOD agrees with the need to reduce
first-term attrition, streamline the bureaucracy, and encourage new
concepts in the management of recruiting facilities, it does not want
to commit to major changes before reviewing the results of several
evaluative efforts recently started. 

We appreciate the need for DOD to complete certain recently initiated
studies before changes are initiated in some areas.  However, we
continue to believe that (1) more aggressive efforts than those cited
by DOD are needed to lower attrition losses on a DOD-wide basis and
thus minimize the resources required to support the services'
recruiting and training operations; (2) the services should
reevaluate the need for management layers that previous studies have
concluded could be eliminated, particularly since a recently
initiated study to examine the consolidation of logistics support
functions for the service recruiting commands could result in reduced
workloads at those layers; and (3) if tests prove successful,
expansion of the experimental process for consolidating recruiting
facilities in large metropolitan areas should be pursued rapidly. 

Specific DOD comments on each recommendation and our views, where
appropriate, follow: 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a more
cost-effective mix of recruiting resources.  It said the RAND
Corporation is conducting research to ascertain how recruiting
outcomes and their determinants have changed in the recent past and
to recommend changes in policies, practices, and resource management,
if necessary, to ensure adequate numbers and quality of future
recruits.  According to DOD, the results of this study are expected
by October 1995.  We believe this recently initiated study is
important because past research has shown that these areas can have
significant effects on recruiting. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to reduce first-term
attrition.  It said that its ongoing efforts were more diverse than
we recognized.  It said that the military services have been and are
engaging in research and operational programs related to attrition
with continuing efforts to (1) develop measures of adaptability to
military life, (2) improve the prediction of training success and job
performance, and (3) better manage personnel in the DEP.  We fully
acknowledge that a number of studies of attrition have been done and
others are ongoing.  Nevertheless, attrition remained relatively high
from 1980 to 1994 regardless of prevailing economic conditions or the
quality level of the force.  In our opinion, isolating the causal
links for attrition is key to reducing attrition rates. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the military
services should continue to streamline their current recruiting
bureaucracy, eliminating layers where possible.  It said that the
services have placed heavy emphasis on evaluation of their recruiting
structures during the drawdown; reducing management layers and
streamlining overhead.  DOD also said it recognizes that continued
evaluation of recruiting structures and business practices is
essential.  According to DOD, an Office of the Secretary of
Defense-directed study, led by the MEPCOM, was initiated to evaluate
consolidation of recruiting support functions of the service
recruiting organizations.  The study should be completed by June 1995
and is to include an evaluation of joint advertising and promotional
support of the service recruiting organizations.  We endorse the
recruiting support function study cited by DOD and further believe
that the services should, in conjunction with this effort, reexamine
those completed studies that recommended the elimination of
management layers in service recruiting organizations. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to revalidate the recruiting
quota systems, which currently deter recruiters from maximizing their
numbers of enlistments.  It said that to revalidate recruiter quota
systems, the RAND Corporation has been asked to research recruiter
incentive systems to determine their current relevance and
effectiveness.  Also, the Army is eliminating individual recruiter
quotas in fiscal year 1995 and will encourage each recruiter to write
as many contracts as possible.  We endorse the examination of the
services' recruiting quota systems and the Army's decision to
eliminate individual quotas following its evaluation of this area--an
effort that was ongoing during our fieldwork. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to encourage the
development and expansion, as appropriate, of concepts such as the
Philadelphia Project in the management of military recruiting
facilities.  It said that the Philadelphia Project is an experimental
process, and while the approach appears promising, the Joint
Recruiting Facilities Committee will not complete its evaluation of
the project and lessons learned until the end of 1994.  The Committee
has targeted a similar project for New York and Chicago in fiscal
year 1996 pending an evaluation of the Philadelphia effort at the end
of 1994.  If this project proves to be successful, we believe the
concept should be implemented in appropriate metropolitan areas on a
expedited basis. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to routinely incorporate more
in-depth benefit analyses in decisions to maintain or establish new
recruiting offices and to evaluate the costs and benefits of
maintaining offices in less productive areas of the country.  It said
that to evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining or
establishing new recruiting offices, the Joint Recruiting Facilities
Committee will combine marketing information with the recruiting
facilities database and evaluate the relative cost-effectiveness of
the services' recruiting offices.  According to DOD, this effort has
begun and is expected to evolve into an integrated information
support system for resource decisions.  We believe this system, if
properly implemented, could materially improve the cost-effectiveness
of the services' recruiting facilities program management by
eliminating marginally productive leased office space and could help
to optimize the allocation and assignment of recruiter resources. 


SERVICE RECRUITING ORGANIZATIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I

The current Department of Defense (DOD) establishment for recruiting
enlisted personnel consists primarily of nine service recruiting
organizations\1 and one major support agency, the Military Entrance
Processing Command (MEPCOM).\2 To meet the enlisted mission,
recruiting organizations employ approximately 22,000 full-time
personnel:  more than 13,000 production recruiters and supervisors
and 9,000 headquarters and other personnel, about 3,000 of whom are
MEPCOM personnel who induct and medically process military recruits. 
Recruiting field operations consist of more than 6,000 recruiting
stations or site locations, in both leased and government-owned
facilities located throughout the United States, its possessions, and
overseas. 


--------------------
\1 These nine recruiting organizations include (1) the Air Force
Recruiting Service, which is part of the Air Education and Training
Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; (2) the Air Force Recruiting
Directorate, Air Force Reserve Headquarters, Robins Air Force Base,
Georgia; (3) the Air National Guard Recruiting and Retention
Division, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland; (4) the Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia;
(5) the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command, New Orleans, Louisiana; (6)
the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.; (7) the Marine
Corps Reserve Recruiting Command, Overland Park, Kansas; (8) the Army
Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky; and (9) the Army National
Guard, Arlington, Virginia. 

\2 MEPCOM headquarters is located in Great Lakes, Illinois. 


   ARMY RECRUITING STRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

The U.S.  Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), established in 1964, is
charged with meeting the Army's requirements for enlisted and certain
officer accessions.  The command is multilayered, consisting of a
headquarters and a field organization that itself contains 4 brigade
headquarters, 40 battalions, 210 companies, and 1,732\3 recruiting
stations (see fig.  I.1). 

   Figure I.1:  U.S.  Army
   Recruiting Command and Brigades

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

USAREC is commanded by a major general and is responsible for the
worldwide recruiting of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Special
Mission personnel.\4 It develops strategic plans, determines
policies, and manages subordinate command operations, including a
nationwide advertising program.  Field operations are overseen at
headquarters by the Deputy Commanding General.  Each recruiting
brigade is commanded by a colonel and performs managerial,
administrative, operational, budgetary, promotional, and logistical
functions and serves as the liaison between the command and the
field.  Battalions actively command and support recruiting efforts by
their assigned companies and stations and also provide administrative
and managerial support.  Each company consists of a captain assisted
by a first sergeant, who develops and executes plans to ensure
mission accomplishment.  Companies are in daily contact with
production recruiters at the stations.  Stations are located in
communities nationwide and carry out the mission of recruiting
eligible candidates. 


--------------------
\3 This total includes company, battalion, full-time, and part-time
offices. 

\4 Special Mission personnel are health professionals such as Army
Nurse Corps and Veterinary Corps members. 


   NAVY RECRUITING STRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

The U.S.  Navy Recruiting Command, which is located in Arlington,
Virginia, consists of a headquarters and a field organization that
contains
5 area headquarters, 31 districts, 195 zones, and 1,428\5 recruiting
stations (see fig.  I.2). 

   Figure I.2:  U.S.  Navy
   Recruiting Command and Area
   Headquarters

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The headquarters is commanded by a one-star admiral and is
responsible for the worldwide recruiting of men and women for
enlisted, officer candidate, and officer status in the Regular and
Reserve components of the Navy.  The headquarters level develops
policy, coordinates and supervises Navy Recruiting Command support
personnel, provides public affairs guidance as required, responds to
media inquiries regarding recruiting matters, disseminates
information concerning Navy and command policies, and allocates
resources necessary to achieve stated command objectives. 

Area headquarters commanders are O-6s (captains) and coordinate and
oversee public affairs activities; provide guidance, training, and
assistance to district commanding officers in developing and
executing public affairs plans; identify issues and situations with
potential impact on Navy recruiting; provide responses to media
inquiries concerning recruiting matters; and allocate resources as
necessary. 

Navy recruiting district commanding officers are all O-5s
(commanders) and basically carry out the same type of recruiting
activities as do the Navy recruiting area commanders except within
the assigned district. 

Navy recruiting zones are headed by a Master Chief Petty Officer (an
E-9) or a Senior Chief Petty Officer (an E-8).  Recruiting zones also
employ career recruiting personnel.  This cadre of personnel does
nothing but recruit.  The zone supervisor is responsible for 25 to 30
recruiters and sometimes more, depending on the size of the zone's
geographical area. 

Below the zone supervisory level are the stations.  This level is
made up of recruiters functioning in the field.  Navy stations are
located throughout communities worldwide and carry out the mission of
recruiting eligible men and women into the Navy. 


--------------------
\5 This number includes zone, district, full-time, and part-time
offices. 


   MARINE CORPS' RECRUITING
   STRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

Effective January 1, 1994, the Marine Corps established the Marine
Corps Recruiting Command, which is located at the Marine Corps
Headquarters, at the Navy Annex in Arlington, Virginia.  The new
Command includes 2 regions, 6 districts, 49 recruiting stations, and
1,520\6 recruiting substations (see fig.  I.3). 

   Figure I.3:  Marine Corps
   Recruiting Command and Regions

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Marine Corps' recruiting organization is responsible for
recruiting all active-duty Marines and all nonprior-service Marines
for the reserves.  The Command is headed by a major general.  A
brigadier general is located at Parris Island, South Carolina, to
head the Eastern recruiting region, while another is located in San
Diego, California, to head the Western recruiting region. 


--------------------
\6 This total includes recruiting station, district, full-time, and
part-time offices. 


   AIR FORCE RECRUITING STRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4

The Air Force Recruiting Service is part of the Air Education and
Training Command, located at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.  It is
responsible for the recruitment of enlisted personnel, officers, and
health professionals into the active-duty component of the Air Force. 
The Recruiting Service consists of a headquarters, 4 groups, 29
squadrons, 172 flights, and
1,221\7 recruiting stations (see fig.  I.4). 

   Figure I.4:  Air Force
   Recruiting Service Headquarters
   and Groups

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The headquarters, which is commanded by a major general, is made up
of operations, health professions, and support divisions.  Consisting
of 165 personnel, the headquarters oversees the 4 recruiting groups. 
Headquarters establishes policy and procedures and provides guidance
to group management.  Headquarters also provides assistance to the
field in the areas of advertising and promotion, flow/trend analysis,
personnel, and resources. 

The typical recruiting group is headed by a colonel and consists of
about 19 personnel.  As part of its supervisory duties over six to
eight squadrons, a group is responsible for executing all training
workshops; for managing squadron commanders, medical flight
supervisors, and operations officers and noncommissioned officers;
for advertising and promotion; and for allocating recruiting goals to
the squadrons. 

The typical squadron, which consists of about 21 staff, is headed by
a major or lieutenant colonel who reports to the group's commander. 
A squadron is responsible for five to seven flights, each of which is
typically 120 miles from the squadron commander.  Among its
supervisory duties, the squadron assigns its flights recruiting
goals.  The squadron commander is responsible for meeting the
squadron's recruiting mission and for managing 60 to 70 personnel and
associated facilities and operations and maintenance funds. 

A flight, which is a unit of five to seven recruiters, is headed by a
master sergeant (E-7) or technical sergeant (E-6), who reports to the
squadron commander.  This flight supervisor assigns individual
recruiting goals and provides on-the-job training to recruiters.  A
recruiter typically works about 60 miles from the flight supervisor. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II

--------------------
\7 This total includes flight, squadron, full-time, and part-time
offices. 


COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I

 See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  2, 12, and 13. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  13-14. 

 See comment 2. 

 Now on pp.  2 and 14. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  14-15. 

 See comment 3. 

 Now on pp.  15-18. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  3-4 and 21-25. 

 See comment 4. 

 See comment 5. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 See comment 6. 

 Now on pp.  26-27. 

 See comment 7. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 See comment 8. 

 Now on pp.  28-29. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  30-32. 

 See comment 9. 

 Now on pp.  35-36. 

 See comment 10. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 See comment 11. 

 See comment 12. 

 See comment 13. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  38-39. 

 See comment 14. 

 Now on pp.  40-41. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  43-44. 

 See comment 15. 

 See comment 16. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  44-45. 

 See comment 17. 

 See comment 18. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  46-50. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 See comment 19. 

 See comment 20. 

 Now on pp.  5 and 53. 

 Now on pp.  5 and 53. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  5 and 53. 

 Now on pp.  5 and 53. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Now on pp.  5 and 53. 

 Now on pp.  6 and 53. 



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are comments on DOD's letter dated October 7, 1994. 


   GAO COMMENTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5

1.  We have discussed and addressed all appropriate DOD and service
initiatives that deal with the issues considered in this report and
that were available and in a usable state of completion at the time
our review was done. 

2.  The DEP is discussed in the first two chapters of this report,
but it is not addressed in an evaluative context. 

3.  We are not suggesting that advertising be used as an indication
of efficiency.  This section in the introduction chapter simply
describes the funding history of advertising and summarizes service
and DOD views of its usefulness. 

4.  This population chart does indeed use two sets of data--one
derived from the 1980 U.S.  census and the other from the 1990 U.S. 
census.  The use of both was necessary to reflect the trend of the
youth pool available for recruiting from 1980 to 2000.  This
information was provided to us by DOD and was the most current
available when we did our review and when DOD submitted its official
response to our draft report.  Further, DOD's comment that a decrease
in the propensity of youth to enlist caused more recruiting
challenges during the early 1990s is misleading.  Actually, RAND's
May 1994 study found that propensity for high quality youth--those
targeted by DOD for enlistment--appears to have stabilized at
pre-drawdown levels and, in fact, increased at one point in the early
1990s. 

5.  Since DOD recruits few non-high school graduates (service goals
allow just 1 to 5 percent annually), the fact that Hispanics--who,
according to DOD, have lower graduation rates than other ethnic
groups--will make up more of the target pool would appear to have a
minimal effect on attrition.  Further, according to historical Youth
Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) data, Hispanic youth have one of the
highest positive propensity rates of any of the groups tracked by
DOD. 

6.  An increase in the number of high school graduates who will
attend college should have limited impact on the target pool because
a substantial number of college students drop out (for a variety of
reasons) during the first year and thus effectively remain in the
available population pool of quality high school graduates. 

7.  DOD implies that a basic shift or change in negative and positive
propensity has occurred, which will require that more people be
recruited from the negative category, thereby causing effort and cost
to rise as accessions increase to a steady state recruiting
environment.  A recent study by RAND suggests this may not be the
case because (1) the projected youth supply available to meet the
increased accession goals for 1996 equals or exceeds that available
in the late 1980s or before the drawdown started and (2) the
propensity of the high quality youth targeted by DOD for recruiting
appears to have stabilized at pre-drawdown levels.  Further, the
majority of youth available for enlistment have, historically,
expressed negative propensity--yet about half of all recruits have
come from this category. 

8.  As noted in comment 7 above, propensity for the high quality
youth targeted by DOD does not appear to have decreased.  These YATS
factors have been stable or increased positively in recent years. 
Further, contrary to DOD's assertions about the negative impact of
downsizing on recruiting, 81 percent of the respondents to the 1993
YATS (an increase from 1992) state that downsizing would not affect
their enlistment propensity. 

9.  Our basic observations on the attrition rate are that (1)
attrition remained relatively stable from 1980 to 1994 regardless of
prevailing economic conditions or the quality level of the force and
(2) DOD and the services have not yet successfully isolated causal
links needed to fully evaluate attrition.  We recognize DOD efforts
to study attrition; however, we believe that, if potentially
significant savings in recruiting and training resources are to be
realized from a reduced attrition rate, the causal links for
attrition must be identified and addressed.  Caption for Finding I
was subsequently revised by GAO. 

10.  We recognize that staffing cuts and limited reorganizations have
been made in the recruiting organizations; however, our point is that
the basic structure has remained intact, and efforts to eliminate
management layers and consolidate functions or organizations have not
been implemented.  Further, there are now plans to increase the
number of recruiting personnel. 

11.  DOD has not offered credible evidence that substantial
additional resources will be required to achieve the planned increase
in accessions.  The number of potential recruits available through
1996 is estimated to equal or exceed the level available in 1989,
when more than 293,000 recruits were enlisted, a level substantially
above that planned for 1996. 

12.  DOD agreed with our recommendation that the service quota
systems need to be reevaluated and stated that an effort to
accomplish this, and evaluate incentive systems as well, is now
underway.  We have already discussed the extent of the evolving
management changes.  For example, we acknowledge that the Army was
experimenting with changes to its quota system at the time of our
review. 

13.  RAND recently concluded that important changes in resource
management and recruiting practices during the drawdown years are the
likely cause of difficulties now reported by the services.  Planned
additional research by RAND into these areas could well show a
positive effect on recruiters' quality of life.  While an additional
responsibility, voter registration may affect the recruiting mission
in a positive way by providing a solid, civics-based means for
recruiters to establish additional face-to-face contacts with the
target youth population. 

14.  The report has been changed to reflect more clearly that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense rejected consolidation of
recruiting organizations based on the adverse comments received from
the individual services and that the services did not acknowledge the
merits of consolidating advertising functions.  However, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense has directed a new study to examine joint
recruiting support concepts that does include advertising and
promotional support as an area to be evaluated. 

15.  We cite pedestrian or "walk in" traffic as one of four basic
factors used by the services to locate recruiting offices, not the
primary factor. 

16.  Our most recent reports on the CIM initiative are (1)
AIMD/NSIAD-94-101, April 12, 1994, and (2) NSIAD-95-25, October 21,
1994. 

17.  The excess space information presented in the report was
provided to us by DOD from the database maintained for leased
recruiting facilities.  The information included data fields for
assigned space and excess space but, did not distinguish between
space that exceeded the "net authorized" for common areas and truly
excess space.  Additional information on facility space has been
added to the report. 

18.  We did not intend to imply that it was possible or necessarily
practical to eliminate all excess space in recruiting facilities, and
we fully recognize the types of situations DOD mentions.  However, as
cited in chapter 4, facility program officials acknowledge the need
to continue to improve management in this area through efforts to
reduce excess space, implement consolidation efforts, and review and
revise space standards.  In addition, DOD agreed with our
recommendation to develop the capability to better analyze the
cost-effectiveness of offices maintained in less productive areas of
the country.  This should result in fewer offices overall and less
excess space as well. 

19.  Our analysis of recruiting facilities indicated that most
supervisory offices are located in leased facilities and not on
military installations or other government property. 

20.  In early May 1994, the Air Force officially informed us that a
request had been submitted to purchase an RV for each of the 29
recruiting squadrons.  According to the Air Force, the RV would (1)
provide the civilian community with the benefit of having a mobile
recruiting facility in its area instead of having to drive 2 or 3
hours to the nearest fixed facility and (2) save leasing costs
expended on maintaining the itinerary stops.  The Air Force
subsequently stated that mobile recruiting offices could best be
characterized as an idea with potential that could not be afforded at
the present time.  As cited in the report, the Air Force concluded
that the earliest even a test program could be envisioned would be 4
or 5 years from now. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Norman Rabkin
Foy Wicker
Irene Robertson
Beverly Schladt
David Michaels
Carole Coffey
Jai Lee
