    Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed (Chapter Report,
    12/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-95-22).

    The military has overstated its future recruiting challenges--the number
    of eligible high-school graduates is actually expected to grow steadily
    in coming years--and current recruiting operations are plagued by
    inefficiencies, with half the network of 6,000 recruiting offices
    supplying just 13.5 percent of enlistees. Moreover, the military
    services plan to add more recruiters even though fewer recruits are
    needed to support the smaller military force resulting from downsizing.
    Although many studies have suggested ways to consolidate or eliminate
    layers of management to cut costs, the services have been reluctant to
    change existing organizational structures.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-22
         TITLE:  Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed
          DATE:  12/22/94
       SUBJECT:  Military personnel
                 Personnel management
                 Personnel recruiting
                 Hiring policies
                 Human resources utilization
                 Attrition rates
                 Military enlistment
                 Public relations
                 Military recruiting
                 Military cost control
    IDENTIFIER:  All Volunteer Force
                 DOD Youth Attitude Tracking Survey
                 Armed Forces Qualifications Test
                 Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
                 DOD Delayed Entry Program
                 DOD Recruiting Facilities Management Information System

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to the Honorable
    David Pryor, U.S.  Senate

    December 1994

    MILITARY RECRUITING - MORE
    INNOVATIVE APPROACHES NEEDED

    GAO/NSIAD-95-22

    Military Recruiting

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      AFQT - Armed Forces Qualification Test
      ASVAB - Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
      BMT - Basic Military Training
      DEP - Delayed Entry Program
      DOD - Department of Defense
      MEPCOM - Military Entrance Processing Command
      MEPS - Military Entrance Processing Station
      RV - recruiting vehicle
      USAREC - U.S.  Army Recruiting Command
      YATS - Youth Attitude Tracking Survey

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-257481

    December 22, 1994

    The Honorable David Pryor
    United States Senate

    Dear Senator Pryor:

    This report responds to your request that we examine Department of
    Defense recruiting operations and identify areas in which military
    recruiting costs could be reduced.

    Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we
    plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its
    issue date.  At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the
    Senate and House Armed Services Committees; the Secretaries of
    Defense, the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; the Commandant, U.S.
    Marine Corps; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
    other interested parties.  Copies will also be made available to
    others upon request.

    Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.  If you
    or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call
    me on (202) 512-5140.

    Sincerely yours,

    Mark E.  Gebicke
    Director, Military Operations
     and Capabilities Issues

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    ============================================================ Chapter 0

       PURPOSE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

    In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been recruiting
    fewer people to support a smaller military force.  Concerned about
    the size of DOD's recruiting budget and the efficiency of its
    recruiting operations, Senator David Pryor asked GAO to survey
    military recruiting policies and practices and highlight areas in
    which DOD could reduce its recruiting costs without adversely
    affecting its ability to meet military personnel requirements.
    Specifically, GAO's objectives were to evaluate (1) recruiting
    challenges the services face in the size of the youth market and its
    propensity to join the military, (2) the services' future plans for
    recruiting staffs and organizations, and (3) the services' management
    of their recruiting facilities.  GAO concentrated on recruiting for
    active-duty enlisted personnel, which represented $1.1 billion of the
    $1.3 billion budget for fiscal year 1994.

       BACKGROUND
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

    During the first several years following the creation of the
    All-Volunteer Force, the military services had generally positive
    results in attracting new recruits.  However, by 1979, the services
    were achieving only 90 percent of their numerical goals, and the
    quality of new recruits had declined significantly.  In the early
    1980s, Congress and the services took several actions to make
    military service more attractive.  Congress granted a raise in
    military pay, authorized the services to offer new recruits financing
    for education, and allowed the services to spend more money on
    advertising.  The services, in turn, reemphasized to their recruiters
    the importance of attracting recruits who had high school diplomas
    and who achieved scores in the upper ranges on standardized military
    tests.  By 1986, all services were meeting or exceeding their
    numerical enlistment objectives, and recruit quality had reached
    historically high levels.  These levels were maintained and, starting
    in 1990, increased significantly again.

    The services target 17- to 21-year-old high school graduates as prime
    candidates for enlistment.  The services believe that individuals in
    this age group are more likely to consider the military as a viable
    option.  The services also direct recruiting efforts toward parents,
    coaches, and teachers, who may influence prospective recruits'
    decisions to enlist.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

    Although the services have requested additional funds from Congress
    to meet what they perceive as future recruiting challenges, GAO's
    review indicates that the services have overstated the potential
    challenges.  As evidence of future difficulties, the services cite
    decreases in the number of potential recruits and in the propensity
    of youths to join the services.  However, the number of people in the
    market is expected to grow steadily until at least 2000, and the
    percentage of the market DOD needs to meet its personnel requirements
    has steadily dropped.  In addition, DOD's surveys of youths'
    propensity to join the services have not in the past been good
    indicators of who actually enlists.

    GAO has identified the following areas in which DOD may not be
    maximizing the cost-effectiveness of its recruiting resources:

    Currently, about one out of every three recruits does not complete
    the first term of enlistment.  This rate of attrition significantly
    increases the number of people the services need to recruit each
    year.  The services have successfully completed various isolated
    experiments to reduce attrition; however, these efforts have not
    resulted in DOD-wide initiatives.

    Even though the services need fewer recruits because they are
    downsizing, some recruiting commanders are increasing or plan to
    increase their numbers of recruiters.  However, adding recruiters at
    this time may not be cost-efficient.

    Numerous DOD and service studies have recommended ways to consolidate
    or eliminate layers of management to reduce costs, but the services
    have been reluctant to change existing organizational structures.

    DOD maintains an extensive network of about 6,000 recruiting offices
    around the United States to obtain geographic representation for the
    services.  However, 50 percent of these offices provide just 13.5
    percent of the recruits.  Technological advances have made the need
    for a number of these offices less critical.

       PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

          SERVICES MAY HAVE OVERSTATED
          FUTURE CHALLENGES IN
          RECRUITING
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

    DOD and the services are concerned about what they believe are recent
    decreases in the size of the recruiting market.  They also believe
    that, in the foreseeable future, their ability to attract quality
    personnel may be limited by a reduction in the propensity of young
    people to join the military (as measured by the annual Youth Attitude
    Tracking Survey).  In fact, the Army and Navy recruiting commanders
    believe that they may need to lower their current targets for the
    quality of their enlistees if the services are to meet their
    requirements for numbers of personnel.

    When placed in historical perspective and viewed in the context of
    predicted trends, the services' concerns appear to be overstated.
    First, although the size of the youth population shrank between
    fiscal years 1980 and 1989, it is now projected to grow steadily
    until at least 2000.  Second, the percentage of the market population
    DOD needs to meet its requirements has steadily dropped and may reach
    a modern-day low by 2000.  Third, though reported propensity to
    enlist in the military has dropped in recent years, about half of the
    enlistees come from the groups who express negative intentions to
    join the military.  Finally, even as propensity to join the military
    has dropped in past years, the services have been able to exceed
    DOD-established benchmarks for recruit quality.

    Between 1980 and 1984, the services were able to improve the quality
    of their recruits and reduce first-term attrition from about 37
    percent to around 29 percent.  Attrition since has risen to over 34
    percent.\1 Much of this attrition occurs in the first months of
    active duty.  This rate of attrition significantly increases the
    number of people the services need to recruit each year.  The
    services have, through various local experiments, found ways to
    reduce attrition, but their efforts have not been initiated DOD-wide
    or even throughout any of the services.

    --------------------
    \1 GAO obtained data on attrition from the Defense Manpower Data
    Center.  These data represent attrition for personnel enlisted
    annually from 1974 through 1989 for a 4-year commitment.  The 1989
    group completed their enlistments in 1992.  For this period, DOD-wide
    annual attrition ranged between 29 percent and 39 percent.

          SERVICES HAVE RESISTED
          ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

    The services have not implemented DOD or service proposals that
    involve a rethinking of recruiting organizations and functions.  Some
    of these proposals have involved eliminating recruiting management
    layers and consolidating recruiting organizations or functional
    areas, such as logistics, market research, and advertising.  However,
    the services have been reluctant to change existing methods.  The
    services have consistently rejected any merging of recruiting across
    service lines because they believe that, as the Comptroller of the
    Army stated in responding to one such DOD proposal, "there are
    tremendous differences in recruiting for each of the Services, most
    of which are irreconcilable."

    The services have cut personnel from all levels of recruiting in
    response to congressional direction to do so in 1992.  At the time of
    our review, approximately 22,000 personnel in all services were
    involved in recruiting.  However, some of the services now plan to
    add recruiters to their staffs.  Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
    recruiting commanders believe that these additions are necessary to
    meet future recruiting goals.  This report presents evidence to the
    contrary, in that historical trends indicate that the relationship
    between numbers of recruiters and accessions is unclear because (1)
    quota systems discourage recruiters from exceeding quotas for
    enlistees; (2) the services have not historically reduced numbers of
    recruiters as accession needs have decreased; (3) numbers of
    accessions per recruiter have declined over the years; and (4)
    service studies suggest that after a certain number of recruiters are
    in place, it is more cost-effective to invest in more advertising.

          DOD HAS CLOSED AND REALIGNED
          RECRUITING OFFICES, BUT
          ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
          EXIST FOR SAVINGS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

    During the late 1980s, DOD and the services began to reduce
    recruiting facilities' costs by closing or collocating recruiting
    offices and eliminating excess space.  However, DOD and the services
    have not questioned their assumption that to recruit equitably, the
    services should maintain a recruiting presence in most geographical
    areas, even if the recruiting offices are unproductive or marginally
    productive.  For example, rather than close marginally productive
    offices, the Air Force has stretched its recruiting resources thinly,
    maintaining 645 recruiting offices that are staffed with only 1
    active-duty Air Force recruiter.

    The services have begun to explore various alternatives to fixed
    recruiting facilities that could enable them to identify, contact,
    and respond to inquiries from potential recruits.  These
    alternatives, some of which involve advances in technology, call into
    question the traditional functions of the recruiting office.

    The lease cost for DOD's nearly 6,000 recruiting facilities is about
    $86 million for fiscal year 1994.  GAO's analysis indicates that
    around $13 million of this amount is spent on separate offices for
    supervisors.  In addition, 50 percent of DOD's recruiting offices,
    which require the assignment of about 2,800 recruiters and cost about
    $13.3 million annually to lease, produce just 13.5 percent of
    accessions.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries
    of the military services to (1) use the results of current studies,
    and undertake additional efforts if necessary, to develop a more
    cost-effective mix of available recruiting resources; (2)
    aggressively test ideas to reduce first-term attrition; (3) continue
    efforts to streamline the current recruiting bureaucracy, eliminating
    layers where possible; (4) revalidate the recruiting quota systems,
    which currently deter recruiters from maximizing the numbers of
    enlistments; (5) encourage the development and expansion, as
    appropriate, of new concepts in the management of military recruiting
    facilities; and (6) routinely incorporate more in-depth cost-benefit
    analyses in decisions to maintain or establish new recruiting offices
    and to evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining offices in less
    productive areas of the country.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that GAO had
    provided a broad overview of very complex issues but did not
    acknowledge the full scope of DOD's initiatives to achieve
    recruitment goals cost-effectively.  DOD stated that it is committed
    to using modern and effective business practices to attract and
    enlist young people and plans to give priority to its ongoing
    evaluation of recruiting organizational structures, consolidation of
    resources, and adaptation of new technologies.

    DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations concerning the mix of
    recruiting resources, the quota systems, and recruiting offices.
    While DOD also concurred with the need to reduce first-term
    attrition, streamline the bureaucracy, and encourage new concepts in
    the management of recruiting facilities, it did not want to commit to
    major changes before reviewing the results of several evaluative
    efforts recently started.

    GAO appreciates the need for DOD to complete certain current
    initiatives before changes are initiated in some areas.  However, GAO
    continues to believe that (1) more aggressive efforts than those
    cited by DOD are needed to lower attrition on a DOD-wide basis in
    order to minimize the resources required to support the services'
    recruiting and training operations; (2) the services should
    reevaluate the need for management layers that previous studies have
    concluded could be eliminated, particularly since the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense-directed study to examine the consolidation of
    logistics support functions for the service recruiting commands could
    result in reduced workloads at those layers; and (3) if tests prove
    successful, expansion of the experimental process for consolidating
    recruiting facilities in large metropolitan areas should be pursued
    rapidly.

    DOD comments and GAO's evaluation of them have been incorporated
    throughout this report.  DOD's comments are presented in their
    entirety in appendix II along with some added GAO notes.

    INTRODUCTION
    ============================================================ Chapter 1

    During the past several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
    been downsizing its forces substantially and recruiting fewer
    personnel to support a smaller All-Volunteer Force.  At the same
    time, total expenditures for military recruiting have also been cut.
    For fiscal
    year 1994, the services' recruiting budget for active-duty officers
    and enlisted personnel is $1.3 billion.  The cost of recruiting
    189,600 active enlisted personnel accounts for about $1.1 billion of
    this total.

       ADVENT OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER
       FORCE NECESSITATED CHANGES IN
       MILITARY RECRUITING
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

    During the first several years following the creation of the
    All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the military services generally had
    success attracting volunteers.  However, the recruiting situation
    deteriorated rapidly beginning in 1977.  In fiscal years 1975 and
    1976, the services had actually exceeded their numerical goals for
    recruiting volunteers, yet by 1979, they were achieving only 90
    percent of their goals.  Moreover, the quality of new recruits had
    declined significantly.

    Quality is measured in terms of (1) educational level (for example,
    high school or general equivalency degrees) and (2) performance on
    the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which is a composite of 4
    of the
    10 components of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
    (ASVAB).  The services use the recruit's educational level as a
    predictor of attrition and AFQT scores as indicators of overall
    eligibility to enter the services and of qualifications for specific
    military jobs.  AFQT scores are stratified into six
    levels--categories I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IV, and V--and are used as
    indicators of trainability.  Recruits placed in categories I, II, and
    IIIA represent those who test in the top 50th percentile; those
    placed in categories IIIB, IV, and V are those in the bottom 50th
    percentile.

    In 1975 and 1976, about 5 percent of new recruits had scored in
    category IV of the AFQT.  By fiscal year 1980, over 35 percent were
    in this category.  Concern over recruit quality peaked in 1980, when
    DOD reported that it had made an error in scoring the ASVAB in 1976.
    Because of DOD's mistake in the formula for scaling scores to
    establish norms, applicants who had tested in the lower ranges of the
    ability distribution were given inflated scores between 1976 and
    1980.  This meant that for 4 years, the services had been enlisting
    individuals of poorer quality than they wanted.

    Congressional concern over recruit quality was demonstrated in fiscal
    year 1981, when Congress passed legislation establishing the
    following parameters:

    65 percent of nonprior-service recruits\1 must be high school
    graduates;

    after September 30, 1982, no more than 20 percent of annual
    accessions can be individuals who score in category IV of the AFQT;

    category IV individuals who are enlisted must be high school
    graduates; and

    category V individuals are not eligible for military service.

    Also during the early 1980s, Congress increased military pay and
    recruiting budgets to offer bonuses and funding for education for
    service applicants and approved increases in advertising expenditures
    to attract higher quality recruits.

    By 1986, all services met or exceeded their overall enlistment
    objectives.  Recruit quality was at historically high levels.  The
    percentage of recruits with high school diplomas increased from 72
    percent during the 1964-73 draft period to 92 percent in 1986.  Also,
    64 percent of new recruits in 1986 scored in the top categories of
    the AFQT.  This percentage was up from 38 percent in 1980.

    --------------------
    \1 According to the specific language in the legislation, this
    provision applies only to male recruits.

       RECRUITING PROCESS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

    While the services use advertising as a tool to increase prospective
    applicants' awareness of and propensity to enlist, the services
    believe that face-to-face contact with a military recruiter is
    necessary to actually enlist applicants.  To provide this contact,
    the services maintain recruiting offices throughout the country and
    overseas.  Recruiting officials believe it is essential that
    recruiters be uniformed representatives of their respective services
    and that they accurately and positively portray military life.  In
    many cases, recruiters are applicants' sole source of information on
    the benefits of their services.  Recruiters provide information on
    military jobs, associated training, financial incentives, terms of
    enlistment, and the unique lifestyles offered by the services.
    Recruiters convey their message by several means, such as making
    presentations at area high schools, canvasing places of employment,
    and contacting prospective enlistees directly.  The Army estimates
    that a recruiter makes over 100 contacts to enlist a single quality
    recruit.  In some services, recruiters are evaluated on the numbers
    and qualifications of individuals they enlist.

    Once applicants have decided to enlist in a military service, the
    recruiter schedules them for processing at the nearest Military
    Entrance Processing Station (MEPS).  At the MEPS, applicants take the
    ASVAB--if they have not already taken it at a high school or other
    testing site--and are given medical examinations.  They also meet
    with representatives of their chosen service.  These service
    representatives provide lists of military occupations for which the
    applicants are qualified on the basis of their AFQT scores and
    certain other factors, such as medical or moral qualifications.  For
    example, applicants who are colorblind would not be eligible for
    positions requiring perfect eyesight; however, they could still
    enlist.

    Once an applicant has chosen a military job, the service
    representative at the MEPS draws up a contract for either the Delayed
    Entry Program (DEP) or immediate active or reserve duty.  Nearly all
    applicants join the DEP; that is, they do not immediately report for
    active duty until up to 1 year later.  The services require several
    months to complete background investigations and await applicants'
    completion of high school and receipt of transcripts.  During their
    time in the DEP, enlistees are members of the inactive reserve, and
    they are required by the services to report to their recruiters
    periodically.  Recruiters may monitor their enlistees' progress in
    high school and attempt to sustain the enlistees' interest in the
    service.  At the completion of the DEP, the enlistee returns to the
    MEPS, undergoes a short medical examination, and is sworn into the
    service.  After recruits are sworn in, they are shipped to basic
    training locations.

       SERVICES TARGET 17- TO
       21-YEAR-OLD YOUTHS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

    All the services target 17- to 21-year-old high school graduates who
    score in the upper categories of the AFQT.  The services believe that
    individuals between 17 and 21 years of age are more likely to
    consider joining the military than they are at any other age.  Since
    1990, 83 to 88 percent of those who joined the services each year
    have been in this age group.  The services have also found that
    individuals who graduated from high school and score in the upper
    categories of the AFQT do better on a variety of military performance
    measures than their lower scoring counterparts.  The services also
    believe that quality recruits are less likely to pose discipline
    problems and are more likely to complete their first terms of
    enlistment.

       SERVICES USE ADVERTISING TO
       ENCOURAGE ENLISTMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

    The military services have a variety of marketing and advertising
    techniques at their disposal to attract members of their target
    market.  In addition to the individuals the services ultimately hope
    to enlist, the target market includes people who may influence a
    prospective recruit's decision to enlist.  These "influencers"
    include parents, coaches, and teachers.  Service advertising is
    designed to appeal to both potential applicants and their
    influencers.  Each service employs an advertising agency to develop
    and/or execute advertising programs.  Advertising methods range from
    the most visible and expensive form--paid national television--to
    public service announcements, national and local radio spots, and
    mass mailings.

    DOD's advertising budgets increased through the mid-1980s.  In
    particular, between fiscal years 1980 and 1986, advertising
    expenditures for active enlisted recruiting grew from $149.3 million
    to $180.7 million, an increase of 21 percent in constant 1994
    dollars.  Advertising expenditures as a percentage of the total DOD
    recruiting budget remained relatively stable during the period,
    ranging from 10 to 11 percent.  From their peak in fiscal year 1986,
    however, active enlisted recruiting budgets were cut significantly
    for all four services, from $180.7 million in fiscal year 1986 to
    $73.8 million programmed for fiscal year 1994, a decline of almost 60
    percent.  Advertising as a percentage of the total DOD recruiting
    budget fell below 7 percent by fiscal year 1994.

    The services have studied advertising and its relationship to
    propensity and have observed that the decline in youth's propensity
    to enlist in the military corresponds to the decline in advertising
    budgets.  According to an Army official, reductions in advertising
    budgets have reduced the services' ability to generate a positive
    public image and counter negative perceptions created by media
    coverage of downsizing and conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia.  The
    services believe that sufficient continuous advertising will have a
    direct effect on reversing the decline in propensity.

       RECRUITING TRENDS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

    Budgets for recruiting active enlisted personnel peaked in 1986 at
    about $1.6 billion (in constant 1994 dollars)--a 23-percent increase
    over the 1980 total of about $1.3 billion.  From 1986, the budgets
    fell to a low of $1.1 billion in 1994--a reduction of about 31
    percent.  For fiscal year 1995, DOD has requested over $1 billion.
    Figure 1.1 shows the four services' active enlisted recruiting
    budgets from 1980 to 1995.

       Figure 1.1:  Services'
       Recruiting Budgets for Active
       Enlisted Personnel

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    \a Data for 1995 are budget requests as of June 1994.

    Between 1980 and 1994, annual enlistments for active force personnel
    also dropped, by over 50 percent (see fig.  1.2).

       Figure 1.2:  Annual Accessions
       for Active Enlisted Personnel

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    \a Data for 1995 are DOD accession targets as of June 1994.

    Because funding between 1980 and 1994 went down about 15 percent and
    accessions of active-duty enlisted personnel went down over 50
    percent, the average cost per accession rose--from $3,261 in 1980 to
    $5,401 in 1994, an increase of over 65 percent.  In fiscal year 1994,
    the Army had the highest cost per accession at $6,956, and the Air
    Force the lowest at $3,440.  The Marine Corps' cost per accession
    stood at $5,127, and the Navy's at $4,655.  Figure 1.3 shows active
    enlisted costs per accession from 1980 to 1995.

       Figure 1.3:  Cost per Accession
       for Active Enlisted Personnel

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    \a Costs are calculated based on projected data for 1995 as of June
    1994.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6

    DOD concurred with all of the information discussed in this chapter
    with the exception of our calculation of the costs per accession for
    the period 1980 through 1995.  DOD commented that we distorted the
    overall cost savings associated with the services' recruiting
    programs by basing our evaluation of the cost per accession only on
    basic recruiting costs.  Further, DOD stated that certain fixed costs
    would increase the average cost per recruit during a drawdown and
    that projecting costs for force-sustainment level recruiting would
    present a much more accurate assessment of recruiting.

    We believe that our analysis of cost per accession is both valid and
    proper.  Computing an average by dividing the total costs associated
    with a particular output is a generally accepted method for
    identifying and tracking trends in most organizations and operations.

    Further, although DOD suggests that increases in the cost per
    accession can be attributed to its drawdown, our analysis shows that
    the cost per accession has generally been on an upward trend since
    1980 and that a substantial part of each service's increase occurred
    before the drawdown started.

    Regarding a projection of costs for force-sustainment level
    recruiting, DOD did not provide the data required to make such a
    projection.  Moreover, on the basis of our analysis of the costs and
    types of costs associated with DOD's recruiting operations, we doubt
    that sustainment-level recruiting would have a major impact on the
    average cost per accession.  We believe that cost increases resulting
    from, among other things, additional military pay for more
    recruiters, increased training and support for more recruiters, and
    additional advertising would largely offset the lowering effect that
    would result from increased accessions.

       OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
       METHODOLOGY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:7

    Concerned about the size of DOD's recruiting budget and the
    efficiency of its recruiting operations, Senator David Pryor asked us
    to survey military recruiting operations and identify areas in which
    DOD could reduce its recruiting costs without adversely affecting its
    ability to meet military personnel requirements.  Specifically, GAO's
    objectives were to evaluate (1) recruiting challenges the services
    face in the size of the youth market and its propensity to join the
    military, (2) the services' future plans for recruiting staffs and
    organizations, and (3) the services' management of their recruiting
    facilities.  This report focuses on the largest consumer of
    resources--recruiting for active enlisted personnel.

    To obtain a general overview of recruiting results and
    cost-effectiveness, we reviewed DOD and service research studies in
    the area of military recruiting.  We met with representatives of
    organizations such as the Rand Corporation and the Army Research
    Institute, which also study recruiting.

    We interviewed officials from DOD's Office of Accession Policy; the
    Army, the Air Force, and the Navy recruiting commands; and the
    Military Entrance Processing Command to obtain their views on the
    evolution and current status of recruiting and problems they have
    experienced or foresee in adjusting to budget cuts and military
    downsizing.  We also interviewed officials from the Naval Audit
    Service and the Congressional Budget Office.

    We did very limited work on Marine Corps' recruiting because during
    our review, the Naval Audit Service was auditing the Marine Corps
    Recruiting Command, and the Command was undergoing major
    restructuring.  We have, however, included the Marine Corps in most
    of the data and in narrative, where possible.

    To identify areas for potential cost savings, we obtained data on (1)
    accessions by service and DOD-wide between fiscal years 1980 and
    1994, (2) the quality of recruits between fiscal years 1980 and 1993,
    (3) individual service budgets, (4) recruiters and support personnel,
    (5) recruiting offices by county and their associated costs between
    fiscal years 1991 and 1994, and (6) attrition by service and DOD-wide
    for active-duty personnel between fiscal years 1974 and 1989.

    We conducted our review between July 1993 and August 1994 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    FUTURE CHALLENGES IN RECRUITING
    MAY HAVE BEEN OVERSTATED
    ============================================================ Chapter 2

    In a 1994 congressional testimony, the services' recruiting
    commanders stated that additional recruiting funds were essential to
    successfully recruit the numbers and quality of enlisted personnel
    they would need in the future.  They expressed concern about a
    decrease in the size of the youth population and in youths'
    propensity to enlist in the military over the past decade.  They
    believe that recruiting will be more difficult than it has been in
    the past and that advertising dollars are crucial in overcoming these
    problems.  Two of the services' recruiting commanders also stated
    that upcoming recruiting difficulties may force their services to
    lower the current standards for the quality of their enlistees if the
    services are to meet their requirements for numbers of personnel.

    We found these concerns to be overstated because (1) the size of the
    target recruiting population is growing; (2) DOD does not need as
    large a percentage of the market to meet its requirements as it has
    in the past; (3) although propensity to enlist in the military has
    dropped in recent years, about half of the enlistees have come from
    the groups who expressed negative intentions to join the military;
    and (4) even as propensity has dropped in recent years, the services
    have maintained recruit quality well above DOD-established
    benchmarks.

    During the 1980s, the services improved the quality of their recruits
    and therefore reduced first-term attrition from about 37 percent in
    1980 to around 29 percent in 1984.  Attrition has since risen to over
    34 percent.\1 These attrition rates significantly increase the
    numbers of personnel DOD must enlist each year.  The services have
    undertaken various experiments that have been successful in reducing
    attrition, but these efforts have not resulted in DOD-wide
    initiatives.

    --------------------
    \1 We obtained data on attrition from the Defense Manpower Data
    Center.  These data represent attrition for personnel enlisted
    annually from 1974 through 1989 for a 4-year commitment.  The 1989
    group completed their enlistments in 1992.  For this period, DOD-wide
    attrition ranged from a high of 39 percent to a low of 29 percent.

       SERVICES' CONCERNS WITH SIZE OF
       YOUTH POPULATION ARE OVERSTATED
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

    In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee's
    Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee, the services' recruiting
    commanders outlined the challenges their services face in meeting
    recruiting targets, strategies for meeting these challenges, and
    funding needs.  All the commanders shared the view that recruiting is
    more difficult than it has been in the past and that advertising
    dollars are crucial to overcoming a reduction in the services' target
    population and youths' lowered propensity to join the military.

    During the testimony, the Commander of the Navy Recruiting Command
    stated that "the pool of 17 to 21 year-old males and females has
    decreased significantly over the past decade.  .  .  and is now at
    its lowest point since the inception of the All Volunteer Force." The
    Air Force Recruiting Service Commander stated that the market of
    those qualified to enter the Air Force was 85 percent of what it was
    in the early 1980s.

    Our review indicated that the services' concern about a shrinking
    market may be overstated.  It is true that the target recruiting
    population decreased between 1980 and 1989, from 20.5 million to 17.6
    million.  Since fiscal year 1989, however, this population has
    increased, and continued growth is projected until at least the year
    2000, when it is

       Figure 2.1:  Size of the Youth
       Population Between 1980 and
       2000

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Note:  Figures for 1980-89 are based on 1980 census data; figures for
    1990-2000 are based on 1990 census data.

    Source:  Defense Manpower Data Center.

    In addition, the percentage of the total target population that the
    services must recruit to meet their accession needs has been
    decreasing, with some fluctuations, since fiscal year 1980--from
    nearly 2 percent to around 1 percent in fiscal years 1994 and 1995
    (see table 2.1).  DOD projects that by 2000 the fraction of youth
    needed for recruiting will likely reach an historical low.

                              Table 2.1

                Percentage of the Youth Population DOD
                Needed to Meet Accession Requirements

                                                   Percentage of
                                                      population
                           Size of                     needed to
                            target      Accession           meet
    Fiscal year         Population    requirement    requirement
    ---------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
    1980                20,493,049        389,861           1.90
    1981                20,327,668        367,240           1.81
    1982                20,087,350        338,223           1.68
    1983                19,539,986        330,815           1.69
    1984                19,006,339        328,457           1.73
    1985                18,415,983        316,676           1.72
    1986                17,953,275        333,550           1.86
    1987                17,740,140        316,826           1.79
    1988                17,773,315        286,763           1.61
    1989                17,586,928        293,896           1.67
    1990                18,626,642        232,306           1.25
    1991                18,354,717        206,617           1.13
    1992                18,257,698        202,752           1.11
    1993                18,256,680        206,927           1.13
    1994                18,318,454        189,619           1.04
    1995\a              18,409,902        195,421           1.06
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    \a Figures for 1995 are projections as of June 1994.

    Source:  GAO's analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

       NEGATIVE PROPENSITY GROUPS
       PROVIDE ABOUT HALF OF DOD
       ACCESSIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

    The services consider propensity to enlist in the military, as
    measured by the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), to be a
    crucial measure of the difficulty of the recruiting environment.  The
    services have found a correlation between positive propensity and
    actual enlistment, and they believe that the higher the percentage of
    youth who express a propensity to enlist, the easier it is for
    recruiters to access personnel.  The military services have stated
    that youths' propensity to enlist in the military is at its lowest
    point in many years.  They believe that this drop indicates that
    recruiting will be even more difficult in the future.  Though youths'
    propensity to enlist in the military is indeed down, the services'
    data on propensity historically has not always been a reliable
    indicator of who actually enlists in the military.

    Each year for the last 18 years, DOD has sponsored a YATS to gather
    information from American youth on their perceptions of the military
    and their future plans in general.  Approximately 10,000 men and
    women between the ages of 16 and 24 are interviewed for 30 minutes by
    telephone.  The questionnaire focuses primarily on enlistment
    propensity.  Youth are asked several questions about the likelihood
    of their serving in the active or reserve military services in the
    near future.  They are asked how likely they are to join the
    military, and each service in particular, in the next few years.
    Those who answer that they "definitely" or "probably" will enlist are
    categorized as indicating "positive propensity"; those who answer
    that they will "probably not" or "definitely not" or "don't know" are
    categorized as indicating "negative propensity." Each year, DOD
    distributes the results of this survey to the individual services.

    Positive propensity to enlist in a military service has been falling
    for several years.  Positive propensity to enlist among 16- to
    21-year-old males decreased by almost 17 percent (from 32 percent to
    26.6 percent) between 1989 and 1992.  Service officials have
    attributed the drop to a number of factors, including a decrease in
    advertising, a lack of knowledge on the part of the public that the
    services are still hiring, concern over the dangers of military
    service due to conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia, and concern over DOD
    budget cuts that are perceived as making the services an unsafe
    career choice.

    However, propensity data are not always reliable indicators of what
    people will do.  According to a Rand study, though those who indicate
    positive propensity are indeed more likely to join the military,
    about half of DOD enlistees have come from the groups that expressed
    negative intention.  This is because those in the negative propensity
    group represent a much larger percentage of the population and a much
    greater pool.  The Army, for example, projected that over 70 percent
    of its enlistments for 1993 came from those who had expressed
    negative propensity to join the military.  It also projected that
    almost 42 percent of Army enlistments in 1993 came from the group who
    said they would definitely not join, while less than 9 percent of
    enlistments came from the group stating they would definitely
    consider enlisting.

    The services' concerns about perceptions that the military is not
    hiring, that it is now too dangerous, or that budget cuts make the
    military unattractive as a career option have not been validated by
    YATS data.  In the 1993 survey, for example, 81 percent of
    respondents said that they thought the services were still
    recruiting, despite downsizing.  This figure is up from 79 percent in
    1992.  In addition, 56 percent of respondents in 1993 said that
    budget cuts would not affect their attitude toward enlistment, up
    from 54 percent in 1992.  Finally, the percentage of respondents who
    stated that danger was the single main reason for not considering
    enlistment fell from 1990 to 1992.

       DESPITE DROPS IN PROPENSITY,
       QUALITY HAS REMAINED WELL ABOVE
       BENCHMARKS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

    Despite drops in propensity in recent years, recruit quality has
    remained well above DOD-established benchmarks.  Even so, in recent
    congressional testimony, the Army and Navy recruiting commanders
    expressed the fear that their services might have to lower enlistment
    quality targets to meet upcoming accession needs.  The Army's
    recruiting commander stated that the Army may need to reexamine
    whether it will be able to sustain its current quality standards for
    new enlisted recruits as it approaches fiscal year 1996, when its
    accession goals are expected to increase.  Similarly, the Navy's
    recruiting commander believes that it may be necessary to review the
    Navy's targets for recruit quality in light of future recruiting
    challenges.

    To help analyze the services' quality requirements, DOD, in
    conjunction with the National Research Council, concluded that having
    90 percent high school graduates and 60 percent scoring in categories
    I through IIIA were benchmarks to which the services should aspire.
    Historical records of recruit quality indicate that the services have
    generally remained above these benchmarks since the mid-1980s.  The
    percentage of enlistees who have high school diplomas and who score
    above the 50th percentile on the AFQT has grown steadily (see fig.
    2.2).  In fact, 1992 represented the highest point since 1980 for
    recruit quality.

       Figure 2.2:  Increase in the
       Quality of Recruits Since 1980

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    As recruit quality has improved, the services' targets have
    correspondingly increased.  These targets have tended to move upwards
    to match the actual results each service has experienced.  For
    example, DOD's 1985 report on its quality requirements for the 5-year
    period 1985-89, basically reflected the recruiting results of 1984.
    Stated requirements for high school graduates ranged from 80 to 95
    percent, with an average of 88 percent for DOD.  The requirements for
    enlistees in categories I through IIIA averaged 61 percent.  The
    percentage of category IV recruits ranged from 4 to 12, with a DOD
    average of 9 percent.  In the early 1990s, as the services were even
    more successful in acquiring quality recruits, the targets moved
    upward to reflect that experience.

    Table 2.2 shows the services' current targets for recruit quality.
    All are well above DOD's benchmarks of 90 percent high school
    graduates and 60 percent scoring in AFQT categories I through IIIA.

                              Table 2.2

                Legislative, DOD, and Service Targets
                         for Recruit Quality

                 (Percentages of enlisted accessions)

                                       Scorers in
    Benchmark/         High school  categories I-     Scorers in
    target               graduates           IIIA    category IV
    ---------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
    Legislative                 65            Not            <20
     requirement                       applicable
    DOD benchmark               90             60            Not
                                                      applicable
    Army target                 95             67             <2
    Navy target                 95             62              0
    Air Force                   99             80             <1
     target
    Marine Corps                95             63             <1
     target
    ------------------------------------------------------------

       ATTRITION HAS INCREASED DURING
       THE LATE 1980S
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

    Between 1980 and 1984, the attrition rate for enlisted personnel
    during their first term dropped from about 37 percent to 29 percent.
    However, this rate has since risen to over 34 percent.  First-term
    attrition is costly to the services because replacements must be
    recruited and trained at an average cost of over $20,000 each.  As
    the services successfully lower attrition rates, their enlistment
    needs and demands on recruiters correspondingly decrease.  Though the
    services have done studies of the causes of attrition and have
    conducted experiments to lower the attrition rate, they have not been
    able to lower it below its current plateau.  At present, about one of
    three recruits does not complete his or her first enlistment term of
    duty, which typically is 4 years.  Much of this attrition occurs in
    the first months of active duty.  Figure 2.3 shows attrition rates
    from 1974 to 1989, which was the last year for which there was
    complete data on personnel who completed their first terms.

       Figure 2.3:  Historical Changes
       in First-Term Attrition Rates

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Researchers have investigated several factors that influence
    attrition during the first term of enlistment.  These include
    educational credentials, gender, age, race, enlistment term, and
    military occupational specialty.  According to DOD and the services,
    the most important of these variables in determining a recruit's
    attrition rate is educational attainment.  Most researchers equate
    high school degrees with lower attrition rates.  A second predictor
    of lower attrition rate is AFQT scores.  Those who score in the upper
    50th percentile of the AFQT have historically also had lower
    attrition rates.  While the services have reduced attrition rates
    slightly by recruiting higher quality recruits, marginal increases in
    quality appear to have limited potential for further reducing
    attrition.

    Despite a considerable number of studies of attrition, DOD and the
    services have not been able to define accurate predictors of
    attrition beyond educational credentials and AFQT scores.  That is,
    DOD and the services have not successfully isolated causal linkages
    between recruiting methods and targets and first-term attrition.
    Although research has been done to define better predictors of
    attrition and provide information to recruiting staff on attrition
    from basic military training, the services have not successfully
    lowered attrition rates below their current plateau.

    To reduce attrition from Basic Military Training (BMT), the Air Force
    Recruiting Service attempts to ensure that recruits are physically
    prepared for BMT; encourages recruiters to identify applicants'
    medical conditions that would prevent their success in BMT; and
    provides to groups, squadrons, flights, and recruiters feedback on
    graduation rates and numbers of honor graduates from BMT.  According
    to recruiting officials, these actions have had positive effects on
    BMT attrition rates.  However, they were not able to tie these
    effects directly to decreased attrition.

    In the fall of 1993, the Air Force Recruiting Service did a study to
    determine the reasons for that year's increase in BMT attrition.
    (The rate rose from about 6 percent in fiscal year 1992 to about 9
    percent in fiscal year 1993.) The study showed that lower recruit
    quality (in terms of AFQT scores) played a very small role in the
    increase.  The study instead attributed most of the increase in BMT
    attrition to losses for medical reasons.  The primary reason for
    higher medical losses, according to the study, was stricter
    application of medical standards by BMT medical personnel.  According
    to Air Force Recruiting Service officials, the Air Force is now more
    lenient in releasing recruits from BMT because it is concerned about
    preventing training deaths.

    The Air Force is conducting research on better ways to use ASVAB
    subscores to predict attrition.  The Air Force now uses ASVAB
    subscores that measure mechanical, administrative, general, and
    electronic ability.  The Air Force hopes to find alternate subscores
    that are more predictive of attrition for various skills.  Another
    program that may offer promise to all the services in lowering
    attrition during BMT is the nonprior service orientation now offered
    by the Oklahoma Army National Guard and Air National Guard units.
    The program began in 1988 as an attempt to reduce BMT attrition
    rates.  The Air National Guard's BMT attrition rate at that time was
    17 percent, one of the worst rates in the nation.  As a result of
    this program, that rate has remained at less than 1 percent for 6
    years.

    The orientation lasts only 2 days and is taught at the Oklahoma
    Military Academy.  After recruits have joined the Guard but before
    they attend BMT, they are put through a simulation of basic training,
    including some lectures, but mostly marching, drills, and physical
    training.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

    In commenting on this chapter, DOD concurred with our findings on
    attrition and the services' success in increasing and maintaining
    recruit quality rates.  However, DOD disagreed with certain
    observations concerning the size of the youth population and some of
    our observations about propensity.

    DOD took issue with our analysis of youth population trend data,
    based on 1980 and 1990 Census Bureau information, which indicates
    that the size of the pool bottomed out in 1989 instead of 1993, as
    according to DOD.  The information contained in this report was the
    most current available when we performed our analysis.  More
    importantly, DOD acknowledged our key point about youth population;
    that is, the size of the pool is projected to increase in future
    years.

    DOD addressed other factors it believes adversely affect any analysis
    of the youth population and the services' ability to recruit
    sufficient numbers.  Specifically, DOD commented that (1) the youth
    population will grow only 1 percent between 1994 and 1996, while
    projected accessions will grow about 13 percent; (2) a change in the
    demographic characteristics of the youth population, for example, an
    increasing percentage of Hispanics, indicates increasing recruiting
    challenges; and (3) an increase in the percentage of high school
    graduates going to college and those who are medically or morally
    unfit to serve will reduce the numbers available to recruit.

    However, based on findings contained in a May 1994 RAND Corporation
    study, "Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications:  Preliminary
    Analysis and Recommendations," the factors DOD cites appear to be
    moot in terms of their impact on the size of the pool of quality
    youth for recruitment.  This study estimated the potential supply of
    high quality enlistees for 1994 and for fiscal year 1996 and compared
    these estimates with the pre-drawdown levels of fiscal year 1989.
    The study found that the prospective supply equals or exceeds that of
    pre-drawdown levels and concluded that the supply of high quality
    youth to recruit for military service should be adequate.

    Regarding propensity, DOD commented that we had reflected some of the
    difficulties associated with recruiting in a negative propensity
    environment but did not present a complete and accurate view of the
    situation.  DOD stated that propensity is not intended to identify
    who will enlist but is a much broader tool for determining how much
    effort and resources will be required to meet recruiting objectives.
    DOD also stated that the 1994 RAND study confirmed that the lower the
    propensity of a youth population to enlist, the more resources would
    be required for each enlistment.

    We agree that propensity data is useful for gaining insights on the
    recruiting environment; however, we continue to believe that the
    services' concerns about propensity trends have been overstated in
    the recent past.  Our view is supported by the recent RAND study,
    which concentrates on the high quality component of the youth
    population, that is, those individuals who are the services' prime
    target for recruiting.

    In the RAND study, propensity for the quality component of the youth
    population was reestimated to correct a sampling change, implemented
    in the 1991 YATS survey, which had the unexpected effect of lowering
    positive propensity rates.  Overall, the study concluded that the
    trends from 1989 to 1993 suggest that the propensity of high quality
    youth to enlist was stabilizing.  Specifically, propensity to enlist
    increased during the Persian Gulf crisis, declined between 1991 and
    1992, then leveled off or increased slightly between 1992 and 1993,
    which placed the 1993 rate near or above that of the late 1980s.  In
    other words, the propensity of high quality youth to enlist exceeded
    or equaled the pre-drawdown level during 1990-93.

    The study also observed that (1) about 75 percent of the male youth
    population expressed a negative propensity to enlist; however, this
    group accounts for about half of all enlistees because of its large
    size and (2) the potential supply of youth for enlistment will move
    up or down with the propensity level, but the supply level would not
    change in proportion to the change in the propensity level; that is,
    a 10-percent drop in propensity would lead to only about a 3-percent
    drop in potential supply.

    OPPORTUNITIES TO STREAMLINE
    RECRUITING STAFFS AND
    ORGANIZATIONS
    ============================================================ Chapter 3

    Military budgets and accession requirements have been dropping for
    several years, as the size of U.S.  military forces has been reduced.
    During this time, a number of initiatives to reduce the size of
    recruiting staffs have been implemented, and several proposals to
    streamline recruiting organizations have been made.

    Most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    1993 (which was enacted in October 1992) required the services to
    reduce by 10 percent the numbers of personnel carrying out recruiting
    activities in the active forces and the National Guard.  This cut was
    to be taken by the end of fiscal year 1994 from 1992 levels.  The
    services initially responded by cutting personnel from all levels of
    recruiting, but some are now planning increases in staff.  Our review
    indicates that increasing the number of recruiters may not be
    necessary.

    Although the military services have reduced the size of different
    recruiting management layers, the basic recruiting structure remains
    intact.  Past DOD, service, and congressional proposals include the
    elimination of certain recruiting command management layers; the
    consolidation of common logistical support functions into one support
    command; the establishment of a joint DOD recruiting organization;
    the consolidation of each service's reserve, active, and Guard
    recruiting; and the consolidation of medical recruiting activities.
    While such proposals have been discussed, few have been implemented,
    generally because the services have been reluctant to change
    organizations and methods that have worked in the past.

       SERVICES' PLANS FOR FUTURE
       STAFFING
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

    The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required
    the services to cut their 1992 recruiting staffs by 10 percent by the
    end of fiscal year 1994.  However, the fiscal year 1995 National
    Defense Authorization Act repealed this required reduction.  While a
    few of the services had stated at the time of our review that they
    had no specific plans to respond to a repeal, three of the services
    believed that additions to recruiting staffs would be necessary in
    the near future.

    In response to the 1993 authorization act, all the services planned
    to cut recruiting staffs by at least the required 10 percent.
    However, because these cuts were to be made by the end of fiscal year
    1994, at the time of our review, most of the services' cuts had not
    been finalized.

    The Air Force is the only service that anticipates no near-term
    increases in recruiting staff.  The Air Force Recruiting Service
    Commander believes that no additions to recruiting staffs are
    necessary unless accession goals rise substantially.  Because the
    Navy had begun a 17-percent rather than a 10-percent cut to its
    recruiting personnel, it has now decided to incrementally add back
    360 people to its recruiting force by the end of the year.  The
    Marine Corps and the Army believe that additions to recruiting staffs
    will alleviate difficulties they foresee in the future.  The Army
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has authorized 5,350 recruiters
    for fiscal year 1995.  This represents about a 27-percent increase
    (1,150 recruiters) over the earlier planned fiscal year 1994 level.

       ADDING RECRUITERS MAY NOT BE
       NECESSARY TO MEET FUTURE
       ACCESSION GOALS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

    We do not believe that more recruiters are required to meet projected
    accession targets.  The services' belief that they need to add
    recruiters suggests that current accessions per recruiter are
    maximized.  Our analysis, however, indicated that the relationship
    between numbers of recruiters and accessions is unclear because (1)
    the recruiters' quota system places artificial constraints on their
    numbers of accessions; (2) the services have not historically reduced
    numbers of recruiters as accession needs have gone down; (3) the
    numbers of accessions per recruiter have declined over the years; and
    (4) service studies suggest that after a certain number of recruiters
    are in place, it is more cost-effective to invest in more
    advertising.

    According to Army officials, the quota system rewards recruiters and
    recruiting organizations for achieving the missions they are assigned
    by headquarters.  Overproduction is not rewarded.  In fact, in the
    current system, a recruiter's overproduction during one year could
    result in a rise in the recruiter's quota for the next year.  The
    higher quota in subsequent years would require more work from the
    recruiter and increase the possibility of the recruiter's missing the
    quota and receiving a career-damaging performance evaluation.  These
    effects of the quota system and past performance suggest that
    recruiters could produce more recruits than they are currently.  Army
    officials told us that the Army is experimenting with changes to the
    quota system to reward overproduction.

    Recruiter productivity has also been negatively affected by the fact
    that most of the services have not reduced their numbers of
    recruiters as accession needs have decreased.  The number of
    accessions per recruiter fell by almost half from 1980 to 1994
    DOD-wide (see fig.  3.1).  This decrease is the direct result of a
    substantial drop in the numbers of enlisted accessions (over 50
    percent), while the numbers of recruiters dropped only slightly (13
    percent).

       Figure 3.1:  DOD- wide Trends
       in Accessions per Recruiter

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Numbers of accessions per recruiter demonstrated wide variations by
    service between fiscal years 1980 and 1994.  The decline in
    accessions per recruiter was most striking in the Army, where it fell
    by over 60 percent.  The Navy's accessions per recruiter fell over 34
    percent, and the Air Force's by almost 35 percent.  Marine Corps'
    accessions per recruiter, on the other hand, increased slightly.  The
    Marine Corps, unlike the other services, reduced its recruiting force
    as its accessions decreased.

    Several recent Army studies suggest that after a certain point,
    adding more recruiters may not result in added accessions.  A
    preliminary study recently done for the Army by the Naval
    Postgraduate School suggests that the number of recruiters is only
    slightly correlated with the number of accessions.  An internal Army
    Recruiting Command study concludes that the number of recruiters is
    negatively correlated with the number of accessions.  Both studies
    found much higher correlations between advertising budgets and
    numbers of accessions.

       CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS HAVE
       BEEN REJECTED BY THE SERVICES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

    Over the years, various proposals have been made to consolidate
    various recruiting functions for all the services.  The services,
    however, have consistently rejected any merging of recruiting across
    service lines because they believe that, as the Army's Comptroller
    has stated in responding to one such DOD proposal, "there are
    tremendous differences in recruiting for each of the Services, most
    of which are irreconcilable."

    A Defense Management Review in fiscal year 1990 proposed two
    alternatives involving the consolidation of service recruiting
    organizations and functions.  The first was to merge the services'
    recruiting organizations into one command.  Recruiting offices would
    remain service-unique and be staffed by individual service
    recruiters.  DOD estimated that implementation of this proposal could
    have resulted in a savings of $27 million in fiscal year 1993 and
    over $240 million through fiscal year 1997.  The second alternative
    proposed the consolidation of support functions, including
    advertising, under a recruiting support command.  Implementation of
    this alternative was estimated to save about $13 million in fiscal
    year 1992 and over $150 million through fiscal year 1997.

    In written comments, none of the service recruiting organizations
    favored consolidating their recruiting headquarters functions.
    Rather than responding with thorough analyses and rebuttals to the
    management review, the services dismissed the proposal out of their
    reluctance to alter methods that had succeeded for them in the past.
    For example, the Army's response was that "a major, radical change to
    our way of doing business--combined with the turbulence of personnel
    reductions while entering an era of uncertainty--will surely disrupt
    mission accomplishment." The Navy's position was that "creating a
    single recruiting bureaucracy would eventually erode [the] strong
    identification with service, reduce the recruiter's emotional
    involvement, and create an atmosphere where quantity, not quality, is
    the major objective." Accordingly, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    rejected the proposal and stated that "to jeopardize the recruiting
    success we have enjoyed in recent years would be unconscionable."

    While the services rejected combined service recruiting entirely,
    they acknowledged that there might be some merit in consolidating
    various support functions, such as the procurement and management of
    vehicles, telecommunications, and recruiting facilities.  The
    services did not support the consolidation of advertising.  In
    January 1994, DOD officials began to reconsider the issue of
    consolidating support functions for the recruiting commands.  DOD has
    tasked the Military Entrance Processing Command with taking the lead
    on a task force to study the concept.  The task force was scheduled
    to begin its work in October 1994.

    Another consolidation idea that DOD has discussed but not acted on is
    joint medical recruiting.  Although some DOD officials believe that
    joint medical recruiting would help the services solve problems in
    attracting qualified medical personnel, most service recruiting
    commands are opposed to this concept.  Some services believe that
    their needs for medical personnel differ from those of the other
    services and that it would therefore not be feasible to recruit
    jointly.

    Though the Air Force and the Navy initiated their own proposals for
    consolidating active and reserve recruiting, they ultimately rejected
    these proposals in favor of continuing their proven successful ways
    of doing business.  In January 1992, the Air Force began a formal
    discussion on combining its active, reserve, and Guard recruiting in
    response to (1) a Senate report on the National Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 1993 directing the services to consider consolidating
    their recruiting functions\1 and (2) Air Force program policy
    guidance.  After extensive meetings involving Air Force recruiting
    personnel at all levels, the working group proposed three options
    that involved combining active and reserve recruiting.  Two options
    involved staffing savings of 191 personnel; a third involved staffing
    savings of 234.  Despite the staffing savings proposed by these three
    options, the Air Force decided to make no changes.  On March 2, 1993,
    the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Installations,
    justified the Air Force's decision as follows:

         "Based on the significant successes of the AF's Active and
         Reserve recruiting organizations relative to the other Services;
         on the significant differences between their missions; on the
         significant savings and streamlining steps already taken and on
         the significant potential for reductions in recruiting quality
         and quantity should consolidation be further pursued, all
         efforts to consolidate Active, Reserve, and/or Air National
         Guard recruiting organizations should be terminated."

    In June 1993, the Navy also completed a study of the feasibility of
    consolidating active and reserve recruiting.  This study, like the
    Air Force's, was initiated at least in part as a result of
    congressional interest in possibilities for cost savings.  Also like
    the Air Force, the Navy decided not to merge what it says are two
    very different programs.  Navy officials told us that Navy Reserve
    enlistment requirements are almost exclusively for experienced
    prior-service personnel, while the active Navy targets those without
    prior service.

    --------------------
    \1 This provision was not included in the House version of the bill
    or the law that was eventually enacted.

       SERVICES HAVE REJECTED
       PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE
       RECRUITING MANAGEMENT LAYERS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

    As the military services' recruiting organizations have downsized,
    they have reduced the size of different management layers, but they
    have not eliminated any.  Their recruiting structures, therefore,
    remain intact.  For example, the Air Force has reduced its numbers of
    recruiting groups, squadrons, and flights.  The Navy has reduced its
    numbers of recruiting districts and zones.  The Air Force, the Army,
    and the Navy have considered but rejected proposals to eliminate
    similar management layers to improve efficiency and save costs.
    While the particular proposals thus far circulated may not represent
    optimum recruiting organizations, potential economies of scale and
    other efficiencies may be available through the elimination of
    command structure layers.  (Fig.  3.2 shows the various service
    recruiting management layers.)

       Figure 3.2:  Organizational
       Recruiting Levels for the
       Military Services

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Note:  Numbers of recruiting offices and substations are taken from
    the Recruiting Facilities Management Information System as of June
    21, 1994.  They include (1) battalion, district, and squadron
    offices; (2) company, zone, and flight offices and Marine Corps
    recruiting stations; (3) full-time recruiting offices; and (4)
    part-time recruiting offices.

    Navy officials told us that though the Navy has considered
    eliminating management layers, it ultimately determined that no layer
    could be eliminated without negatively affecting the recruiting
    organization's overall operations.  The area level, in particular,
    has constantly been under consideration for elimination.  However,
    considering that span of control difficulties already challenge the
    Navy Recruiting Commander, Navy officials concluded that if the areas
    were eliminated, the Navy would not have adequate command and control
    over its 31 districts.  The Navy believes that taking such a big step
    would severely reduce recruiting efficiency.

    As part of their study of the feasibility of consolidating active and
    reserve Air Force recruiting organizations, various options--all
    recommending the elimination of the group level--were developed.  The
    Air Force's final decision was to maintain its 4 groups, each
    typically staffed with
    18 officer and enlisted personnel and 1 civilian.  Air Force
    Recruiting Service officials told us that eliminating the groups
    would have positioned the Recruiting Service Commander as the direct
    supervisor for 29 squadron commanders.  In the officials' opinion,
    this direct supervision would have been an unmanageable task and,
    functionally, would have required too much direct involvement by
    Recruiting Headquarters in operational issues.

    An internal Army command study concluded that the elimination of the
    Army brigade level would enhance efficiency and save money.  The same
    study also identified areas of competing and overlapping
    responsibilities and redundant functions in the command.  Brigade
    officials disagreed with the internal study's findings and
    recommendations and stated that their level is necessary for command
    and control of field operations.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

    In commenting on this chapter, DOD stated that we had failed to
    recognize the depth of the services' cuts since the drawdown and that
    to meet increased 1996 recruiting goals, most services must add a
    complementary mix of recruiters, advertising, and enlistment
    incentives.  According to DOD, this mix is determined with the help
    of analytical models and informed judgment.

    We recognize that the services have made overall cuts in the numbers
    of personnel associated with recruiting.  However, before DOD expands
    its recruiter staff, it should reevaluate its efforts to improve
    recruiters' productivity and quality of life through more investments
    in advertising and (as discussed in the next chapter) evolving
    technology.  The recent RAND study recommends a hedging strategy
    pending the outcome of additional research to determine how
    recruiting resource management and recruiting practices--areas which
    are important in the recruiting process--have changed during the
    drawdown.  While this study initially recommended that DOD augment
    advertising and ask Congress to remove the ceiling on recruiters, it
    also recommended that the implementation and effects of any increases
    in advertising or in the number of recruiters be carefully monitored.

    CLOSING AND REALIGNING MORE
    RECRUITING OFFICES WOULD CREATE
    OPPORTUNITIES FOR SAVINGS
    ============================================================ Chapter 4

    In general, DOD's policy is to acquire and maintain the fewest
    recruiting facilities at the lowest cost adequate to support the
    recruiting mission.  However, DOD and the services have not
    questioned the one principle that drives the establishment of
    recruiting offices throughout the United States and overseas:  that
    to recruit equitably, a physical recruiting presence in widespread
    geographical areas must be maintained, even to the point of
    maintaining offices that have produced few new recruits annually.
    The military services currently operate nearly 6,000 recruiting
    stations in leased facilities located throughout the United States,
    its possessions, and overseas at a cost of more than $86 million
    annually in direct lease costs.  Since 1989, the services have
    reduced the number of recruiting facilities by 25 percent and total
    facilities costs by 12 percent by closing and collocating offices and
    reducing the amount of office space that is leased in excess of what
    is authorized.  Alternatives to fixed facilities, some of which
    include evolving technologies and modern sales techniques, appear to
    be changing the role and diminishing the importance of the
    traditional recruiting office.

       FULL-TIME RECRUITING OFFICES
       AND EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

    Full-time recruiting offices are leased by the services and used by
    recruiters to prospect for new recruits, administer aptitude
    screening tests, assess applicant qualifications, prepare applicant
    documentation, store and display recruiting literature and publicity
    material, and conduct routine administrative tasks.  These offices
    are now located to maximize their (1) access to public
    transportation, (2) pedestrian traffic, (3) visibility, and (4)
    proximity to schools and other areas where military-aged men and
    women congregate.

    The evolution of computer and communication technologies appears to
    be changing some of the conditions underlying the role and need for
    the number of fixed facilities required in the past.  For example,
    the services believe that recruiting offices must be located in areas
    of high visibility to make the offices more accessible to walk-in
    traffic and to provide a form of advertising.  However, officials
    told us that the percentage of accessions gained from walk-in traffic
    is quite low.  The services have found that these individuals
    generally do not have other employment options available to them and
    are not qualified to enlist.  This fact apparently represents a
    change from the past, as evidenced by the following statement from
    the Army Recruiting Command's recruiting manual:

         "Since the advent of the AVF [All Volunteer Force], prospecting
         [for recruits] has become a critical element of our success.  In
         the days of the draft, it was not uncommon for applicants to
         walk into a recruiting station ready, willing, and able to
         enlist.  Today's environment is much different."

    DOD and the services have recognized that the realities of the
    marketplace are changing the role of the recruiter and the recruiting
    office.  For example, the Army is currently studying ways to enhance
    recruiter productivity and reduce reliance on permanent facilities
    through the development and introduction of state-of-the-art sales
    management and processing equipment.  These include the use of
    portable telephones and fax machines as well as laptop computers that
    provide interactive sales presentations at any location, including an
    applicant's home.  According to the Army, these systems will allow
    recruiters to move their recruiting activities away from recruiting
    stations and into schools, other public areas, and homes and provide
    full support for recruiters where most recruiting occurs, that is,
    away from the recruiting station.  Such systems should permit the
    number of stations to be reduced.  Army officials told us that the
    fixed recruiting office could then be used simply to pick up messages
    or to meet with supervisors.

       RECRUITING FACILITIES' COSTS
       HAVE DROPPED
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

    Since fiscal year 1989, the number of recruiting facilities and the
    cost of maintaining them have dropped.  In 1989, over 8,000
    recruiting offices were leased; currently, about 6,000 offices are
    leased.  In 1989, the total facilities program cost was $118.4
    million; in 1994, the cost is $104.2 million.  The reductions in
    space and cost were made possible by closing and collocating offices
    and eliminating excess space.  These efforts were the result of
    actions taken by the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee.

    Program officials recognize the need to continue to improve the
    management of the facilities program and intend to (1) continue the
    cost/excess space reduction program, (2) implement consolidation
    efforts wherever applicable, (3) validate all high-cost offices, and
    (4) review and revise space standards.

          COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESS
          OFFICE SPACE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

    The Corps of Engineers has been directed, as Executive Agent for
    acquiring and maintaining recruiting facilities, to establish and
    execute a program that reduces the cost of rent through the
    elimination of excess space.  The Corps' guidance and a DOD directive
    establish uniform policies and procedures for acquiring space for
    recruiting offices at all levels.  DOD and the Corps of Engineers
    stipulate how much square footage is authorized for each type of
    office and the types of personnel who will occupy it.  According to
    the Corps of Engineers' guidance, every effort should be made not to
    exceed the net authorized footage by more than 25 percent for
    multi-person recruiting facilities or by more than 50 percent for
    full-time one- or two-person recruiting offices.  DOD and the Corps
    recognize that it is not always possible to acquire space that
    exactly fits authorized footage, but they discourage excess space
    through these limitations.

    Although many recruiting facilities occupy less space than authorized
    by the Corps of Engineers, our analysis of information in the
    Recruiting Facilities Management Information System showed that
    overall the services maintain excess office space.  For example, in
    fiscal year 1994, the services were maintaining more than 1,000,000
    square feet of office space over the amount they were assigned.  Our
    calculation, which was based on the average cost per square foot,
    showed that this excess space costs over $17 million to maintain.
    According to DOD, the estimated 1,000,000 square feet of space
    includes space required for common areas, such as hallways and
    bathrooms, and that an average of 25 percent of the net authorized
    space is allowed for common areas.  DOD estimated that the total
    office space for recruiting facilities currently exceeded the net
    authorized by
    33 percent or 8 percent over that allowed for common areas.
    According to DOD, the 8 percent costs approximately $5 million.

          THE PHILADELPHIA PROJECT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

    On January 28, 1994, DOD initiated a pilot project in Philadelphia,
    Pennsylvania, as part of its effort to further reduce facility costs.
    DOD chose Philadelphia for this project because recruiting offices in
    the area had extensive amounts of excess space, were poorly located
    or deteriorating, or were involved in unresolved disputes with
    landlords.

    The pilot project involved comparing the cost of the 15 existing
    recruiting facilities with 2 alternatives.  Under the first
    alternative, the 15 offices in the Philadelphia area would be
    collocated into 6 new ones.  (The option excludes from consolidation
    offices for battalions, districts, Marine Corps officer stations, the
    Army company commander, and nurse recruiters.) Under the second
    alternative, some already established stations would be upgraded,
    some new stations would be opened, and others would be closed.

    DOD's annual cost for the 15 facilities is about $398,000.  Option 1
    would cost DOD about $326,000 after the first year, a savings of
    approximately $71,000 annually, assuming there are no yearly
    increases in rent or services.  Option 2 would cost about $314,000
    after the first year, for an annual savings of about $96,000.

    Although several revisions have been made as a result of comments
    from the services and others, DOD is seriously considering
    collocating the
    15 recruiting offices into 6 offices.  We were told that the concept
    of the Philadelphia project might in the future be considered for the
    cities of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

       SERVICES ARE CONSTRAINED BY
       PRINCIPLE OF GEOGRAPHIC
       COVERAGE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

    One basic assumption underlying the military services' recruiting
    philosophies appears to drive much of their fixed recruiting costs.
    The services believe that they must recruit equitably across the
    geographic expanse of the country, and to do so they maintain 6,000
    recruiting offices throughout the country.  They maintain these
    offices despite the fact that some offices have not been productive.
    For example, according to some Air Force recruiting officials, the
    Air Force would not need recruiting offices in many areas of the
    country to meet its quota for 30,000 enlisted accessions per year.
    However, because it accepts the principle of national coverage, the
    Air Force stretches its recruiting resources thinly.  According to
    the Commander of the Air Force Recruiting Service in congressional
    testimony on April 14, 1994, 981 full-time recruiter offices were
    distributed in all 50 states and in several overseas locations, 645
    of which had only
    1 active-duty Air Force recruiter.

    If DOD needs to achieve further savings, it could consider closing
    supervisory offices and offices in the least productive areas of the
    country and using alternative recruiting methods.  The services are
    beginning to identify alternatives to leased facilities that would
    enable recruiters to be as productive but at less cost.

          SUPERVISORY OFFICES ARE
          COSTLY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1

    According to DOD, the lease cost for its nearly 6,000 facilities is
    about $86 million for fiscal year 1994.  Our analysis of information
    in the Recruiting Facilities Management Information System covered
    $76 million of this amount.  Of the total number of facilities the
    services maintained in fiscal year 1994, about 420 were separate
    offices for recruiters' immediate supervisors, and over 100 were
    separate offices for the next higher level of supervisor.  Offices
    for immediate supervisors cost $7.7 million, and offices for the next
    level of supervisors cost $5.3 million, for a total of $13 million
    annually.

    It is DOD's policy to assign recruiters' supervisors separate office
    space to ensure fair treatment of their recruiters.  The services, as
    a general rule, encourage this policy.  According to a DOD official
    who manages the facilities program, all the Army's, and about half of
    the Navy's and Air Force's supervisory personnel occupy separate
    office space.  The Marine Corps, on the other hand, locates its
    supervisors in the same offices as its recruiters.

    According to a DOD official who manages the facilities program,
    because of base closures and realignments, DOD has located some of
    its "main stations" in space that is federally owned or is leased.
    Main stations are the offices of those one level above the
    recruiter's immediate supervisor.

    If the services were to either collocate supervisors with recruiters
    or relocate supervisors to existing offices on military bases or less
    expensive space, DOD could reduce its facility leasing costs.

          SERVICES MAINTAIN OFFICES IN
          RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE
          AREAS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2

    The services have closed some recruiting offices in relatively
    unproductive areas and moved offices to new locations.  They also
    have concentrated offices in areas of high productivity.  But the
    services' policy of maintaining national coverage limits how much
    more they can do to reduce facilities' costs.  The relative
    productivity of recruiters (in terms of the numbers of recruits they
    produce over a period of time) does not appear to be a primary
    criterion for maintaining recruiting offices in their current
    locations.

    Our analysis of the relative cost of recruiting offices in various
    counties in the United States was based on data from two sources:
    the Military Entrance Processing Command's database of accessions per
    county for the United States and the Recruiting Facilities Management
    Information System, which contains the costs of facilities.  The
    Command's data did not include information on accessions per
    recruiting station.  Therefore, we tracked accessions by county and
    calculated the cost of facilities in each county.  Our database
    contained accessions from the 1,036 counties in the United States
    where recruiting offices are located.

    Our analysis showed that recruiting productivity is highest in areas
    of high population density.  It also showed that offices in the most
    highly productive counties account for the bulk of the services'
    accessions.  For example, according to our analysis, recruiting
    offices in the most productive 25 percent of the counties accounted
    for about 70 percent of all accessions for the first 5 months of
    fiscal year 1994.  Conversely, offices in the least productive 25
    percent of counties produced less than 4 percent of DOD's accessions
    for the period.  Offices in the least productive 50 percent of
    counties generated about 13.5 percent of accessions.

    If DOD wanted to further reduce its recruiting costs, it could
    consider closing or consolidating offices in its least productive
    counties and rely on one or more of the alternatives to maintaining
    fixed recruiting offices.  For example, if the services had closed
    offices in the least productive
    25 percent of counties, they could have saved about $5 million in
    1994 lease costs.  The 1,100 recruiters in these offices could have
    been reassigned to other recruiting locations.  If the services had
    closed offices in its least productive 50 percent of counties, it
    could have saved $13.3 million in annual lease costs and reassigned
    2,800 recruiters.

    Our analysis also showed that between fiscal years 1991 and 1993, a
    large number of counties produced only one recruit per year.  This
    trend continued into fiscal year 1994, as almost 28 percent of the
    counties in our analysis produced only one recruit during the first 5
    months.  Figure 4.1 shows the most and least productive counties in
    the United States for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1994.  County
    lines are drawn for the
    1,036 counties in the United States where recruiting offices are
    located.  In areas where no county lines are drawn, there are no
    recruiting offices, or Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM)
    data were incomplete.

       Figure 4.1:  Relative
       Productivity of Counties in the
       United States in Numbers of
       Accessions

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  GAO'S analysis of
       MEPCOM data.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Lease costs for recruiting offices tend to increase with population
    density.  However, the distribution of productivity leads to wide
    disparities in the cost per recruit.  For example, in the first 5
    months of fiscal year 1994, the lease cost per recruit ranged from
    $18 to $14,355.  As expected, unit costs decrease with increasing
    productivity.  The office where the cost per recruit was lowest
    produced 26 recruits during the period; the two offices where the
    cost per recruit was highest produced only 1 each.  The least
    productive 25 percent of counties had an average lease cost of almost
    $900 per recruit, while the most productive 25 percent of counties
    had an average cost of $350 per recruit.

          ALTERNATIVES TO
          FIXED-STATION RECRUITING
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3

    Service officials have suggested a number of alternatives to
    maintaining recruiting offices in unproductive areas without
    sacrificing either the quality or quantity of recruits.  We discuss
    two examples in this report.

    Army recruiting officials told us that in certain less productive
    areas, a fixed recruiting presence may not be needed.  Instead, the
    Army could use teams of traveling recruiters using recreational-type
    vehicles to visit these areas on a periodic basis preceded by local
    advertising.  This is called the "wolfpack" concept.  Similar to this
    method is the idea of "island recruiting," whereby small recruiting
    stations in relatively nonproductive areas would be consolidated.
    These ideas have been discussed among nonpolicy-making officials in
    the Army Recruiting Command; they have not been fully developed or
    endorsed by upper level officials.  Currently, the Army's Recruiting
    Support Command uses recreational-type vehicles to make presentations
    to potential recruits.  However, the presenters do not take
    enlistment applications.

    In an effort to close "itinerary stops," or part-time recruiting
    offices that are used only 1 or 2 days per week, the Air Force
    Recruiting Service has considered the use of "Recruiting Vehicles
    (RV)" as mobile recruiting stations.  An RV, which would contain
    computers and communications gear, would allow recruiters to visit
    communities in areas not conveniently located near fixed recruiting
    stations.  The Air Force Recruiting Service told us it cannot afford
    these RVs at present.  Air Force officials believe that, in the
    current budget environment, the earliest they envision even a test
    program using these vehicles would be 4 or 5 years from now.  In the
    meantime, it continues to lease facilities for offices that are
    unproductive or marginally productive.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

    While acknowledging that representation across America is a
    consideration of some military services, DOD stated that there are no
    efforts to ensure "equitable" geographic representation.  DOD further
    stated that the number of recruiters and location of recruiting
    offices are based on the population of potential recruits in a
    specific geographic area and that potential recruiter productivity is
    the primary concern in locating recruiters.

    Although at an agencywide level DOD may not have any efforts to
    ensure geographic representation, individual service recruiting
    command officials told us that their decisions concerning where to
    open or close recruiting offices are based on two principles:  first,
    to offer enlistment opportunities to all qualified Americans,
    regardless of where they live; and second, to make recruiters
    physically available to offer those opportunities to potential
    recruits.  As indicated by our analysis of the productivity of
    recruiting offices as now located, adherence to these principles may
    be putting DOD in a situation where it is not capitalizing on more
    cost-effective ways to recruit.

    CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
    ============================================================ Chapter 5

    Despite DOD's downsizing of forces, the military services still need
    to recruit thousands of quality men and women each year.  To do this,
    the services rely on a recruiting system built around public
    awareness through advertising and enlistments through personal
    contacts.

    The services predict that their recruiting goals will be more
    difficult to achieve in the future because of smaller target markets
    and the reduced propensity of young people to join the military.  In
    addition, continued high attrition of first-term recruits keeps
    enlistment goals high.  To compensate, the services are asking for
    more funds for advertising and more recruiters.

    We believe the services have overstated the difficulties they may
    experience in meeting enlistment goals.  The number of people in the
    recruiters' target market is predicted to grow over the rest of the
    decade, and the percentage of the market that DOD needs to enlist is
    decreasing.  Although overall positive responses to DOD's propensity
    survey are at their lowest levels in 15 years, these results do not
    necessarily indicate that accession targets (for both quantity and
    quality) will not be met.  In addition, DOD appears not to have made
    serious attempts to tackle the first-term attrition problem despite
    promising results from several isolated studies.

    We also believe that the services have not done all they can to make
    their current recruiting operations more efficient and have not given
    serious consideration to past recommendations aimed at eliminating
    organizational layers.  Some services suggest adding recruiters as
    the principal means to achieve future enlistments, despite (1)
    indications in studies that additional investments in advertising
    could be more cost-effective than additional recruiters and (2) the
    fact that recruiters are not as productive as they could be because
    of current quota systems.  Finally, DOD seems to recognize that fixed
    recruiting facilities are no longer crucial for contacting and
    enlisting potential recruits, yet it has not been aggressive in
    adopting cost-efficient alternatives involving the consolidation of
    facilities in urban areas and the closing of facilities in less
    productive areas.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1

    We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
    the military services to take the following steps to make their
    recruiting programs more cost-effective before they request more
    funds for additional recruiters or advertising:

    in allocating resources, use the results of current studies, and
    undertake additional efforts if necessary, to develop a more
    cost-effective mix of available recruiting resources, including
    advertising, recruiters, bonuses, and other elements affecting
    recruiting;

    aggressively test ideas to reduce first-term attrition;

    continue efforts to streamline the current recruiting bureaucracy,
    eliminating layers where possible;

    revalidate the recruiting quota systems, which currently deter
    recruiters from maximizing their numbers of enlistments;

    encourage the development and expansion, as appropriate, of concepts
    such as the "Philadelphia project," in the management of military
    recruiting facilities; and

    routinely incorporate more in-depth cost-benefit analyses in
    decisions to maintain or establish new recruiting offices and to
    evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining offices in less
    productive areas of the country.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2

    DOD concurred or partially concurred with our six recommendations and
    responded that it is committed to using modern and effective business
    practices to attract and enlist young people and therefore plans to
    continue to give priority to the ongoing evaluation of recruiting
    organizational structures, consolidation of resources, and adaptation
    of new technologies.  While DOD agrees with the need to reduce
    first-term attrition, streamline the bureaucracy, and encourage new
    concepts in the management of recruiting facilities, it does not want
    to commit to major changes before reviewing the results of several
    evaluative efforts recently started.

    We appreciate the need for DOD to complete certain recently initiated
    studies before changes are initiated in some areas.  However, we
    continue to believe that (1) more aggressive efforts than those cited
    by DOD are needed to lower attrition losses on a DOD-wide basis and
    thus minimize the resources required to support the services'
    recruiting and training operations; (2) the services should
    reevaluate the need for management layers that previous studies have
    concluded could be eliminated, particularly since a recently
    initiated study to examine the consolidation of logistics support
    functions for the service recruiting commands could result in reduced
    workloads at those layers; and (3) if tests prove successful,
    expansion of the experimental process for consolidating recruiting
    facilities in large metropolitan areas should be pursued rapidly.

    Specific DOD comments on each recommendation and our views, where
    appropriate, follow:

    DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a more
    cost-effective mix of recruiting resources.  It said the RAND
    Corporation is conducting research to ascertain how recruiting
    outcomes and their determinants have changed in the recent past and
    to recommend changes in policies, practices, and resource management,
    if necessary, to ensure adequate numbers and quality of future
    recruits.  According to DOD, the results of this study are expected
    by October 1995.  We believe this recently initiated study is
    important because past research has shown that these areas can have
    significant effects on recruiting.

    DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to reduce first-term
    attrition.  It said that its ongoing efforts were more diverse than
    we recognized.  It said that the military services have been and are
    engaging in research and operational programs related to attrition
    with continuing efforts to (1) develop measures of adaptability to
    military life, (2) improve the prediction of training success and job
    performance, and (3) better manage personnel in the DEP.  We fully
    acknowledge that a number of studies of attrition have been done and
    others are ongoing.  Nevertheless, attrition remained relatively high
    from 1980 to 1994 regardless of prevailing economic conditions or the
    quality level of the force.  In our opinion, isolating the causal
    links for attrition is key to reducing attrition rates.

    DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the military
    services should continue to streamline their current recruiting
    bureaucracy, eliminating layers where possible.  It said that the
    services have placed heavy emphasis on evaluation of their recruiting
    structures during the drawdown; reducing management layers and
    streamlining overhead.  DOD also said it recognizes that continued
    evaluation of recruiting structures and business practices is
    essential.  According to DOD, an Office of the Secretary of
    Defense-directed study, led by the MEPCOM, was initiated to evaluate
    consolidation of recruiting support functions of the service
    recruiting organizations.  The study should be completed by June 1995
    and is to include an evaluation of joint advertising and promotional
    support of the service recruiting organizations.  We endorse the
    recruiting support function study cited by DOD and further believe
    that the services should, in conjunction with this effort, reexamine
    those completed studies that recommended the elimination of
    management layers in service recruiting organizations.

    DOD concurred with our recommendation to revalidate the recruiting
    quota systems, which currently deter recruiters from maximizing their
    numbers of enlistments.  It said that to revalidate recruiter quota
    systems, the RAND Corporation has been asked to research recruiter
    incentive systems to determine their current relevance and
    effectiveness.  Also, the Army is eliminating individual recruiter
    quotas in fiscal year 1995 and will encourage each recruiter to write
    as many contracts as possible.  We endorse the examination of the
    services' recruiting quota systems and the Army's decision to
    eliminate individual quotas following its evaluation of this area--an
    effort that was ongoing during our fieldwork.

    DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to encourage the
    development and expansion, as appropriate, of concepts such as the
    Philadelphia Project in the management of military recruiting
    facilities.  It said that the Philadelphia Project is an experimental
    process, and while the approach appears promising, the Joint
    Recruiting Facilities Committee will not complete its evaluation of
    the project and lessons learned until the end of 1994.  The Committee
    has targeted a similar project for New York and Chicago in fiscal
    year 1996 pending an evaluation of the Philadelphia effort at the end
    of 1994.  If this project proves to be successful, we believe the
    concept should be implemented in appropriate metropolitan areas on a
    expedited basis.

    DOD concurred with our recommendation to routinely incorporate more
    in-depth benefit analyses in decisions to maintain or establish new
    recruiting offices and to evaluate the costs and benefits of
    maintaining offices in less productive areas of the country.  It said
    that to evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining or
    establishing new recruiting offices, the Joint Recruiting Facilities
    Committee will combine marketing information with the recruiting
    facilities database and evaluate the relative cost-effectiveness of
    the services' recruiting offices.  According to DOD, this effort has
    begun and is expected to evolve into an integrated information
    support system for resource decisions.  We believe this system, if
    properly implemented, could materially improve the cost-effectiveness
    of the services' recruiting facilities program management by
    eliminating marginally productive leased office space and could help
    to optimize the allocation and assignment of recruiter resources.

    SERVICE RECRUITING ORGANIZATIONS
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    The current Department of Defense (DOD) establishment for recruiting
    enlisted personnel consists primarily of nine service recruiting
    organizations\1 and one major support agency, the Military Entrance
    Processing Command (MEPCOM).\2 To meet the enlisted mission,
    recruiting organizations employ approximately 22,000 full-time
    personnel:  more than 13,000 production recruiters and supervisors
    and 9,000 headquarters and other personnel, about 3,000 of whom are
    MEPCOM personnel who induct and medically process military recruits.
    Recruiting field operations consist of more than 6,000 recruiting
    stations or site locations, in both leased and government-owned
    facilities located throughout the United States, its possessions, and
    overseas.

    --------------------
    \1 These nine recruiting organizations include (1) the Air Force
    Recruiting Service, which is part of the Air Education and Training
    Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; (2) the Air Force Recruiting
    Directorate, Air Force Reserve Headquarters, Robins Air Force Base,
    Georgia; (3) the Air National Guard Recruiting and Retention
    Division, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force
    Base, Maryland; (4) the Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia;
    (5) the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command, New Orleans, Louisiana; (6)
    the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.; (7) the Marine
    Corps Reserve Recruiting Command, Overland Park, Kansas; (8) the Army
    Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky; and (9) the Army National
    Guard, Arlington, Virginia.

    \2 MEPCOM headquarters is located in Great Lakes, Illinois.

       ARMY RECRUITING STRUCTURE
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

    The U.S.  Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), established in 1964, is
    charged with meeting the Army's requirements for enlisted and certain
    officer accessions.  The command is multilayered, consisting of a
    headquarters and a field organization that itself contains 4 brigade
    headquarters, 40 battalions, 210 companies, and 1,732\3 recruiting
    stations (see fig.  I.1).

       Figure I.1:  U.S.  Army
       Recruiting Command and Brigades

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    USAREC is commanded by a major general and is responsible for the
    worldwide recruiting of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Special
    Mission personnel.\4 It develops strategic plans, determines
    policies, and manages subordinate command operations, including a
    nationwide advertising program.  Field operations are overseen at
    headquarters by the Deputy Commanding General.  Each recruiting
    brigade is commanded by a colonel and performs managerial,
    administrative, operational, budgetary, promotional, and logistical
    functions and serves as the liaison between the command and the
    field.  Battalions actively command and support recruiting efforts by
    their assigned companies and stations and also provide administrative
    and managerial support.  Each company consists of a captain assisted
    by a first sergeant, who develops and executes plans to ensure
    mission accomplishment.  Companies are in daily contact with
    production recruiters at the stations.  Stations are located in
    communities nationwide and carry out the mission of recruiting
    eligible candidates.

    --------------------
    \3 This total includes company, battalion, full-time, and part-time
    offices.

    \4 Special Mission personnel are health professionals such as Army
    Nurse Corps and Veterinary Corps members.

       NAVY RECRUITING STRUCTURE
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

    The U.S.  Navy Recruiting Command, which is located in Arlington,
    Virginia, consists of a headquarters and a field organization that
    contains
    5 area headquarters, 31 districts, 195 zones, and 1,428\5 recruiting
    stations (see fig.  I.2).

       Figure I.2:  U.S.  Navy
       Recruiting Command and Area
       Headquarters

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    The headquarters is commanded by a one-star admiral and is
    responsible for the worldwide recruiting of men and women for
    enlisted, officer candidate, and officer status in the Regular and
    Reserve components of the Navy.  The headquarters level develops
    policy, coordinates and supervises Navy Recruiting Command support
    personnel, provides public affairs guidance as required, responds to
    media inquiries regarding recruiting matters, disseminates
    information concerning Navy and command policies, and allocates
    resources necessary to achieve stated command objectives.

    Area headquarters commanders are O-6s (captains) and coordinate and
    oversee public affairs activities; provide guidance, training, and
    assistance to district commanding officers in developing and
    executing public affairs plans; identify issues and situations with
    potential impact on Navy recruiting; provide responses to media
    inquiries concerning recruiting matters; and allocate resources as
    necessary.

    Navy recruiting district commanding officers are all O-5s
    (commanders) and basically carry out the same type of recruiting
    activities as do the Navy recruiting area commanders except within
    the assigned district.

    Navy recruiting zones are headed by a Master Chief Petty Officer (an
    E-9) or a Senior Chief Petty Officer (an E-8).  Recruiting zones also
    employ career recruiting personnel.  This cadre of personnel does
    nothing but recruit.  The zone supervisor is responsible for 25 to 30
    recruiters and sometimes more, depending on the size of the zone's
    geographical area.

    Below the zone supervisory level are the stations.  This level is
    made up of recruiters functioning in the field.  Navy stations are
    located throughout communities worldwide and carry out the mission of
    recruiting eligible men and women into the Navy.

    --------------------
    \5 This number includes zone, district, full-time, and part-time
    offices.

       MARINE CORPS' RECRUITING
       STRUCTURE
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

    Effective January 1, 1994, the Marine Corps established the Marine
    Corps Recruiting Command, which is located at the Marine Corps
    Headquarters, at the Navy Annex in Arlington, Virginia.  The new
    Command includes 2 regions, 6 districts, 49 recruiting stations, and
    1,520\6 recruiting substations (see fig.  I.3).

       Figure I.3:  Marine Corps
       Recruiting Command and Regions

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    The Marine Corps' recruiting organization is responsible for
    recruiting all active-duty Marines and all nonprior-service Marines
    for the reserves.  The Command is headed by a major general.  A
    brigadier general is located at Parris Island, South Carolina, to
    head the Eastern recruiting region, while another is located in San
    Diego, California, to head the Western recruiting region.

    --------------------
    \6 This total includes recruiting station, district, full-time, and
    part-time offices.

       AIR FORCE RECRUITING STRUCTURE
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4

    The Air Force Recruiting Service is part of the Air Education and
    Training Command, located at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.  It is
    responsible for the recruitment of enlisted personnel, officers, and
    health professionals into the active-duty component of the Air Force.
    The Recruiting Service consists of a headquarters, 4 groups, 29
    squadrons, 172 flights, and
    1,221\7 recruiting stations (see fig.  I.4).

       Figure I.4:  Air Force
       Recruiting Service Headquarters
       and Groups

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    The headquarters, which is commanded by a major general, is made up
    of operations, health professions, and support divisions.  Consisting
    of 165 personnel, the headquarters oversees the 4 recruiting groups.
    Headquarters establishes policy and procedures and provides guidance
    to group management.  Headquarters also provides assistance to the
    field in the areas of advertising and promotion, flow/trend analysis,
    personnel, and resources.

    The typical recruiting group is headed by a colonel and consists of
    about 19 personnel.  As part of its supervisory duties over six to
    eight squadrons, a group is responsible for executing all training
    workshops; for managing squadron commanders, medical flight
    supervisors, and operations officers and noncommissioned officers;
    for advertising and promotion; and for allocating recruiting goals to
    the squadrons.

    The typical squadron, which consists of about 21 staff, is headed by
    a major or lieutenant colonel who reports to the group's commander.
    A squadron is responsible for five to seven flights, each of which is
    typically 120 miles from the squadron commander.  Among its
    supervisory duties, the squadron assigns its flights recruiting
    goals.  The squadron commander is responsible for meeting the
    squadron's recruiting mission and for managing 60 to 70 personnel and
    associated facilities and operations and maintenance funds.

    A flight, which is a unit of five to seven recruiters, is headed by a
    master sergeant (E-7) or technical sergeant (E-6), who reports to the
    squadron commander.  This flight supervisor assigns individual
    recruiting goals and provides on-the-job training to recruiters.  A
    recruiter typically works about 60 miles from the flight supervisor.

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II

    --------------------
    \7 This total includes flight, squadron, full-time, and part-time
    offices.

    COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
    =========================================================== Appendix I

     See comment 1.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  2, 12, and 13.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  13-14.

     See comment 2.

     Now on pp.  2 and 14.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  14-15.

     See comment 3.

     Now on pp.  15-18.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  3-4 and 21-25.

     See comment 4.

     See comment 5.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     See comment 6.

     Now on pp.  26-27.

     See comment 7.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     See comment 8.

     Now on pp.  28-29.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  30-32.

     See comment 9.

     Now on pp.  35-36.

     See comment 10.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     See comment 11.

     See comment 12.

     See comment 13.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  38-39.

     See comment 14.

     Now on pp.  40-41.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  43-44.

     See comment 15.

     See comment 16.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  44-45.

     See comment 17.

     See comment 18.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  46-50.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     See comment 19.

     See comment 20.

     Now on pp.  5 and 53.

     Now on pp.  5 and 53.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  5 and 53.

     Now on pp.  5 and 53.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

     Now on pp.  5 and 53.

     Now on pp.  6 and 53.

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    The following are comments on DOD's letter dated October 7, 1994.

       GAO COMMENTS
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5

    1.  We have discussed and addressed all appropriate DOD and service
    initiatives that deal with the issues considered in this report and
    that were available and in a usable state of completion at the time
    our review was done.

    2.  The DEP is discussed in the first two chapters of this report,
    but it is not addressed in an evaluative context.

    3.  We are not suggesting that advertising be used as an indication
    of efficiency.  This section in the introduction chapter simply
    describes the funding history of advertising and summarizes service
    and DOD views of its usefulness.

    4.  This population chart does indeed use two sets of data--one
    derived from the 1980 U.S.  census and the other from the 1990 U.S.
    census.  The use of both was necessary to reflect the trend of the
    youth pool available for recruiting from 1980 to 2000.  This
    information was provided to us by DOD and was the most current
    available when we did our review and when DOD submitted its official
    response to our draft report.  Further, DOD's comment that a decrease
    in the propensity of youth to enlist caused more recruiting
    challenges during the early 1990s is misleading.  Actually, RAND's
    May 1994 study found that propensity for high quality youth--those
    targeted by DOD for enlistment--appears to have stabilized at
    pre-drawdown levels and, in fact, increased at one point in the early
    1990s.

    5.  Since DOD recruits few non-high school graduates (service goals
    allow just 1 to 5 percent annually), the fact that Hispanics--who,
    according to DOD, have lower graduation rates than other ethnic
    groups--will make up more of the target pool would appear to have a
    minimal effect on attrition.  Further, according to historical Youth
    Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) data, Hispanic youth have one of the
    highest positive propensity rates of any of the groups tracked by
    DOD.

    6.  An increase in the number of high school graduates who will
    attend college should have limited impact on the target pool because
    a substantial number of college students drop out (for a variety of
    reasons) during the first year and thus effectively remain in the
    available population pool of quality high school graduates.

    7.  DOD implies that a basic shift or change in negative and positive
    propensity has occurred, which will require that more people be
    recruited from the negative category, thereby causing effort and cost
    to rise as accessions increase to a steady state recruiting
    environment.  A recent study by RAND suggests this may not be the
    case because (1) the projected youth supply available to meet the
    increased accession goals for 1996 equals or exceeds that available
    in the late 1980s or before the drawdown started and (2) the
    propensity of the high quality youth targeted by DOD for recruiting
    appears to have stabilized at pre-drawdown levels.  Further, the
    majority of youth available for enlistment have, historically,
    expressed negative propensity--yet about half of all recruits have
    come from this category.

    8.  As noted in comment 7 above, propensity for the high quality
    youth targeted by DOD does not appear to have decreased.  These YATS
    factors have been stable or increased positively in recent years.
    Further, contrary to DOD's assertions about the negative impact of
    downsizing on recruiting, 81 percent of the respondents to the 1993
    YATS (an increase from 1992) state that downsizing would not affect
    their enlistment propensity.

    9.  Our basic observations on the attrition rate are that (1)
    attrition remained relatively stable from 1980 to 1994 regardless of
    prevailing economic conditions or the quality level of the force and
    (2) DOD and the services have not yet successfully isolated causal
    links needed to fully evaluate attrition.  We recognize DOD efforts
    to study attrition; however, we believe that, if potentially
    significant savings in recruiting and training resources are to be
    realized from a reduced attrition rate, the causal links for
    attrition must be identified and addressed.  Caption for Finding I
    was subsequently revised by GAO.

    10.  We recognize that staffing cuts and limited reorganizations have
    been made in the recruiting organizations; however, our point is that
    the basic structure has remained intact, and efforts to eliminate
    management layers and consolidate functions or organizations have not
    been implemented.  Further, there are now plans to increase the
    number of recruiting personnel.

    11.  DOD has not offered credible evidence that substantial
    additional resources will be required to achieve the planned increase
    in accessions.  The number of potential recruits available through
    1996 is estimated to equal or exceed the level available in 1989,
    when more than 293,000 recruits were enlisted, a level substantially
    above that planned for 1996.

    12.  DOD agreed with our recommendation that the service quota
    systems need to be reevaluated and stated that an effort to
    accomplish this, and evaluate incentive systems as well, is now
    underway.  We have already discussed the extent of the evolving
    management changes.  For example, we acknowledge that the Army was
    experimenting with changes to its quota system at the time of our
    review.

    13.  RAND recently concluded that important changes in resource
    management and recruiting practices during the drawdown years are the
    likely cause of difficulties now reported by the services.  Planned
    additional research by RAND into these areas could well show a
    positive effect on recruiters' quality of life.  While an additional
    responsibility, voter registration may affect the recruiting mission
    in a positive way by providing a solid, civics-based means for
    recruiters to establish additional face-to-face contacts with the
    target youth population.

    14.  The report has been changed to reflect more clearly that the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense rejected consolidation of
    recruiting organizations based on the adverse comments received from
    the individual services and that the services did not acknowledge the
    merits of consolidating advertising functions.  However, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense has directed a new study to examine joint
    recruiting support concepts that does include advertising and
    promotional support as an area to be evaluated.

    15.  We cite pedestrian or "walk in" traffic as one of four basic
    factors used by the services to locate recruiting offices, not the
    primary factor.

    16.  Our most recent reports on the CIM initiative are (1)
    AIMD/NSIAD-94-101, April 12, 1994, and (2) NSIAD-95-25, October 21,
    1994.

    17.  The excess space information presented in the report was
    provided to us by DOD from the database maintained for leased
    recruiting facilities.  The information included data fields for
    assigned space and excess space but, did not distinguish between
    space that exceeded the "net authorized" for common areas and truly
    excess space.  Additional information on facility space has been
    added to the report.

    18.  We did not intend to imply that it was possible or necessarily
    practical to eliminate all excess space in recruiting facilities, and
    we fully recognize the types of situations DOD mentions.  However, as
    cited in chapter 4, facility program officials acknowledge the need
    to continue to improve management in this area through efforts to
    reduce excess space, implement consolidation efforts, and review and
    revise space standards.  In addition, DOD agreed with our
    recommendation to develop the capability to better analyze the
    cost-effectiveness of offices maintained in less productive areas of
    the country.  This should result in fewer offices overall and less
    excess space as well.

    19.  Our analysis of recruiting facilities indicated that most
    supervisory offices are located in leased facilities and not on
    military installations or other government property.

    20.  In early May 1994, the Air Force officially informed us that a
    request had been submitted to purchase an RV for each of the 29
    recruiting squadrons.  According to the Air Force, the RV would (1)
    provide the civilian community with the benefit of having a mobile
    recruiting facility in its area instead of having to drive 2 or 3
    hours to the nearest fixed facility and (2) save leasing costs
    expended on maintaining the itinerary stops.  The Air Force
    subsequently stated that mobile recruiting offices could best be
    characterized as an idea with potential that could not be afforded at
    the present time.  As cited in the report, the Air Force concluded
    that the earliest even a test program could be envisioned would be 4
    or 5 years from now.

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    ========================================================== Appendix II

       NATIONAL SECURITY AND
       INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
       WASHINGTON, D.C.
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

    Norman Rabkin
    Foy Wicker
    Irene Robertson
    Beverly Schladt
    David Michaels
    Carole Coffey
    Jai Lee