Unexploded Ordnance: A Coordinated Approach to Detection and Clearance Is
Needed (Letter Report, 09/20/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-197).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the extent to which
existing or forseeable technologies offer solutions to worldwide
landmine and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems.

GAO found that: (1) U.S. research and development requirements for UXO
detection and clearance technology are broader today than they were
during the Cold War; (2) the Department of Defense's (DOD) technological
efforts have supported countermine operations, for which the main
priority is making paths through minefields during combat; (3) U.S.
research and development efforts cover a group of near-term and advanced
technologies that could increase detection and clearance functions; (4)
the most effective clearance techniques are time-consuming, expensive,
and labor intensive; (5) the current technologies do not perform well
against newer, more advanced munitions; (6) no governmentwide strategy
exists to ensure that the most is gained from the various clearance
efforts; (7) the technologies available today are inadequate and unable
to keep pace with the number of landmines being emplaced annually; and
(8) the barriers to technical solutions include the relative ease with
which inexpensive improvements in mine designs have outstripped
detection and clearance methods, the unique clearance challenges that
Third World countries pose, and the difficulty in controlling the
proliferation of antipersonal landmines.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-197
     TITLE:  Unexploded Ordnance: A Coordinated Approach to Detection 
             and Clearance Is Needed
      DATE:  09/20/95
   SUBJECT:  Munitions
             Technology transfer
             Research and development
             Explosives
             Military bases
             Clearinghouses
             Waste disposal
             Interagency relations
             Environmental monitoring
IDENTIFIER:  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (National)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1995

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE - A
COORDINATED APPROACH TO DETECTION
AND CLEARANCE IS NEEDED

GAO/NSIAD-95-197

Unexploded Ordnance

(703066)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-258886

September 20, 1995

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Over the past 2 years, several accounts of the casualties caused by
antipersonnel landmines have brought to light the threat such
munitions pose years after hostilities cease.  The deaths and
injuries attributed to these mines each year have been estimated to
total about 30,000.  Many of the victims are civilians, including
children.  While the contamination of land caused by landmines and
other forms of unexploded ordnance (UXO) may appear to be primarily a
Third World issue, closer examination suggests that the problem is
shared by developed nations as well. 

As you requested, we assessed the extent to which ongoing or
foreseeable technology efforts offer solutions to worldwide landmine
and other UXO problems.  More specifically, we

  reviewed the extent to which the Department of Defense's (DOD) and
     other agencies' requirements and associated research and
     development may have application to clearance problems elsewhere
     in the world,

  assessed the ability of existing or foreseeable technologies to
     detect and clear landmines and other UXO, and

  identified barriers that could impede the progress or output of
     such technology. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

DOD defines "explosive ordnance" as all munitions, weapon delivery
systems, and ordnance items that contain explosives, propellants,
nuclear materials, and chemical agents.  Included in this definition
are bombs, missiles, rockets, artillery rounds, ammunition, mines,
and any other similar item that can cause injury to personnel or
damage to material.  UXO consists of these same items after they (1)
are armed or otherwise prepared for action; (2) are launched, placed,
fired, or released in a way that they cause hazards; and (3) remain
unexploded either through malfunction or design. 

Antipersonnel mines pose a particularly difficult clearance problem
because they are hard to detect, inexpensive, and prone to
proliferation.  The Department of State considers landmines to be a
distinct class of weapon that is subject to specific doctrinal and
international legal controls.  Landmines--particularly antipersonnel
mines--may pose a greater hazard to innocent civilians than items
such as unexploded bombs because they are intended to detonate when a
person steps on or near them.  Landmines are considered to be a
valuable military asset since, by slowing and possibly demoralizing
opponents, they multiply the combat impact of defending forces. 
Their attractiveness to smaller military and paramilitary
organizations, such as in the Third World, is further enhanced
because mines do not require complex logistics support and are
readily available and inexpensive--some can be bought for as little
as $3 each. 

Over 60 countries, developed and undeveloped, report a need to clear
areas from landmine and other UXO contamination.  As of December
1994, the Department of State estimated that 80 million to 110
million landmines remain uncleared worldwide, the bulk of which are
in undeveloped countries.  Most of these countries' economies depend
heavily on agriculture and thus are particularly vulnerable because
the presence of landmines can deny farmers large sections of land. 
Within the United States, DOD estimates that over 900 military sites
are contaminated with UXO.  DOD estimates that it has already cost
$10.3 billion through fiscal year 1994 to clean up sites contaminated
with hazardous materials, including UXO, and that it will cost an
additional $31 billion for future actions.  In European countries,
millions of bombs, landmines, and other munitions from World Wars I
and II still remain uncleared. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

U.S.  research and development requirements for UXO detection and
clearance technology are broader today than they were during the Cold
War years and thus have more in common with the worldwide problem. 
Traditionally, DOD's technical efforts have supported countermine
operations, for which the main priority is rapidly "breaching" or
making paths through minefields during combat.  "Clearance" differs
from breaching because it requires that large areas--such as
farmland--be cleared and timeliness is not as critical.  With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, U.S.  requirements have evolved that
have more in common with area clearance than breaching.  These other
requirements include clearing (1) U.S.  military sites of UXO and
other hazards and (2) areas and roads needed for conducting
operations other than war, such as peacekeeping.  Such broader
requirements make it likely that research and development sponsored
by DOD will have more direct application to the clearance problems
faced by Third World countries.  Other agencies, such as the
Departments of Energy, Transportation, and Justice also sponsor
research and development applicable to the detection and clearance of
explosives and other hazards. 

U.S.  research and development efforts cover a group of technologies
that can be categorized as (1) near-term, less advanced technologies
that can be put to work immediately and (2) advanced technologies
that will take time to develop but could greatly speed up the
detection and clearance functions.  However, the technologies
available today to clear wide areas are inadequate and cannot keep
pace with the number of landmines being emplaced annually.  For
example, the United Nations estimated that in 1993, 2.5 million mines
were emplaced, while only 80,000 were removed.  The most effective
techniques, such as hand-held probes and metal detectors, are
time-consuming, expensive, and labor-intensive.  While heavy mine
clearing equipment, such as plows, is suited to breaching paths, it
is not practical for clearing large areas.  Also, current
technologies do not perform well against newer, more advanced
munitions.  For example, metal detectors are ineffective against
newer antipersonnel mines that contain little or no metal.  Moreover,
recent technology demonstrations showed the more advanced methods to
be much less reliable than traditional methods. 

Several factors limit the potential output from the U.S.  investment
in technologies related to the detection and clearance of landmines
and other forms of UXO.  Although numerous U.S.  organizations within
and outside DOD are sponsoring technologies that could have
application to the problem, no overarching, governmentwide strategy
or organization exists to ensure that the most is gained from these
various efforts.  Moreover, it is difficult to develop an accurate
estimate of how much funding these organizations are collectively
providing for applicable technologies or whether that level of
investment is sufficient.  The House Committee on National Security
recently took a step to address this problem by directing the
Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to improve the management and
cooperation of technology efforts directed at landmine and other UXO
clearance.\1 Other barriers to technical solutions include the
relative ease with which inexpensive improvements in mine designs
have outstripped detection and clearance methods, the unique area
clearance challenges Third World countries pose, and the difficulty
of controlling the proliferation of antipersonnel landmines. 


--------------------
\1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, H.R. 
Rep.  104-131, p.  95. 


   EMERGING U.S.  REQUIREMENTS MAY
   SPAWN TECHNOLOGY THAT IS MORE
   APPLICABLE TO WORLDWIDE
   PROBLEMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3


      COMPARISON OF COMBAT AND
      NONCOMBAT CLEARANCE
      REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

A primary focus of DOD's research and development activities in
detection and clearance has been on the countermine mission in
support of combat operations.  In combat, mines are seen as an
obstacle in the way of an attack or a maneuver; overcoming these
obstacles involves rapidly detecting, breaching, and marking paths
while under assumed enemy fire.  Some casualties are expected and
accepted.  Most of these countermine operations are destructive
because heavy or destructive equipment such as plows, rollers,
flails,\2 and explosives--are used to breach enemy minefields.  Once
breached, the cleared paths are marked so that following forces can
traverse the minefield safely.  These operations do not require the
identification of the exact locations of the mines.  Also, the
operations do not require that an entire area be cleared unless the
area is to be occupied for future operations. 

Detecting and clearing landmines and other UXO in noncombat
situations in some ways is less demanding and in other ways more
demanding than countermine operations.  In noncombat situations,
neither time nor enemy fire is a constraining factor, so detection
and clearance operations take place under much less hostile
circumstances.  On the other hand, because the noncombat objective is
to render an area safe and worthwhile to repopulate, the
corresponding objective is to detect and clear all landmines and
other UXO.  Thus, not only must contaminated areas be positively
identified to very high standards of reliability, but efforts must be
made to find all munitions and other hazards.  Once found, the
explosives must be removed or neutralized in an environmentally sound
way.  In the process, care must be taken not to destroy the land or
infrastructure. 

These differing demands produce corresponding differences in research
and development priorities.  For example, money spent to develop an
improved plow for an M-1 tank may be a good investment for the
countermine mission, but it is not necessarily practical for
noncombat operations.  Similarly, a detection technology that takes a
lot of time may work well in a noncombat situation, but be too slow
for countermine operations.  On the other hand, countermine and
noncombat missions do share some requirements and benefit from the
attendant technologies.  If a military force plans to occupy a mined
area, it must use detection and clearance technologies and methods
aimed at achieving as near as possible a 100-percent clearance.\3
Also, it is beneficial to combat forces to detect the presence of
minefields so that they can be avoided, if possible.  Such a
detection capability would also benefit noncombat clearance
operations, even if the exact locations of individual munitions could
not be pinpointed, because unsafe areas could be posted or cordoned
off and avoided by civilians. 


--------------------
\2 Flails generally consist of hardened cylinders with heavy chains
that pummel the ground by spinning.  They are mounted on heavy
vehicles. 

\3 DOD's specific requirement is 99.9-percent clearance at a depth of
18 inches. 


      BROADER U.S.  AREA CLEARANCE
      REQUIREMENTS HAVE EMERGED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

Several factors have converged into a set of emerging U.S. 
requirements that go beyond the countermine mission and address the
need for detecting and clearing all hazards, including landmines and
other UXO.  Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United
States has become more involved with operations other than war,
including special operations, low-intensity conflicts, and
peacekeeping.  These operations require U.S.  and other forces to
routinely clear operational areas and infrastructure--such as roads
and buildings--of mines and other explosives.  In addition to open
area clearance, DOD has developed urban warfare requirements that
include the detection and clearance of mines and booby traps.  It
should be noted that while U.S.  military personnel will perform such
operations when U.S.  interests are at stake, it is against U.S. 
policy for them to physically remove landmines from other countries
for humanitarian purposes. 

In addition, the closing of numerous bases per the recommendations of
the base realignment and closure process and the environmental
cleanup of other defense sites have generated a sizeable clearance
requirement.  Many of these sites, such as test ranges, impact
ranges, and training sites, contain large areas of UXO contamination. 
Clearing these areas--even partially--so that they can be used for
other purposes requires detection and clearance methods to meet a
100-percent clearance objective.  The research and development
efforts sponsored by DOD to support operations such as peacekeeping
and base cleanup are likely to have more direct application to the
clearance problems faced by Third World countries than those efforts
supporting countermine operations. 

Other U.S.  agencies besides DOD are responsible for detecting and
clearing explosives and other hazards.  For example, the Departments
of Treasury, Justice, and Transportation conduct or sponsor research
and development of technologies to help curb terrorism, such as
detecting explosives and weapons in airports, aircraft, and public
buildings.  The Department of Transportation is also responsible for
detecting subsurface flaws in roads and bridges.  The Department of
Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency are responsible for
detecting hazardous materials, such as buried radioactive and
chemical waste.  These research and development efforts have some
commonality with those needed to detect and clear landmines and other
UXO.  Specifically, they involve (1) detecting the presence and exact
location of explosive and hazardous materials in the open,
underground, or hidden in a building or vehicle; (2) removing or
neutralizing the materials; and (3) using methods that allow maximum
standoff distances. 

European countries have had broad clearance requirements for a long
time as they are still clearing areas from World Wars I and II.  For
example, in Verdun, France, millions of UXO items from World War I
still have not been found or cleared.  Germany has been clearing UXO
from Berlin since World War II ended.  The United Kingdom has
clearance requirements both at home following World War II
bombardments and abroad.  For example, after the Falkland Islands
war, the United Kingdom sponsored efforts to detect and clear
remaining mines there. 


   AN IDEAL SOLUTION IS NOT
   FORESEEABLE BASED ON KNOWN
   TECHNOLOGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4


      CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

Currently, hand-held probes, metal detectors, trained dogs, and
mechanical breaching equipment are considered the most effective
tools to detect and/or clear landmines and other UXO.  These methods
are slow, costly, and labor-intensive.  They mainly find landmines at
or near the surface, although some metal detectors can find larger,
more deeply buried UXO items because of their greater metal content. 
Although current methods offer the greatest assurance that an area is
safe to use, they are also quite dangerous because they put the
operator in close proximity to the explosive.  For example, in the
post-Gulf War cleanup of Kuwait,
84 operators, including at least 2 private U.S.  contractors, were
killed using these methods.  This number of fatalities is more
significant when one considers that the mines in Kuwait were easier
to find than in some Third World countries because they were in sand
and had been placed in patterns according to known military doctrine. 

Metal detectors have been in use since World War II and are still the
most effective sensors for use against landmines and other UXO. 
There are two types of metal detectors.  One detects anomalies in the
earth's magnetic field caused by ferrous (iron-based) materials.  The
other creates an electromagnetic field that can detect both ferrous
and non-ferrous metals.  Improvements made to metal detectors have
reportedly been in processing sensor information, weight reduction,
and improved sensitivity to disturbances in the magnetic field caused
by metallic objects.  Detection of trace metal elements and
debris--found in most soils--still leads to a high level of false
alarms since operators are often unable to discriminate between a
metal fragment and a mine.  False alarms translate into increased
workload because each detection must be treated as if it were an
explosive.  Efforts to duplicate the knowledge, skills, and abilities
of a proficient operator through computers and artificial
intelligence have not yet proven successful. 

Trained dogs have proven effective at detecting hidden explosives. 
South Africa has developed a system that uses blast-hardened vehicles
to collect air samples from geographical sectors in filter canisters. 
The dogs can then detect which canister--and thus which
sector--contains any evidence of explosives.  These sectors can then
be cleared using traditional methods.  Since dogs have been extremely
efficient in pinpointing the location of landmines, research and
development efforts have been underway to duplicate the dogs'
abilities through development of artificial biosensors, spectrum
analysis, and computer intelligence.  However, no sensor technology
has been developed that can replicate the dogs' ability to sense
explosives. 

Mechanical equipment used in combat operations to clear mines
includes armored vehicles equipped with devices such as plows,
flails, and rollers.  This equipment clears a path by pushing mines
aside or detonating them.  It is not effective in rough or rocky
terrain and against more advanced, off-route or wide-area mines. 
However, these advanced mines do not yet make up a large portion of
the landmines already emplaced in Third World countries.  For these
reasons, and because of the potential environmental impact, such as
pollution and soil erosion, heavy mechanical equipment is of limited
use for wide-area clearance.  Another technique used in combat is the
explosive line charge.  The line charge is a cord or rope of
explosives that is fired across a suspected minefield.  The
explosives are set off to detonate or disable nearby mines and thus
clear a path.  Line charges have been used since World War II and are
still being improved today. 

All of these methods are slow and costly.  For example, the Navy
estimates that it would take $2 billion and 20 years to clear the
28,800-acre Hawaiian island of Kaho'olawe to achieve a 4-foot depth
needed for farming.  The services have used the island as a bombing
range since 1941.  Similarly, we have previously reported that a
study of the Jefferson Proving Ground found that current cleanup
technologies were not practical for removing the UXO from the
installation's 51,000 heavily forested acres.\4 Army officials
estimated that cleanup estimates for the installation could range
from $5 billion to $8 billion.  These estimates underscore the
current challenge the United States faces in cleaning up millions of
acres of its defense sites.  The worldwide challenge is even more
daunting. 


--------------------
\4 Military Bases:  Environmental Impact at Closing Installations
(GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb.  23, 1995). 


      ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

Generally, more advanced technologies being pursued aim to make the
detection of landmines and other UXO quicker, safer, and more
cost-effective.  They employ sensors that can be operated from remote
distances, such as from manned or unmanned ground and air vehicles. 
However, no revolutionary area clearance technology with acceptable
reliability has been forthcoming.  Most of the advanced technologies
have drawbacks such as weaknesses under certain environmental
conditions or impractical power requirements.  At this point, the
more promising efforts involve using a combination of technologies
either concurrently or sequentially.  While standoff sensors do not
perform as well as current hand-held methods, they can perform
initial searches for landmines and other UXO to help identify
contaminated areas that are ultimately cleared using traditional
methods. 

Advanced sensor technologies with application to detection and
clearance can be grouped as follows:  infrared sensors,
ground-penetrating radars, microwave, photon backscatter, nuclear or
thermal neutron analysis, and lasers.  Their characteristics are
summarized in table 1. 



                                     Table 1
                     
                         Advanced Detection and Clearance
                                   Technologies

Technology      Characteristics                 Comments
--------------  ------------------------------  --------------------------------
Infrared        Looks for differences in        Only effective against UXO at or
sensor          surface radiation caused by     near the surface and against UXO
                objects or disturbances in the  that has not been in the ground
                soil. Affected by ambient       too long.
                temperatures, high levels of
                soil moisture, and vegetation
                density.

Ground-         Emits short pulses of           Effectiveness varies with
penetrating     electromagnetic energy of       changes in atmospheric
radar           various wave lengths            conditions. Ineffective in moist
                (including microwave) into the  soils without a high-power
                ground. Returning signals are   system; cost-effective means of
                collected by arrays of          meeting these power requirements
                detectors.                      in the field is lacking. Trade-
                                                offs exist between radar wave
                                                length, depth of ground
                                                penetration, and resolution.

Microwave       In addition to its application  Large power needs. Can affect
                to ground-penetrating radar, a  soil characteristics and harm
                high-powered microwave system   life forms and equipment.
                could be used to neutralize
                UXO in situ.

Photon          Scans the ground with a         Early in development. Has large
backscatter     pencil-thin beam of X-rays. X-  power needs, slow speed, and a
                rays produce scattered returns  small footprint. Can change soil
                from objects that are           characteristics and harm life
                collected by detectors on       forms and equipment. Has a high
                either side of the vehicle and  data processing requirement.
                processed.

Nuclear or      One application uses            Early in development. Has a
thermal         californium (a radioactive      small footprint. Hydrogen
neutron         element) to excite explosive    sensors are not effective in
analysis        material to release gamma rays  moist soil.
                that can be detected. Another
                application excites hydrogen
                in an explosive that releases
                neutrons that can be detected.

Laser           Irradiates small areas of       Neutralization and irradiation
                ground so mines and other UXO   types have high power
                at or near the surface may      requirements. Can affect soil
                react to this type of laser     characteristics and harm life
                energy by emitting heat and     forms and equipment.
                light, unlike the surrounding   Hyperspectral sensor's large
                soil. Other sensors, such as    data processing requirements tax
                infrared and hyperspectral,     the capacity of airborne
                may be used to detect the       platforms.
                reactions and pinpoint the
                UXO. Also being developed to
                neutralize and to help map
                locations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some promising recent research and development efforts involve
coupling sensor technologies.  For example, the Army has the Airborne
Standoff Minefield Detection System under development that combines
infrared and laser sensors.  The Marine Corps has a project underway
that couples ground-penetrating radar and infrared sensors.  The
Department of Energy has initiated a subsurface imaging program
utilizing ground-penetrating radar and seismic measurements.  Several
projects are also underway that link sensors with the satellite-based
Differential Global Positioning System.  Linkage to this system can
help map geographical locations of landmines and other UXO. 

Advances in mine technologies have been made that can reduce the
amount of contamination posed by landmines and other UXO in the
future.  Specifically, DOD has developed self-destruct mechanisms
that detonate munitions a specified time after they have been
deployed.  According to DOD officials, such mechanisms have been
incorporated into U.S.  landmines since 1979.  While not
foolproof--self-destruct mechanisms have demonstrated 90 percent
reliability in testing--they do reduce the risk of injury to innocent
civilians.  DOD officials noted that not all U.S.  landmines contain
self-destruct mechanisms because some minefields are intended to stay
active indefinitely.  Self-destruct mechanisms are currently being
developed for submunitions, but are not yet fielded.  DOD is also
developing mechanisms that can detonate munitions on demand from
remote locations. 


      TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS
      HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED AN IDEAL
      SOLUTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

Although numerous efforts to advance technology have been made,
demonstrations have not produced an ideal solution.  The Army
Environmental Center, in cooperation with Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology Division,\5 has been conducting an Advanced
Technology Demonstration for the detection, identification, and
clearance of UXO, including landmines.  The demonstration was
mandated by the Congress in fiscal years 1993 and 1994.  The purpose
of this effort was to demonstrate the best available off-the-shelf
detection and clearance technologies.  Thirty-three projects were
demonstrated, with most coming from private industry and a few from
government laboratories.  The demonstration projects represented
airborne, ground vehicle, and man-portable platforms with metal
detectors, ground-penetrating radar, and infrared sensors.  The test
areas included a variety of ordnance buried at realistic depths;
however, the terrain was relatively benign--open, clear, and level. 
Target processing software and clearance technologies were also
demonstrated.  Some used multiple sensors, such as ground-penetrating
radar with infrared or metal detectors. 

The goals of the demonstrations were to (1) survey large areas; (2)
determine density of UXO, as well as type, depth, and exact location;
(3) discriminate between UXO and other objects; and (4) demonstrate
UXO detection, identification, and clearance systems as integrated
technology.  UXO, scrap metal, and other objects were planted in two
courses--one for ground systems and one for airborne systems. 

Demonstration results showed that none of the technologies, either
individually or coupled, came close to approaching 100-percent
clearance.  UXO detection ranged from 0 to 59 percent, with the
ground-based systems performing the best, especially when
vehicle-mounted and man-portable systems were used together. 
However, the ability to separate UXO from false alarms was dismal for
all technologies demonstrated.  Again, the ground-based systems were
the most reliable, but the system with the highest detection rates
did not finish the course in the required time.  All but one airborne
system completed the course in the required time, but the airborne
systems were the least effective of all systems.  The clearance
systems in the demonstration, which relied on robotics excavations,
were considered effective but time-consuming. 


--------------------
\5 Although this organization originated under the Navy, it is
jointly staffed and funded to conduct UXO research, development, and
operations for all three services. 


   SEVERAL FACTORS COULD IMPEDE
   THE PROGRESS OF FUTURE EFFORTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5


      MANY ORGANIZATIONS ARE
      INVOLVED WITH DETECTION AND
      CLEARANCE TECHNOLOGIES,
      OPERATIONS, AND POLICIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

We identified over 20 U.S.  organizations that directly or indirectly
conduct or sponsor research and development with application to
detection and clearance, review related programs and policies,
conduct detection and clearance operations, or provide funds or
related training.  Some of these organizations are shown in table 2. 



                                     Table 2
                     
                     U.S. Organizations Involved in Detection
                            and Clearance Technologies

                                                                     Conducts or
                                                                        sponsors
                                 Conducts or  Reviews research     detection and
                                    sponsors   and development         clearance
                                research and       policies or   operations and/
Organizations                    development          programs       or training
--------------------------  ----------------  ----------------  ----------------
Office of the Secretary of                 X                 X                 X
 Defense, Defense
 Acquisition and
 Technology
Office of the Joint Chiefs                 X                 X
 of Staff
Office of the Secretary of                 X                 X                 X
 Defense, Special
 Operations and Low-
 Intensity Conflict
Advanced Research Projects                 X                 X
 Agency
Army Environmental Center                  X                 X                 X
Program Executive Officer                  X                 X                 X
 for Armored Systems
 Modernization, U.S. Army
Army Communications                        X                 X                 X
 Electronics Command,
 Mine, Countermine, and
 Demolitions
Army National Ground                                         X
 Intelligence Center
Air Force Materiel Command                 X                 X                 X
Naval Explosive Ordnance                   X                 X                 X
 Disposal Technology
 Division
Office of Naval Research                   X                 X
Marine Corps Amphibious                    X                 X                 X
 Warfare Technology
Marine Corps Intelligence                                    X
 Activity
Department of Energy,                      X                 X                 X
 Environmental Restoration
 and Waste Management,
 Technology Development
Environmental Protection                   X                 X                 X
 Agency
Department of Justice,                     X                 X                 X
 Federal Bureau of
 Investigation
Department of                              X                 X                 X
 Transportation, Federal
 Aviation Administration
Department of State,                                         X                 X
 Bureau of Political-
 Military Affairs
U.S. Agency for                                                                X
 International Development
Interagency Working Group                                    X                 X
 on Demining and Landmine
 Control
Department of Treasury,                    X                 X                 X
 Bureau of Alcohol,
 Tobacco, and Firearms
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of U.S.  organizations involved is greater than indicated
in the table because the different offices in the service commands
are involved with one or more forms of UXO, national laboratories
conduct research and development for DOD, and individual contractors
work for different agencies or on commercial applications. 
Organizations outside the United States are also involved with
detection and clearance technologies.  For example, the United
Nations is actively involved with clearing landmines from Third World
countries and promoting policies to counter proliferation.  Many
individual countries have been working on countermine operations and
UXO clearance and are developing clearance technologies and methods. 
These countries include the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Germany,
Russia, and South Africa. 


      RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
      EFFORTS ARE NOT
      WELL-COORDINATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

No formal mechanism or strategic plan exists to ensure that a fully
coordinated U.S.  research and development effort is leveraged at the
problem.  This situation exists because the organizations involved
with technologies related to detection and clearance are seeking
solutions to more narrowly defined problems that fall under their
purview.  For example, the combat branches of the military services
have traditionally pursued solutions to the countermine problem.  The
Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency sponsor
research and development to detect and clear hazards such as
subsurface radioactive, chemical, and other waste.  The Federal
Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
sponsor research and development to see through concealments to
detect explosives, firearms, and contraband.  More recently, DOD has
sponsored technology efforts to facilitate cleanup of defense sites. 

Nonetheless, when requirements are more broadly defined as the
detection and clearance of harmful, hidden objects or voids (such as
concrete flaws and underground facilities), the technologies that
various agencies employ or are developing for their own missions can
be related.  For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Department of
Energy are either sponsoring research and development in or have
experimented with ground-penetrating radars.  This does not
necessarily mean that unwanted duplication is occurring, but it does
illustrate the potential for one agency to be aware of and possibly
take advantage of relevant technologies other agencies are working
on. 

Some interagency coordination occurs on an ad hoc or narrow basis,
such as through symposia, technology demonstrations, and joint
programs, but this does not necessarily provide a firm basis for
technology exchange.  Most of the participants at an interagency UXO
forum that we sponsored in May 1995 cited the lack of a coordination
mechanism as a barrier to making progress in technologies applicable
to the detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO.  They also
pointed out the need for an overarching research and development plan
for these technologies and for an entity to be charged with
overseeing and coordinating the relevant technology efforts. 

Even within DOD, full coordination between agencies working on
detection and clearance technologies is not occurring.  In
particular, agencies that are responsible for cleaning up military
sites and those responsible for countermine missions are not always
working together, even though they share interests in many of the
same technologies.  Currently, two demonstrations of detection
technologies for use against landmines and other forms of UXO are
underway.  One is being conducted by the Army Communications
Electronics Command, which sponsors countermine research and
development, and the other is being jointly conducted by the Army
Environmental Center and the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Technology Division.  Neither organization has participated in the
other's demonstration.  Perhaps illustrative of the need for broader
coordination is the fact that several similar demonstrations have
been conducted in the past 5 years by the Department of Energy, the
Army, and the Marine Corps. 

Several cooperative efforts have been undertaken by U.S. 
organizations.  In September 1993, the National Security Council
established what became known as the Interagency Working Group on
Demining and Landmine Control.  The group plans, funds, and organizes
operations to remove landmines from Third World countries.  It also
established a research and development subgroup to promote
improvements in area clearance technologies.  The group includes
representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence
Agency.  However, not all U.S.  organizations involved in technology
applicable to the detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO
are represented. 

Within DOD, several organizations have begun to develop mechanisms
for coordinating, planning, and budgeting countermine research and
development activities.  While these efforts may improve
coordination, they involve agencies within the countermine community. 
The Navy and the Marine Corps have recently initiated efforts to
formally recognize clearance technology as beneficial to their
individual missions.  The Marine Corps and the Navy have established
a Mine Warfare Program Executive Office and a Shallow Water Mine
Countermine Steering Committee.  The Army and the Marine Corps have
established a joint demonstration effort that is directed toward
identifying advanced concepts for a potentially integrated
countermine capability.  The Mine Countermeasures Subpanel under the
Joint Directors of Laboratories, established within the last
2 years, is a multiservice mechanism that involves all of the
services. 

The number of different U.S.  organizations supporting relevant
research and development also makes it difficult to gauge the level
of funding the United States is devoting to technologies that can
detect UXO and other hazardous materials.  For example, based on
fiscal year 1996 budget estimates, the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and Transportation could invest somewhere between $75 million
and $150 million in research and development efforts that may have
some application to the detection and clearance of landmines and
other UXO.  However, it is unclear how much of that amount is
directly related to detection and clearance technologies that have
application to noncombat situations.  Accordingly, it is difficult to
determine whether the United States is getting the most from its
level of investment in these technologies or whether the current
level matches known national requirements. 


      OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO SEEKING
      TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

Even if the maximum output could be gained from the various
organizations sponsoring research and development, several other
factors could blunt the effect of technology gains.  One factor is
mine technology's ability to stay ahead of detection and clearance
technologies.  For example, some new mines are made of plastic,
composite, and ceramic components, and have little or no metallic
content.  Thus, the effectiveness of the metal detector, which is one
of the most widely used detection technologies, is limited against
such mines.  Some mines are designed to prevent premature detonation,
such as when they are blasted with explosives or dropped.  For
example, some have air bladders that react to blast or overpressure
and inflate to disarm and, then, rearm to await their intended
targets.  In addition, scatterable mines have been developed that can
be deployed by air, increasing the number of these mines that can be
rapidly deployed exponentially.  Despite these advances, service
officials note that even the traditional research and development
efforts devoted to the countermine mission have historically been
accorded relatively low funding priority. 

The characteristics of the country to be cleared can also affect the
applicability of a given technology.  For example, detection and
clearance equipment to be used by Third World countries must be
inexpensive to buy and maintain as well as easy to understand and
use.  From a cost and logistics support perspective, a sophisticated
military technology may not be practical in such circumstances. 
Landmine and other UXO detection and clearance equipment must be
effective given the geographical and terrain characteristics at hand. 
For example, soil with traces of metal elements can confuse metal
detectors, and rocky soil impairs hand-held probes.  High levels of
moisture in soil can affect the performance of detection
technologies.  Mountainous or forested terrain makes technologies
that depend on large or heavy vehicles impractical. 

Finally, despite the efforts of the United Nations, the landmine
problem continues to worsen.  Each year, many more mines are emplaced
than can be removed.  For example, the United Nations estimated that
in 1993, 2.5 million mines were emplaced, while only 80,000 were
removed.  The primary mechanism for controlling the use of landmines
is contained in Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional
Weapons.  The protocol was designed to reduce the harm to innocent
civilians.  It limits the use of landmines and booby traps to
military objectives, prohibits their use against civilian
populations, requires that parties to a conflict try to ensure that
the location of minefields is recorded, and requires that scatterable
mines contain self-destruct mechanisms or have their location
recorded. 

The protocol has been largely ineffective for several reasons. 
First, it covers only international conflicts, while most
landmine-related injuries have resulted from civil or internal
conflicts.  Second, it does not regulate the production, stockpiling,
transfer, or export of landmines.  Third, it contains no provision
for monitoring compliance, conducting enforcement, or penalizing
violators. 


   THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
   BRANCH HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO
   HELP RESOLVE THE LANDMINE
   PROBLEM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The executive branch and the Congress have taken several actions over
the past 3 years to curb the proliferation of landmines and improve
research and technology directed at detecting and clearing landmines
and other UXO.  In October 1992, the United States adopted a
unilateral export moratorium on antipersonnel landmines, which has
been extended until 1996.  According to DOD, the United States was
the first country to take such a step, which has led other countries
to follow suit.  In his address to the U.  N.  General Assembly in
1994, the President called for the eventual elimination of
antipersonnel landmines and for the international control of
production, export, and stockpiling as the first step toward
elimination.  On March 24, 1995, the Senate gave its advice and
consent and the President ratified the 1980 Convention on
Conventional Weapons as well as
Protocol II.  In addition, the United States was an active
participant in the July 1995 International Meeting on Mine Clearance
in Geneva, Switzerland. 

Beginning on September 25, 1995, 48 nations will convene as full
parties to reopen the Convention on Conventional Weapons and conduct
a conference to review the Convention, including Protocol II on
landmine use.  Other signatories and observers are also expected to
participate in the conference, which will consider several proposals
to strengthen Protocol II.  The executive branch strongly supports
strengthening the Convention by (1) extending its scope to include
internal conflicts, (2) limiting the use of non-self-destructing
antipersonnel landmines to marked and monitored areas, (3) making the
party that placed the mines responsible for clearing them, (4)
banning nondetectable mines, and (5) creating a system to verify the
restrictions on mine usage. 

In the conference report accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the Congress directed DOD to
undertake a large-scale detection and clearance technology
demonstration.  Although this demonstration did not produce
breakthrough solutions, it did establish a baseline for assessing the
state of the art in UXO detection technologies.  In the conference
report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1995, the Congress directed the Army to develop technologies for
mine detection and neutralization for use in humanitarian mine
removal operations and operations other than war.  Such technologies
were to be capable of being shared in an international environment. 
In its report on the fiscal year 1996 DOD authorization bill, the
House Committee on National Security cited the need for a central
authority to plan, oversee, and coordinate the research, development,
and acquisition of the technology applicable to area ordnance
clearance.  It directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan
that defines research and development priorities, program management,
and cooperative activity with international programs. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

The numerous research and development efforts funded by the United
States and by other countries could be more productive if they were
linked by a common purpose--the detection and clearance of landmines
and other UXO.  Such a common purpose should complement--not
supplant--individual missions, such as countermine, cleanup of
hazardous waste, cleanup of bases, and humanitarian demining, by
serving as a vehicle for sharing technical progress and avoiding
duplication. 

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in
the research and development plan called for by the House Committee
on National Security, a proposal on how a multiagency clearinghouse
function could be performed to

  maintain visibility over all federally funded research and
     development projects with application to detection and clearance
     of landmines, other UXO, and other hazards;

  develop an overarching strategy that encompasses both near-term and
     long-term priorities for detection and clearance technologies;
     and

  serve as an active link to relevant international and private
     research and development efforts. 

Such a proposal should be based on consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of other federal
agencies that sponsor research and development that may have
application to detection and clearance of landmines, other UXO, and
other hazards. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate an
executive agent to serve as a clearinghouse for research and
development efforts within DOD that may have application to detection
and clearance of landmines, other UXO, and other hazards.  The role
of such an agent would be to gain visibility over and to leverage
these efforts against the broader problems of detection and clearance
rather than to champion an individual mission. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

Both DOD and the Department of State concurred with our
recommendations.  In its comments (see app.  I), DOD stated that it
could prepare a proposal detailing the functions of a multiagency
clearinghouse and that statutory language could facilitate
implementation of the proposal by specifically identifying the roles
and responsibilities of the participating agencies.  DOD also said
that it would identify an executive agent to serve as a clearinghouse
within DOD as part of the February 1996 plan required by the House
National Security Committee. 

The Department of State commented that it endorsed the need for more
coordinated research and for the identification of a lead institution
in U.S.  government research and development (see app.  II). 

Both agencies provided specific technical clarifications that we
incorporated in the report, as appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

We reviewed pertinent reports, documents, and legislation relevant to
detection and clearance technologies.  We also interviewed officials
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the military services'
program offices, laboratories, and intelligence agencies; the
Departments of Energy and State; the Army Environmental Center and
the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division; the
Advanced Research Projects Agency; the United Nations; and the
National Academy of Science.  We also attended related conferences
and symposia and spoke with industrial and technical representatives
from other countries, such as England, South Africa, Austria,
Germany, and Sweden. 

In May 1995, we hosted a forum to discuss landmine and other UXO
problems, technologies, and solutions.  Participants included
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
military services, the Departments of State and Energy, the Advanced
Research Projects Agency, the United Nations, and CMS, Inc., a firm
that conducted mine clearance operations in Kuwait.  The key
questions that the forum attempted to address were (1) whether a
legitimate UXO requirement--different from the countermine
requirement--exists that warrants the pursuit of technological
solutions; (2) whether the research and development efforts currently
planned or underway constitute a sound approach toward such a
solution; (3) what factors (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if
any, impede the advancement of detection and clearance technology for
landmines and other UXO; (4) what change in approach to technology
development (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, should be
made in the near term and long term; and (5) who or what
organizations should take the lead in instituting change and ensuring
that the efforts in developing landmine and UXO detection and
clearance technology are well orchestrated. 

We conducted our review from September 1994 to July 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this report to other interested
congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and
State; the Secretaries of the military services; and the Secretary
General of the United Nations.  We will also make copies available to
others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
were Sharon Cekala, Paul Francis, MaeWanda Michael-Jackson, and James
Dowd. 

Mark E.  Gebicke, Director
Military Operations and
  Capabilities Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated August 29, 1995. 


   GAO COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

1.  A discussion of self-destruct mechanisms has been added to the
report. 

2.  Language has been added to the report to recognize the fact that
U.S.  forces do not conduct humanitarian demining missions. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated August 17, 1995. 


   GAO COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11

1.We have not concluded that more research and development funds
should be appropriated in the future.  As noted in the report,
because of the number of organizations involved and the various
projects underway, it is difficult to estimate the current level of
U.S.  investment in technologies related to detection and clearance
of landmines and other UXO.  We believe that once a multiagency
clearinghouse function and an executive agent for DOD are
established, the data can be assembled to establish the current U.S. 
level of investment and determine whether that level is appropriate. 
Such analysis, along with an updated assessment of the landmine and
other UXO problem, should be the basis for determining the level of
future funding. 

2.  Change adopted. 

3.We have modified our wording throughout the report in reference to
landmines and other UXO.  We have explicitly recognized the
distinction the Department of State makes for the purposes of
policymaking.  However, we note that (1) landmines are included in
the DOD definition of UXO and (2) for the thrust of this
report--research and development to advance technology--it is
important to stress the similarities between the problems posed by
landmines and by other UXO rather than the distinctions. 

4.A summary of all U.S.  mine clearance programs currently underway
was beyond the scope of our work.  DOD may be able to provide a
reasonable summary at this time, but a better summary would likely be
possible following the establishment of the multiagency clearinghouse
function. 

5.The U.S.  Agency for International Development is included in the
report as a member of the Interagency Working Group on Demining and
Landmine Control.  We have also added the agency to our list of U.S. 
organizations contained in table 2. 

