Naval Surface Fire Support: Navy's Near-Term Plan Is Not Based on
Sufficient Analysis (Letter Report, 05/19/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-160).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's upgrade of
its surface ships' guns to determine whether the Navy has chosen the
most cost-effective improving naval surface fire support (NSFS).

GAO found that: (1) the Navy did not sufficiently analyze its needs
before deciding on the upgrade of its 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and the
development of a 5-inch precision-guided munition; (2) the Navy
determined that the most cost-effective system to meet NSFS needs by
fiscal year (FY) 2003 would be a 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun with an
advanced propellant and precision-guided munitions in combination with
the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile; (3) although it initially proposed to
develop the guns at a cost of about $360 million, the Navy has decided
to limit the program to upgrading existing guns and developing
precision-guided munitions to meet the reduced funding level; (4) the
Navy estimates that research and development (R&D) costs for the 5-inch
guns will be about $246 million; (5) currently, the Navy R&D budget has
a $86 million shortfall which will be corrected in FY 1997; (6) the
Marine Corps has revised its minimum NSFS range requirement to reflect
the Navy's restructured gun program; and (7) the Navy is currently
conducting a supplemental analysis to evaluate near-term alternatives
for NSFS, but it is unclear whether this analysis will support the
Navy's decision to upgrade the 5-inch gun.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-160
     TITLE:  Naval Surface Fire Support: Navy's Near-Term Plan Is Not 
             Based on Sufficient Analysis
      DATE:  05/19/95
   SUBJECT:  Advanced weapons systems
             Navy procurement
             Naval warfare
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Firearms
             Military cost control
             Research and development costs
             Weapons research
             Missiles
             Military budgets
IDENTIFIER:  Tomahawk Cruise Missile
             DOD Future Years Defense Program
             SC-21 Surface Ship
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Committee on National Security, House of
Representatives

May 1995

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT -
NAVY'S NEAR-TERM PLAN IS NOT BASED
ON SUFFICIENT ANALYSIS

GAO/NSIAD-95-160

Naval Surface Fire Support


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  COEA - Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
  DOD - Department of Defense
  NSFS - Naval Surface Fire Support

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-261397

May 19, 1995

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman, Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

As you requested, we evaluated the Navy's program to upgrade guns on
surface ships to determine whether the Navy has chosen the most
cost-effective system for improving its ability to provide naval
surface fire support (NSFS). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has emphasized a strategy of
littoral warfare.  As part of this strategy, the Navy and the Marine
Corps have been developing operational concepts for amphibious
warfare, which rely heavily on the ability to launch and support
amphibious assaults from ships up to 25 nautical miles from the
enemy's shore.\1

According to the Navy and the Marine Corps, to successfully conduct
amphibious operations, the Marine Corps requires all-weather fire
support.  If artillery and other ground-based fire support assets are
not available, Marine Corps ground forces will need long-range fire
support from Navy surface ships or from attack helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft. 

Currently, the Navy operates the 5-inch, 54-caliber gun on cruisers
and destroyers, which can fire unguided projectiles a maximum range
of about 13 nautical miles.  According to the Navy and the Marine
Corps, this short range combined with threats to surface ships from
mines and antiship missiles currently preclude the Navy from
adequately supporting Marine Corps amphibious operations or engaging
other long-range targets. 

The Congress has been interested in the Navy's plans for NSFS since
1991.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992
and 1993 required (1) the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report
to the Congress outlining NSFS requirements and survey alternative
technologies and other options that could meet these requirements;
(2) the Secretary of Defense, through the Institute for Defense
Analysis, to provide a study of naval ship-to-shore fire support
requirements and cost-effective alternatives; and (3) the Navy to
conduct a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) based on
the requirements and technologies identified in the first report.  In
the conference report to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, the Congress required the Secretary of the Navy to
submit a report on the Navy's NSFS plan.  At the time of this review,
this report has not been submitted to the Congress. 


--------------------
\1 A nautical mile is equal to about 1.85 kilometers. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Navy's decision to upgrade existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and
develop a 5-inch precision-guided munition, at an estimated research
and development cost of $246 million, was made without sufficient
analysis.  As a result, the Navy is unable to show that this decision
will meet NSFS requirements or provide the most cost-effective
solution. 

The Navy's COEA for NSFS determined that a 155-millimeter, 60-caliber
gun with an advanced propellant and precision-guided munitions in
combination with the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile was the most
cost-effective system to meet NSFS requirements by fiscal year 2003. 
On the basis of the COEA's results, the Navy initially proposed a
$360 million research and development program to (1) develop
155-millimeter, 60-caliber guns; (2) develop a 155-millimeter
precision-guided munition with the Army; and (3) research advanced
propellants.  The Navy also proposed providing limited upgrades to
existing 5-inch guns until 155-millimeter, 60-caliber guns became
operational.  However, the Navy subsequently determined that this
comprehensive plan was not affordable and decided to limit the
program to upgrading existing 5-inch guns and developing 5-inch
precision-guided munitions.  A chronology of major events surrounding
the NSFS program appears in appendix I. 


   COEA DETERMINED THAT
   155-MILLIMETER GUN WAS THE MOST
   COST-EFFECTIVE SYSTEM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

In February 1993, the Center for Naval Analyses began the COEA.  It
evaluated the performance of 10 existing and candidate 5- and 8-inch
and 155-millimeter gun systems with different propellants, flight
classifications, and warhead types against target sets for three
scenarios, two of which represented major regional conflicts.  The
third scenario represented a noncombatant evacuation operation.  The
Navy also evaluated seven missile concepts against these scenarios
because it found that none of the gun systems could handle all of the
target sets.  The scenarios and target sets were developed along with
the Marine Corps and validated by the COEA's oversight board.\2

The COEA identified eight gun systems that, when combined with
missiles, were capable of attacking at least 95 percent of the
targets in the major regional conflict scenarios at the lowest total
estimated cost.  Five of these systems were 155-millimeter variants,
and three were 8-inch variants with different propellants and
calibers.  The COEA concluded that a 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun
system with an advanced propellant and precision-guided munitions in
combination with the Tomahawk missile was the most cost-effective
NSFS option.\3

According to the Navy, the only 5-inch gun candidate that was able to
compete with other gun systems modeled in the COEA was a 5-inch,
70-caliber Magnum gun.  This gun does not exist and would have to be
developed.  The COEA found that, for both major regional conflict
scenarios, fewer 155-millimeter munitions and long-range missiles
would be needed to hit a majority of the target sets than 5-inch,
70-caliber munitions and missiles.  For example, the Navy could hit
99 percent of the targets in one scenario with 1,316 fewer
155-millimeter projectiles, and 34 fewer long-range missiles at a
wartime cost of about $69 million less than with a combination of
5-inch, 70-caliber projectiles and missiles.\4 Also, the COEA stated
that, if the NSFS program became fiscally constrained, development of
a 5-inch, 70-caliber gun might save money in the near term, making it
an attractive option because of lower research and development costs,
but (1) wartime costs would be considerably higher than with larger
guns and (2) a 5-inch, 70-caliber gun would not adequately cover the
targets. 

The Navy subsequently developed the NSFS program based on the results
of the COEA.  In March 1994, the Navy proposed (1) developing a new
155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun; (2) developing, along with the Army,
a new 155-millimeter precision-guided munition; and (3) researching
different propellants, including electro-thermal-chemical and liquid
propellants.  The Navy planned to field these new systems by fiscal
year 2003.  The Navy also proposed providing limited upgrades to
existing 5-inch guns to achieve greater ranges until the
155-millimeter gun became available and planned to conduct concept
demonstrations of various missiles. 

According to the Navy, the NSFS program had the potential for joint
development of various propellants and commonality with Army
155-millimeter munitions.  To fund this overall program, the Navy
included $360 million for research and development in its proposed
Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years 1996-2001 and expected
to field the 155-millimeter gun in fiscal year 2003 on new-production
DDG-51 destroyers or on a follow-on surface ship, known as SC-21. 


--------------------
\2 Co-Chairs of the oversight board were the Director, Expeditionary
Warfare Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments)--a Marine Corps
official; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition (Ship Programs). 

\3 The COEA was signed out for distribution by the oversight board in
December 1994.  However, according to the Navy, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition had
not signed or released it to the Congress. 

\4 According to the COEA, wartime costs refer to costs to replace
missile and gun projectile stocks to prewar levels. 


   THE NAVY RESTRUCTURED ITS
   PROGRAM FOR AFFORDABILITY
   REASONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Funding shortfalls in the Navy's fiscal year 1996 program objective
memorandum led to a decision by the Navy to cut its NSFS program in
August 1994 to help pay for programs that the Marine Corps considered
vital to its amphibious capabilities.  These programs included the
V-22 medium-lift aircraft and the Advanced Amphibious Assault
Vehicle. 

According to program officials, to stay within the reduced funding
level, the Navy canceled plans to develop the 155-millimeter,
60-caliber gun and the 155-millimeter precision-guided munition and
scaled back efforts to develop advanced propellants for
155-millimeter munitions.  The Navy said it would consider this
option as a long-term NSFS solution as it develops its new surface
combatant ship, the SC-21.  In the interim, the Navy has decided to
upgrade its existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and develop a 5-inch
precision-guided munition.  According to program officials, the Navy
made this decision primarily because it believed that modifying
existing guns would be the quickest way to gain better gun capability
at the least cost. 

In December 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the Navy's
revised NSFS plan, and in January 1995, directed the Naval Sea
Systems Command to (1) initiate upgrades to the 5-inch, 54-caliber
gun to deliver precision-guided munitions; (2) develop a 5-inch
precision-guided munition with an initial operational capability
before fiscal year 2001; and (3) scale back liquid propellant gun
technology efforts.  In addition, the Chief of Naval Operations
directed that no funds be used to develop the 155-millimeter gun. 

According to the Navy, it will need about $246 million in research
and development funds between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 for the
revised NSFS program.  About $165 million will be required to develop
the precision-guided munition, $56 million to upgrade the 5-inch gun,
and $25 million will be needed for research and development on
NSFS-related command and control systems.  The Navy included $160.2
million in its Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years
1996-2001 for research and development of the 5-inch gun and
precision-guided munition, including $12 million for fiscal year
1996.  As a result, the Navy's research and development program is
underfunded by about $86 million.  Navy officials told us that funds
would be added to the program in fiscal year 1997. 


   MARINE CORPS DEFINED GUN RANGE
   REQUIREMENTS AFTER THE NAVY
   RESTRUCTURED THE PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

In November 1994, 3 months after the Navy proposed the 5-inch,
54-caliber gun solution, the Marine Corps established a range
requirement for NSFS that is less than the range requirements assumed
in the COEA.  Although the COEA does not specify a range requirement,
the COEA assumed that a majority of the NSFS targets in the major
regional conflict scenarios were located within 75 nautical miles of
the fire support ship.  This requirement was consistent with the
findings of the July 1992 Navy NSFS requirements study and the June
1993 Institute for Defense Analysis study, which found that 75
nautical miles was the maximum required range to support the Marine
Corps' operational concepts. 

Although range estimates for an upgraded 5-inch, 54-caliber gun vary,
all estimates are less than 75 nautical miles.  The June 1993
Institute for Defense Analysis study estimated that an advanced
5-inch gun projectile with rocket-assisted propulsion could achieve a
range between
45 and 65 nautical miles. 

Navy officials told the Chief of Naval Operations that an upgraded
5-inch gun could achieve ranges between 45 and 70 nautical miles
depending on the scope of the upgrade and the type of propellant used
in the precision-guided munition.  According to the Navy, to achieve
a 70 nautical mile range, electro-thermal-chemical propellants may be
needed, but these propellants have not yet been developed. 

In November 1994, the Marine Corps established a requirement for NSFS
in terms of range, volume of fire, and lethality.  Although it
participated in developing the original 75 nautical mile range target
assumption used in the COEA, the Marine Corps decided that the
minimum range requirement for NSFS should be 41.3 nautical miles and
that the maximum range should be 63.1 nautical miles.  The Marine
Corps based these ranges on its intent to use NSFS during the initial
stages of an amphibious operation until artillery is ashore. 

Because its 155-millimeter towed artillery would be unavailable
during the initial stages of an amphibious operation, the Marine
Corps concluded that NSFS, at a minimum, must provide the same range,
lethality, and accuracy as current artillery systems.  The minimum
41.3 nautical mile range consists of the 25 nautical mile
ship-to-shore distance plus a 16.3 nautical mile (30 kilometers)
distance representing the maximum range of existing Marine Corps
155-millimeter artillery with rocket-assisted projectiles.  To derive
the maximum range of 63.1 nautical miles, the Marine Corps used the
accepted minimum range for threat artillery articulated in the Army
Field Artillery COEA of 21.8 nautical miles (40 kilometers) and added
this range to the minimum range of 41.3 nautical miles. 

The Marine Corps' intent to use NSFS during the initial stages of
amphibious landing operations was outlined in the NSFS mission needs
statement, which was signed by the Navy in May 1992.  According to
the statement, NSFS also involves suppressing and destroying hostile
antiship weapons and air defense systems, delaying and disrupting
enemy movements, and reinforcing defending forces. 

Marine Corps and Navy requirements officials also told us that the
Marine Corps revised the 75 nautical mile range requirement because
it was not logical, specifically defined, or formally agreed to by
the Navy or the Marine Corps.  We found this surprising because Navy
and Marine Corps officials were involved in developing the target
sets used in the COEA's scenarios.  The scenarios and target sets
were also approved by officials from both services serving on the
COEA's oversight board. 

The fact that the Navy and the Marine Corps established the new range
requirement after the Navy completed work on the COEA and
restructured the program raises questions about the validity of NSFS
range requirements.  The Marine Corps did not assess the impact of
its new requirement on the target sets originally developed for the
COEA or conduct any further analysis to validate these ranges. 
Therefore, the importance to the NSFS mission of targets located
between 63 and 75 nautical miles from the ship is not clear. 


   SUPPLEMENTAL NAVY ANALYSIS
   APPEARS TO BE LIMITED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

According to defense acquisition management policies and procedures,
a COEA is intended to assist decisionmakers in choosing the best
system alternative for the money invested and not to justify
decisions that have already been made.  The Navy did not perform a
supplemental analysis to its original COEA before it decided to
restructure the NSFS program. 

The Navy is currently conducting a supplemental analysis to evaluate
near-term alternatives for NSFS.  According to the Navy, this
analysis will reflect the new Marine Corps' maximum range requirement
of
63.1 nautical miles and be limited only to 5-inch gun options.  The
Navy has asked the Center for Naval Analyses to complete this
analysis by May 1995. 

It is not clear whether a supplemental analysis that considered all
gun options--5 and 8 inch and 155 millimeter--against the Marine
Corps' new distance requirements would support the Navy's decision to
upgrade the 5-inch gun because (1) larger guns firing advanced
projectiles with more payload can attack more targets than smaller,
5-inch guns and (2) the original COEA found that the rankings of the
eight most cost-effective systems were not sensitive to range.  The
original COEA assessed the effectiveness of the eight most
cost-effective systems when the ship-to-shore distance was reduced
from 25 to 5 nautical miles and found that the cost-effectiveness
rankings of the systems remained basically the same.  Even at shorter
ranges, the 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun and Tomahawk missile
combination remained the most cost-effective NSFS option. 


   MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL
   CONSIDERATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

The Congress may wish to consider not authorizing or appropriating
fiscal year 1996 funds for NSFS until the Navy has (1) determined and
validated NSFS requirements and (2) conducted a comprehensive
supplemental analysis to the COEA that includes all available gun and
missile alternatives. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur with either the thrust
of this report or the matter for congressional consideration (see
app.  II).  DOD took issue with three major issues in the report: 
the Marine Corps' range requirement, the Navy's long-term plans for
the 155-millimeter gun, and our suggestion that the Navy is revising
the COEA to justify decisions it had already made. 

DOD noted that the report incorrectly alludes to a Marine Corps
initial NSFS requirement of 75 nautical miles.  DOD said that the
minimum 41.3 and maximum 63.1 nautical mile ranges established by the
Marine Corps in November 1994 was the first explicit statement of the
requirement based on a practical analysis of war-fighting scenarios. 

We do not agree with DOD's position.  Although the COEA did not
include a specific range requirement, a majority of the targets in
the major regional conflict scenarios modeled by the COEA were
located within 75 nautical miles of the fire support ship.  The 75
nautical mile range was consistent with the findings of the July 1992
Navy NSFS requirements study and the June 1993 Institute for Defense
Analysis study, which found that
75 nautical miles was the maximum required range to support the
Marine Corps' operational concepts.  Further, the Navy did not
conduct an analysis to validate the relationship between the target
set used in developing the COEA and the Marine Corps' new maximum
range requirement of 63.1 nautical miles.  Also, it should be noted
that the original COEA found that the rankings of the eight most
cost-effective systems were not sensitive to range.  The original
COEA assessed the effectiveness of the eight most cost-effective
systems when the ship-to-shore distance was reduced from 25 to 5
nautical miles and found that the cost-effectiveness rankings of the
systems remained basically the same.  Even at shorter ranges, the
155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun and Tomahawk missile combination
remained the most cost-effective NSFS option. 

DOD said that plans to develop the 155-millimeter gun and
precision-guided projectile, as recommended in the COEA, have not
been canceled and that this system remains a viable option for
inclusion on the SC-21.  This differs sharply from what Navy
officials told us during the audit.  Moreover, no funds have been
budgeted for this program in the Future Years Defense Program for
fiscal years 1996-2001.  Also, in his December 1994 decision to focus
on the 5-inch gun upgrade program, the Chief of Naval Operations
directed that no funds be used to develop the 155-millimeter gun. 

DOD said that the Navy was not revising its COEA but was conducting a
supplemental analysis to the original NSFS COEA.\5 DOD noted that the
purpose of the supplemental analysis was to determine the best
near-term NSFS improvements to meet the range requirements
established by the Marine Corps in November 1994.  However, we note
the Navy requested the Center for Naval Analyses to perform the
supplemental analysis
2 months after its decision to proceed with the restructured program. 
Because the Navy has restricted the supplemental analysis to only
5-inch gun solutions, rather than all potential gun solutions, we
believe that the supplemental analysis may not determine the most
cost-effective, near-term NSFS program.  Our recent discussions with
officials from the Center for Naval Analyses who are conducting the
supplemental analysis has reinforced this view.  According to these
officials, the 5-inch precision-guided munition development program
is a high-risk endeavor that requires concurrent development of a
number of new technologies.  One risk associated with concurrency is
that fielding of the munition may be delayed beyond the year 2001. 
According to the Center for Naval Analyses, another risk is that the
5-inch munition may not be able to meet the Marine Corps' maximum
range requirement. 

DOD also disagreed with the matter for congressional consideration. 
DOD noted that its near-term program was consistent with the 1993
Institute for Defense Analysis study, which recommended developing
advanced projectiles compatible with existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns
for the near term and that sufficient analysis has been conducted for
the Navy to proceed with its program.  DOD also stated that removal
of fiscal year 1996 funding would slow the achievement of both near-
and long-term objectives.  From the outset, the Navy intended to use
the COEA to determine the best program for NSFS.  We continue to
believe the Navy has not conducted sufficient analysis to support its
near-term program. 


--------------------
\5 In a draft of this report, we referred to the supplemental
analysis as a revised COEA; as a result of DOD's comments, we changed
this language and incorporated other technical comments where
appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

To obtain information on NSFS requirements and the Navy's plans, we
interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements,
and Assessments and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Washington, D.C.  We also
interviewed officials and reviewed documents at the Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and the Naval Sea
Systems Command, Crystal City, Virginia.  We reviewed the Navy and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense NSFS studies mandated by the
Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993 and discussed them with Navy officials and
representatives of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria,
Virginia. 

The Navy did not provide us with a copy of the COEA, but we reviewed
the COEA's summary report dated March 31, 1994, which contained its
major findings and conclusions.  We discussed the COEA with officials
of the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia.  We conducted
our review between July 1993 and March 1995 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this letter to the Secretaries of Defense
and the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  We will also
make copies available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are Richard Price, Assistant Director; Anton Blieberger,
Evaluator-in-Charge; and Robert Goldberg, Senior Evaluator. 

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
=========================================================== Appendix I


         DECEMBER 1991
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.1

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
mandates the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
assess naval surface fire support (NSFS) needs and the Navy to
conduct a formal cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA). 


         MAY 1992
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.2

The Navy signs the NSFS mission needs statement. 


         JULY 1992
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.3

The Navy issues its first congressionally mandated report on NSFS
requirements. 


         FEBRUARY 1993
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.4

The Navy begins the COEA. 


         JUNE 1993
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.5

The Institute for Defense Analysis completes its assessment of NSFS. 


         MARCH 1994
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.6

The Navy completes its work on the COEA and, on the basis of its
results, proposes an NSFS program and funding in its Future Years
Defense Program for fiscal years 1996-2001. 


         AUGUST 1994
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.7

The Navy restructures the NSFS program in light of funding shortfalls
and cancels 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun development. 


         NOVEMBER 1994
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.8

The Marine Corps identifies NSFS range requirements. 


         DECEMBER 1994
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.9

The COEA is signed out for distribution by the Co-Chairs of COEA
oversight board, but is not released to the Congress.  The Navy
proposes a revised NSFS program to the Chief of Naval Operations and
obtains approval. 


         JANUARY 1995
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.10

The Chief of Naval Operations formally approves the NSFS range
requirement and issues formal program guidance directing the Navy to
pursue upgrades to 5-inch guns and development of a precision-guided
munition. 


         MARCH 1995
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.0.11

The Navy asks the Center for Naval Analyses to provide a supplemental
analysis to its original COEA that reflects the Marine Corps' new
range requirements by May 1995. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)

