NASA Budgets: Gap Between Funding Requirements and Projected Budgets Has
Been Reopened (Briefing Report, 05/12/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-155BR).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) budgets, focusing on: (1)
NASA efforts to reduce or eliminate the gap between its funding
requirements and projected budgets; and (2) whether gaps remain between
NASA program plans and its future budgets.

GAO found that: (1) recent events have reopened the gap between NASA
program plans and its projected budgets; (2) NASA has not yet developed
plans for closing this gap, projected at $5.3 billion from fiscal years
1996 through 2000; (3) NASA closed its previous funding gap by changing
or eliminating some major programs, resulting in increased risks in some
of its largest programs; and (4) the $20-billion reduction in program
plans was based on the assumption that NASA could reduce shuttle
operating costs by another $1.3 billion through fiscal year 2000.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-155BR
     TITLE:  NASA Budgets: Gap Between Funding Requirements and 
             Projected Budgets Has Been Reopened
      DATE:  05/12/95
   SUBJECT:  Future budget projections
             Budget authority
             Budget cuts
             Aerospace research
             Space exploration
             Research and development costs
             Agency missions
             Appropriated funds
             Cost control
             Presidential budgets
IDENTIFIER:  NASA Earth Observing System
             NASA Cassini Saturn Probe Program
             NASA Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility Program
             NASA Space Station Program
             NASA Space Shuttle Program
             Russia
             High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer
             NASA Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby Program
             NASA Space Infrared Telescope Facility
             NASA Hubble Space Telescope Program
             NASA Compton Gamma Ray Observatory
             NASA Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program
             NASA Structural Spares Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Briefing Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Science, Technology and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, U.S.  Senate

May 1995

NASA BUDGETS - GAP BETWEEN FUNDING
REQUIREMENTS AND PROJECTED BUDGETS
HAS BEEN REOPENED

GAO/NSIAD-95-155BR

NASA Budget Gap


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AXAF -
  AXAF-S -
  CRAF -
  EOS -
  GAO -
  NASA -
  OMB -
  SIRTF -
  SOFIA -

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260434

May 12, 1995

The Honorable John D.  Rockefeller, IV
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Science, Technology
 and Space
Committee on Commerce, Science
 and Transportation
United States Senate

Dear Senator Rockefeller: 

You asked us to (1) identify the nature and scope of the adjustments
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had made to
reduce or eliminate the gap between required funding and likely
future budgets that we had previously identified and (2) determine
whether any gap remained between NASA's program plans and its likely
future budgets. 

On April 27, 1995, we briefed your staff on the results of our work. 
This report summarizes the information presented during that
briefing. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Recent events have reopened a gap between NASA's program plans and
its likely budgets.  NASA has not yet developed plans for closing
this $5.3-billion gap projected for fiscal years 1996 through 2000. 
NASA closed the gap that we reported in 1992 primarily by changing
and/or deleting some of its major programs.  As a result of these
changes, NASA increased the risks in several of its largest programs. 


   BUDGET GAP IS REOPENED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

In 1992,\1 we reported that NASA's funding estimates for fiscal years
1993 through 1997 exceeded its likely budgets for those years.  We
estimated that if the current federal budget allocation for domestic
discretionary spending continued to be constrained, NASA would have
to reduce its program plans by $13 billion to $21 billion to match
the available budgets. 

Since submitting its 1993 preliminary estimates, NASA has reduced its
5-year program plans by about $20 billion, or almost 22 percent.  In
its fiscal year 1996 budget request, NASA estimated its funding
requirements would be $72.4 billion for fiscal years 1996 through
2000.  NASA accomplished these reductions through a variety of
techniques such as eliminating some programs, scaling down program
scopes, identifying program efficiencies, stretching some programs
beyond the 5-year planning period, and reducing the number of civil
service personnel.  In some cases, NASA has accepted higher program
risk to achieve the budget reductions.  For example, reductions in
the space shuttle program have increased the risk of delays in
meeting projected launch schedules.  The $20-billion reduction is
based on the assumption that NASA can reduce shuttle operating costs
another $1.3 billion through fiscal year 2000. 

Reductions in current programs and activities were actually more than
$20 billion because the fiscal year 1996 budget plans included nearly
$3 billion for new programs.  These new programs include the new
millennium spacecraft; technology development for a new reusable
launch vehicle to replace the shuttle; the Space Infrared Telescope
Facility to complement both the Hubble Space Telescope, already in
orbit, and the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility, planned for
launch in 1998; and the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared
Astronomy, a suborbital observatory. 

In addition, NASA was required to plan for a continuing loss of
purchasing power due to inflation.  Future budgets are not expected
to cover anticipated inflation and, in fact, the budgets are actually
decreasing.  Using the gross domestic product deflator forecasts from
the President's fiscal year 1996 budget, we estimate that NASA will
lose $3.8 billion in purchasing power in fiscal years 1996 through
2000 because of inflation.  NASA accounted for this reduction when it
prepared the fiscal year 1996 plans. 

Even though NASA reduced its 5-year funding requirements, it still
has a $5.3-billion gap between estimated funding requirements and
projected budgets.  NASA's fiscal year 1996 budget request includes
over $4 billion in "unresolved percentage reductions." This gap
occurred because in January 1995--just before the President's budget
was submitted to the Congress--NASA and other agencies were directed
to make additional funding reductions.  Specifically, NASA was
directed to freeze its budget at the 1996 funding level--$14.3
billion--and make increasingly larger reductions from that level for
each year from 1997 through 2000.  Under this plan, the agency's
budget would be reduced from $14.3 billion in fiscal year 1996 to
$13.2 billion in fiscal year 2000.  The cumulative reductions totaled
$4 billion for the 5-year period.  The plan included another $1.3
billion in unresolved reductions in the shuttle program, making a
budget gap of $5.3 billion. 

NASA has not yet determined how it will accomplish the $5.3 billion
in unresolved reductions.  A number of studies have been completed or
are underway on how to make the reductions.  For example, an internal
shuttle workforce review and an independent management review have
recommended changes to reduce shuttle costs, but NASA has not acted
on all of the recommendations and has no estimate of the potential
savings.  The NASA Administrator testified that he would try to take
the bulk of the reductions from NASA's infrastructure costs and would
reduce programs only as a last resort.  A recent study by an
independent task force for NASA's Advisory Council\2 endorsed this
approach.  The task force cautioned, however, that even with this
approach, it believed NASA would have to terminate some of its lower
priority objectives.  The Administrator is awaiting the results of an
internal zero-base study before making final decisions on the cuts. 
He expects these results in mid-May 1995. 


--------------------
\1 NASA Budget:  Potential Shortfalls in Funding NASA's 5-Year Plan
(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-18, Mar.  17, 1992) and NASA:  Large Programs May
Consume Increasing Share of Limited Future Budgets (GAO/NSIAD-92-278,
Sept.  4, 1992). 

\2 NASA Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council,
NASA Federal Laboratory Review (Feb.  1995). 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

To determine how NASA reduced its 5-year funding requirements, we
compared preliminary program plans NASA prepared for use in
negotiations with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the
fiscal year 1993 budget request to program planning estimates
contained in the fiscal year 1996 budget request.  We used the fiscal
year 1993 preliminary program plans as our baseline because the
President's fiscal year 1993 budget submission omitted the out-year
funding profiles and our 1992 reports were based on the preliminary
plans.  Our comparisons were further complicated by the fact that, in
fiscal year 1995, NASA changed its budget structure.  This change
limited the level of detail of our comparisons. 

Because of the comparison difficulties, we selected five of NASA's
largest programs for detailed review.  These programs were the space
station, space shuttle, Earth Observing System, Cassini, and Advanced
X-ray Astrophysics Facility.  Together with the civil service
personnel reductions, these programs accounted for about $13 billion
of the $20 billion reduction and represent about 56 percent of NASA's
fiscal year 1996 5-year program estimates.  We reviewed program and
budget documents, internal and external management studies, and our
prior reports on these programs and discussed the reductions with
NASA program and budget officials.  A list of issued GAO products
related to NASA's budget and the programs mentioned above is at the
back of this report. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

We discussed the contents of our draft report with NASA officials and
incorporated their technical comments and clarifications where
appropriate.  The NASA officials stated that they believed the report
was well balanced and represented NASA's budget situation. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to the NASA Administrator and
interested congressional committees.  We will also provide copies to
others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
were Lee Edwards, Galen L.  Goss, Pauline Nowak, and Bonita Page. 

Sincerely yours,

David R.  Warren
Director, Defense Management
 and NASA Issues


NASA BUDGET GAP
============================================================ Chapter I


   FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM PLANS BY
   NASA--1993-96 (BY FISCAL YEAR)
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:1



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

  The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
     preliminary program plan for fiscal years 1993 through 1997
     would have required increasing the agency's annual budget from
     $15 billion in fiscal year 1993 to about $21 billion in fiscal
     year 1997.  We estimated the cumulative funding requirements
     exceeded likely budgets by $13 billion to $21 billion. 

  The plan submitted with the fiscal year 1994 budget (fiscal years
     1994 through 1998) called for a cumulative 5-year total of $12
     billion less than the 1993 plan, but still provided for annual
     increases in the budget. 

  The fiscal year 1995 plan (fiscal years 1995 through 1999) included
     further cumulative cuts of about $8 billion.  It provided for
     essentially level budgets of about $14.5 billion per year
     through fiscal year 1999. 

  Without the percentage reductions added in January 1995, just
     before the President submitted the fiscal year 1996 budget to
     the Congress, the fiscal year 1996 plan (fiscal years 1996
     through 2000) would have provided for nearly the same level
     budget as the fiscal year 1995 plan.  NASA's planned funding for
     fiscal years 1996 through 2000 totaled $72.4 billion--about $20
     billion, or 22 percent less, than the plan for fiscal years 1993
     through 1997.  The unresolved percentage reductions in the 1996
     President's budget for NASA will decrease funding by another $4
     billion in fiscal years 1997 through 2000.  With the percentage
     reductions, the fiscal year 1996 plan provides for budgets that
     will steadily decrease from $14.3 billion in fiscal year 1996 to
     about $13.2 billion in fiscal year 2000. 


   BUDGET GAP REOPENED (5-YEAR
   TOTALS)
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:2



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

In 1992, we reported that NASA's funding estimates for fiscal years
1993 through 1997 exceeded its likely budgets for those years by $13
billion to $21 billion.  NASA has reduced its 5-year funding
requirements, but a $5.3-billion gap between estimated funding
requirements and projected budgets for fiscal years 1996 through 2000
has been reopened. 

The gap is composed of $1.3 billion in unresolved reductions in the
shuttle program and $4 billion in "unresolved percentage reductions"
in the fiscal year 1996 President's budget.  In preparing its fiscal
year 1996 budget, NASA was directed to freeze its budget at the 1996
funding level--$14.3 billion--and make increasingly larger reductions
from that level for each year from 1997 to 2000.  The cumulative
reductions totaled $4 billion for the 5-year period. 


   DECLINING BUDGET; DECLINING
   PURCHASING POWER
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:3



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

In preparing its fiscal year 1996 budget out-year program plan, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed NASA not to increase
funding to account for inflation.  As a result, NASA formulated the
plan based on reduced purchasing power.  Using the gross domestic
product deflator forecasts in the President's budget, we estimate
that NASA will lose a cumulative total of $3.8 billion in purchasing
power for fiscal years 1997 through 2000 due to inflation.  For
example, NASA's budget is projected to decrease from $14.3 billion in
fiscal year 1996 to $13.2 billion in fiscal year 2000, a reduction of
about 7.7 percent.  However, the fiscal year 2000 budget equates to
$11.7 billion in constant fiscal year 1996 dollars, a reduction in
purchasing power of almost 18 percent. 


   FUNDING CHANGES FOR PROGRAMS
   REVIEWED (DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:4



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

To determine how NASA reduced its 5-year funding requirements, we
selected five of NASA's largest programs and the civil service
personnel account for detailed review.\1

Together, these activities accounted for almost $13 billion of the
$20 billion reduction from the 1993 plan to the 1996 plan.  Moreover,
these six activities represent about 56 percent of NASA's fiscal year
1996 5-year program estimates. 


--------------------
\1 Comparisons of cost and program elements among the programs cannot
be made because costs change as a program moves from early design
through development, launch, and operation. 


   SPACE SHUTTLE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:5



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The space shuttle, NASA's costliest program, has also accounted for
about half of the cost reduction effort.  Shuttle costs were lowered
primarily by eliminating some planned upgrades, reducing the flight
rate, reducing funding reserves, and improving operational
efficiency.  NASA eliminated its expensive upgrades and used already
existing less costly alternatives, as well as canceled its structural
spares program.  For example, NASA canceled the advanced solid rocket
motor program, which saved about $1.4 billion, and continued to use
the reliable existing motors.  Some upgrades (e.g., the super
lightweight external tank needed to support space station assembly)
were added after the fiscal year 1993 plan, but they were less costly
than the ones terminated. 

NASA also reduced the planned flight rate from 10 to 7 per year. 
According to a December 1994 study by the National Academy of Public
Administration, reducing the flight rate by one flight saves about
$100 million per year.  NASA and its contractors also improved the
efficiency of shuttle operations and, as a result, reduced contractor
labor by over 20 percent. 

Although shuttle costs have been reduced, internal documents show
that estimated costs still exceed planned funding by $1.3 billion for
fiscal years 1996 through 2000.  A February 1995 NASA workforce
review and an independent management review recommended changes to
further reduce costs, but NASA has not made any decisions. 

According to the workforce review, the cost reductions have increased
the risk that NASA will not meet future flight schedules, but the
review did not quantify the added risk.  Also, canceling the
structural spares program would increase NASA's response time if a
shuttle is damaged or destroyed and would result in the loss of some
personnel with skills that would be needed if another shuttle had to
be produced.  According to NASA, the skills could be reacquired, but
would increase the time for producing a replacement shuttle. 
However, NASA considers this risk to be minimal because it has no
plans to build another orbiter. 


   SPACE STATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:6



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

NASA reduced space station costs from the fiscal year 1993 program
estimate by (1) redesigning the station and expanding Russia's role
in the space station program by including it in the international
partnership and (2) consolidating program management and
restructuring station development contracts. 

In 1993, the President directed NASA to redesign the station program
to reduce costs.  Subsequently, the United States and Russia agreed
to bring Russia into the partnership.  The resulting station
configuration is based on a modular concept with a phased buildup. 
The new design deleted some hardware (e.g., a pressurized logistics
module) and replaced some development efforts with already proven
equipment (e.g., a Russian tug for guidance, navigation, and
control).  In addition, the administration imposed an annual station
funding cap of $2.1 billion through fiscal year 1998,\2 which reduced
the planned level of funding. 

To gain efficiencies, NASA implemented a new management approach:  a
single prime contractor (Boeing) was given total prime contractor
responsibility.  Other previous prime contractors and support
contractors became subcontractors to Boeing.  Additionally, NASA
reduced the combined contractor workforce.  NASA also streamlined its
program management office and merged headquarters program management
with the space shuttle program.  A consolidated program management
office was located at the Johnson Space Center, and project
management organizations at the various centers were eliminated. 

In January 1995, NASA and Boeing signed the restructured contract for
$5.6 billion--about $600 million less than the original estimate. 
However, Boeing has not yet completed negotiations with its major
subcontractors.  And one provision of the restructured contract
allows Boeing to reopen negotiations if it is unsuccessful at
negotiating subcontract prices within the $5.6-billion price. 

The redesign may have increased program risks because (1) the new
design will require a number of modifications to the shuttle to
increase its performance because of the station's higher inclination
and resulting shuttle payload weight loss, (2) more flights will be
required for station assembly, and (3) the program depends, to some
extent, on Russian participation. 


--------------------
\2 The funding cap excludes the $400-million contract with the
Russian Space Agency for hardware and services. 


   EARTH OBSERVING SYSTEM (EOS)
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:7



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Earth Observing System (EOS) is a series of polar-orbiting and
low-inclination satellites that will gather information on the
Earth's environment and climate until about 2021.  It will take 2
years after the satellites' instruments have finished gathering
information to analyze it. 

Between the time the fiscal years 1993 and 1996 budget plans were
prepared, NASA revised the EOS program twice to reduce funding
requirements.  The first revision reduced funding for fiscal years
1991 through 2000 by $3 billion--from $11 billion to $8 billion.  The
second revision reduced funding another $750 million--from $8 billion
to $7.25 billion.  The two revisions (1) reduced the program's scope,
(2) increased program reliance on international partners, (3)
stretched out the program, (4) delayed availability of some data, and
(5) reduced program funding reserves from 28 percent to 23 percent. 

To achieve cost reductions, NASA deleted some planned measurement
instruments, such as the High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer,
originally estimated to cost between $413 million and $434 million
through fiscal year 2000.  It also reduced the development of
algorithms, which translate raw data into useful information, and the
program's number of standard data products from 512 to 222.  In
addition, NASA slipped the launch of some planned instruments and
increased the time between launches of replacement spacecraft from 5
years to 6 years, thus saving about $187 million through 2000. 
However, it increased the risks of in-orbit failure and lost data. 
In revising EOS, NASA also increased its reliance on international
partners. 

Although NASA reduced its 1991 to 2000 costs by $3.75 billion, the
1996 5-year funding total is only $200 million less than the 1993
total.  This difference occurs because development will be more
intense and costly in fiscal years 1996 to 2000 than in 1993 to 1997. 

According to a July 1994 NASA report, the cost reductions have
adversely affected both the program's science content and its
schedule.  Reducing the funding reserves increased the risk that
instruments will not be available on schedule or will not achieve
their planned capabilities.  In addition, since agreements with other
agencies and international partners are not finalized, risks increase
that equipment and data may not be available when needed. 

ADVANCED X-RAY ASTROPHYSICS FACILITY (AXAF)



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF) is the third in
NASA's series of four "great observatories." These observatories are
intended to provide new data and insights for studies of the age,
evolution, and composition of the universe and its objects. 

The $900-million reduction in AXAF's 5-year funding requirements
resulted from progress in the development program and NASA's redesign
of the observatory to make its development and operation less costly. 
In the fiscal year 1993 plan, NASA estimated it would need $1.7
billion for fiscal years 1993 through 1997.  Much of these costs were
for development.  By the 1996 program plan, NASA estimated funding
requirements totaling about $800 million for fiscal years 1996
through 2000.  As the 1996 5-year period ends, AXAF will have moved
from development to operations. 

At the time of the 1993 plan, AXAF was a single large satellite that
would be launched in 1999 and operate in low Earth orbit for 15
years.  The shuttle was to rendezvous periodically with AXAF to
maintain and service it.  After submitting the fiscal year 1993
budget, NASA concluded that AXAF was not affordable and divided the
program into two separate satellites or missions:  AXAF-I (imaging)
and AXAF-S (spectroscopy).  The redesign reduces AXAF's life-cycle
costs by about $3 billion, allows NASA to complete development and
launch the spacecraft in fiscal year 1998 (a year earlier), reduces
the operating life from 15 to 5 years, and places it in a high Earth
orbit.  In 1994, the Congress terminated funding for the spacecraft
portion of AXAF-S--saving $393 million in development and operational
costs--and directed NASA to investigate whether the primary
instrument could be included on a future Japanese mission. 

Although redesigning the AXAF mission reduced costs, it also
increased the risks.  For example, since AXAF-I will no longer be
serviceable in space because of the higher orbit, technical problems
that cannot be corrected through ground communications could degrade
or destroy the mission.  In addition, the redesign will result in
less science data being collected because AXAF will achieve 10-years
equivalent observing time in 5 years with the high orbit, due to
increased instrument efficiency, as opposed to the 15 years of
observing time with the low orbit. 


   CASSINI
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:8



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Cassini mission is to provide long-term (4 years) observations of
Saturn's atmosphere, rings, magnetosphere, and moons.  When Cassini
development began, the mission included a second spacecraft--the
Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF).  Because the Congress imposed
reductions on fiscal years 1992 and 1993 funding, NASA terminated the
CRAF portion of the mission and deferred the Cassini launch from
April 1996 to October 1997. 

Between the fiscal year 1993 plan and the fiscal year 1996 plan,
there was a $900-million reduction.  It resulted from (1) a redesign
of the spacecraft, project management, and operating approach and (2)
completion of much of the spacecraft development. 

In 1993, NASA redesigned the CRAF/Cassini mission by replacing the
original multimission with a less expensive, less capable
Cassini-unique design.  NASA also streamlined project management and
reduced the number of people working on the project.  In 1994, NASA
revised its approach to Cassini operations and improved the
efficiency of operations personnel by sharing them with other
projects rather than dedicating them to the Cassini mission. 

The fiscal year 1993 program plan covered 5 years of peak development
activity for Cassini.  However, by the fiscal year 1996 plan, much of
the development activity had been completed, with Cassini scheduled
for launch in fiscal year 1998.  Funding for fiscal years 1999 and
2000 is for mission operations, data analysis, and tracking and data
support. 

The 1993 redesign reduced the mission's science capabilities. 
Although no science instruments were deleted from the project and the
mission's primary science objectives were not changed, the new
spacecraft design reduced the depth and quality of some planned
investigations.  With the new design, instruments will be mounted on
the spacecraft's body rather than on moveable booms.  In many cases,
the entire spacecraft will have to move in order to point the
instruments, thus reducing the amount and quality of science data
that can be obtained.  The approach of sharing operations personnel
may also increase risks because the right experts might not be
available when needed. 


   REDUCTIONS IN MISSION SUPPORT -
   CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:9



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The $100-million reduction in civil service personnel costs will
result from cutting the number of civil service personnel by 14
percent, from 24,231 equivalent personnel\3 in fiscal year 1993 to
20,906 equivalent personnel in fiscal year 2000.  NASA has already
reduced its workforce by about 1,200 from the fiscal year 1993 level
and plans an additional reduction of about 2,100 through the end of
the century.  Most of the personnel reduction resulted from
consolidating the space station program management--the number of
equivalent civil service personnel dropped from 2,394 in fiscal year
1993 to 1,279 in fiscal year 1995. 


--------------------
\3 Labor is measured in "equivalent persons." One equivalent person
is equal to the number of hours one person could be expected to work
in a year less adjustments, such as for federal holidays. 


   NEW PROGRAMS IN FISCAL YEAR
   1996 PLAN (5-YEAR TOTALS IN
   MILLIONS)
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:10



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

As with any fiscal year program plan, the fiscal year 1996 through
2000 plan includes several new programs that will require cumulative
total funding of $2.8 billion. 

  The new millennium spacecraft will demonstrate how complex
     scientific spacecraft--such as those required for planetary
     missions--can be built for lower costs and in less time, but
     still possess considerable scientific merit.  The program's
     primary objectives are to increase the performance capabilities
     of spacecraft and instruments while simultaneously reducing
     total mission costs. 

  The new launch vehicle will include systems engineering and concept
     analysis, ground-based technology development, and a series of
     flight demonstrators.  In accordance with the August 1994
     National Space Transportation Policy, NASA is leading the
     NASA/industry-funded technology development program for the next
     generation reusable space transportation system. 

  SIRTF (Space Infrared Telescope Facility) will complement the
     Hubble Space Telescope, the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, and
     AXAF, and help provide new data and insights for studying the
     age, evolution, and composition of the universe and its objects. 

  SOFIA (Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy) will
     replace the aging Kuiper Airborne Observatory to study the birth
     and death of stars, formation of planetary systems, chemical
     make-up of star-forming clouds in the Milky Way galaxy, energy
     sources in other galaxies, and outer bodies in our solar system. 

  NASA included place-holder funds for new program starts in 1998
     through 2000.  According to a NASA official, these types of
     funds were included in prior year's budget within program
     offices.  NASA used a separate line item in 1996 to ensure that
     future projects had strategic importance to the agency. 


   UNRESOLVED PERCENTAGE REDUCTION
   BY BUDGET ACCOUNT
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:11



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

NASA's fiscal year 1996 budget documentation included a preliminary
distribution of the unresolved percentage reductions ($4 billion) to
budget accounts.  Under the preliminary distribution, science,
aeronautics, and technology activities would absorb about 47 percent
of the reductions.  The mission support category, which provides
funding for NASA's civil service personnel, space communication
services, safety and quality assurance activities, and maintenance
activities at NASA centers, would absorb about 34 percent.  Human
space flight activities would absorb about 19 percent; the space
station program was exempted from these cuts.  According to a NASA
budget office official, the ultimate distribution of the reductions
may be different than those in the fiscal year 1996 budget
documentation. 


   POTENTIAL ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE
   GAP
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:12



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

NASA has a number of options for resolving the remaining $5.3-billion
gap between funding requirements and expected budgets.  These options
range from reducing the agency's infrastructure to eliminating or
reducing programs.  Although no final decisions have been made, the
NASA Administrator has stated a preference for reducing
infrastructure.  A number of recently completed or ongoing studies
are intended to identify ways to reduce costs.  These include the
shuttle workforce review completed in February 1995, an independent
shuttle management review completed in December 1994, a national
facilities study completed in April 1994, an independent NASA
laboratory review completed in February 1995, an internal "Red Team"
study of the missions of NASA's field centers completed in January
1995, and an ongoing, comprehensive zero-base review of the agency. 

According to NASA, the principles guiding these studies include (1)
eliminating duplication and overlapping activities, (2) transferring
functions to universities or the private sector, (3) changing the way
NASA works with prime contractors, (4) emphasizing objective
contracting, (5) privatizing and commercializing functions whenever
possible, (6) reducing oversight and streamlining procurement, and
(7) returning NASA to the role of a research and development agency. 
Some of these studies contain specific recommendations, but NASA has
not acted on all of the recommendations and has no current estimate
of the savings expected to result from them.  According to the
Administrator, if infrastructure reductions do not resolve the gap,
the agency will reduce or eliminate some of its programs.  According
to NASA, final decisions will be reflected in the President's fiscal
year 1997 budget request. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
=========================================================== Appendix 0


   ADVANCED X-RAY ASTROPHYSICS
   FACILITY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:1

Space Projects:  Astrophysics Facility Program Contains Cost and
Technical Risks (GAO/NSIAD-94-80, Jan.  28, 1994). 

Space Projects:  Status and Remaining Challenges of the Advanced
X-ray Astrophysics Facility (GAO/NSIAD-92-77, Feb.  28, 1992). 


   CASSINI
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:2

Space Science:  Causes and Impacts of Cutbacks to NASA's Outer Solar
System Exploration Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-24, Dec.  29, 1993). 


   EARTH OBSERVING SYSTEM
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:3

Earth Observing System:  Concentration on Near-Term EOSDIS
Development May Jeopardize Long Term Success (GAO/T-AIMD-95-103, Mar. 
16, 1995). 

Earth Observing System:  Information on NASA's Incorporation of
Existing Data Into EOSDIS (GAO/IMTEC-92-79, Sept.  25, 1992). 

Earth Observing System:  Broader Involvement of the EOSDIS User
Community Is Needed (GAO/IMTEC-92-40, May 11, 1992). 

NASA's Development of EOSDIS (GAO/IMTEC-92-42R, Mar.  23, 1992). 

Earth Observing System:  NASA Needs to Reassess Its EOSDIS
Development Strategy (GAO/T-IMTEC-92-7, Feb.  26, 1992 and
GAO/T-IMTEC-92-8, Feb.  27, 1992). 

NASA's EOSDIS Development Approach Is Risky (GAO/IMTEC-92-24, Feb. 
25, 1992). 


   NASA BUDGET
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:4

NASA:  Large Programs May Consume Increasing Share of Limited Future
Budgets (GAO/NSIAD-92-278, Sept.  4, 1992). 

NASA Budget:  Potential Shortfalls in Funding NASA's 5-Year Plan
(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-18, Mar.  17, 1992). 


   SPACE SHUTTLE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:5

Space Shuttle:  NASA's Plans for Repairing or Replacing a Damaged or
Destroyed Orbiter (GAO/NSIAD-94-197, July 21, 1994). 

Space Shuttle:  Incomplete Data and Funding Approach Increase Cost
Risk for Upgrade Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-23, May 26, 1994). 

Space Shuttle Main Engine:  NASA Has Not Evaluated the Alternate Fuel
Turbopump Costs and Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-94-54, Oct.  29, 1993). 

Space Transportation:  The Content and Uses of Shuttle Cost Estimates
(GAO/NSIAD-93-115, Jan.  28, 1993). 

Space Shuttle:  Status of Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program
(GAO/NSIAD-93-26, Nov.  17, 1992). 


   SPACE STATION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:6

Space Station:  Plans to Expand Research Community Do Not Match
Available Resources (GAO/NSIAD-95-33, Nov.  22, 1994). 

Space Station:  Update on the Impact of the Expanded Russian Role
(GAO/NSIAD-94-248, July 29, 1994). 

Space Station:  Impact of the Expanded Russian Role on Funding and
Research (GAO/NSIAD-94-220, June 21, 1994). 

Space Station:  Status of Financial Reserves (GAO/NSIAD-92-279, July
20, 1992). 
