Combat Identification Systems: Changes Needed in Management Plans and
Structure (Letter Report, 09/14/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-153).

GAO reviewed the Army's and Navy's development of combat identification
systems to reduce the occurrences of friendly fire incidents, focusing
on the services' management plans and structures for the systems'
development and integration.

GAO found that: (1) the Army and Navy do not have a cohesive management
plan and structure for the development of their cooperative combat
identification systems; (2) the lack of cohesiveness reflects the
division in the services' responsibilities for developing systems for
different combat modes; (3) the two services have based their system
development plans on different technologies and have not addressed how
and at what cost these systems will be integrated; (4) the lack of a
cohesive management structure could lead to development and deployment
delays which allows the services to prioritize their efforts
differently; (5) the Department of Defense (DOD) believes that an
upgrade of the current identification system will permit greater
flexibility in meeting future needs and compatability objectives; (6)
the Navy has developed a cost and operational effectiveness analysis
(COEA) for its system, but the Army is just beginning to develop its
COEA; (7) the development of separate COEA wastes resources because of
duplication and delays in system development and deployment and does not
address the need for interoperability; (8) the DOD proposal for a single
funding line for system development would help ensure better cooperative
systems development; and (9) the Army is preceeding with the procurement
of more near-term identification systems than its needs for its planned
field demonstration without knowing if the systems are affordable and
can be integrated into long-term solutions.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-153
     TITLE:  Combat Identification Systems: Changes Needed in Management 
             Plans and Structure
      DATE:  09/14/95
   SUBJECT:  Defense contingency planning
             Warning systems
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Military aircraft
             Army procurement
             Navy procurement
             Systems compatibility
             Accident prevention
             Ground warfare
             Air warfare
IDENTIFIER:  Desert Storm
             DOD Operation Provide Comfort
             FAA Mode S Surveillance System
             Mark XII Identification System
             
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO        *
* report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles,       *
* headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are           *
* identified by double and single lines.  The numbers on the right end   *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the page       *
* numbers of the printed product.                                        *
*                                                                        *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure    *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble     *
* those in the printed version.                                          *
*                                                                        *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document    *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your        *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015,             *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time.                                    *
**************************************************************************


Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

September 1995

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS -
CHANGES NEEDED IN MANAGEMENT PLANS
AND STRUCTURE

GAO/NSIAD-95-153

Combat Identification Systems

(707055)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ACTD -
  ASD/C3I -
  BCI -
  BCIS -
  CAI -
  COEA -
  DOD -
  EMD -
  IFF -
  OSD -
  Q&A -

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260443

September 14, 1995

Congressional Committees

The military services are pursuing a number of solutions that should
help reduce the occurrence of friendly fire incidents.  One class of
systems being pursued under Army and Navy led efforts are cooperative
identification of friend or foe (IFF) question and answer (Q&A)
systems.  Because the services are approaching major decision points
in the acquisition process for these systems, we reviewed their
management plans and structures for cooperative IFF Q&A systems
development and integration.  We conducted this review under our
basic legislative responsibilities and are addressing this report to
you because we believe it will be of interest to your committees. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Army and the Navy have been pursuing cooperative IFF Q&A systems
to help combat the problem of fratricide without having developed a
cohesive management plan and structure.  These systems could cost
more than $4 billion.  Currently, responsibility for the development
of these systems is divided between the Army and the Navy.  The two
services have been pursuing systems based on different technologies
without fully considering how and at what cost those systems will be
integrated.  For example, the Navy has developed a cost and
operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for air-to-air and
ground-to-air systems, while the Army is just beginning to develop a
COEA that will help determine what ground-to-ground and air-to-ground
system(s) to pursue.  The development of separate COEAs risks the
development and procurement of systems that cannot be integrated, or
at least cost effectively integrated, and may result in having to
field two or more cooperative IFF Q&A systems on the same equipment. 
Moreover, it should be noted that a cooperative IFF Q&A system only
enables the identification of friends having compatible and operating
cooperative IFF Q&A systems. 

In our prior report\1 on combat identification, we noted that the
Army planned to begin production of its near-term millimeter wave
cooperative identification system without an analysis of whether the
system could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). 
At that time, we recommended that the Army not begin production of
the near-term system until it had determined that the system could be
integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s).  The Department
of Defense (DOD) agreed that the integration of the near-term
battlefield combat identification system into the long-term approach
is an important consideration in deciding on the production of the
near-term system.  However, we recently learned that the Army plans
to acquire more near-term systems than needed for a demonstration
that is to be the basis for the near-term system production decision
without the analysis recommended in our prior report.  The Army plans
to acquire an additional 115 near-term systems at a cost of about
$23.4 million.  Army officials informed us that only 45 of the
additional
115 systems are required for them to accomplish their goals for that
demonstration. 

DOD and the Army are concerned about the affordability and
cost-effectiveness of the near-term system, and it may never be fully
fielded for these reasons.  The Army's plan to acquire more near-term
systems than necessary to reach a production decision and without a
determination of whether the near-term system can be cost effectively
integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s) or whether they
will be affordable for large-scale fielding risks wasting millions of
dollars on a system that may never be procured. 


--------------------
\1 Minimizing Friendly Fire:  The Army Should Consider Long-Term
Solution in Its Procurement Decision on Near-Term Needs
(GAO/NSIAD-94-19, October 22, 1993). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The friendly fire casualties and equipment losses suffered during
Operation Desert Storm reilluminated an old problem, fratricide, and
underscored the need for more effective means of identifying friendly
and hostile forces, and neutrals and noncombatants on the battlefield
(i.e., combat identification).  Studies and incidents subsequent to
Operation Desert Storm, such as the friendly forces shootdown of two
Blackhawk helicopters over Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort,
have reiterated the need for improved combat identification. 

Combat identification has been defined as "the means to positively
identify friendly, hostile and neutral platforms in order to reduce
fratricide due to mis-identification and to maximize the effective
use of weapon systems." The services are pursuing a number of
solutions\2 to provide combat identification.  They believe the
solution will involve a "system of systems," one component of which
will be cooperative IFF Q&A systems. 

In March 1992, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved a
mission need statement for combat identification.  That mission need
statement requires positive, timely, and reliable identification of
hostiles, friendlies, and neutrals; classification of foes by
platform, class/type, and nationality; interoperability between
services;\3 and interoperability with minimum civil air traffic
control system requirements.\4 It states that the primary constraint
is affordability. 

A cooperative IFF Q&A identification is accomplished when a
shooter/observer queries a target and the target answers with a reply
identifying itself as a friend.  A Defense Acquisition Board review
conducted on August 14, 1992, and subsequent approval from the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, gave (1) the Army the lead in
battlefield combat identification (BCI) efforts, including
cooperative systems for ground-to-ground and air-to-ground
identification, and (2) the Navy the lead for air-to-air and
ground-to-air cooperative identification systems.  The Navy was
charged with coordinating these efforts.  Figures 1 and 2 depict the
current breakdown of responsibility for cooperative IFF Q&A systems
development. 

   Figure 1:  Army Area of
   Responsibility for Cooperative
   IFF Q&A Development

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 2:  Navy Area of
   Responsibility for Cooperative
   IFF Q&A Development

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\2 The services are pursuing both materiel and nonmateriel solutions
to help prevent fratricide.  The materiel solutions include
cooperative and noncooperative target identification systems of
various types and systems to provide knowledge of the location of
friendly, enemy, and neutral forces.  The nonmateriel solutions
include changes in training, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
The services' cooperative IFF Q&A development efforts are, thus, a
small part of a larger effort to combat the problem of fratricide. 

\3 Interoperability with allies is not a requirement but is desired. 

\4 The United States and Europe are moving to adopt a new civil air
traffic control signal, Mode S.  The services' current Mark XII IFF
systems do not have Mode S capability.  Since military aircraft must
operate in civilian controlled airspace, the military will have to
adopt some Mode S capability or face restricted airspace in peace
time. 


      ARMY'S EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.1

To enhance force warfighting capability and minimize fratricide in
the future, the Army has been pursuing a BCI\5 program to improve
situational awareness and provide immediate, positive target
identification.  In 1991, the Army started implementing a five-phased
program to develop and field battlefield identification techniques
through fiscal year 2000.  The Army is actively into the third
phase\6 of the program, the near-term phase, whose objective is to
integrate a battlefield combat identification system (BCIS) into
selected ground vehicles and helicopters.  A millimeter wave
cooperative IFF Q&A system was selected for BCIS as the near-term
technology. 

The near-term cooperative IFF Q&A system is currently in engineering
and manufacturing development (EMD).  The Army is acquiring 45 EMD
models and is planning to acquire another 115 in fiscal year 1996 to
be demonstrated during the fiscal year 1997 digitized brigade
experiment known as Task Force XXI.  The Army currently estimates the
cost of providing the near-term BCIS to 6,400 selected platforms of
Force
Package I\7 at between $250 million and $300 million.  The ultimate
cost of BCIS would be substantially higher if all Army divisions were
to be equipped. 

The Army is just beginning the mid- and long-term phases of its BCI
efforts with the development of a COEA to identify affordable and
promising alternatives.  The objectives of the mid- and long-term
phases are to integrate situational awareness and target
identification and to have an automated correlation and display of
situational awareness and target identification information.  The
mid- and long-term cooperative IFF Q&A system may be different than
the near-term technology. 


--------------------
\5 The Army determined that the term "combat identification" would
encompass all antifratricide measures and would address situational
awareness and immediate, positive combat target identification
capabilities.  Situational awareness is knowledge of the tactical
environment, that is, knowledge of where friendly, enemy, and neutral
forces are located.  Combat identification is a subset of and
complement to situational awareness.  Each can enhance the
effectiveness of the other, and both contribute to avoiding
fratricide and improving combat effectiveness. 

\6 The first two phases of the Army's BCI program were (1) quick fix
and (2) quick-fix plus.  The quick-fix phase included the development
and production of various infrared identification systems.  The
quick-fix plus phase includes the development and production of
positive navigation systems and the integration of global positioning
systems to enhance situational awareness as well as further
developments in thermal identification systems. 

\7 Force Package I contains 5-1/3 divisions.  The Army currently has
a total of 12 active divisions.  There are an additional eight
National Guard divisions.  Current plans are for the Army to reduce
to 10 active and 5 National Guard divisions by fiscal year 1999. 


      NAVY'S EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.2

As the lead for cooperative aircraft identification development, the
Navy has been working on its Cooperative Aircraft Identification
(CAI) effort to address deficiencies in the currently used aircraft
identification system, Mark XII.  The CAI effort is to provide a
system to replace or upgrade the Mark XII system for use in
air-to-air and ground-to-air identification.  Navy officials have
estimated that a Mark XII follow-on system could cost more than $3.5
billion. 

In addition to providing reliable, secure identification of friends,
any Mark XII follow-on system will have to ensure future civil
aviation air traffic control compatibility.  Mode S is a civil
aviation air traffic control capability started by the United States
and now planned for international use.  Eurocontrol, the European
aviation authority, has mandated Mode S usage by January 1, 1999. 
Mark XII transponders, however, do not currently incorporate Mode S. 
Without this capability, U.S.  military aircraft may face delays in
the use of civil airspace or may even be excluded from certain
regions during peacetime. 

In June 1994, the Naval Research Laboratory completed and published a
draft COEA for the CAI effort.  That COEA was not approved because
some Navy officials believe it did not consider subsequently proposed
alternatives that should be considered.  Additionally, the Navy
provided only about half of the funding required for fiscal years
1996 and 1997 to accomplish a 1997 scheduled decision on whether to
move the CAI effort forward to the next phase of the acquisition
process--demonstration and validation. 


   COHESIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND
   STRUCTURE NEEDED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The services' current management plan and structure for cooperative
IFF Q&A systems, which reflect the division of responsibility between
the Army and the Navy, lack needed cohesiveness.  While the Army and
the Navy have worked to coordinate their efforts, the separation of
responsibility between the two services may result in the selection
of suboptimal solutions, unnecessary program delays, and the
acquisition of systems that may not be interoperable across the
services. 

The services defined the management structure for their efforts to
combat fratricide in a December 1992 memorandum of agreement on
combat identification.  In its capacity as lead for the services'
cooperative IFF Q&A systems development, the Navy led the development
of the management section of DOD's September 1993 Joint Master Plan
for Cooperative Aircraft and Battlefield Combat Identification.  The
plan provides a management approach that is intended to coordinate
cooperative identification requirements development and management
mechanisms to ensure development, procurement, and integration of
interoperable surface and air identification systems. 

As shown in figure 3, the management structure identified in the plan
uses the organizations defined in the services' memorandum of
agreement on combat identification. 

   Figure 3:  Current Cooperative
   IFF Q&A Development Management
   Structure

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  DOD. 

The principal coordinating bodies identified in the plan are the
General Officers' Steering Committee for Combat Identification, the
Joint Combat Identification Office, the Service Acquisition Executive
Council, and the Senior Advisory Group.  The General Officers'
Steering Committee for Combat Identification provides senior level
review and coordination of all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps combat identification requirements, development and procurement
efforts, product improvements, and related technologies.  The Joint
Combat Identification Office provides action officer level
coordination and functions as the primary information center for all
combat identification issues, programs, requirements, and
technologies.  The Senior Acquisition Executive Council was
established to provide the highest level of service coordination,
while the Senior Advisory Group is to provide program manager level
coordination. 


      SUBOPTIMAL SOLUTIONS,
      DELAYS, AND INTEROPERABILITY
      RISKED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The separation of responsibility for the development of cooperative
IFF Q&A systems between the Army and the Navy is not conducive to
looking for and finding common technological solutions.  For example,
a DOD official informed us that a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ally has demonstrated a laser interrogation and D-band\8 response
system for ground-to-ground identification.  Since the Mark XII
system operates in the D-band,\9 the adoption of a D-band
ground-to-ground system, if feasible, could be a cost-effective
solution providing interoperability among the services.  The Army,
however, has not considered that D-band system or one like it for
ground-to-ground identification. 

Even absent the identification of a common technology, the current
management plan and structure have allowed the services to pursue
systems without fully considering how and if those systems can cost
effectively be made interoperable.  For example, the Navy's COEA
could not fully consider the equipment that would be needed to unify
the Army's mid- and long-term approach with the Navy's CAI system
because that approach has not been defined.  Since a Mark XII
follow-on wave form has not been identified for CAI, the Army will
have similar difficulties. 

While the Army and the Navy have worked to coordinate their efforts,
the current management structure and plan perpetuate the stovepipe
development of cooperative IFF Q&A systems.  In commenting on an
earlier draft of the management plan, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition stated ".  .  .  I am concerned that the `stovepipe'
management scheme shown .  .  .  will not enable possible equipment
interoperability and commonality to be realized between aircraft and
battlefield systems." A Navy official informed us that the plan's
developers added the Senior Acquisition Executive Council and Joint
Senior Advisory Group to the plan's organizational chart to address
this criticism.  However, these organizations were already defined in
the draft plan because they were included in the services' memorandum
of agreement on combat identification.  Furthermore, the delays in
developing a new air-to-air and ground-to-air cooperative IFF Q&A
system combined with the recent Army start of its mid- and long-term
efforts provide an opportunity to address the Under Secretary's
concerns through joint management of the Army's and Navy's efforts. 

The current management structure also risks unnecessary delays in the
development and fielding of a set of systems planned to help prevent
future fratricide by allowing the services to prioritize their
efforts differently.  For example, while DOD has made development of
combat identification systems a high priority, the Navy, through its
funding process, did not make CAI a high priority.  Given the high
priority DOD places on combat identification, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) proposed an Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) funding line for the CAI effort to (1) pursue the
planned course of development or (2) alternatively use an advanced
concepts and technology demonstration (ACTD)\10 to accelerate it. 

OSD decided not to proceed with the Program Objective Memorandum
proposed strategy.  Instead, OSD adopted the position that the
existing
Mark XII system satisfies the services' current air-to-air and
ground-to-air cooperative IFF Q&A system requirements.  Its current
strategy is an evolutionary upgrade of Mark XII equipment to provide
improved reliability and maintainability and greater upgradeability,
while over the next couple of years defining, under a continued
Navy-led effort, in coordination with our allies, what a Mark XII
follow-on wave form might look like.  The upgradeability of the new
Mark XII system would allow for the addition of Mode S capability and
implementation of the Mark XII follow-on wave form, should the
services later decide that the current wave form no longer satisfies
their requirements. 

If the Program Objective Memorandum proposal had been adopted, it
would have alleviated any risk of delay in Mark XII efforts due to
low prioritization.  However, it would not have corrected the
stovepipe nature of the management structure and plan. 

Even given OSD funding of the Mark XII effort, the continued division
of development under the current management plan and structure would
allow the Army's and the Navy's efforts to continue unsynchronized. 
The Navy's initial time lead in development resulted in the Navy and
Army programs being unsynchronized.  The current delays in defining a
Mark XII follow-on wave form, however, provides an opportunity for a
jointly managed effort.  The original Navy time lead is what led to
(1) the Navy's uncertainty about likely mid- and long-term ground
identification systems and (2) the Navy's inability to consider in
its COEA the equipment necessary to obtain interoperability with
those ground identification systems.  Schedule changes in separate
efforts could again result in difficulties obtaining full
consideration of interoperability issues.  Separate service efforts
risk delays in the development and fielding of cooperative IFF Q&A
systems due to time and resource expenditures to obtain
"after-the-fact" interoperability, if required.  Additionally, a dual
management structure means dual funding of dual efforts when a single
management structure and funding source could provide efficiencies
resulting in not only monetary savings but also faster development
and earlier fieldings. 


--------------------
\8 D-band comprises the radio frequency range of 1 to 2 gigahertz. 

\9 Specifically, the Mark XII system queries at a frequency of 1.03
gigahertz and answers at a frequency of 1.09 gigahertz. 

\10 In general, an ACTD is to demonstrate "novel" yet relatively
mature technologies through the placement of prototype equipment with
an active military unit(s) of one or more of the services.  The
prototypes are evaluated by the service(s) during operation level
exercises.  The ACTD evaluation is then to be used in deciding
whether to procure the technology. 


      PROPOSED FUNDING ACTION IS
      STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

The ASD/C3I proposal that an OSD program line be created and funded
to ensure cooperative aircraft IFF continuity also provided for the
demonstration and validation or an ACTD of an armor identification
capability using the upgraded aircraft IFF signal format.  The
ASD/C3I proposal noted that a COEA on alternatives to the Mark XII
system,

     ".  .  .  has been completed, and alternatives for improving the
     system and applying it to armor identification were to be
     considered at a CAI Milestone I review originally planned for
     the fall of 1993.  However, the Services do not place a high
     priority on upgrading the Mark XII or on defining and
     demonstrating an integrated aircraft/armor identification
     system, and they have yet to schedule the review."

We believe ASD/C3I's proposed action was a step in the right
direction and that a single funding line for both the Navy's CAI
effort and the Army's BCI program would help ensure coordinated
aircraft and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems development.  While
ASD/C3I's proposed action would have alleviated some of the
unnecessary risk currently associated with the services' management
structure and plan, it would not have corrected the stovepipe nature
of that structure and plan.  We believe, therefore, that, in addition
to having a single funding line, those efforts should be managed
under a structure similar to that recommended by DOD's Acquisition
Reform Process Action Team\11 in its recent report\12 on
reengineering the acquisition process. 

The Process Action Team recommended that a trial management structure
be tested on selected programs for which either a joint requirement
exists or there is a need for substantial integration among the
components.  Specifically, the team recommended that the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) be
designated as a Joint Acquisition Executive and be delegated
oversight, review, and budgeting/programming responsibility for those
selected programs.  The team noted that

     "the creation of a Joint Acquisition Executive permits the DOD
     to directly address the long-standing problems encountered by
     joint programs.  Issues of agreement on requirements, dictated
     marriages and shifting priorities are avoided by having the
     programs placed under a purple-suited decision maker who has
     fiscal resource management authority.  No single Component will
     be able to optimize system performance at the expense of other
     users .  .  .  ."

The team stated that the advantages of such a management structure
included reduction of program redundancy, promotion of commonality
across the services, and stabilization of funding by removing funds
from the vagaries of each service's priorities.  We believe that the
adoption of the proposed management structure outlined by the team
could help ensure the development of a cost-effective, integrated
combat identification solution(s) while maintaining appropriate OSD
oversight. 


--------------------
\11 The Secretary of Defense chartered this team to develop ".  .  . 
a comprehensive plan to reengineer the oversight review process for
systems acquisition, in both the Components and OSD, to make it more
effective and efficient, while maintaining an appropriate level of
oversight."

\12 Reengineering the Acquisition Oversight and Review Process, Vol. 
2, Implementation Plan, a report by the DOD Acquisition Reform
Process Action Team, Dec.  9, 1994. 


   JOINT COEA NEEDED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Army's and the Navy's development of separate COEAs for their
respective BCI and CAI efforts risks the selection and development of
systems that may not represent the most cost and operationally
effective solution(s).  The division of responsibility for
cooperative IFF Q&A systems development between the Army and the Navy
raises interoperability issues.  Ground and air platforms that
represent threats to each other and that are provided cooperative IFF
Q&A systems based on different technologies will either have to field
dual systems or systems that have been made interoperable or will
remain at risk of fratricide from each other.  COEAs that do not
fully consider the desirability of interoperability, the way to
obtain it, and its cost risk suboptimal solutions. 

In providing guidance on COEAs, DOD Instruction 5000.2 notes that
"individual systems generally cannot be evaluated in isolation." It
goes on to state that ".  .  .  the analysis must consider all
relevant systems and the synergisms, such as interoperability, and
potential difficulties they collectively represent on the
battlefield." The development of separate COEAs for IFF Q&A systems
has not allowed and may not allow proper consideration of the
interoperability issue and thus risks the selection of a suboptimal
solution(s).  A DOD official expressed concern about this risk when
commenting on the plan to perform separate COEAs for the BCI and CAI
efforts during the first meeting of the Combat Identification COEA
Oversight Group that OSD established to periodically review the two
COEA efforts.  Additionally, Naval Research Laboratory officials who
conducted the CAI COEA stated that because the Army's selected
near-term technology differed so dramatically from their
expectations, the BCIS initially envisioned in their CAI COEA was
made irrelevant by the Army selection.  Without an approved Mark XII
follow-on wave form identified, the Army will face the same
difficulty addressing interoperability in its currently started BCI
COEA effort.  The performance of a joint COEA now, giving due
consideration to the interoperability issue, will help assure the
selection and development of the most cost and operationally
effective solution(s). 

The recent delays in the Navy's efforts combined with the Army's
recent start of its mid- and long-term BCI COEA provide an
opportunity to develop a joint COEA for combat identification.  A DOD
official stated that an agreement with the allies on a Mark XII
follow-on wave form should be accomplished within 2 years.  The
current Army schedule calls for the mid- and long-term COEA to be
completed in fiscal year 1997, which provides time for a joint COEA
effort to consider the new wave form being discussed with U.S. 
allies, expand the Navy's COEA to consider subsequently proposed
solutions, and merge the work with the Army's COEA efforts.  A joint
COEA would ensure that DOD and the services have a joint analysis
that will help to select systems representing the most cost and
operationally effective integrated solution. 


   ARMY ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL
   SYSTEMS RISKS WASTING MILLIONS
   OF DOLLARS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The Army continues to invest in its near-term millimeter wave
cooperative system when there is no discernible indication whether
this system can or should be integrated into mid- and long-term
solution(s).  Without a completed COEA for BCI, there is no way to
tell whether the near-term system should be or will be a part of the
mid- and long-term solution(s).  Furthermore, the Army may never
choose to make large scale fieldings of the near-term system due to
affordability. 

In our prior report on combat identification, we noted that the Army
planned to begin procuring the near-term millimeter wave cooperative
identification system without an analysis of whether the near-term
system could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). 
At that time, we recommended that the Army not begin procurement of
the systems until it had determined whether the near-term systems
could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s).  DOD
agreed that the integration of the near-term BCIS into the long-term
approach is an important consideration in deciding on the production
of the near-term system.  Nevertheless, the Army now plans to acquire
more near-term systems than are necessary to reach a production
decision without the analysis we suggested. 

Our current evaluation showed that the Army plans to use $5 million
in fiscal year 1995 funds and has requested about $18.4 million of
fiscal year 1996 funds to acquire 115 additional near-term systems
beyond the 45 in its current EMD contract.  The Army intends to use
these units, in combination with 25 refurbished EMD units, in the
testing of the digitized battlefield concept.  However, the Army did
not develop a specific analysis to support the need to demonstrate
140 BCISs during the digitized brigade experiment.  Rather, Army
officials stated that the goal of the near-term BCIS demonstration
was to sell individual soldiers on the system and provide higher
level Army officials with an understanding of its operational
effectiveness.  They noted that the more soldiers supporting the
acquisition of the system the better.  This formed the basis for
their "the more, the better" rationale.  Given funding and time
constraints, 115 systems are all "the more" that can be acquired. 
The Army has already awarded a contract option to obtain 45 of the
additional 115 systems and expects to award a second option at a cost
of about $15.2 million for the remaining systems in July 1995.  When
questioned about the impact of limiting the demonstration to 70
systems (i.e., those already on hand or on contract), Army program
officials stated that they could accomplish their goals for the
demonstration with 70 systems. 

There are concerns within DOD and the Army over the affordability and
cost-effectiveness of the near-term system, and it may never be
fielded for these reasons.  The selection of a cooperative technology
to pursue in the mid- and long-term will be determined in part by the
Army's mid- and long-term COEA, an effort that has just started. 
Until a mid- and long-term cooperative technology is selected, the
continued acquisition of the near-term system risks wasting millions
of dollars on a system that may not be able to be integrated into the
mid- and long-term solution(s).  Furthermore, acquiring more systems
to demonstrate during the Task Force XXI exercise than is necessary
to accomplish the goals of that demonstration also risks millions of
dollars. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) create a single OSD
funding line for the Army's BCI and Navy's CAI efforts, (2) direct
the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop and institute a
cohesive management structure and plan in line with the Process
Action Team's recommendation, and (3) direct the Secretaries of the
Army and the Navy to develop a joint COEA for their BCI and CAI
efforts giving due consideration to the problem and costs of
obtaining systems' interoperability. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to (1) use the 70 near-term systems on hand or currently
under contract for the Task Force XXI digitized brigade experiment
and (2) not acquire more near-term systems than necessary until the
Army determines the near-term technology is affordable and will be
fielded and whether, if determined desirable, it can be integrated
into the mid- and long-term combat identification and aircraft
solution(s). 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that the
requirements for aircraft and battlefield identification should not
be addressed in isolation.  It stated that this was one of the
reasons they formed a Combat Identification Task Force in October
1994.  DOD stated that the task force was created to consider the
overall architectural framework for combat identification and within
that architecture, the techniques and programmatic plans for
battlefield identification and for the Mark XII identification
system.  DOD also stated that management actions are being taken that
reflect the results of the task force, and that address the concerns
described in our report.  Specifically, DOD stated that a joint COEA
on battlefield identification is being organized, and technology
demonstrations that will be an important element of the evaluation
will be guided and partially funded by OSD. 

DOD did not agree that Army's plan to acquire 140 near-term systems
for the Task Force XXI digitized brigade experiment risked wasting
millions of dollars.  In discussing Army officials' comments made to
us that they could accomplish their goals for the experiment with 70
near-term systems, DOD stated that the adequacy of 70 systems was
judged in the context of a contingency plan, should 140 systems not
be available.  It also stated that the acquisition of more units
would result not only in more operational experience and more data
but also in a greater capability left with the forces.  DOD partially
agreed with our recommendation that the Army be directed to not
acquire more near-term systems prior to a determination that the
near-term system is affordable and will be fielded and whether it can
be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s).  DOD noted
that although the integration of the near-term system into the
long-term solution is an important consideration, it may be prudent
to produce the near-term system even if it is not part of the
long-term architecture and noted that it was concerned that, without
a near-term system, U.S.  forces may face a period of 10 years or
more with no substantial improvement in their ability to identify
combat vehicles. 

While DOD, in forming its Combat Identification Task Force, may have
been motivated by many of the same concerns expressed in our report,
it does not appear that the task force's final product will address
the issues identified in our report.  Specifically, based on
briefings we have received on the task force's efforts, the task
force's final product will not (1) address needed management changes
to provide cohesiveness in the services' cooperative identification
development efforts; (2) dictate a joint, single COEA for those
efforts; and (3) address the Army's plan to acquire more near-term
systems than are required for the Army to reach a production
decision.  Furthermore, while the task force has developed an overall
architectural framework for combat identification, it does not appear
to provide the management structure and plans needed to assure a
cohesive effort to obtain the goals of that architecture.  The
architecture provides direction to the services.  However, in the
past, DOD has provided direction to the services that was
subsequently ignored.  For example, as we noted earlier, while DOD
has placed a high priority on combat identification efforts, the Navy
did not place a high priority on its CAI effort and underfunded it. 

Regarding the Army's plan to acquire more near-term systems than are
necessary to accomplish the Army's goals for the Task Force XXI
experiment, the DOD's comment indicates that 70 systems are adequate
for conducting the experiment if 140 systems are not available. 
Since the Army has not yet made a procurement decision for the
near-term BCIS, the expenditure of $15.2 million to acquire 70
systems beyond the 70 necessary to accomplish the goals for the
demonstration risks millions of dollars on a system that may never be
fielded.  If the Army can accomplish its goals for the demonstration
with 70 systems, as Army officials have repeatedly informed us, then
only 70 systems are needed.  Furthermore, the Army did not produce
and does not have an analysis to support a requirement to demonstrate
140 BCIS units.  There is no debating that more units will provide
more operational experience and data.  This, however, should not be
the basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to accomplish
the goals of the demonstration.  DOD's comment stating that it might
be prudent to produce the near-term system even if it is not a part
of the long-term architecture is not debated, and our recommendation
would not prevent the Army from fielding any system for 10 years.  We
simply believe it would be prudent for the Army to make its
production decision for the near-term system taking into
consideration its decision for its mid- and long-term solution(s). 
Such a determination should be possible once the BCI COEA is
completed.  Since that COEA is currently scheduled to be completed in
fiscal year 1997 and the BCIS production decision is currently
scheduled to occur in late fiscal year 1997 or early fiscal year
1998, our recommendation would not delay the fielding of the
near-term system.  DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix I, along with our evaluation. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

During this review, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents
in Washington, D.C., at the offices of the ASD/C3I; the DOD Joint
Combat Identification Office; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition; the U.S.  Navy, Air Traffic
Control and Landing Systems Office; the U.S.  Navy, Office of the
Director of Navy Space Systems Division; the Naval Research
Laboratory; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.  We also reviewed
documentation issued from the offices of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office
of Technology Assessment.  We visited, received, and analyzed
information from the U.S.  Army Communications and Electronics
Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the U.S.  Army Training and
Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; the U.S.  Army Armor Center
and School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; the U.S.  Army Aviation Center, Fort
Rucker, Alabama; and the Headquarters of the U.S.  Marines Corps'
Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. 

In addition, we visited and received briefings on the Air Force's
Combat Identification Integration Management Team from Air Force
personnel at the Directorate of Special Projects, Electronic Systems
Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.  We also visited and
received briefings on the OSD sponsored Joint Air Defense
Operation/Joint Engagement Zone exercises from service personnel at
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. 

We conducted this review from August 1994 to July 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Navy.  We
will also make copies available to other interested parties upon
request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
were William L.  Wright, Bruce H.  Thomas, and Peris Cassorla. 

Louis J.  Rodrigues
Director, Systems Development
 and Production Issues

List of Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn, Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye, Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable William V.  Roth, Jr., Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn, Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence, Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums, Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W.  Bill Young, Chairman
The Honorable John P.  Murtha, Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K.  Dornan, Chairman
The Honorable Owen B.  Pickett, Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 3. 

See comments 1 and 4. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  7, p.  10,
and pp.  11-12. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comments 1 and 5. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 9. 

See comment 10. 

See comment 11. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on pp.  12-13. 

See comment 12. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on pp.  14-15. 

See comment 13. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 14. 

Now on p.  15. 

See comment 15. 

See comment 7. 

Now on p.  15. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 16. 

See comment 9. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 17. 

Now on p.  15. 

See comment 12. 

Now on p.  15. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comments 13, 14, and 18. 

Now on p.  15. 

See comments 13, 14, and 18. 

See comment 19. 

See comment 20. 

See comment 21. 



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated July 6, 1995. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

1.  We appreciate that DOD shares our concern that the requirements
for aircraft and battlefield identification should not be addressed
in isolation.  While this was one of the reasons the Combat
Identification Task Force was formed, and we believe the task force's
efforts were a step in the right direction, we do not believe the
task force adequately addressed our concerns regarding the
cohesiveness of the structures and plans created to manage the
services' aircraft and battlefield cooperative identification
efforts. 

2.  The management actions discussed represent a continuation of the
stovepipe management of the ground and air identification efforts
discussed in our report.  The Army-led development of a cost and
operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for battlefield
identification separate from the Navy-led similar analyses planned to
help define what a new air identification wave form might look like
perpetuates the stovepipe development scheme identified in our
report. 

3.  As explained in our report, we focussed our evaluation on the
services' cooperative identification of friend or foe (IFF) question
and answer (Q&A) system efforts because the services are approaching
major decision points in the acquisition process for those systems. 
To address DOD's concern, we have added information to the body of
our report indicating that the services' cooperative IFF Q&A system
development efforts are a part of a much broader array of efforts
that should help minimize friendly fire incidents. 

4.  At the time our draft report was written, we were aware of the
task force's efforts.  We determined that while those efforts may
have been motivated by many of the same concerns expressed in our
report, it did not appear that the task force was going to address
the issues related to our findings.  Based on more recent briefings
on the task force's outcome, it still does not appear that those
issues were addressed.  Specifically, based on the information we
have received in briefings on the task force's efforts, the task
force's final product will not (1) address needed management changes
to provide needed cohesiveness in the services' cooperative
identification development efforts; (2) dictate a joint, single COEA
for those efforts; and (3) address the Army's plan to acquire more
near-term systems than are needed to reach a production decision. 

5.  While the task force has developed an overall architectural
framework for combat identification, it does not appear to provide
the management structure needed to assure a cohesive effort to attain
the architecture's goals.  The architecture provides direction to the
services.  However, in the past, DOD has provided direction that was
subsequently ignored.  For example, as noted in our report, while DOD
has placed a high priority on combat identification efforts, the Navy
did not place a high priority on the Cooperative Aircraft
Identification (CAI) effort and underfunded it. 

6.  The management and funding arrangements being established do not
adequately address our concerns.  The joint advanced concepts
technology demonstration and advanced technology demonstrations
planned are to demonstrate candidate battlefield identification
systems, that is, ground-to-ground and air-to-ground solutions.  The
planned demonstrations are to focus on battlefield identification
solutions, not on battlefield and aircraft identification solutions
and their interoperability.  Furthermore, the planned demonstrations
will not address the underlying management structure's division of
responsibility between the Navy and the Army and the risks that are
associated with that division.  The continued use of the current
management plan and structure with its division of responsibility
between the Army and the Navy still risks the selection of suboptimal
solutions, unnecessary program delays, and the acquisition of systems
that may not be interoperable across the services. 

7.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) role as the top
level manager of these demonstrations and the funding of these
demonstrations under an OSD line do not adequately address our
concerns regarding the cohesiveness of the Army's and the Navy's
efforts and the need for truly joint management.  Under the current
DOD plan, that is, the joint demonstrations, the Army and the Navy
will continue to manage and fund separate developmental efforts for
their respective areas of responsibility.  Continued use of separate
funding lines for those efforts will continue to pose
interoperability risks and risks to the timely accomplishment of the
most cost and operationally effective solutions. 

8.  While the evolutionary nature of the upgrade process and the
reliance on commercial technology may or may not make centralized
funding desirable, the DOD's adopted strategy includes working with
U.S.  allies to define what a new wave form might look like.  The
services' new wave form definition efforts will be a joint effort
under a Navy lead, just as the Navy's original CAI effort was.  We
maintain our position that funding the services' new aircraft wave
form definition and ground identification efforts under a single
funding line would help ensure coordinated aircraft and ground
cooperative IFF Q&A systems' development. 

9.  As we indicated in our report, while the Army and the Navy have
worked to coordinate their efforts, the current management structure
and plan perpetuate the stovepipe development of cooperative IFF Q&A
systems.  As noted in our report, in commenting on an earlier draft
of the management plan for the cooperative IFF Q&A development
efforts, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition stated ".  . 
.  I am concerned that the 'stovepipe' management scheme shown .  . 
.  will not enable possible equipment interoperability and
commonality to be realized between aircraft and battlefield systems."
The General Officers' Steering Committee on Combat Identification,
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint Combat
Identification Office were all defined in the draft and final
management plans.  Despite these coordinating bodies, we agree with
the Under Secretary's assessment and believe the current management
structure continues to perpetuate that stovepipe management scheme. 

10.  We have added information on the role of the General Officers'
Steering Committee on Combat Identification to our report. 

11.  A prioritized list of identification initiatives with service
funding commitments did not prevent the Navy from placing a lower
priority on its CAI effort than DOD placed.  As we note in our
report, while DOD has made development of combat identification
systems a high priority, the Navy, through its funding process did
not make the CAI effort a high priority.  Again, a single OSD funding
line for both the Navy's new wave form and the Army's battlefield
combat identification system (BCIS) efforts would help ensure
coordinated aircraft and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems
development efforts and appropriate funding given DOD's
prioritization of those efforts. 

12.  While DOD's adopted Mark XII upgrade strategy has superseded the
Navy-led COEA, the continued research and development of air and
ground systems without performing a joint COEA still risks the
selection and development of systems that may not represent the most
cost and operationally effective solutions.  DOD's adopted strategy
for upgrading the Mark XII includes working with U.S.  allies to
define what a follow-on
Mark XII wave form might look like.  In providing oral comments on a
draft of this report, agency officials indicated that the new wave
form air identification effort would include cost and operational
effectiveness type analyses.  Those analyses should be done as a part
of a joint aircraft and ground identification COEA to ensure that the
most cost and operationally effective ground and air solutions are
selected giving due consideration to the interoperability issue. 

We recognize that commonality between air and ground identification
systems may or may not be attainable or desirable from a cost and
operational effectiveness standpoint.  In fact, a joint COEA may
support the use of different technologies for air and ground systems. 
The performance of a joint COEA, however, will not only help ensure
the consideration of technological commonality between air and ground
solutions but also the cost and operational effectiveness of
solutions to provide interoperability between differing air and
ground solutions.  Because the Navy-led joint service new wave form
air identification effort is to develop cost and operational
effectiveness type analyses and the Army-led joint service ground
identification effort is developing a formal COEA, it appears that
minimal adjustment would be required to combine the two efforts to
obtain a joint COEA ensuring due consideration of the
interoperability issue.  In addition, the final product of a joint
COEA would present a service-wide, unified vision of the air and
ground solution(s) to be pursued and the means, if determined
attainable and desirable, by which air and ground interoperability
will be obtained. 

13.  DOD's comment indicates that 70 systems are adequate for
conducting the demonstration if 140 systems are not available.  Since
the Army has yet to determine whether it will procure the near-term
BCIS, the expenditure of $15.2 million to acquire 70 systems beyond
the 70 systems necessary to accomplish the goals for the
demonstration risks millions of dollars on a system that may never be
fielded. 

14.  At issue here is not whether the demonstration of more systems
will have value, but rather the value of what is gained against the
cost and the risk that the Army may never procure and field the BCIS. 
The Army did not produce and does not have an analysis to support a
requirement to demonstrate 140 BCIS units.  If the Army can
accomplish its goals for the demonstration with 70 systems, as Army
officials have repeatedly informed us, then only 70 systems are
needed.  There is no debating that more units will provide more
operational experience and data.  This, however, should not be the
basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to accomplish the
goals of the demonstration. 

Army correspondence obtained during our evaluation states that this
demonstration ".  .  .  is going to be the decision making exercise
to decide whether to purchase .  .  .  ." Clearly, a procurement
decision is yet to be made.  If the Army subsequently decides against
procuring the BCIS, what value do the additional 70 systems then have
and what is the value of the greater capability left with the forces. 
As we noted in our prior report on the Army's combat identification
efforts, vehicle deployments in Operation Desert Storm included 2,300
M1A1 Abrams tanks, 2,200 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 20,000 High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, over 4,400 Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Trucks, over 29,000 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, and
several thousand other wheeled vehicles.  We do not believe, in view
of the number of vehicles fielded, that the additional capability
that would be left with the forces by the acquisition of 140 systems
versus 70 systems is great enough to warrant the expenditure of an
additional $15.2 million before a production decision is made. 

15.  DOD misinterpreted our recommendation.  In line with Finding A,
as reported by DOD, we believe the Army battlefield combat
identification (BCI) and the Navy new wave form efforts should be
managed under a single OSD funding line.  We have rephrased our
recommendation to clarify its scope. 

16.  We believe that it would be more accurate to state that the
Under Secretary's memorandum overruled the Process Action Team's
recommendation.  Regardless, the Under Secretary's memorandum still
allows for joint program management and oversight.  DOD's response to
the team's recommendation recognizes that the current joint program
management structure has problems but fails to offer solutions and
merely creates another panel to consider the issue.  We believe that
the team's recommendation should be tested, as it recommended.  We
believe a joint Army combat identification and a Navy new wave form
aircraft identification effort would be an excellent candidate for
testing the team's recommendation. 

17.  The coordination among the services of the DOD's adopted Mark
XII strategy does not alleviate the stovepipe nature of the
management structure represented in the continued division of the air
and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems development efforts between
the Army and the Navy. 

18.  DOD's response to our recommendation is at odds with its
response to Finding C and to comments made by Army officials.  In
response to our recommendation, DOD states that 70 systems are
inadequate to meet the equipment needs of the planned demonstrations. 
In response to Finding C, DOD states that 70 systems were adequate if
140 systems were not available.  Furthermore, Army program officials
stated that they could accomplish their goals for the Task Force XXI
demonstration with 70 systems.  It is further evident from Army
correspondence obtained during our evaluation that the Army's goals
for the demonstration can be accomplished with fewer than 140
systems.  In that correspondence, an Army official states

     "Believe it is imperative that during Force XXI we not only
     evaluate how well BCIS works but the total impact BCIS has on
     the way we operate.  Platforms are currently prioritized to give
     us the ability to look at this total impact even if we don't get
     the entire 140 systems we are currently planning for."

19.  We have clarified our recommendation in view of DOD's comments. 
We believe that the acquisition of near-term systems should be
limited to the minimum quantity required to complete any testing
needed to make a production decision.  Furthermore, the Army should
not be allowed to acquire more near-term systems than that limit
until a COEA based determination has been made that the near-term
system, if deemed desirable, can be integrated, that is, made
interoperable, with the mid- and long-term combat identification and
aircraft solutions. 

20.  We recognize that commonality between air and ground
identification systems may or may not be attainable or desirable from
a cost and operational effectiveness standpoint, just as
interoperability of differing air and ground systems may not be
determined attainable or desirable.  Nothing in our report dictates
commonality.  It does, however, argue that a joint COEA should be
completed to assess this issue before moving forward. 

21.  As we pointed out in our response to DOD in our prior report,
our recommendation will not prevent the Army's acquisition of the
near-term system and will not require the Army to wait until
long-term systems are fielded.  As stated in our prior report, we
believe it would be prudent for the Army to make its production
decision for the near-term system taking into consideration its
decision for its mid- and long-term solution(s).  Such a
determination should be possible once the BCI COEA is completed. 
Since that COEA is currently scheduled to be completed in fiscal year
1997 and the BCIS production decision is not scheduled to occur until
late fiscal
year 1997 or early fiscal year 1998, our recommendation would not
delay the fielding of the near-term system.  Our current
recommendation extends the recommendation in our prior report to
include a determination on interoperability with the new air
identification wave form being defined. 
