Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past
Mistakes is Largely Untapped (Chapter Report, 08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-152).
GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the military's lessons learned
programs in: (1) collecting all significant lessons learned information;
(2) analyzing the information to identify recurring weaknesses; (3)
disseminating the information to all potential users; and (4)
implementing corrective actions and validating results.
GAO found that the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Navy do not: (1)
include all significant information from training exercises and
operations in their lessons learned programs; and (2) analyze their
lessons learned information to identify trends in performance
weaknesses. In addition, GAO found that: (1) Marine Corps lessons
learned data continues to highlight recurring deficiencies during major
combined arms exercises in such areas as maneuver, fire support,
engineering, chemical threat, intelligence, communications, and
electronic countermeasures; (2) although the dissemination of lessons
learned information is adequate, the Air Force does not make its
information readily available to all potential users; (3) regardless of
the availability and widespread distribution of lessons learned
information, most services use this information on a limited basis
because they lack the training in how to access the databases; and (4)
the Army has made excellent use of trend analysis to develop a
corrective action plan to address the highest priority areas.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-152
TITLE: Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to
Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped
DATE: 08/01/95
SUBJECT: Military training
Operations analysis
Combat readiness
Information analysis operations
Information gathering operations
Military personnel
Military operations
Military forces
Data bases
IDENTIFIER: Florida
Somalia
DOD Operation Restore Hope
Persian Gulf War
DOD Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee
on National Security, House of Representatives
August 1995
MILITARY TRAINING - POTENTIAL TO
USE LESSONS LEARNED TO AVOID PAST
MISTAKES IS LARGELY UNTAPPED
GAO/NSIAD-95-152
Military Training
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CD-ROM - Compact Disk-Read Only
DOD - Department of Defense
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-261022
August 9, 1995
The Honorable Robert K. Dornan
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This report discusses lessons learned programs in the military
services and the Joint Staff. It discusses how well the services and
the Joint Staff collect, analyze, disseminate, and follow up on
lessons learned information from major training exercises and
operations. It contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
that are aimed at making better use of lessons learned information to
avoid past mistakes.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations,
Senate Committee on Armed Services, and House Committee on National
Security; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other
interested parties.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Military training exercises and operations provide an unparalleled
opportunity for the military services to assess the performance and
capabilities of their forces under realistic conditions. Moreover,
these experiences often result in lessons learned information, which
can identify and publicize recurring problems and be used to develop
corrective actions so that others can avoid repeating past mistakes.
Accordingly, GAO reviewed the lessons learned programs in the
military services and the Joint Staff to determine their
effectiveness in (1) collecting all significant lessons learned
information, (2) analyzing the information to identify recurring
weaknesses, (3) disseminating the information to all potential users,
and (4) implementing corrective actions and validating results.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Military forces train at combat training centers and have
participated in operations such as the Persian Gulf War, Hurricane
Andrew civil relief in Florida, and Operation Restore Hope in
Somalia. The principal training centers include (1) the Army's
combat training centers at Fort Irwin, California; Fort Polk,
Louisiana; and Hohenfels, Germany; (2) the Marine Corps' Air Ground
Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms, California; and (3) the Air
Force's Weapons and Tactics Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.
The Navy conducts major training exercises at the Naval Strike
Warfare Center in Fallon, Nevada, and during worldwide fleet
exercises. Joint military exercises are conducted at many worldwide
locations, including Germany, South Korea, Egypt, and Central
America.
Major training exercises enable combat units to train in an
environment that closely parallels that of actual warfare. The
exercises are monitored and documented by ground observers and with
electronic instrumentation, which allow the services to objectively
document units' performance. Information on the units' strengths and
weaknesses is recorded in after-action reports, which are the primary
source of information for the services' lessons learned programs.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Despite lessons learned programs in the military services and the
Joint Staff, units repeat many of the same mistakes during major
training exercises and operations. Some of these mistakes could
result in serious consequences, including friendly fire incidents and
ineffective delivery of bombs and missiles on target. As a result,
the services and the Joint Staff cannot be assured that significant
problems are being addressed or that resources are being used to
solve the most serious ones.
The programs have not achieved effective results for different
reasons.
The Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Navy do not include all
significant information from training exercises and operations
in their lessons learned programs.
The Joint Staff and all of the services, except the Army, do not
routinely analyze lessons learned information to identify trends
in performance weaknesses.
The Air Force does not ensure that lessons learned information
receives the widest possible distribution.
The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps do not ensure that
lessons learned information is being used to its fullest
potential.
The services and the regional commanders in chief have not
implemented adequate remedial action processes to follow up and
validate that problems have been corrected.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
ALL SIGNIFICANT LESSONS ARE
NOT COLLECTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Navy have not established
effective procedures to ensure that all significant information from
training exercises and operations is submitted to their lessons
learned programs. As a result, these programs are missing important
information that could be useful to others. For example, Marine
Corps lessons learned officials estimated that they had received less
than 50 percent of all after-action reports that documented the
results of major exercises. One of these lessons pertained to units
having difficulty conducting breaching operations, a critical
component of large-scale maneuver operations. In addition, summaries
of performance trends at the Air Ground Combat Center were not
included in the Marine Corps' lessons learned program.
In another example, lessons learned information developed by a large
Air Force composite wing was not submitted to its major command. One
of these lessons pertained to radar systems that identified friendly
aircraft as hostile. Similarly, reports of performance observations
that were recorded from after-action debriefings aboard ships were
not submitted to the Navy's lessons learned program.
LESSONS ARE NOT ROUTINELY
ANALYZED TO IDENTIFY
RECURRING DEFICIENCIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Joint Staff do not
analyze their lessons learned information to identify trends in
performance weaknesses. Accordingly, it is difficult for them to
differentiate the importance of correcting some deficiencies rather
than others. On the other hand, the Army does analyze lessons
learned information over time, which enables it to highlight the most
pressing problem areas and focus on the highest priority areas.
Moreover, it has recently made excellent use of trend analysis to
develop a corrective action plan to address friendly fire incidents
that occurred at its principal combat training center from 1990 to
1993. Since implementing the action plan, friendly fire incidents at
the training center have decreased over 50 percent.
Since lessons learned information is not routinely analyzed by the
other services and Joint Staff, they cannot be assured that
significant problems receive top-level management attention. As a
result, units continue to repeat many of the same mistakes during
training exercises and operations. For example, a recent Air Force
lessons learned report said that
"Almost every problem occurring during Operation Restore Hope
has already been documented in JULLS [Joint Universal Lessons
Learned System] as a result of previous exercises and
contingencies. There appears to be a continuing trend of
failure to fix problems already know [sic] to exist. We end up
paying again to achieve the same undesirable results."
Likewise, GAO found that Marine Corps lessons learned data continues
to highlight recurring deficiencies during major combined arms
exercises in such critical areas as maneuver, fire support,
engineering, chemical threat, intelligence, communications, and
electronic countermeasures. Joint exercise data also reveals
recurring weaknesses. For example, a 1991 Joint Staff lessons
learned report revealed a lack of training on the Joint Staff's
transportation planning system, which manages strategic air and sea
movements. Joint Staff officials stated that this problem had
occurred in almost every exercise since the early 1980s.
Although service and Joint Staff officials acknowledged that trend
information was not routinely analyzed to highlight recurring
problems, they said that officials in leadership positions gained an
awareness of the most significant problems through informal means
such as conferences, meetings, and exercise planning discussions. In
GAO's view, the informal approach has not worked well as recurring
problems have not been resolved.
SOME LESSONS LEARNED
INFORMATION IS NOT READILY
AVAILABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
For the most part, the dissemination of lessons learned information
is adequate. However, the Air Force does not make this information
readily available to all potential users, and Marine Corps and Navy
personnel lack training on how to use the lessons database. The Air
Force's decentralized lessons learned databases are maintained at
each major command's headquarters and therefore are not easily
accessible to units throughout the Air Force. Air Force units can
request information through the mail, but some units are not even
aware of the databases' existence. For example, one major Air Force
command maintained over 4,000 lessons in its database, yet in 1994 it
received only about 1 request for information per week from its
subordinate units.
Regardless of the availability and widespread distribution of lessons
learned information, most services have used this information on a
limited basis. The primary reason for not using the information is
the lack of training in how to access the databases. For example,
several Marine Corps representatives knew of no one in their unit who
had used the lessons learned database because of a lack of training
in how to use the database's technology. In another example, Navy
fleet operations personnel said that they seldom used lessons learned
information because their operating tempo was extremely high and they
lacked the skills needed to quickly access specific information.
FOLLOW-UP AND VALIDATION ARE
INSUFFICIENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
Effective follow-up and validation are important parts of a lessons
learned program, as they are the only means for ensuring that
problems have been corrected and are brought to closure. The Joint
Staff and all of the services have remedial action processes, but not
all have been effective in following up on corrective actions that
have been taken to address significant problems. The Marine Corps,
the Joint Staff, and one of the Air Force commands that GAO visited
seemed to have visibility over the status of corrective actions. The
Navy recently implemented its remedial action process but has not yet
used it to follow up on the status of corrective actions. The Army
is strengthening its follow-up process by establishing a separate
remedial action program to address training and doctrine deficiencies
that occur during major training exercises and operations. It
expects this program to start in September 1995.
The Air Force, the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Joint Staff all
have requirements to validate corrective actions (for example, test
the effectiveness of the actions so that deficiencies will not
recur), but not all of them have fully implemented procedures for
this purpose. The Navy does not have a validation requirement.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries
of the Air Force and the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the regional commanders in chief, as appropriate, to (1)
establish controls to ensure that all significant lessons learned
information collected from combat training centers, fleet exercises,
and other major training exercises are recorded in lessons learned
databases; (2) analyze lessons learned information so that trend data
can be developed to identify recurring problems; (3) provide training
to key personnel in the use of lessons learned information; and (4)
incorporate effective validation procedures, such as testing
corrective actions in joint training exercises, into lessons learned
programs.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
The Department of Defense (DOD) generally agreed with GAO's findings
and recommendations (see app. I). DOD said that many of GAO's
findings are attributable to the prioritization of limited resources
by the services and the Joint Staff but that they now have plans to
improve the capability of lessons learned systems. In response to
GAO's recommendations, DOD said that (1) collecting information that
documents performance at the combat training centers and during major
exercises could be useful to lessons learned system users, (2) the
Navy plans to begin a process to analyze and identify trends in
performance weaknesses, (3) the services plan to increase training
for system users to ensure better awareness and accessibility to
their lessons learned databases, and (4) the Navy and the Air Force
were taking actions to ensure validation efforts were effective. DOD
said that there are circumstances under which it is appropriate for
regional commanders in chief to use means other than testing to
validate solutions to deficiencies. Although GAO agrees with this
position, it found that commanders in chief seldom tested solutions
to problem areas in planned exercises. Consequently, the
effectiveness of collecting data on problem areas is reduced, which
could be a contributing reason for not resolving recurring
deficiencies. Accordingly, GAO has modified its recommendation to
stress the importance of testing.
DOD's specific comments and GAO's evaluation of them are discussed in
chapters 2 through 5.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The military services rely on major training exercises to assess
their units' strengths and weaknesses. These exercises generally
take place at combat training centers that often enable units to
train in an environment that closely parallels that of actual
warfare. The primary centers used for conducting major exercises
include (1) the Army's combat training centers at Fort Irwin,
California; Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Hohenfels, Germany; (2) the
Marine Corps' Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms,
California; and (3) the Air Force's Weapons and Tactics Center at
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The Navy conducts major training
exercises at the Naval Strike Warfare Center in Fallon, Nevada, and
during worldwide fleet operations. Joint military exercises are
conducted at many worldwide locations, including Germany, South
Korea, Egypt, and Central America.
The services use electronic instrumentation, observers, and subject
matter experts to monitor and record the results of the exercises so
that they can objectively document performance. Additional
information on the services' capabilities is obtained from the
results of actual military operations, such as Operation Desert
Storm.
The services document the results of military training exercises and
operations in after-action reports,\1 which include lessons learned
information. The units use such information in preparing for
operations and environments associated with their assigned combat
missions and in tailoring training for anticipated future missions
and events.
In addition, lessons learned information can help the services and
the Joint Staff identify recurring weaknesses in key areas. The
services and the Joint Staff can then publicize problem areas and
deficiency trends, allowing others to benefit from their experiences,
and institute corrective actions. According to senior military
leaders, weaknesses can be addressed through changes to such areas as
doctrine, training and education, tactics, leadership, and materiel.
Our prior work has revealed that the Army has not effectively used
lessons learned information to eliminate recurring deficiencies and
change doctrine, revise tactics, or develop improved training
strategies. In September 1993, we reported that, although the Army
was doing a good job of identifying lessons learned, it was not
achieving the maximum benefit from the lessons in terms of changed
doctrine or revised training practices because it lacked procedures
for prioritizing the lessons and for tracking necessary changes in
training and doctrine.\2 In July 1986, we reported that Army
assessments of exercise results identified many recurring
deficiencies, yet the Army had not developed a system to identify
causes of and solutions to problem areas.\3
--------------------
\1 After-action reports provide an official description of the
results of military training exercises and operations. A complete
after-action report includes (1) a summary of exercise objectives,
exercise limitations, and major participants and (2) a description of
successes or problems that were observed, including recommended
actions and additional comments. The after-action reports are
organized in a standardized electronic format, known as the Joint
Universal Lessons Learned System.
\2 Army Training: Prioritizing and Following Up on Lessons Learned
Should Minimize Recurring Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-93-231, Sept. 16,
1993).
\3 Army Training: National Training Center's Potential Has Not Been
Realized (GAO/NSIAD-86-130, July 23, 1986).
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAMS VARY
AMONG THE SERVICES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Each service and the Joint Staff has its own program for
incorporating lessons learned information into its operations. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has no regulations that establish
policies for or require uniformity among the services' lessons
learned programs. Since no overall guidance exists, the services
have taken different approaches to developing and operating their
programs. However, even though the programs differ, the services and
the Joint Staff use after-action reports as the primary source of
information for their programs. As an example, Army lessons learned
program guidance states that lessons learned programs should (1)
effectively gather, analyze, disseminate, and use lessons learned
information so that actions can be taken to correct deficiencies and
(2) have a means for testing or validating whether the corrective
action actually resolves the deficiency.
ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1
The Army's lessons learned program started in 1986. It is run by the
Center for Army Lessons Learned, which is operated by the Training
and Doctrine Command. The Center has a staff of about 25 civilian
and military analysts that collect observations from exercises and
operations, develop trends of deficiencies, and publish the results
of its analyses in bulletins and newsletters that receive widespread
distribution throughout the Army.
MARINE CORPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2
The Marine Corps' lessons learned program started in 1989 to
centralize lessons learned information and address deficiencies
identified in after-action reports. The program is managed by the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command and staffed with four
full-time personnel. The program collects, processes, and
disseminates lessons learned information throughout the Marine Corps
through the use of Compact Disc--Read Only Memory (CD-ROM)
technology. The Marine Corps also prepares special lessons learned
reports for users on specific subjects, such as the Hurricane Andrew
disaster in Florida and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
NAVY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3
The Navy's lessons learned program was established in 1991 at its
headquarters in Washington, D.C., and reorganized in 1993 under the
direction of the newly established Naval Doctrine Command in Norfolk,
Virginia. The program is run by two naval officers at the Doctrine
Command and a civilian who manages the database. In addition, four
of the Navy's major commands serve as management sites for lessons
learned information. These sites screen lessons learned information
submitted by naval units and decide, within their respective area of
authority, what information is appropriate for the Navy's lessons
learned database.
The Navy's program collects, evaluates, and disseminates lessons
learned information on operational and tactical issues. Similar to
the Marine Corps, the Navy distributes its lessons learned
information to users through CD-ROM technology.
AIR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4
The Air Force's lessons learned program is the only one of the
services' programs that is decentralized. As a result, each of the
Air Force's six major operational commands is responsible for
developing and managing its own lessons learned program. Air Force
regulations do not require that the commands' programs be uniform, so
each command can take different approaches to operating its program.
In fact, the four major commands that we visited or contacted during
our review all had different lessons learned programs. The programs
were designed to account for, act on, and share lessons learned
information throughout the command, but not throughout the Air Force.
The staffing levels for the lessons learned programs varied from one
to three individuals.
The Air Force also operates a limited lessons learned program at its
headquarters. This program, which is staffed by two people,
addresses lessons learned information that results only from the Air
Force's participation in joint exercises or operations or that
affects more than one of the major commands' missions.
JOINT STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.5
The Joint Staff established the Joint Center for Lessons Learned to
maintain and manage a centralized database on lessons learned
information from joint military operations and exercises. This
information, which includes ways to improve practices or overcome
problems, is disseminated periodically among the services. The
Center is staffed with two military analysts and one contractor
representative who are assisted, when necessary, by representatives
of each military service.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
We reviewed the lessons learned programs in the military services and
the Joint Staff to determine their effectiveness in (1) collecting
all significant lessons learned information, (2) analyzing lessons to
identify recurring weaknesses, (3) disseminating lessons to all
potential users, and (4) implementing corrective action and
validating results. To do so, we reviewed the regulations and
program guidance related to the lessons learned programs within each
service and the Joint Staff and the policies and systems that
implement the regulations and guidance. We determined how the
services and the Joint Staff obtain, document, and input lessons
learned data from participants in exercises and operations into their
lessons learned programs. We examined the extent to which the
services and the Joint Staff analyzed lessons learned information to
develop trends that could highlight recurring deficiencies.
Furthermore, we examined the methods and mediums the services and the
Joint Staff used to provide lessons learned information to their
units and analyze outputs provided from the systems.
We reviewed individual lessons learned reports contained in service
and Joint Staff databases that showed the results of exercises and
operations. We used this information to identify recurring
deficiencies, including those that could affect the success or
outcome of an exercise or operation. We also examined whether the
services and the Joint Staff had remedial action systems to address
deficiencies. We determined whether remedial action systems had
procedures for measuring the effectiveness of solutions that were
developed for deficiencies.
We interviewed service officials who managed the lessons learned
programs to obtain their views on the programs. We also obtained the
views of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps officials at combat
training centers as they repeatedly observed the performance of large
numbers of units. In addition, we interviewed the leadership of
selected units that participated in large-scale training exercises to
determine how they used lessons learned information to improve their
performance and how they generated lessons learned from their
training or operational experiences. (See app. II for a list of the
military organizations we visited or contacted during our work.)
Information about the Army's lessons learned program, however, is
based primarily on issues developed in our September 1993 report and
limited follow-up discussions with officials at the Center for Army
Lessons Learned.
We performed our review from December 1993 to December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
ALL SIGNIFICANT LESSONS LEARNED
ARE NOT COLLECTED
============================================================ Chapter 2
The effectiveness of the services' lessons learned programs varies
considerably. The Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy programs provide
only limited assurance that significant lessons documented in combat
training center analyses, fleet exercises, and after-action reports
are included in their databases. This information is extremely
important since, in several instances, it discloses weaknesses
displayed by many units during their most important training
exercises--those conducted at the services' combat training centers.
Some of the weaknesses, if not corrected, could have serious
consequences on a real battlefield. Until the services take steps to
ensure that all lessons learned information is collected in their
databases, units will continue to miss a significant opportunity to
avoid repeating past mistakes.
MARINE CORPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The cornerstone of Marine Corps' ground unit training is the combined
arms exercise conducted at the Air Ground Combat Center, which
provides extensive ground training to units about once every 2 years.
From this training, Marine Corps evaluators and senior leaders
assigned to the Center prepare several reports, which include lessons
learned information, that are not included in the Marine Corps
lessons learned database. This information could be extremely
valuable to commanders preparing for a future combat training center
rotation, since it documents tasks that commanders did not perform
well and provides examples of successful practices used by others to
avoid similar problems. Moreover, the reports summarize performance
trends over time and include independent observers' assessments of
the performance of weapon systems and the effectiveness of doctrine.
However, these reports are not routinely included in the Marine
Corps' lessons learned database.
Some of the weaknesses discussed in these reports, if not corrected,
could have serious consequences on a real battlefield. For example,
one report said that indirect fire was placed on or behind friendly
forces. This happened because of improper coordination and a lack of
situational awareness. Recurring weaknesses in breaching
operations--a critical component of any large-scale maneuver
operation--are other examples of significant lessons learned
information that were not captured by the lessons learned database.
For example, a 1993 report prepared by the Center stated that a
breaching operation failed because it was not rehearsed and
coordination between the engineers and maneuver units was poor. In
1994, the Center again reported that coordination problems
contributed to the breaching force being committed before the support
force was in place and before the enemy defending the obstacle could
be suppressed. The report also said that several vehicles were
destroyed during the breaching operation because they veered outside
prescribed lanes and into minefields.
In another 1994 lessons learned report, the Center noted a weakness
in the handling of intelligence information that sometimes led to
erroneous conclusions by commanders about enemy intentions and force
composition. This weakness was attributed to intelligence
information that was seldom analyzed and incorporated in commanders'
battle plans. As a result, commanders were often forced to react to
enemy initiatives rather than be proactive in shaping the
battlefield.
After-action reports prepared by participating units upon completion
of their combat training center exercises are another important
source of lessons learned information that was not fully captured.
Even though units are required to submit after-action reports that
document their performance at the Center, officials that manage the
lessons learned program told us that they had received only about
half of the reports required. According to these officials,
noncompliance with the requirement is primarily due to the lack of
emphasis throughout the chain of command.
To address this problem, the Commander of the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command sent a message in October 1994 to all major
combat and support commands that stressed the importance of the
lessons learned program and the need to improve after-action
reporting. A lessons learned official told us that his office also
periodically sent messages to units encouraging them to send in
lessons learned information, but normally they did not follow up to
determine compliance.
AIR FORCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The Air Force's Weapons and Tactics Center is the Air Forces's
premier training center for tactical fighter units. It provides
aircrew and support training in a simulated combat environment.
Active duty tactical fighter units rotate through the Center about
every 18 months and reserve units are expected to rotate about every
2 years. Training Center observers who oversee exercises capture
lessons learned information about unit performance and enter the
lessons in the Center's lessons learned database.
The Center's database includes lessons in a variety of functional
areas such as command, control, and communications; planning; and
friendly fire incidents or fratricide. The following are examples of
lessons that could help other units avoid repeating mistakes:
Airborne Warning and Control System controllers or escort fighter
pilots identified friendly aircraft as enemy forces because they
were not familiar with the entire group of friendly aircraft on
an air strike mission. Also, because friendly forces did not
respond to threat information, the controllers were unsure which
aircraft had been given the threat information and therefore
were not able to focus their attention on other pressing
matters.
Air strike missions were conducted under compressed time frames
because of inadequate planning. Also, escort aircraft did not
provide unrestricted airspace for aircraft delivering munitions
because of a failure to communicate plans. These deficiencies
resulted in the ineffective delivery of bombs and missiles on
targets.
Recurring incidents of fratricide resulted from multiple causes,
including the aircraft's fuel tank configuration and color, and
pilots' failure to check or select the proper modes or codes in
their electronic identification equipment.
Because the Air Force's lessons learned program is decentralized,
each major operational command manages its own lessons learned
program. Similar to the Marine Corps, Air Force lessons learned
managers at one major command we visited were not successful in
obtaining after-action reports covering units' participation in
various exercises and operations. For example, the command collected
only five lessons learned from the numerous exercises and operations
conducted by its subordinate units during 1991. Command personnel
told us that this happened because units did not have the proper
software for collecting lessons learned information.
Also, one of the command's subordinate composite air wings did not
know that the command had a lessons learned program or that it was
supposed to submit lessons learned information to the command. The
wing, however, maintained a lessons learned database that contained
significant information related to the operations of its composite
wing. This information might have been useful to other Air Force
composite wings with similar operations. The database included the
following information:
Mission commanders should use F-15E and F-16 fighter aircraft to
protect B-1 and B-52 bombers after they leave the target area,
and the fighters should have sufficient fuel to cover
slow-moving bombers.
Radar systems identified friendly aircraft as hostile, thus causing
other aircraft to assume that friendly aircraft were threats and
disrupting the air strike mission of a group of friendly
aircraft.
KC-135 tanker aircraft spacing should allow sufficient time for the
first tanker to become airborne before the second tanker
releases its brakes for takeoff. This margin of time would
allow the first tanker to abort its mission, if necessary,
without causing the second aircraft to abort.
Conversely, another Air Force major command had established a process
to monitor the submission of after-action reports by subordinate
units. Procedures for the submission of reports were specified in
command regulations and were emphasized in operations orders prepared
for each individual exercise. In addition, a control center within
the command monitored subordinate units' participation in exercises
and operations and followed up to ensure that required reports were
submitted.
NAVY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
The Navy's lessons learned program does not collect all of the
significant lessons learned information that is recorded during fleet
exercises. Units record observations about their performance during
these exercises in lessons learned reports. Also, ship commanding
officers, training instructors, and key exercise leaders discuss
units' performance in after-action debriefings. Lessons learned
observations are submitted through the chain of command to the Navy's
lessons learned database. However, reports of after-action
debriefings are not entered into the lessons learned database.
Reports of after-action debriefings document units' performance in
areas such as air and surface warfare and weapons usage. Naval fleet
personnel told us that because these are performance debriefings, the
results are not entered into lessons learned database. Debrief
participants also can pass on the performance results to others under
their command.
ARMY AND JOINT STAFF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
Army lessons learned information is collected from a variety of
sources, including after-action reports and evaluations from
independent observers. The information is widely distributed and is
readily available to Army units. Additionally, information from
training center exercises is published periodically by the Center for
Army Lessons Learned to keep units informed of observations and
trends. For example, in March 1994, the Center reported the
following observations on tactical deployments:
Units routinely deploy without necessary intelligence field manuals
and adequate quantities of materials needed to secure tactical
equipment during shipping.
Leaders do not plan for medical treatment and evacuation in all
phases of a deployment.
Communications capability is not introduced early enough in the
deployment to ensure mission success.
The regional commanders in chief do not use independent observers to
document units' performance during joint exercises. The units are
required, however, to submit after-action reports to the Joint Staff
upon completion of an exercise. To ensure that it receives
after-action reports for all major exercises, the Joint Staff tracks
the reports received against quarterly schedules of military
exercises to identify any missing reports.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
Until the services take steps to ensure that all significant lessons
learned information is included in their databases, they will not
realize the full potential of these assessments to make necessary
changes in doctrine, tactics, training, or materiel. As a result,
units are likely to continue to miss an opportunity to avoid
repeating past mistakes, many of which could have serious
consequences on a real battlefield.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Navy and the Air Force to establish controls to ensure that all
significant lessons learned information collected from combat
training centers, fleet exercises, and other major training exercises
are recorded in the services' lessons learned databases.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7
DOD generally agreed with our recommendation. According to DOD, the
Marine Corps plans to collect trend information on unit performance
at its combat training center and will include this information in
its lessons learned database. The Navy has taken steps through such
means as fleet operational orders, awareness messages, and increased
training to ensure that lessons learned from major naval exercises
are recorded in its database. DOD said that the Air Force records
most lessons learned from combat training center exercises in a
lessons learned database that is maintained at the combat training
center. Because this database is not currently available to other
Air Force major commands, we believe that the Air Force is missing an
important opportunity to share these lessons learned with system
users throughout the Air Force.
LESSONS LEARNED INFORMATION IS NOT
ROUTINELY ANALYZED, AND MISTAKES
CONTINUE TO BE REPEATED
============================================================ Chapter 3
The services and the regional commanders in chief continue to repeat
mistakes during military operations and major training exercises.
For example, a recent Air Force lessons learned report stated that
almost every problem occurring during Operation Restore Hope had been
documented in a lessons learned report on previous exercises or
contingencies. However, the Army is the only service that analyzes
lessons learned information to identify recurring weaknesses. As a
result, the other services and the Joint Staff cannot be assured that
significant problems are identified and receive top-level management
attention.
Two key steps must be completed if the Marine Corps, the Air Force,
the Navy, and the Joint Staff are to identify and correct their most
significant recurring deficiencies. The first step is to perform
trend analyses of lessons learned information, which can highlight
recurring weaknesses over a period of time. The second step is to
rank the various problems on the basis of their significance.
Completing these steps would allow the services and the Joint Staff
to focus on correcting the highest priority problems.
MISTAKES CONTINUE TO BE
REPEATED DURING TRAINING
EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Over a number of years, lessons learned reports in each of the
services and the Joint Staff have shown that many mistakes continue
to be repeated in training exercises and military operations. These
mistakes fall into different categories, including communications,
fratricide, battlefield planning, reconnaissance, maneuver, combat
engineering, chemical threat, fire support, and combat service
support.
MARINE CORPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
In 1993, the Marine Corps published lessons learned information that
summarized about 9 years of unit performance during combined arms
exercises. This information disclosed recurring deficiencies,
including (1) indirect fire being placed on or behind friendly
forces; (2) inadequacies in several phases of obstacle breaching
operations; (3) ineffective preparation of engagement areas, which is
critical to stopping or slowing an enemy advance; and (4) units'
inability to integrate supporting arms and maneuver to destroy the
enemy.
A lessons learned report from February 1990 also documented numerous
training deficiencies that had been cited in previous reports.
Significant deficiencies included ones in the areas of surveillance,
target acquisition, and reconnaissance; camouflage/concealment;
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; electronic
countermeasures; and communications. Many of these deficiencies are
still occurring today in combat training center exercises.
AIR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
A major recurring weakness that has been reported over a number of
years is the inadequate communication of air tasking orders. These
orders provide information to aircraft in the same or other military
services and are necessary to coordinate a specific operational
mission within an area of operation. According to lessons learned
reports, inadequate communication of air tasking orders could result
in serious consequences, including friendly fire losses.
Problems relating to air tasking orders were most recently reported
during 1994 operations in Haiti, yet these problems were identified 4
years earlier during the Gulf War. A 1990-91 lessons learned report
found that air tasking orders were inadequately transmitted among the
services during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Likewise,
a 1992 report said that the Air Force used a different communications
system than the other services and lacked a standardized format for
air tasking orders.
Other recurring deficiencies were illustrated in a 1993 report on
lessons learned from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. For example,
the Air Force deployed an airlift communications system, which was to
assist in air mobility operations, without qualified operators and
training guides. The lack of trained, qualified operators resulted
in delays in communicating mission-essential information and hampered
the use of an important piece of communications equipment in an area
where communications were important but limited. The report stated
that this deficiency had occurred in 1990 and 1991 during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Another 1993 Air Force lessons learned report on Operation Restore
Hope stated that
"Almost every problem occurring during Operation Restore Hope
has already been documented in JULLS [Joint Universal Lessons
Learned System] as a result of previous exercises and
contingencies. There appears to be a continuing trend of
failure to fix problems already know [sic] to exist. We end up
paying again to achieve the same undesirable results."
NAVY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
The Navy does not enter lessons learned information into its database
if the lessons are similar to those that were previously reported and
recorded. Therefore, Navy officials told us that, although it is
difficult to identify recurring deficiencies through the lessons
learned database, such problems do exist. The database showed that,
at least as far back as 1989, (1) friendly force identification codes
were not used properly and (2) several different air tasking order
problems were experienced, including orders that contained
inaccuracies regarding the capabilities of carriers and airwings,
demonstrated improper planning to carry out air strikes, and went to
several organizations that did not have a need for the orders.
ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.4
Since the establishment of the Army's combat training centers in the
1980s, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has documented a number of
recurring deficiencies in units' performance. For example, a 1992
lessons learned report stated that the following problems continued
to be repeated: (1) direct fire was not synchronized effectively;
(2) reconnaissance and surveillance plans were not well coordinated,
managed, or focused; (3) communications with higher headquarters were
not properly planned and executed; (4) fire support plans did not
support the scheme of maneuver; and (5) operations in a chemical
environment were not satisfactory. Many of these same problems
continue today.
JOINT STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.5
Regional commanders in chief have reported recurring deficiencies
during training exercises and operations, including Just Cause in
Panama (1989), Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and Restore Hope.
According to a 1991 lessons learned report, one recurring problem was
the lack of adequate training on the joint transportation planning
and management system. This system schedules and manages strategic
air and sea movements during peacetime and wartime. Joint Staff
officials said that this problem had come up during almost every
exercise since the early 1980s.
Another recurring problem has been inadequate training of personnel
involved in the formation and operation of a Joint Task Force
headquarters. For example, the task force headquarters for Operation
Restore Hope, which included personnel from all services, was formed
on an ad hoc basis after deployment. According to a lessons learned
report from the operation, this situation resulted in inefficient
planning, confusion, and a less-than-optimal deployment. Similar
problems with this issue have been reported since the late 1980s.
MOST SERVICES DO NOT PERFORM
TREND ANALYSES OR PRIORITIZE
RECURRING DEFICIENCIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
The Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Joint Staff do not
analyze their lessons learned information to identify trends in
performance weaknesses. Accordingly, it is difficult for them to
differentiate the importance of correcting some deficiencies rather
than others. On the other hand, the Army analyzes lessons learned
information over time, which enables it to highlight the most
pressing problem areas and focus on the highest priority areas.
MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE,
NAVY, AND JOINT STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
Lessons learned program guidance does not require the Marine Corps,
the Air Force, the Navy, or the Joint Staff to perform trend
analyses. However, service and Joint Staff officials told us they
believed trend analyses would be useful to them.
Marine Corps operations personnel in several units told us that trend
analyses could highlight recurring deficiencies and that knowledge of
these deficiencies would be especially useful in preparing for major
training exercises because their units would have a better
opportunity to overcome past mistakes. In 1993, the Marine Corps
Combat Development Command developed a proposal to examine recurring
operational and training deficiencies. Under the proposal, the
Command's Studies and Analysis Group would develop trends based on
Marine Corps units' performance over a number of exercises. The
group could then identify recurring deficiencies and recommend
corrective actions. The proposal was approved by the Commander of
the Combat Development Command in November 1993 but has not been
implemented. As of May 1995, a group analyst said that the delay in
implementing the proposal was due to resource limitations and the
inability to obtain more in-depth training data from the Air Ground
Combat Center.
Air Force regulations do not require the major commands to develop
trend analyses of lessons learned information. Nevertheless, the
lessons learned program director at Air Force headquarters told us
that one of the program's most noted weaknesses was the lack of
assigning priorities to performance deficiencies. According to this
official, since trend analyses and prioritization are not being
accomplished at the Air Force's major commands, it is difficult for
decisionmakers to differentiate the significance of problem areas.
The Navy's lessons learned database does not contain the information
necessary to perform trend analyses because the system screens out
duplicate or similar deficiencies. Navy fleet operations personnel
told us that they seldom used lessons learned information because of
the high volume of unprioritized information in the database and the
time constraints associated with their day-to-day operations.
Even though Joint Staff program guidance does not require trend
analyses of lessons learned information, program officials said that
information was available in their database to perform such analyses.
However, they said that a shortage of resources precluded them from
routinely analyzing the information.
Although Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Joint Staff officials
acknowledged that trend information was not routinely analyzed to
highlight recurring deficiencies, they said that officials in
leadership positions gained an awareness of the most significant
problems through informal means such as conferences, meetings, and
exercise planning discussions. In our view, the informal approach
has not worked well, as recurring deficiencies have not been
resolved. Moreover, reliance on an informal approach to problem
solving does not provide for program continuity as military personnel
are subject to periodic reassignment.
ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
The Center for Army Lessons Learned is responsible for identifying
systemic training strengths and weaknesses of units that participate
in major operations and exercises. After documenting lessons
learned, the Center consolidates the information and analyzes trends
and deficiencies. Under an ongoing Army proposal, these performance
trends are expected to provide the basis for developing a priority
issue list that ranks the importance of problems affecting
war-fighting capabilities. According to an Army official, the
priority issue list would enable Army leaders to establish clear
priorities for those problems it deems most serious, identify the
participants involved and establish accountability, and estimate the
resources required to resolve problems. The Army expects to have
this process in place by September 1995.
The Army has recently made excellent use of trend analyses. For
example, the Army analyzed the extent of friendly fire incidents at
its National Training Center from 1990 to 1993 and developed a
corrective action plan to address this serious deficiency. Recent
data shows that friendly fire-related incidents at the Center have
decreased over 50 percent since 1990.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
Military units continue to experience recurring deficiencies in
exercises and operations, even though the services and the Joint
Staff have lessons learned programs. This situation is unlikely to
change markedly until the services and the Joint Staff begin to make
better use of the wealth of lessons learned information contained in
their databases. As it is now, the lessons are of limited value to
military trainers because they provide no systematic insight to
recurring deficiencies.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Navy and the Air Force and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to (1) analyze lessons learned information so that trend data
can be developed to identify recurring deficiencies and (2)
prioritize these recurring deficiencies so that limited resources can
be concentrated on the most pressing problems.
To facilitate trend analyses in the Navy, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to modify the
Navy's lessons learned program to retain all significant lessons
learned from operations and exercises.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
DOD agreed with our recommendations as they applied to the Navy. It
said that the Navy plans to implement a process, beginning in the
first quarter of fiscal year 1996, to capture and retain all
significant lessons learned from operations and exercises. Moreover,
the Navy will analyze and identify trends in performance weaknesses
through its newly established remedial action program. However, DOD
said that trend analyses in the Air Force was unnecessary because the
Air Force acted on deficiencies as they were identified. While this
may be true for deficiencies recorded in the lessons learned database
maintained at Air Force headquarters, DOD officials acknowledged this
was not the case for the lessons learned that are recorded by the
major commands. Until the Air Force undertakes trend analyses that
systematically identifies and highlights recurring deficiencies in
the major commands, there is no assurance that significant problems
will be addressed and corrected.
DOD said the Joint Staff believes that trend analyses would be
worthwhile, but that it is not sufficiently resourced to conduct such
analyses at this time. Given the significance of the potential value
that can be gained from such an analysis, for example, identifying
matters that can make a difference between success or defeat on the
battlefield, we believe that this is a matter that the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff should carefully review.
DOD did not agree with our conclusion that the Marine Corps does not
analyze lessons learned information. DOD said that the Marine Corps
analyzes lessons learned information through its remedial action and
combat development processes. However, these processes address only
those one-time deficiencies that the Marine Corps selects for
remedial action. In the absence of a systematic process to analyze
the lessons learned database to identify trends, the Marine Corps may
be overlooking deficiencies of a recurring nature that warrant
remedial action.
MANY FACTORS IMPEDE UNITS' ABILITY
TO USE LESSONS LEARNED INFORMATION
============================================================ Chapter 4
The Air Force does not routinely distribute lessons learned
information throughout the Air Force. As a result, information from
the major commands' lessons learned databases is not reaching all
potential users. The Joint Staff, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps routinely distribute lessons learned information, and their
users can access the information as needed. However, most of the
services use this information only on a limited basis. The primary
reason for this situation is that users lack the training necessary
to access the high volume of information in the databases.
DISSEMINATION OF LESSONS
LEARNED INFORMATION IS
GENERALLY ADEQUATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
The Air Force does not disseminate lessons learned information to its
units on a routine basis because it does not have a centralized
lessons learned program. Also, Air Force units only have access to
lessons learned information from their own major command. Therefore,
the units cannot benefit from the experiences of other Air Force
units. Unit personnel told us that Air Force-wide lessons learned
information would be beneficial in planning future exercises and
operations.
Air Force units must specifically request lessons learned information
from their major commands. If the information is available, it is
sent to the units in the mail. However, units do not frequently
request lessons learned information. For example, one major Air
Force command maintained over 4,000 lessons learned reports in its
database at command headquarters, yet in 1994 it received, on
average, only 1 request for information per week from its subordinate
units. Command officials told us that in 1993 they had received only
about 30 requests for information. The official who managed this
lessons learned program acknowledged that the dissemination of
information was not very good and needed to be improved. Air Force
personnel in one unit stated that their major command's database was
not very useful since it was not accessible to them.
Air Force lessons learned officials recognized the limitations of a
decentralized lessons learned program, and they were attempting to
improve access to program information. As of June 1995, the Air
Force was developing a computer network that would provide access to
lessons learned information throughout the Air Force. Once this
capability is achieved, units within major commands throughout the
Air Force should have better access to lessons learned information.
One of the major commands that we visited plans to achieve this
capability later in 1995. Another major command is testing the
network. However, until this network becomes fully operational
throughout the Air Force and is proven effective, units will continue
to have limited access to important lessons learned information.
Navy lessons learned information is available to over 1,000 major and
intermediate-level commands, specialized operational units, and
individual ships. Until recently, Navy organizations had to request
that they be included on the lessons learned distribution list to
receive such information. As a result, all naval units may not have
been receiving the information. In early 1995, the Navy took action
to ensure that all commands, units, and ships were receiving lessons
learned information.
The remaining services and the Joint Staff also provide access to
their information. The Marine Corps distributes lessons learned
information to over 500 organizations, principally units down through
the battalion level. The Army periodically publishes this
information in bulletins and newsletters that are sent to each Army
specialty school and most other organizations throughout the Army.
The Joint Staff routinely distributes lessons learned information to
its major command organizations and to the other services such as the
Navy, which publishes the Joint Staff database on CD-ROM along with
its own lessons learned information.
SERVICES' USE OF AVAILABLE
LESSONS LEARNED INFORMATION IS
LIMITED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Regardless of the availability and widespread distribution of lessons
learned information, most services have used this information only on
a limited basis. The principal reason for not making greater use of
the information is the lack of training in how to easily access the
databases.
MARINE CORPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1
According to Marine Corps personnel, units do not use lessons learned
information because users possess limited training and knowledge on
how to access information in the system or how to process available
information in a timely manner. For example, a unit representative
told us that he had been in a headquarters organization for over 1
year, but knew of no one who had used the lessons learned database to
obtain information. An officer from this unit attributed this fact
to the users' unfamiliarity with the information in the database and
lack of training on how to use CD-ROM technology.
Lessons learned officials from the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command recognized that users had problems with the CD-ROM technology
needed to access the database and took steps in 1994 to expand
training in this area. Specifically, these lessons learned officials
began to regularly schedule visits to units to provide unit personnel
with hands-on training on the operation of the lessons learned
database and information on its benefits.
NAVY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2
The Navy's lessons learned database contains over 4,000 unprioritized
reports. Accordingly, to use the system effectively, users must
possess the skills needed to access the information and identify the
most pressing problems. Some Navy fleet operations personnel told us
that they seldom used lessons learned information because their
operating tempo was extremely high and they had not been trained to
use the system to quickly access specific lessons learned
information. For example, several officers with submarine
backgrounds said that they relied on other mechanisms for lessons
learned to identify submarine-related lessons.
Some Atlantic Fleet staff officers said that they seldom used the
Navy's lessons learned database and felt no need to do so. They
relied instead on more ad hoc systems to obtain lessons learned
information. They specifically cited Navy message traffic,
newsletters, bulletins, and discussions with their counterparts on
other ships as sources of information. They also said that the lack
of knowledge about the system and how to quickly access information
hindered them from using the lessons learned database.
The manager of the Navy's lessons learned database acknowledged that
training for fleet personnel in the use of the system could be
improved. He cited personnel turnover as a principal cause for some
users' unfamiliarity with the system. Further, he said that this
situation was likely to continue until training became widespread.
AIR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.3
One Air Force unit that we visited did not use lessons learned
information from its major command's database because unit personnel
did not know that a lessons learned database existed at the major
command. It was for this reason that personnel at this unit told us
they had never requested any lessons learned information from their
major command. At another Air Force unit, personnel were aware that
lessons learned information was maintained at their major command;
nevertheless, they had used the database very little because they
lacked knowledge of the database's detailed information and because
they had no quick, ready mechanism to access or obtain this
information. Unit personnel had requested lessons learned
information from their major command on several occasions, and it was
provided to them through the mail. However, unit officials told us
that requesting and obtaining information through the mail was
time-consuming.
ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.4
Primary users of Army lessons learned information are the Training
and Doctrine Command's 18 schools, which develop training programs
for Army personnel in their military specialties and tactical units.
These schools are ultimately responsible for using lessons learned
information to modify training and doctrine. Even though officials
at several schools told us that they used lessons learned information
to develop training plans and to update doctrine, they said that they
did not keep track of how training and doctrine were modified based
on this information. Likewise, the leadership of several Army units
said that they used lessons learned information to prepare for major
training events but did not keep track of how this information was
used during training.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
It is clear that the services are not maximizing the potential
benefits of lessons learned information. For the most part, the
dissemination of lessons learned information by the Joint Staff, the
Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps is adequate. The Air Force's
ongoing effort to establish a computer network that will provide
access to lessons learned information throughout the Air Force could
solve its dissemination problem. However, dissemination of lessons
information is only the first step necessary to facilitate units' use
of the information. To better facilitate the use of lessons
information, Air Force and Navy personnel need to possess skills
necessary to access lessons in their services' databases. The Marine
Corps' ongoing effort to provide unit personnel with the skills
needed to access their lessons database is a step in the right
direction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Navy and the Air Force to provide training to key personnel in
the use of lessons learned information and the technology for
accessing and reviewing this information.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
DOD agreed with our recommendation. DOD said that the Navy had
selected a more user friendly computer program to make the Navy
lessons learned database more accessible to personnel and was working
to incorporate lessons learned system training into various officer
and selected enlisted schools. Also, DOD said that the Air Force is
planning steps to ensure that its major commands provide training in
the use of the lessons learned system. Moreover, the Air Force
expects to improve the distribution of lessons learned information by
implementing a wide area network throughout its major commands by the
end of fiscal year 1996.
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAMS LACK
SUFFICIENT FOLLOW-UP AND
VALIDATION
============================================================ Chapter 5
Effective follow-up and validation are important parts of a lessons
learned program since they are the only means for ensuring that
problems have been corrected and are brought to closure. However,
the Navy only recently implemented a follow-up process, and the Army
does not expect to have a process in place to address training and
doctrinal deficiencies until September 1995.\1 The Marine Corps, the
Joint Staff, and one of the Air Force commands that we visited seemed
to have visibility over the status of corrective actions. Even
though most of the services and the Joint Staff have requirements to
validate corrective actions, not all of them have fully implemented
procedures for this purpose.
--------------------
\1 The Army has a remedial action program at its headquarters level
that addresses primarily policy or procedural issues or matters that
affect several Army commands.
REMEDIAL ACTION PROCESSES VARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
An important part of a lessons learned program is a remedial action
process to track and follow up on actions taken to address problems.
The remedial action process generally involves identifying problems,
assigning responsibility for the problems, and monitoring corrective
actions taken. However, one of the services does not have a remedial
action process in place to address training and doctrinal issues, and
another service only recently established one. The other services'
processes vary in effectiveness.
MARINE CORPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1.1
Although the Marine Corps' lessons learned program was established in
1989, the remedial action element of the program did not become
operational until 1991. A Marine Corps lessons learned program
official said that corrective actions are monitored primarily through
the combat development process, which is a formal process that
identifies battlefield requirements and develops combat capabilities.
On the basis of our review of a sample of remedial action items, we
found that the Marine Corps was able to successfully track the status
of corrective actions through the combat development process.
AIR FORCE AND JOINT STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1.2
The Air Force has directed each of its major commands to establish a
remedial action element for its lessons learned program. However,
the quality of remedial action processes in place at the major
commands varies. For example, one of the commands we visited had
only recently begun to systematically track corrective actions taken
to address problem areas. A command official told us that before
October 1994 the status of corrective actions could not be readily
determined. According to the official, functional offices within the
command were tasked to develop solutions to problems. However, the
command had no systematic tracking system to determine the status of
corrective actions. To correct this situation and improve its
ability to track corrective actions, the command developed a
spreadsheet to document the status of corrective actions.
In contrast, another major command we visited had implemented
procedures to assign responsibility for solutions and systematically
track the status of corrective actions. The office responsible for
solving a problem is required to provide periodic status reports to
the major command. On the basis of our review of a sample of lessons
learned reports, we found that the command had visibility over the
development and implementation of corrective actions.
The Joint Staff employs a similar remedial action process to that of
the Air Force major command discussed previously. It assigns
responsibility for developing solutions to problems of a joint nature
to its own offices, or those within the services. These offices
periodically report their progress to the Joint Staff, and the status
of corrective actions is recorded as part of Joint Staff lessons
learned reports. On the basis of our review of a sample of lessons
learned reports, we found the Joint Staff had visibility over the
status of corrective actions.
NAVY AND ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1.3
The Navy did not establish a remedial action process for its lessons
learned program until January 1995. Before that time, the lessons
learned program was limited to providing information on operational
issues for use by fleet personnel. As of May 1995, however, the Navy
had not addressed any deficiencies through its remedial action
process.
In September 1993, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command began
developing a remedial action process that would address lessons
learned pertaining to training and doctrine deficiencies that it
deemed most critical. Under this process, the Army plans to
establish accountability for problem resolution and monitoring
progress. The Army expects the process to be in place by September
1995.
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAMS LACK
AN EFFECTIVE VALIDATION ELEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2
Validation of corrective actions (for example, testing the
effectiveness of actions taken to correct deficiencies) can ensure
that recurring deficiencies have been resolved and brought to
closure. Validation can be accomplished by evaluating the
effectiveness of potential solutions during a training exercise.
However, the Navy does not require that its lessons learned program
contain a validation element. The Army also does not formally
validate solutions to deficiencies. However, the Army's proposed
enhancements to its lessons learned program would recognize the
benefits of validation. Specifically, the Army plans to include a
validation element in its remedial action process and test solutions
to deficiencies through training exercises. As stated earlier, the
Army expects the remedial action process to become operational by
September 1995.
In contrast, the Marine Corps and the Air Force require validation.
The Marine Corps requires that corrective actions be validated
through its combat development process. Air Force guidance requires
major commands to incorporate a validation element in their lessons
learned program. However, only two of the four major commands we
contacted had done so.
Joint Staff guidance states that validation is necessary to ensure
the effectiveness of corrective actions taken to resolve problems.
However, officials said that it is left to regional commanders in
chief to determine whether corrective actions will be tested in
training exercises. The Joint Staff permits open items to be closed
by means other than testing, such as a determination by senior
officials that all corrective actions were completed and that the
actions taken had solved the problem. Joint Staff officials said
that insufficient staffing was the principal reason for not taking a
stronger oversight role in the validation process.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:3
Without adequate follow-up and validation in remedial action
processes, lessons learned programs can only be used to identify and
distribute information about problems rather than to track and
validate that solutions work. Until the services and the Joint Staff
establish effective follow-up and validation procedures in their
lessons learned programs, there will be little assurance that
problems have been brought to closure and the possibility for
repeating past mistakes will remain.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:4
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Navy to incorporate a validation process into
the Navy's lessons learned program,
the Secretary of the Air Force to take actions to ensure that each
of the major commands complies with existing program guidance
calling for the establishment of a validation process for their
lessons learned programs, and
the regional commanders in chief to ensure that solutions to
deficiencies are tested in joint exercises or, if this is not
appropriate, validated through alternative means.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:5
DOD agreed with our first two recommendations. DOD said that, as
part of its lessons learned program, the Navy had established a
remedial action program working group that will validate lessons
learned. It also said that the Air Force would take action to ensure
that the major commands establish a validation process for their
lessons learned programs. Specifically, DOD said that Air Force
headquarters will increase its oversight of lessons learned programs
by monitoring the minutes of remedial action plan meetings conducted
by the major commands and by assessing the commands' compliance with
program guidance.
A draft of this report recommended that the regional commanders in
chief establish formal procedures to ensure that solutions to
deficiencies are tested and validated. DOD said that this
recommendation was unnecessary because current program guidance
contained formal procedures to test corrective actions through the
Joint Staff's remedial action program. Although we agree that formal
procedures for testing already exist, we found that commanders in
chief seldom tested whether prior problems had been corrected in
their exercises because (1) they were not required to do so and (2)
they had insufficient time to analyze past problems before planning
future exercises. We believe that testing solutions to problem areas
in exercises is a vital part of assessing the capabilities of the
regional commanders in chief to support national security strategies.
Further, the failure to conduct such testing, when appropriate,
reduces the effectiveness of collecting data on problems and, in our
opinion, is a major reason contributing to recurring problems.
Accordingly, we modified our recommendation to stress the importance
of testing remedial actions and to recognize that, in some instances,
it may be appropriate to close remedial action projects if their
effectiveness can be demonstrated through alternative means.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 5
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
KEY ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN OUR
REVIEW
========================================================== Appendix II
JOINT STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Washington,
D.C.
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, Washington,
D.C.
Operations Directorate, Washington, D.C.
AIR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
Weapons and Tactics Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada
21st Air Force, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey
438th Airlift Wing, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey
366th Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
3rd Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Europe, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany
ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Washington, D.C.
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas
1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
NAVY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk, Virginia
Navy Tactical Support Activity, White Oak, Maryland
Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
2nd Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, California
USS Saipan
USS Scott
USS Thomas S. Gates
USS San Jacinto
MARINE CORPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:5
Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-nine Palms,
California
Marine Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
Sharon A. Cekala, Associate Director
Charles J. Bonanno, Assistant Director
Karen S. Blum, Communications Analyst
KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
James S. Moores, Evaluator-in-Charge
Benjamin Douglas, Senior Evaluator
Darryl S. Meador, Evaluator
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
Jeffrey L. Overton, Jr. Senior Evaluator
Robert C. Mandigo, Jr., Senior Evaluator