Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities (Briefing
Report, 02/13/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR).

Peace operations use military forces to help maintain or restore
international peace.  Peace operations fall into three categories: those
seeking to prevent conflict from breaking out, those that seek to compel
countries to comply with international sanctions designed to maintain or
restore peace and order, and those designed to relieve human misery and
suffering.  This briefing report covers (1) the cost and funding of
peace operations, (2) the effectiveness of U.N. operations, (3) U.S.
policy and efforts to strengthen U.N. capabilities, and (4) the impact
of peace operations on the U.S. military.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-102BR
     TITLE:  Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities
      DATE:  02/13/95
   SUBJECT:  International organizations
             International relations
             Military intervention
             International cooperation
             Warfare
             United Nations
             Operations analysis
             Federal aid to foreign countries
             Logistics
             Cost effectiveness analysis
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Operation Support Hope
             UN Operation in Somalia
             Dushanbe (Tajikistan)
             Yugoslavia
             Angola
             Bosnia
             Cambodia
             Haiti
             Iraq
             Rwanda
             Desert Shield
             Desert Storm
             DOD Operation Provide Comfort
             C-130 Aircraft
             C-141 Aircraft
             Airborne Warning and Control System
             F-4G Aircraft
             National Security Revitalization Act
             Peace Powers Act
             AWACS
             Somalia
             
**************************************************************************
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Briefing Report to Congressional Committees

February 1995

PEACE OPERATIONS - INFORMATION ON
U.S.  AND U.N.  ACTIVITIES

GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR

Peace Operations


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  MRC - major regional conflict
  MFO - Multinational Force Observers
  PDD - Presidential Decision Directive
  UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia
  UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force
  UNTAC - United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260417

February 13, 1995

Congressional Committees

This report provides information drawn from the work we have done on
peace operations at the request of various Committees and individual
Members of Congress.  It covers (1) the cost and funding of peace
operations, (2) the effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.)
operations, (3) U.S.  policy and efforts to strengthen U.N. 
capabilities, and (4) the impact of peace operations on the U.S. 
military.  On February 3, 1995, we briefed staff from multiple
Committees on these issues. 

In reviewing issues concerning U.N.  and U.S.  peace operations over
the past several years, we have done extensive work in the United
States and at various peace operation locales, including Bosnia,
Cambodia, and Northern Iraq.  We spoke with U.N.  officials at these
operations and with representatives of the warring parties.  We have
also discussed peace operations extensively with officials throughout
the U.S.  government, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and
Department of State, the United Nations, private organizations, and
U.S.  military units that have participated in peace operations. 
Finally, we have reviewed U.S.  government, U.N, and private
organization reports and documents concerning peace operations.  A
list of issued GAO products related to peace operations is at the
back of this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies
will also be made available to others upon request. 

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I.  If
you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call
Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis Issues, on (202)
512-3504 regarding DOD aspects of peace operations and Joseph Kelley,
Director-in- Charge, International Affairs Issues, on (202) 512-4128
regarding the Department of State and U.N.  aspects. 

Henry L.  Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General

List of Committees

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Pete V.  Domenici
Chairman
The Honorable J.  James Exon
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable John R.  Kasich
Chairman
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W.  Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives


BACKGROUND
============================================================ Chapter I

Types of Operations



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Peace operations use military assets to help maintain or restore
international peace.  Peace operations cover three types of
actions--preventive deployment, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. 

Preventive deployment is defined as the use of military assets to
prevent conflict from breaking out.  An example of preventive
deployment is Operation Able Sentry, where U.S.  troops are stationed
in Macedonia to deter fighting from spreading into that country from
the former Yugoslavia.  Peacekeeping is a military operation designed
to monitor and facilitate implementation of a cease-fire or other
similar agreement.  Peacekeeping is undertaken with the consent of
all major parties to the dispute.  Both preventive deployment and
peacekeeping are authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N.  Charter,
which specifies peaceful means to resolve disputes. 

Peace enforcement is the use of military force or the threat of force
to compel countries to comply with international sanctions designed
to maintain or restore peace and order.  Peace enforcement, such as
the operation in Somalia, is authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter, which specifies forceful action to deal with international
crises. 

Humanitarian operations involve the use of military assets to relieve
human misery and suffering.  Humanitarian operations, such as DOD's
Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, do not attempt to directly resolve
disputes or support a peace settlement. 

These operations can be U.N.-led, that is, planned, paid for, and
implemented by the United Nations.  They can also be authorized by
the U.N.  Security Council and thus U.N.-sanctioned, but without U.N. 
participation, such as the U.S.-led coalition in Haiti.  Or they may
be completely independent of U.N.  sanction or participation, such as
the

U.S.  Policy Framework



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Two acts of Congress and Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25)
provide a basis for U.S.  participation in U.N.  peace operations. 
The U.N.  Participation Act of 1945, as amended, states that a
maximum of 1,000 U.S.  armed forces personnel can be detailed to the
United Nations in noncombat roles to help peacefully resolve
disputes.  The act also authorizes the President to negotiate
agreements with the Security Council, subject to the approval of
Congress, to provide armed forces to the United Nations acting under
Chapter VII to maintain international peace and security. 

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995 limits appropriations for the U.S.-assessed contribution for
U.N.  peacekeeping to 25 percent of the operations' costs, as of
fiscal year 1996.\1 It further requires the President to consult with
Congress each month on the status of U.N.  peacekeeping operations,
provide quarterly and annual reports on peacekeeping, and notify
Congress 15 days prior to providing assistance to the United Nations
for peacekeeping. 

PDD-25, issued by the President in May 1994, sets U.S.  policy
regarding U.S.  participation in peace operations.  It sets forth
factors the United States will consider before deciding to
participate in peace operations and states that U.S.  troops will not
be placed under U.N.  command, but may be placed under U.N. 
operational control for a prescribed operation. 

On January 4, 1995, the National Security Revitalization Act (HR7)
was introduced in the House of Representatives, and the Peace Powers
Act (S5) was introduced in the Senate of the United States.  This
legislation, if enacted, would build on the existing policy
framework.  It would clarify certain reporting requirements, require
the President to certify that placing U.S.  troops under the command
or operational control of a U.N.  commander is necessary to protect
U.S.  security interests, and provide a credit against the U.S. 
peacekeeping assessment for certain DOD expenditures in support of
U.N.  Security Council

U.N.-Led Operations



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

As of February 1995, there were 17 active U.N.-led peace operations. 
Thirteen were peacekeeping operations and four authorized the use of
force.  A total of 64,000 U.N.  troops, police, and military
observers were assigned to these 17 missions.  Seventeen of these
personnel were deployed to the U.N.  Observer Mission in Tajikistan,
and 40,000 were deployed to the U.N.  Protection Force in the former

Non U.N.-Led Operations



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

At the end of 1994, there were 13 non-U.N.-led peace operations.  Ten
operations were undertaken in support of U.N.  Security Council
resolutions; of those, the United States participated in eight.  The
two operations the United States did not participate in were the
South Ossetia-Georgia Force and the CIS Collective Force in
Tajikistan, both in the former Soviet Union.  Three operations were
independent of the United Nations--the Multinational Force Observers
(MFO) in the Sinai, the Economic Community of West African States
Cease-fire Monitoring Group, and the Moldova Force.  The United
States participates only in the MFO. 


--------------------
\1 Currently the U.S.  peacekeeping assessment is 31.7 percent of
peacekeeping costs, but the United States pays 30.4 percent,
reflecting an informal agreement. 


COST AND FUNDING
=========================================================== Chapter II

What Kind of Costs Are Involved? 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Two broad cost categories are associated with peace
operations--incremental and total.  DOD reports the incremental costs
of its participation in peace operations.  As defined by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L.  101-508) for use during
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, incremental costs are those costs that
would not have been incurred except for the operation.  DOD is still
using this definition. 

We have reported that when considering the cost of operations it
should be recognized that DOD's financial systems cannot reliably
determine costs.  The services do not have the systems in place to
capture actual incremental costs.  Only the total obligations are
captured by the accounting systems.  The services use various
management information systems to identify incremental obligations
and to estimate costs.  Obligational data are generated by individual
military units that report them up the chain of command.  In our work
on several operations, a limited review of obligations documents
showed that these actions were directly related to the operation. 

Total costs are difficult to quantify because many assumptions have
to be made concerning the allocation of costs.  For example, the
Marine Corps brought equipment to Somalia valued at almost $100
million.  This equipment was purchased over a period of years and has
a long useful life.  To determine total costs DOD would have to
decide how much of the value of that equipment to charge against the

Who Incurs Costs? 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

DOD, the Department of State, the Agency for International
Development, and a host of other agencies--including the Departments
of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice,
Transportation, and the Treasury--have participated to some extent in
peace operations. 

Of these agencies, DOD has the most incremental costs for peace
operations.  For fiscal year 1994, it reported incremental costs of
$1.9 billion.  The most costly operations were those in Somalia ($528
million), Haiti ($371 million), and in and around Iraq ($425
million).  For fiscal year 1995, DOD estimates that it will incur
incremental costs of $2.6 billion for all contingency operations,
including operations in Haiti ($592 million), in and around Iraq
($579 million), and Bosnia ($312 million).  Our preliminary estimate
is that peace operations-related incremental costs are about $2.1
billion of that amount.  The remainder, which we have not
characterized as a peace operation, is associated with Operation
Vigilant Warrior, the U.S.  response to Iraqi troop movements near
the Kuwait border.  DOD incurs incremental costs to transport troops,
equipment, and supplies and to sustain the military forces in the
field, among other things. 

The Department of State has the next highest amount for peace
operations.  The bulk of State's costs are for the U.S.  share of
U.N.  peacekeeping assessments.  In fiscal year 1994, the State
Department paid $1.1 billion towards the U.S.  assessed contribution
for peacekeeping.  State also incurs costs for additional voluntary
peace operation contributions and for refugee programs. 

The Agency for International Development's costs for humanitarian aid
exceed $100 million.  Other agencies' costs range from several
hundred thousand to several million dollars, some of which are
reimbursed by DOD or State.  At the request of the House Budget
Committee, we are developing data on estimated fiscal year 1995 costs
for all U.S. 

How Are Peace Operations Funded? 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Most agencies budget for and receive annual appropriations to fund
their participation in peace operations.  Each year, the Congress
appropriates funds for the State Department for the anticipated U.S. 
share of assessments for U.N.  peace operations, for U.S.  voluntary
contributions for U.N.  operations, and for refugee programs.  The
Congress has also at times provided emergency supplemental
appropriations for the State Department to cover unanticipated U.N. 
peacekeeping assessments.  The U.S.  Agency for International
Development receives annual appropriations for humanitarian aid, and
the U.S.  Department of Agriculture receives annual appropriations
for food programs, as authorized by P.L.  480. 

DOD does not budget for the cost of military operations or
contingencies.  It budgets to be ready to conduct such operations. 
When the services have to conduct these operations, the planned
budget execution cycle is necessarily disrupted.  DOD must then
absorb the costs of these operations within its existing
appropriation or seek supplemental appropriations. 

DOD has funded operations in different ways.  In fiscal year 1993, to
pay for the cost of operations in Somalia, DOD asked for and received
a supplemental that reprogrammed $750 million from other areas within
its budget but provided no new funds.  In fiscal year 1994, DOD
received two emergency supplementals:  one for $1.2 billion in
February 1994 and one for $299 million in September 1994.  These
supplementals covered most of DOD's incremental costs for peace
operations; the remainder of the costs were absorbed within its
existing appropriations.  DOD recently requested a $2.6 billion
emergency supplemental to cover estimated costs for fiscal year 1995. 

The way peace operations are funded has important implications.  If
the funds come from existing appropriations, spending plans are
disrupted because funding for other planned activities has to be
reduced.  Additional resources received through supplemental
legislation would not have this same impact, but such legislation
could be subject to the discretionary spending limits of the Budget
Enforcement Act unless designated as emergency funding.  If emergency
supplemental legislation appropriates additional resources to fund an
operation, the budget deficit will increase, since emergency
appropriations cause an increase in the spending caps established by
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 for that fiscal year.  If
additional resources are appropriated but not marked as emergency,
they would be subject to the discretionary spending limits in the
Budget Enforcement Act, which could mean that the amount of budget
authority available for other discretionary spending could

U.N.  Pays Some U.S.  Costs



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

For peace operations, the United Nations needs to fill planned and
unexpected requirements for equipment and services.  To do this, the
United Nations uses Letters of Assist, specific agreements that
define a requirement, the delivery and payment terms, and other
necessary information.  DOD has provided the United Nations such
items as armored personnel carriers, maps, and transport services
through these agreements and has been reimbursed for this support. 
U.S.  support provided through these agreements is authorized by
section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

In return for participating in specific U.N.-led peace operations,
the United Nations reimburses member nations for the costs they incur
when fielding troops and equipment.  The United Nations uses a fixed
rate of payment for all troops serving in U.N.-led operations.  These
rates are $988 per person per month for regular infantry, $1,279 per
person per month for specialists, and an additional $70 per person
per month for wear and tear on personal clothing, gear, and weapon. 
The United Nations also reimburses member nations for the value of
the equipment participating troops are requested to bring with them
to the operation. 

The United States will not be reimbursed for the deployment of troops
and equipment to an operation that is not U.N.-led.  For example,
during the U.N.  operation in Somalia, DOD provided 2,900 logistics
troops to the U.N.  force.  DOD also had about 1,100 troops under
U.S.  command in Somalia as a quick reaction force to assist U.N. 
troops.  The United Nations reimbursed DOD for the 2,900 logistics
troops and their equipment, but not for the 1,100 combat troops in
the quick reaction force. 


EFFECTIVENESS OF U.N.  OPERATIONS
========================================================== Chapter III

Findings



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The United Nations has had limited effectiveness carrying out complex
missions such as the U.N.  Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
and operations that entail the use of force, such as the U.N. 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and U.N.  Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM).\2 In Cambodia, for example, UNTAC held a successful
election, but national reconciliation was fragile because the force
did not disarm the combatants, ensure human rights were respected, or
ensure that the government acted impartially.  In Bosnia, U.N. 
operations fell short of carrying out many objectives.  Aid convoys
were delayed and obstructed on a daily basis.  In the safe areas,
human rights were violated and many civilians were killed. 

These operations took place in hostile environments.  However,
several weaknesses of the United Nations limit its ability to
effectively undertake such large and ambitious operations.  These
include weaknesses in leadership, command and control, and logistics. 
In Bosnia, for example, weaknesses in overall leadership and
coordination hindered consistent assertive action to deliver aid and
protect Bosnians.  The operation lacked central authority to set
policies and integrate humanitarian objectives with supporting
military activities.  All three operations illustrate the limits in
U.N.  command and coordination.  There was limited coordination of
military and civilian activities in UNTAC, partly due to
fragmentation in planning.  UNTAC's large multinational force carried
out orders inconsistently.  In UNOSOM II, command and control
sometimes broke down during operations and troop contingents carried
out actions independently of U.N.  command.  In Bosnia, command and
control problems prevented UNPROFOR from deploying troop contingents
to areas where assistance was desperately needed. 

The United Nations is ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, and
deploy personnel to large missions.  For example, operational plans
for UNTAC were not fully prepared before deployment, supplies and
equipment arrived long after deployment, and military and civilian
peacekeepers were late

Findings



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The United Nations has effectively observed and monitored peace
processes, supervised elections, and authorized multilateral action. 
U.N.  operations monitor cease-fires in such locations as the
Arab-Israeli border following the war of 1948; Cyprus; and Liberia. 
And U.N.  military observers work unarmed in the former Yugoslavia
and Liberia.  In Cambodia, UNTAC conducted over 1,000 investigations
of cease-fire violations.  The United Nations has also supervised
elections in Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique.  In Cambodia, the U.N. 
electoral unit organized a nationwide voter education campaign,
registered nearly 5 million Cambodians, and supervised a staff of
over 50,000 during the election.  The U.N.  Security Council also
authorizes multinational actions to address international disputes. 
Multinational coalitions for Somalia, Haiti, and Desert Storm in Iraq
were authorized by the U.N.  Security Council. 

Several factors enable the United Nations to carry out these actions. 
First, the actions are limited in scope.  Observation and monitoring,
for example, involves reporting on the situation through
on-the-ground visual inspection.  Some observer missions have used as
few as 17 personnel.  Elections are usually one component of a larger
operation, and the objective is clear--hold the election.  Standard
approaches are also used in conducting these actions.  The primary
action of over 15 U.N.  peace operations has been the observation and
monitoring of cease-fires, dating back to the U.N.  Truce Supervision
Organization in 1948.  Elections are supported by the electoral unit,
which specializes in planning elections.  For Cambodia, the electoral
unit wrote a plan for developing electoral laws, registering voters,
and administering the election.  The plan, completed 18 months prior
to the election, provided the blueprint used for the election. 


--------------------
\2 Humanitarian Intervention:  Effectiveness of U.N.  Operations in
Bosnia (April 13, 1994, NSIAD 94-156BR); U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Lessons
Learned in Managing Recent Missions (December 29, 1993, NSIAD 93-15)


U.S.  POLICY AND RESPONSE
=========================================================== Chapter IV

PDD-25



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

PDD-25 provides policy guidance for U.S.  support of and involvement
in peace operations.  This guidance outlines factors to be considered
by the United States before deciding to participate or support a new
U.N.  peace operation or renewing long-standing peace operations. 
Under the policy, the United States participates in peace operations
that are in the national interest.  Other factors to be considered
include whether missions have clear objectives, adequate financing,
and an end date for involvement of U.S.  troops.  As part of our
ongoing review of the effectiveness of peace operations, we are
focusing on the impact of PDD-25.  Before the President approved the
directive in May 1994, elements of it were considered in deciding to
participate in earlier peace operations.  But the first full
implementation of PDD-25 was in Rwanda.  Our evaluation of the
decision to participate in Rwanda indicated that the U.S.  agencies
closely scrutinized operations against the factors outlined in PDD-25
before committing to support the mission. 

In addition to providing guidance, the directive calls for
strengthening the U.N.  capacity to manage peace missions.  Our past
reports on Somalia and Cambodia, for example, have detailed
deficiencies in logistics, deployment, and staffing

U.S.  Actions to Strengthen U.N.  Capacity



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

PDD-25 recommends steps to improve the capabilities of the U.N. 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and thus provide for effective
and efficient peace operations.  U.S.  agencies have assisted in
making these improvements.  For example, DOD has detailed military
officers, sealift and airlift planners, and budget experts to U.N. 
headquarters to improve planning and preparation for new and ongoing
operations.  The Joint Staff sponsored a logistics working group
comprised of 10 U.S.  military logistics experts who produced a
manual of recommendations for further enhancement of logistics
operations at the United Nations. 

In May 1994, DOD commissioned the Defense Information Systems to
study the communication and information needs of the U.N.  Department
of Peacekeeping Operations.  The study recommends the establishment
of a modern communications architecture that will allow the United
Nations to save money on communications costs, to capture
data--financial, military or other--at any point from the field to
the headquarters, and to integrate its communication with systems
used by the United States and other nations that contribute to
peacekeeping operations. 

In addition to the support provided in the areas above, U.S. 
interagency working groups have been closely monitoring and

U.N.  Reform Efforts



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The United Nations has instituted or is implementing a number of
reforms.  Many of these reforms were a direct result of U.S efforts
to strengthen the U.N.  capacity to manage peace operations.  For
example, as a result of PDD-25, the U.N.  Security Council is more
closely reviewing its decisions to enter into international crises
and has adopted many of the same PDD-25 factors for consideration
before making a decision. 

The United Nations has also begun strengthening its planning
capability.  The Department of Peacekeeping Operations created a
separate planning unit, now headed by a Major General from a member
state, and obtained additional staff.  The planning unit prepares
plans for individual missions, civilian police, and demining and
intends to provide peacekeeping training.  Our ongoing work will
report on the results of the planning unit. 

The U.N.  reforms include the establishment of a new logistics center
to be established in Brindisi, Italy, where materials and equipment
left over from previous peace missions, such as those in El Salvador
and Cambodia, will be refurbished and reused.  Also, in March 1994, a
24-hour Situation Center was created.  During a visit, we noted that
the center quickly provides up-to-date information on troop locations
and bottlenecks in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  However,
compared to similar DOD activities, preciseness was lacking in some
areas. 


U.S.  MILITARY PARTICIPATION
============================================================ Chapter V

Participating U.  S.  Forces



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

U.S.  military forces have participated in peace operations for
almost 50 years, with limited numbers of personnel.  However, as the
number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased in the
past several years, the nature and extent of U.S.  participation have
changed markedly.  Recently, the United States has used much larger
numbers of combat and support forces to respond to events in a number
of locations. 

U.S.  Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical aircraft have
provided a variety of capabilities to peace operations, such as
suppression of enemy air defenses, close air support, air-to-ground
weapons delivery, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and
control.  Forces providing such capabilities have participated in
operations such as Deny Flight (Bosnia), Provide Comfort (Northern
Iraq), and Southern Watch (Southern Iraq).  Air Force C-130 and C-141
airlift aircraft have delivered humanitarian relief for operations
such as Provide Promise (Bosnia) and Support Hope (Rwanda). 

Navy Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units/Amphibious
Ready Groups are the naval units of choice for peace operations. 
They include an array of multipurpose, forward-deployed forces,
including aircraft carriers and supporting airwings, surface
combatants, amphibious ships, submarines, and maritime patrol
aircraft.  Naval forces have supported peace and humanitarian
operations off the coast of Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq,
Haiti, and Cuba. 

Forces from the Army's 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry
Division, 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division,
and 1st Armored Division have participated in peace operations such
as Restore and Continue Hope (Somalia), Able Sentry (Macedonia), and
Uphold Democracy (Haiti). 

Peace operations tend to rely heavily on support forces.  Military
police, special operations, logistics, and command, control, and
communications forces from all the services have provided unique
capabilities for peace operations.  Few other nations have this range
of capabilities, and these U.S.  forces have been used extensively in
most peace

Impact on U.S.  Forces



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Peace operations have stressed certain key military capabilities, few
of which are in the active component.  These include (1) certain Army
support forces, such as quartermaster, transportation, engineering,
and special operations units, and (2) Air Force specialized aircraft,
such as the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center,
the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System, and the F-4G Wild
Weasel, which is used for lethal suppression of enemy radars.  These
forces are being used in an increasing number of peace operations,
most of which have required a sustained presence. 

Peace operations have provided U.S.  military forces with valuable
experience, for example, in joint and coalition operations.  For some
units, these operations provide excellent training in the same
missions they would perform in a war.  However, the increased number
of these operations and their extended nature have resulted in (1) an
increased number of days spent away from home bases exceeding
recommended standards; (2) consecutive deployments; (3) missed
training; (4) increased maintenance on systems and equipment; and (5)
cannibalization of aircraft. 

Because of the increasing number of peace operations, aircrews
associated with certain specialized aircraft are exceeding the
120-day maximum time on temporary duty recommended by the Air Force's
Air Combat Command.  For example, personnel assigned to the only F-4G
squadron in the active component averaged approximately 145 days on
temporary duty in 1994, and some individuals exceeded 180 days. 

The extent to which a unit's combat capabilities are affected by
participating in peace operations depends on several factors,
including the length of participation and the mission performed. 
According to Air Force and Navy officials, aircrews can lose
proficiency in some combat skills through prolonged participation in
peace operations because the missions may not require the entire
breadth of combat capabilities.  Skills not practiced could include,
for example, night and low-level flight operations, night intercept
maneuvers, and other air combat maneuvers. 

To cope with the increased tempo of operations, the military has
relied on and most likely will continue to rely on reserve forces,
primarily volunteers.  In some cases, reserves have been needed to
meet mission requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill. 
In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief
to active forces that had been continuously participating in

Impact on Regional Conflicts



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Extended participation in multiple and/or large-scale peace
operations could impact the ability of some forces to respond in a
timely manner to major regional conflicts (MRC).  This is because
certain active component support units and specialized Air Force
aircraft used for these operations would also be needed initially in
an MRC.  Contrary to the DOD bottom-up review's assumption, it could
be difficult to quickly disengage these assets from a peace operation
and redeploy them to an MRC. 

First, some of the forces needed in the early days of an MRC, such as
port handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, and petroleum
handlers, would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the
peace operation.  During the Somalia peace operation, for example,
the Army used 100 percent of some of the contingency forces that
would be needed in the first 30 days of an MRC.  Had an MRC begun
then, immediate access to reserve component forces would have been
necessary.  The Army recognizes this challenge and is addressing the
issue as part of the ongoing Total Army Analysis 2003. 

Second, airlift assets would have to pick up personnel and equipment
from the peace operation.  Redeployment of ground personnel and
equipment from a peace operation could be difficult because the
already limited number of airlift assets flying from the United
States to the MRC would have to be provided to pick up personnel and
equipment from the peace operation. 

Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and
equipment before deploying to an MRC.  For example, once 10th
Mountain Division personnel returned from Somalia, it took
approximately 3 to 6 months to bring some units' skills back to a
level acceptable for combat operations, according to Division
officials.  The extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the
effects of harsh environments in certain peace operations, has
required that the equipment undergo extensive maintenance before it
can be used again.  Also, equipment and supplies off-loaded from
prepositioned ships for use in a peace operation, as was the case in
Somalia, would not be immediately available for use in an MRC. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

Ann Borseth
Joseph C.  Brown
Elizabeth Guran
Zina Jones
Julio A.  Luna
Tet Miyabara
Joseph F.  Murray
Lisa M.  Quinn
Nancy Ragsdale
Leroy Richardson
Steven H.  Sternlieb

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Raymond J.  Wyrsch

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

United Nations:  How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping
Operations Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug.  1, 1994). 
Contact:  Tet Miyabara (512-8974). 

Peace Operations:  Withdrawal of U.S.  Troops from Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).  Contact:  Steve Sternlieb
(512-4534). 

DOD Budget:  Analysis of Options for Funding Contingency Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-94-152BR, Apr.  26, 1994).  Contact:  Steve Sternlieb
(512-4534). 

Humanitarian Intervention:  Effectiveness of U.N.  Operations in
Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr.  13, 1994).  Contact:  Tet Miyabara
(512-8974). 

Peace Operations:  Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-88, Mar.  4, 1994).  Contact:  Steve Sternlieb
(512-4534). 

U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions
(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec.  19, 1993).  Contact:  Tet Miyabara (512-8974). 

Haiti:  Costs of U.S.  Programs and Activities Since the 1991
Military Coup (GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug.  6, 1993).  Contact:  Dave
Martin (512-8979). 

U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Observations on Mandates and Operational
Capability (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).  Contact:  Tet Miyabara
(512-8974). 

Serbia-Montenegro:  Implementation of U.N.  Economic Sanctions
(GAO/NSIAD-93-174, Apr.  22, 1993).  Contact:  Dave Martin
(512-8979). 

United Nations:  U.S.  Participation in Peacekeeping Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept.  9, 1992).  Contact:  Lee Richardson
(512-5493). 

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