Warfighting Capability: Some Army Tanks Should Be Transferred to the
Marine Corps (Letter Report, 03/15/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-93).

In response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, the United States has changed its national defense
strategy. As part of that effort, the military services have been
reexamining and restructuring their forces. This report reviews the
basis for the Marine Corps' tank requirement and the reasonableness of
the Marine Corps' efforts to have the Army transfer tanks to the Marine
Corps free of charge.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-94-93
     TITLE:  Warfighting Capability: Some Army Tanks Should Be 
             Transferred to the Marine Corps
      DATE:  03/15/94
   SUBJECT:  Defense contingency planning
             Combat readiness
             Defense capabilities
             Military land vehicles
             Marine Corps
             Strategic forces
             Army procurement
             Logistics
             National Guard
IDENTIFIER:  Soviet Union
             Warsaw Pact
             M1A1 Tank
             Desert Storm
             M60 Tank
             Persian Gulf War
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

March 1994

WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY - SOME ARMY
TANKS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE
MARINE CORPS

GAO/NSIAD-94-93

Warfighting Capability


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-254507

March 15, 1994

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

In response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution
of the Warsaw Pact, the United States has changed its national
defense strategy.  In light of that change, the military services
have been reexamining and restructuring their forces, and we have
been reviewing changes as they take place.  We recently reviewed the
basis for the Marine Corps' tank requirement and the reasonableness
of the Marine Corps' efforts to have the Army transfer tanks to the
Marine Corps free of charge.  In this report, we detail the results
of our review, which may be of interest to your Committees in
overseeing these programs. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Marine Corps established a requirement for 443 M1A1 tanks based
on a force structure of two active tank battalions and three maritime
prepositioning force squadrons, two reserve tank battalions, and
tanks to sustain the fleet.  This requirement is basically consistent
with the force structure recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) and by the bottom-up review recently conducted by the
Department of Defense (DOD).  However, the Marine Corps currently has
only 221 M1A1 tanks, posing a shortfall of 222 tanks against the
requirement. 

Because of the cost, the Marine Corps does not consider buying the
222 tanks it needs a viable option.  To help satisfy the Marine
Corps' requirements, the Army agreed to transfer 50 tanks from its
force.  Meanwhile, the Army plans to transfer about 1,500 of its M1A1
tanks to Army National Guard units by 2003.  To date, the Marine
Corps' efforts to obtain an additional transfer of tanks have been
unsuccessful. 

Transferring a relatively small number of additional tanks to the
Marine Corps instead of the National Guard would provide enhanced
overall readiness of U.S.  forces.  Specifically, an additional 84
tanks would provide the Marine Corps with enough tanks to fulfill its
maritime prepositioning squadrons requirement.  Tanks in these
squadrons would be available for deployment in a crisis much more
rapidly than those in National Guard units.  Similarly, the Marine
Corps' sustainment requirement for
40 additional tanks may also represent a higher priority transfer
than the National Guard.  These transfers would still allow the
National Guard to receive about 1,400 tanks. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

In February 1993, the Chairman, JCS, reported on the roles and
missions of the armed forces.  That report recommended a Marine Corps
tank force structure, which the Secretary of Defense approved in
March 1993.  In October 1993, the Secretary of Defense released a
report on the results of the bottom-up review--a comprehensive review
of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization,
infrastructure, and foundations.  A key judgment in that report was
that the United States must field forces, in concert with its allies,
capable of fighting and winning two major, nearly simultaneous
regional conflicts.  The bottom-up review relied on the results of a
mobility requirements study, dated January 1992, in which the
Chairman, JCS, identified a need to deploy Marine expeditionary
brigades\1 and an Army heavy brigade within 2 weeks of the onset of a
crisis. 


--------------------
\1 The Marine Corps uses 13 ships in 3 maritime prepositioning
squadrons to deploy its expeditionary forces. 


   THE MARINE CORPS HAS A
   RECOGNIZED NEED FOR TANKS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The Marine Corps established its requirement for 443 M1A1 tanks based
on its 2001 force structure plan--a concept for employment of the
Marine Corps in joint operations into the 21st century.  Table 1
shows the differences between the Marine Corps' tank requirements and
the amount expected to be on hand under current plans. 



                                     Table 1
                     
                     Status of Marine Corps' Tank Requirement

                                Requiremen    Amount             50-tank  Amount
Unit                                     t   on hand  Shortage  transfer  needed
------------------------------  ----------  --------  --------  --------  ------
Three maritime prepositioning          174        90        84         0      84
 squadrons                       (58 each)       (30
                                               each)
Two active tank battalions             116        88        28        28       0
                                 (58 each)
Two reserve tank battalions             64        16        48         0      48
                                 (32 each)  (8 each)
Tanks for sustainment\a                 89        27        62        22      40
================================================================================
Total                                  443       221       222        50     172
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The tank sustainment categories consist of the equipment allowance
pool (tanks used in training), prepositioned war reserves, depot
level maintenance (replacements for tanks undergoing major repairs),
and operational readiness float (tanks held in reserve). 

Currently, the Marine Corps has 221 M1A1 tanks and is scheduled to
receive an additional 50 from the Army by March 1994.  The Marine
Corps plans to use these additional tanks to bring its 2 active tank
battalions up to their authorized strength of 58 tanks each and to
provide dedicated tanks for combined arms training exercises at the
Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms,
California.  If the Marine Corps receives these tanks as scheduled,
it will still have a shortfall of
172 tanks. 

Requirements recommended by the Chairman, JCS, and approved by the
Secretary of Defense are consistent with the Marine Corps' stated
requirement.  In a report dated February 1993, the Chairman, JCS,
recommended that the Marine Corps retain enough tank battalions to
support amphibious operations and fill three maritime prepositioning
squadrons and that the Army provide any additional armor units as
required.\2 In March 1993, the Secretary of Defense (1) approved the
recommendation, (2) directed the Marine Corps to meet the recommended
requirement, and (3) directed the Secretaries of the Army and the
Navy to establish joint procedures for the use of Army armor units in
wartime when required by the Marine Corps. 

While the Chairman, JCS, and the Secretary of Defense did not specify
the number of tanks needed by the Marine Corps, according to a
representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Marine Corps' requirement is valid.  However, this representative
noted that the Army's requirements are valid as well.  According to
Army officials, the Army had no excess M1A1 tanks as of January 1994. 
The Army plans to preposition some tanks on ships and transfer about
1,500 tanks to National Guard units to offset the phaseout of its M60
tanks.  This transfer is expected to be completed in the year 2003. 


--------------------
\2 During Operation Desert Storm, Marine Corps forces in Saudi Arabia
participated with an Army armored brigade in the breaching operation
that ultimately led to the capture of Kuwait International Airport
and the liberation of Kuwait City. 


   THE MARINE CORPS' NEED FOR ARMY
   TANKS APPEARS TO BE REASONABLE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Marine Corps believes that at an estimated cost of $965.7 million
(in fiscal year 1996 dollars), the 222 M1A1 tanks it needs are
unaffordable.  If the Army agreed to transfer the 222 tanks from its
inventory, the Marine Corps might have to pay only the costs
associated with the transfer.  In June 1993, senior Army and Marine
Corps officers held informal discussions concerning the Marine Corps'
obtaining tanks from the Army.  These discussions resulted in an
agreement to transfer the 50 tanks discussed earlier from the Army to
the Marine Corps.  A Marine Corps' official estimated it would cost
about $11.2 million to transfer the 50 tanks to the Marine Corps.\3
To date, the Army has not agreed to an additional transfer of tanks. 

DOD's report on its bottom-up review confirms the need to fill active
duty units first.  With the drawdown of forces overseas, DOD places a
premium on rapidly deployable, highly lethal forces to halt an
invasion in a major regional conflict.  Accordingly, the
prepositioning of heavy combat equipment and supplies, both ashore
and afloat, will be essential in future conflicts.  However, at
present, the Marine Corps' maritime prepositioning squadrons are 84
tanks short. 

DOD's report also states that National Guard combat forces will
deploy later than active forces during a crisis.  This is consistent
with the Army's own strategic priorities.  The Army's policy is to
distribute equipment based on the principle that the first to fight
are the first to be equipped, and active Army units are expected to
be among the first to deploy.  Our work on the use of Army National
Guard combat units during the Persian Gulf War indicates that these
units would not be available for early deployment in a crisis.  We
testified in May 1992 that during the Persian Gulf War, the Army
National Guard's roundout brigades remained in a training status
until the end of the war because of significant deficiencies.\4 As a
result, the Army has replaced the roundout brigades with active
forces in its early deploying divisions. 


--------------------
\3 This cost includes $20,000 to pack and preserve the tanks for
transport, $1.2 million to transport the tanks from Europe, and $10
million that has been allocated to upgrade the tanks to the level of
those in its current inventory. 

\4 Operation Desert Storm:  Army Guard Combat Brigade War Lessons
Reflect Long-Standing Problems (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-36, May 5, 1992). 


   RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY
   OF DEFENSE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

To ensure that the Army's transfers of M1A1 tanks best contribute to
total military capability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to transfer 84 M1A1 tanks to the
Marine Corps to meet its maritime prepositioning squadrons tank
requirement.  We also recommend that the Secretary (1) assess whether
transferring an additional 40 tanks to satisfy the Marine Corps'
sustainment requirement has a higher priority than providing those
tanks to the National Guard and (2) direct the Army to transfer an
additional 40 tanks to the Marine Corps if the assessment shows that
the Marine Corps has a higher priority than the Army National Guard
requirement. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

DOD noted that the Marine Corps has not officially requested that
additional tanks be transferred from the Army to meet its
requirements at this time.  DOD stated that it would reassess the
relative priority of Army and Marine Corps requirements before any
further transfer of tanks occurs.  DOD intends to further consider
our recommendations before reaching a final decision, but did not set
any timetable for the decision. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

To evaluate the basis for the Marine Corps' tank requirements and
efforts to acquire needed tanks, we reviewed (1) the Marine Corps'
development of its requirement for 443 M1A1 tanks, (2) the JCS roles
and missions report as it relates to tanks, (3) the decision made by
the Secretary of Defense on the JCS report, (4) the results of the
bottom-up review, and (5) the mobility requirements study. 

We discussed the issues in this report with officials from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, and the Marine Corps in
Washington, D.C., and incorporated their comments as appropriate.  We
conducted our work from March 1993 through January 1994 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget.  We will also make
copies available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix II. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated February 16, 1994. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

1.  We have revised the report to clarify the content of DOD's roles
and missions report as it relates to Marine Corps armor force
structure. 

2.  We have revised the report to reflect (1) the more recent Marine
Corps tank requirement figure and (2) the nature of Army armor
support to the Marine Corps.  DOD's comments state that there will
only be 400 M1A1 tanks to replace more than 1,600 Army National Guard
M60 tanks.  Our analysis indicates that over the period 1993-2003,
the Army plans to transfer a total of more than 1,500 M1A1 tanks from
the Army to the National Guard.  We have clarified our report to make
clear the time period over which this transfer will occur. 

3.  We do not question the validity of the Army National Guard tank
requirements.  However, in allocating tanks over the next decade, we
believe that DOD needs to look beyond individual service priorities. 
Accordingly, the focus of our report is on the need to allocate tanks
that the Army plans to transfer in the manner that best supports the
premium the bottom-up review places on rapidly deployable, highly
lethal forces to halt an invasion in a major regional conflict.  We
believe that (1) the Marine Corps' recognized need for tanks, (2) the
premium the bottom-up review places on rapidly deployable forces, and
(3) the application of the Army's priorities for distributing
equipment across service lines leads to the conclusion that
additional tanks be transferred to the Marine Corps. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Steven H.  Sternlieb, Assistant Director
William Wood, Senior Evaluator
Nancy Ragsdale, Managing Editor


   LOS ANGELES REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

Joseph E.  Dewechter, Evaluator-in-Charge
Dennis DeHart, Regional Management Representative
Lorene S.  Sarne, Evaluator

