B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain (Letter Report,
09/08/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-217).

Problems with the technology of the B-2 Stealth bomber, including its
sophisticated radar systems and computer software, coupled with testing
delays, could push acquisition costs for 20 aircraft above the $44
billion ceiling imposed by Congress. Although the Air Force believes
that the B-2 acquisition program can be completed within the total
program cost limitation, the Air Force has not prepared documentation
describing its analysis, assumptions, and rationale for the estimate.
GAO believes that major uncertainties surround completion of the B-2
acquisition within the cost limitation. About 57 percent of the planned
flight test hours are not yet completed and testing to date has
highlighted problems that have not yet been corrected. Additional
performance problems could crop up during the remaining testing that
would boost program costs.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     TITLE:  B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain
      DATE:  09/08/94
   SUBJECT:  Bomber aircraft
             Air Force procurement
             Aircraft research
             Defense cost control
             Advanced weapons systems
             Future budget projections
             Reporting requirements
             Advance appropriations
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Research and development
IDENTIFIER:  B-2 Aircraft
             B-1B Aircraft
             Joint Direct Attack Weapon
             Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
             NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
             C-17 Aircraft
             F-14D Aircraft
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================================================================ COVER

Report to Congressional Committees

September 1994



B-2 Bomber

=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  GPS - Global Positioning Satellite system
  JDAM - Joint Direct Attack Munition
  RCS - radar cross-section
  RDT&E - research, development, test, and evaluation
  TSSAM - Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile

=============================================================== LETTER


September 8, 1994

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994 limits
how much can be spent on acquiring B-2 aircraft.  The conference
report on the 1994 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act
calls for GAO to report at regular intervals on the total B-2
acquisition costs through completion of the production program.  This
is the first in a series of reports concerning B-2 acquisition costs. 
Our objectives were to identify risks that remain in the program and
identify issues that could affect the Air Force's ability to complete
the acquisition of 20 operational aircraft within the cost

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The B-2 development program was initiated in 1981 and was followed by
approval in 1987 to procure B-2 aircraft concurrently with the
development and testing effort.  The Air Force's early plans were to
acquire 132 operational aircraft; however, the plans were reduced in
the early 1990s to 20 operational aircraft.\1 At about the same time,
the B-2's mission emphasis was changed from being principally a
strategic bomber capable of delivering nuclear weapons to a
conventional bomber capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. 

The 1994 Defense Authorization Act, in addition to reaffirming a
limit on procuring no more than 20 operational B-2 aircraft, also
limited the program acquisition costs to no more than $28,968.0
million, expressed in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars.  Currently,
the same program acquisition cost limitation expressed in then-year
dollars is $44,656.0 million. 

The last of the 20 operational aircraft are scheduled for delivery in
January 1998.  These aircraft are required to be low observable
aircraft with sufficient range and payload capability to deliver
precision-guided conventional weapons or nuclear weapons anywhere in
the world with enhanced survivability. 

Most B-2 aircraft delivered will not initially meet that requirement. 
To meet the requirement, 18 of the aircraft, including 5 test
aircraft, are scheduled to undergo major modifications after their
initial delivery to the Air Force.  The modifications now planned are
required partly as a consequence of producing the aircraft before the
test program uncovered problems and limitations.  The modifications
are also partly necessitated by the change in the B-2's mission from
a nuclear to a conventional bomber.  Planned modifications to correct
defects and incorporate full conventional and strategic capabilities
are scheduled to continue through July 2000.  Appendixes I and II
include details of the planned modifications. 

Although the flight test program began in July 1989, it was only 43
percent complete as of July 31, 1994, because of delays and problems
experienced earlier in the test program. 

\1 This includes 5 test aircraft and 15 production aircraft. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Significant development, testing, production, and modification
efforts are required before the 20 operational aircraft meet their
final\2 performance configuration.  Through fiscal year 1994, the
Congress has appropriated $39,639.7 million, about 89 percent of the
$44,656.0 million cost limitation established.  Air Force plans
indicate that the funding required to complete the program will be
spread over the next 10 fiscal years, ending in fiscal year 2004. 

Air Force officials believe the total program cost limitation is
sufficient to accommodate completion of the B-2 acquisition program. 
However, the Air Force has not prepared documentation describing its
analysis, assumptions, and rationale for the estimate.  The lack of
the required documentation hindered our evaluation of B-2 costs. 
Further, in October 1993, an independent Air Force review team
identified significant risk in sustaining and interim contractor
support costs yet to be incurred in the procurement program.  The
review team noted a need for additional cost analyses and recommended
specific analyses be accomplished by the Air Force. 

We believe there is uncertainty about whether the Air Force will be
able to complete B-2 acquisition within the cost limitation.  About
57 percent of the planned flight test hours are not yet completed and
testing to date has identified problems that are yet to be corrected. 
Additional performance problems could be discovered during the
remaining testing that would increase program acquisition costs. 
Correcting problems already identified during testing and new
problems identified in the remainder of the test program could cause
additional development effort, further extension of development and
test schedules, and increased costs to further modify or correct
defects on delivered aircraft. 

Much of the funding remaining to be appropriated is expected to pay
for such things as B-2 support, including support equipment, spares,
technical data, and interim contractor support.  However, making an
accurate estimate of these costs requires that DOD decide on the
specific support approach for the B-2.  The Congress directed that no
funds be used to establish an Air Force organic maintenance support
activity for the B-2 until the Undersecretary of Defense,
Acquisition, reviewed the infrastructure for the private sector and
Air Force depot support and maintenance of the B-2.  The
Undersecretary was to report no later than May 15, 1994, about the
most efficient and cost-effective use of both public and private
facilities to support the B-2.  As of July 31, 1994, DOD had not
issued its report.  Until this decision is made, B-2 support costs
remain uncertain. 

\2 The final performance configuration is now defined as a block 30
aircraft with certain other planned performance improvements.  See
appendix I for definitions of B-2 configurations. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Through fiscal year 1994, the Congress has appropriated $39,639.7
million of the $44,656 million that the Air Force expects to be
needed for B-2 acquisition.  Significant program efforts are required
to complete the acquisition of B-2s.  The rest of the funding is to
be requested through fiscal year 2004.  In addition, the contractor
must complete initial delivery of the production aircraft and modify
aircraft to the final configuration within the cost and schedule
agreed to in the current contract.  In a January 1994 evaluation of
the B-2 costs, an independent Air Force cost review team identified
cost trends that indicated the Air Force needed to take actions to
ensure the program would not cost more than the congressional limit
on the B-2 program. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The Air Force financial plan indicates that $5,016.3 million in
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement
funding is yet to be appropriated through fiscal year 2004.  Table 1
shows the Air Force's current plans for the use of these remaining

                           Table 1
           Planned Use of Funds to be Appropriated
            for B-2 Program From Fiscal Years 1995
                         Through 2004

                    (Dollars in millions)

RDT&E funding          Amount  Procurement funding    Amount
-------------------  --------  -------------------  --------
Air vehicle            $481.6  Support              $1,139.5
Weapon delivery         209.5  Curtailment/            679.5
 systems                        closeout
Engineering/            406.5  Spares                  532.8
 program management
Test and evaluation     243.1  Interim contractor      229.1
Support                 135.0  Other government        122.2
Other government        549.8  Retrofit                102.6
Engineering changes     180.0  Engineering changes       5.1
Subtotal             $2,205.5  Subtotal             $2,810.8
Total                                               $5,016.3
Two major program efforts yet to be funded and executed are
identified in table 1 as support ($1,139.5 million) and interim
contractor support ($229.1 million).  DOD has not yet made decisions
that are likely to affect the ultimate cost of logistics support. 
For example, it must decide whether the Air Force or the contractor
will perform depot support.  Until such decisions are made, estimates
of logistics support costs will remain uncertain.  The fiscal year
1994 Defense Appropriations Act requires the Undersecretary of
Defense, Acquisition, to evaluate the most efficient and
cost-effective use of public and private facilities for B-2 depot
support.  A report should have been submitted to the congressional
defense committees by May 15, 1994, but as of July 31, 1994, the
report had not been submitted. 

The B-2 program office has not completed the cost estimate
documentation required for major defense acquisition programs.  The
cost estimate documentation is to include a detailed record of the
estimating procedures and data used to develop the cost estimate. 
B-2 program officials told us they have not completed the
documentation because of higher priorities within the program office. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

All the production aircraft, except the last two to be delivered, are
planned to be subsequently modified.  The modifications of these
aircraft are currently planned to begin in June 1996 and end in July
2000.  In addition, the modification of the five test aircraft are
planned to begin in September 1995 and end in May 2000. 

Aircraft are scheduled to be delivered in three different
configurations, called blocks 10, 20, and 30.  The blocks are based
on capabilities planned to be demonstrated during the flight test
program.  Appendix I shows the aircraft capabilities planned in each
block.  Air Force officials believe the total program cost limitation
is sufficient to complete the B-2 acquisition in the block 30
configuration.  Appendix II shows the detailed schedule for initial
aircraft delivery and subsequent modifications. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

In October 1993, the Secretary of the Air Force chartered an
independent Air Force team to review the B-2 program and determine if
it could be executed within the congressional cost limitation.  The
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial
Management stated, "The Independent Cost and Executability Review
team identified significant cost risk in sustaining and material
costs for production and interim contractor support costs for
support." One element of the team's analysis showed actual sustaining
costs were on a trend to exceed the sustaining costs estimated to
complete the B-2 program.  The team concluded, however, that the B-2
program could be executed within the cost limitation, provided that
B-2 program management actions are successful in changing the
existing cost performance trends of the contractor. 

Because of the limited financial analysis found during its review and
the cost risks that remain, the review team recommended that the Air
Force closely monitor the remaining efforts covered by the production
contract, noting several reports that should be analyzed and
analytical procedures that should be followed.  The team also
recommended that an annual program office cost estimate be prepared
and submitted with the annual B-2 budget request, which would include
a detailed analysis of the cost of items such as aircraft production
and block 20 and block 30 modifications. 

The review team also pointed out that the 1994 Defense Appropriations
Act prohibits the Air Force from using funds to establish or support
any organic depot maintenance for the B-2 until DOD studies and
reports to the Congress on the support concept.  The Air Force will
fund interim contractor support for interim maintenance until DOD
develops and implements a support concept.  Since interim contractor
support is paid for by procurement funds that are included within the
cost limitation, delays in the DOD support decision could extend the
time period originally planned for interim contractor support.  This
could increase interim contractor support costs over the Air Force's

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

A major risk to staying within the cost limitation stems from the
fact that all the aircraft are being produced with only 43 percent of
the flight test program completed as of July 31, 1994.  Flight test
results are to be used to determine the performance specifications
that both production and modified aircraft must achieve.  Therefore,
until specified performance is demonstrated through the test flight
program, the extent to which any further problems will affect
development and production costs and schedules is largely unknown. 
However, based on past experiences with other systems, flight testing
typically identifies problems that require financial resources to

Early flight testing of the B-2 uncovered numerous problems such as
radar cross-section (RCS) deficiencies and aft deck cracks. 
Corrective actions have been identified and either have been or will
be tested in a B-2 aircraft.  The flight test program is, however,
not scheduled to be completed until July 1997.  As of July 1994,
performance testing of offensive and defensive avionics, precision
weapons, and range/payload is yet to be completed.  Delivery of
software to integrate B-2 systems and subsystems, important to
meeting test schedules, is not expected to be completed before
December 1996.  Further, some problems are being encountered with the
RCS of production aircraft.  The status and plans for completing
tests in each of these areas are discussed below. 

  Offensive and defensive avionics.  Avionics have not been fully
     flight tested in the B-2.  Several radar modes and defensive
     avionics functions, important to the B-2 mission, are scheduled
     for flight testing as late as 1997.  Recent problems with the
     terrain-following and terrain-avoidance functions of the radar
     and signal processing capacity in Band 1 of the defensive
     avionics subsystem have delayed flight testing of the radar and
     defensive avionics subsystem. 

Problems with the terrain-following and terrain-avoidance functions
will cause about a 1-year delay in the scheduled flight testing of
selected parts of these functions.  Air Force engineers stated that
changes to the avionics software have reduced the rate of occurrence
of some of the problems.  Additional software changes and flight
testing are still required to resolve all the current deficiencies. 
However, Air Force officials noted that aircraft delivered in the
block 10 configuration are not required to have an effective
terrain-following and terrain-avoidance capability.  Accordingly,
acceptance of block 10 aircraft will not be delayed.  We are
concerned because the Air Force experienced development problems with
the B-1B terrain-following radar mode that delayed its full
capability until well after the B-1B's initial operational capability

The contractor has developed software changes to avoid the conditions
causing the signal processing capacity problem with Band 1 of the
defensive avionics.  This will allow the continuation of flight
testing for other defensive functions but does not resolve the signal
processing capacity problem.  Air Force engineers told us they have
not determined if the problems are caused by deficiencies in the
hardware or software. 

  Precision weapons.  The principal mission of the B-2 was changed
     from nuclear to conventional bombing missions in late 1992.  To
     make effective use of the expensive and complex B-2 aircraft,
     the Air Force planned to incorporate new conventional munitions
     with precision capabilities.  These new munitions, the Joint
     Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Tri-Service Standoff Attack
     Missile (TSSAM), are planned to be the primary conventional
     weapons to be used by the B-2.  These weapons are still in
     development, and integration flight testing is not scheduled to
     begin until 1995 or later. 

  Range/payload.  The flight testing was planned to be completed in
     July 1994, but data analysis is not scheduled to be completed
     until December 1994.  About one-third of the test points were
     completed as of April 1994.  Estimated capability based on
     preliminary test data show the B-2 should meet the range/payload
     requirements.  However, Air Force officials said the margin for
     error is small for some of the specification range

  Integration software.  The B-2 flight test schedule depends on the
     delivery of the software that integrates the functions of the
     various subsystems into the aircraft so it can perform as an
     operational military aircraft.  Critical functions that remain
     to be incorporated into the test aircraft include the Global
     Positioning Satellite system (GPS), TSSAM, final defensive
     system, Band 4 defensive capabilities, GPS Aided Targeting
     System, and JDAM.  In addition, any problems identified during
     flight testing must be resolved, and software updates will be
     required.  The remaining development integration software
     versions are scheduled to be delivered to the flight test
     program through December 1996.  Final block 30 production
     software is not scheduled to be delivered until January 20,
     1997.  Historically, software has been a source of development
     problems that resulted in schedule delays and cost overruns. 
     Both the C-17 and the F-14D experienced such software
     development problems. 

  RCS.  The Air Force has done extensive testing to demonstrate
     capabilities and correct serious problems identified earlier in
     the test program.  As of July 31, 1994, however, flight testing
     of a fully configured block 30 aircraft has not been
     accomplished.  Flight tests to demonstrate RCS in a block 30
     aircraft are scheduled to begin in late 1995 after a test
     aircraft has been modified to include RCS enhancements and other
     block 30 changes. 

Before the Air Force accepts delivery of early production aircraft,
limited RCS acceptance testing is to be completed to determine if the
aircraft meets the block 10 acceptance criteria.  The second and
third production aircraft were scheduled for delivery on March 31,
1994, and July 31, 1994, but the Air Force refused to accept delivery
because RCS performance did not meet the acceptance criteria. 
Officials stated aircraft failed to meet the criteria because of a
slight change in the process used to manufacture the aircraft
tailpipe.  They said the manufacturing process has been corrected and
new tailpipes have been installed and successfully tested on one of
the aircraft, bringing it into compliance with the block 10 RCS
acceptance criteria.  The Air Force accepted the aircraft on August
17, 1994. 

Other RCS problems resulting from the manufacturing process were
identified during the acceptance testing of the third production
aircraft and have been corrected, according to Air Force officials. 
However, flight testing of the additional corrective measures has
been delayed because problems with the aircraft's environmental
control system have prevented further acceptance flight testing. 
These RCS problems show how sensitive RCS is to small changes in the
aircraft or its manufacturing process and raises concerns about
production repeatability of the specified RCS. 

\3 Ten aircraft will be heavier than the specification aircraft by
about 3,000 pounds.  This equates to reduced aircraft range
(unrefueled distance) of between 40 and 150 miles, depending on the
altitude of the aircraft. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force

  direct the B-2 Program Office to complete the annual cost estimate
     and the supporting documentation for the fiscal year 1996
     President's budget and

  require that office to prepare updated cost estimates and the
     supporting documentation before future annual budgets are
     submitted to the Congress. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
findings and stated that it would direct the Air Force to take action
on our recommendations.  DOD acknowledged that significant work
remained to deliver fully operational B-2 aircraft but said that
remaining tasks are on contract and the amount of work required is
understood by the Air Force and the contractor.  In addition, the Air
Force is currently monitoring the key cost elements of the B-2
program.  DOD stated continued interim contractor support costs for
the B-2 remains an open issue, as they have not yet decided whether
to support the B-2 with organic or contractor maintenance.  Until
this support issue is resolved, DOD states pressure will continue on
the cost cap. 

Although DOD is correct in saying that most major program efforts yet
to be funded are on contract, we would point out that many are
contract options that are to be exercised as far in the future as the
year 2002.  Furthermore, the B-2 development contract will be
incrementally funded for several more years.  With only 43 percent of
the flight test program complete, uncertainties exist that can affect
both development and production costs.  These uncertainties are
potentially of greater risk to the B-2 program because of the
extensive amount of concurrency between development and production. 
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We reviewed available documents and records and interviewed officials
at the B-2 Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the
Departments of Defense and the Air Force, Washington D.C.; and the
Northrop B-2 Division, Pico Rivera and Palmdale, California. 

We performed our review from January 1994 through August 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue date.  At
that time, we will send copies to the Ranking Minority Members of the
Senate and House Committees on Armed Services; Subcommittees on
Defense, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; the
Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director of Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties.  We will make
copies available to others upon request. 

This report was prepared under the direction of Louis J.  Rodrigues,
Director, Systems Development and Production Issues, who may be
reached on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report.  Other contributors to this report are listed
in appendix IV. 

Frank C.  Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General

=========================================================== Appendix I

                                                            Block 30
                                                            modifications and
Capability                              Block 20            performance
categories          Block 10            modifications       improvements
------------------  ------------------  ------------------  --------------------
Mission             Initial signature   Band 1-3 awareness  Final signature
survivability                                               Band 4 awareness\ a
Low observable                                              Contrail Management
                                                            System \a

Terrain following/  Visual contour      Limited TF/TA       Full TF/TA
terrain avoidance   flying

Radar               6 radar modes       11 radar modes      19 radar modes

Navigation          Stellar/inertial    Global              Full specification
                    navigation          Positioning         requirements
                                        Satellite system
                                        (GPS) \a

Fixed target        Limited mark-84     Full mark-84        Full B-83/B-61 bomb
effectiveness       (2,000 lb)          bombs               rack
                    and B-83 nuclear    Precision-guided    assembly weapons
                    bomb                munitions           Joint Direct Attack
                                        GPS-Aided           Munition\ a
                                        Targeting System

Deployability       No requirement      Deployable for 14   Deployable for 30
                                        days                days

Command and         Normal Air Force    Secure high         MILSTAR -UHF \a
control             Satellite           frequency
                    System Normal and
                    secure VHF/UHF

Air refueling       KC-10/135           Autonomous          Autonomous
                    directed            rendezvous          rendezvous
                    rendezvous          defensive           multiple on multiple
                                        avionics            JP-8
                                        single on single

Flying qualities    Limited aero        Full aero
                    envelope Limited    envelope
                    autopilot           Full auto pilot
                    80 percent loads    100 percent loads
                    clearance           clearance
                    Limited weapons     Full weapons bay
                    bay door            door
                    envelope            envelope
                    Tactical air        Radar coupled
                    navigation and      approaches
                    instrument landing  All weather
                    system approaches
                    Light to moderate

Ground mission      Unit-level mission                      Deployable unit
planning            planning                                mission

In-flight mission   In-flight route     In-flight mission   In-flight mission
planning            changes             changes             changes

Training            Training systems    Training systems    Training systems
                    compatible          compatible          compatible

Reliability/        On aircraft -all    Off aircraft -Air   Off aircraft -Air
maintainability     Air Force           Force/interim       Force/
                    Off aircraft -      contractor          contractor
                    limited             support/            logistics
                    Air Force/limited   contract support    support or mix
                    interim             mix
                    contractor support

Other                                                       Pilot vehicle
                                                            interface \a
                                                            Defensive management
                                                            system tools\a
\a Characteristics are planned performance improvements and are not
yet contractually definitized. 

========================================================== Appendix II

                          Start        Complete     Start        Complete
-----------  -----------  -----------  -----------  -----------  ---------------
1            Test                                   Sept. 1,     Mar. 31, 1999

2            Test                                   Dec. 1,      Feb. 28, 2000

3            Test                                   June 1,      May 31, 2000

4            Test                                   Jan. 1,      July 31, 1998

5            Test                                   Apr. 1,      Dec. 31, 1999

6            Aug. 31,                               Feb. 1,      May 31, 1998
             1994\c                                 1997

7            Dec. 17,                               Aug. 1,      Dec. 31, 1997
             1993                                   1996

8            Mar. 31,                               Nov. 1,      Mar. 31, 1998
             1994\d                                 1996

9            July 31,                               June 1,      Sept. 30, 1997
             1994\e                                 1996

10           Oct. 31,                               Sept. 1,     Dec. 31, 1998
             1994                                   1997

11           Jan. 31,     Dec. 1,      Jan. 31,     Apr. 1,      July 31, 1999
             1995         1996         1997         1998

12           Apr. 30,     Apr. 1,      May 31,      Mar. 1,      June 30, 2000
             1995         1997         1997         1999

13           Oct. 31,     Aug. 1,      Sept. 30,    July 1,      Oct. 31, 1998
             1995         1996         1996         1997

14           Jan. 31,     Oct. 1,      Nov. 30,     Feb. 1,      May 31, 1999
             1996         1996         1996         1998

15           Apr. 30,     Feb. 1,      Mar. 31,     July 1,      Sept. 30, 1999
             1996         1997         1997         1998

16           July 31,                               Nov. 1,      Jan. 31, 2000
             1996                                   1998

17           Sept. 30,                              Jan. 1,      Apr. 30, 2000
             1996                                   1999

18           Dec. 31,                               May 1, 1999  July 31, 2000

19           Oct. 31,

20           Jan. 31,
\a There is a sixth test aircraft that is not currently planned to be
modified to operational capability.  (Program, therefore, has 21
total aircraft.)

\b Five test aircraft are planned to be modified and delivered to the
Air Force in block 30 configuration after flight test completion. 
Ten aircraft are planned to be delivered to the Air Force in block 10
configuration.  Five of these are planned to be modified to block 20
configuration.  All 10 of these are planned to be modified to block
30 configuration.  Three aircraft are planned to be delivered to the
Air Force in block 20 configuration and then modified to block 30
configuration.  Two aircraft are planned to be delivered to the Air
Force in block 30 configuration. 

\c This aircraft underwent special testing and is planned to be
delivered out of sequence. 

\d Air Force acceptance of this aircraft was delayed because of RCS
problems.  It was accepted on August 17, 1994. 

\e Air Force acceptance of this aircraft was delayed because of RCS
problems.  It is now scheduled for acceptance on September 6, 1994. 

(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
========================================================== Appendix II

(See figure in printed edition.)

(See figure in printed edition.)

(See figure in printed edition.)

(See figure in printed edition.)

========================================================== Appendix IV

-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1

Robert D.  Murphy

-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2

Michael J.  Hazard
Jeffrey T.  Hunter
Brian Mullins

-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3

James F.  Dinwiddie