Army Training: Prioritizing and Following Up on Lessons Learned Should
Minimize Recurring Weaknesses (Letter Report, 09/16/93,
GAO/NSIAD-93-231).

The Army assesses the performance of units during their rotations at the
combat training centers, identifies lessons learned from their battle
experience, and shares this information so that training and doctrine
can be fine tuned.  Despite this effort, GAO found that Army units
repeat many of the same mistakes during maneuvers at the combat training
centers.  Some of these mistakes could have serious consequences on a
real battlefield.  For example, when fighting broke out in the Persian
Gulf, Army officials sought to resolve problems in Army training that
could contribute to fratricide incidents.  Most of these problems had
been identified two years earlier but had yet to be corrected.  The Army
is not reaping all the benefits of the lessons learned at the training
centers because the Training and Doctrine Command's program lacks
procedures for assigning priorities to the lessons and for tracking the
schools' use of them.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-93-231
     TITLE:  Army Training: Prioritizing and Following Up on Lessons 
             Learned Should Minimize Recurring Weaknesses
      DATE:  09/16/93
   SUBJECT:  Military training
             Prioritizing
             Army personnel
             Operations analysis
             Military facilities
             Combat readiness
             Army bases
             Defense capabilities
             Information dissemination operations
IDENTIFIER:  Army Training and Doctrine Command Decision Support System
             Army Center for Lessons Learned System
             Desert Storm
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives

September 1993

ARMY TRAINING - PRIORITIZING AND
FOLLOWING UP ON LESSONS LEARNED
SHOULD MINIMIZE RECURRING
WEAKNESSES

GAO/NSIAD-93-231

Army Training

(393509)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-253884

September 15, 1993

The Honorable Earl Hutto
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

The Army assesses the performance of units during their rotations at
the combat training centers, identifies the lessons learned from
their battlefield experience, and disseminates this information so
that training and doctrine can be modified to avoid repeating the
same mistakes during training exercises.  As requested, we determined
whether the Army has an effective program for using these lessons
learned to correct the problems identified at the training centers. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Army's forces train at four combat training centers.  Heavy
forces participate in exercises at the National Training Center at
Fort Irwin, California, and its smaller counterpart, the Combat
Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, where mechanized
infantry and armored battalions can engage in free-play maneuvers
against an opposing force.  A third training center, the Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, is used
primarily by light forces.  The fourth training center, the Battle
Command Training Program at Ft.  Leavenworth, Kansas, is used to
provide command and control training to division and corps battle
staffs. 

The Army has come to rely increasingly on these training centers to
train its combat units and assess their capabilities.  The training
centers enable units to train and maneuver in an environment that
closely parallels that of actual warfare.  With their electronic
instrumentation, they provide the capability to objectively document
units' performance and provide information on their strengths and
weaknesses. 

Under Army Regulation 11-33, the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) has overall responsibility for the Army's lessons learned
program.  TRADOC has assigned responsibility for lessons learned at
the training centers to its Combined Arms Command, which carries out
the program through its Center for Army Lessons Learned. 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned is responsible for identifying
systemic training strengths and weaknesses of units that participate
in major operations and exercises, including exercises at the
training centers.  To accomplish this task, the Center uses
information from a variety of sources, including "after action"
reports, audio and video transmissions that occur during the
exercises, and evaluations from observers at the training centers. 
After documenting the lessons learned, the Center consolidates them
and analyzes trends and deficiencies.  It then publishes the results
of its analyses in bulletins and newsletters that are sent to
TRADOC's schools and to other organizations throughout the Army. 

TRADOC has 18 schools that serve as proponents for their own area and
develop training programs for Army personnel in their military
specialty.  Included are the Infantry School, the Armor School, the
Aviation School, and the Engineer School.  Ultimately, the schools
are responsible for using the lessons learned analyses to modify
training and doctrine and to validate and assess the adequacy of
solutions to training problems. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Despite the lessons learned program, Army units repeat many of the
same mistakes during maneuver exercises at the combat training
centers.  Some of these mistakes could have serious consequences on a
real battlefield.  For instance, when hostilities erupted during the
Persian Gulf War, Army officials sought to resolve problems in Army
training that could contribute to fratricide incidents.  The Center
for Army Lessons Learned had identified most of these same problems
about 2 years earlier, but they had not been corrected. 

The Army is not achieving the full benefits of the lessons learned at
the training centers because TRADOC's program lacks procedures for
assigning priorities to the lessons and for tracking the schools' use
of them.  The lessons are essentially provided to the schools as
information to use as they wish.  Consequently, the schools lack
guidance on which problems the TRADOC leadership considers most
serious.  While the schools use the lessons learned, neither TRADOC
nor the schools keep track of the extent to which the schools modify
their training and doctrine to incorporate the lessons.  Further, the
schools are not held accountable by TRADOC for ensuring that problems
identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned are resolved. 


   UNITS' PERFORMANCE AT TRAINING
   CENTERS REVEALS RECURRING
   DEFICIENCIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Over the course of many years at the combat training centers, the
Center for Army Lessons Learned has identified a number of recurring
problems in units' performance.  These problems are in such areas as
battlefield planning; development and use of intelligence data,
reconnaissance, and communications; performance under chemical
threats; and integration of effective fire support into unit mission
planning.  In September 1992, for instance, the Center identified the
following recurring problems in units' performance:  battles were not
tracked properly; direct fire was not synchronized effectively;
reconnaissance and surveillance plans were not well coordinated,
managed, or focused; communications with higher headquarters were not
properly planned and executed; many fire support plans did not
support the scheme of maneuver; and operations in a chemical
environment were not satisfactory. 

Problems relating to fratricide have also been recurring at combat
training centers and firing ranges.  For example, in August 1988, an
M1 tank participating in gunnery exercises on a firing range in
Germany inadvertently shot several rounds outside of its firing
perimeter, hitting two M2 infantry fighting vehicles and causing
several casualties.  This accident prompted the TRADOC Commander to
direct the Center for Army Lessons Learned to conduct a follow-up
study on fratricide at the National Training Center.  The Center
found problems with fratricide--that is, units firing weapons via an
instrumented laser device were "destroying" tanks and other weapon
systems on their own side.  On the basis of this analysis, the
Combined Arms Command issued a plan in February 1989 to correct
deficiencies in six areas:  risk assessment, land navigation, target
assessment, target identification, fire planning, and fire control. 

The plan established specific actions to be taken and assigned
responsibilities for these actions to various TRADOC organizations,
including the proponent schools.  However, the responsible
organizations either did not carry out the actions in the plan or did
not document what actions they did take.  During 1990, the Center for
Army Lessons Learned continued to identify fratricide-related
problems at the National Training Center. 

The issue began to receive renewed interest because of Operation
Desert Storm.  Army officials raised concerns about the possibility
of fratricide, and the Combined Arms Command issued a new plan in
December 1990 for correcting fratricide-related deficiencies in unit
training.  This plan addressed the same six areas as the 1989 plan,
plus two others.  We found that the Army has more aggressively
implemented the 1990 plan, and recent data shows improvements in
fratricide-related problems since that time. 

Other examples of recurring deficiencies involve battlefield supply
procedures and the construction of fortifications.  The Combined Arms
Command reported in 1988 that combat units at the combat training
centers were bogged down waiting for engineering construction support
materials to reach them and had weaknesses in their basic
fortification skills.  The Combined Arms Command, believing that
these problems increased the risk that units could not conduct
successful defensive operations, issued a corrective action plan in
1988.  In spite of the plan, these problems were not completely
resolved.  Training center data reported in October 1992--4 years
later--showed that similar deficiencies remained.  According to
Combined Arms Command officials, the lack of progress in resolving
these deficiencies was caused by the tasks' complexity and competing
demands that limited training at home stations.  We believe that
another contributing factor may have been the Combined Arms Command's
failure to adequately monitor the plan's implementation. 

TRADOC officials told us that even though the Center for Army Lessons
Learned had continued to identify recurring deficiencies in exercises
conducted at the training centers, the deficiencies were not as
severe as they were in the past.  Furthermore, officials said that
some deficiencies will never be eliminated entirely because (1) the
Army is continuously training new soldiers and it is reasonable to
expect them to make mistakes as they learn their profession and (2)
some tasks are particularly complex and difficult to master.  These
officials may be correct in their view that recurring problems are
less severe, as indicated in fratricide data.  However, as discussed
below, we believe an effective assessment in such critical areas--as
well as whether more can or should be done to modify training and
doctrine--requires a more disciplined process. 


   TRADOC'S LESSONS LEARNED
   PROGRAM HAS WEAKNESSES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

TRADOC's lessons learned program has two primary weaknesses that
hamper its effectiveness.  First, TRADOC does not systematically rank
the lessons identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned on the
basis of their significance.  The schools thus choose the problems
they will address, with no direction from TRADOC leadership on which
ones merit greatest attention.  Second, TRADOC lacks formal follow-up
procedures for tracking the use of lessons learned and holding the
schools accountable for correcting deficiencies.  Absent such
procedures, TRADOC has limited knowledge as to whether and to what
extent the lessons are being used to resolve the problems identified
by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. 


      LESSONS LEARNED ARE NOT
      RANKED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR
      PRIORITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

When the Center for Army Lessons Learned publishes the results of its
analyses in bulletins and newsletters, it does not list the
deficiencies according to their significance.  This judgment is left
instead to the individual proponent schools.  Thus, the schools are
not systematically provided guidance on which problems the TRADOC
leadership considers most serious.  Senior school officials also do
not prioritize the lessons learned.  Rather, they rely on their
school staff--instructors, doctrine writers, and department heads--to
incorporate the lessons as they see fit in their training and
doctrinal modifications. 

In 1988, TRADOC attempted to take a more systematic approach to
correcting the problems identified at the combat training centers. 
It developed a "priority issue list" to rank the importance of each
of
28 problems that had been identified collectively by the senior
leadership of TRADOC, the Combined Arms Command, and the schools. 
TRADOC officials intended to prepare plans detailing the specific
actions required to resolve the most important problems on the list
within a 6-month to 2-year period.  The Commander of the Combined
Arms Command had previously endorsed the concept of a priority issue
list.  He stated that such a list would enable the TRADOC leadership
to establish clear priorities for those problems it deems most
serious, to identify the participants involved and establish
accountability, and to estimate the resources required to resolve
problems. 

The TRADOC Commander approved the priority issue list in April 1988,
stating that the list would be used to focus training exercises
during 1989.  However, the plan was never implemented, and many
issues identified on the list were left unresolved.  TRADOC officials
could not provide an explanation for this.  All of the individuals
involved had left TRADOC, and records were not kept to document the
plan's status. 

The former Director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned told us he
believed the priority issue list concept still had merit, and he
planned to develop another priority issue list.  The Center planned
to select about five top issues of recurring deficiency, determine
the reasons for these problems, and obtain suggestions on how to
solve them.  The plan would require the approval of the Combined Arms
Command and TRADOC headquarters.  The Deputy Commanding General for
Training at the Combined Arms Command also told us he plans to
reestablish a priority issue system. 


      TRADOC LACKS FOLLOW-UP
      PROCEDURES FOR TRACKING USE
      AND IMPACT OF LESSONS
      LEARNED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

Regulation 11-33 requires TRADOC to track the actions taken to
resolve training deficiencies.  TRADOC assigned this responsibility
to its Combined Arms Command in May 1989.  However, the Combined Arms
Command has not established formal tracking procedures. 
Consequently, TRADOC does not know to what extent the lessons
identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned are incorporated in
the schools' revisions to training and doctrine. 

Moreover, TRADOC does not hold the schools accountable for resolving
the problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned.  A
key reason for this is that no feedback mechanisms exist to provide
information on the impact of the schools' training and doctrinal
revisions--that is, whether they succeeded or failed in correcting
the identified deficiencies. 

Like TRADOC, the schools we visited also did not track their use of
lessons learned.  Officials at the Engineer School, Chemical School,
and Armor School told us that the staff who make critical decisions
concerning changes to training and doctrine are experienced in their
work and rely on the Center for Army Lessons Learned as just one
source of information.  For instance, the staff have frequent
telephone conversations with observers at training events, and many
have served as observers themselves.  These staff also review much of
the same raw data used by the Center for Army Lessons Learned in its
analyses, including after action reports and audio transmissions from
the training exercises. 

The Deputy Commanding General for Training at the Combined Arms
Command acknowledged the lack of formal and systematic follow-up
procedures.  However, he was satisfied that the schools were aware of
the problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and
that they took the appropriate steps to address them.  He also said
TRADOC's leadership and other senior Army officials, including the
Chief of Staff, Army, were aware of the recurring deficiencies in
unit training because the deficiencies are discussed at Army
conferences, seminars, and meetings.  He believes that the current or
informal approach works well. 

We disagree that the informal approach has been effective.  The
recurring deficiencies at the combat training centers indicate that
the problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned are
not systematically resolved.  Even when the Combined Arms Command has
issued a plan to correct specific problems--such as the 1989 plan to
correct fratricide-related problems--the Command has no assurances
that the plan has been implemented.  According to officials at the
Center for Army Lessons Learned, it took the Gulf War to prompt the
Army into developing and implementing a revised fratricide action
plan. 

Moreover, the reliance on an informal approach to correct training
and doctrine deficiencies is not compatible with the Army's practice
of periodically rotating military personnel assigned to TRADOC.  As a
result of personnel turnover, we found that there was little
institutional knowledge among TRADOC officials on either the use made
of lessons learned information or the progress made to minimize
recurring deficiencies.  For example, Engineer School officials had
little knowledge about specific actions taken to address deficiencies
involving battlefield supply procedures and the construction of
fortifications.  Moreover, it took these officials several days to
locate a copy of the original action plan. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander,
TRADOC, to establish a system for placing priorities on the problems
identified at the combat training centers.  A starting point for this
effort may be the new priority issue list being formulated by the
Center for Army Lessons Learned. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the
Commander, TRADOC, to establish procedures for tracking the schools'
use of lessons learned and for holding the schools accountable for
resolving the identified problems. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The Department of Defense agreed with our findings and
recommendations.  It said that while the lessons learned program had
provided important information to the Army, improvements could be
made.  In response to our recommendations, the Department said that
Army headquarters will provide guidance to TRADOC regarding the
interpretation of and compliance with Army Regulation 11-33.  More
specifically, it said that the guidance would direct TRADOC to
establish (1) a system to assign priorities to the problems
identified at the combat training centers and (2) procedures for
tracking lessons learned and assigning accountability for problem
resolution.  We believe that effective implementation of these
initiatives should significantly improve the lessons learned program. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed Army regulations related to
the lessons learned program, as well as directives from the TRADOC
headquarters.  We also reviewed information on recurring deficiencies
developed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, priority issue
lists of problem areas, plans for addressing deficiencies, and other
pertinent documents. 

We interviewed Army officials responsible for the management of the
lessons learned program at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the
Combined Arms Command, and TRADOC.  We also obtained the views of
Army officials who have oversight of the program.  We interviewed
officials at several TRADOC schools and centers to obtain their views
on how lessons learned at the training centers are identified and
used to correct training and doctrinal deficiencies.  We also
interviewed battalion, brigade, and division leadership in two active
Army divisions to determine how they use lessons learned information
to correct deficiencies identified during rotations through the
National Training Center. 

We performed our work at the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the
Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; TRADOC
headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;
the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army
Research Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, California; the Armor
School at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Engineer School at Fort Leonard
Wood, Missouri; the Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the
lst Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Riley, Kansas; and the lst
Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. 

We conducted our review from April 1992 to April 1993 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and
House Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense;
and the Acting Secretary of the Army.  We will also make copies
available to others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix I. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Norman J.  Rabkin, Associate Director
Charles J.  Bonanno, Assistant Director
Thomas W.  Gosling, Reports Analyst


   KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

James S.  Moores, Evaluator-in-Charge
George N.  Lundy, Jr., Site Senior

*** End of document. ***