Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses: Air Force Plans (Letter Report,
09/30/93, GAO/NSIAD-93-221).
The Air Force's Supression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) system is
designed to take out enemy air communications, radar, and other systems
that are directing surface-to-air missiles and antiair artillery. By
the turn of the century, the Air Force plans to retire the aging F-4G
"Wild Weasel" SEAD aircraft and eliminate dedicated SEAD units.
Pentagon officials acknowledged in 1992 that this plan entails some risk
because of the time gap between the retirement of the F-4G and the
fielding of enough new SEAD systems to counter decreases in the
capabilities of the new systems. The Air Force decided this year to
field even fewer SEAD-equipped aircraft with potentially even less
capability, further increasing the risk. Yet the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Air Force have identified significant threats that
indicate a continuing need for SEAD. Air Force officials say that
potential budget cuts and force reductions are driving the decision to
eliminate single mission units, such as the F-4G force, because they
compete for dollars with the Air Force's high priority F-22 and B-2
programs.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-93-221
TITLE: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses: Air Force Plans
DATE: 09/30/93
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense budgets
Air Force procurement
Air defense systems
Air warfare
Defense contingency planning
Warning systems
Tactical air forces
Fighter aircraft
Advanced weapons systems
IDENTIFIER: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses System
F-4G Aircraft
F-15 Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
F-22 Aircraft
B-2 Aircraft
EF-111 Aircraft
EA-6B Aircraft
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
F-117 Aircraft
APR-47 Radar Warning Receiver
Advanced Tactical Fighter Aircraft
F-15E Aircraft
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
September 1993
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES
- AIR FORCE PLANS
GAO/NSIAD-93-221
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
(392700)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD - Department of Defense
HARM - High Speed Antiradiation Missile
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDF - precision direction finder
SEAD - Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-253753
September 30, 1993
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to the Committee's interest in the Department of
Defense's (DOD) efforts to develop and procure future Suppression of
Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) systems, we assessed the Air Force's plans
for the SEAD mission as one of its primary SEAD aircraft, the F-4G
"Wild Weasel," retires toward the end of the century. Specifically,
our objectives were to assess (1) current and future enemy air
defense threats and (2) the capabilities of the alternatives the Air
Force is considering for future SEAD. This report focuses on the Air
Force's efforts to accommodate the retirement of the F-4G SEAD
aircraft.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
U.S. conventional combat aircraft would face increased risk in
future conflicts if the Air Force proceeds with its plans for future
SEAD aircraft. By the turn of the century, the Air Force will retire
the aging F-4G "Wild Weasel" SEAD aircraft and eliminate dedicated
SEAD units. The Air Force expects to assign the SEAD mission, as an
added task, to units flying F-15 and F-16 aircraft and to equip them
with SEAD systems that are less capable than current systems. In
August 1992, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials
acknowledged to congressional staff that the Air Force's plans for
SEAD involve some risk because there will be a time gap between the
retirement of the F-4G and the fielding of the new SEAD systems in
numbers sufficient to offset decreases in the capabilities of the new
systems. Subsequently, in March 1993, the Air Force decided to field
fewer SEAD-equipped aircraft with potentially even less capability,
which would further increase risk.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Air Force have
identified a continued need for SEAD. DIA recently reported that
U.S. conventional combat aircraft would continue to face significant
threats that will require suppression to minimize their losses. Air
Force threat assessments supporting the need for future SEAD
equipment have reached similar conclusions. The Air Force's plans to
accomplish SEAD are budget rather than threat driven. According to
Air Force officials, future reduced budgets and force structure are
driving the decision to eliminate single mission units such as the
F-4G SEAD force because they compete for funding with the Air Force's
high priority F-22 and B-2 programs.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The goal of SEAD is to establish an environment that allows friendly
aircraft to attack in the safest, most effective manner. SEAD
entails neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading enemy
integrated air defense command, control, communications, and radar
systems that are directing surface-to-air missiles and antiair
artillery against friendly aircraft. SEAD reduces friendly aircraft
losses and allows aircraft to operate effectively.
SEAD may be accomplished by lethal and nonlethal means. Lethal SEAD
physically destroys or incapacitates crucial parts of the air defense
system such as radar antennae and communications links. Nonlethal
SEAD electronically jams (or interferes with) these systems to
temporarily degrade their effectiveness.
DOD tasks all the armed services to provide SEAD using a variety of
weapon systems such as artillery, ground-to-ground missiles, cruise
missiles, helicopters, and attack aircraft using general purpose
munitions. Some weapon systems were specifically designed for SEAD,
including the Air Force's F-4G "Wild Weasel" and EF-111 "Raven" and
the Navy's and Marine Corps' EA-6B "Prowler." The F-4G provides
lethal suppression, the EF-111 provides nonlethal suppression, and
the EA-6B provides both. The jointly used High Speed Antiradiation
Missile (HARM), designed to attack emitting radar, is the services'
munition of choice for lethal SEAD.
These systems were employed extensively in the Gulf War with the Air
Force using virtually all available F-4Gs. DOD and Congressional
Gulf War studies highlighted the importance of the SEAD mission.
They concluded that the services' SEAD aircraft were effective in
shutting down Iraqi radar systems allowing coalition aircraft to
attack their targets in the safest and most effective manner while
minimizing friendly aircraft casualties.
According to Air Force officials, the F-4G "Wild Weasel" continues to
fly in the Gulf region. F-4Gs are flying to protect U. N. patrols
in the north and south "no-fly" zones in Iraq. About half of the
available F-4G force is deployed to the Gulf region.
U.S. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WILL
REMAIN VULNERABLE TO ENEMY AIR
DEFENSE THREATS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
U.S. attack aircraft will remain vulnerable to enemy air defenses
into the next century because of (1) the increased dispersion and
sophistication of the defenses and (2) the conventional, nonstealthy
characteristics of the attack aircraft force. At DOD's request, DIA
assessed threats to U.S. fixed-wing tactical aircraft in the 2000 to
2005 time frame. This assessment, completed in February 1993,
concluded that U.S. conventional aircraft would face enemy air
defense threats equal to or surpassing the current threat and will
require suppression to minimize losses. In discussing the report,
DIA officials noted that the United States will continue to face
systems and technologies developed by the former Soviet Union,
Western Europe, and even the United States that are sold to potential
regional adversaries.
Documentation supporting development programs for new Air Force SEAD
systems and stealthy aircraft, as well as discussions with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, OSD and service officials support DIA's conclusions.
For example, to justify the stealthy F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter
program before the Congress in March 1992, the Secretary of the Air
Force noted that
". . . Although the Soviet threat has declined, its advanced
technology, high-performance aircraft and anti-air defense systems
are rapidly being disbursed around the globe. This proliferation can
challenge our presence throughout the world . . ."
Air Force and DOD reports on the Gulf War concluded that U.S.
stealthy attack aircraft reduced vulnerability to enemy air defense.
Until 2005, the vast majority of U.S. attack aircraft will be
conventional nonstealthy aircraft. The only stealthy attack aircraft
available in 2005 will be the same number of Air Force F-117s
currently available, which comprised only about 4 percent of the Gulf
War attack force. The services have no plans to increase the number
of stealthy air interdiction aircraft until about 2005.
THE AIR FORCE'S CURRENT LETHAL
SEAD AIRCRAFT IS NEAR THE END
OF ITS USEFUL LIFE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
According to DOD and Air Force officials, the F-4G force is near the
end of its useful life and needs to be retired. The aging two-seat
F-4G equipped with the APR-47 radar receiver is the Air Force's
primary lethal SEAD weapon system. The APR-47 is key to effective
lethal SEAD because it gives the aircraft the capability (1) to
detect, classify, and localize enemy air defense radars and (2) to
quickly pass target range, bearing and enemy system information to
HARM. The APR-47 is the only radar receiver currently available that
can automatically provide HARM with both bearing and ranging
information, a factor that significantly increases the HARM's
effectiveness.
Even though the average age of F-4G aircraft is about 24 years, the
Air Force extended F-4G's 1993 retirement date toward the end of the
century because there will be no system available to assume the
lethal SEAD mission until that time. In fiscal year 1989, the Air
Force had 72 F-4Gs in active units and by the end of fiscal year
1993, only 42 will remain in
2 squadrons--1 active unit and 1 Air National Guard unit. By the
turn of the century, the Air Force expects to have retired all F-4Gs
from service and will have eliminated dedicated lethal SEAD units in
favor of adding SEAD as an additional task for F-15 and F-16 units.
AIR FORCE ALTERNATIVES FOR
FUTURE SEAD SYSTEMS ARE LESS
CAPABLE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Since 1989, the Air Force has changed directions twice in considering
future lethal SEAD systems to assume the mission as the F-4G retires.
The most recent plans would result in the Air Force trying to
accomplish the SEAD mission with a less capable system than the F-4G.
INITIAL PLAN TO REPLACE F-4G
CONSIDERED UNAFFORDABLE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
In fiscal year 1982, the Air Force began considering the need for a
follow-on Wild Weasel aircraft to replace the aging F-4G in the SEAD
role. In 1986, the Air Force contracted with McDonnell Aircraft
Company and General Dynamics to study how SEAD capabilities could be
built into the F-15 and F-16, respectively. In July 1987, these
companies proposed modifications to the two-seat F-15E and the
two-seat F-16. Both proposals incorporated the APR-47 into the
aircraft, maintaining, at a minimum, current capabilities. In
discussing these proposals, Air Force officials noted that a
single-seat aircraft could not accommodate the APR-47.
In 1988, the Air Force included these proposals in another analysis
of a potential follow-on to the Wild Weasel and suggested that fiscal
year 1990 funds be made available to start such an acquisition
program. For this analysis, the Air Force required that, at a
minimum, the follow on would maintain the capabilities of the F-4G's
APR-47. The Air Force studied modifying various aircraft and
reviewed radar receiver technology and concluded that a modified
two-seat F-15 would best meet requirements.
However, on December 11, 1989, the Air Force decided to cancel the
follow-on effort even though it had plans to retire the F-4G in 1993.
According to Air Force headquarters and Air Combat Command officials
(formerly Tactical Air Command), this decision was based on expected
budgetary constraints. They stated that the Air Force could no
longer afford to develop and support single mission aircraft that
would be in direct competition with such Air Force priorities as the
F-22 stealthy fighter and the B-2 stealthy bomber. The Wild Weasel
mission would have to be absorbed by F-15E and F-16 aircraft modified
with less capable SEAD equipment.
CURRENT AIR FORCE PLANS WILL
NOT MATCH CURRENT SEAD
CAPABILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
In January 1990, the Air Force Chief of Staff tasked the Air Combat
Command and the Air Systems Division with developing a plan to meet
near-term (3 to 5 years) and long-term (6 to 15 years) SEAD needs.
Near-term efforts were to concentrate on developing limited SEAD
capabilities for F-15E and F-16 aircraft. Long-term efforts were to
concentrate on new approaches to SEAD that at a minimum would lead to
the development of a target location and attack system that meets
projected threats in 2005 and that exceeds current F-4G SEAD system
performance.
The Air Combat Command and the Air Systems Division responded with a
three-phased approach, but none of the systems envisioned in any
phase would be as capable as the F-4G system. In the first phase,
currently underway, the Air Force is developing and procuring an
interim HARM Targeting System that will provide limited SEAD
capability for the single-seat F-16. This phase was intended to
provide limited SEAD with these F-16s during the expected gap between
the 1993 F-4G retirement and fielding the long-term solution.
In fiscal year 1992, the Air Force began the second phase--developing
an internal HARM targeting capability for the two-seat F-15E called
the precision direction finder (PDF). The unfunded third phase was
to develop a variant of PDF for the F-16.
The cost and operational effectiveness analysis supporting milestone
I acquisition decisions for the PDF program (completed in March 1992)
established a baseline well below the capabilities of the F-4G. SEAD
options were compared to this baseline. DOD acquisition regulations
state that the baseline is generally the current capability.
However, the Air Force omitted its most capable SEAD system, the
F-4G, and used instead an F-16 firing HARMs without SEAD electronic
equipment as the baseline. The Air Force uses the F-16 to fire HARMs
only when accompanied and directed by an F-4G. The cost and
operational effectiveness analysis indicated that the F-15E PDF
system was the most cost-effective option compared to the baseline.
But the analysis is misleading because it does not provide any
indication of how this system would perform in comparison to the
F-4G. According to Air Force officials, neither the F-15E nor F-16
PDF would be as capable as the current F-4G.
In an August 1992 briefing to congressional staff, OSD electronic
warfare officials acknowledged the Air Force position that the PDF
system was not as capable as the current system. They also noted
that degradation in technical capability would be offset by increased
numbers of aircraft available for the mission. However, they
concluded that the PDF concept would result in some risk through 2000
because there will be a time gap between the F-4G's retirement and
the fielding of sufficient numbers of new SEAD systems to compensate
for the degraded capability.
In March 1993, the Air Force terminated the F-15E PDF program. Air
Force officials expressed concerns that the number of F-15E aircraft
are not sufficient to assume the SEAD mission. Instead, single-seat
F-15Cs are to be modified with a PDF-like system for SEAD. The Air
Force also reduced the SEAD program budget by 50 percent through the
5-year defense plan.
According to Air Force officials, the reduced budget will lead to a
system that does not meet the operational requirements established
for the F-15E PDF system and will result in the fielding of fewer
aircraft than was planned for the F-15E PDF. Also, Air Force
officials have concerns about increasing the pilot work load for the
single-seat F-15C.
RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate funding
priorities in light of the increased risk associated with reducing
SEAD capabilities.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
DOD generally concurred with the report but took exception to our
description of OSD's August 1992 congressional briefing concerning
risk associated with the PDF concept. OSD stated that the risk
involved with the PDF concept is the time gap between the F-4G
retirement and the initial operational capability of the PDF
equipment and not risk to the attack force. We clarified OSD's
position concerning risk in the report.
DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD commented that although
the recommendation was too broad in scope, DOD will specifically
address the reduction in SEAD capabilities (i.e., F-4G capability) by
requesting the Air Force to update the cost and operational
effectiveness analysis using the F-4G with the APR-47 as the baseline
by the end of fiscal year 1994. We recognize that the recommendation
is broad in scope, but we believe that it would allow DOD maximum
flexibility in addressing this issue.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed DOD's acquisitions
regulations and the Air Force's requirements documents to analyze the
methodology used to select the replacement for the F-4G. We
interviewed Air Force officials to determine (1) strengths and
weaknesses of options considered for F-4G replacement and (2) how the
service plan to conduct SEAD in the future versus how it is conducted
today. We also interviewed intelligence and tactical warfare
personnel to identify factors relevant to future SEAD roles and
missions.
We performed our work at the Air Combat Command (formerly Tactical
Air Command), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; DIA, Bolling Air
Force Base, Maryland; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD, the Air Force
and Navy Headquarters, Washington D.C.; the Naval Strike Warfare
Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; the Marine Electronic Warfare
Squadron Three, Marine Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; the
National Guard Bureau, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; the Air
National Guard, Boise, Idaho; and the 366th Wing and the 429th
Electronic Combat Squadron, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.
We conducted our work between March 1992 and June 1993 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
This report was prepared under the direction of Richard Davis,
Director, National Security and Analysis, who may be reached on (202)
512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors
to this report are listed in appendix I.
Sincerely yours,
Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
Fred Dziadek, Assistant Director
Robert L. Pelletier, Assistant Director
John K. Harper, Assistant Director
Lisa R. Shames, Assignment Manager
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Richard G. Payne, Regional Management Representative
Gaines R. Hensley, Evaluator-in-Charge
Dawn R. Godfrey, Site Senior
Angela Pun, Evaluator
*** End of document. ***