Test and Evaluation: DOD Has Been Slow In Improving Testing of
Software-Intensive Systems (Chapter Report, 09/29/93, GAO/NSIAD-93-198).

Most of the Pentagon's software costs, estimated to hit $42 billion by
1995, are linked to the maintaining, upgrading, and modifying of
existing computer systems.  Many of today's sophisticated weapons
systems cannot operate without fully functioning software.  Because
software mistakes can have dire, even life-threatening, consequences,
software-intensive weapons systems must be thoroughly tested before
production.  This report discusses (1) the extent to which software
problems affect the performance of weapons systems being tested, (2)
pervasive barriers in the acquisition process that limit the
effectiveness of test and evaluation of software-intensive systems, and
(3) the Defense Department's efforts to overcome software test and
evaluation problems.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-93-198
     TITLE:  Test and Evaluation: DOD Has Been Slow In Improving Testing 
             of Software-Intensive Systems
      DATE:  09/29/93
   SUBJECT:  Computer software
             Defense procurement
             Computerized information systems
             Systems management
             Systems evaluation
             Benchmark testing
             Research and development
             Systems analysis
             Procurement policies
IDENTIFIER:  F-14D Aircraft
             F/A-18C/D Aircraft
             Airborne Self-Protection Jammer
             ASPJ
             F-15E Aircraft
             Air Force Consolidated Space Operations Center
             Navy Consolidated Automated Support System
             Army Regency Net
             DOD Software Master Plan
             Army Interoperability Network
             Navy Total Quality Leadership Plan
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Secretary of Defense

September 1993

TEST AND EVALUATION - DOD HAS BEEN
SLOW IN IMPROVING TESTING OF
SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE SYSTEMS

GAO/NSIAD-93-198

Test and Evaluation

(396241)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  DT&E - development test and evaluation
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  OT&E - operational test and evaluation

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-253411

September 29, 1993

The Honorable Les Aspin
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr.  Secretary: 

This report addresses test and evaluation of software-intensive
systems and the Department of Defense's efforts to improve the
software process.  It contains recommendations to you. 

The head of a federal agency is required under 31 U.S.C.  720 to
submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to
the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the
report.  A written statement must also be submitted to the House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request
for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the
report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House Committee on Government Operations,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and House and Senate
Committees on Armed Services; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy,
and the Air Force; and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.  We will also make copies available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please call me at (202) 512-4587.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours,

David E.  Cooper
Director, Acquisition Policy,
 Technology, and Competitiveness Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Department of Defense (DOD) software costs total over $30 billion a
year (estimated to be $42 billion by 1995), of which about two-thirds
is for maintaining, upgrading, and modifying operational systems
already in production.  Today's major defense systems depend largely
on the quality of this complex and increasingly costly software.  In
fact, many major weapon systems cannot operate if the software fails
to function as required.  Because software errors can cause a system
to fail, possibly with life-threatening consequences,
software-intensive systems need to be thoroughly tested before
production. 

Since the early 1970s, GAO has reported problems in operational test
and evaluation of defense acquisition programs.  Senior DOD
officials, as well as Members of the Congress, are concerned that
many of these problems continue today, particularly in
software-intensive systems.  Because of these concerns, GAO initiated
this review to identify (1) the extent that software-related problems
affect the performance of defense acquisition programs during
operational test and evaluation, (2) pervasive barriers in the
acquisition process that limit the effectiveness of test and
evaluation of software-intensive systems, and (3) DOD's efforts to
resolve software test and evaluation problems.  Although GAO
recognizes that inherently complex technical characteristics
contribute to software problems, this report focuses more directly on
nontechnical barriers that limit the effectiveness of operational
test and evaluation and need management attention. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

As defense programs progress through the acquisition process, they
undergo various tests and evaluations to reduce the risk that they
will not meet performance specifications or cannot be effectively
used in their intended operational environment.  These tests
generally focus on the total system--both hardware and software. 

Test and evaluation of a defense acquisition program is the key
management control to ensure that decisionmakers have valid, credible
information upon which to base decisions.  Before a system is
certified as ready for operational testing, deficiencies are to be
identified during development testing and then corrected. 
Deficiencies discovered during developmental and operational testing
affect a system's cost, schedule, and performance.  However, problems
that come to light after production begins are generally more costly
and difficult to correct. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Because systems are generally ready for operational testing before
their software is fully mature (i.e., the software is able to satisfy
all documented user requirements), they often fall short of system
performance expectations.  The readiness of such systems for
operational testing is therefore questionable because DOD has not
sufficiently recognized the acquisition community's bias toward
hardware and ensured thorough and rigorous development test and
evaluation before systems are certified as ready for operational test
and evaluation. 

Several pervasive barriers that limit the effectiveness of test and
evaluation require DOD acquisition and technology management's
attention throughout the acquisition process.  These barriers are
that DOD has not (1) acknowledged or addressed the criticality of
software to systems' operational requirements early enough in the
acquisition process; (2) developed, implemented, or standardized
decision-making tools and processes for measuring or projecting
weapon system cost, schedule, and performance risks; (3) developed
test and evaluation policy that provides consistent guidance
regarding software maturity; and (4) adequately defined and managed
software requirements. 

Although DOD has studied and restudied what needs to be done to
develop and test quality software and to field effective
software-intensive systems, it has not effectively implemented
long-standing recommendations.  The individual military services have
tried to improve their software development processes without a
DOD-wide, coordinated strategy. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE SYSTEMS
      GENERALLY DO NOT MEET USER
      REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

According to a 1992 report by the Secretary of the Air Force,
virtually all software-intensive defense systems suffer from
difficulties in achieving cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
Prior GAO reports, the comments of senior officials responsible for
various aspects of software development, and the reports of the
services' operational test agencies (27 such reports were analyzed
during GAO's review) corroborate the existence of significant
software problems.  The inability of these systems to meet user
requirements has been repeatedly demonstrated during operational
testing and, in some cases, during operations in the field.  Most of
these software problems could have been identified and addressed
during earlier development testing. 

However, DOD has yet to implement a consistent policy defining
software maturity and systems' readiness for operational test and
evaluation.  DOD officials believe that program managers often tend
to present an overly optimistic view of weapon systems' cost,
schedule, and performance and certify systems as ready for
operational testing despite questionable maturity.  Additionally,
current defense acquisition practices give program managers little
incentive to fully ensure that software is appropriately mature
before systems begin operational test and evaluation. 

GAO's review of the services' operational test agencies' reports on
operational test and evaluation conducted from January 1990 to
December 1992 showed that many software-intensive systems were
immature, poorly documented, ineffective in a threat environment, and
difficult to maintain in field operations.  These problems were
prevalent for the F-14D, F/A-18C/D, Airborne Self-Protection Jammer,
F-15E, Consolidated Space Operations Center, Consolidated Automated
Support System, Regency Net, and other systems. 


      BARRIERS EXIST TO EFFECTIVE
      SOFTWARE TEST AND EVALUATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Although software is critical to successfully meeting the cost,
schedule, and performance objectives of major defense programs, the
defense acquisition community has perceived software as secondary to
hardware and as a lower priority during development.  Viewing
software as something that can be fixed later, program managers
generally have not become involved in software development until
software problems affect a system's cost or schedule--usually just
before or during operational testing.  Because DOD has not
effectively balanced the hardware and software requirements of
defense systems during development, software is generally immature
when certified as ready for operational testing. 

Program managers and other decisionmakers often lack reliable data
for measuring how well software-intensive systems are meeting their
objectives and for estimating future system costs and schedules.  In
the private sector, particularly in the companies visited by GAO,
software metrics (i.e., methods used to describe, predict, estimate,
control, and measure the attributes of software) and related tools
are generally used to obtain more timely and reliable program
information, as well as higher productivity and savings. 

Additionally, DOD expects post-deployment software support costs,
typically 70 percent of life-cycle costs, to be less when
disciplined, measurable software development processes are employed. 
(DOD estimates that 14 percent of these costs are attributable to
correcting software errors missed during testing and earlier
development phases.)

Although DOD has a written policy that requires the use of software
metrics and related structured processes to improve data quality and
timeliness, DOD has not fully implemented it.  According to DOD
officials, program management offices have not fully embraced its
adoption because (1) the data may be costly to collect and store; (2)
they may provide decisionmakers with too much direct access to a
program's status, thus allowing decisionmakers to determine how
problems began and who is responsible; and (3) their potential
benefits may not be realized in the short term (i.e., by current
program managers and sponsors.)


      SOLUTIONS TO SOFTWARE
      PROBLEMS HAVE NOT BEEN
      IMPLEMENTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

DOD has often studied software development and testing problems that
have contributed to its inability to field software-intensive systems
on time, within cost projections, and in accordance with users'
requirements.  For example, as early as 1983, DOD's Software Test and
Evaluation Project report recommended, among other things, (1)
integrating test and evaluation into software development; (2)
defining clearly testable software requirements and capabilities; (3)
assessing and identifying critical software risks and applying
appropriate levels of testing; (4) developing, recording, and using
software metrics; (5) developing and supporting the use of automated
test tools and systematic methods; and (6) developing and
implementing triservice standards for unified software development,
testing, and evaluation approaches.  More recently, Defense Science
Board (1987) and Software Assessment Project (1990) studies have
reached conclusions similar to those of the earlier study.  In
response to these studies, DOD issued policy manuals and
instructions, but the guidance was often inconsistent and many basic
improvements were never implemented. 

To date, the individual services and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense have generally taken independent approaches in making
software improvements and in developing software metrics.  Further,
policy and oversight responsibilities for software-intensive systems
has been divided between the Offices of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, a situation that
DOD's Software Master Plan criticizes as leading to duplicative and
artificially fragmented acquisition guidance, policies, and oversight
for software-intensive systems.  GAO found that DOD officials had
been unable to reconcile various test and evaluation resourcing
issues that exist, in part, due to this organizational division of
responsibility. 

Among the services, GAO found various levels of quality software
development capability.  The Army is the leader in implementing the
recommended software improvements in a servicewide, goal-oriented
way.  For example, the Army has developed enforceable guidance on
software testing and requirements management and has adopted
12 software metrics to better monitor the progress made during a
system's life cycle.  Although the Air Force acquisition community
has not required the use of software metrics in the past, its
operational test organization uses a well-documented and consistent
metrics process to measure software maturity for operational test and
evaluation.  One Navy organization's software processes mirror the
best practices in industry and may serve as a model for other
government agencies. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense

  -- issue and implement a software test and evaluation policy that
     defines testing requirements for software maturity, regression
     testing, and the use of temporary software fixes during testing;

  -- strengthen controls to ensure that operational testing does not
     begin until results of development test and evaluation
     demonstrate an appropriate level of software maturity;

  -- require program management officials to define exit criteria for
     certifying a systems' readiness for operational testing at the
     beginning of full-scale development (i.e., milestone II); and

  -- require the services to develop a common core set of management
     metrics for software (i.e., cost, schedule, and quality) for
     major defense programs early in the development cycle to be
     approved at milestone II. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with
GAO's findings and recommendations that additional steps could be
taken to improve the test and evaluation of software-intensive
systems.  Accordingly, DOD indicated that, during fiscal year 1994,
it would issue revised software policy guidance to address these
concerns.  However, GAO believes that the issuance of revised policy
guidance without incentives to change behavior or ensure effective
implementation may have little effect in ensuring software maturity. 

DOD pointed out that many of the reasons GAO cited for immature
software during operational test and evaluation were outside the
control of the test and evaluation community.  GAO agrees with DOD's
comment and specifically addresses this fact. 

DOD indicated that programs reviewed as part of GAO's analysis
preceded DOD's most recent acquisition guidance and that the
potential benefits of such guidance were therefore not sufficiently
acknowledged in the report.  DOD indicated that current updates of
its acquisition policy series provided improved guidance and stronger
program oversight for development strategies, testing, and
requirements.  However, this policy has some voids and, more
importantly, it remains to be seen whether and to what degree the
policy updates will be implemented and whether they will address the
long-standing problems. 

DOD also indicated that the benefits of software metrics for
operational test and evaluation were not supported.  GAO did not
attempt to quantify the direct benefits of software metrics for
operational test and evaluation.  GAO pointed out that experts in DOD
and in the private sector believe that software metrics could improve
the management of the software development process and thus
contribute to greater software maturity before operational test and
evaluation begins. 

DOD's comments appear in appendix III. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

Because computer software controls most functions of modern defense
systems, the systems' performance depends largely on the quality of
that complex and increasingly costly software.  In fact, many major
weapon systems may be inoperable if software fails to function as
required.  Mission-critical computer software, which is integral to
most military applications, tends to be more difficult to develop
than software for other types of applications primarily because it
must operate in real time under very unique environments. 
Accordingly, software quality has become a primary concern in
emerging defense acquisition programs, including weapon systems;
automated information systems; and command, control, communications,
and intelligence systems. 


   DEFENSE SOFTWARE COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

Software-intensive systems are, by nature, highly complex and often
require millions of lines of code.  These significant factors
increase the overall costs of software.  Although the Department of
Defense (DOD) does not know precisely how much it spends on
software,\1 the Defense Systems Management College projected that DOD
would spend about $36.2 billion for software in 1992.\2 The
Management College expects software costs to continue to rise at a
rate proportionately higher than computer hardware costs.  According
to the DOD Inspector General, the costs of computer hardware
components integral to weapon systems and other critical military and
intelligence systems, are expected to remain stable at about $6
billion annually between 1990 and 1995, whereas corresponding
software costs are expected to grow from about $30 billion to $42
billion.\3 (See fig.  1.1.)

   Figure 1.1:  Software and
   Hardware Costs for Fiscal Years
   1990 and 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  DOD Inspector General. 

DOD estimates that about 30 percent of its software life-cycle
expenditures are for initial development and 70 percent are for
post-deployment software support, that is, maintaining, upgrading,
and modifying existing software to correct deficiencies, respond to
mission changes, or enhance technology.\4 Up-front improvements in
the quality of software development processes and more effective
software test and evaluation may play a significant role in
controlling these costs, which are incurred largely after systems
have been fielded. 


--------------------
\1 Defense Does Not Know How Much It Spends on Software
(GAO/IMTEC-92-62BR, July 6, 1992). 

\2 Mission Critical Computer Resources Management Guide, Defense
Systems Management College.  Last published in 1990.  Current version
is undated. 

\3 Management of the Software Technology for Adaptable, Reliable
Systems Program, Department of Defense Inspector General Audit,
91-050, February 1991. 

\4 The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology estimates that 14 percent of post- deployment software
support costs are attributable to correcting software errors missed
during testing and earlier development phases. 


   OVERVIEW OF TEST AND EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

The primary purpose of test and evaluation during the acquisition
process is to reduce the risk that the system or equipment either
will not meet performance specifications or cannot be effectively
used in its intended operational environment.  Test and evaluation is
therefore designed to detect errors in both software and hardware
before a system is fielded and to provide essential information to
decisionmakers for assessing acquisition risk. 

Early in the acquisition cycle, development test and evaluation
(DT&E) primarily measures a system's technical performance and
compliance with contractual specifications.  DT&E, which starts at
the systems requirements phase and proceeds through the design phase,
is designed to detect errors in software and hardware prior to
operational test and evaluation (OT&E).  Later, OT&E focuses on the
system's effectiveness and suitability.\5 (See table 1.1.) Before a
system is certified as ready for OT&E, any major deficiency is
expected to be identified and corrected during DT&E. 



                               Table 1.1
                
                 Key Differences Between DT&E and OT&E

DT&E                                OT&E
----------------------------------  ----------------------------------
Technical performance measurement   Estimate of operational
and specifications compliance       effectiveness and suitability

Technical personnel                 Operational personnel

Developing agency responsibility    OT&E agency responsibility

Functionally limited test articles  Production-representative test
                                    articles

Controlled environment              Representative operational
                                    environment

Contractor heavily involved         Development contractor generally
                                    not allowed
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Deficiencies discovered during developmental and operational testing
affect a system's cost, schedule, and performance.  However, problems
that are not identified and resolved until operational testing and
production begins are generally more difficult and costly to correct. 

Test and evaluation is the key internal control to ensure that
decisionmakers have valid, credible information for making
development and production decisions.  OT&E results contribute to
decisions not only on acquiring new systems but also on modifying
systems deployed in the field and upgrading the software or hardware
of systems already in production. 


--------------------
\5 A system is operationally effective if it can accomplish its
intended mission when used by representative personnel in a realistic
operational environment.  A system is operationally suitable when it
is able, among other things, to be effectively operated, maintained,
and supported by the military forces. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The Congress and senior DOD officials have long been concerned with
DOD's inability to field software-intensive defense acquisition
programs on time and within budget.  Because of these concerns, we
initiated this review to identify (1) the extent to which
software-related problems affect the performance of defense
acquisition programs during OT&E, (2) pervasive barriers in the
acquisition process that limit the effectiveness of test and
evaluation of software-intensive systems, and (3) DOD's efforts to
resolve software test and evaluation problems. 

A wide range of technical and management challenges impact the
development, testing, and fielding of software-intensive systems. 
However, this report is not intended to address the technical aspects
of the software development process, which, at best, is a difficult
and complex undertaking.  Rather, the report focuses more directly on
those barriers that require the attention of DOD acquisition and
technology management officials and that DOD believes limit the
effectiveness of OT&E of software-intensive systems. 

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed defense acquisition,
software development, and test and evaluation policy documents.  To
determine the status of systems' software during OT&E, we analyzed
the OT&E results of
27 systems that represented the total population of major programs
the services had identified as having undergone OT&E during the
2-year period from January 1990 to December 1992. 

We also visited several prime contractors identified by DOD and
service officials to obtain an overview of industry practices.  The
organizations we visited included the

  -- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
     Washington, D.C.;

  -- Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
     Washington, D.C.;

  -- Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
     Washington, D.C.;

  -- Army's Director of Information Systems for Command, Control,
     Communications, and Computers, Washington, D.C.;

  -- Test and Evaluation Management Agency, Washington, D.C.;

  -- Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria,
     Virginia;

  -- U.S.  Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth,
     New Jersey;

  -- Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force, Norfolk, Virginia;

  -- Fleet Combat Direction Support System Activity, Dam Neck,
     Virginia;

  -- Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity, Quantico,
     Virginia;

  -- Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Albuquerque,
     New Mexico;

  -- Sacramento Air Logistics Center, California;

  -- Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California;

  -- Hughes Aircraft Corporation, Ground Systems Group, Fullerton,
     California;

  -- Hughes Aircraft Corporation, Radar Systems Group, Torrance,
     California;

  -- General Dynamics Electronics Division, San Diego, California;

  -- Science Applications International Corporation, San Diego,
     California; and

  -- TRW Systems Integration Group, Carson, California. 

We conducted our review between April 1992 and April 1993 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


SOFTWARE TEST AND EVALUATION
PROBLEMS AND OBSTACLES TO SOLVING
THEM
============================================================ Chapter 2

Since the 1970s, software problems discovered during OT&E have
adversely affected the cost, schedule, and performance of major
defense acquisition systems.\1 Because many systems do not undergo
rigorous DT&E and therefore begin OT&E before their software is fully
mature (i.e., the software is able to satisfy all documented user
requirements), they often fall short of system performance
expectations.  The readiness of such systems for OT&E is therefore
questionable. 

Although DOD recognizes these problems, it has made only limited
progress in adopting solutions.  Fundamentally, DOD has not (1)
acknowledged or adequately addressed the criticality of software to
systems' operational requirements early enough in the acquisition
process; (2) developed, implemented, or standardized decision-making
tools and processes (e.g., metrics) to help measure or project weapon
system software cost, schedule, and performance risk; (3) developed
test and evaluation policy that provides specific guidance regarding
software maturity; and (4) adequately defined and managed
requirements for its increasingly complex software (see ch.  3). 


--------------------
\1 In some cases, significant performance shortfalls were also
identified after systems had been produced and put into operational
use. 


   OT&E OFTEN IDENTIFIES IMMATURE
   SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE SYSTEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

To ensure no surprises during OT&E, defense systems are expected to
be subjected to rigorous DT&E.  Formal operational test readiness
reviews also address the readiness of systems for OT&E.  However,
software-intensive systems have repeatedly failed to meet users'
requirements during OT&E and, in some cases, during operations in the
field.  This has been recognized in DOD and industry as a major
contributor to DOD's "software crisis." In general, the thoroughness
of DT&E and the readiness of such systems for operational testing has
been questionable. 

According to a 1992 report by the Secretary of the Air Force,
virtually all software-intensive defense systems suffer from
difficulties in achieving cost, schedule, and performance
objectives.\2 Our prior reports, the comments of senior officials
responsible for various aspects of software development, and the
reports of the services' operational test agencies
(27 such reports were analyzed during our review) corroborate the
existence of significant software problems. 


--------------------
\2 Guidelines for the Successful Acquisition of Computer Dominated
Systems and Major Software Developments, Secretary of the Air Force,
February 1992. 


      OT&E RESULTS REPORTED BY THE
      SERVICES' OPERATIONAL TEST
      AGENCIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

Our review of the services' OT&E reports from January 1990 to
December 1992 showed that 23 of 27, or 85 percent, of the
software-intensive systems tested were immature, ineffective in a
threat environment, or difficult to maintain in field operations. 
Table 2.1 contains some typical examples of software problems found
in these systems, and appendix I provides a more complete list of the
problems. 



                               Table 2.1
                
                Software Problems Found by the Services'
                       Operational Test Agencies

System                  Problems
----------------------  ----------------------------------------------
Army

Regency Net             Software was immature.

                        Many software-related operational failures
                        occurred.

Trackwolf               Software was immature, resulting in numerous
                        computer lockups.

Air Force

Consolidated Space      Software was not mature.
Operations Center

F-15 Eagle              Software was not mature.

                        Severe software problems (mission aborts and
                        mission degradation) occurred.

Navy

AN/ALQ-165              Current mission critical software was not
                        available.

                        Mission critical faults were found in built-
                        in testing (not confirmed as software or
                        hardware).

Consolidated Automated  Software was not mature (power-up failures,
Support Systems         computer lockups, and station aborts),
                        requiring system reboot.

F-14D                   Software was not mature, and the system was
                        not ready for OT&E.

                        Numerous software anomalies were found.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

      SOFTWARE PROBLEMS HAD BEEN
      PREVIOUSLY REPORTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2

Since the early 1970s, we have reported that defense systems have
begun production without timely or realistic OT&E.  More recently, we
have reported on software shortfalls in individual systems (see table
2.2).  For example, in December 1992 we reported that DOD's
mission-critical computer systems continued to have significant
software problems due in part to a lack of management attention,
ill-defined requirements, and inadequate testing.\3



                               Table 2.2
                
                Examples of Software Problems Identified
                             in Our Reviews

System                  Problems
----------------------  ----------------------------------------------
Maneuver Control        Testing of numerous critical system software
System\a                functions was deferred.

Airborne Self           Software-induced failures were excluded from
Protection Jammer\b     criteria.

                        DOD test standards were circumvented.

F/A-18\c                Previous deficiencies were not corrected in
                        software modifications and enhancements.

Fire Direction Data     Software development standards were not
Manager\d               enforced.

                        Testing was unrealistic and superficial.

                        Requirements definition was inadequate.

C-17\e                  Software requirements were not completely
                        identified.

                        Software development complexity was
                        underestimated.
                        Access to software cost, schedule, and
                        performance data was limited.

                        Subcontractor was unable to meet contract
                        requirements for mission computer software.

                        Electronic Flight Control system experienced
                        software development and integration problems.

F-14D\f                 Intended mission was not met.

                        Software testing approach was inadequate.

                        Software capability was deferred.

                        Software development standards were not
                        followed.

B-1B\g                  Defensive avionics software required about $1
                        billion to fix.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Planned Production Decision for Army Control System Is Premature
(GAO/NSIAD-92-151, Aug.  10, 1992). 

\b Electronic Warfare:  Established Criteria Not Met for Airborne
Self-Protection Jammer Production (GAO/NSIAD-92-103, Mar.  23, 1992). 

\c Embedded Computer Systems:  New F/A-18 Capabilities Impact Navy's
Software Development Process (GAO/IMTEC-92-81, Sept.  23, 1992). 

\d Embedded Computer Systems:  Software Development Problems Delay
the Army's Fire Direction Data Manager (GAO/IMTEC-92-32, May 11,
1992). 

\e Embedded Computer Systems:  Significant Software Problems on C-17
Must Be Addressed (GAO/IMTEC-92-48, May 7, 1992) and Cost and
Complexity of the C-17 Aircraft Research and Development Program
(GAO/NSIAD-91-5, Mar.  19, 1991). 

\f Embedded Computer Systems:  F-14D Aircraft Software Is Not
Reliable (GAO/IMTEC-92-21, Apr.  2, 1992). 

\g Strategic Bombers:  B-1B Cost and Performance Remain Uncertain
(GAO/NSIAD-89-55, Feb.  3, 1989). 


--------------------
\3 Mission Critical Systems:  Defense Attempting to Address Major
Software Challenges (GAO/IMTEC-93-13, Dec.  24, 1992). 


      REASONS CITED FOR SOFTWARE
      PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3

DOD officials cited the following reasons for immature software
during OT&E: 

  -- In many cases, rigorous DT&E is not being done before systems
     begin OT&E nonetheless, the systems are being certified as
     ready before they have achieved appropriate levels of maturity. 

  -- Problems are not identified until it is too late to address them
     effectively and economically because some program managers may
     not fully report program weaknesses that could lead
     decisionmakers (i.e., the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
     Congress, or the military services' acquisition executive) to
     adjust program funding. 

  -- The career success of participants in the acquisition process is
     perceived to depend more on getting programs into production
     than on achieving successful program outcomes.  Thus, program
     managers have incentives to delay testing and take chances that
     immature systems might succeed in OT&E. 

  -- The congressional appropriations process forces programs to be
     calendar-driven rather than event-driven, causing program
     managers to prematurely certify systems as ready for OT&E to
     avoid losing funding or slipping schedules. 

  -- Some program managers give priority to developing software that
     will support a system production decision and give less
     attention to the post-deployment support element of life-cycle
     costs. 


   SEVERAL BARRIERS PREVENT
   EFFECTIVE SOFTWARE TEST AND
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Our review identified several pervasive barriers that need the
attention of DOD acquisition and technology management officials and
inhibit the solutions of DOD's software test and evaluation problems. 
Eliminating these barriers will require the difficult process of
changing the acquisition culture, a task that must be driven from the
top and must be consistent.  The barriers are (1) failure of the
acquisition community to adequately address the critical nature of
software; (2) lack of credible cost, schedule, and performance data
as the basis for decision-making; (3) lack of specific software test
and evaluation policy; and (4) ineffective definition and management
of requirements for software. 


      THE ACQUISITION COMMUNITY
      HAS NOT ADEQUATELY RESPONDED
      TO THE CRITICAL NATURE OF
      SOFTWARE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1

Although major defense acquisition systems depend largely on the
quality of computer resources, software has been perceived as
secondary to hardware and as a lower priority during development. 
Due to the traditional mind-set of the prevailing acquisition
culture, the acquisition community has not appropriately focused on
the criticality of software to cost, schedule, and performance. 
Also, software, unlike hardware, has lacked a disciplined, systems
engineering approach to development. 

Viewing software as something that can be fixed later, DOD's
acquisition community has been almost exclusively concerned with the
cost and schedule of hardware early in the development life cycle. 
Historically, program managers

  -- have known little about software;

  -- have left software management to technical managers who are not
     always part of the decision-making process; and

  -- generally have not become involved in software development and
     testing until problems affected cost and schedule, by which time
     it was usually too late to resolve these problems
     cost-effectively. 

Additionally, program managers have little incentive to alter these
practices and to ensure that software is appropriately mature before
systems are certified as ready for OT&E based on rigorous DT&E. 

DOD officials generally believe that test and evaluation should focus
on the total system--both software and hardware--rather than two
separate systems, as in the past.  They told us that the acquisition
process is most effective when development problems are detected and
corrected early in the acquisition life cycle, rather than during or
after OT&E. 


      DOD LACKS CREDIBLE DATA FOR
      DECISION-MAKING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2

Software managers, developers, acquisition officials, and those
charged with oversight responsibilities need dependable information
and independent techniques for measuring the progress of development
efforts and for monitoring the balance of cost, schedule, and
performance objectives.  However, the quality of data available to
decisionmakers remains largely ad hoc and overly optimistic and may
be too dependent on informal channels.  As a result, the ability of
decisionmakers to objectively or accurately estimate future costs and
schedules of defense systems continues to be limited.  Also, the
ability to learn from the past has been impaired, as each software
development effort has tended to start anew and independent of other,
sometimes quite similar efforts. 

DOD has yet to develop and implement the management processes and
tools required to improve the reliability of its data.  For example,
the "best practices" in the private sector indicate the following
benefits that can be achieved by using software management, quality,
and process metrics:\4

  -- Management metrics help determine progress against plans. 

  -- Quality metrics help assess product attributes, such as
     requirements stability, performance, user satisfaction, and
     supportability. 

  -- Process metrics provide indicators evaluating tools, techniques,
     organization, procedures, and so on. 

DOD officials told us that software metrics have broad applications
for defense acquisition programs because of their usefulness to
government and private software developers, the test and evaluation
community, and decisionmakers.  Some officials believe that software
metrics, in combination with prescribed work breakdown structure,\5
are essential for managing cost, schedule, and performance risk in
the defense systems acquisition process.  Other officials told us
that software metrics present a valuable input for independently
monitoring the maturity of software and its readiness for OT&E. 
However, although they are useful, software metrics cannot substitute
for actual test and evaluations. 


--------------------
\4 Software metrics are used to describe, predict, estimate, control,
and measure the attributes of software. 

\5 A work breakdown structure is a description of work tasks that
describe the required product as well as any work that needs to be
accomplished to develop the required product. 


         THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAS
         BENEFITED FROM SOFTWARE
         METRICS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.1

All of the contractors we visited had established, with assistance
from the Software Engineering Institute,\6 similar quality
improvement programs that incorporated software metrics into
day-to-day decisions on software development projects.  The
contractors viewed software metrics as valuable decision-making and
estimating tools.  They generally credited the metrics for savings,
higher productivity, and more credible information, resulting in
better program and management decisions.  Contractor officials
believe that DOD could benefit similarly from implementing
metrics-based software development approaches. 

One division within one company we visited invested about $400,000 in
software metrics-based process improvements.  Company officials
projected annual savings from this one-time investment at about
$2 million.  Officials estimated that, due to the company's lower
software development costs, the government had saved millions of
dollars in its development contracts.  They added that increasing
contractor productivity could translate into more competition and
more affordable DOD acquisitions. 

DOD has indicated that it expects the cost of maintaining
software-intensive systems after deployment in the field, which
typically accounts for 70 percent of DOD's total software costs now,
will decline when disciplined, measurable software development
processes are used.  According to defense officials we talked to, the
additional cost of requiring the use of software metrics and related
tools during development ranges from 0 to 6 percent of overall
software development costs. 


--------------------
\6 DOD established the Software Engineering Institute in 1984 to
provide leadership in advancing software engineering and in improving
the quality of systems that depend on software.  The Institute
provides technical support in four key areas:  software process,
software risk management, software engineering methods and tools, and
real-time distributed systems.  The Institute has developed a
Capability Maturity Model for DOD's use in evaluating and improving
contractors' software engineering practices.  Most of DOD's leading
software development activities and related private contractors use
the model to measure improvement. 


         SOFTWARE METRICS ARE NOT
         WIDELY USED IN DOD
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.2

Although DOD has a written acquisition policy that requires the use
of software metrics and other tools to improve the quality and the
timeliness of data, to date DOD has not fully implemented it.  The
development and use of software metrics by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services has not been consistent
or fully coordinated.  For example, each of the services is
independently developing software metrics for its own use while OSD
is sponsoring studies of a core set for DOD-wide implementation. 
However, coordination to avoid costly duplication of effort has been
limited. 

Although the potential benefits of software metrics have been
recognized, program management offices have not fully adopted their
use.  Industry and DOD officials attributed this hesitancy to several
basic attitudes.  For example, the officials believe that software
metrics

  -- may provide decisionmakers with too much direct access to a
     program's status (i.e., they may enable decisionmakers to
     determine how problems began and who is responsible);

  -- may add to the overall cost of software development, even though
     the potential benefits may not be realized in the short term;

  -- may be used against managers who are perceived as not performing
     well; and

  -- may not represent an improvement over "business as usual."


      DOD LACKS A CONSISTENT
      SOFTWARE TEST AND EVALUATION
      POLICY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3

OSD and service officials acknowledge that current OSD acquisition
and life-cycle support policy does not adequately address planning
for software test and evaluation in a logical, structured fashion and
that a software policy void exists with respect to test and
evaluation of software-intensive systems.  Current policy is not
definitive and does not adequately address the following critical
questions: 

  -- When is software ready to test (i.e., maturity)? 

  -- When and how much should modifications or upgrades be retested
     (i.e., regression testing)? 

  -- What is the appropriate use of software "patches" (e.g.,
     temporary software programming fixes) during testing? 

However, OSD does not plan to issue guidelines specifically directing
the services how to manage these complex issues.  Rather, it plans to
issue a series of "expectations" or "evaluation guidelines" for
software development and test and evaluation for use by oversight
action officers in addressing both maturity and regression testing. 
OSD is also considering developing an on-line data base for software
issues to capture best practices, lessons learned, and some specific
guidance from superseded software test and evaluation policy. 
Although these efforts may prove beneficial, they fall short of
providing enforceable criteria for ensuring effective oversight and
test and evaluation. 


      REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION AND
      MANAGEMENT LACK CONTINUOUS
      USER INVOLVEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.4

Even though many factors contribute to DOD's failure to produce
systems that meet user needs in a timely, cost-effective manner, one
critical factor is defining and managing users' requirements.\7

Effectively defining requirements, along with focused management and
appropriate user involvement, is critical to the success of a
program.  As discussed earlier, the inability of software-intensive
systems to meet users' needs has consistently been demonstrated
during OT&E and, in general, has been a pervasive problem in the
acquisition process. 

The definition of users' requirements, particularly for large,
complex systems and for unprecedented systems (i.e., those that are
unlike any that have already been built), is subject to varying
interpretations by many different groups.  These groups include field
users, users' representatives, program managers, contracting
officers, and contractors.  Each group brings different expectations
and agendas to the contracting, development, and acquisition
processes.  (See app.  II for a list of DOD organizations responsible
for test and evaluation.)

In the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command establishes the
general user requirements for a new system in an operational
requirements document.  The Army Materiel Command then transforms
these requirements into technical and administrative requests for
proposals for contracting, after which the contractor proposes how to
meet those requirements.  Because this process often does not keep
the user appropriately involved during this transformation of
original requirements into procurement efforts, top-level operational
requirements documents may result in systems that differ from those
the user had envisioned. 

Because these requirements often represent an area of great risk, DOD
believes a comprehensive requirements management strategy is
essential to reducing overall program risk.  In addition to the fact
that user requirements may not be well understood, formulated, or
articulated at the start of a program, the requirements almost
invariably change throughout a system's life cycle.  These changes
are often directly related to the length of the development process
and include changes in threat, technology, doctrine, unrealistic
schedules, and perceived user opportunity. 

DOD considers early and continuous user involvement in the
requirements definition and management process and early testing
programs to be essential to successful outcomes of software-intensive
development efforts.  To help ensure that a system will meet user
requirements and expectations, DOD officials believe they need to
formally involve the users in the total system development.  They
said that system developers should be communicating with the users
from the beginning of an acquisition program and throughout its life
cycle and allowing the users to influence the development effort. 
DOD and private sector officials cited the benefits of user
involvement in several programs, particularly in automated
information systems. 


--------------------
\7 Some acquisition officials put this statement in the context that
the quality of a software development effort cannot exceed the
quality of the requirements definition and management process
(because requirements precede the coding of software).  Also, errors
found during the requirements definition phase cost significantly
less to correct than those discovered in test and evaluation or after
production has begun. 


DOD EFFORTS TO RESOLVE
LONG-STANDING SOFTWARE TESTING
PROBLEMS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Since the 1980s, DOD has studied and restudied its inability to field
software-intensive systems on time, within cost projections, and in
accordance with users' performance requirements.  Each succeeding
study built upon earlier studies and consistently recommended key
actions needed for successful acquisition strategies and effective
OT&E.  However, OSD has made only limited progress in adopting these
long-standing recommendations.  The individual military services have
tried to improve their software development processes, but a
DOD-wide, coordinated approach is lacking.  Senior OSD officials told
us that they believe the creation of a single OSD-level office for
software would, in part, help to resolve long-standing software
problems. 


   DOD HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY
   IMPLEMENTED SOLUTIONS TO
   SOFTWARE PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

DOD's 1983 Software Test and Evaluation Project report concluded that
solutions to the software test and evaluation problems required more
effective management, rather than technological breakthroughs.  The
report's recommendations included

  -- integrating test and evaluation into software development;

  -- defining clearly testable software requirements and
     capabilities;

  -- assessing and identifying critical software risks and applying
     appropriate levels of testing;

  -- developing, recording, and using software metrics;

  -- developing and supporting the use of automated test tools and
     systematic methods; and

  -- developing and implementing triservice standards for unified
     software development, testing, and evaluation approaches. 

More recently, Defense Science Board (1987) and Software Assessment
Project (1990) studies have reached conclusions similar with those of
the earlier study. 

OSD has responded to these recommendations by issuing written policy
and guidance manuals and instructions.  For example, DOD Instruction
5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures,
requires the use of a software work breakdown structure,\1 software
metrics, and a disciplined development process.  However, according
to a 1987 Defense Science Board study, most of the recommendations
remained unimplemented.\2 The Board stated that "if the military
software problem is real, it is not perceived as urgent." Our work
demonstrates that many basic improvements to the DT&E of
software-intensive systems remain unimplemented in 1993. 

OSD responsibility for oversight of software-intensive systems is
shared between the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
(computers embedded in weapon systems) and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
Systems (also responsible for Automated Information Systems). 
Although the acquisition processes are essentially identical for all
major defense programs, two different acquisition policy series are
used to govern their development.  In its draft Software Master Plan,
DOD stated that this dual oversight has resulted in duplicative and
artificially fragmented acquisition guidance, policies, and oversight
for software-intensive systems.\3

We found that DOD officials had been unable to reconcile various test
and evaluation resourcing issues that exist, in part, due to this
organizational division of responsibility.  According to DOD
officials, for example, even though the services' operational test
agencies are responsible for conducting OT&E of automated information
systems, they have not been funded for this testing and have
generally not conducted such testing because their focus has been on
the traditional testing of weapon systems.  Further, DOD officials
indicated that the OT&E of one automated system was delayed due to
lack of test funding and disagreements between OSD and the services
regarding OT&E policy.  Additionally, senior defense officials
specifically singled out the lack of dedicated government DT&E of
automated information systems as a concern that needed to be
addressed. 


--------------------
\1 A software work breakdown structure is a framework for compiling
the cost (time and effort) of developing software to improve
monitoring, analyzing, estimating, and overall project management. 

\2 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military
Software, September 1987. 

\3 DOD Software Master Plan, Volume I:  Plan of Action, February 9,
1990 (preliminary draft). 


   SERVICES ARE WORKING
   INDEPENDENTLY TO IMPROVE
   SOFTWARE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

According to the Software Engineering Institute, all of the services
have used ad hoc practices that have resulted in unpredictable costs
and schedules and low-quality software products that do not meet
users' needs.  To address these problems, the services have taken
different approaches to improving software development and test and
evaluation and are in various stages of implementing those
improvements. 

Among the services, the Army has implemented more of the recommended
software development and testing processes in a servicewide,
goal-oriented way.  The Air Force's operational test organization has
used a well-documented and consistent metrics process to measure
software maturity for OT&E.  A Navy software support activity has
also established a software development process using metrics similar
to the practices in industry. 

Although the services' operational test agencies have agreed on
implementing five common software metrics, OSD and the services are
generally developing software metrics and making other improvements
independently, rather than using the same ones to meet common needs. 
OSD recently established a Software Test and Evaluation Task Force to
work toward implementing common policies and consensus.  It is too
soon, however, to determine if this will effectively address the
fragmented, redundant approaches observed during our field work. 


   ARMY'S SERVICEWIDE, PROACTIVE
   APPROACH
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

In September 1989, the Army convened the Software Test and Evaluation
Panel to improve software test and evaluation practices and to
prevent immature software from being deployed in operational systems. 
The Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command initiated the panel
because it believed that software problems were the primary cause of
delays in operational testing. 

As a result of the panel's 1992 report, the Army issued policy
guidance on the procedures necessary for effective OT&E of
software-intensive systems and on software requirements management. 
Unlike the other services, the Army has made substantial progress in
developing enforceable policy guidance.  The Army also implemented 12
servicewide requirements, management, and quality software metrics
and is in the process of implementing a centralized metrics data base
to enable decisionmakers to better monitor the progress made during a
system's life cycle.  Other improvements include

  -- a standard framework for test and evaluation of software,

  -- a clear definition of responsibilities under the Army process
     known as continuous evaluation,

  -- the involvement of independent test and evaluation personnel
     from the start of a software development,

  -- increased user involvement in defining and refining
     requirements, and

  -- the early and frequent demonstration of software development
     progress. 

In addition, Army post-deployment software support agencies have
begun to provide such support throughout a system's life cycle.  For
example, the Communications-Electronics Command provides (1)
life-cycle software engineering for mission-critical defense systems;
(2) support in developing and testing command, control,
communications, and intelligence systems; and (3) hands-on experience
and formal training in software engineering for Army Materiel Command
interns. 

The Communications-Electronics Command also developed the Army
Interoperability Network to support software and interoperability
throughout Army systems' life cycles.  This computer resources
network, available for use by developers, testers, and evaluators of
command, control, communications, and intelligence systems, is
designed to provide for early integration and interoperability
assurance, reduced development costs, and more efficient system
scheduling for life-cycle software support.  Additionally, the
command developed (1) a software life-cycle engineering process, (2)
software process metrics, and (3) automated tools to manage software
support and the software development process.  The overall effect of
such tools on DT&E and OT&E is still to be seen. 


      AIR FORCE EFFORTS TO
      INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS
      OF SOFTWARE OT&E
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1

With the assistance of the Software Engineering Institute, the Air
Force developed a process improvement program in December 1991 and
directed its software development activities to implement the program
in July 1992.  The Air Force is now developing policy intended to
encourage all bidders on Air Force software contracts to improve
current operations so that the bids could be assessed at a high
software maturity level.  Also, the Air Force is developing
standardized procedures for software test and evaluation that will be
used in both development and operational tests. 

Historically, the Air Force acquisition community has not required
the use of metrics due to differences in opinions about which metrics
have value and whether attention to the wrong metrics could lead to
an incorrect focus and a skewed outcome.  Through a limited set of
software metrics, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center has had some success in measuring software maturity for OT&E. 
To assess the contribution of software to the system's operational
suitability, the Center uses software deficiency reports in
evaluating software maturity and a structured questionnaire approach
to determine software supportability.  This approach has been less
than optimal due to the absence of more formal metrics programs in
Air Force acquisition programs.  Also, this relatively informal
process has focused on projecting weapon systems' suitability but not
effectiveness. 

However, as part of its software process improvement plan, the Air
Force is developing a software metrics policy on

  -- what data are required to support the metrics (such as
     contracting guidance),

  -- how the metrics will be reported, and

  -- how to interpret the results. 

The policy will require all acquisition programs to use certain
software metrics and to report the results of the metrics at every
Air Force program review, thus providing decisionmakers with more
current, reliable insights into the status of software development. 
The software metrics will include the OSD core set and the Air Force
core set.\4 Some Air Force guidance on using metrics was issued in
1991. 

In September 1991, the Sacramento Air Logistics Center, with the
assistance of the Software Engineering Institute, made its first
self-assessment of software development and support processes.  The
assessment indicated that program results were unpredictable, systems
were completed behind schedule and over cost, and customers were
often dissatisfied.  Also, because the Center lacked a unified,
structured process for supporting software, it was difficult for
management to gain the insight required to effectively plan and
control software programs.  To correct these deficiencies, the Center
plans to establish a documented process for project planning, project
management, requirements management, configuration management, and
support organization management.  According to Center officials,
other Air Force logistics centers are similarly involved in these
assessments. 

Center officials also believe that program managers lack an effective
process model and reliable historical data to estimate the cost,
schedule, and resource requirements for software development.  Such
estimates are essential to effectively measure progress against
planned performance.  Recognizing that software metrics are key to
oversight by all decisionmakers, the Center has established a
Software Metrics Working Group.  The group is expected to define the
data to be collected and a way to present those data to project
managers and first-line supervisors so that the software project
management process can be stabilized and be repeated. 

Also, to improve post-deployment software support, the Center has
established a team to develop a process model that will provide a
comprehensive, structured process for making software changes to

  -- improve the maintainability and supportability of software,

  -- make software support more cost-effective and more responsive to
     user requirements,

  -- be tailorable to all types of software applications, and

  -- make managers more responsible and accountable for resources
     used in software test and evaluation. 

The process model is aimed at overcoming all the historical problems
common to post-deployment software support, as well as improving (1)
project management visibility, (2) user productivity through better
understanding of responsibilities, and (3) day-to-day activities. 


--------------------
\4 The OSD core set includes size, effort, schedule, and quality as
defined by the Software Engineering Institute.  The Air Force core
set includes software maintainability, software maturity, software
scrap and rework, computer resource utilization, requirements and
design stability, and software cost and schedule. 


      NAVY IMPLEMENTATION OF
      SOFTWARE OT&E PROCESS
      IMPROVEMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2

The Navy's software OT&E improvement efforts have been slow compared
to the other services, and its primary OT&E focus has been on the
total system.  However, as part of its Total Quality Leadership Plan,
the Navy is beginning to take some actions to improve its software
development and testing processes.  For example, in August 1992, the
Navy tasked a Test and Evaluation Process Action Team to develop
recommendations to improve the Navy's test and evaluation process
throughout all phases of the acquisition process and readiness of
systems for OT&E. 

On the basis of a 4-month review\5 that included an analysis of Army
and Air Force software management initiatives and policy guidance,
the team concluded that the Navy needed to implement

  -- stronger fleet support for test and evaluation in Navy
     acquisition programs;

  -- a formal working group to coordinate and resolve Navy test
     planning issues;

  -- a clearer, more timely requirements definition and management
     process; and

  -- a rigorous OT&E certification review process. 

The team further concluded that certification and testing of software
releases and of mission-critical systems needed additional study. 
With respect to metrics, the team concluded that a common set of
metrics was needed as a tool to measure software maturity but that
metrics alone should not be the determining factor in the
certification of systems as ready for OT&E. 

In addition, the team concluded that the Navy should

  -- issue revised policy guidance\6 on the procedures necessary for
     effective test and evaluation of software-intensive systems,

  -- conduct rigorous operational test readiness reviews before
     systems are certified as ready for operational test,

  -- develop and recommend a common set of at least eight metrics to
     be used by decisionmakers as indicators of software maturity,

  -- develop additional metrics that can be used by program managers
     to measure the progress of development efforts,

  -- determine the appropriate level of testing for major and minor
     releases of software, and

  -- develop and recommend methods to streamline the process for
     testing software releases. 

The report concluded that the test and evaluation initiatives and
recommendations would work if implemented by instructions, formal
policy, and clear command guidance and accompanied with command
involvement.  Although it is far too soon to tell if these
recommendations will be effective for Navy acquisition programs, they
appear to be consistent with those made by the DOD Software Test and
Evaluation Project report in 1983. 

By contrast, the Navy Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support
Activity, with the assistance of the Software Engineering Institute,
has already developed an improvement program that mirrors the best
practices in the private sector and may assist government software
development activities in improving their processes.  Begun in
January 1992, the program was intended to improve the Activity's
software development and support processes.  As a result, the
Activity began using 13 software management metrics to make
fact-based decisions about systems' performance during software
development.  Activity officials said that the indicators

  -- provided a clear and concise reporting structure;

  -- improved planning and data collection for future projections;

  -- provided a degree of standardization among projects,
     contractors, and in-house personnel;

  -- fostered closer adherence to military standards;

  -- greatly improved communication and problem and process
     definition;

  -- acted as a reliable early-warning system if plans were not met;
     and

  -- highlighted small problems early so that they could be resolved
     before they grew. 

The Activity's software development process, in our view, is
structured and measurable and includes relatively open, periodic
reporting to management, which is a good foundation for
decision-making. 


--------------------
\5 Navy Process Action Team Report of Enhancements to Test and
Evaluation, December 1992. 

\6 OPNAV Role and Responsibilities in the Acquisition Process, Draft
OPNAVINST 5000.42D, April 1993. 


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 4

Test and evaluation of software and software-intensive defense
systems remains among the most difficult, most expensive, and least
understood processes in the defense acquisition cycle.  Although key
software test and evaluation study recommendations have provided a
starting point for DOD to address and resolve the software crisis,
only limited progress has been made in improving the ability of
software-intensive systems to meet users' requirements. 

Some OSD officials believe that the lack of a single OSD-level office
for software has been the primary reason long-standing software
problems have not been resolved.  Other officials have concluded that
OSD needs to take a more direct role in ensuring that
software-intensive systems are ready for OT&E before this critical
process begins. 

In our view, consistent adoption across DOD of the recommendations in
this report could greatly enhance the OT&E of software and better
enable DOD to accomplish its objectives of developing
software-intensive systems on schedule, within cost, and in
accordance with required performance capabilities.  DOD must go
beyond simply reworking the prior studies on software test and
evaluation.  Moreover, promulgating more policy guidance without
ensuring that the guidance is implemented is not the solution. 

Overall, DOD has not (1) developed an overarching strategy that
ensures development and implementation of key software test and
evaluation policy throughout DOD; (2) issued definitive acquisition
and life-cycle support policies that focus on software test and
evaluation; and (3) adopted a focused, disciplined approach to
software development and test and evaluation that recognizes the
critical nature of software. 

To achieve the potential of its mission-critical software and to
accomplish its software improvement objectives, DOD must overcome the
prevailing acquisition culture's failure to react to the problems of
modern defense systems; that is, DOD must understand that software is
a critical path through which systems achieve performance objectives. 
Because this message has often been ignored, systems have proceeded
into production when software had not yet achieved the appropriate
level of maturity to yield valid test results.  Because of the
acquisition community's bias toward hardware, DOD has not adequately
ensured that software was fully mature and had undergone thorough and
rigorous DT&E before systems were certified as ready for OT&E. 

DOD does not currently have a high-quality decision-making data base
to ensure that decisions concerning mission-critical software are
made based on reliable, credible data.  Further, DOD does not have
reasonable assurance that unnecessary duplication and redundancy in
software development are being avoided.  DOD has not adequately (1)
coordinated its efforts to develop and use software metrics for
defense acquisition programs; (2) made maximum use of contractors'
software development processes that have been favorably assessed by
credible, independent evaluation; (3) developed team-building efforts
to ensure the early and continuous involvement of users with
acquisition, post-deployment support and testing personnel; and (4)
filled in the policy and oversight voids that have contributed to the
shortfalls that we have addressed. 

OSD has recently established a Software Test and Evaluation Task
Force to work toward common policies.  Further, some senior defense
officials and software development and support personnel at the
services' working levels are working independently to resolve some of
the pressing software issues.  Overall, however, the agency has not
adequately responded to the magnitude of the problem. 

We are encouraged by the progress the services have made in
developing policy guidance to improve the OT&E of its
software-intensive systems and of its software requirements.  We are
particularly encouraged by the Army's implementation of requirements,
management, and quality software metrics, as well as a centralized
metrics data base.  Accordingly, we believe these Army initiatives
should be watched closely by OSD, since these efforts may show
potential for application throughout DOD. 

We are similarly encouraged by senior defense acquisition and
technology officials' recognition of the critical need to improve
management of the requirements process for software-intensive
systems.  Effectively defining requirements; building teams of
appropriate users, logisticians, program management, and contractor
personnel; and focusing appropriate management attention is critical
to improving software maturity before OT&E begins. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

To realize lasting improvements in test and evaluation of
software-intensive systems and to enhance the life-cycle
affordability of such programs, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense

  -- issue and implement a software test and evaluation policy that
     defines testing requirements for software maturity, regression
     testing, and the use of temporary software fixes during testing;

  -- strengthen controls to ensure that operational testing does not
     begin until results of development test and evaluation
     demonstrate an appropriate level of software maturity;

  -- require program management officials to define exit criteria for
     certifying a systems' readiness for operational testing at the
     beginning of full-scale development (i.e., milestone II); and

  -- require the services to develop a common core set of management
     metrics for software (i.e., cost, schedule, and quality) for
     major defense programs early in the development cycle to be
     approved at milestone II. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with
our findings and recommendations that additional steps can be taken
to improve the test and evaluation of software-intensive systems. 
Accordingly, DOD indicated that, during fiscal year 1994, it will
issue revised software policy guidance to address these concerns. 
However, we believe that the issuance of revised policy guidance
without incentives to change behavior or ensure effective
implementation could have little effect in ensuring software
maturity. 

DOD pointed out that many of the reasons for immature software during
OT&E were outside the control of the test and evaluation community. 
We agree with DOD's comment and specifically address this fact in the
report. 

DOD indicated that programs reviewed as part of our analysis preceded
DOD's most recent acquisition guidance and that the potential
benefits of such guidance were therefore not sufficiently
acknowledged in the report.  DOD indicated that current updates of
its acquisition policy series provided improved guidance and stronger
program oversight for development strategies, testing, and
requirements.  However, this policy has some voids and, more
importantly, it remains to be seen whether and to what degree the
policy updates will be implemented and whether they will address the
long-standing problems. 

DOD also indicated that the benefits of software metrics for OT&E
were not supported.  We did not attempt to quantify the direct
benefits of software metrics for OT&E.  We pointed out that experts
in DOD and in the private sector believe that software metrics could
improve the management of the software development process and thus
contribute to greater software maturity before OT&E begins. 

DOD's comments appear in appendix III. 


DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEMS
EXHIBITING TYPICAL SOFTWARE
PROBLEMS
=========================================================== Appendix I

Tables I.1 through I.3 summarize the results of the military
services' operational test agencies' operational test and evaluation
(OT&E) reports on major systems that had critical software problems
affecting operational effectiveness and suitability during testing
conducted from January 1990 to December 1992.\1 The information in
the tables includes all OT&E reports related to software-intensive
major defense acquisition programs that were available during the
course of our review. 



                               Table I.1
                
                Army Systems Exhibiting Typical Software
                                Problems

System                                    Test      Problem(s)
----------------------------------------  --------  ------------------
Army Tactical Missile System              IOT&E\a   Software was
                                                    immature.

Regency Net                               IOT&E     Software was
                                                    immature before
                                                    fielding.

                                                    Many software-
                                                    related
                                                    operational
                                                    failures were
                                                    found.

Trackwolf                                 IOT&E     Software was
                                                    immature,
                                                    resulting in
                                                    numerous computer
                                                    lockups.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Initial OT&E (IOT&E) provides an estimate of a systems'
effectiveness and suitability to support full-rate production
decisions. 



                               Table I.2
                
                  Air Force Systems Exhibiting Typical
                           Software Problems

System                                    Test      Problem(s)
----------------------------------------  --------  ------------------
AGM-130A                                  IOT&E     Software
                                                    documentation
                                                    lacked
                                                    traceability and
                                                    descriptiveness.

AGM-136A Tacit Rainbow                    IOT&E     Software was not
                                                    mature.

                                                    Severe software
                                                    problems (mission
                                                    abort and mission
                                                    degradation) were
                                                    found.

Consolidated Space Operations Center      IOT&E     Software was not
                                                    mature and was
                                                    likely to stay
                                                    immature for
                                                    several years.

                                                    Software problems
                                                    being reported
                                                    were increasing
                                                    faster than
                                                    previously
                                                    identified
                                                    problems could be
                                                    fixed.

F-15 Eagle                                OT&E      Software was not
                                                    mature.

                                                    Severe software
                                                    problems (mission
                                                    abort and mission
                                                    degradation) were
                                                    found.

F-16C Multinational Staged Improvement    IOT&E     Source code was
Program                                             corrupt, which led
                                                    to poor software
                                                    configuration
                                                    management.

Ground Station for Satellite 14           IOT&E     Software
                                                    documentation
                                                    requirements were
                                                    not met.

Navstar Global Positioning System         OT&E      Software
                                                    documentation was
                                                    inadequate (no
                                                    computer program
                                                    product
                                                    specification).

Navstar Space and Control Station         IOT&E     Software problems
                                                    were the cause of
                                                    89 percent of
                                                    unscheduled
                                                    outages and 73
                                                    percent of
                                                    downtime.
                                                    Software was not
                                                    mature.

Peacekeeper Rail Garrison                 IOT&E     Software design
                                                    documentation was
                                                    inadequate as a
                                                    maintenance tool.

Short-Range Attack Missile II             IOT&E     Operational flight
                                                    software
                                                    documentation was
                                                    inadequate (e.g.,
                                                    detailed test
                                                    procedures,
                                                    "executive"
                                                    function, etc.).

                                                    Software
                                                    requirements were
                                                    difficult to
                                                    trace.
----------------------------------------------------------------------


                               Table I.3
                
                Navy Systems Exhibiting Typical Software
                                Problems

System                                    Test      Problem(s)
----------------------------------------  --------  ------------------
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile  FOT&E\a   Software was not
                                                    mature; dedicated
                                                    software
                                                    operational
                                                    testing was
                                                    needed.

AN/ALQ-165 Airborne Self-Protection       OT&E      Current mission-
Jammer                                              critical software
                                                    was not
                                                    available.

                                                    Mission-critical
                                                    faults were in
                                                    built-in testing
                                                    (not confirmed as
                                                    software or
                                                    hardware).

AN/SPY-1/D Radar Upgrade                  OT&E      Deficiencies in
                                                    software
                                                    documentation were
                                                    uncorrected.

AV-8B                                     FOT&E     Software
                                                    interoperability
                                                    deficiencies were
                                                    reported.

Consolidated Automated Support System     IOT&E     Software was not
                                                    mature (power-up
                                                    failures, computer
                                                    lockups, and
                                                    station aborts),
                                                    requiring system
                                                    reboot.

EA-6B ICAP II Block 86                    FOT&E     Software
                                                    deficiencies were
                                                    found with
                                                    detection,
                                                    documentation,
                                                    built-in test, and
                                                    logistic support.

EA-6B ICAP II Block 82                    FOT&E     Software
                                                    deficiencies were
                                                    found with
                                                    detection,
                                                    documentation, and
                                                    built-in test.

F-14D                                     OT&E      Software was not
                                                    mature, and the
                                                    system was not
                                                    ready for OT&E.

                                                    Numerous software
                                                    anomalies were
                                                    found.

F/A-18C/D                                 FOT&E     Software
                                                    configuration
                                                    control was
                                                    difficult due to
                                                    rapidly changing
                                                    software
                                                    requirements.

T-45 TS Ground Training Subsystems        IOT&E     Mission-critical
                                                    software faults
                                                    (computer lockups)
                                                    were found.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) assesses the need for modifications to a
system by verifying changes made since previous testing. 


--------------------
\1 No major software deficiencies affecting operational effectiveness
and suitability were reported by the operational test agencies during
OT&E of the Over the Horizon Back Scatter Radar, CV-Inner Zone,
F/A-18A Operational Flight Program 89A, and T-45A programs. 


ORGANIZATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II

Organization            Responsibilities
----------------------  ----------------------------------------------
Deputy Under Secretary  Sets development test and evaluation (DT&E)
of Defense for          policy within the Department of Defense (DOD),
Acquisition (Test and   reviews and approves Test and Evaluation
Evaluation)             Master Plans, and provides technical
                        assistance to the Secretary of Defense.

Director, Operational   Oversees OT&E policy within DOD, reviews and
Test and Evaluation     approves Test and Evaluation Master Plans, and
                        provides OT&E assessments to the Secretary of
                        Defense and Congress.

Army, Navy, and Air     Review summary test results for funding,
Force Headquarters      scheduling, and fielding recommendations.

Development commands    Review summary test results for funding,
                        scheduling, and performance recommendations.

Program offices         Devise overall plan for DT&E, certify systems'
                        readiness for OT&E, review and approve
                        contractor test documents for specification
                        and contract adherence, and support
                        operational testing.

Contractors             Prepare and execute DT&E program and analyze
                        and report DT&E results.

Development test        Plan, conduct, and report on DT&E with respect
agencies                to satisfying required technical performance
                        specifications and objectives.

Operational test        Plan, conduct, and report on all OT&E
agencies                regarding operational effectiveness and
                        suitability and monitor, participate in, and
                        review DT&E results to obtain information
                        applicable to OT&E objectives.

Software support        Evaluate software for maintainability
agencies                throughout life cycle and verify and validate
                        software as applicable.

User and training       As applicable, support OT&E, evaluate software
commands                usability, and define and monitor
                        requirements.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix III COMMENTS FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II













The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's
letter dated September 17, 1993. 


   GAO COMMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

1.  We have revised the report title and, where appropriate, the text
to better reflect the nature of our findings; that is, the barriers
to ensuring the maturity of software-intensive systems primarily
reside with acquisition management and must be addressed in advance
of OT&E. 

2.  We have incorporated this comment in the text of the report. 

3.  The report has been modified to state that post-deployment
software support receives comparatively less attention during early
development.  Discussion of the Army's post-deployment software
support process as it relates to test and evaluation is covered in
chapter 3 of the report. 

4.  The text of the report has been modified to better reflect our
support for the existence of substantial software problems. 

5.  The 27 systems we reviewed represented the total population of
major programs that the services had identified as having undergone
OT&E during the 2-year period from January 1990 to December 1992. 

6.  Our review indicates that the issuance of revised procedures
without incentives to change behavior or ensure effective
implementation has had little effect in ensuring software maturity. 
The pervasiveness and significance of software problems in critical
defense systems clearly warrant special attention, as reflected in
our recommendations. 

7.  The report acknowledges revisions in DOD's policy guidance and
associated requirements.  The programs cited in our analysis,
however, were intended to reflect the most current 2-year "snapshot"
of OT&E results. 

8.  Our concern is with the implementation of the policy.  We have
modified the text of the report to better distinguish between
updating policy guidance and implementing it.  Detailed discussion of
progress is covered in chapter 3 of the report. 

9.  Even though DOD's Software Master Plan was not approved for
agencywide implementation, senior defense officials told us that they
support the views expressed therein; that is, divided software
oversight in modern defense systems is not the optimal managerial
approach. 

10.  DOD's response indicates that this issue has not been resolved. 
Even though some steps have been completed by the Army, the other
services' efforts and results are not as well defined. 

11.  The recommended uses of cost and schedule metrics are intended
to ensure better acquisition management of software.  We believe that
more effective management of the software development and testing
processes, particularly early in the development cycle, will increase
the likelihood of appropriate software maturity for OT&E.  As the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Software Test and Evaluation
Task Force continues to develop the common policies, procedures, and
tools referred to in DOD's comments, we believe that the potential
savings of a common software metrics tool will become more evident. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1

Michael E.  Motley, Associate Director
Lester C.  Farrington, Assistant Director


   NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2

Fred Harrison, Regional Manager Representative
Clifton Spruill, Evaluator-in-Charge
Sandra Epps, Site Senior


*** End of document. ***