F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided (Letter Report, 03/14/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-68).

Pursuant to a congressional mandate, GAO reviewed the Air Force's
engineering and manufacturing development program for the F-22 aircraft,
focusing on: (1) the extent to which the F-22 development program is
meeting its performance, schedule, and cost goals; (2) whether the Air
Force is likely to complete the development program as planned without
exceeding the cost limitation established by the act; and (3) whether
GAO had access to sufficient information to make informed judgements on
matters covered in this report.

GAO noted that: (1) in 1999, Air Force made progress in demonstrating
the F-22's expected performance; (2) Air Force continues to estimate
that by the end of the development program, the F-22 will meet or exceed
its performance goals; (3) GAO has no evidence indicating the
performance parameters will not be met; (4) however, the Air Force's
performance estimates are based on limited flight test data, computer
models, ground tests, and analyses and will not be confirmed until
flight tests are completed; (5) while the development program made
progress in achieving its schedule goals in 1999, some tests and
scheduled activities established in 1997 were delayed because of
continuing problems such as delays in delivery of flight test aircraft
and in completion of testing of nonflying ground test aircraft; (6)
despite these delays, Air Force has not extended the August 2003
completion date of the development program and therefore, may not be
able to complete development flight tests before the development program
is scheduled to end; (7) further, the schedule for completion of
avionics development appears optimistic; (8) avionics is being developed
in segments (blocks) with completion of each segment dependent on
completion of prior segments; (9) although it postponed the completion
dates of the first two avionics software segments from the 1997
schedule, Air Force moved up the completion dates of subsequent
segments; (10) in late 1998, Air Force identified $667 million in
potential cost increases that could cause the development program to
exceed its cost limitation; (11) by December 1999, Air Force  had
identified an additional $90 million because of higher than expected
contractor costs, bringing the total potential cost increase to $757
million; (12) despite these potential cost increases, the F-22
development program could still be managed within its cost limitation
because Air Force and contractors have identified $860 million in
potential costs offsets; (13) should further significant cost increases
materialize, however, the development program may need to be scaled
back, or other ways may need to be found to reduce the costs; (14)
challenges remain in completing the development program within the
congressional cost limitation and as scheduled; and (15) however, Air
Force has identified sufficient cost offset to more than cover all
identified potential cost increases and is aggressively managing the
program.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-00-68
     TITLE:  F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major
	     Problems Are Avoided
      DATE:  03/14/2000
   SUBJECT:  Procurement planning
	     Advanced weapons systems
	     Air Force procurement
	     Fighter aircraft
	     Defense cost control
	     Future budget projections
	     Operational testing
	     Avionics
	     Military budgets
	     Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER:  F-22 Aircraft

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GAO/NSIAD-00-68

Rev-LG logo.eps
GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to Congressional Committees
March 2000 F- 22 AIRCRAFT Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are Avoided

GAO/NSIAD-00-68

Page 1 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Contents Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Estimates of Performance for Key F- 22 Parameters 22
Appendix II: Criteria Established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for the F- 22 Program 23
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 24 Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 25
Related GAO Products 26 Tables Table 1: Comparison of Schedules for First Flight Dates of Test
Aircraft 9 Table 2: Comparison of Planned, Current, and Needed F- 22 Airframe
Performance Flight Test Point Accomplishment Rates 11 Table 3: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and Fatigue Structural Integrity Tests 12
Table 4: Comparison of Air Force Planned and Projected Assembly Hours for Flight Test Aircraft 4003- 4009, December 1999 16 Table 5: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters 22
Figures Figure 1: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget, January Through December 1999 15
Figure 2: Actual and Planned Contractor Personnel Levels in 1999 16
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Page 3 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
National Security and International Affairs Division
B- 280222 Lett er
March 14, 2000 Congressional Committees As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 1 we reviewed the Air Force's engineering and manufacturing development program for the F- 22 aircraft. The F- 22 is an air superiority 2 aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries
(stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges. It has integrated aviation electronics (avionics) to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation surrounding them. The objectives of the F- 22 development program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F- 22 flight test aircraft and 25 flight- qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate, integrate, and test the avionics suite; and (3) design, develop, and test the support and training systems. The F- 22 is being developed under contracts with Lockheed Martin Corporation (for the aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine). For this report, an update to a report we issued in 1999, we assessed the extent to which the F- 22 development program is meeting its performance, schedule, and cost goals. 3 We also determined whether the Air Force is likely to complete the development program as planned without exceeding
the cost limitation established by the act. The act also requires us to certify whether we had access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on matters covered in this report. There is a congressional cost limitation for the F- 22 development program. The limitation is currently $18. 880 billion, but Department of Defense (DOD) officials said the limitation is being revised and is expected to be $20.4 billion, with the amount to officially be announced in May or June 2000. The revision is mostly to recognize program direction included in the
fiscal year 2000 appropriation act, which added flight test aircraft to the 1 P. L. 105- 85 (Nov. 18, 1997). 2 Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive interference by the enemy. 3 F- 22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 55, Mar. 15, 1999).
B- 280222 Page 4 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
development program. The Air Force plans to complete the development program, which began in 1991, in August 2003. As of December 1999, the Air Force had accepted two flight test aircraft and had completed over 500
flight test hours about 13 percent of the planned total. Results in Brief In 1999, the Air Force made progress in demonstrating the F- 22's expected
performance. The Air Force continues to estimate that by the end of the development program, the F- 22 will meet or exceed its performance goals. At this time, we have no evidence indicating that the performance parameters will not be met. However, the Air Force's performance estimates are based on limited flight test data, computer models, ground tests, and analyses and will not be confirmed until flight tests are completed. While the development program made progress in achieving its schedule
goals in 1999, some tests and scheduled activities established in 1997 were delayed because of continuing problems such as delays in delivery of flight test aircraft and in completion of testing of nonflying ground test aircraft.
Even though the Air Force encountered problems that caused delays in completing flight and other test activities, it has not extended the August 2003 completion date of the development program and therefore may not be able to complete development flight tests before the development program is scheduled to end. Further, the schedule for completion of
avionics development appears optimistic. Avionics is being developed in segments (blocks), with completion of each segment dependent on completion of prior segments. Although it postponed the completion dates of the first two avionics software segments from the 1997 schedule, the Air Force moved up the completion dates of subsequent segments.
In late 1998, the Air Force identified $667 million in potential cost increases that could cause the development program to exceed its cost limitation. By December 1999, the Air Force had identified an additional $90 million because of higher than expected contractor costs, bringing the total potential cost increase to $757 million. Despite these potential cost
increases, the F- 22 development program could still be managed within its cost limitation because the Air Force and contractors have identified $860 million in potential cost offsets. Should further significant cost increases materialize, however, the development program may need to be scaled back, or other ways may need to be found to reduce the costs. Challenges remain in completing the development program within the congressional cost limitation and as scheduled. However, the Air Force has
B- 280222 Page 5 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
identified sufficient cost offsets to more than cover all identified potential cost increases and is aggressively managing the program. As a result, we are making no recommendations. In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Defense stated that it concurred.
Background Since the beginning of the F- 22 development program in 1991, the Air Force's estimated cost to develop the aircraft has increased. Cost trends in 1995 showed a potential for costs to increase further. Concerned about these growing costs, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition established the Joint Estimating Team to estimate the most probable costs to complete F- 22 development and production. The team consisted of personnel from the Air Force, DOD, and private industry. The team concluded in 1997 that additional time would be required to complete the development program and estimated that costs would increase from $17.4 billion to $18.688 billion. The team recommended several changes to the development program's schedule, including slower manufacturing for a
more efficient transition from development to low- rate initial production and an additional 12 months to complete avionics development. The Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics generally adopted the team's recommendations to extend the development program schedule, including the dates for accomplishing
interim events. 4 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation of $18.688 billion (an amount that mirrored the team's estimate) for the development program. The act instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to adjust the cost limitation for the amounts of increases or decreases in costs attributable to economic inflation after September 30, 1997, and for compliance with changes in federal, state, and local laws
enacted after September 30, 1997. Since then, the Air Force has adjusted the program's cost limitation to $18.880 billion. DOD officials said the limitation will be adjusted again to $20. 4 billion in May or June 2000 to recognize the program's fiscal year 2000 legislation, which added flight test aircraft to the development program.
4 For more information on the team's recommendations, see Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F- 22 Fighter Program (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 156, June 4, 1997).
B- 280222 Page 6 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
For fiscal year 2000, the Air Force requested $1.6 billion for initial production of six F- 22 aircraft. Both authorization and appropriations acts for fiscal year 2000 established further congressional direction for the program. The authorization act 5 required that before initial production begins, the Secretary of Defense must certify that the test plan is adequate for determining whether the F- 22 is effective and suitable for its mission, and that the development program can be executed within the cost limitation. The appropriations act 6 did not approve initial production but approved funding for acquisition of additional flight test aircraft with
research, development, testing, and evaluation funding. The act restricted award of a fully funded contract for initial production until (1) the first flight of an F- 22 with block 3 7 avionics software is conducted; (2) the Secretary of Defense certifies to congressional defense committees that criteria identified in the act for award of initial production contracts have been met; and (3) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reports on the adequacy of testing to measure and predict the performance of avionics systems, stealth characteristics, and weapon delivery systems. Extent to Which F- 22
Development Program Is Meeting Performance Goals
In December 1999, the Air Force estimated that by the time the development program ends, the F- 22 will have met and in many instances exceeded the goals for major performance parameters. These include 10 parameters on which the Air Force reports regularly to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. At this time, we have no evidence indicating that the performance parameters will not be met. However, we observe that the Air Force's performance estimates are based on limited flight test data, computer models, ground
tests, and analyses. Most ground and flight tests will have to be completed before the estimates are confirmed.
Table 5 in appendix I shows the goal for each parameter, the estimated performance for each parameter as of December 1999, and the Air Force's latest estimates of the performance expected to be achieved for each
parameter by the end of the development program. 5 P. L. 106- 65 (Oct. 5, 1999). 6 P. L. 106- 79 (Oct. 25, 1999). 7 Block 3 is the third major avionics software segment, which brings most avionics software into an integrated system.
B- 280222 Page 7 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Extent to Which the F- 22 Development Program Is Meeting Schedule Goals
The F- 22 development program made progress toward meeting its schedule goals in 1999. It carried out flight, engine, and avionics tests and met a crucial test requirement deadline. However, the Air Force did not achieve several goals established in 1997, when the program was last restructured. In particular, the development flight test program has been delayed and may not be able to complete the number of flight tests planned before the development program is scheduled to end in August 2003, the schedule for completion of avionics development appears optimistic, and tests of nonflying ground test aircraft are behind schedule. Further delays in
completing these activities could delay the completion of the development program, thereby increasing development costs. The Air Force has modified many of its detailed schedules, delaying and in a few instances, moving up the dates for which various events are scheduled to occur. The Air Force said the 1997 schedule is outdated and it no longer manages the program to achieve the schedules of events as restructured in 1997. They said many events were not achieved as planned and the schedules had to be revised to reflect different plans for completing development at the same time. Because the program was last restructured in 1997 and the congressional cost limitation mirrored the program as restructured, we used the cost and schedule plans established in 1997 from the team's study as an analytical baseline in our assessment of cost and
schedule goals for the F- 22 development program. Progress Made in 1999 Through 1999, the Air Force completed over 500 flight test hours (about 200 of which were completed in 1998), conducted avionics and engine test activities, and began testing the nonflying ground test aircraft. By
December 1999, the Air Force had met test requirements set by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as a prerequisite for acquiring production representative test aircraft approved by Congress for fiscal year 2000. The test requirements are included in appendix II. Some of the more notable tests conducted on the F- 22 in 1999 included  supercruise (sustained flight at 1 times speed of sound without using
engine devices that consume significant amounts of fuel);  flight with open weapon bays;  ability to operate at many different altitudes and speeds in flight zones E- 2, E- 2A, E- 3, E- 3A, and E- 4;
B- 280222 Page 8 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
 flight with thrust vectoring 8 in unconventional situations;  structural (static) tests up to 100 percent of the design limit load on
critical structure (full requirement is to test the aircraft's structure to 150 percent);  demonstration of the second major F- 22 avionics software segment
aboard a Boeing 757 flying test bed; 9  demonstration that the engine allows the aircraft to fly throughout its planned flight regime (engine full flight release);  flight up to an altitude of 50,000 feet, the maximum required (demonstrated in late 1998); and  complete initial radar cross section testing of a full- scale model.
Flight Test Program May Not Be Completed as Planned
Information provided by the Air Force indicates that, unless certain problems are resolved, a significant percentage of the flight test program may not be completed as planned before the development flight tests are scheduled to end. The Air Force is experiencing several problems executing the flight test program on schedule: (1) deliveries of some test aircraft have been delayed by over 8 months, (2) completed test aircraft have required more modifications than expected, and (3) the flight test program efficiency the number of test points 10 accomplished for each flight test hour has been less than planned. According to an Air Force
analysis, if these problems persist, 37 to 50 percent of the total planned flight test hours would not be completed by the time F- 22 development is scheduled to be completed.
The Air Force, in June 1999, reported further delays 11 in test aircraft deliveries because of additional delays in wing deliveries and repairs 8 Changing the direction of the thrust generated by the aircraft's engines to make the aircraft more maneuverable. 9 Tests involved primarily the radar, not the more sophisticated integrated avionics capability, which includes communication, navigation, and identification and electronic warfare functions.
10 A test point is one of thousands of measurements of the performance of individual functions of the aircraft and its components in a range of conditions and flight environments.
11 For a description of previous delays in the completion of test aircraft, see F- 22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 55, Mar. 15, 1999).
B- 280222 Page 9 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
needed to the aft (rear) fuselage. 12 Table 1 compares the first flight dates of test aircraft as planned in 1997 with the first flight dates as planned at the time of our last report in March 1999 and the Air Force plan as of June 1999.
Table 1: Comparison of Schedules for First Flight Dates of Test Aircraft
a Actual date of first flight.
Because of manufacturing problems, the third test aircraft (4003) will be delivered over 8 months later than planned in 1997, and the next four flight test aircraft will also be delivered late. However, the Air Force has not extended the date for completion of the development program. As a result,
the Air Force now has over 29 fewer flight test months available to complete the development flight test program and has lost over 626 flight test hours that would have been available had these aircraft been delivered on schedule. Flight test time is essential to verify an aircraft's specific features and to reduce the risk of structural or performance problems emerging after production begins. 12 In April 1999, an airframe structural strength analysis indicated insufficient strength in a panel in the rear of the airframe. Development aircraft are being repaired to provide additional structural strength.
Test aircraft First flight dates
as planned in 1997
First flight dates as planned in March 1999
First flight dates as planned in June 1999
Total delay of first flight dates (months)
as of June 1999
4001 May 1997 September 1997 a September 1997 a 3.37 4002 July 1998 June 1998 a June 1998 a -0.33 4003 June 1999 November 1999 February 2000 8.17 4004 August 1999 February 2000 May 2000 8.67 4005 January 2000 March 2000 June 2000 5.67 4006 May 2000 May 2000 August 2000 2.73 4007 September 2000 September 2000 October 2000 0.73 4008 February 2001 February 2001 February 2001 0 4009 June 2001 June 2001 June 2001 0 Total 29. 01
B- 280222 Page 10 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Furthermore, the June 1999 schedule for conducting first flights of aircraft 4005 through 4008 may also be overly optimistic. In December 1999 the Air Force reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that delivery of aircraft 4005 through 4008 was expected to be further delayed, delaying first flight dates of these aircraft by 2 to 3 months. Air Force officials told us that they would have to pay
overtime labor rates to meet the original schedule and that they are willing to accept later delivery to save money. Air Force officials also told us that one of the major reasons the flight test program may not be completed as planned is that the two deployed F- 22 test aircraft have required many more modifications than anticipated since flight tests began in September 1997. As a result, these aircraft have not been available for the planned amount of flight testing. The flight test program has not been as efficient as expected. A gauge of the efficiency of flight tests is the number of test points achieved in each flight test hour. Flight testing through December 1999 did not achieve test points at a sufficient rate to complete the flight test program as planned. At the
current rate, the development program may not achieve as much as onethird or more of its planned flight test points by the time operational testing begins. The program is currently achieving 8.1 test points per flight test hour. To complete the program as planned, the Air Force would have to
increase its rate to 12. 5 test points per flight test hour for the remainder of the airframe performance portion of the flight test program (see table 2). To achieve 12.5 test points per flight hour, the Air Force will have to increase
the accomplishment rate to a level substantially above the planned accomplishment rate of 11. 3.
B- 280222 Page 11 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Table 2: Comparison of Planned, Current, and Needed F- 22 Airframe Performance Flight Test Point Accomplishment Rates
The Air Force maintains that it is managing the flight test program aggressively by improving test efficiency, prioritizing work, and reducing overall test point requirements without affecting weapon system capabilities. However, if the flight test program continues at about its current flight test point accomplishment rate, the Air Force will have to
eliminate over 35 percent of the airframe performance flight test points in other words, it will not be able to complete over one- third of the flight test points unless more flight tests hours are flown or flight tests are extended. Avionics Development Is Behind Schedule, Remaining Schedule Appears Optimistic
In 1997, a study team concluded that avionics development could take as much as 12 months longer than planned because of delays in the development of major avionics segments, known as blocks (1, 2, 3, and 3.1). Completion of each avionics segment depends on completion of prior segments. Block 1 was completed 13 behind schedule. Currently, block 2 is also expected to be completed behind the 1997 schedule, and the majority
of initial software development tasks related to blocks 3 and 3. 1 have been delayed between 1 and 14 months behind the 1997 schedule. Although it postponed the completion dates for blocks 1 and 2, the Air Force moved up
the planned completion dates for blocks 3 and 3. 1. According to the current avionics schedule, the Air Force is planning on blocks 3 and 3. 1 being completed 5 and 3 months, respectively, earlier than the dates considered realistic by the study team. If the Air Force's current avionics schedule is not achieved, additional costs will be incurred to complete avionics development.
Flight test accomplishment plans Flight test
points Flight test hours
Flight test point accomplishment rate
(per flight test hour)
Planned accomplishment 20, 125 1,787 11. 3 Accomplishment through December 1999 4,121 505.7 8. 1
Accomplishment needed to complete airframe performance flight test program as planned 16, 004 1,281.3 12. 5
13 Completed to the point that it is placed on an aircraft in preparation for flight testing.
B- 280222 Page 12 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
There have also been significant delays in the start of avionics flight tests. Flight tests of block 1, which were supposed to begin aboard the fourth test aircraft in August 1999, have been delayed until May 2000. At the same
time, flight tests of block 3 are still planned 5 months earlier than the date considered realistic in 1997.
Testing of Nonflying Ground Test Aircraft Continues to Be Delayed
Two major tests of the structural integrity of the F- 22's airframe have been delayed significantly. Static testing is designed to ensure the aircraft will withstand stresses throughout the aircraft's flight regime, and fatigue
testing subjects the aircraft to the structural stresses expected within its planned life. These tests are important to reduce the risk of structural problems emerging during the production phase. The completion dates for these tests have been delayed 13 and 14 months, respectively. Table 3
shows the delayed completion dates for these tests.
Table 3: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and Fatigue Structural Integrity Tests
Extent to Which the F- 22 Program Is Meeting Cost Goals
The F- 22 development program can be managed within the cost limitation of $20. 4 billion only if the current completion date for the program is not extended and if additional cost increases can be managed within the current projected surplus. The Air Force and contractors have identified initiatives to produce sufficient cost offsets to complete the development program within the cost limitation. The Air Force reports that these
initiatives will total about $860 million, or $103 million more than needed to offset the total projected cost growth of $757 million. However, there are risks that (1) contractor costs will continue to exceed budgets more than expected and (2) overhead costs for the F- 22 program will increase because sales of the C- 130J cargo aircraft, which is manufactured in the same plant as the F- 22, have been lower than expected, thereby increasing overhead costs to the F- 22 program. Furthermore, as explained previously,
there is the possibility that flight tests and the development program itself Test 1997 plan March 1999 plan December 1999 plan Total delay (months)
Static October 1999 February 2000 November 2000 13 Fatigue December 1999 September 2000 February 2001 14
B- 280222 Page 13 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
will be extended if aircraft manufacturing and avionics problems continue or if the Air Force is unable to reduce the necessary modifications to test aircraft or increase the efficiency of the flight test program. Any of these conditions could increase program costs. Status of Initiatives In late 1998, the Air Force identified $667 million in potential cost increases
that could cause the development program to exceed its cost limitation. To keep development program costs from exceeding the congressional cost limitation, the Air Force and contractors developed a number of cost reduction initiatives aimed at offsetting the projected $667 million cost increase. The Air Force reported in December 1999 that these initiatives were expected to result in $730 million in offsets to the F- 22 development program cost. These initiatives include the following:  Contractor management efficiencies ($ 360 million). Lockheed Martin
has developed a number of initiatives to improve the efficiency of assembling the F- 22 while reducing costs. One of these involves closing some contractor laboratories earlier than planned. Another is a management approach that emphasizes reduction of unneeded steps in the manufacturing process. Air Force officials stated that initiatives implemented through November 1999 would achieve an estimated
$328 million of cost savings, but initiatives expected to result in $32 million of savings have not yet been implemented.  Applying management reserve ($ 180 million). This is essentially an
accounting adjustment. Management reserve is the balance of funds available within the contract price that the contractor has not budgeted for planned work. The purpose of management reserve is to provide flexibility in managing increases and decreases in budgets and the actual costs of completing the planned work. Because the contractor's costs exceeded budgeted amounts, the management reserve balance
(totaling $180 million) will be used to offset the increased costs. One effect of this action will be that the contractor will not have flexibility in managing future cost increases.  Deferring weapon testing ($ 140 million). The Air Force deferred
indefinitely tests of some weapons to be carried externally on the aircraft because the F- 22's primary mission is to carry weapons internally. Carrying weapons externally would substantially decrease the F- 22's stealth capabilities. The deferral reduces F- 22 development costs but may require the costs, when incurred, to be charged to an account different from the one used for F- 22 development.
B- 280222 Page 14 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
 Eliminating all remaining government studies for which funds have already been allocated ($ 50 million) and applying the funds to cost increases in other F- 22 development program activities.
The Air Force also plans to exempt the F- 22 development program from contributing to a servicewide research fund, thus freeing up an additional $130 million. In testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, the Air Force announced in December 1999 that it would not take funds from the F- 22 development program to pay for small
business innovative research programs intended to benefit the Air Force as a whole. The funds are usually taken from most Air Force programs. This initiative, however, may require other Air Force programs to make up for the loss of research funds that would have been obtained from the F- 22 program.
With $730 million in offsets and an additional $130 million available from not contributing to the servicewide research fund, the Air Force has a total of $860 million to offset the $757 million in projected cost increases. This provides a surplus of as much as $103 million to absorb additional cost increases if necessary.
Contractor Costs Continuing to Grow More Than Projections
Contractor costs continued to increase in 1999 and again exceeded available budgets by more than projected. Through 1998, contractor costs had exceeded available budgets by a total of $185 million since the Joint Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. Lockheed Martin had expected its costs for 1999 to exceed the available budget by another $40 million for a total of $225 million since the Joint Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. But by September 1999, costs for the year
exceeded the $40 million expected growth, despite the contractor's establishment of plans to limit the cost growth. Through December 1999, costs had exceeded available budgets by $80 million in 1999, for a total of $265 million since the Joint Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. This brings into question the contractor's ability to control costs enough to complete the development program as planned within the cost limitation.
The Air Force attributes these cost increases to production labor costs, manufacturing support and assembly labor cost overruns, and certain types of work performed out of sequence. Delayed software deliveries and avionics redesign, rework, and supplier overruns also contributed to cost increases. The Air Force acknowledges that because of the contractor cost
B- 280222 Page 15 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
increases in 1999, overall development program costs are likely to grow by an additional $90 million above the projected cost growth of $667 million. Figure 1 compares actual cost growth with Lockheed Martin's projections from January through December 1999.
Figure 1: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget, January Through December 1999
Among the factors contributing to higher contractor costs and manufacturing problems is the fact that the next four flight test aircraft are projected to take more hours than planned to assemble (see table 4). Also, except in April, the number of contractor personnel assigned to the program was consistently higher than planned for 1999 (see fig. 2). Labor costs make up a large portion of total program costs; therefore, taking longer than planned to assemble the aircraft and maintaining consistently higher personnel levels than planned increases program costs above estimates.
B- 280222 Page 16 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Table 4: Comparison of Air Force Planned and Projected Assembly Hours for Flight Test Aircraft 4003- 4009, December 1999
Figure 2: Actual and Planned Contractor Personnel Levels in 1999
Potential Impact of C- 130J Sales on Program
Unexpectedly low sales of the C- 130J cargo aircraft produced by Lockheed Martin may affect F- 22 program costs. The C- 130J, the F- 22, and several other weapon systems are produced or modified at the same Lockheed Martin plant in Marietta, Georgia. Lower C- 130J production would mean
Test aircraft Planned
assembly hours, December 1999
Projected assembly hours,
December 1999 Difference Percent difference
4003 269,360 274,158 4,798 1. 8 4004 232,546 260,471 27,925 12. 0 4005 207,342 228,260 20,918 10. 1 4006 205,822 220,991 15,169 7. 4 4007 201,815 201,815 0 0 4008 197,168 197,168 0 0 4009 175,919 175,919 0 0
B- 280222 Page 17 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
that a larger share of plant overhead costs might have to be absorbed partly by the F- 22. The assumption had been that 24 or 25 C- 130J aircraft would be produced each year. However, it now appears the C- 130J program will not achieve these production rates. Only 19 aircraft were produced in fiscal year 1999, and only 17 are estimated to be produced in fiscal year 2000 and 16 in each of the following 3 fiscal years. The Defense Contract Management Command analyzed this new information and concluded that this reduction in aircraft production could result in approximately
$45 million in unabsorbed overhead costs per year at the plant. This amount would need to be absorbed by all government programs at the plant, including possibly the F- 22 program. The specific impact of all this on the F- 22 program has not yet been determined.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD concurred with a draft of our report. DOD's comments are reproduced in appendix III. DOD suggested additional technical changes, which we incorporated in the report where appropriate.
Scope and Methodology To determine whether the development program is likely to meet performance goals, we analyzed information on the performance of key
performance parameters and those sub- parameters that are measured. We compared performance goals established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with the Air Force's current estimates of performance in December 1999 and at completion of development. The performance parameters are shown in appendix I. To determine whether the program is expected to meet schedule goals, we
reviewed program and avionics schedules and discussed potential changes to these schedules with F- 22 program officials. We also compared current schedules with those developed in 1997 as a result of a study by the Joint Estimating Team. We tracked progress in the flight test program, evaluated schedule variances in the contractors' performance management system, and compared planned milestone accomplishment dates with actual dates. We tracked technical problems in manufacturing and assembling the
development aircraft. To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost limitation, we examined (1) the extent to which the development program cost goals are being met, (2) Air Force plans to fund the program for fiscal year 2001, and (3) consistencies between the program funding plan and the cost
B- 280222 Page 18 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
limitation. We compared the estimated cost at completion of the prime contracts with planned amounts, evaluated cost variances identified in the contractors' cost reporting systems, and reviewed the status of initiatives designed to avoid cost growth.
To assess the extent to which the F- 22 development program was meeting its performance, schedule, and cost goals, we required access to current information about test results, performance estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, and incurred costs. The Air Force and
contractors gave us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters covered in this report. In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D. C.; the F- 22 System Program Office, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the
Defense Contract Management Command, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle,
Washington. We performed our work from April 1999 through February 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Senator John W. Warner, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable Representative Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Representative Jerry Lewis, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.
B- 280222 Page 19 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Please contact Allen Li at (202) 512- 4841 or Robert D. Murphy at (937) 258- 7904 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Louis J. Rodrigues Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
B- 280222 Page 20 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
List of Congressional Committees The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
Page 21 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Page 22 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Appendix I
Appendi xes Estimates of Performance for Key F- 22 Parameters Appendi x I
Table 5: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters Key performance parameters Goal (acquisition program baseline)
Estimated December 1999 performance
Estimated performance at completion of development
Supercruise 100 percent 115 percent 115 percent Acceleration 100 percent 114 percent 114 percent Maneuverability 100 percent 104 percent 104 percent Airlift support (C- 141 equivalents) 8 7.4 7.4
Sortie generation rate 100 percent 100 percent 100 percent
Radar cross section (front sector only) 100 percent Estimated to meet requirements (data
classified) Estimated to meet
requirements (data classified) Mean time between maintenance (hours)
3.0 3. 0 3. 0 Payload (missiles) four medium- range, two short- range six medium- range,
two short- range six medium- range, two short- range Combat radius 100 percent 123 percent 123 percent Radar detection range 100 percent 117 percent 117 percent
Page 23 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Appendix II Criteria Established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for the F- 22 Program Appendi x II
Criteria to be completed before approval to award contracts to acquire six aircraft for fiscal year 2000 (awarded in Dec. 1999):
 Demonstrate flight up to 50, 000 feet.  Engine full flight release.  Conduct weapon bay open testing (initiate data analysis).  Complete avionics integration laboratory integration of the operational flight program block 1.1 software and deliver to manufacturer.
 Complete critical design review for avionics block 3 software.  Complete aircraft 4004 fuselage, wing, and empennage mate.  Demonstrate supercruise.  Release avionics block 2 software to the flying test bed.  Complete static test up to 100 percent of the design limit load on critical structure.
 Conduct flight test operations in zones E- 2, E- 2A, E- 3, E- 3A, and E- 4.  Complete initial radar cross section full- scale pole model testing.  Demonstrate high angle of attack post- stall flight with thrust vectoring.  Complete aircraft 4003 flight preparation up through installed engine
runs. Criteria that are prerequisites for approval to award contracts to begin lowrate initial production (planned for Dec. 2000):
 Complete first portion of engine initial service release qualification test (2, 150 total accumulated cycles,  full hot section life).  Complete air vehicle final production readiness review.  Complete first flight on flight test aircraft 4003, 4004, 4005, and 4006.  Complete flight test aircraft 4008 fuselage, wing, and empennage mate.  Complete static structural testing.  Complete critical design review for avionics block 3.1 software.  Complete avionics block 3.0 first flight, initiate testing of block 3.0
unique functionality.  Conduct flight testing on flight test aircraft, including initiating radar
cross section flight testing, initiating high angle of attack testing with weapons bay doors open, and initiating separation testing of Air Intercept Missile- 9 and the Air Intercept Missile- 120.  Initiate fatigue life testing with the goal of completing 40 percent of first
fatigue life.
Page 24 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I II
Page 25 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Appendix IV GAO Staff Acknowledgments Appendi x I V
Acknowledgments Mark Abraham, Marvin E. Bonner, Christopher T. Brannon, Edward R. Browning, Shirley Johnson, Don M. Springman, and John Van Schaik made key contributions to this report.
Page 26 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68 F- 22 Aircraft
Related GAO Products Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F- 22 Cost and Schedule Goals (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 58, Dec. 7, 1999). Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT& E Programs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 233R, Sep. 23, 1999). Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2000 (GAO/ OCG- 99- 26, Apr. 16, 1999). Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F- 22 and F/ A- 18E/ F Engineering and Manufacturing Development Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 113, Mar. 17, 1999).
F- 22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 55, Mar. 15, 1999).
F- 22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 137, Mar. 25, 1998). F- 22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 67, Mar. 10, 1998). Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F- 22 Fighter Program (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 156, June 4, 1997). Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 103, Mar. 5, 1997). F- 22 Restructuring (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 100BR, Feb. 28, 1997). Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F- 22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 59, Apr. 19, 1995).
Air Force Embedded Computers (GAO/ AIMD- 94- 177R, Sep. 20, 1994). Tactical Aircraft: F- 15 Replacement Issues (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 94- 176, May 5, 1994).
Tactical Aircraft: F- 15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 118, Mar. 25, 1994).
(707413) Lett er
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PAGE 31 GAO/ XXXX- 98-??? NAME OF DOCUMENT
Rev-LG logo.eps GAO United States General Accounting Office Report
to Congressional Committees March 2000 F- 22 AIRCRAFT Development
Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are Avoided   GAO/NSIAD-00-
68  Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Contents Letter 3
Appendixes Appendix I: Estimates of Performance for Key F- 22
Parameters 22 Appendix II: Criteria Established by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
for the F- 22 Program 23 Appendix III: Comments From the
Department of Defense 24 Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 25
Related GAO Products 26 Tables Table 1: Comparison of Schedules
for First Flight Dates of Test Aircraft 9 Table 2: Comparison of
Planned, Current, and Needed F- 22 Airframe Performance Flight
Test Point Accomplishment Rates 11 Table 3: Delays in Planned
Completion of Static and Fatigue Structural Integrity Tests 12
Table 4: Comparison of Air Force Planned and Projected Assembly
Hours for Flight Test Aircraft 4003- 4009, December 1999 16 Table
5: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters 22 Figures Figure
1: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget,
January Through December 1999 15 Figure 2: Actual and Planned
Contractor Personnel Levels in 1999 16 Abbreviations DOD
Department of Defense Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft United States General Accounting
Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22
Aircraft National Security and International Affairs Division B-
280222 Lett er March 14, 2000 Congressional Committees As required
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 1
we reviewed the Air Force's engineering and manufacturing
development program for the F- 22 aircraft. The F- 22 is an air
superiority 2 aircraft with advanced features to make it less
detectable to adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of
high speeds for long ranges. It has integrated aviation
electronics (avionics) to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the
situation surrounding them. The objectives of the F- 22
development program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and
deliver 9 F- 22 flight test aircraft and 25 flight- qualified
engines; (2) design, fabricate, integrate, and test the avionics
suite; and (3) design, develop, and test the support and training
systems. The F- 22 is being developed under contracts with
Lockheed Martin Corporation (for the aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney
Corporation (for the engine). For this report, an update to a
report we issued in 1999, we assessed the extent to which the F-
22 development program is meeting its performance, schedule, and
cost goals. 3 We also determined whether the Air Force is likely
to complete the development program as planned without exceeding
the cost limitation established by the act. The act also requires
us to certify whether we had access to sufficient information to
make informed judgments on matters covered in this report. There
is a congressional cost limitation for the F- 22 development
program. The limitation is currently $18. 880 billion, but
Department of Defense (DOD) officials said the limitation is being
revised and is expected to be $20.4 billion, with the amount to
officially be announced in May or June 2000. The revision is
mostly to recognize program direction included in the fiscal year
2000 appropriation act, which added flight test aircraft to the 1
P. L. 105- 85 (Nov. 18, 1997). 2 Air superiority is the degree of
air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by land, sea,
and air forces without prohibitive interference by the enemy. 3 F-
22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999). B-280222 Page
4 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft development program. The Air
Force plans to complete the development program, which began in
1991, in August 2003. As of December 1999, the Air Force had
accepted two flight test aircraft and had completed over 500
flight test hours about 13 percent of the planned total. Results
in Brief In 1999, the Air Force made progress in demonstrating the
F- 22's expected performance. The Air Force continues to estimate
that by the end of the development program, the F- 22 will meet or
exceed its performance goals. At this time, we have no evidence
indicating that the performance parameters will not be met.
However, the Air Force's performance estimates are based on
limited flight test data, computer models, ground tests, and
analyses and will not be confirmed until flight tests are
completed. While the development program made progress in
achieving its schedule goals in 1999, some tests and scheduled
activities established in 1997 were delayed because of continuing
problems such as delays in delivery of flight test aircraft and in
completion of testing of nonflying ground test aircraft. Even
though the Air Force encountered problems that caused delays in
completing flight and other test activities, it has not extended
the August 2003 completion date of the development program and
therefore may not be able to complete development flight tests
before the development program is scheduled to end. Further, the
schedule for completion of avionics development appears
optimistic. Avionics is being developed in segments (blocks), with
completion of each segment dependent on completion of prior
segments. Although it postponed the completion dates of the first
two avionics software segments from the 1997 schedule, the Air
Force moved up the completion dates of subsequent segments. In
late 1998, the Air Force identified $667 million in potential cost
increases that could cause the development program to exceed its
cost limitation. By December 1999, the Air Force had identified an
additional $90 million because of higher than expected contractor
costs, bringing the total potential cost increase to $757 million.
Despite these potential cost increases, the F- 22 development
program could still be managed within its cost limitation because
the Air Force and contractors have identified $860 million in
potential cost offsets. Should further significant cost increases
materialize, however, the development program may need to be
scaled back, or other ways may need to be found to reduce the
costs. Challenges remain in completing the development program
within the congressional cost limitation and as scheduled.
However, the Air Force has B-280222 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22
Aircraft identified sufficient cost offsets to more than cover all
identified potential cost increases and is aggressively managing
the program. As a result, we are making no recommendations. In
commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Defense
stated that it concurred. Background Since the beginning of the F-
22 development program in 1991, the Air Force's estimated cost to
develop the aircraft has increased. Cost trends in 1995 showed a
potential for costs to increase further. Concerned about these
growing costs, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition established the Joint Estimating Team to estimate the
most probable costs to complete F- 22 development and production.
The team consisted of personnel from the Air Force, DOD, and
private industry. The team concluded in 1997 that additional time
would be required to complete the development program and
estimated that costs would increase from $17.4 billion to $18.688
billion. The team recommended several changes to the development
program's schedule, including slower manufacturing for a more
efficient transition from development to low- rate initial
production and an additional 12 months to complete avionics
development. The Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics generally adopted the
team's recommendations to extend the development program schedule,
including the dates for accomplishing interim events. 4 The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
established a cost limitation of $18.688 billion (an amount that
mirrored the team's estimate) for the development program. The act
instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to adjust the cost
limitation for the amounts of increases or decreases in costs
attributable to economic inflation after September 30, 1997, and
for compliance with changes in federal, state, and local laws
enacted after September 30, 1997. Since then, the Air Force has
adjusted the program's cost limitation to $18.880 billion. DOD
officials said the limitation will be adjusted again to $20. 4
billion in May or June 2000 to recognize the program's fiscal year
2000 legislation, which added flight test aircraft to the
development program. 4 For more information on the team's
recommendations, see Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air
Force F- 22 Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997). B-
280222 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft For fiscal year 2000,
the Air Force requested $1.6 billion for initial production of six
F- 22 aircraft. Both authorization and appropriations acts for
fiscal year 2000 established further congressional direction for
the program. The authorization act 5 required that before initial
production begins, the Secretary of Defense must certify that the
test plan is adequate for determining whether the F- 22 is
effective and suitable for its mission, and that the development
program can be executed within the cost limitation. The
appropriations act 6 did not approve initial production but
approved funding for acquisition of additional flight test
aircraft with research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding. The act restricted award of a fully funded contract for
initial production until (1) the first flight of an F- 22 with
block 3 7 avionics software is conducted; (2) the Secretary of
Defense certifies to congressional defense committees that
criteria identified in the act for award of initial production
contracts have been met; and (3) the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation reports on the adequacy of testing to measure and
predict the performance of avionics systems, stealth
characteristics, and weapon delivery systems. Extent to Which F-
22 Development Program Is Meeting Performance Goals In December
1999, the Air Force estimated that by the time the development
program ends, the F- 22 will have met and in many instances
exceeded the goals for major performance parameters. These include
10 parameters on which the Air Force reports regularly to the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. At this time, we have no evidence
indicating that the performance parameters will not be met.
However, we observe that the Air Force's performance estimates are
based on limited flight test data, computer models, ground tests,
and analyses. Most ground and flight tests will have to be
completed before the estimates are confirmed. Table 5 in appendix
I shows the goal for each parameter, the estimated performance for
each parameter as of December 1999, and the Air Force's latest
estimates of the performance expected to be achieved for each
parameter by the end of the development program. 5 P. L. 106- 65
(Oct. 5, 1999). 6 P. L. 106- 79 (Oct. 25, 1999). 7 Block 3 is the
third major avionics software segment, which brings most avionics
software into an integrated system. B-280222 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-
68 F- 22 Aircraft Extent to Which the F- 22 Development Program Is
Meeting Schedule Goals The F- 22 development program made progress
toward meeting its schedule goals in 1999. It carried out flight,
engine, and avionics tests and met a crucial test requirement
deadline. However, the Air Force did not achieve several goals
established in 1997, when the program was last restructured. In
particular, the development flight test program has been delayed
and may not be able to complete the number of flight tests planned
before the development program is scheduled to end in August 2003,
the schedule for completion of avionics development appears
optimistic, and tests of nonflying ground test aircraft are behind
schedule. Further delays in completing these activities could
delay the completion of the development program, thereby
increasing development costs. The Air Force has modified many of
its detailed schedules, delaying and in a few instances, moving up
the dates for which various events are scheduled to occur. The Air
Force said the 1997 schedule is outdated and it no longer manages
the program to achieve the schedules of events as restructured in
1997. They said many events were not achieved as planned and the
schedules had to be revised to reflect different plans for
completing development at the same time. Because the program was
last restructured in 1997 and the congressional cost limitation
mirrored the program as restructured, we used the cost and
schedule plans established in 1997 from the team's study as an
analytical baseline in our assessment of cost and schedule goals
for the F- 22 development program. Progress Made in 1999 Through
1999, the Air Force completed over 500 flight test hours (about
200 of which were completed in 1998), conducted avionics and
engine test activities, and began testing the nonflying ground
test aircraft. By December 1999, the Air Force had met test
requirements set by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as a prerequisite for
acquiring production representative test aircraft approved by
Congress for fiscal year 2000. The test requirements are included
in appendix II. Some of the more notable tests conducted on the F-
22 in 1999 included  supercruise (sustained flight at 1 times
speed of sound without using engine devices that consume
significant amounts of fuel);  flight with open weapon bays;
ability to operate at many different altitudes and speeds in
flight zones E- 2, E- 2A, E- 3, E- 3A, and E- 4; B-280222 Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft  flight with thrust vectoring 8 in
unconventional situations;  structural (static) tests up to 100
percent of the design limit load on critical structure (full
requirement is to test the aircraft's structure to 150 percent);
demonstration of the second major F- 22 avionics software segment
aboard a Boeing 757 flying test bed; 9  demonstration that the
engine allows the aircraft to fly throughout its planned flight
regime (engine full flight release);  flight up to an altitude of
50,000 feet, the maximum required (demonstrated in late 1998); and
complete initial radar cross section testing of a full- scale
model. Flight Test Program May Not Be Completed as Planned
Information provided by the Air Force indicates that, unless
certain problems are resolved, a significant percentage of the
flight test program may not be completed as planned before the
development flight tests are scheduled to end. The Air Force is
experiencing several problems executing the flight test program on
schedule: (1) deliveries of some test aircraft have been delayed
by over 8 months, (2) completed test aircraft have required more
modifications than expected, and (3) the flight test program
efficiency the number of test points 10 accomplished for each
flight test hour has been less than planned. According to an Air
Force analysis, if these problems persist, 37 to 50 percent of the
total planned flight test hours would not be completed by the time
F- 22 development is scheduled to be completed. The Air Force, in
June 1999, reported further delays 11 in test aircraft deliveries
because of additional delays in wing deliveries and repairs 8
Changing the direction of the thrust generated by the aircraft's
engines to make the aircraft more maneuverable. 9 Tests involved
primarily the radar, not the more sophisticated integrated
avionics capability, which includes communication, navigation, and
identification and electronic warfare functions. 10 A test point
is one of thousands of measurements of the performance of
individual functions of the aircraft and its components in a range
of conditions and flight environments. 11 For a description of
previous delays in the completion of test aircraft, see F- 22
Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999). B-280222 Page
9 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft needed to the aft (rear)
fuselage. 12 Table 1 compares the first flight dates of test
aircraft as planned in 1997 with the first flight dates as planned
at the time of our last report in March 1999 and the Air Force
plan as of June 1999. Table 1: Comparison of Schedules for First
Flight Dates of Test Aircraft a Actual date of first flight.
Because of manufacturing problems, the third test aircraft (4003)
will be delivered over 8 months later than planned in 1997, and
the next four flight test aircraft will also be delivered late.
However, the Air Force has not extended the date for completion of
the development program. As a result, the Air Force now has over
29 fewer flight test months available to complete the development
flight test program and has lost over 626 flight test hours that
would have been available had these aircraft been delivered on
schedule. Flight test time is essential to verify an aircraft's
specific features and to reduce the risk of structural or
performance problems emerging after production begins. 12 In April
1999, an airframe structural strength analysis indicated
insufficient strength in a panel in the rear of the airframe.
Development aircraft are being repaired to provide additional
structural strength. Test aircraft First flight dates as planned
in 1997 First flight dates as planned in March 1999 First flight
dates as planned in June 1999 Total delay of first flight dates
(months) as of June 1999 4001 May 1997 September 1997 a September
1997 a 3.37 4002 July 1998 June 1998 a June 1998 a -0.33 4003 June
1999 November 1999 February 2000 8.17 4004 August 1999 February
2000 May 2000 8.67 4005 January 2000 March 2000 June 2000 5.67
4006 May 2000 May 2000 August 2000 2.73 4007 September 2000
September 2000 October 2000 0.73 4008 February 2001 February 2001
February 2001 0 4009 June 2001 June 2001 June 2001 0 Total 29. 01
B-280222 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Furthermore, the
June 1999 schedule for conducting first flights of aircraft 4005
through 4008 may also be overly optimistic. In December 1999 the
Air Force reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that delivery of aircraft
4005 through 4008 was expected to be further delayed, delaying
first flight dates of these aircraft by 2 to 3 months. Air Force
officials told us that they would have to pay overtime labor rates
to meet the original schedule and that they are willing to accept
later delivery to save money. Air Force officials also told us
that one of the major reasons the flight test program may not be
completed as planned is that the two deployed F- 22 test aircraft
have required many more modifications than anticipated since
flight tests began in September 1997. As a result, these aircraft
have not been available for the planned amount of flight testing.
The flight test program has not been as efficient as expected. A
gauge of the efficiency of flight tests is the number of test
points achieved in each flight test hour. Flight testing through
December 1999 did not achieve test points at a sufficient rate to
complete the flight test program as planned. At the current rate,
the development program may not achieve as much as onethird or
more of its planned flight test points by the time operational
testing begins. The program is currently achieving 8.1 test points
per flight test hour. To complete the program as planned, the Air
Force would have to increase its rate to 12. 5 test points per
flight test hour for the remainder of the airframe performance
portion of the flight test program (see table 2). To achieve 12.5
test points per flight hour, the Air Force will have to increase
the accomplishment rate to a level substantially above the planned
accomplishment rate of 11. 3. B-280222 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-
22 Aircraft Table 2: Comparison of Planned, Current, and Needed F-
22 Airframe Performance Flight Test Point Accomplishment Rates The
Air Force maintains that it is managing the flight test program
aggressively by improving test efficiency, prioritizing work, and
reducing overall test point requirements without affecting weapon
system capabilities. However, if the flight test program continues
at about its current flight test point accomplishment rate, the
Air Force will have to eliminate over 35 percent of the airframe
performance flight test points in other words, it will not be able
to complete over one- third of the flight test points unless more
flight tests hours are flown or flight tests are extended.
Avionics Development Is Behind Schedule, Remaining Schedule
Appears Optimistic In 1997, a study team concluded that avionics
development could take as much as 12 months longer than planned
because of delays in the development of major avionics segments,
known as blocks (1, 2, 3, and 3.1). Completion of each avionics
segment depends on completion of prior segments. Block 1 was
completed 13 behind schedule. Currently, block 2 is also expected
to be completed behind the 1997 schedule, and the majority of
initial software development tasks related to blocks 3 and 3. 1
have been delayed between 1 and 14 months behind the 1997
schedule. Although it postponed the completion dates for blocks 1
and 2, the Air Force moved up the planned completion dates for
blocks 3 and 3. 1. According to the current avionics schedule, the
Air Force is planning on blocks 3 and 3. 1 being completed 5 and 3
months, respectively, earlier than the dates considered realistic
by the study team. If the Air Force's current avionics schedule is
not achieved, additional costs will be incurred to complete
avionics development. Flight test accomplishment plans Flight test
points Flight test hours Flight test point accomplishment rate
(per flight test hour) Planned accomplishment 20, 125 1,787 11. 3
Accomplishment through December 1999 4,121 505.7 8. 1
Accomplishment needed to complete airframe performance flight test
program as planned 16, 004 1,281.3 12. 5 13 Completed to the point
that it is placed on an aircraft in preparation for flight
testing. B-280222 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft There
have also been significant delays in the start of avionics flight
tests. Flight tests of block 1, which were supposed to begin
aboard the fourth test aircraft in August 1999, have been delayed
until May 2000. At the same time, flight tests of block 3 are
still planned 5 months earlier than the date considered realistic
in 1997. Testing of Nonflying Ground Test Aircraft Continues to Be
Delayed Two major tests of the structural integrity of the F- 22's
airframe have been delayed significantly. Static testing is
designed to ensure the aircraft will withstand stresses throughout
the aircraft's flight regime, and fatigue testing subjects the
aircraft to the structural stresses expected within its planned
life. These tests are important to reduce the risk of structural
problems emerging during the production phase. The completion
dates for these tests have been delayed 13 and 14 months,
respectively. Table 3 shows the delayed completion dates for these
tests. Table 3: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and Fatigue
Structural Integrity Tests Extent to Which the F- 22 Program Is
Meeting Cost Goals The F- 22 development program can be managed
within the cost limitation of $20. 4 billion only if the current
completion date for the program is not extended and if additional
cost increases can be managed within the current projected
surplus. The Air Force and contractors have identified initiatives
to produce sufficient cost offsets to complete the development
program within the cost limitation. The Air Force reports that
these initiatives will total about $860 million, or $103 million
more than needed to offset the total projected cost growth of $757
million. However, there are risks that (1) contractor costs will
continue to exceed budgets more than expected and (2) overhead
costs for the F- 22 program will increase because sales of the C-
130J cargo aircraft, which is manufactured in the same plant as
the F- 22, have been lower than expected, thereby increasing
overhead costs to the F- 22 program. Furthermore, as explained
previously, there is the possibility that flight tests and the
development program itself Test 1997 plan March 1999 plan December
1999 plan Total delay (months) Static October 1999 February 2000
November 2000 13 Fatigue December 1999 September 2000 February
2001 14 B-280222 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft will be
extended if aircraft manufacturing and avionics problems continue
or if the Air Force is unable to reduce the necessary
modifications to test aircraft or increase the efficiency of the
flight test program. Any of these conditions could increase
program costs. Status of Initiatives In late 1998, the Air Force
identified $667 million in potential cost increases that could
cause the development program to exceed its cost limitation. To
keep development program costs from exceeding the congressional
cost limitation, the Air Force and contractors developed a number
of cost reduction initiatives aimed at offsetting the projected
$667 million cost increase. The Air Force reported in December
1999 that these initiatives were expected to result in $730
million in offsets to the F- 22 development program cost. These
initiatives include the following:  Contractor management
efficiencies ($ 360 million). Lockheed Martin has developed a
number of initiatives to improve the efficiency of assembling the
F- 22 while reducing costs. One of these involves closing some
contractor laboratories earlier than planned. Another is a
management approach that emphasizes reduction of unneeded steps in
the manufacturing process. Air Force officials stated that
initiatives implemented through November 1999 would achieve an
estimated $328 million of cost savings, but initiatives expected
to result in $32 million of savings have not yet been implemented.
Applying management reserve ($ 180 million). This is essentially
an accounting adjustment. Management reserve is the balance of
funds available within the contract price that the contractor has
not budgeted for planned work. The purpose of management reserve
is to provide flexibility in managing increases and decreases in
budgets and the actual costs of completing the planned work.
Because the contractor's costs exceeded budgeted amounts, the
management reserve balance (totaling $180 million) will be used to
offset the increased costs. One effect of this action will be that
the contractor will not have flexibility in managing future cost
increases.  Deferring weapon testing ($ 140 million). The Air
Force deferred indefinitely tests of some weapons to be carried
externally on the aircraft because the F- 22's primary mission is
to carry weapons internally. Carrying weapons externally would
substantially decrease the F- 22's stealth capabilities. The
deferral reduces F- 22 development costs but may require the
costs, when incurred, to be charged to an account different from
the one used for F- 22 development. B-280222 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-
68 F- 22 Aircraft  Eliminating all remaining government studies
for which funds have already been allocated ($ 50 million) and
applying the funds to cost increases in other F- 22 development
program activities. The Air Force also plans to exempt the F- 22
development program from contributing to a servicewide research
fund, thus freeing up an additional $130 million. In testimony
before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,
the Air Force announced in December 1999 that it would not take
funds from the F- 22 development program to pay for small business
innovative research programs intended to benefit the Air Force as
a whole. The funds are usually taken from most Air Force programs.
This initiative, however, may require other Air Force programs to
make up for the loss of research funds that would have been
obtained from the F- 22 program. With $730 million in offsets and
an additional $130 million available from not contributing to the
servicewide research fund, the Air Force has a total of $860
million to offset the $757 million in projected cost increases.
This provides a surplus of as much as $103 million to absorb
additional cost increases if necessary. Contractor Costs
Continuing to Grow More Than Projections Contractor costs
continued to increase in 1999 and again exceeded available budgets
by more than projected. Through 1998, contractor costs had
exceeded available budgets by a total of $185 million since the
Joint Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. Lockheed Martin
had expected its costs for 1999 to exceed the available budget by
another $40 million for a total of $225 million since the Joint
Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. But by September
1999, costs for the year exceeded the $40 million expected growth,
despite the contractor's establishment of plans to limit the cost
growth. Through December 1999, costs had exceeded available
budgets by $80 million in 1999, for a total of $265 million since
the Joint Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. This brings
into question the contractor's ability to control costs enough to
complete the development program as planned within the cost
limitation. The Air Force attributes these cost increases to
production labor costs, manufacturing support and assembly labor
cost overruns, and certain types of work performed out of
sequence. Delayed software deliveries and avionics redesign,
rework, and supplier overruns also contributed to cost increases.
The Air Force acknowledges that because of the contractor cost B-
280222 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft increases in 1999,
overall development program costs are likely to grow by an
additional $90 million above the projected cost growth of $667
million. Figure 1 compares actual cost growth with Lockheed
Martin's projections from January through December 1999. Figure 1:
Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget,
January Through December 1999 Among the factors contributing to
higher contractor costs and manufacturing problems is the fact
that the next four flight test aircraft are projected to take more
hours than planned to assemble (see table 4). Also, except in
April, the number of contractor personnel assigned to the program
was consistently higher than planned for 1999 (see fig. 2). Labor
costs make up a large portion of total program costs; therefore,
taking longer than planned to assemble the aircraft and
maintaining consistently higher personnel levels than planned
increases program costs above estimates. B-280222 Page 16
GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Table 4: Comparison of Air Force
Planned and Projected Assembly Hours for Flight Test Aircraft
4003- 4009, December 1999 Figure 2: Actual and Planned Contractor
Personnel Levels in 1999 Potential Impact of C- 130J Sales on
Program Unexpectedly low sales of the C- 130J cargo aircraft
produced by Lockheed Martin may affect F- 22 program costs. The C-
130J, the F- 22, and several other weapon systems are produced or
modified at the same Lockheed Martin plant in Marietta, Georgia.
Lower C- 130J production would mean Test aircraft Planned assembly
hours, December 1999 Projected assembly hours, December 1999
Difference Percent difference 4003 269,360 274,158 4,798 1. 8 4004
232,546 260,471 27,925 12. 0 4005 207,342 228,260 20,918 10. 1
4006 205,822 220,991 15,169 7. 4 4007 201,815 201,815 0 0 4008
197,168 197,168 0 0 4009 175,919 175,919 0 0 B-280222 Page 17
GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft that a larger share of plant
overhead costs might have to be absorbed partly by the F- 22. The
assumption had been that 24 or 25 C- 130J aircraft would be
produced each year. However, it now appears the C- 130J program
will not achieve these production rates. Only 19 aircraft were
produced in fiscal year 1999, and only 17 are estimated to be
produced in fiscal year 2000 and 16 in each of the following 3
fiscal years. The Defense Contract Management Command analyzed
this new information and concluded that this reduction in aircraft
production could result in approximately $45 million in unabsorbed
overhead costs per year at the plant. This amount would need to be
absorbed by all government programs at the plant, including
possibly the F- 22 program. The specific impact of all this on the
F- 22 program has not yet been determined. Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation DOD concurred with a draft of our report. DOD's
comments are reproduced in appendix III. DOD suggested additional
technical changes, which we incorporated in the report where
appropriate. Scope and Methodology To determine whether the
development program is likely to meet performance goals, we
analyzed information on the performance of key performance
parameters and those sub- parameters that are measured. We
compared performance goals established by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with the Air
Force's current estimates of performance in December 1999 and at
completion of development. The performance parameters are shown in
appendix I. To determine whether the program is expected to meet
schedule goals, we reviewed program and avionics schedules and
discussed potential changes to these schedules with F- 22 program
officials. We also compared current schedules with those developed
in 1997 as a result of a study by the Joint Estimating Team. We
tracked progress in the flight test program, evaluated schedule
variances in the contractors' performance management system, and
compared planned milestone accomplishment dates with actual dates.
We tracked technical problems in manufacturing and assembling the
development aircraft. To determine whether the program is likely
to meet the cost limitation, we examined (1) the extent to which
the development program cost goals are being met, (2) Air Force
plans to fund the program for fiscal year 2001, and (3)
consistencies between the program funding plan and the cost B-
280222 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft limitation. We
compared the estimated cost at completion of the prime contracts
with planned amounts, evaluated cost variances identified in the
contractors' cost reporting systems, and reviewed the status of
initiatives designed to avoid cost growth. To assess the extent to
which the F- 22 development program was meeting its performance,
schedule, and cost goals, we required access to current
information about test results, performance estimates, schedule
achievements and revisions, and incurred costs. The Air Force and
contractors gave us access to sufficient information to make
informed judgments on the matters covered in this report. In
performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington
D. C.; the F- 22 System Program Office, Wright- Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio; the Defense Contract Management Command,
Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta,
Georgia; Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth,
Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle, Washington. We
performed our work from April 1999 through February 2000 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Senator John
W. Warner, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable
Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee
on Appropriations; the Honorable Representative Floyd D. Spence,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable
Representative Jerry Lewis, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense,
Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable William Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary
of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of
Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
others on request. B-280222 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft
Please contact Allen Li at (202) 512- 4841 or Robert D. Murphy at
(937) 258- 7904 if you or your staff have any questions concerning
this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV. Louis J. Rodrigues Director, Defense Acquisitions
Issues B-280222 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft List of
Congressional Committees The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The
Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United States
Senate The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike
Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House
of Representatives The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The
Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Page
21 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22
Aircraft Appendix I Appendi xes Estimates of Performance for Key
F- 22 Parameters Appendi x I Table 5: Estimates of Performance for
Key Parameters Key performance parameters Goal (acquisition
program baseline) Estimated December 1999 performance Estimated
performance at completion of development Supercruise 100 percent
115 percent 115 percent Acceleration 100 percent 114 percent 114
percent Maneuverability 100 percent 104 percent 104 percent
Airlift support (C- 141 equivalents) 8 7.4 7.4 Sortie generation
rate 100 percent 100 percent 100 percent Radar cross section
(front sector only) 100 percent Estimated to meet requirements
(data classified) Estimated to meet requirements (data classified)
Mean time between maintenance (hours) 3.0 3. 0 3. 0 Payload
(missiles) four medium- range, two short- range six medium- range,
two short- range six medium- range, two short- range Combat radius
100 percent 123 percent 123 percent Radar detection range 100
percent 117 percent 117 percent Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22
Aircraft Appendix II Criteria Established by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for the F-
22 Program Appendi x II Criteria to be completed before approval
to award contracts to acquire six aircraft for fiscal year 2000
(awarded in Dec. 1999):  Demonstrate flight up to 50, 000 feet.
Engine full flight release.  Conduct weapon bay open testing
(initiate data analysis).  Complete avionics integration
laboratory integration of the operational flight program block 1.1
software and deliver to manufacturer.  Complete critical design
review for avionics block 3 software.  Complete aircraft 4004
fuselage, wing, and empennage mate.  Demonstrate supercruise.
Release avionics block 2 software to the flying test bed.
Complete static test up to 100 percent of the design limit load on
critical structure.  Conduct flight test operations in zones E- 2,
E- 2A, E- 3, E- 3A, and E- 4.  Complete initial radar cross
section full- scale pole model testing.  Demonstrate high angle of
attack post- stall flight with thrust vectoring.  Complete
aircraft 4003 flight preparation up through installed engine runs.
Criteria that are prerequisites for approval to award contracts to
begin lowrate initial production (planned for Dec. 2000):
Complete first portion of engine initial service release
qualification test (2, 150 total accumulated cycles,  full hot
section life).  Complete air vehicle final production readiness
review.  Complete first flight on flight test aircraft 4003, 4004,
4005, and 4006.  Complete flight test aircraft 4008 fuselage,
wing, and empennage mate.  Complete static structural testing.
Complete critical design review for avionics block 3.1 software.
Complete avionics block 3.0 first flight, initiate testing of
block 3.0 unique functionality.  Conduct flight testing on flight
test aircraft, including initiating radar cross section flight
testing, initiating high angle of attack testing with weapons bay
doors open, and initiating separation testing of Air Intercept
Missile- 9 and the Air Intercept Missile- 120.  Initiate fatigue
life testing with the goal of completing 40 percent of first
fatigue life. Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Appendix III
Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I II Page 25
GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22 Aircraft Appendix IV GAO Staff
Acknowledgments Appendi x I V Acknowledgments Mark Abraham, Marvin
E. Bonner, Christopher T. Brannon, Edward R. Browning, Shirley
Johnson, Don M. Springman, and John Van Schaik made key
contributions to this report. Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F- 22
Aircraft Related GAO Products Defense Acquisitions: Progress in
Meeting F- 22 Cost and Schedule Goals (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58, Dec. 7,
1999). Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT& E
Programs (GAO/NSIAD-99-233R, Sep. 23, 1999). Budget Issues:
Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2000
(GAO/OCG-99-26, Apr. 16, 1999). Defense Acquisitions: Progress of
the F- 22 and F/ A- 18E/ F Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113, Mar. 17, 1999). F- 22
Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999). F- 22
Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137, Mar. 25, 1998). F- 22
Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-98-67, Mar. 10, 1998). Tactical
Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F- 22 Fighter Program
(GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997). Defense Aircraft Investments:
Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic Budget Projections
(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997). F- 22 Restructuring
(GAO/NSIAD-97-100BR, Feb. 28, 1997). Tactical Aircraft:
Concurrency in Development and Production of F- 22 Aircraft Should
Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995). Air Force Embedded
Computers (GAO/AIMD-94-177R, Sep. 20, 1994). Tactical Aircraft: F-
15 Replacement Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176, May 5, 1994). Tactical
Aircraft: F- 15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned
(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994). (707413) Lett er Ordering
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