Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training (Letter Report, 03/21/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-64).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
potential for duplicative weapons of mass destruction training, focusing
on: (1) the principal federal organizations that provide weapons of mass
destruction training to first responders; (2) whether the training is
well coordinated among federal organizations; and (3) actions being
taken to improve the federal government's role in weapons of mass
destruction training.

GAO noted that: (1) the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the principal
federal organizations that provide weapons of mass destruction training
to first responders; (2) DOD provides this training through its Domestic
Preparedness Program; (3) DOJ provides training primarily through its
Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program; (4)
both programs were authorized and funded by Congress and specifically
developed to provide training in cities and counties primarily to
individuals who would train others in their communities; (5) DOJ also
provides training through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium;
(6) in 1998 Congress directed that DOJ use to the fullest extent
possible the capabilities of the Consortium to achieve cost-effective
weapons of mass destruction training; (7) FEMA provides weapons of mass
destruction courses at its National Fire Academy and Emergency
Management Institute in Maryland, and also provides related course
materials to local and state organizations for their use in training
first responders; (8) federal training programs on weapons of mass
destruction are not well coordinated, resulting in inefficiencies in the
federal effort and concerns in the first responder communities; (9) DOD,
DOJ, and FEMA are providing similar awareness courses as part of their
train-the-trainer programs; (10) DOD and DOJ plan to deliver their
programs to individuals in the same 120 cities; (11) state and local
officials and representatives of various responder organizations express
concerns about duplication and overlap among the two federal training
programs, courses offered by the Consortium, and other courses such as
hazardous materials and other specialized training that first responders
are required to complete; (12) officials were concerned that DOD and DOJ
programs offered to cities and counties had bypassed the states'
emergency management and training structures and that DOD and DOJ
programs will not train responders in smaller communities; (13) the
responders' concerns are consistent with the conclusions reached by a
forum of over 200 state and local responders in August 1998 and a June
1999 Justice report; (14) more actions are needed to eliminate
duplicative training and improve the efficiency of DOD and DOJ programs;
and (15) in response to requests from the first responder community, DOJ
has established the interagency National Domestic Preparedness Office,
which will provide an interagency forum for coordinating federal weapons
of mass destruction assistance to state and local emergency responders.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-00-64
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal
	     Weapons of Mass Destruction Training
      DATE:  03/21/2000
   SUBJECT:  Terrorism
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Interagency relations
	     Federal/state relations
	     Training utilization
	     Technical assistance
	     Nuclear weapons
	     Redundancy
	     Mobilization
	     Defense contingency planning
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Domestic Preparedness Program
	     Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program
	     Oklahoma City (OK)
	     DOJ Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Services
	     Program

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GAO/NSIAD-00-64

Appendix I: Cities Selected for Training Provided by
the Departments of Defense and Justice

30

Appendix II: Jurisdictions Exclusively Selected to Receive Justice
Department Training

31

Appendix III: Organizations and Locations Visited

32

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense

34

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Justice

37

Appendix VI: Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency

44

Table 1: First Responders Trained Through Domestic Preparedness Program
(from program's inception in fiscal year 1997 through
fiscal year 1999) 10

Table 2: Consortium Training Courses Provided to First Responders 12

Figure 1: Domestic Preparedness Program Training at Louisville,
Kentucky, June 1999 9

Figure 2: Recovering Casualties From a Terrorist Incident Scene
During a Training Exercise 13

Figure 3: Firefighters Decontaminating Bomb Squad Members
During a WMD Exercise in Minneapolis, Minnesota 15

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

WMD weapons of mass destruction

National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-284321

March 21, 2000

Congressional Requesters

The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and the
Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, along with the
release of a nerve agent in the Tokyo, Japan, subway in 1995, have raised
concerns about terrorism in the United States. Local emergency responders
such as firefighters and hazardous materials, law enforcement, and emergency
medical personnel will be the first to respond to terrorist incidents.
Concerned that terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction--chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear devices--and that local first
responders would not be prepared to effectively deal with incidents
involving such weapons, in 1996 Congress authorized programs to provide
these responders training in dealing with such incidents. In a prior report
and testimony,1 we raised concerns about the potential for duplicative
weapons of mass destruction training. Because of these concerns, you asked
us to determine (1) the principal federal organizations that provide weapons
of mass destruction training to first responders,
(2) whether the training is well coordinated among federal organizations,
and (3) actions being taken to improve the federal government's role in
weapons of mass destruction training.

The Departments of Defense and Justice and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency are the principal federal organizations that provide weapons of mass
destruction training to first responders. Defense provides this training
through its Domestic Preparedness Program, which will be provided in the 120
largest U.S. cities by mid-2001. Justice provides training primarily through
its Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program, which
will be provided to individuals in 255 cities and counties.2 Both programs
were authorized and funded by Congress and specifically developed to provide
training in cities and counties primarily to individuals who would train
others in their communities (train the trainer). Through fiscal year 1999,
Defense had received about $67 million and Justice $10 million for their
training programs. Defense had trained about 19,000 individuals and Justice
had trained about 44,000 individuals. Justice also provides training through
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium.3 In 1998, Congress directed
that Justice use to the fullest extent possible the capabilities of the
Consortium to achieve cost-effective weapons of mass destruction training.
The members of this Consortium received about $24 million during fiscal
years 1998-99 and trained about 3,000 individuals during fiscal year 1999.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency provides weapons of mass destruction
courses at its National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute in
Maryland. In addition, the Academy and Institute provide weapons of mass
destruction course materials to local and state organizations for their use
in training first responders. Several of these are train-the-trainer
courses. Funding for the Agency's weapons of mass destruction training
totaled about $3 million for fiscal years 1998-99. About 71,000 students
participated in the Fire Academy's offerings from October 1, 1997, through
September 30, 1999.

Federal training programs on weapons of mass destruction are not well
coordinated, resulting in inefficiencies in the federal effort and concerns
in the first responder communities. The Departments of Defense and Justice
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are providing similar awareness
courses as part of their train-the-trainer programs. Defense and Justice
plan to deliver their programs to individuals in the same 120 cities, and
Justice also plans to train individuals in 135 additional jurisdictions.
Through September 1999, Defense had trained individuals in 67 cities, and
through mid-November 1999 Justice had trained individuals in 95 cities and
metropolitan areas. Training from both agencies' programs was provided to
individuals in 16 common cities. State and local officials and
representatives of various responder organizations expressed concerns about
duplication and overlap among the two federal training programs, courses
offered by the Consortium, and other courses such as hazardous materials and
other specialized training that first responders are required to complete.
Some officials said that the number of federal organizations involved in
weapons of mass destruction training creates confusion about which federal
organization is in charge of that training. Officials were concerned that
the Defense and Justice programs offered to cities and counties had bypassed
the states' emergency management and training structures. As a result, some
responders, such as state police, had been missed. And some officials were
concerned that the Defense and Justice programs will not train responders in
smaller communities. They pointed out the potential to reach responders in
smaller communities through the use of state and local training
organizations and the use of training tools such as video transmission of
instructional materials to existing facilities at firehouses and National
Guard armories. The responders' concerns are consistent with the conclusions
reached by a forum of over 200 state and local responders in August 19984
and a June 1999 Justice report.5 Common themes included the need for a
single focal point for information about federal programs, a centrally
coordinated and standardized national training program to ensure an
effective and integrated response and to minimize redundancy in training
programs, and the need to incorporate training related to terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction into existing training
delivery mechanisms for the emergency responder communities.

Efforts are under way to improve the federal government's role in weapons of
mass destruction training, but more actions are needed to eliminate
duplicative training and improve the efficiency of the Defense and Justice
programs. Although Defense plans to transfer its Domestic Preparedness
Program to Justice on October 1, 2000, and Justice was to provide Congress
with a comprehensive plan for the transfer no later than December 15, 1999,
that plan had not been issued as of March 1, 2000.6 According to Justice
officials, Justice will complete Domestic Preparedness training in the 120
cities to honor Defense's commitments to those cities. It also still plans
to deliver its Metropolitan Firefighters program to individuals in
255 cities and counties. Thus, in the near term, some cities will receive
similar awareness courses under both programs. Justice officials said that
in the longer term, they will assess the need to continue the Domestic
Preparedness Program beyond the 120 cities based on a number of factors,
including comprehensive needs assessments to be completed by the states and
inputs from the first responder communities. In response to requests from
the first responder community, Justice has established the interagency
National Domestic Preparedness Office. The Office, recently funded under the
Consolidated Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2000, is just getting
organized. According to its draft action plan, it will provide an
interagency forum for coordinating federal weapons of mass destruction
assistance to state and local emergency responders. The Office has
identified an ambitious list of tasks directed at many of the training
concerns expressed by first responders.

To improve the efficiency of federal programs, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General eliminate duplicative training
in the same metropolitan areas. We are also recommending that if the
Department of Justice provides Domestic Preparedness Program training in
more than the currently planned 120 cities, it integrate the program with
the Metropolitan Firefighters Program to capitalize on the strengths of each
program and eliminate duplication and overlap.

Concerned that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are increasingly available
to terrorists, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996, commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act.7 The
act designates the Department of Defense as the lead agency to enhance
domestic preparedness for responding to and managing the consequences of
terrorists' use of WMD. Under the act, Defense established the Domestic
Preparedness Program to provide first responder training focused on
terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons. Congress also passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996,8 which authorizes the Attorney General, in consultation
with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to
provide specialized training and equipment for enhancing the capabilities of
metropolitan fire and emergency service departments to respond to terrorist
attacks. In response, Justice established the Metropolitan Firefighters and
Emergency Medical Services Program.

The Conference Committee Report on Justice's fiscal year 1998 appropriation
act directed Justice to use the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium to
achieve its WMD training objectives. Specifically, the report directed the
Attorney General to provide funding support to operations of the state and
local training center for first responders at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and
similar operations at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology.9
The report also urged the use of existing institutions, including those at
Texas A&M University and the Nevada Test Site. The conference committee
report accompanying Justice's fiscal year 1999 appropriations act10 directed
Justice to use the Consortium to the fullest extent possible and specified
that $24 million be specifically provided to its members. Congress directed
the use of the Consortium to take advantage of existing facilities and
resources and to maximize training accessibility by using multiple
facilities.

Responders

Three principal federal organizations provide WMD training to first
responders: the Departments of Defense and Justice and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. Defense provides training through its Domestic
Preparedness Program, and Justice provides training primarily through its
Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program. Both
programs were specifically developed to train local first responders who
would then instruct others in their local communities. Justice also uses the
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium to provide WMD training to first
responders. FEMA provides WMD courses at its National Fire Academy and
Emergency Management Institute in Maryland. The Academy and Institute also
provide WMD course materials directly to individuals or to local and state
organizations for their use in training first responders. Several of these
are train-the-trainer courses. In addition, the Academy, Institute, and
other federal organizations such as the Departments of Energy and Health and
Human Services and the Environmental Protection Agency offer training that
can assist first responders in dealing with WMD incidents.

Defense developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to build on the existing
knowledge and capabilities of those who would first deal with a WMD incident
locally: fire, law enforcement, hazardous materials, and medical
personnel.11 Defense planned to provide personnel in the
120 largest U.S. cities (based on city population) with training and expert
advice regarding emergency responses to the use or threatened use of weapons
of mass destruction or related materials.12 Defense targeted cities for the
training because it wanted to deal with a single government entity that
could choose the most appropriate personnel to be trained and to receive
training equipment.13 Defense trains city personnel, who then provide
similar instruction to their emergency responder communities.

The training is generally a week long and comprises six separate
courses−emergency responder awareness, emergency responder operations,
technician-hazardous materials, technician-emergency medical services,
technician-hospital provider, and incident command. The awareness and
operations courses, each 4-hour segments, generally train responders in how
to recognize a WMD incident and how to protect themselves and their
communities during such incidents. The technician courses vary in length
from 8 to 16 hours and are primarily for individuals in those specialties.
The incident command course, 8 hours in length, focuses on the management of
an incident and includes an exercise during which participants role-play
their responses. Figure 1 shows students in Louisville, Kentucky, taking
part in the hazardous materials course of Defense's WMD training program.

Figure 1: Domestic Preparedness Program Training at Louisville, Kentucky,
June 1999
Source: U.S. Army.

As of September 30, 1999, Defense had completed training in 67 cities and
trained approximately 19,000 individuals. This includes only those
individuals directly trained by Defense instructors. Table 1 provides the
number of responders, by profession, that received Defense training.

Table 1: First Responders Trained Through Domestic Preparedness Program
(from program's inception in fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 1999)

 Responder community         Number trained
 Firefighter                 5,100
 Law enforcement             4,300
 Emergency medical servicesa 1,600
 Hospital provider           2,800
 Military                    850
 Otherb                      4,350
 Total                       19,000

aSome emergency medical service participants are included with firefighters
because of the way some cities reported their data.

bParticipants from organizations such as public works, mass transit
authorities, and airport fire and rescue services.

Source: Defense.

Total funding for the program during fiscal years 1997-99 was
$66.9 million.14 Funding for fiscal year 2000 is $12.6 million.

Justice provides WMD training to first responders primarily through its
Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program but also
uses the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium to provide such training.
Justice, with assistance from FEMA's National Fire Academy, designed the
metropolitan program to prepare first responders for terrorist incidents
involving WMD. Justice designed the program to be presented in the largest
120 metropolitan municipalities, which includes cities and counties. In
September 1999, Justice increased the number of jurisdictions targeted for
the program from 120 to 255. According to Justice officials, the additions
were to make the program more responsive to the needs of local responders by
providing training to the 120 cities included in Defense's program as well
as each state capital and/or the largest city in each state previously
excluded from both Justice's and Defense's training programs. Justice either
trains-the-trainer or directly trains fire, emergency medical services, and
hazardous materials personnel in local communities. Justice received $5
million in each year of fiscal years 1998 and 1999 to carry out the training
segment of its program. For fiscal year 2000, Congress appropriated $8
million to Justice for training firefighters, emergency services personnel,
and state and local law enforcement personnel. The fiscal year 2000
appropriation also provided $2 million for Justice to work with Defense in
developing distance learning instructional tools such as interactive
computer software and video transmission of WMD-related instructional
materials.

The training lasts 16 hours and comprises five modules: understanding and
recognizing terrorism, implementing self-protective measures, scene
security, tactical considerations, and incident command overview. The
overall objective of the course is to enable the participants to recognize
the circumstances that indicate a potential terrorist act and to take
precautionary measures. Through mid-November 1999, 44,000 participants in 95
cities and counties had received the training. This total includes those
trained directly by Justice's instructors and the students later trained by
the instructors.

The Consortium offers a variety of WMD courses to first responders within
certain specialties, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Consortium Training Courses Provided to First Responders

                             Total
 Consortium                  trained                             Course
 member       WMD specialty  in fiscal   Courses                 duration
                             year                                (days)
                             1999a

 Fort         Chemical                   First responderb        4
 McClellan,   explosive      1,498       Hazardous materials     3
 Ala.         agents                     technician              3
                                         Incident command
 New Mexico
 Institute of Bombs and
 Mining and   explosive      396         Explosive/incendiaryc   3
 Technology   devices
                                         Emergency medical
                                         service operations and
                                         planningc               3
 Texas A&M    Emergency                  Tactical emergency      5
 University   medical        1,013       medical servicesc       5
              services
                                         WMD incident            3
                                         managementc
                                         Threat assessmentc
                                         Responder operationsc
 Nevada Test  Radiological               Radiological/nuclear    4
 Site         agents         40          agentsc                 3
                                         WMD incident            3
                                         operationsc
                                         Emergency response to
 Louisiana    Law                        terrorism/basic         2
 State        enforcement/   64          conceptsc,d
 University   biological                 Emergency response to   e
              events                     domestic biological
                                         events

aAs of Sept. 14, 1999.

bCourse is being discontinued.

cCourses were being piloted.

dCourse is an adaptation of the Metropolitan Firefighters course for law
enforcement personnel.

eCourse is under development as a 2 -day course.

Source: Justice.

Figure 2 shows law enforcement and hazardous materials personnel and
firefighters recovering victims of a terrorist incident during a training
exercise at Texas A&M University's fire protection training facility.

Figure 2: Recovering Casualties From a Terrorist Incident Scene During a
Training Exercise
Source: Texas Engineering Extension Service/Fire Protection Training
Division, Texas A&M University.

The Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan received
$2 million and $8 million in fiscal years 1998 and 1999, respectively, as
part of the Justice appropriations and is budgeted to receive $13 million in
fiscal year 2000. The other four members of the Consortium received a total
of $2 million in fiscal year 1998 and $12 million in fiscal year 1999 and
are budgeted to receive $14 million in fiscal year 2000 to develop and carry
out WMD training.

FEMA provides WMD training to first responders through its National Fire
Academy and its Emergency Management Institute. These organizations offer
training at their combined residence campus in Emmitsburg, Maryland, and
provide course materials to individuals for self-study or to state and local
training organizations for their use. In addition, they offer courses that
were not developed specifically for dealing with WMD incidents but would
assist first responders with those incidents.

The Fire Academy offers six courses to prepare first responders to manage
the consequences of a terrorist WMD incident. It provides the training at
its campus and also provides training materials for use by individuals and
state and local training organizations. One course, its 6-day incident
management course, is offered on campus and to state and local training
organizations for their use. The other five courses are offered off campus
using Academy-developed materials. These courses train individuals in
emergency response to terrorism through (1) a self-paced, self-study course;
(2) a basic concepts course, the same 16-hour course offered by Justice in
its Metropolitan Firefighters program;15 (3) a 2-day more advanced course
for the first on-scene supervisor; (4) a 2-day more advanced course for the
first on-scene emergency medical services personnel; and (5) a 2-day more
advanced course for the first on-scene hazardous materials personnel. Many
of these are train-the-trainer courses. About 71,000 students have
participated in the Fire Academy's offerings from October 1, 1997, through
September 30, 1999. This includes students trained by Academy instructors
and by student instructors.

The Emergency Management Institute also offers several courses related to
the use of WMD. It offers a 5-day course, integrated emergency management
consequences of terrorism, on campus. Off campus, it offers a 1-day course,
senior officials workshop on terrorism, and a series of courses involving
specific WMD scenarios, such as an anthrax incident, to aid senior officials
to respond to and manage a WMD event.

Figure 3 shows firefighters in Minneapolis, Minnesota decontaminating
members of the city's bomb squad during a training exercise.

Figure 3: Firefighters Decontaminating Bomb Squad Members During a WMD
Exercise in Minneapolis, Minnesota
Source: Sheriff's Office, Hennepin County, Minnesota.

Both organizations also offer courses on and off campus that are not
specifically WMD related but that can help first responders deal with WMD
incidents. For example, the Institute has a 5-day radiological emergency
response operations course that provides training on response and management
of radiological incidents.

Funding for FEMA's first responder training totaled $4 million in fiscal
year 1998 and $3.6 million in fiscal year 1999 and is projected at about
$6.4 million in fiscal year 2000. Included are small, antiterrorism training
grants that FEMA makes available to the states, either directly or through
its Fire Academy. FEMA's direct grants totaled about $1.2 million in fiscal
years 1998 and 1999, or about $23,000 per state. The states can use these
grants for a variety of purposes. For example, officials we met with in
North Carolina and Virginia said that they have used FEMA grant money to
help fund training in their community college and fire academy systems. The
Academy's grants totaled about $2 million in fiscal year 1998 and $4 million
in fiscal year 1999 and are budgeted for $4 million for fiscal year 2000.
The states have to apply for the grants and can use the funds to pay for
instructor travel, training equipment, and the use of facilities.

Responders

Other federal agencies offer courses that are not specifically directed at
responding to WMD incidents but can provide skills and knowledge that would
be useful to first responders in those incidents. Many of these courses
relate to the agencies' basic functions. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency offers several courses in how to deal with incidents
involving hazardous materials. Also, the Department of Energy offers several
courses aimed at handling the consequences of radiation incidents. Moreover,
Health and Human Services' National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health offers training to the health community in areas such as hazardous
materials.16

Federal training programs are not well coordinated, resulting in
inefficiencies in the federal effort and concerns in the first responder
communities. For example, Defense and Justice courses have been offered in
some of the same communities around the country, while many other large
communities have not yet received training. Also, the 16-hour course
presented by Justice to local jurisdictions is also offered by the National
Fire Academy to state and local training facilities throughout the country.
State and local officials with whom we met expressed their concerns over the
duplication and overlap among the federal WMD training programs. Some also
expressed confusion about which federal organization is in charge of WMD
training. Some of the concerns have been previously expressed in first
responder forums and studies.

According to Defense and Justice officials, at the inception of Defense's
Domestic Preparedness Program and Justice's Metropolitan Firefighters and
Emergency Medical Services Program, the course content and locations to be
visited were not coordinated. Both programs were established under specific
legislation aimed at increasing first responders' abilities to recognize and
respond to WMD incidents. FEMA also responded to perceived needs in the
first responder communities when its Fire Academy and Emergency Management
Institute began offering courses similar to those offered by Defense and
Justice. While these training efforts have helped fill a void and should
better prepare first responders to deal with possible WMD incidents, the
lack of coordination of individual federal efforts has led to overlapping
courses being offered to some of the same communities.

Defense's and Justice's primary training programs represent the most obvious
example of training overlap, both in terms of locations visited and course
content. Of the 67 cities that received Defense training and 95 metropolitan
areas that received Justice training, 16 cities had received training from
both through November 1999, and other large cities such as Richmond,
Virginia, and Dayton, Ohio, had not yet received training. Eventually,
Defense and Justice plan to visit the same 120 cities, and Justice also
plans to visit 135 additional jurisdictions. Both programs are primarily for
first responders in those cities and metropolitan areas that would be
expected to train others in their communities. (App. I identifies the 120
cities that both Defense and Justice plan to visit, and app. II identifies
the additional 135 jurisdictions Justice plans to visit.) In addition, both
courses have some similar objectives. For example, Defense's awareness and
operations courses and Justice's program make responders aware of (1) the
terrorist threat, (2) ways to identify a WMD incident,
(3) personal protective measures to be taken, and (4) scene control and
incident management measures. These are the same objectives of the National
Fire Academy's basic concepts course that is also available to responders
and state and local training facilities throughout the country.

Training offered by Consortium members also overlaps with the Defense,
Justice, and FEMA courses. For example, the Center for Domestic Preparedness
at Fort McClellan, Alabama, offers a 4-day responder training course that is
designed to provide basic instruction to first responders on how to respond
to, and operate in, a WMD environment.17 The course introduces chemical,
biological, and radiological threats and provides hands-on familiarization
training with specialized protective clothing and equipment. This is similar
to the instruction offered by the Domestic Preparedness Program, the
Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program, and FEMA's
basics concepts course. However, because of the Center's location and
facilities,18 its training incorporates the use of actual chemical agents
that cannot be included in the other programs.

Many state and local officials and representatives of various responder
organizations that we met with expressed concerns about duplication and
overlap among the federal WMD training programs and other training that
first responders are required to complete. Some cited duplication in the
Defense and Justice programs and specifically cited the awareness portion of
the two programs as being the most duplicative. Other officials commented
that the courses offered by Justice's Center for Domestic Preparedness at
Fort McClellan had the same basic content as the Defense and Justice
courses. Also, other officials noted that the hazardous materials and
incident command courses many responders are already required to take as
part of the specialized training in their fields contain much of the same
material presented in Defense's and Justice's primary training programs.
Some officials we met with did not believe that duplication was a problem.
For example, one official commented that the more sources for training the
better.

State and local officials expressed other concerns about the federal WMD
training effort. For example, some officials were concerned that Defense and
Justice are not training responders in smaller communities. While
acknowledging that the training is projected to cover jurisdictions where
the majority of the U.S. population lives, the officials pointed out that
those jurisdictions cover only a small portion of the land area. Considering
factors such as the extensive presence of hazardous materials throughout the
United States, they believed that threats in smaller and rural areas could
not be discounted. The officials pointed out the potential for WMD training
to reach emergency responders in smaller cities and rural areas through the
use of distance-learning techniques such as video transmissions of
instructional materials and interactive computer compact disks at existing
facilities such as firehouses and National Guard armories. Justice has
received $2 million to work with Defense in developing distance-learning
instructional tools such as interactive computer software and video
transmission of WMD-related instructional materials.

Officials were also concerned that the Defense and Justice training programs
offered to cities and metropolitan areas had bypassed the states' emergency
management and training structures. As a result, some responders, such as
state police, had been missed. According to Justice, Congress did not
provide funds prior to fiscal year 2000 to develop training for state
police. According to Defense, the directors of emergency management, within
the states that have received Defense's training, have received
instructional materials that can be disseminated throughout their statewide
emergency management structures.

Some officials said the closeness of neighboring cities was not considered
when training was scheduled. For example, even though Minneapolis and St.
Paul, Minnesota, work closely together and would do so in the event of a
major incident, St. Paul received its Domestic Preparedness Program training
about 6 months after Minneapolis received its training. An official said
that scheduling both cities for training at the same time would have made
more sense, since the cities are only separated by the Mississippi River.
The official added that, since those were the only cities in Minnesota to
receive Domestic Preparedness training, combining the training could have
allowed Defense to train another city in Minnesota. According to Defense,
officials from the two cities were offered the opportunity to train together
but opted to train separately. Defense said such joint training has occurred
and cited the Hampton Roads, Virginia, area, where the cities decided that
it would be most effective for Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and
Newport News to train together during a 2-week period.

Some officials said that the number of federal organizations involved in WMD
training creates confusion about which organization is in charge of WMD
training at the federal level. Since several agencies offer WMD-related
training and other assistance, it was unclear to local responders who they
should approach for that training.

Many officials said that training in dealing with a WMD incident should be
incorporated into regular training programs for first responders (for
example, fire-fighting courses for firefighters). This would make the
training part of the responders' certification process, which would help
ensure the continuation of WMD training when federal programs end.19 Also,
according to the individuals, the time taken from their regular duties would
be lessened if WMD training were part of the responders' normal training
requirements because all training could be better coordinated and better
take into account the needs of the specific responders. Additionally, some
believed the overall training burden would be lessened if the WMD training
was incorporated into the hazardous materials and incident command training
responders already receive. Several commented about the training burden
already placed on first responders. Responders already must meet extensive
training requirements that limit their availability for their duties. This
is a particularly acute problem for volunteer firefighters whose
availability is much more limited than that of full-time firefighters.

Some state and local officials we spoke with believed that the federal
government has a continuing role in training. They cited the need to
(1) establish WMD training goals and national training standards for each
first responder community to ensure consistency in training; (2) research
and disseminate information on new equipment, technologies, and changing
threats; (3) develop sophisticated tabletop exercises and scenarios based on
identified local threats; and (4) funnel federal funds to state and local
organizations for them to provide WMD training to first responders.

Some of the concerns and suggestions expressed by officials we interviewed
are similar to those previously identified in forums and studies. Problems
with federal efforts to train first responders began to surface during the
latter half of the 1990s, when several needs assessments and studies were
conducted to determine how best to prepare the nation's first responders to
manage the response to and consequences of a terrorist attack involving WMD.
Common themes included the need for a single focal point for information
about federal programs, a centrally coordinated and standardized national
training program, and the need to incorporate training related to terrorist
incidents involving WMD into the existing training delivery mechanisms for
the emergency responder communities.

In August 1998, the State and Local Domestic Stakeholders Forum met at the
request of the Attorney General to identify the needs of emergency
responders, and to recommend ways to structure a cooperative approach for
first responders in dealing with acts of terrorism involving WMD. The forum,
which consisted of more than 200 state and local responders and emergency
response planners, recommended, among other things, that first responder WMD
training be improved by (1) developing a single, integrated federal training
program based on responders' needs assessments and using existing training
delivery mechanism when available; (2) ensuring sustained training and
exercises using periodically updated material; (3) establishing a
single-source clearinghouse to disseminate information on new technologies
and response techniques; and (4) reducing redundancy in and prioritizing
training.

In 1998, Justice undertook a congressionally directed comprehensive
assessment of the needs of state and local emergency response agencies to
handle incidents of domestic terrorism involving chemical and biological
agents; radiological, nuclear, and explosive devices; and other weapons of
mass destruction.20 The assessment was to frame future federal training
efforts. Justice reported on its assessment to Congress in June 1999,
acknowledging, among other things, (1) the lack of a centrally coordinated
and standardized national WMD program to ensure an effective, integrated
response and to minimize redundancy in training; (2) the need for a single
source of information on federal training related to WMD; (3) the redundancy
among the various WMD courses provided to first responders; and (4) the
advantages of using existing methods for delivering WMD training to first
responders.21

In a November 1998 report on Defense's Domestic Preparedness Program, we
noted the program had increased cities' awareness of potential chemical or
biological terrorist incidents and should better prepare them to deal with
such incidents.22 However, we also stated that the program could have been
better designed and implemented. For example, we noted that by dealing
directly with cities, Defense did not build upon the states' existing
emergency management and training structures. Had it done so, Defense could
have consolidated training to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations
than presently planned, at less cost. We also noted that no threat and risk
assessments were done to help determine cities' requirements or needs or to
establish a roadmap or defined end state of preparedness. We recommended
actions to improve the program, such as using existing state and local
emergency management response systems or arrangements to select locations
and training structures to deliver courses and consider the geographical
proximity of program cities. We also recommended a review of the growing
number of WMD training programs to ensure that agencies' separate efforts
take advantage of existing state and local emergency management systems and
are coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly
defined end state.

According to Defense officials, based upon feedback from participants, key
improvements have been made to the Domestic Preparedness Program. For
example, representatives from all levels of the state, county, and local
emergency management structures are now fully integrated into the program.
This allows the program to leverage existing emergency management structures
and experiences. Also, the instructional materials from the program are sent
to the directors of emergency management in each state trained under the
program for them to disseminate throughout their emergency management
structure.

Needed

Federal agencies recognize that they have problems in their programs for
training first responders and have initiatives under way that could lead to
improvements in the training they provide. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act,
which directed Defense to establish the Domestic Preparedness Program, also
authorized its transfer to another agency, like Justice. Justice plans to
replace Defense on October 1, 2000, as the lead agency for the program and
will be responsible for its program and the Defense program. Concerned about
possible duplication in the training and the inefficient use of limited
resources, the Conference Committee Report on Justice's fiscal year 2000
appropriation act directed Justice to provide, no later than December 15,
1999, a comprehensive plan for integrating Defense's program into ongoing
Justice and other federal agency programs in the most efficient and
cost-effective manner.23

However, as of March 1, 2000, Justice's plan for the transfer had not been
issued.24 Justice officials discussed their draft plan with us and let us
review the plan. According to the officials, Justice will complete the
Domestic Preparedness training in the 120 cities to honor Defense's
commitments to those cities. Justice also still plans to deliver its
Metropolitan Firefighters program to individuals in 255 cities and counties.
Thus, in the near term, some cities will receive similar awareness courses
under both programs. In the longer term, according to Justice officials,
they will assess the need to continue the Domestic Preparedness Program
beyond the 120 cities based on a number of factors, including comprehensive
needs assessments to be completed by the states and inputs from the first
responder communities.

In response to requests from the first responder community for a single
federal focal point, Justice has established the interagency National
Domestic Preparedness Office. The Office, which was recently funded in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000, is just getting
organized.25 Located within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office
is to be staffed with representatives of the Departments of Justice,
Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection
Agency; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and state and local
responder organizations that possess recognized skills and experiences. It
is to coordinate and serve as an information clearinghouse for federal
programs devoted to supporting state and local emergency responder
communities in the area of WMD-related domestic preparedness planning,
training, exercises, and equipment research and development.

According to the Preparedness Office's draft action plan, the Office will
function as an interagency forum to coordinate federal policy and program
assistance for state and local emergency responders. For instance, the
Office will assess federal training programs to eliminate duplication and
ensure that the training adheres to minimum national standards. However, the
Office will not have veto power over any agency's programs. According to the
plan, the Office will first focus on the following tasks:

ï¿½ Identify existing needs assessment tools for finding gaps or duplication
in training and coordinate and facilitate the consolidation of existing
tools or the development of any necessary new tools by the appropriate
agency.

ï¿½ Catalogue all federal domestic preparedness training in the "Compendium of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Courses"; with the assistance of state and local
representatives, identify shortfalls in existing federal training; and work
with the federal interagency community to identify the most appropriate
agency to develop curriculums to eliminate shortfalls.

ï¿½ Verify that federal domestic preparedness training initiatives meet the
applicable standards established through the National Fire Protection
Association, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and other
pertinent regulatory entities.

ï¿½ Identify existing training delivery systems and coordinate among federal
departments and agencies the development and implementation of additional
systems, such as video presentations and other distance training
technologies, that state and local jurisdictions can use.

ï¿½ Coordinate the development of sustainment WMD training for emergency
responders, including the means to fully integrate the training with
existing entry core curriculums and with certification and recertification
processes of, for example, existing local fire and police academies, medical
schools, and other emergency responder training facilities.

ï¿½ Facilitate the incorporation of lessons learned into appropriate training
curriculums.

The Attorney General is to provide oversight of the Office's activities as
chair of the Domestic Preparedness Leadership Group, a cabinet-level group
that will be a forum for strategic guidance and the resolution of policy
issues. The Group will comprise the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Health
and Human Services; the Directors of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Security Council's
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism.
According to the draft plan, the Group will resolve policy issues that may
arise and provide strategic guidance consistent with each agency's mission.

According to Justice officials, Justice will complete the Domestic
Preparedness Program in the 120 cities to honor Defense's commitments to
those cities. It also still plans to deliver its Metropolitan Firefighters
Program to individuals in 255 cities and counties. Thus, in the near term,
some cities will receive similar awareness courses under both programs,
which results in the inefficient use of limited resources. In the longer
term, according to Justice officials, they will assess the need to extend
the Domestic Preparedness Program to more than the 120 cities planned. If
Justice continues the program without integrating it with the firefighters
program, this inefficient use of limited resources would continue.

To improve the efficiency of federal training programs on weapons of mass
destruction, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney
General eliminate duplicative training to the same metropolitan areas. We
also recommend that if the Department of Justice extends the Domestic
Preparedness Program to more than the currently planned 120 cities, it
integrate the program with the Metropolitan Firefighters Program to
capitalize on the strengths of each program and eliminate duplication and
overlap.

We provided a draft of this report to Defense, Justice, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency for their review and comment. Defense generally
agreed with the report. Justice did not agree with our finding that the
programs were duplicative and our recommendation that the duplication be
eliminated. However, Justice stated that, if the Domestic Preparedness
Program is provided to more than the original 120 cities, it will be
evaluated, modified as necessary based on input from other federal agencies
and the state and local emergency response community, and fully integrated
with the Metropolitan Firefighters Program. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency said that it had no significant comments on our draft report.
Comments by Defense, Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
are included as appendixes IV, V, and VI, respectively. In addition, we have
incorporated technical comments provided by these organizations, as
appropriate.

Defense stated that our draft report reiterated many of the same concerns
included in our November 1998 report on the Domestic Preparedness Program
and did not consider the positive changes that had been made since then.
Defense also cited specific examples of improvements. Our report includes
examples of program improvements that Defense has made since 1998. For
example, we noted that representatives from all levels of the state, county,
and local emergency management structures are now fully integrated into the
program. However, program participants that we contacted during the current
review cited some of the same concerns that were raised during our prior
work in 1998. Thus, we believe Defense and Justice should take additional
steps to improve coordination of their training programs and eliminate
inefficiencies.

Justice did not agree that its training is similar to Defense's training and
therefore did not agree with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General eliminate duplicative training to the same
metropolitan jurisdictions. Justice said that it provides a 16-hour
awareness course for fire and emergency medical services personnel, while
Defense provides a 4-hour nondiscipline-specific, general awareness course
under its program. Additionally, it said that local jurisdictions could
choose not to participate in the Justice program, if they preferred to
receive only Defense's training. Our analysis shows that Defense's 4-hour
awareness and 4-hour operations courses have objectives similar to those of
Justice's awareness course for fire and emergency medical services
personnel. Both programs have the objective of training first responders,
who would be expected to train other responders in their communities.
Moreover, some state and local officials specifically cited the awareness
portion of the two programs as being duplicative. While jurisdictions and
individuals can choose not to participate in the Justice program, we believe
that weapons of mass destruction awareness training could be more
efficiently provided to trainers in a city or metropolitan area as part of a
single, integrated, and comprehensive program rather than through separate
programs. This would comply with the approach recommended by the State and
Local Domestic Stakeholders Forum held in August 1998. Such a federal
program could train instructors, who could tailor the material to the needs
of specific local audiences.

Defense and Justice also provided comments on the report's discussion of the
draft transition plan to transfer Defense's Domestic Preparedness Program to
Justice. Defense noted that it has been working with Justice for the past
year to develop a transition plan for the Program and that the transfer,
combined with the development of the National Domestic Preparedness Office
within Justice, will make important strides in eliminating duplication that
we believe exists among federal training programs. Justice said that our
comments regarding the plan were accurate, but not comprehensive, and gave
the impression that Justice is making no effort to integrate the Domestic
Preparedness Program into its existing programs or to improve the program.
Justice further noted that the draft plan clearly identifies Justice's plan
to integrate training. However, on the basis of our review of the draft
plan, we noted that Justice planned to continue to offer both the
Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program training as
well as the Domestic Preparedness Program training until the 120 cities
originally scheduled for Defense's program have completed the training. As a
result, notwithstanding other improvements in the draft transition plan, we
believe our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney
General eliminate duplicative training to the same metropolitan areas is
still valid.

To determine the principal federal organizations that provide training to
first responders that would deal with incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction, we used our prior reports and reviewed legislation that formed
the basis for recent efforts to train emergency responders, including the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. In addition, we
interviewed officials from the Departments of Justice, Defense, Energy,
Treasury, Veterans' Affairs, and Health and Human Services as well as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Environmental Protection Agency.

To assess the adequacy of the coordination of federal WMD training, we
interviewed officials in the federal agencies responsible for providing such
training to first responders. In addition, we analyzed information they
provided concerning the scope of their training programs, the material and
topics covered in their courses, the cities in which training was provided,
and the responder communities they targeted for training. Moreover, we
interviewed various responders, including firefighters and law enforcement,
hazardous material, and emergency medical personnel at the state, county,
and city levels in the states of Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, and
Virginia. Finally, we talked with national organizations for responders. See
appendix III for a detailed list of the locations we visited.

To identify actions the federal government could take to improve its
provision of WMD training, we interviewed responders who had attended both
the Department of Justice's Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical
Services Program and the Department of Defense's Domestic Preparedness
Program. We asked for their views on the training and on the qualifications
training normally required by their responder communities. As mentioned
above, we also interviewed representatives of the various emergency
responder communities at the state, county, and city levels and national
organizations for the responder communities. Moreover, we reviewed various
studies and reports pertaining to first responders' views on federal
training efforts.

Our review was conducted from March through December 1999 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time,
we will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees; the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable
Janet Reno, Attorney General; and the Honorable James Lee Witt, Director,
Federal Emergency Management Agency. We will also make copies available to
other interested parties upon request.

If you have any questions about this report, please call Robert Pelletier on
(202) 512-4032. Key contributors to this report were Tim Stone, Ronald
Leporati, and W. Bennett Quade.

Norman J. Rabkin
Director, National Security
Preparedness

List of Requesters

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Robert Byrd
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Chairman
The Honorable Barbara Mikulski
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on VA, HUD,
and Independent Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
Unites States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

Cities Selected for Training Provided by
the Departments of Defense and Justice

 Akron, Ohio       Detroit, Mich.     Los Angeles,       Riverside, Calif.
                                      Calif.
 Albuquerque,
 N.Mex.            El Paso, Tex.      Louisville, Ky.    Rochester, N.Y.
 Amarillo, Tex.    Fort Wayne, Ind.   Lubbock, Tex.      Sacramento, Calif.

 Anaheim, Calif.   Fort Worth, Tex.   Madison, Wis.      Salt Lake City,
                                                         Utah
 Anchorage, Alaska Fremont, Calif.    Memphis, Tenn.     San Antonio, Tex.

 Arlington, Tex.   Fresno, Calif.     Mesa, Ariz.        San Bernardino,
                                                         Calif.

 Arlington, Va.a   Ft. Lauderdale,    Metairie, La.a     San Diego, Calif.
                   Fla.

 Atlanta, Ga.      Garland, Tex.      Miami, Fla.        San Francisco,
                                                         Calif.
 Aurora, Colo.     Glendale, Ariz.    Milwaukee, Wis.    San Jose, Calif.

 Austin, Tex.      Glendale, Calif.   Minneapolis,       Santa Ana, Calif.
                                      Minn.
 Bakersfield,      Grand Rapids,
 Calif.            Mich.              Mobile, Ala.       Seattle, Wash.
 Baltimore, Md.    Greensboro, N.C.   Modesto, Calif.    Shreveport, La.
 Baton Rouge, La.  Hialeah, Fla.      Montgomery, Ala.   Spokane, Wash.
 Birmingham, Ala.  Honolulu, Hawaii   Nashville, Tenn.   Springfield, Mass.
 Boston, Mass.     Houston, Tex.      New Orleans, La.   St. Louis, Mo.

 Buffalo, N.Y.     Huntington Beach,  New York, N.Y.     St. Paul, Minn.
                   Calif.

 Charlotte, N.C.   Huntsville, Ala.   Newark, N.J.       St. Petersburg,
                                                         Fla.
 Chattanooga,
 Tenn.             Indianapolis, Ind. Newport News, Va.  Stockton, Calif.
 Chesapeake, Va.   Irving, Tex.       Norfolk, Va.       Syracuse, N.Y.
 Chicago, Ill.     Jackson, Miss.     Oakland, Calif.    Tacoma, Wash.

 Cincinnati, Ohio  Jacksonville, Fla. Oklahoma City,     Tampa, Fla.
                                      Okla.
 Cleveland, Ohio   Jersey City, N.J.  Omaha, Nebr.       Toledo, Ohio
 Colorado Springs,
 Colo.             Kansas City, Kans. Orlando, Fla.      Tucson, Ariz.
 Columbus, Ga.     Kansas City, Mo.   Philadelphia, Pa.  Tulsa, Okla.

 Columbus, Ohio    Knoxville, Tenn.   Phoenix, Ariz.     Virginia Beach,
                                                         Va.
 Corpus Christi,
 Tex.              Las Vegas, Nev.    Pittsburgh, Pa.    Warren, Mich.
 Dallas, Tex.      Lexington, Ky.a    Portland, Oreg.    Washington, D.C.
 Dayton, Ohio      Lincoln, Nebr.     Providence, R.I.   Wichita, Kans.

 Denver, Colo.     Little Rock, Ark.  Raleigh, N.C.      Worcester County,
                                                         Mass.a
 Des Moines, Iowa  Long Beach, Calif. Richmond, Va.      Yonkers, N.Y.

aNot a city government.

Jurisdictions Exclusively Selected to Receive Justice Department Training

 Alameda County,    City of            Fresno County,     Oakland County,
 Calif.             Huntington, W.Va.  Calif.             Mich.
 Allegheny County,  City of Lansing,   Fulton County,     Oklahoma County,
 Pa.                Mich.              Ga.                Okla.
 Baltimore County,  City of            Hamilton County,   Onondaga County,
 Md.                Manchester, N.H.   Ohio               N.Y.
 Bernalillo County, City of            Harris County,     Orange County,
 N.Mex.             Montpelier, Vt.    Tex.               Calif.
 Bergen County,     City of New Haven, Hennepin County,   Orange County,
 N.J.               Conn.              Minn.              Fla.

 Bexar County, Tex. City of Olympia,   Hillsborough       Palm Beach
                    Wash.              County, Fla.       County, Fla.
 Bristol County,    City of Pierre,    Hudson County,     Passaic County,
 Mass.              S.Dak.             N.J.               N.J.
 Broward County,    City of Pocatello, Jackson County,    Pierce County,
 Fla.               Idaho              Mo.                Wash.

 Bucks County, Pa.  City of Portland,  Jefferson City,    Pima County,
                    Maine              Mo.                Ariz.
 Camden County,     City of Salem,     Jefferson County,  Pinellas County,
 N.J.               Oreg.              Ala.               Fla.

 Carson City, Nev.  City of Santa Fe,  Jefferson County,  Prince George's
                    N.Mex.             Colo.              County, Md.
 City/Borough of    City of Sioux      Jefferson County,  Ramsey County,
 Juneau, Alaska     Falls, S.Dak.      Ky.                Minn.
 City of Albany,    City of            Jefferson Parish,  Riverside County,
 N.Y.               Springfield, Ill.  La.                Calif.
 City of Annapolis, City of            Kent County,       Sacramento
 Md.                Tallahassee, Fla.  Mich.              County, Calif.
 City of Augusta,   City of Topeka,    Kern County,       Salt Lake County,
 Maine              Kans.              Calif.             Utah
 City of Billings,  City of Trenton,   King County,       San Bernardino
 Mont.              N.J.               Wash.              County, Calif.
 City of Biloxi,    City of Warwick,                      San Diego County,
 Miss.              R.I.               Lake County, Ill.  Calif.
 City of Bismarck,  City of                               San Joaquin
 N.Dak.             Wilmington, Del.   Lake County, Ind.  County, Calif.
 City of Boise,                        Los Angeles        San Mateo County,
 Idaho              Clark County, Nev. County, Calif.     Calif.
 City of                               Lucas County,      Santa Clara
 Burlington, Vt.    Cobb County, Ga.   Ohio               County, Calif.
 City of Casper,    Contra Costa       Macomb County,     Shelby County,
 Wyo.               County, Calif.     Mich.              Tenn.
 City of Cedar                         Mancopa County,    Snohomish County,
 Rapids, Iowa       Cook County, Ill.  Ariz.              Wash.
 City of            Cuyahoga County,   Mecklenburg        St. Louis County,
 Charleston, S.C.   Ohio               County, N.C.       Mo.
 City of                               Middlesex County,  Suffolk County,
 Charleston, W.Va.  Dade County, Fla.  Mass.              N.Y.
 City of Cheyenne,  Dallas County,     Middlesex County,  Summit County,
 Wyo.               Tex.               N.J.               Ohio
 City of Columbia,  De KaIb County,    Milwaukee County,  Tarrant County,
 S.C.               Ga.                Wis.               Tex.
 City of Concord,   Delaware County,   Monmouth County,   Travis County,
 N.H.               Pa.                N.J.               Tex.
 City of Dover,     DuPage County,     Monroe County,     Tulsa County,
 Del.               Ill.               N.Y.               Okla.
 City of Fargo,     El Paso County,    Montgomery         Union County,
 N.Dak.             Tex.               County, Md.        N.J.
 City of Fort                          Montgomery         Ventura County,
 Smith, Ark.        Erie County, N.Y.  County, Ohio       Calif.
 City of Frankfort, Essex County,      Montgomery
 Ky.                Mass.              County, Pa.        Wake County, N.C.
 City of                               Multnomah County,  Wayne County,
 Harrisburg, Pa.    Essex County, N.J. Oreg.              Mich.
 City of Hartford,  Fairfax County,    Nassau County,     Westchester
 Conn.              Va.                N.Y.               County, N.Y.
 City of Helena,    Franklin County,   Norfolk County,
 Mont.              Ohio               Mass.

Organizations and Locations Visited

During the course of our review, we met with officials from the following
organizations:

ï¿½ National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Office of Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen, Md.

ï¿½ Headquarters, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Environmental Response Team, Cincinnati, Ohio

ï¿½ Headquarters, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Emergency Management Institute, Emmitsburg, Md.

ï¿½ U.S. National Fire Academy, Emmitsburg, Md.

ï¿½ U.S. Public Health Service, Rockville, Md.

ï¿½ Federal Bureau of Investigation

ï¿½ Charlotte, N.C. Field Office

ï¿½ Minneapolis, Minn. Field Office

ï¿½ National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Office of Justice Programs, Office for State and Local Domestic
Preparedness Support, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Headquarters, Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, Ga.

ï¿½ Office of Emergency Medical Preparedness, Martinsburg, W.Va.

ï¿½ Baltimore County Fire Department, Towson, Md.

ï¿½ Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Reisterstown, Md.

ï¿½ Montgomery County Fire Department, Rockville, Md.

ï¿½ St. Paul

ï¿½ State Department of Emergency Management, St. Paul, Minn.

ï¿½ Hennepin County

ï¿½ Charlotte

ï¿½ Greensboro

ï¿½ Raleigh

ï¿½ State Division of Emergency Management, Raleigh, N.C.

ï¿½ Mecklenburg Emergency Management Services Agency, Charlotte, N.C.

ï¿½ State Bureau of Investigation, Raleigh, N.C.

ï¿½ Wake County

ï¿½ Department of Emergency Services, Richmond, Va.

ï¿½ National Sheriff's Association, Alexandria, Va.

ï¿½ National Volunteer Fire Council, Washington, D.C.

ï¿½ Special Operations Response Team, Winston-Salem, N.C.

ï¿½ Texas Engineering Extension Service, Texas A&M University,
College Station, Tex.

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are our comments on the Department of Defense's letter dated
February 22, 2000.

1. Program participants that we contacted in performing the current review
cited some of the same concerns that were cited in our November 1998 report.
Our report discusses those concerns but also provides Defense's position on
the concerns and includes examples of program improvements.

2. We revised our report to reflect Defense's position that officials from
Minneapolis and St. Paul opted to have separate training sessions. We have
also noted that in the Hampton Roads area, the cities decided it would be
most effective for Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Newport News to
train together during a 2-week period rather than in separate sessions for
each city.

3. We note in the report that providing instructional materials to the
directors of emergency management in each state trained under the program is
among the improvements Defense has instituted in the Domestic Preparedness
Program. However, our concern centered on the fact that by originally
bypassing state-level agencies, state officials were unable to coordinate
the training offered by Defense, Justice, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency within their states to ensure that the appropriate
individuals were trained. We agree with Defense that the regional kickoff
meetings now part of the program could alleviate this concern.

4. We have revised the report to clearly indicate the differences in student
data provided by Defense, Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Specifically, Defense's number of students trained includes only
individuals trained by Defense, whereas Justice and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency numbers include individuals trained by Justice and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency instructors as well as by student
instructors. We have also noted that the $66.9 million includes planning
visits, training exercises, and equipment loans.

Comments From the Department of Justice

The following are our comments on the Department of Justice's letter dated
February 22, 2000.

1. Our report states that Justice provides its weapons of mass destruction
training primarily through its Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency
Medical Services Program but also offers training through the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium. The data provided by Justice shows that
through mid-November 1999, Justice had trained 44,000 students through the
program, whereas Consortium members had trained about 3,000 students as of
September 14, 1999.

2. The 8-hour awareness and operations courses in Defense's Domestic
Preparedness Program have objectives similar to those of Justice's
Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program. Also, some
state and local officials specifically cited the awareness portion of the
two programs as being most duplicative of each other. Moreover, both the
Domestic Preparedness Program and the Metropolitan Firefighters program are
train-the-trainer programs with the objective of providing selected
responders with the necessary skills to train their fellow responders. While
it is true that jurisdictions and individuals can choose not to participate
in the Justice program, we believe that it would be more efficient to
provide weapon of mass destruction awareness training to trainers in a city
or metropolitan area as part of a single, integrated, and comprehensive
program rather than through separate programs. Such a federal training
program could train instructors who could tailor the material to the needs
of the specific local audience.

3. For the reasons discussed above, we continue to believe that our
recommendation is sound.

4. We agree with Justice that classes at the Center for Domestic
Preparedness can incorporate a live agent component and so noted in our
report. At the time of our review, the first responder awareness course that
we cited was being offered as part of the Center's curriculum. We support
Justice's decision to discontinue the course because, as we state in the
report, it is duplicative of other training available to first responders.

5. As Justice states in its comments, our report notes that Justice is
currently pursuing distance learning initiatives and that state and local
officials believe distance learning techniques can be an effective way of
delivering instruction to the responder communities. We also pointed out in
our discussion of efforts under way to improve training that one of the
initial tasks the National Domestic Preparedness Office plans to focus on is
coordinating the development and implementation of training systems such as
video presentations and other distance training technologies. We have
revised the report to show the link between Justice's distance learning
initiative and the comments by state and local officials.

6. We have revised the report to include Justice's position that Congress
provided no funding prior to fiscal year 2000 to develop training for state
police. We agree that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 directed that Justice provide training to the fire-fighting and
emergency medical communities. However, the legislation did not preclude
Justice from coordinating with the state emergency management agencies and
training structures in offering that training. If Justice had done so, state
agencies could have better coordinated the federal training programs within
their states to ensure appropriate responder communities were trained by the
available federal programs.

7. We were briefed on the draft plan and allowed to read it. However,
because the plan was not approved, Justice would not provide us with a copy
and cautioned us that the plan could change. Because of the limitations on
our access to the draft plan, the cautionary nature of Justice's comments,
and the draft status of the plans, we chose to summarize Justice's plan for
the Domestic Preparedness Program. Notwithstanding the other provisions of
Justice's plan, Justice planned to continue to offer both the Metropolitan
Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Program training and the
Domestic Preparedness Program training until the 120 cities originally
scheduled for the Defense training have completed the training. Thus, as we
originally stated, in the near term, some cities will receive similar
awareness courses under both programs, which results in the inefficient use
of limited resources.

Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(701157)

Table 1: First Responders Trained Through Domestic Preparedness Program
(from program's inception in fiscal year 1997 through
fiscal year 1999) 10

Table 2: Consortium Training Courses Provided to First Responders 12

Figure 1: Domestic Preparedness Program Training at Louisville,
Kentucky, June 1999 9

Figure 2: Recovering Casualties From a Terrorist Incident Scene
During a Training Exercise 13

Figure 3: Firefighters Decontaminating Bomb Squad Members
During a WMD Exercise in Minneapolis, Minnesota 15
  

1. Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998) and Combating
Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Preparedness Program
(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

2. Justice had not determined the completion date for this training.

3. Members of the Consortium are the Center for Domestic Preparedness, Fort
McClellan, Alabama; the National Energetic Materials Research and Testing
Center, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; the National Center
for Bio-Medical Research and Training, Louisiana State University; the
National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center, Texas A&M
University; and the National Exercise, Test, and Training Center, Nevada
Test Site. The Consortium was formed in 1997 to take advantage of existing
institutions for training first responders.

4. Justice convened the forum in Washington, D.C., to discuss federal
efforts and make recommendations to improve those efforts.

5. Responding to Incidents of Domestic Terrorism: Assessing the Needs of
State and Local Jurisdictions, Phase I Report, June 2, 1999.

6. Justice officials said they were revising the plan in response to
concerns raised by congressional staff. They also said that the revisions
would not affect our description of the plan.

7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201,
Sept. 23, 1996).

8. Section 819 of P.L. 104-132, Apr. 24, 1996.

9. House Report 105−405, Nov. 13, 1997.

10. House Report 105-825, Oct. 19, 1998.

11. Because of its subject matter expertise, the Army's Soldier and
Biological Chemical Command is the organization responsible for carrying out
Defense's WMD training program.

12. The 120 largest cities were based on the 1990 census revised in April
1995.

13. As part of the program, each city can request $300,000 of equipment,
which is lent by Defense.

14. Includes planning visits, training exercises, and equipment loans in
addition to the week's training.

15. In a 1997 statement of understanding, Justice and FEMA agreed that
Justice would concentrate its training on responders in the 120 largest
metropolitan areas while FEMA would make its training available throughout
the United States.

16. The fiscal year 1999 Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services
appropriation act provided funding to renovate and modernize the Nobel Army
Hospital at Fort McClellan for the purpose of providing training to health
responders to bioterrorism (Section 101 (f) of Division A, P.L. 105-277,
Oct. 21,1998).

17. According to Justice, this course is being discontinued.

18. The Center occupies facilities that were part of the U.S. Army Chemical
School before the school was relocated.

19. According to Defense's schedule, all 120 cities will have received the
Domestic Preparedness Program training by mid-2001. Justice has not
projected a completion date for its Metropolitan Firefighters Program
training.

20. House Report 105-636, July 20, 1998.

21. Responding to Incidents of Domestic Terrorism: Assessing the Needs of
State and Local Jurisdictions, June 2, 1999.

22. Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3 , Nov. 12,1998).

23. House Report 106-479, Nov. 18, 1999.

24. Justice officials said they were revising the plan in response to
concerns raised by staff of the Appropriations Committees. They also said
that the revisions would not affect our discussion of the plan.

25. House Report 106-479, Nov. 18, 1999.
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