    Defense Acquisitions: Army Purchased Truck Trailers That Cannot be Used
    as Planned (Letter Report, 10/27/1999, GAO/NSIAD-00-15).

    Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
    Army's purchase of the High Mobility Trailers, focusing on the: (1)
    factors leading to the substantial increase in the contract unit price
    of the trailers; (2) reasons the trailers cannot be used as planned and
    the cost to the Army for required modifications; and (3) Army's
    acquisition strategy and plans to procure additional trailers.

    GAO noted that: (1) the Army has paid a much higher unit price for the
    High Mobility Trailers than it originally expected primarily because it
    awarded a $50.6 million, 5-year, multiyear contract to produce 7,563
    trailers and then decided not to fund the fourth year of the contract;
    (2) a program official said that the Army did not fund the fourth year
    of the contract because of other higher funding priorities; (3) rather
    than cancel the final 2 years of the contract, the Army and the
    contractor agreed to a restructured contract; (4) the restructured
    contract reduced annual production quantities; extended production a
    year; and increased the price of each cargo trailer by 57 percent, from
    $6,710 to $10,521, and each chassis trailer by 50 percent, from $3,560
    to $5,334; (5) the increase in the unit price was attributed primarily
    to spreading overhead costs over fewer units, allowing for higher labor
    and material costs, and an increase in the contractor's profit
    percentage; (6) most of the 6,700 High Mobility Trailers the Army has
    purchased are: (a) not usable because of a safety problem; and (b) not
    suitable because they damage the light and heavy trucks towing them; (7)
    in addition to damaging the truck, the Army found that the trailer
    drawbar could break, causing a safety problem; (8) if it breaks, the
    trailer can disconnect from the truck or overturn; (9) to make the
    trailers usable and suitable, the Army needs to make two modifications
    to the trailers and one modification to each type of truck; (10) it has
    identified a trailer modification that will cost an additional $640 for
    each trailer and a truck modification that will cost an additional $250
    for each heavy truck; (11) the Army's acquisition strategy
    underestimated the risks; (12) the Army, based on its belief that only
    minor modifications to an existing trailer design were required, entered
    into a multiyear production contract without demonstrating that the
    design would meet its requirements; (13) further, the contract required
    the contractor to design, produce, and deliver trailers within 150 days
    of contract award; (14) the Army subsequently found that the contractor
    could not meet the contract's original delivery schedule, the trailers
    initially did not pass testing, and initial trailer design required
    significant modifications; (15) it plans to award a competitively bid,
    5-year requirements contract sometime after fiscal year 2002 begins to
    acquire 18,412 more High Mobility Trailers; and (16) the Army is in the
    early stages of planning for this contract and has not worked out many
    of the details.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-00-15
         TITLE:  Defense Acquisitions: Army Purchased Truck Trailers That
    	     Cannot be Used as Planned
          DATE:  10/27/1999
       SUBJECT:  Cost overruns
    	     Schedule slippages
    	     Procurement planning
    	     Contract modifications
    	     Cost analysis
    	     Army procurement
    	     Prices and pricing
    	     Military land vehicles
    IDENTIFIER:  High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
    	     Army High Mobility Trailer Program

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    Report to the Honorable
    Tom Harkin, U.S. Senate

    October 1999

    DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

    Army Purchased Truck Trailers That Cannot Be Used as
    Planned
    *****************

    *****************

    GAO/NSIAD-00-15

                                                          National Security and
                                                 International Affairs Division

    B-283452

    October 27, 1999

    The Honorable Tom Harkin
    United States Senate

    Dear Senator Harkin:

    The Army has purchased 6,700 ****ITCCentury Book:xbd****-ton High Mobility
    Trailers as companion trailers for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
    Vehicles, 1****ITCCentury Book:xb9****-ton trucks. The Army is buying two
    types of trailers. A cargo trailer that will be used to carry loose cargo,
    such as ammunition boxes, and a chassis trailer, which will be used to
    permanently attach towed equipment, such as power generators. The
    trailers' unit price has significantly increased and generally they cannot
    be used as planned until modifications are made to the trailers and the
    trucks that tow them. The Army plans to acquire
    18,412 more of the trailers. In response to your request, we (1)
    determined factors leading to the substantial increase in the contract
    unit price of the trailers, (2) identified reasons the trailers cannot be
    used as planned and the cost to the Army for required modifications, and
    (3) assessed the Army's acquisition strategy and plans to procure
    additional trailers.

    Results in Brief

    The Army has paid a much higher unit price for the High Mobility Trailers
    than it originally expected primarily because it awarded a $50.6-million,
    5-year, multiyear contract to produce 7,563 trailers and then decided not
    to fund the fourth year of the contract. A program official said that the
    Army did not fund the fourth year of the contract because of other higher
    funding priorities. The multiyear contract required the cancellation of
    the fourth and fifth years of production if the fourth year was not
    funded. Rather than cancel the final 2 years of the contract, the Army and
    the contractor agreed to a restructured contract. At the time the contract
    was restructured, the contractor was more than a year behind the original
    delivery schedule and had incurred additional costs in modifying the
    trailer to meet requirements. The restructured contract reduced annual
    production quantities; extended production a year; and increased the price
    of each cargo trailer by
    57 percent, from $6,710 to $10,521, and each chassis trailer by 50
    percent, from $3,560 to $5,334. The increase in unit price was attributed
    primarily to spreading overhead costs over fewer units, allowing for
    higher labor and material costs, and an increase in the contractor's
    profit percentage.

    Most of the 6,700 High Mobility Trailers the Army has purchased are (1)
    not usable because of a safety problem and (2) not suitable because they
    damage the light and heavy trucks towing them./Footnote1/ In addition to
    damaging the truck, the Army found that the trailer drawbar could break,
    causing a safety problem. If it breaks, the trailer can disconnect from
    the truck or overturn. The Army has placed all 5,696 cargo trailers and
    854 of the chassis trailers into storage until they are modified to
    correct the problem. The modifications to correct the trailer drawbar
    problem caused additional problems with the trailer brakes and additional
    damage to the trucks. Since it had accepted the trailer design, the Army
    determined that it would pay for the required modifications. To make the
    trailers usable and suitable, the Army needs to make three modifications
    to the trailers and one modification to each type of truck. It has
    identified two of the trailer modifications that will cost an additional
    $640 for each trailer and a truck modification that will cost an
    additional $250 for each heavy truck. However, it has not yet identified
    the other trailer modification or the light truck modification.

    The Army's acquisition strategy underestimated the risks. The Army, based
    on its belief that only minor modifications to an existing trailer design
    were required, entered into a multiyear production contract without
    demonstrating that the design would meet its requirements. Further, the
    contract required the contractor to design, produce, and deliver trailers
    within 150 days of contract award. The Army subsequently found that the
    contractor could not meet the contract's original delivery schedule, the
    trailers initially did not pass testing, and the initial trailer design
    required significant modifications. It plans to award a competitively bid,
    5-year requirements contract sometime after fiscal year 2002 begins to
    acquire more High Mobility Trailers. The Army is in the early stages of
    planning for this contract and has not worked out many of the details. It
    is revising the trailer specifications and as a result, the new contract
    may include a new trailer design.

    This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to
    require the Army, before beginning production of the follow-on trailers,
    to demonstrate the design will meet requirements and will not damage the
    trucks. In its comments to the report, the Department of Defense concurred
    with this recommendation.

    Background

    In 1987, the Army decided it needed a new companion trailer for the High
    Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle to provide improved off-road
    mobility and carry heavier loads compared to the then current M101 series
    ****ITCCentury Book:xbd****-ton military trailer. The Army found that the
    M101 series trailer lacked stability because its wheels did not have the
    same tire track width as the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
    and its suspension was not adequate. As a result, the trailer had a
    tendency to overturn, even at low speeds, in soft soil and rough terrain.

    The new trailer (see fig. 1) was designed to be compatible with both the
    light and heavy High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. Differences
    in the two trucks required that two cargo versions of the trailers be
    produced. The light cargo trailer was to carry at least 1,500 pounds and
    the heavy cargo trailer was to carry at least 2,500 pounds. The new
    trailers also included a chassis version that was to carry at least 2,700
    pounds. The Army required the trailers to have the same track width and
    tires as the truck and inertia brakes, called surge brakes, which are
    actuated by forces between the tow hitch of the truck and the drawbar of
    the trailer. The trailer was to be capable of being towed at speeds up to
    20 miles per hour cross-country, 35 miles per hour on secondary roads, and
    55 miles per hour on primary roads.

    Figure****Helvetica:x11****1:    The High Mobility Cargo
                                     Trailer
    *****************

    *****************

    Source: Raytheon E-Systems Richardson.

    On October 27, 1993, the Army awarded a $50.6-million, multiyear, firm
    fixed-price, 5-year production contract, with options, to Electrospace
    Systems, Inc., Richardson, Texas, to produce 7,563 trailers for active,
    guard, and reserve Army units. Electrospace subcontracted with Silver
    Eagle Manufacturing Co., Portland, Oregon, for the actual production of
    the trailers. Silver Eagle based its new trailer design on a High Mobility
    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle trailer it had designed earlier for an Army
    demonstration program. Silver Eagle had previously sold 15 of these
    trailers for demonstration programs, both inside and outside the Army.
    Electrospace and Silver Eagle had to modify the earlier military trailer
    to meet the new requirements. Electrospace became part of Raytheon
    E-Systems, Inc., in June 1996.

    The contract was restructured, effective on December 27, 1996. The Army
    fielded the first 740 trailers to Army Reserve and National Guard units.
    The contractor produced 6,700 trailers at a total price of $57 million
    under the restructured contract. The contractor had delivered all the
    trailers required by the restructured contract by the end of July 1999.

    Contract Unit Price of Trailers Increased Significantly

    The Army has paid a much higher unit price for the High Mobility Trailers
    than it originally expected, primarily because it awarded a multiyear, 5-
    year production contract that required it to fully fund each year by a
    specific date or cancel the remaining production years and then decided
    not to fund the fourth year of the contract. Rather than cancel the
    remaining production years, the Army and the contractor decided to
    restructure the contract. The restructuring reduced the number of trailers
    to be produced and allowed the contractor to reprice the trailers based on
    then-current costs. This resulted in a 57-percent increase, from $6,710 to
    $10,521, in the unit price of the cargo trailers and a 50-percent
    increase, from $3,560 to $5,334, in the unit price of the chassis trailers.

    In developing its fiscal year 1997 budget request, the Army decided not to
    fund the High Mobility Trailer program. A program official said that the
    Army cited higher funding priorities as the reason for not funding the
    trailer program. The funding was required for the fourth year of the 5-
    year production contract. Under the terms of the multiyear contract, if
    the required funds were not available by the required date, the Army would
    have to cancel the remainder of the contract and pay the contractor for
    reasonable and necessary costs incurred and a reasonable profit on those
    costs. The contract limited these costs to no more than $1.1 million for
    cancellation of the contract's fourth and fifth production years.

    Rather than cancel the contract, the Army and the contractor negotiated a
    restructured contract, effective December 27, 1996. According to program
    office officials, they believed the benefits of continuing the contract
    outweighed the costs of cancellation. On December 23, 1996, 4 days before
    the restructure, the Army informed the contractor that the trailers had
    successfully completed the testing to show that they met contract
    performance requirements. At that time, the contractor was more than a
    year behind the original delivery schedule and had incurred additional
    costs in modifying the trailers to meet requirements. However, the Army
    did not allow the contractor to recoup the additional costs on the
    restructured contract.

    Under the restructured contract, the original fourth and fifth years of
    production were terminated and a lower total production quantity was
    established and spread over 3 years of production. The original contract
    called for 4,534 trailers to be produced in the last 2 program years. The
    restructured contract reduced this number to 2,300 trailers to be produced
    over 3 years. The restructured contract allowed the contractor to increase
    its unit prices to $10,521 per trailer for the two cargo trailer versions,
    an increase of 57 percent over their original unit price of $6,710, and to
    $5,334 per trailer for the chassis trailer version, an increase of 50
    percent over its original unit price of $3,560. The negotiations leading
    to the restructured contract attributed the increased unit price to
    spreading overhead costs over fewer units, allowing for higher labor and
    material costs, and increasing the contractor's profit percentage.

    Trailers Are Not Usable With Trucks Until the Army Modifies Them

    Most of the 6,700 High Mobility Trailers the Army has purchased are (1)
    not usable because of a safety problem and (2) not suitable because they
    damage the trucks towing them. The Army found that the trailer drawbar
    could break causing a safety problem. If it breaks, the trailer could
    disconnect from the truck or overturn. The Army has stored all 5,696 cargo
    trailers and 854 of the chassis trailers until they are modified to
    correct the problem. The modification to correct the trailer drawbar
    problem caused additional problems with the trailer brakes and additional
    damage to the trucks. Because it had previously accepted the trailer
    design, the Army determined that it would pay for the required
    modifications identified since the acceptance. The Army will pay an
    additional $640 per trailer for required trailer modifications but has not
    yet determined the modification needed to correct the trailer's brakes.
    The Army also will pay $250 per heavy truck for a modification, but it has
    not determined the required modification for the light truck. Because the
    Army has not determined all the required modification, the total program
    or unit cost to the Army for the trailers is unknown.

    In July 1995, the Army Operational Evaluation Command performed an
    operational assessment of the trailers using data generated during
    production testing. It found that (1) the trailer demonstrated the
    potential for causing catastrophic failure in the truck due to cracking of
    the truck's rear cross member and (2) the heavy truck jack was not
    compatible with the trailer, which did not have a requirement to have a
    tire jack of its own. The Command assessed the trailers as effective but
    not suitable for Army use primarily because of the damage to the truck. It
    recommended that the cause of the truck damage be investigated and
    corrected before approving the trailers for full fielding.

    Although the trailers damaged the trucks towing them during testing, the
    Army concluded that the design met contract performance requirements. The
    program office did not believe the truck damage was a major problem
    because only three of the trucks were damaged during testing. Rather than
    correcting the truck damage problem before fielding, the Army, on December
    23, 1996, informed the contractor that the trailers had successfully
    completed testing and that it would accept all trailers built to their
    designs. The Army fielded the first 740 trailers to Army Reserve and
    National Guard units without correcting the problem.

    To prevent the trailer from damaging the trucks, the Army developed bumper
    and cross member modifications. In testing the truck modifications, on
    November 14, 1997, the trailer drawbar broke. In analyzing the drawbar
    design, the Army determined that the drawbar had no margin of safety when
    the trailer was fully loaded and the drawbar was bending when going over a
    bump or rough spot. Since it had accepted the trailer design, the Army
    determined that it would pay for the required modifications.

    On March 3, 1998, the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command
    issued a safety-of-use message requiring the Army to stop using all High
    Mobility Trailers, except about 150 chassis versions with generators
    mounted on them. These trailers were excluded because their operational
    weight was lower than that of the cargo trailers and would not break a
    drawbar. Since the message, the Army has been accepting trailers from the
    contractor and immediately placing them in storage at various locations
    around the country until the necessary modifications can be made. It has
    5,696 cargo trailers and 854 chassis trailers in storage.

    To correct the drawbar problem, the Army developed a new drawbar with a
    steel center bar to replace the trailer's original all aluminum drawbar.
    It began testing trailers modified with the new drawbar on May 8, 1998.
    The modified drawbar was stiffer that the original drawbar, and the Army
    found that it accelerated the wear on the surge brake actuator
    housing/Footnote2/ and caused more damage to the trucks than the original
    drawbar.

    On July 8, 1999, the Army completed its latest test of truck and trailer
    modifications. Some of the modifications were successful and some were
    not. The trailer drawbar modification was successful because it did not
    fail during testing, and the heavy truck bumper modification kept the
    trailers from damaging the heavy trucks. However, the trailer brake
    actuator and light truck modifications were not successful since the surge
    brake actuator housing cracked and parts wore out and the trailer
    continued to damage the light trucks.

    A program official said that the heavy truck trailer will need a heavier
    surge brake actuator and the light truck will need additional
    reinforcement to its rear cross member. As of September 27, 1999, the Army
    had not decided on the surge brake actuator housing modification or the
    light truck modification needed to correct the problems. The program
    official also said that most of the stored trucks would not be retrofitted
    with the drawbar and surge brake modifications until the surge brake
    problem is corrected and demonstrated either through modeling and
    simulation or actual testing. However, he added that because units had to
    turn in their older trailers before being issued the new trailer, the
    program office is seeking approval to immediately retrofit the modified
    drawbar onto the
    740 fielded trailers. The retrofit will allow the units to use the trailer
    up to
    10 miles-per-hour cross-country as long as they inspect the trailers and
    trucks more often.

    The final unit cost of the trailers cannot be determined until the Army
    identifies all of the trailer and truck modifications needed to make the
    trailers suitable for Army use. Since the Army will pay for these
    modifications, these costs should be added to the contract unit price of
    the trailers to obtain the total unit cost for the trailers. The Army has
    determined that each trailer needs (1) a jack adapter costing $60 that
    will allow the heavy truck tire jack to be used on the trailers and (2)
    the drawbar modification estimated to cost $580. These will increase the
    unit cost to $7,350 for cargo trailers and $4,200 for chassis trailers
    bought before the contract was restructured and $11,161 for cargo trailers
    and $5,974 for chassis trailers bought after the contract was
    restructured. The modification cost to solve the surge brake actuator
    problem should be added to these costs once the Army identifies the
    required modification.

    In addition to determining the cost of the trailer modifications, the cost
    to modify the trucks needs to be determined to arrive at the Army's total
    cost for the trailer program. The Army estimates the modification on the
    heavy trucks will cost $250 per truck. However, the Army has not
    determined the modification for the light trucks. Also, the Army has not
    determined the number of trucks that need to tow the trailer and therefore
    would need the modifications. The Army was surveying the units that have
    the trucks to determine their requirements for towing the trailer.

    Army's Acquisition Strategy Underestimated Risks

    The Army, based on its belief that only minor modifications to an existing
    trailer design were required, entered into a multiyear, 5-year production
    contract without demonstrating that the design would meet its
    requirements. The Army subsequently found that the contractor could not
    meet the original delivery schedule, the trailers initially did not pass
    testing, and the initial trailer design required significant
    modifications. The Army is in the early stages of planning for the follow-
    on purchase of trailers. The follow-on contract may include a new trailer
    design.

    The Army awarded the multiyear production contract because it believed
    that its High Mobility Trailer requirements could be met by making minor
    modifications to an existing Silver Eagle trailer. Its market
    investigation prior to contract award determined that both Silver Eagle
    and another manufacturer had existing trailers that met 92 percent of the
    Army requirements. However, this determination was based upon the
    manufacturers' statements, not on Army tests. The trailer contract,
    awarded to Electrospace, required the contractor to design, produce, and
    deliver the first 12 trailers for testing within 150 days of contract
    award. The contractor was from 4 to 6 months late in delivering the first
    12 trailers, which were initially unable to meet the contract requirements
    because of excessive wear to the axle and surge brake actuator. The
    contractor replaced the original axle with a stronger one and modified the
    trailer's surge brake actuator. The Army tested the modified trailers and,
    while it determined that the axle problem had been fixed, it raised
    continuing concerns about wear to the surge brake actuator. However,
    rather than requiring further modifications to the brake, the Army
    accepted a surge brake system warranty from the contractor. On December
    23, 1996, the Army informed the contractor that the trailers had
    successfully completed the testing to show that they met contract
    performance requirements and that it would accept all trailers built to
    the same configuration as those that had successfully completed testing.

    The Army plans to acquire 18,412 more High Mobility Trailers and to
    continue the trailer program with the award of a 5-year requirements
    contract. Originally, the Army planned to award this contract in March
    2000; however, problems with the trailers and an Army decision not to fund
    the program in fiscal year 2001 will delay the contract award until
    October 2001 at the earliest.

    The Army is in the early stages of planning for this contract and has not
    worked out many of the details of the follow-on production, but it is
    revising the trailer specifications. For example, the program office has
    considered allowing the next contractor to produce the new trailers with a
    brake system other than an inertia brake system. The current surge brake
    system resulted from the requirement that the original trailers have an
    inertia brake system. As a result of revising the trailer specifications,
    the new contract may include a new trailer design.

    Conclusions

    The Army's acquisition strategy for High Mobility Trailers underestimated
    the risks of entering into a multiyear, 5-year production contract before
    demonstrating that the trailer's design met its requirements. As a result,
    the trailers cannot be used as planned, and the Army and the contractor
    have incurred substantial additional costs to fix problems. The Army's
    plan for the follow-on purchase of trailers may include a new design, but
    it is not clear yet if the Army plans to demonstrate, prior to production,
    that the new design will meet its requirements.

    Recommendation

    To ensure that the Army does not again acquire trailers that need
    substantial modifications before being fielded, we recommend that the
    Secretary of Defense require the Army, before proceeding with follow-on
    production of the trailer, to demonstrate the design will meet
    requirements and will not damage the trucks.

    Agency Comments

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
    concurred with the recommendation, stating that before proceeding with the
    follow-on procurement of the trailer, the Army will perform testing to
    demonstrate that the trailer design meets operational requirements and
    will not damage the truck towing it. The Department added that the Army
    has reviewed the original trailer strategy and its execution to develop an
    improved strategy for the follow-on trailer procurement. In addition, the
    Department stated that the Army is refining the trailer performance
    specification and developing a more rigorous testing plan that will
    evaluate trailer and truck performance as an integrated system.

    Scope and Methodology

    To identify the factors leading to a substantial increase in the trailer's
    contract unit price and the reasons the Army cannot use most of the
    trailers until modifications are made, we reviewed the original market
    investigation report, the Army's acquisition strategy, contract files,
    program schedules, test plan and reports, and other program documents. We
    discussed implications of the documentation with program and test
    officials.

    To assess the Army's acquisition strategy and plans to procure additional
    trailers, we reviewed the High Mobility Trailer acquisition strategy and
    plan, Army budget documents, and other program documents. We discussed the
    evolving plans with Army program officials involved in planning the follow-
    on trailer contract.

    In performing our work, we obtained documents and interviewed officials
    from the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Army, Washington,
    D.C.; the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren,
    Michigan; and the U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
    Maryland.

    We conducted our review between May and September 1999 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
    distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that
    time, we will send copies of the report to Senator John W. Warner,
    Chairman, and Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate
    Committee on Armed Services; Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator
    Daniel K. Inouye, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate
    Committee on Appropriations; Representative Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, and
    Representative Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on
    Armed Services; and Representative Jerry Lewis, Chairman, and
    Representative John P. Murtha, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
    Defense, House Committee on Appropriations. We will also send copies of
    this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the
    Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; and the Honorable Jacob J.
    Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
    available to others on request.

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report please call
    Robert J. Stolba or me on (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this
    report are Lawrence Gaston, Jr.; Stephanie J. May; and William T. Woods.

    Sincerely yours,
    *****************

    *****************

    James F. Wiggins
    Associate Director
    Defense Acquisitions Issues

    --------------------------------------
    /Footnote1/-^The light trucks are the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
      Vehicles that were produced with a frame cross member instead of a rear
      bumper and can tow up to 3,400 pounds, including the trailer and its
      load. The heavy trucks are the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
      Vehicles that were produced with a rear bumper and can tow up to 4,200
      pounds, including the trailer and its load.
    /Footnote2/-^The surge brake actuator housing is located on the trailer
      drawbar and contains the surge brake actuator, which is basically a
      piston that the truck slowing down or accelerating moves to compress or
      expand hydraulic fluid that, in turn, cause the trailer brakes to engage
      or disengage.

    COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
    =======================================

    *****************

    *****************

    *****************

    *****************

    (707416)

    *** End of document. ***