Defense Acquisitions: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship
Cruise Missile Defense (Letter Report, 07/11/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-149).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) assessed the Navy's
progress since 1996 in improving the self-defense capability of surface
ships against cruise missiles; and (2) evaluated Navy plans for meeting
future anti-cruise missile self-defense requirements.
GAO noted that: (1) although the Navy has made some progress in
improving surface ship self-defense capabilities, most ships continue to
have only limited capabilities against cruise missile threats; (2) a
Navy assessment of current surface ship self-defense capabilities
conducted in 1998 concluded that only the 12 Whidbey Island and Harpers
Ferry class amphibious ships have or will be equipped with defensive
systems that can provide measurable improvement against near- and
mid-term cruise missile threats; (3) the assessment projected that none
of the improvements the Navy plans to make in the future would provide
any ship class a high level of self-defense capability against far-term
threats; (4) in projecting ship self-defense capability improvement, the
assessment assumed, among other things, that all planned improvements
would be developed and fielded as scheduled; (5) GAO believes that the
Navy assessment overstates the actual and projected capabilities of
surface ships to protect themselves from cruise missiles because the
models used in the assessment to determine capabilities include a number
of optimistic assumptions that may not reflect the reality of normal
fleet operations; (6) among these assumptions are perfect weather,
uninterrupted equipment availability, and perfect crew and equipment
performance at all times; (7) further, inadequate funding, maintenance,
and repair parts support continue to limit the availability of existing
self-defense equipment; (8) plans for meeting ship self-defense
requirements are not promising because the Navy still does not have a
comprehensive and consistent strategy for improving its capabilities;
(9) previous plans have not included all affected ship classes, have not
always established priorities among ship classes, have not consistently
used a baseline from which to measure progress, and have not provided
timelines for achieving the desired improvements; (10) although Navy
leaders express concern about the vulnerability of surface ships, that
concern may not be reflected in the budget for ship self-defense
programs; and (11) from fiscal years 1997 to 2005, spending is
relatively flat (fluctuating between $719 million and $ billion) and
associated research and development funding is projected to decline from
about $517 million to about $218 million.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-00-149
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to
Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense
DATE: 07/11/2000
SUBJECT: Naval procurement
Military vessels
Defense contingency planning
Naval warfare
Procurement planning
Weapons systems
Defense capabilities
Military systems analysis
Missiles
IDENTIFIER: Rolling Airframe Missile
MK-15 Phalanx Close-in Weapons System
Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile
Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability System
Navy Ship Self Defense System Mark I/Quick Reaction Combat
Capability
Aegis Weapon System
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GAO/NSIAD-00-149
Appendix I: Planned Self-Defense Capabilities for Amphibious
Transport Dock Ships
26
Appendix II: Current and Planned Ship Self-Defense Equipment
27
Appendix III: Completed, Ongoing, and Planned Improvements in Self-Defense
Capability by Ship Class
41
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense
51
Table 1: Anti-ship Cruise Missile Threats 5
Table 2: Planned Equipment Additions or Improvements, as of
June 2000 11
Table 3: Existing Cruise Missile Defense Capability by Ship Class,
as of October 1998 13
Table 4: Projected Cruise Missile Defense Capability as of Program Objective
Memorandum 2000, as of October 1998 13
Table 5: Availability Rates of Selected Ship Self-Defense Equipment 16
Figure 1: U.S.S. Stark, 1987 6
Figure 2: Navy Layered Defense Concept 8
Figure 3: Total Ship Self-Defense Funding 20
Figure 4: Ship Self-Defense Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation Funding 21
ACDS Advanced Combat Direction System
AIEWS Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System
AOE fast combat support ship
CC&D Common Command and Decision
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability
DOD Department of Defense
ESSM Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
GMFCS Guided Missile Fire Control System
GMLS Guided Missile Launching System
HAS helicopter/aircraft/surface craft
IRST Infrared Search and Track
LHA Landing Helicopter Assault Ship
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock Ship
LSD Dock-Landing Ship
MFR Multi-function Radar
MPU Medium Pulse Repetition Upgrade
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSSMS NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System
NULKA Offboard Active Decoy
RAIDS Rapid Anti
ship Cruise Missile Integrated Defense System
RAM Rolling Airframe Missile
RNSSMS Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System
SM Standard Missile
SSDS Ship Self Defense System
TISS Thermal Imaging Sensor System
VSR Volume Search Radar
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-283202
July 11, 2000
The Honorable Curt Weldon
Chairman
The Honorable Owen B. Pickett
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has shifted its focus from
preparing for warfare on the open ocean to developing operational concepts
and capabilities for conducting combat operations in the coastal waters of
the world. However, the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated
anti-ship cruise missiles threatens the ability of Navy ships to operate and
survive close to hostile shores. In response to this threat, the Chief of
Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of ship self-defense
requirements. Completed in fiscal year 1996, this study formally identified
the capabilities needed by each ship class1 to defend against cruise missile
threats in the near, mid-, and far term.2 Since then, the Navy has spent
$3.8 billion to improve its ship self-defense capabilities against cruise
missile attacks, and it plans to spend another $5.1 billion over the next 6
years.
This report responds to your request that we (1) assess the Navy's progress
since 1996 in improving the self-defense capability of surface ships against
cruise missiles and (2) evaluate Navy plans for meeting future anti-cruise
missile self-defense requirements. Appendix I contains the specific
information you requested on the planned defensive suite for the San Antonio
class of amphibious ships now in development.
Although the Navy has made some progress in improving surface ship
self-defense capabilities, most ships continue to have only limited
capabilities against cruise missile threats. A Navy assessment of current
surface ship self-defense capabilities conducted in 1998 concluded that only
the
12 Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry class amphibious ships have or will be
equipped with defensive systems that can provide measurable improvement
against near- and mid-term cruise missile threats. The assessment projected
that none of the improvements the Navy plans to make in the future would
provide any ship class a high level of self-defense capability against
far-term threats. In projecting ship self-defense capability improvement,
the assessment assumed, among other things, that all planned improvements
would be developed and fielded as scheduled. We believe that the Navy
assessment overstates the actual and projected capabilities of surface ships
to protect themselves from cruise missiles because the models used in the
assessment to determine capabilities include a number of optimistic
assumptions that may not reflect the reality of normal fleet operations.
Among these assumptions are perfect weather, uninterrupted equipment
availability, and perfect crew and equipment performance at all times.
Further, inadequate funding, maintenance, and repair parts support continue
to limit the availability of existing self-defense equipment.
Plans for meeting ship self-defense requirements are not promising because
the Navy still does not have a comprehensive and consistent strategy for
improving its capabilities. Previous plans have not included all affected
ship classes, have not always established priorities among ship classes,
have not consistently used a baseline from which to measure progress, and
have not provided timelines for achieving the desired improvements. Although
Navy leaders express concern about the vulnerability of surface ships, that
concern may not be reflected in the budget for ship self-defense programs.
From fiscal years 1997 to 2005, spending is relatively flat (fluctuating
between $719 million and $1 billion) and associated research and development
funding is projected to decline from about $517 million to about $218
million.
This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct
the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive strategy for
self-defense improvements for surface ships that clearly articulates
priorities, establishes baselines, provides timelines, and defines resource
requirements for achieving needed improvements. The Department has agreed
with the recommendation and plans to request that the Navy develop a
comprehensive strategy within 30 days after the release of the our report.
The threat to surface ships from sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles is
increasing. Nearly 70 nations have deployed sea- and land-launched cruise
missiles, and 20 nations have air-launched cruise missiles. There are over
100 existing and projected missile varieties (including subsonic3 and
supersonic,4 high and low altitude, and sea-skimming models) with ranges up
to about 185 miles. Table 1 shows some of the current and projected missile
threats.
Missile type Producing Approximate range Speed
country in miles
Existing and near-term threats (1999-2005)
C801 China 25 Subsonic
C802 China 65 Subsonic
Enhanced
Harpoon Israel 75 Subsonic
Exocet France 45 Subsonic
Moskit Russia China 55−75 Supersonic
Uran Russia 80 Subsonic
Yakhont Russia 185 Supersonic
Novator Subsonic missile with
Alpha Russia 125 supersonic terminal
phase
Projected mid- and far-term threats (2006 and beyond)
C701 China 10 Subsonic
Teseo 3 Italy 185 Subsonic
Source: Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of Naval Intelligence.
Current anti-ship cruise missiles are faster, stealthier, and can fly at
lower altitudes than the missiles that hit the U.S.S. Stark in 1987, killing
37 sailors (see fig. 1). The next generation of anti-ship cruise
missiles--most of which are now expected to be fielded by 2007--will be
equipped with advanced target seekers and stealthy design. These features
will make them even more difficult to detect and defeat.
Source: Department of Defense.
Defeating modern cruise missiles involves three distinct phases: detection,
control, and engagement. In the detection phase, sensors aboard ships and
aircraft attempt to detect and track incoming cruise missiles. In the
control phase, ships' computers and software identify and evaluate
approaching threat missiles. In the engagement phase, threat missiles are
further evaluated, prioritized, and assigned to an appropriate weapon system
for destruction. Decoys or electronic countermeasures may be employed first,
with missiles and guns fired against the threat missiles when they come
within range.
For operations involving a large number of ships, such as a carrier battle
group, the Navy intends to use a layered defense to defeat hostile cruise
missiles, as illustrated in figure 2 below. In high-threat situations, where
multiple, simultaneously launched missile threats are expected, fighter
aircraft, cruisers, and destroyers are responsible for providing the
outermost defenses. The Navy assumes that these assets will be able to
significantly reduce the number of missiles directed against a battle group,
but it recognizes that some missiles could be fired and get through the
outer defenses. Therefore, individual ships must have an autonomous
capability to defend themselves. In peacetime presence or interdiction
operations, individual ships are often required to operate independently,
without the protection of the layered defenses provided by a battle group.
Consequently, they must be able to rely on their own self-defense
capabilities.
Source: U.S. Navy.
In 1995, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of
ship self-defense requirements. In conducting this analysis, the Navy
defined requirements for three basic operational situations--contested,
uncertain, and controlled5--that its surface ships may encounter in the
post-Cold War era. The review also assessed the expected threat levels and
the degree to which layered defense assets contributed to an individual
ship's self-defense capabilities. The review defined the level of defenses
needed by individual ship classes in the three operational environments
using the Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) model.6 The Chief of Naval
Operations approved the identified levels of needed capability and the Navy
formalized them in the Self-Defense Capstone Requirements document in
February 1996. Since then, the Navy has been attempting to develop and field
defensive systems that would enable each ship class to achieve the required
level of self-protection.
The Navy has made modest improvements to its surface ship self-defense
capabilities since 1996. Its 1998 assessment of self-defense capabilities
shows only limited measurable improvement toward defeating the far-term
threat (2012 and beyond). Even if all of its planned additional improvements
can be realized, the Navy projected that four ship classes will have
moderate capability in defeating the far-term threat. We believe that the
Navy projections are overstated because (1) the assessment is based on Navy
assumptions that are optimistic and (2) the Office of Naval Intelligence now
projects that the next generation of anti-ship cruise missile threats will
become operational much sooner than the Navy projected at the time of the
assessment. Moreover, existing capabilities have been reduced by funding,
maintenance, and spare parts problems that are reducing the availability of
a number of important self-defense systems.
The Navy has spent $3.8 billion on ship self-defense efforts since 1996,
largely focusing on research and procurement activities related to
anti-cruise missile systems such as the Rolling Airframe Missile, the
Phalanx Close-in Weapon System, the Rearchitectured North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Sea Sparrow Surface Missile, the Cooperative Engagement
Capability system, the Ship Self Defense System, electronic countermeasure
systems, and radar improvements. However, from 1996 through 1998, only one
amphibious ship class--the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry class of dock
landing ships--received equipment that provides measurable improvement
against near- and mid-term cruise missiles. This class accounts for only 12
of 150 surface ships having cruise missile self-defense requirements. These
12 ships have received, or are scheduled to receive, an improved version of
the SPS-49 radar, the Ship Self Defense control system, the Rolling Airframe
Missile system, and the Phalanx Block 1A. The Navy estimates that these
improvements, when completed, will more than double the assessed capability
of these ships to defeat near- and mid-term threats. However, they will
provide only low capability against far-term threats.
Though not reflected in measurable improved self-defense capabilities, the
Navy has also installed improved self-defense equipment on some of its other
surface ships. For example, it installed (1) the Rolling Airframe Missile on
landing helicopter assault and dock ships and on Spruance class destroyers;
(2) upgraded versions of the Phalanx Close-in Weapon System on frigates,
Aegis7 destroyers, and landing helicopter dock and dock landing ships; and
(3) radar upgrades on carriers, frigates, dock landing ships, and landing
helicopter dock ships. A list and description of the Navy's current and
planned ship self-defense equipment for surface ships are in appendix II.
The key to defeating future cruise missile threats is in gaining additional
reaction time for defending ships to detect, divert, or engage them. As
future missiles will be much faster and have more range, Navy surface ships
must be able to detect them sooner. Once the hostile missiles are detected,
a ship's combat system must be able to rapidly process information about
them and generate recommendations to counter them. Finally, the ship's
weapon systems must be able to engage threat missiles quickly and accurately
and to overcome the incoming missiles' countermeasures.
The Navy plans to spend about $5.1 billion over the next 6 years to upgrade
the detection, control, and engagement components of the self-defense
capability of selected ship classes. These plans are summarized in table 2.
In responding to the Department of Defense (DOD) technical comments, we have
revised table 2 to reflect the Navy's current plans to improve the defensive
systems of these ship classes. The revised table 2 reflects Navy plans as of
June 2000. The original table 2 reflected Navy's planned improvements as of
October 1998. Table 4 contains the projected capability associated with the
Navy's planned improvements as of October 1998. The Navy did not provide us
with revised projected capability values to associate with its June 2000
plans.
Ship class Detection Control Engagement
Ship Self Defense Upgraded Rolling
System and Airframe Missile,
Aircraft Horizon search Cooperative Rearchitectured NATO Sea
carriers radar Sparrow Surface Missile,
Engagement Evolved Sea Sparrow
Capability Missile
Landing Upgraded Rolling
helicopter MK 23 TAS No plans Airframe Missile (not
assault ships Upgrade funded)
Landing Advanced Combat Upgraded Rolling
helicopter Horizon search Direction System Airframe Missile,
dock ships radar and Ship Self Rearchitectured NATO Sea
Defense System Sparrow Surface Missile
Amphibious Upgraded Rolling
transport dock Horizon search Ship Self Defense Airframe Missile and
ships radar System NULKA
Dock landing Ship Self Defense Upgraded Rolling
ships No plans System Airframe Missile and
NULKA
Spruance class MK 23 TAS Upgraded Rolling
destroyers upgrade No plans Airframe Missile and
NULKA
Upgraded Standard
Aegis Enhanced Aegis Enhanced Aegis Missile, Evolved Sea
destroyers phased array Combat System Sparrow Missile, NULKA,
radar and electronic warfare
system
Upgraded Rolling
Enhanced Aegis Airframe Missile,
Aegis cruisers phased array Enhanced Aegis Evolved Sea Sparrow
and horizon Combat System Missile, NULKA, and
search radars electronic warfare
system
Frigates No plans No plans Phalanx Block 1B (12
CORT ships only)
Fast combat
support ships No plans No plans No plans
Source: Navy planning documents and DOD technical comment updates.
Planned research and development funding is largely concentrated on
developing Cooperative Engagement Capability integration, a multifunction
radar, and a new electronic warfare system. Planned procurement funding is
concentrated on the Cooperative Engagement Capability, Ship Self-Defense
System MK I, Rolling Airframe Missile, NULKA, Rearchitectured NATO Sea
Sparrow Surface Missile, and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile systems.
The Navy expects these improvements to increase the self-defense capability
of most surface ship classes against near- and mid-term threats. However,
when it modeled the projected improvements, the Navy concluded that none of
the 10 ship classes would gain a high capability to defeat far-term threats.
In October 1998, the Navy assessed both the current and projected
self-defense capability of the affected nine ship classes, as part of its
budget planning for fiscal year 2000. The assessment of current capability
concluded that only Landing Helicopter Dock and cruiser class ships would
have a moderate to high capability against the near-term threats and no
class would have an equivalent capability against the mid- or far-term
threats (see table 3). Aegis cruisers and destroyers can be assigned an area
air-defense role and are equipped with the most advanced combat system in
the world, yet the Aegis destroyers were assessed at having a moderate
capability against the near-term threats and a low to moderate capability
against the mid-term threats. The ship classes least able to counter
near-term threats are aircraft carriers, support ships, and frigates. The
risk that these ship classes can be successfully attacked by hostile cruise
missiles remains high.
Level of Capability by Threat Time Period
Far-term
Ship class Near-term threat Mid-term threat threat
(1998-2005) (2006-2011) (2012 and
beyond)
Nuclear carriers Low Low Low
Landing helicopter
assault ships Low to moderate Low Low
Landing helicopter
dock ships Moderate to high Low Low
Dock landing ships Moderate Low Low
Spruance class
destroyers Moderate Low Low
Aegis destroyers Moderate Low to moderate Low
Aegis cruisers Moderate to high Moderate Low
Fast combat support
ships Low Low Low
Frigates Low Low Low
Source: GAO analysis of October 1998 Navy assessment.
The assessment of projected capability, summarized in table 4, showed that
four classes of Navy surface ships are expected to receive improvements that
would provide a moderate defensive capability against the far-term threat
missiles and no ship class would have a high capability against this threat.
Level of Capability by Threat Time Period
Far-term
Ship class Near-term threat Mid-term threat threat
(1998-2005) (2006-2011) (2012 and
beyond)
Nuclear carriers Moderate to high Moderate to high Low to
moderate
Landing helicopter
assault ships Low to moderate Low Low
Landing helicopter
dock ships High High Moderate
Amphibious
transport dock High High Moderate
ships
Dock landing ships High Moderate to high Low
Spruance class
destroyers Moderate to high Moderate N/A
Aegis destroyers High High Moderate
Aegis cruisers High High Moderate
Fast combat support
ships Low Low N/A
Frigates Low Low N/A
Source: GAO analysis of October 1998 Navy assessment.
The projected capability improvements shown in table 4 are Navy estimates as
of October 1998. They are based on an assumption that all the ships in each
class will have been fitted with all of the planned self-defense equipment
in time to deal with emerging threats. However, some threat missiles that
were projected to become operational in the far-term are emerging more
rapidly than previously forecast.
The frigate and fast combat support ship classes have the least self-defense
capability. The Navy plans to upgrade the self-defense capability of the
12 CORT Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates by installing the Phalanx
Block 1B. However, the Navy is not planning to upgrade the defense
capability of fast combat support class ships because it has been
considering the possibility of transferring these ships to the Military
Sealift Command since at least 1997.
Optimistic assumptions used by the Navy in its assessment models have led it
to overstate existing and projected ship self-defense capabilities. The
models used in the assessment to determine capabilities include a number of
optimistic assumptions that may not reflect the reality of normal fleet
operations. Among these assumptions are perfect weather, uninterrupted
equipment availability, and perfect crew and equipment performance at all
times. In commenting on our report, the Navy added that the optimistic
assumptions have repeatedly resulted in understated requirements for
multispectral detection capability in littoral regions and the need for
infrared sensors to provide anti-ship cruise missile detection when radar
performance is degraded by natural or man-made conditions. Further, the
models assumed that all the ships of an assessed class have the planned
improvements already installed. We collected information on the equipment
actually installed on each ship in the affected classes as of September 30,
1999. This information showed that not all of the 12 ships in the two Dock
landing ship classes had received the equipment on which the Navy's
assessment is based. For example, only 7 of the 12 ships had received the
improved Ship Self-Defense System MK-1 system. Further, the Navy's
assessment of the self-defense capability of Spruance class destroyers is
based on the inclusion of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 0 in the
equipment suite. However, we found that only 6 of the 24 ships in this class
had actually received this missile system.
Availability
Some of the existing ship self-defense systems have not met the Navy's own
standards for availability because the Navy has not adequately funded needed
overhaul, spare parts, and technological upgrades. For example, while the
fleet availability standard for equipment is 80 percent, the availability
rate for some versions of the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system has been as
low as 35 percent. According to Navy officials, the low availability rate
resulted because the Navy funded the development of a replacement system
instead of funding needed spare parts and available upgrades.
According to the Navy's Material Readiness Database for fiscal years 1997
through 1999, the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, NATO Sea Sparrow Surface
Missile System (NSSMS), Phalanx Close-in Weapon System, and the SPS-48E
radar system were among the ship self-defense systems with the lowest
availability rates. Table 5 presents data on the average availability of
these systems and impediments to their availability.
Equipment type and
version Availability ratea Impediments to availability
FY 97 FY 98 FY 99
SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System
High cost of parts, lack of
V2 0.72 0.70 0.69 funding for parts and upgrades,
parts failure, lack of technician
experience, and training.
V3 0.76 0.55 0.45
V5 0.41 0.53 0.35
NSSMS
Failure and high cost of
Mark 57 Bl components, excessive parts usage,
1R/mods2/3 0.79 0.84 0.78 nonavailability of parts onboard,
excessive operational tempo, and
maintenance requirements.
Phalanx Close-in Weapon System
Lack of funds for timely overhaul,
hydraulic problems, limited parts
commonality, excessive parts
Block 0 0.71 0.82 0.68 usage, lack of onboard spare
parts, lack of onboard repair and
preventive maintenance, crew
inexperience, and inadequate
manning for maintenance.
Block 1 Bl0 0.80 0.78 0.81
Block 1 Bl1/2/1A 0.72 0.77 0.73
SPS-48E Radar System
Inadequate training of shipboard
0.73 0.81 0.77 technicians, lack of technical
schematics, and no parts support
for sub-modules.
aRates reported in the 1999 CINCPACFLT/CINCLANTFLT Combat Systems Troubled
Systems Process Report before remedial action was taken. The Navy's measure
of effectiveness for Equipment Operational Capability (availability) is
classified in the following manner: Operable = Greater than 0.8; Minor
problems = 0.7 - 0.8; Limited capability = 0.5 - 0.6; Major problems = 0.3 -
0.4; Inoperative = 0 - 0.2.
Source: Navy Material Readiness Database.
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders and maintenance officials we
interviewed said that the Navy is not placing adequate emphasis and funding
priority on the maintenance of existing systems because it would rather
focus on developing new systems. However, the present systems will remain in
the fleet for a number of years before replacement systems are fielded. For
example, the Navy will continue to have versions of the SLQ-32 on some of
its ships for at least another 10-20 years. However, the
30-year-old technology of the SLQ-32 cannot be upgraded or modified to
provide the full capability needed by the fleet to deal with the modern
missile threat. A similar situation exists with the NSSMS. The NSSMS on
nuclear carriers and landing helicopter dock ships are slated for upgrade to
a very high availability, local area network integrated configuration, the
Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System. This program has
been extended beyond the initial requirement time frame, resulting in
continued low availability rates for the NSSMS remaining on ships in the
fleet for another 7-10 years.
Since 1996, the Navy increased annual ship self-defense related operations
and maintenance funding from about $75 million to about $112 million in
fiscal year 2000. Moreover, almost $128 million is projected for fiscal
year 2005. Officials responsible for maintenance and overhaul said that
additional resources would be needed to improve availability of systems.
However, according to these officials, even if the Navy provided additional
resources, improvement would take many years because ships are frequently
not available for installation of upgrades due to operational commitments.
In commenting on our report, the Navy also noted the importance of
recognizing the impact on funding from extended maintenance of both legacy
and upgraded systems due to protracted procurement and installation plans.
Budgets
The Navy lacks a comprehensive strategy for acquiring and installing
self-defense systems on its surface ships. Plans for developing and fielding
improved self-defense equipment are incomplete and inconsistent, do not
measure progress against a baseline, and do not provide clear timelines for
the achievement of needed capabilities. Navy leaders express concern about
the vulnerability of surface ships and say they are placing a priority on
improving surface ship self-defense capabilities, but they have not directed
any significant funding increases to these efforts. Research and development
spending related to ship self-defense has declined about
9.4 percent over the last 5 years and is projected to decline more than
44 percent over the next 6 years. This trend may limit Navy efforts to
develop technological solutions needed to defeat projected future threats.
The Navy lacks a comprehensive strategy for improving its surface ship
self-defense capabilities. Plans presented in the reports it has prepared
since 1996 are incomplete because they (1) do not cover all affected ship
classes, (2) do not consistently contain stated priorities, (3) do not
consistently reference a baseline from which to measure progress, and
(4) do not address time frames for achieving required capabilities. Instead,
these reports largely detail the status of individual systems.
For the period 1996-99, we examined a series of congressionally mandated
Navy reports on ship self-defense plans, objectives, schedules, and funding
requirements8 as well as several internal Navy documents dealing with
investment alternatives. We found that the Navy's plans did not cover all
affected ship classes and lacked consistent improvement priorities. For
example, the ship classes covered by these reports varied from one year to
another and excluded coverage of ship self-defense for Aegis destroyers and
cruisers in all but its most recent investment briefing. Our analysis also
showed that the Navy did not consistently articulate its priorities for
improving self-defense capabilities among the affected ship classes. The
Navy's 1997 report to Congress described improving carriers and some
amphibious ship classes (landing helicopter dock ships, and dock landing
ships) as a priority, but it offered no rationale for selecting these
classes. Subsequent reports focused on these same ship classes and added the
planned amphibious transport dock ship class, but they did not prioritize
improvements for the remaining six ship classes.
We also found that established baselines for measuring progress on ship
self-defense have not been used on a consistent basis. Navy reports to
Congress in 1996 and 1997 contained ship class baselines9 that spelled out
the planned self-defense equipment configuration by the various ship
classes. Later reports and briefings made no mention of progress toward
meeting these baselines. Instead, the reports and briefings measured current
equipment configurations against short-term program goals rather than
baselines. Further evidence of the use of fluctuating short-term program
goals arose when we reviewed the Navy's installation plans for the horizon
search radar (the SPQ-9B) as depicted in its budget justification documents
for fiscal years 1997-2001. These documents reflected three changes in 5
years as to which ship classes and how many ships within each class would
received this radar. In addition, installation plans for this system had
been continually stretched out. While some degree of change in program plans
and budgets is to be expected over time, Navy ship self-defense program
plans seem to be in a fluid state from one year to the next. Using a
succession of short-term goals as the reference point for measuring progress
instead of using a stable baseline makes it difficult to determine how much
progress the Navy is making toward meeting the Self-Defense Capstone
Requirements.
Finally, only the 1997 report to Congress provided a timeline for achieving
the self-defense requirements by ship class. This timeline is neither
repeated nor expanded upon in subsequent reports or investment briefings.
Without a timeline by ship class, it is not possible to know if the Navy
will be able to achieve planned improvements in time to defeat evolving
cruise missile threats.
Although the Navy says it places a high priority on improving ship
self-defense, it has not dedicated any significant funding increases to
these efforts. From fiscal years 1997 to 2005, projected annual spending for
ship self-defense programs will fluctuate between $719 million and $1
billion (see fig. 3), and research and development funding is projected to
decline from about $517 million to about $218 million (see fig. 4). If the
decline in ship self-defense related research and development resources
continues, the Navy may not be able to develop the technological solutions
it needs to defeat projected threats. Navy officials acknowledged that
technologies that are required to defeat far-term cruise missile threats
have yet to be developed. In commenting on our report, DOD noted that a
comprehensive strategy that communicates priorities and defines required
resources would serve as a useful tool for better aligning available
resources.
Note: Funding does not include costs of ship construction.
Source: Fiscal year 1999 and 2000 President's budgets.
Funding
Note: Includes science and technology funding for ship self-defense related
projects identified by the Office of Naval Research staff.
Source: Fiscal year 1999 and 2000 President's budgets.
Unless the Navy can improve the self-defense capabilities of its surface
ships, these ships will be increasingly vulnerable to cruise missile threats
when they operate in coastal waters. The Navy lacks a comprehensive strategy
for improving their self-defense capabilities, making it difficult to
measure progress and to predict future capabilities. Program planning
documents and reports prepared by the Navy since 1996 have not covered all
affected ship classes, consistently addressed stated priorities,
consistently employed baselines to measure progress, or addressed time
frames for achieving required capabilities. Instead, they have only provided
a status of individual systems. A comprehensive approach would articulate
the Navy's ship self-defense improvement plans for the various systems and
their application to all the affected ship classes in terms of baselines,
with associated funding and timelines for meeting the required capability
levels. In its 1996 report to Congress, the Navy recognized the importance
of stability and a long-term view. "A fundamental requirement for the
success of these current and future initiatives, however, is adequate and
stable funding and long-term commitment for the future." Without such a
comprehensive approach, the Navy's effectiveness in improving ship
self-defense capability may suffer because (1) needed improvements may not
be properly defined and prioritized, (2) needed resources to develop and
sustain improved capabilities may not be properly identified and applied,
and (3) the achievement of required improvement will continue to be
difficult to measure.
To provide a complete framework the Navy can use to identify and prioritize
needed improvements to ship self-defense capabilities and to provide a
baseline to measure and track its progress toward achieving these goals, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to
develop a comprehensive strategy that clearly articulates priorities,
establishes baselines, provides timelines, and defines resource requirements
for achieving required capabilities.
In written comments on this report, DOD agreed with our recommendation that
the Navy needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for improving ship
self-defense capabilities, and it stated that it would request the Secretary
of the Navy to prepare such a plan. DOD indicated that it would also request
the Secretary of the Navy to re-evaluate whether assumptions used in
performance assessment models reflect the reality of fleet operations. The
Navy has formed a new modeling and simulation test group with the charter of
introducing variables to make the performance assessments more realistic.
We incorporated in this report a number of technical comments provided by
DOD. Table 2 originally reflected Navy plans as of 1998. We revised this
table to include current Navy plans for improving the ship self-defense
capabilities of various ship classes. As the Navy did not provide us with
revised projected capability values for its current plans, we were not able
to reflect the impact of these plans in table 4.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
To determine requirements, plans, and cost of self-defense improvement
efforts for the Navy's surface ship, we interviewed officials and obtained
documentation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of Naval Research, and
the Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. As part of
our discussions, we asked officials of the Offices of the Chief of Naval
Operations and Naval Research to identify ship self-defense related
programs. We received briefings on and reviewed Navy self-defense planning
and investment strategy documents. We then determined the Navy's funding
projections applicable to those programs over the fiscal year 1995 to 2005
period as contained in the fiscal year 1997 through 2000 President's
budgets. We excluded the Navy's Standard Missile program from our funding
analysis, because we were unable to determine which parts are chargeable to
ship self-defense functions.
To gain an understanding of how the Navy conducted its assessments of ship
self-defense capabilities, we reviewed modeling and simulation data prepared
by officials from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, and
discussed the data with officials of the Johns Hopkins University. We also
received cruise missile threat briefings from officials from the Office of
Naval Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
To assess the Navy's current ship self-defense capabilities, we visited the
U.S.S. Comstock, U.S.S. Fitzgerald, U.S.S. Hue City, U.S.S. George
Washington, U.S.S. Harpers Ferry, U.S.S. Kaufmann, U.S.S. San Jacinto, and
U.S.S. Wasp. We examined their self-defense systems and interviewed
crewmembers responsible for operating and maintaining them.
To assess the availability of the Navy's existing self-defense systems, we
interviewed commanders, crewmembers, and other officials, and obtained
historical information from the Naval Warfare Assessment Station, Corona,
California. We reviewed equipment installation data maintained in a Navy
database and verified our analysis with Navy officials.
To assess the Navy's plans and progress in developing improved capabilities,
we interviewed officials from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Theater Combat Systems, the Program Executive Offices for Theater Surface
Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare, and the Naval Sea Systems Command and its
surface warfare centers at Dahlgren, Virginia; Crane, Indiana; and Port
Hueneme, California. In addition, we visited a detachment of the Port
Hueneme facility located in Louisville, Kentucky. We also obtained
information on selected programs from officials from the Naval Air Systems
Command.
We conducted our review from July 1999 through May 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy;
General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Honorable Jacob
J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
congressional committees. Copies will be made available to others upon
request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Mr. Richard Price at (202) 512-3630
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key
contributors to this report were Anton Blieberger, Martha Dey, and
John Heere.
James F. Wiggins
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
Planned Self-Defense Capabilities for Amphibious Transport Dock Ships
This appendix contains the information you requested on the status of
planned ship self-defense capabilities of the next generation of amphibious
transport dock ships (the LPD-17 class) currently in development. The Navy
plans to procure 12 of these ships between fiscal years 2003 and 2009 to
replace a larger number of existing amphibious transport ships that are
nearing the end of their useful life. The LPD-17 program is currently in the
engineering and manufacturing development phase.
In June 1996, the Navy received Milestone II approval for the baseline
design of the LPD-17 ship class. The design included a self-defense suite
consisting of a SPS-48E radar, a SPQ-9B radar, a SLQ-32(V2) electronic
warfare system or its successor, a Ship Self Defense System MK-2, a
Cooperative Engagement Capability node for sensor fusion, two Rolling
Airframe Missile launchers, an Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) vertical
launcher and associated target illuminators, and a decoy launcher. At that
time, the Navy realized that the ESSM program schedule would not mesh with
the production schedule of the first two ships in the class and decided to
reserve space and weight in the ship design for the missile system and
launcher. However, the Navy still planned to build the remaining 10 ships in
the class with the ESSM and its launcher.
During internal deliberations on the Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget, the
Navy decided to remove projected funding for the ESSM and its launcher from
the LPD-17 budget in order to fund the cruiser conversion program and other
shipbuilding and conversion efforts. However, the Navy directed Avondale
Industries to reserve space and weight for the ESSM in the design of all 12
LPD-17 class ships.
In 1998, various congressional committees directed the Navy to prepare an
analysis of alternatives to the LPD-17 baseline design, including an
evaluation of the AN/SPY-1 radar and its associated Aegis combat system,
multifunction radar, and the ESSM. The March 1999 results of the Navy
analysis confirmed that the baseline design without the ESSM could meet the
near- and mid-term threat at the least cost. As a result of this assessment,
the Navy does not plan to equip the LPD-17 class ships with the ESSM.
However, if the threat materializes as currently predicted, the Navy could
later add improved variants of the ESSM and the Rolling Airframe Missile as
weapon modifications on these ships. These improved variants are yet to be
developed. In addition, if the threat warrants it, the Navy could also
back-fit multifunction and volume search radar on the LPD-17, when they
become available.
Current and Planned Ship Self-Defense Equipment
AN/SPS-48 Air Search Radar: The AN/SPS-48 is a medium-range,
three-dimensional (height, range, and bearing) air search radar whose
primary function is to provide target position data to a weapon system and a
ship command and control system. It provides for detection of targets as
high as 100,000 feet and over a distance of 2 to 200 miles. At the present
time, only the AN/SPS-48E version can be found in the fleet. Specifically,
the
48E version is installed in the following ship classes: CV/CVN, LHA, and
LHD. Also, the Navy plans to install the 48E version in the LPD-17 ship
class.
AN/SPS-49 Air Search Radar: The AN/SPS-49 radar is a long-range,
two-dimensional (range, bearing) air search radar whose primary function is
to provide target position data to a ship command and control system. It
provides for detection of targets as high as 100,000 feet and over a
distance of 2 to 300 miles. The current version, AN/SPS-49V, is installed in
the following ship classes: CV/CVN,CG-47, FFG-7, LSD 41/49, and LHD.
AN/SPS-49 Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency Upgrade (MPU): The MPU
incorporates key ship defense enhancements to the Navy's AN/SPS-49 air
search radar. Specifically, it provides for increased detection of
low-observable targets, reduces reaction time through internal firm track
criteria changes, and enhances performance against electronic
countermeasures and naturally occurring clutter. The AN/SPS-49 MPU is or is
planned to be installed on the following ship classes: CV/CVN, FFG-7, LSD
41/49, and LHD.
AN/SPQ-9A Low-Search Radar: The AN/SPQ-9A radar provides for detection of
surface targets. It is currently installed on CG 47 class cruisers and DD
963 class destroyers. The AN/SPQ-9A radar interfaces with the
MK-86 Gun Fire Control System on DD-963 class ships.
AN/SPQ-9B Upgrade Horizon Search Radar: The AN/SPQ-9B represents a product
improvement to the AN/SPQ-9A radar that will enhance its ability to detect
and track high-speed, low-radar cross section sea-skimming targets in
high-clutter coastal environments. The AN/SPQ-9B uses a high resolution,
track-while-scan, pulse-Doppler radar to provide rapid acquisition and
automatic tracking of multiple targets. The AN/SPQ-9B is to be interfaced
with either the MK-86 Gun Fire Control System, the Ship Self Defense System,
or the Aegis Combat Direction System.
In October 1994, the Navy awarded an engineering and manufacturing
development contract for two AN/SPQ-9B prototypes--one to be used as a
contractor test set and one to support land-based testing at Port Hueneme,
California. Following land-based tests, the Navy exercised three options to
produce six low-rate initial production units to meet ship delivery
schedules and to support developmental and operational testing aboard the
U.S.S. Oldendorf (DD 972). Although early development tests were successful,
a change in program policy called for the AN/SPQ-9B radar to be installed on
ship classes that could not carry the weight of the development
(heavyweight) antenna. As a result, the Navy developed a prototype
lightweight antenna assembly. The prototype is currently being maintained by
the contractor for use as a test set. A modification to the existing
contract enabled the Navy to procure two lightweight antenna radar sets, as
well as three lightweight antenna backfit sets.
During November 1999 shipboard developmental testing with a heavyweight
antenna, the Navy encountered an unexpected interference problem with the
AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. According to Navy officials, the
problem is of an electromagnetic nature and would have occurred even if a
lightweight antenna had been used. The problem is currently being
investigated and will likely delay the system's operational evaluation.
According to Navy officials, the delay of the operational evaluation will
not impact the planned procurement contract for three SCN radar sets in
fiscal year 2000.
The Navy plans to install the lightweight AN/SPQ-9B radar on LPD 17, CVN,
and LHD ship classes and on selected CG ships through fiscal year 2007.
AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System: The AN/SLQ-32 is a family of electronic
warfare systems comprising five modular variants with varying levels of
capability. The SLQ-32A(V)1 provides for early warning, identification, and
direction-finding of incoming radar-guided anti-ship cruise missiles. The
A(V)2 variant provides early warning, increased frequency range,
identification, and direction-finding of missile targeting radars, and the
A(V)3 variant adds a jamming capability. The A(V)4 is a modified (V)3
variant specifically for aircraft carrier installation. The
(V)5 variant is a modified (V)2 for FFG-7 class ships, which adds jamming
capability. One or more versions of the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system
are installed in each ship class discussed in this report.
Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS): AIEWS is currently
under development as the next generation shipboard electronic warfare
system. Increment I of the two-increment program is to include an advanced
display, improved emitter processing, enhanced combat system integration,
and a new receiver package. Increment II is to include an advanced
electronic attack subsystem and advanced off-board countermeasures. AIEWS is
being designed for employment of layered countermeasures in the coastal
operating environment, with specific emphasis on the full integration of all
soft kill elements into the ship's control system.
Infrared Search and Track (IRST): Currently in development, IRST is a
shipboard, lightweight, passive infrared sensor that scans the horizon to
automatically detect and declare both subsonic and supersonic threat
missiles that fly at low altitudes. In April 1999, the IRST prototype
successfully detected and tracked Exocet missiles while installed on the
U.S.S. O'Bannon (DD 987). In August 1999, the IRST contractor successfully
linked the only existing IRST prototype scanner to two separate computer
interfaces--CEC baseline 1 and Aegis. In June 1999, the Navy exercised a
contract option to upgrade the prototype's signal processing and control
unit to provide for enhanced reliability and incorporate other minor
improvements into the only prototype unit. The upgraded unit is to be
delivered on May 21, 2002. Though Navy officials would like to have acquired
additional IRST prototype units for further risk reduction efforts and to
participate in a joint U.S./foreign navy exercise in fiscal year 2001, there
are no funds in the Future Years Defense Program to do so.
Thermal Imaging Sensor System (TISS): TISS, a stand-alone shipboard sensor
used primarily for situational awareness, was designed to detect floating
mines, small surface craft, and low flying aircraft. It consists of a
thermal imaging (infrared) sensor, two television cameras, and a laser range
finder. Though not developed to detect incoming cruise missiles, TISS has a
limited ship self-defense application. Specifically, its sensors can be used
to monitor land-based cruise missile launching sites in places such as the
Straits of Hormutz and the Persian Gulf, if a line of sight to the launch
site is available.
In October 1995, the Navy awarded an engineering and manufacturing
development contract for a single engineering test unit. The test unit was
successfully tested aboard the Self Defense Test Ship in May 1996. In April
1997, the Navy awarded a production contract for 24 units. In April 1999,
during development of the Navy's fiscal year 2000 budget submission, the
Navy reprogrammed nearly all outyear TISS procurement funding
($50.2 million) to higher priority programs. As of March 2000, the Navy had
installed 6 of 11 delivered production units on selected frigates and
amphibious class ships most likely to be deployed to the Persian Gulf. Due
to quality control problems at sub-vendor facilities, delivery of the
remaining 13 production units has been delayed until October 2000.
AN/SPY-1A, 1B, and 1D Radars: The SPY radar is the multi-function,
phased-array radar that conducts search, automatic detection, and tracking
of air and surface targets aboard Aegis cruisers and destroyers. The
SPY-1A, installed on CG-47 through CG-58, uses a digital signal processor
and a four-bay AN/UYK-7 control computer. The SPY-1B radar, installed in
CG-59 through CG-73 cruisers, also uses a digital signal processor and
either a four-bay AN/UYK-7 or upgraded AN/UYK-43 control computer. The
SPY-1D, installed on DDG-51 through DDG-78, is a variant of the SPY-1B
radar. The SPY-1D provides better performance against targets than the
earlier SPY versions.
Multi-function Radar (MFR): In June 1999, the Navy awarded a contract to
develop an MFR prototype. The Navy expects the radar to perform such
functions as horizon search, limited above-the-horizon search, and fire
control track and illumination. One of the most significant design features
of the radar is to provide automatic detection, tracking, and illumination
of low-altitude threat missiles in adverse environmental conditions
routinely found in coastal waters. Based on current program plans, the
initial MFR prototype will be available in fiscal year 2002 to support
land-based and sea-based testing.
The Navy intends for the MFR to replace legacy radars currently found on CVN
68 class carriers including the SPS-67, Mk 23 TAS with Mk 95 illuminator or
SPQ-9B, and the SPN-41/46 radars, which provide glide slope for approach
control on aircraft carriers. Current Navy plans call for inclusion of the
MFR on CVN 77, which is expected to enter service in December 2007, and the
DD 21 ship class. Other installation candidates are LHD 8, CVN 70−76
(as a backfit), and CVN(X) and LH(X) future ship classes.
Additionally, the Navy will review the LPD 17 combat system in 2001 to
determine if changes in configuration are warranted. The costs and benefits
of including the MFR/VSR suite in the LPD 17 combat system suite will be
considered in this review.
Volume Search Radar (VSR): According to requirements for the DD 21 ship
class, the Navy intends to have an integrated radar suite that will comprise
both the multi-function radar and VSR. The Navy expects the VSR to perform
long-range detection and tracking of airborne traffic above-the-horizon and
high flying cruise missile threats as well as to provide cueing data to the
multifunction radar. During deliberation of the Navy's fiscal year 2000
budget request, Congress provided the Navy with a $12-million plus-up to
begin VSR development. Based on current program plans, the initial VSR
prototype will be available during fiscal year 2002 to coincide with MFR
development testing.
Both DD 21 Industry Teams will develop a VSR capability in the context of
the design competition for that ship class. It is the Navy's intent that the
MFR/VSR radar suite will be the radar suite for the CVN 77, and will replace
the SPS-48E, SPS-49, and SPN-43 (air traffic control) radars currently on
CVN-68 class ships. VSR is also a candidate for installation in LHD 8,
CVN 70−76 (as a backfit), CVN(X), and LH(X).
Additionally, the Navy will review the LPD 17 combat system in 2001 to
determine if changes in configuration are warranted. The costs and benefits
of including the MFR/VSR suite in the LPD 17 combat system suite will be
considered in this review.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): The objective of the CEC program is
to develop a means of integrating all of the radar detection sensors of a
battle force's ships and aircraft and for transmitting the resulting common
composite radar track data directly into the combat systems of the ships on
the CEC network. Currently, no two ships within a battle force can currently
"see" the same radar picture. Consequently, the engagement capability of
each ship is limited, in part, by the quality of the data its own radar
sensors are able to provide to its combat system. If the CEC network can be
made to work as envisioned, individual ships would be able see and use
composite radar tracks developed by all of the ships of a battle force and
some aircraft in a single-integrated-air picture. The composite track data
could be frequently updated and fed directly into the combat system of each
ship of the battle force. This composite track data would be of
"fire-control" quality, and would allow all of the battle force's ships to
engage targets without any additional processing or human intervention.
The Navy fielded the first CEC system in 1998. The Department of Defense
supported the Navy's fiscal year 2001 budget submission to procure a total
of 220 CEC systems by the end of fiscal year 2012. Seventy-nine of these
systems are to be integrated with the Aegis combat systems of cruisers and
destroyers. The remaining CEC systems will be placed on other ships and
aircraft, but will not necessarily be integrated with their combat systems.
In response to congressional direction, efforts are also underway to fully
integrate CEC into some Navy E-2C aircraft, an Air Force E-3 aircraft, and
the Army Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System.
Because of a lack of progress in integrating CEC on Aegis ships, in the
Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Authorization Conference Report 105-736, Congress
directed the Navy to report at least quarterly to the Congressional Defense
Committees on Cooperative Engagement Capability/combat direction system
interoperability problems and planned solutions. The Navy has provided six
such reports through March 2000.
The Navy has made some progress toward demonstrating a CEC capability on two
Aegis cruisers in the spring of fiscal year 2001. Many of the problems
standing in the way of Aegis and CEC interoperability have been identified
and are being fixed. However, a single-integrated-air-picture display
capability on a single console is not expected to be available until the
Aegis weapons system baseline 6 Phase 3 computer programs become available,
after the scheduled follow-on test and evaluation in fiscal year 2002.
Aegis Combat System: The Aegis combat system was designed as a total weapon
system, from detection to kill. The heart of the system is the advanced,
automatic detect and track, multi-function phased-array radar, the AN/SPY-1.
It can detect and track hundreds of targets at ranges in the hundreds of
miles. The core of the Aegis combat system is its computer-based command and
decision element. This interface makes the Aegis combat system capable of
simultaneous operation against a multi-mission threat, anti-air,
anti-surface, and anti-submarine. The Aegis combat system is or will be
installed on all CG-47 cruisers and all DDG-51 destroyers.
Rapid Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Integrated Defense System (RAIDS): RAIDS is a
tactical decision aid for a ship's Commanding Officer/Tactical Action
Officer providing automatic display of anti-ship cruise missile threats,
depicting active and passive sensor display and showing status of existing
ship engagement systems. A multiple microprocessor-based system, RAIDS
considers threat capabilities, environmental data, ship-unique
characteristics, and approved tactical doctrine in determining appropriate
recommendations. RAIDS was developed as an interim system in the approved
incremental acquisition of the SSDS MK I system. RAIDS is installed on 12
Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates and 24 Spruance class destroyers.
Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS): ACDS is a centralized, automated
command and control system for aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare
ships that communicates engagement and other orders to combat system
components and units throughout a battle group. The program has been divided
into Block 0, an initial system, and Block 1, the follow-on system.
Currently, ACDS Block 0 is installed on nine aircraft carriers and eight
amphibious ships.
ACDS Block I focused on developing a new advanced tactical computer program
with significant improvements in tactical data link interoperability,
automated engagement doctrine, increased range and track capacity, and other
improvements. In February 1998, the Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, determined that ACDS Block I was not operationally
suitable or effective for deployment. As a result, the Navy decided to (1)
make minimal enhancements to the ACDS Block 1 software and (2) limit
installation to five ships (three aircraft carriers and two amphibious
ships). The functionality of the ACDS Block I command and control system
will be integrated into the Navy's Ship Self Defense System MK II
development effort.
Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) MK I: SSDS MK I consists of a computer
network, special software, microprocessors, and operator displays and
workstations. The SSDS MK I is designed to integrate both individual sensors
and weapon systems and automate the tracking, assessment, prioritization,
and engagement of threat anti-ship cruise missiles to enhance ship
survivability.
The SSDS MK I completed development testing in May 1997 and operational
testing in June 1997 onboard U.S.S. Ashland (LSD 48). During operational
testing, every one of more than 200 targets presented to the ship were
detected and tracked by the system. In September 1997, the Commander,
Operational Test and Evaluation Force, declared the system to be
operationally effective and suitable, and he recommended fleet introduction.
As a result, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development
and Acquisition approved the SSDS program for full-rate production in March
1998. To date, SSDS MK I installations have been completed on five LSD 41
and two LSD 49 class ships. The Navy plans to complete installation of the
SSDS MK I on the remaining LSD 41/49 class ships by December 2001.
SSDS MK II: SSDS MK II is the evolutionary development of the SSDS MK I
expanded to include the integration of sensors and weapons. SSDS MK II is
planned for installation on CV/CVN, LHD, and LPD 17 ship classes.
The Navy issued a letter contract for three SSDS MK II hardware sets in
December 1998 and awarded a software development contract in April 1999.
Developmental testing is currently scheduled to begin in March 2002.
Common Command and Decision (CC&D) Program: CC&D represents the Navy's
future ship self-defense control solution. CC&D is a preplanned product
improvement to the Aegis weapon system and the Ship Self Defense System MK
II that would replace the major command and decision capability in these
systems with a common computer architecture. The Navy is funded for an
initial delivery around 2010, but has identified fiscal years 2006-08 as the
optimal delivery time frame.
Standard Missile (SM): The SM is a ship-launched, medium- to long-range
missile system family that provides advanced air defense for an entire fleet
area. The first generation, SM-1, is essentially a home-all-the-way missile
in medium- and extended-range versions. Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates
use the SM-1 missile both in area defense roles and to defend themselves
against incoming cruise missiles.
The latest generation of the SM is the SM-2. The SM-2's primary role is to
provide area defense against enemy aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles.
The SM-2 capitalizes on communication techniques, advanced signal processing
and propulsion improvements to substantially increase intercept range, high-
and low-altitude intercept capability, and performance against advanced
threats. The SM-2 Block IIIB is the latest version to enter the fleet, and
incorporates a side-mounted infrared seeker for terminal guidance against a
known fielded threat. The SM-2 Block IV is the latest version to enter
production and deployment, and it provides an extended-range capability with
the addition of a MK 72 booster. Aegis cruisers and destroyers use these and
other SM-2 versions in area defense roles as well as to defend themselves
against incoming cruise missiles.
The SM-2 Block IVA, currently under development, will utilize a side-mounted
imaging infrared seeker to detect and track incoming ballistic missiles and
guide to a lethal intercept, while retaining previous SM-2 Block IV
capabilities. In January 1997, a prototype test vehicle successfully
intercepted a representative Theater Ballistic Missile target. In September
1997, the Navy awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract
to build 46 test vehicles required for developmental and operational
testing. During fiscal year 1999, however, the program began encountering
problems that directly impacted the start of the flight-test program. The
problems included vibration-induced test failures, less than anticipated
software code reuse, technical challenges associated with design and
integration of multiple sensors, and various schedule and cost impacts
related to contractor business consolidation decisions. Collectively, the
problems resulted in a 6-month delay of the first control test vehicle
flight and program cost growth of $55 million. According to program
officials, the problems have been addressed and a fix for the vibration
anomaly has been incorporated into the missile design. The first control
test vehicle flight was successfully completed in June 2000.
NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System (NSSMS): NSSMS is a medium-range
missile weapon system that provides the capability of destroying hostile
aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and airborne and surface missile platforms.
Thirteen nations fund the NSSMS program cooperatively and utilize the system
in various configurations aboard many ships. The
U.S. NSSMS consists of a MK 91 Guided Missile Fire Control System (GMFCS)
and a MK 29 Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS). The GMFCS is a
computer-operated fire control system that provides automatic acquisition
and tracking of a designated target, generates launcher and missile orders,
and in the automatic mode initiates the firing command when the target
becomes engageable. The GMLS is a lightweight launching system that provides
on-mount stowage and launch capability of up to eight missiles. The NSSMS
employs RIM-7 surface-to-air/surface-to-surface semi-active homing missiles.
The missile utilizes the energy reflected from the target and from radio
frequencies transmitted from its director system for developing missile wing
movement orders enabling target intercept. NSSMS is currently installed on
DD 963, LHD, AOE, and CV/CVN class ships.
Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System (RNSSMS): In July
1995, the Navy awarded a contract to develop the necessary software and
hardware for a RNSSMS. When fully developed and tested, the RNSSMS will
replace the legacy NSSMS closed architecture design and unique display
consoles with an open, distributed processing architecture and Navy standard
display consoles. Specific features of the new design include, but are not
limited to, cross utilization of launchers and directors, reduced manning
requirements, and interoperability with SSDS MK II. Collectively, these
features will improve system operational availability, reliability, and
mission effectiveness. They will also improve a ship's ability to meet its
capstone requirements.
As of late April 2000, initial RNSSMS production systems were delivered for
installation aboard LHD 7 and CVN 68. In May 2000, the system's software
began LHD class configuration combat system level testing at the Navy's
Integrated Combat System Test Facility in Point Loma, California, to be
completed by October 2000. The current RNSSMS program schedule, which
includes integration testing with SSDS MK II, provides the first fully
operational systems on LHD 7 in April 2001 and on CVN 68 in December 2001.
RNSSMS hardware installations in CVN 76 and 69 are planned during fiscal
years 2000 through 2002. The Navy also plans to install the system on the
entire LHD ship class, all remaining CVN ships, and one conventional carrier
(CV 67) between 2003 and 2006. The RNSSMS is intended to help pave the way
for the next generation of self-defense systems.
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM): ESSM is an improved version of the RIM-7
missile with a new rocket motor, associated tail control section, new
warhead, and guidance upgrades. A faster missile with an improved payload
and range, the ESSM will have enhanced capability to destroy next generation
anti-ship cruise missiles. The ESSM is an international cooperative effort
being designed to operate with current and future fire control systems and
with the capability of being fired from three existing missile launchers.
In December 1997, an ESSM blast test vehicle was successfully fired from an
industry developed prototype that utilized a MK 41 Vertical Launching System
Quad Pack cannister. In March 1998, a test firing that utilized a
MK 48 Guided Vertical Launching System was successfully conducted. In
mid-1998, however, the program began experiencing technical problems. The
technical problems involved the new digital autopilot software and the
control actuator assembly in the missile. The autopilot software had to be
redesigned causing a program delay of about nine months. Concurrently,
efforts were expended to modify the control actuator assembly. Collectively,
both problems resulted in a program delay of 13 months and a U.S. cost
growth of about $22 million.
In November 1999, the ESSM program conducted a test firing that did not
achieve all required objectives. Upon investigation, the program office
learned that a control actuator assembly was missing a critical component.
During the next scheduled test firing in March 2000, the test firing was
successful, accomplishing all remaining controlled test vehicle objectives
and initial guided test vehicle objectives. A test firing for the guided
test vehicle is scheduled for July 2000. The next major milestone is a
Program Management Review for low rate initial production, scheduled for
September 2000.
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 0: RAM is a NATO cooperative program
with Germany. Memorandums of Understanding between the United States and
Germany have been signed for the development and production of the RAM Block
0 as well as for the development of RAM Block I. The RAM Block 0 weapon
system consists of a 21-round missile launcher, below-deck electronics, and
a guided missile round pack. The round pack consists of a 5-inch, supersonic
missile and launching canister, which interfaces the missile and the
launcher. The Block 0 missile is a dual mode, radio frequency/infrared
seeking autonomous homing missile that initially guides on the threat
missile's radar signature prior to transitioning to infrared guidance. In
May 1993, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition approved RAM Block 0 for production. Subsequently, the missile
has had successful intercepts in
127 of 132 production proofing and ship qualification test flights in both
the U.S. and German navies.
Since 1993, the RAM Block 0 has been installed on all five LHA ships, eight
DD 963 ships, six LHD ships, and eight LSD class ships. Navy installation
plans call for RAM Block 0 installations in one DD 963 class ship and on LHD
7 (currently under construction). All other planned RAM installations call
for the RAM Block I configuration.
Rolling Airframe Missile Block 1: The Block I upgrade provides the RAM
missile with an increased capability to intercept cruise missiles by means
of an infrared only acquisition technique. Based on the results of
operational testing conducted aboard the U.S.S. Gunston Hall (LSD 44) in
January 1999 and the Self-Defense Test Ship between March and August 1999,
the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, declared the RAM Block
I to be operationally effective against a variety of cruise missile threats
and recommended fleet introduction. The Block I missile had successful
intercepts in 23 of 24 development test firings. A full-rate production
decision occurred in January 2000.
As of March 2000, RAM Block I has been installed on two LSD class ships and
is pending installation on two LSD 41 class ships, LHD 7, and CVN 76. Navy
installation plans call for Block I installations or upgrades on 8 LSD
41/49, 3 DD 963, 12 CV/CVN, 7 LHD, and 12 LPD 17 (new construction) ships
between 2001 and 2006. Though not yet funded, the Navy also plans to install
RAM Block I upgrades on all five LHA class ships during fiscal year 2007.
In November 1998, the United States and Germany amended the Block I
development Memorandum of Understanding to include scope and funding for the
development of a helicopter/aircraft/surface craft (HAS) upgrade of the RAM
missile. Requiring only software changes to the RAM Block I missile, the HAS
upgrade will extend RAM targets to include helicopters, aircraft, and
surface ships. Navy plans indicate that all RAM installations on LSDs, LHDs,
LPDs, and CV/CVNs will be the HAS configuration by 2009. Also, the Navy is
developing an 11-round guided missile launcher in the HAS mode configuration
for installation on CG 52 through 73 between 2004 and 2009.
Phalanx Close-in Weapon System: The Phalanx Close-in Weapon System is a
high-fire rate system that automatically acquires, tracks, and destroys
enemy cruise missile threats that have penetrated all other ships' defenses.
The original Block 0 configuration incorporated on-mount search and track
radars, the M61A1 gatling gun capable of firing at a rate of 3,000 rounds
per minute, and a 980-round magazine. Subsequent Block 1 baseline 0 upgrades
included a larger magazine (1,500 rounds), a multiple pulse repetition
frequency search radar, an expanded radar search envelope to counter diving
targets as well as reliability and maintainability improvements. Block 1
baseline 1 replaced the hydraulic gun drive with a pneumatic
(air-driven) gun drive system that increased the rate of fire to 4,500
rounds per minute. Search radar sensitivity was also improved in the
baseline 1 upgrade. Block I baseline 2 introduced further reliability
upgrades and a muzzle restraint to decrease dispersion. Installed on
multiple non-Aegis and Aegis ships, neither the original Phalanx Block 0 nor
the subsequent Block 1 baseline 0, 1, or 2 upgrades are integrated with a
ship self-defense system.
The Phalanx Block 1A incorporates a high-order language computer and
provides improved performance against maneuvering targets. Block 1A also
provides for basic integration with the Ship Self Defense System and enables
RAM missile engagement through the Phalanx detection and track function. As
of mid-March 2000, Block 1A installations have been completed on 20 DDG
(Aegis) destroyers, 2 LHD, 2 FFG-7, and 9 LSD 41/49 class ships. In
addition, LHD-7 (currently under construction) will commission with Block
1A. A January 1992 Chief of Naval Operations decision requires replacement
of Phalanx with the new ESSM system in new construction DDG ships. Though it
initially appeared that DDG-79 would be the first new construction DDG to
receive Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile in lieu of Phalanx, it now appears that,
due to a slippage in the ESSM development program, DDG-85 will be the first.
The Navy plans to install the Phalanx Block 1 baseline 2 configuration as
temporary installations on DDG-79 through 84 until ESSM is produced.
The Phalanx Block 1B upgrade allows engagement of small, high-speed,
maneuvering surface craft and low, slow aircraft. This upgrade incorporates
a thermal imager, an automatic acquisition video tracker, and a
stabilization system for the imager, providing both day and night detection
of threats. The thermal imager also improves the system's ability to engage
anti-ship cruise missiles by providing more accurate angle tracking
information to the fire control computer. Operational evaluation of Block
1B, conducted aboard U.S.S. Underwood (FFG-36) and the Self-Defense Test
Ship, was completed in August 1999. According to Phalanx Program Office
plans, Block 1B will be installed in 11 other FFG-7 CORT ships between June
2000 and July 2002.
Decoys: Decoys are an integral component of current ship self-defense
efforts. Deployed in conjunction with electronic warfare systems and passive
countermeasures, chaff and infrared distraction decoys are an effective
adjunct to hard kill weapons. Used to launch both chaff and infrared decoys,
the MK 36 decoy launching system is the primary decoy launcher in the fleet
today. The MK 36 decoy launching system is found on the following ship
classes: LSD 41/49, LHD, LPD 4, LHA, FFG 7, DD 963, DDG 47, CG 47, and AOE
1/6.
The Offboard Active Decoy (NULKA): NULKA is a joint cooperative program
between the U.S. and Australia to develop an active, off-board,
ship-launched decoy. The NULKA decoy uses a broadband radio frequency
repeater mounted on a hovering rocket platform to defeat advanced
sea-skimming/high diving anti-ship cruise missiles. After launch, the decoy
radiates a large, ship-like radar cross-section signal while flying a
trajectory that lures the attacking missile away from the ship. In September
1996, the Navy modified its existing Mk 36 decoy launching system to a new
MK 53 system that is capable of launching NULKA decoys.
In May 1995 the U.S. Navy, on behalf of the Joint Project Office, awarded an
engineering and manufacturing development contract to build 13 prototype
NULKA decoys. Based on successful contractor qualification tests, the
U.S. Navy authorized the Royal Australian Navy to award an initial
production contract in June 1997 that included 52 NULKA decoys for U.S. Navy
use. During October 1997 development tests aboard the U.S.S. Stump (DD 978),
the program encountered technical problems with two of three launched
decoys. In response, the Joint Project Office officials initiated an
in-depth analysis of the contractor's production facilities. Upon finding
quality control and production management problems, the contractor corrected
the problems. During the summer of 1998, successful developmental and
operational tests were conducted aboard the U.S.S Peterson (DD 969).
In January 1999, the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force,
assessed NULKA and the MK 53 decoy launching system as potentially effective
and suitable, and he recommended limited fleet introduction with additional
follow-on test and evaluation requirements. As a result, a production
contract for 11 MK 53 launch systems was awarded in February 1999. As of
January 2000, four systems had been installed on Ticonderoga class cruisers.
The remaining seven systems are to be installed in fiscal year 2000 on four
other Ticonderoga class cruisers and two Arleigh Burke class destroyers. One
system is designated for use as a trainer.
Under Navy installation plans dated January 2000, an additional 47 launching
systems will be installed on 14 Ticonderoga class cruisers,
29 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and 4 LSD 41/49 class ships between
fiscal years 2001 and 2006. Also during this period, an additional 20 NULKA
systems will be delivered for new construction installations on 9 LPD 17 and
11 Arleigh Burke class ships. NULKA development efforts are ongoing to
integrate NULKA with the Navy's future SSDS MK II and AIEWS systems.
Completed, Ongoing, and Planned Improvements in Self-Defense Capability by
Ship Class
There are 27 ships in this class, and each has a crew of 364. These ships
can be used to provide area air defenses for carrier battle groups or
amphibious ready groups. They can operate independently and serve as
flagships of surface action groups. They are equipped with the Aegis weapon
system that integrates their SPY radar system with the Standard and Tomahawk
missiles they normally carry. The Aegis system allows them to detect and
engage multiple air targets nearly simultaneously. The earliest planned
decommission date for any ship of this class is approximately 2019.
In 1994, the detection systems aboard these ships included a SPS-49
two-dimensional air search radar, a SPY-1A or SPY-1B radar, and the SLQ-32
electronic warfare system. The control function was performed by the Aegis
combat direction system. Engagement systems consisted of the Standard
Missile II variant and the Phalanx Blocks 0 or 1.
Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have been limited to
the installation of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system on
four ships. In 1999, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense capability
of this class as having moderate to high capability against the near-term
threat requirement, moderately capability against the mid-term threat
requirement, and low capability against the far-term threat requirement. The
Navy's representation of the ship self-defense capability of this class may
be overstated as it is based on the assumption that the class is being
equipped with the Phalanx Block 1A, but as of September 30, 1999, none of
these cruisers has this variant. In addition, the assessment was based on
these ships being equipped with the SPY-1B. However, only 15 of the
27 cruisers have this radar variant.
The Navy expects to modernize this cruiser class initially with the SPQ-9B
radar, the AIEWS, CEC, the baseline 6 version of the Aegis combat system, an
upgraded RAM, and NULKA. The procurements of these self-defense systems are
scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2002, and the installations are scheduled
for fiscal year 2004. The Navy has determined that these additions would
provide high self-defense capability against both the near- and mid-term
threat requirements, and moderate capability against the far-term threat
requirement.
These warships conduct anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-surface operations
in support of carrier battle groups, surface action groups, amphibious
groups, and replenishment groups. They are equipped with the Aegis combat
direction system that integrates the SPY-1 radar with the Standard,
Tomahawk, and Harpoon Missiles; torpedoes; and Phalanx. The Navy has 28 of
these ships and plans to build 30 more. Each ship has a crew of about 323.
The earliest planned decommission date for any ship in this class is
approximately 2026.
In 1994, the self-defense configuration for these destroyers included the
SPY-1D radar and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. The control function
was performed by the Aegis combat system. Engagement systems consisted of
the Standard Missile II variant and the Phalanx Block 1.
Since 1994, the ship self-defense capability on this class of destroyers has
been limited. In 1999, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense
capability of this class as having moderate capability against the near-term
threat requirement, low to moderate capability against the mid-term threat
requirement, and low capability against the far-term threat requirement. The
Navy's representation of the ship self-defense capability of this class may
be overstated with regard to its weapon systems. The assessment is based on
the assumption that the class has been equipped with the Phalanx Block 1A,
but as of September 30, 1999, only 13 of the 28 destroyers in the fleet have
this variant. Alternatively, the assessment assumed that the destroyers were
equipped with only the electronic support version of
SLQ-32, when in fact 11 of the 28 destroyers in the fleet are equipped with
the upgraded electronic warfare version of SLQ-32.
The Navy expects to upgrade DDG 51-78 with CEC, the baseline 6 version of
the Aegis weapon system, an upgraded Standard Missile II variant, and NULKA.
The Navy plans to install the ESSM on DDG 79 and subsequent ships. The Navy
expects these upgrades to give these ships a high capability against both
the near- and mid-term threat requirements and moderate capability against
the far-term threat requirement.
These ships operate primarily as anti-submarine warfare combatants for
protecting amphibious expeditionary forces, underway replenishment groups,
and merchant convoys. They also have a limited anti-air warfare capability.
These ships cost less than cruisers and destroyers, but lack the
multi-mission capability needed by modern surface combatants against
multiple, high-technology threats. They also offer limited capacity for
growth. Despite their limitations, they are capable of withstanding
considerable damage. The ship's survivability was demonstrated when the
U.S.S. Stark was hit by two Exocet cruise missiles in 1987. The ship
survived, was repaired, and returned to the fleet. Frigates carry
helicopters, missiles, torpedoes, a gun, and Phalanx. There are 36 ships in
this class and each has a crew of about 300. Seven of the 36 ships in this
class are planned for decommissioning by fiscal year 2003.
In 1994, the self-defense configuration for the Oliver Hazard Perry class
frigates included the SPS-49 radar, the STIR/CAS system, and the SLQ-32
electronic support system. The MK 92 performed the control function.
Engagement systems consisted of the Standard Missile I variant and the
Phalanx Block 0 or 1.
Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have consisted of the
installation of RAIDS. In 1998, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense
capability of this class as having low capability against the near- and
mid-term threat requirements. Although there are 36 ships in this class, the
Navy has focused its attention for ship self-defense improvements on the 12
CORT10 ships. Accordingly, only the 12 CORT ships received the RAIDS system.
Additionally, some of the CORT ships have received radar and electronic
warfare upgrades. Additionally, the Navy plans to add Phalanx Block 1B to
the 12 CORT ships by July 2002. The non-CORT ships were not assessed because
of their short remaining service life.11 The Navy projected the self-defense
capability of frigate class ships to be low against the near- and mid-term
threats.
The primary mission of these ships is anti-submarine warfare. They are
completing a long-term modernization program during which they will have
received SH-60B helicopters, Tomahawk missiles, and Phalanx. Adding the
Tomahawk has greatly expanded their role in strike warfare. There are 24
ships in this class, and each has a crew of 382. The Navy plans to
decommission 11 ships in this class between 2001 and 2005 and the remaining
13 ships between 2006 and 2009.
In 1994, the self-defense configuration for these destroyers included the
MK-23 target acquisition system, the SPS-40 two-dimensional air search
radar, and the SLQ-32 electronic support system. The SWY-1 integrator
performed the control function by interfacing the MK-23 target acquisition
radar with the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile system. The engagement
systems consisted of the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile and Phalanx Block
0 or 1.
Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have consisted of the
installation of the SWY-3 integrator with RAIDS and the RAM Block 0. In
1998, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense capability of this class
as being moderate relative to meeting the near-term threat requirement and
low relative to meeting the mid-term threat requirement. The Navy's
representation of the ship self-defense capability of this class may be
overstated as it is based on the assumption that the class has been equipped
with the RAM Block 0, but as of September 30, 1999, only 7 of the 24 ships
had this missile. According to its future upgrade plans, the Navy expects to
add the NULKA to the entire ship class and RAM Block 1 to three ships in
this class, thus providing them with a moderate to high capability to meet
the near-term threat requirement and a moderate capability to meet the
mid-term missile threat requirement.
The Navy's 8 Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft carriers provide
sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in
peacetime; operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary
forces in times of crisis; operate and support aircraft attacks on enemies;
and protect friendly forces and engage in sustained independent operations
in war. Carriers support and operate aircraft that engage in attack on
airborne, afloat, and ashore targets that threaten free use of the sea and
engage in sustained operations in support of other forces. They are the
largest warships in the world, are powered by two nuclear reactors, and
carry 85 aircraft. The crew consists of a ship's company of 3,200 and an air
wing of 2,480.
In 1994, the self-defense configuration for Nimitz class carriers included
the SPS-49 two-dimensional radar, the SPS-48E three-dimensional radar, MK-23
target acquisition system, and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. The
SWY-1 integrator performed the control function by interfacing the
MK-23 target acquisition radar with the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile.
Engagement systems consisted of the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile and the
Phalanx Block 1.
Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have consisted of the
installation of Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS). This system
integrates with the SWY-1 in performing the control function. In 1998, the
Navy had assessed the ship self-defense capability of this class as being
low against the near-, mid-, and far-term threat requirements. The Navy's
representation of the ship self-defense capability is based on the
assumption that the ships in the class had been equipped with the ACDS Block
1. As of September 30, 1999, only one of the eight ships had ACDS Block 1,
six ships had Block 0, and one ship was being overhauled. When the overhaul
of this ship is complete, it will have both SSDS MK II and ACDS Block 1.
According to its future plans, the Navy expects to upgrade the detect
systems to include the SPQ-9B and the Cooperative Engagement Capability, the
control system to include the SSDS MK II, and the weapon systems to include
the RAM Block 1 and the Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile
System. This upgrade is planned for CVN 76; however, the capability of CVN
77 is being negotiated. By adding these systems, the Navy believes that the
ship self-defense capability of these carriers will be moderate to high in
meeting the near- and mid-term threat requirements and low to moderate in
meeting the far-term threat requirement.
Dock Landing Ships (LSD) have the ability to flood a well deck to make
possible the loading at sea of various types of amphibious craft and
vehicles and their cargoes. The LSD 41 class, designed specifically to
handle four Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), can also accommodate
22 officers, 391 enlisted sailors, and 402 Marine Corps troops. Commissioned
in 1985, the U.S.S. Whidbey Island became the first ship of this class.
Between 1986 and 1992, the Navy added seven ships to this class. In 1987,
the Navy requested funding for a cargo variant that differed from the
original LSD 41 by reducing its number of landing air cushion craft to two
in favor of additional cargo capacity. The first cargo variant, the U.S.S.
Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), was delivered in 1994. The remaining three LSD
49 class ships were delivered between 1995 and 1998. The LSD 49 class has
the same crew capacity, as does the LSD 41 class.
As of October 1994, self-defense configurations for the combined LSD 41/49
class included the SPS-49 air search radar and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare
system. Though the control function was being performed manually throughout
the class, the Navy completed operational testing of an automated control
system (SSDS MK I) in June 1997 aboard the U.S.S. Ashland (LSD 48).
Engagement relied primarily upon Phalanx Block 0 or 1 and the Mk 36 decoy
launching system. As measured by the Navy's performance assessment model,
this configuration produced a performance result that was far below the
threat requirements for the class.
Since October 1994, the Navy has taken several actions to enhance the
LSD 41/49 class's ability to defeat cruise missiles. The Navy enhanced
detection capabilities by adding a medium pulse repetition frequency upgrade
to the SPS-49 radar and integrating the Phalanx radar with the control
system. To improve the control function, the Navy installed SSDS MK I on
four LSD 41 and two LSD 49 class ships. In addition, to improve engagement
capabilities, the Navy completed installations of the Phalanx Block 1A
upgrade on six LSD 41 and two LSD 49 class ships. In addition, RAM Block 0
was installed on five LSD 41 and three LSD 49 class ships. With these
installations, the Navy more than doubled the class's ability to counter
current and future missile threats since requirements were adopted in
February 1996. However, additional improvements in capability are needed to
meet requirements for near-, mid-, and far-term threats.
Two recent development efforts, RAM Block 1 and NULKA, are planned for
future installation in the LSD 41/49 ship class. Once installed, the Navy
expects that these improvements will provide these ships with a high
capability against the near-term threat, moderate to high capability against
the mid-term threat, but a low capability against the far term threat.
Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) ships serve as primary landing ships for
assault operations of Marine expeditionary units. These ships use
conventional landing craft and helicopters to move Marine assault forces
ashore. In a secondary role, these ships also use AV-8B Harrier aircraft and
anti-submarine warfare helicopters to perform sea control and limited power
projection missions. Commissioned in 1976, the U.S.S. Tarawa
(LHA 1) became the first ship of this amphibious class. Between 1977 and
1980, the Navy added four more ships to this class. LHA class ships can
accommodate 82 officers, 882 enlisted sailors, and 1,900 Marine Corps
troops.
As of October 1994, LHA class ships were outfitted with the SPS-40E air
search radar, the MK 23 target acquisition system, and the SLQ-32 electronic
warfare system as detection elements. Also, installation of the SPS-48E
radar was complete on three ships. Control functions were performed by the
SWY-2 integrator, which interfaced the MK 23 target acquisition radar with
the RAM Block 0 weapon system. Engagement elements included RAM Block 0,
Phalanx Block 0, and the MK 36 decoy launching system. This defense
configuration produced a performance result that was below the capstone
requirements for the class.
Since October 1994, Navy staff made only a few defensive improvements to the
LHA class. Specifically, they completed installations of the SPS-48E radar
and the Phalanx Block 1 on all five LHA ships. In addition, they installed
the Advanced Combat Direction System Block 0 on three ships. These
improvements, however, provided little overall improvement in the class's
ability to meet the capstone requirements.
In October 1998, the Navy considered implementing a Service Life Extension
Program to this class; however, there are no current plans to do so.
Beginning in fiscal year 2001, the Navy plans to conduct an analysis of
alternatives study to determine the preferred choice between a modification
to the LHD class design or a brand new hull configuration, currently known
as the LH(X) class.
Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships are the Navy's new class of amphibious
assault ships to support a Marine landing force. These ships can accommodate
three landing craft, AV-8B Harrier aircraft, and the full range of Navy and
Marine Corps helicopters. Commissioned in 1989, the U.S.S. Wasp (LHD 1) is
the lead ship of this new class of multipurpose amphibious assault ships.
Between 1992 and 1998, the Navy added five more LHD ships to its fleet. LHD
class ships can accommodate 104 officers; 1,004 enlisted sailors; and 1,894
Marine Corps troops.
As of October 1994, three LHD class ships had been delivered to the fleet.
The fourth LHD ship was commissioned in February 1995. These first four LHD
ships were outfitted with the SPS-48E and SPS-49 air search radars, the MK
23 target acquisition system, and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system as
detection elements. The ACDS integrated with the AN/SWY-1 performs threat
assessment and weapons control. Engagement elements included the NATO Sea
Sparrow Surface Missile, Phalanx Block 1, and the MK 36 decoy launching
system. This defense configuration produced a performance result that was
below the capstone requirements for the class.
Two additional LHD class ships were delivered to the fleet in 1997 and 1998.
These ships were delivered with ACDS and the AN/SWY-3 control configuration.
This integrated capability/configuration included the MK 23 Target
Acquisition System and multiple NATO Sea Sparrow Surface and RAM missile
systems. No LHDs are slated to receive RAM Block 1 until late fiscal year
2002, with LHD 5 and 6 slated for fiscal year 2006 and 2007, respectively.
The Navy assessed that this improvement provided the ship class with a high
capability against the near- and mid-term threat and a moderate capability
against the far-term threat.
The U.S.S. Iwo Jima (LHD 7), currently in production, is being outfitted
with the AN/SPS-48E and the AN/SPS-49 MPU radar, MK 23 Target Acquisition
System, ACDS, an AN/SWY-3 configuration, and Phalanx
Block 1A. The Navy plans to improve the AN/SWY-3 capability in late fiscal
year 2002 by an upgrade of the MK 23 Target Acquisition System and
incorporation of RAM Block 1. These improvements should enable the U.S.S.
Iwo Jima to have moderate to high capability against near- and mid-term
threats. The U.S.S. Iwo Jima is also slated to receive a Mission Force
Protection upgrade in the 2006-2009 time frame.
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) ships serve primarily to transport and land
Marines, their equipment, and supplies for amphibious operations. The Navy
currently has 11 LPD class ships in commission, but the ships are nearing
the end of their service life. For example, the oldest ship, the U.S.S.
Austin (LPD 4) turned 35 in February 2000. Moreover, these ships are
especially vulnerable to cruise missile attack as their defensive
capabilities consist of only two Phalanx weapon systems. The Navy plans to
replace its current LPD fleet, as well as other old amphibious ships, with
its newest class of amphibious ship--the LPD 17. The new LPD 17class ship is
being designed to accommodate 32 officers, 463 enlisted sailors, and 720
Marine Corps troops.
In June 1996, the Navy received approval to enter into the engineering and
manufacturing development phase of its LPD 17 program and to produce the
first three of a low-rate initial production quantity of 12 ships. The
baseline design included the following configuration--SPS-48E, SPQ-9B, and
SLQ-32 or AIEWS (if matured for production) as detection elements; CEC and
SSDS MK 2 as control element; and RAM Block 1, NULKA, and the new Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) with a vertical launch system as engagement
elements. As projected by the Navy's performance assessment model, this
configuration would have high capability against the near- and mid-term
threat and moderate capability against far-term threat.
The Navy realized that the ESSM program schedule would not coincide with the
production schedule of the first two ships in the class and decided to
reserve space and weight in the ship design for the missile system and
launcher for subsequent installation in these two ships. However, the Navy
planned to equip the remaining 10 ships in the class with the ESSM system
during their production. In 1998, various congressional committees directed
the Navy to prepare an analysis of alternatives to the LPD 17 baseline
design, including an evaluation of the AN/SPY-1 radar and its associated
Aegis combat system, multifunction radar, and the ESSM. The March 1999
results of the Navy analysis confirmed that the baseline design without the
ESSM could meet the near- and mid-term threat at the least cost. As a result
of this assessment, the Navy withdrew funding for the ESSM system from the
LPD 17 budget for fiscal years 2000−2003, and applied those funds to
its cruiser conversion program and other shipbuilding and conversion
activities. This action resulted in deletion of the ESSM and its vertical
launching system from the remaining 10 ships, with only a space and weight
reservation for an eventual backfit.
The Navy will review the LPD 17 combat system in 2001 to determine if
changes in configuration are warranted. The costs and benefits of including
a multi-function and volume search radar in the LPD 17 combat system suite
will be considered in this review.
The fast combat support ship (AOE) is the Navy's largest combat logistics
ship. Its mission is to receive ammunition, provisions, stores, and
petroleum products from shuttle ships, and to distribute them to carrier
battle groups while underway. Commissioned in 1964, the U.S.S. Sacramento
(AOE 1) became the first ship of this class. Between 1967 and 1970, the Navy
added three more AOE 1 class ships to its fleet. In 1987, Congress
appropriated funds for the next generation AOE class ship. The lead ship,
U.S.S. Supply (AOE 6), was commissioned in 1994. Three more AOE 6 ships were
delivered between 1995 and 1998. AOE 6 class ships can accommodate 40
officers and 627 enlisted sailors.
As of October 1994, self-defense configurations for the combined AOE 1/6
class included the MK 23 target acquisition system and the SLQ-32 electronic
warfare system. Control functions were performed manually. Engagement
elements included NATO Sea Sparrow Missile system, the Phalanx Block 0 or 1,
and the MK 36 decoy launching system. This defense configuration produced
low capability against all threat requirements. With the exception of minor
technical changes, Navy staff has made no ship self-defense improvements to
either AOE ship class since October 1994.
Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and fleet commanders are currently
weighing alternatives for the future of the AOE 1 and AOE 6 class ships. In
December 1996, the Navy estimated that it would cost $450 million to extend
the service life of the four AOE 1 ships to the year 2010. In February 1997,
the Chief of Naval Operations tasked Navy program staff to identify the
minimum requirements needed to keep the AOE 1 class operational until the
year 2010. In response, type and group commander staff, engineers, ship
commanding officers, and members of the Navy Sea Systems Command technical
community reached consensus on what came to be called the AOE 1 Class
Sustainability Program, with an estimated cost of $103 million. A teaming
effort among the Naval Sea Systems Command and Navy type commanders has, to
date, accomplished many of the work items associated with the Sustainability
Program. Of the remaining program balance of
$60.6 million, $9.6 million is currently funded in the future years defense
plan, leaving an unfunded balance of $51 million. However, none of the work
items included in the AOE 1 Class Sustainability Program will improve the
class's level of ship self-defense.
Since at least 1997, the Navy has been considering the possibility of
transferring its AOE 6 ship class to the Military Sealift Command. At the
present time, no ship self-defense upgrades are being planned or
recommended, according to Navy officials.
Comments From the Department of Defense
(707424)
Table 1: Anti-ship Cruise Missile Threats 5
Table 2: Planned Equipment Additions or Improvements, as of
June 2000 11
Table 3: Existing Cruise Missile Defense Capability by Ship Class,
as of October 1998 13
Table 4: Projected Cruise Missile Defense Capability as of Program Objective
Memorandum 2000, as of October 1998 13
Table 5: Availability Rates of Selected Ship Self-Defense Equipment 16
Figure 1: U.S.S. Stark, 1987 6
Figure 2: Navy Layered Defense Concept 8
Figure 3: Total Ship Self-Defense Funding 20
Figure 4: Ship Self-Defense Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation Funding 21
1. The ship classes for which self-defense performance requirements were
established include aircraft carriers (CV and CVN); Aegis cruisers and
destroyers (CG-47 and DDG-51 classes); Spruance destroyers (DD-963 class);
frigates (FFG); amphibious ships (LHA, LHD, LPD-17, and LSD 41/49); and fast
combat support ships (AOE).
2. The Navy study defined the near term as 1998-2005, the mid-term as
2006-2011, and the far term as 2012 and beyond.
3. Subsonic is less than the speed of sound (i.e. around 742 miles per
hour).
4. Supersonic is greater than the speed of sound.
5. The Navy defined a contested environment as one in which the degree of
violence approaches that of a global war or a major regional conflict,
requiring the commitment of a large number of ships that would be placed at
risk; an uncertain environment as one involving lesser regional and low
intensity conflict in which fewer surface combatants, but a larger number of
amphibious ships, would be placed at risk; and a controlled environment as
one in which a mix of individual ships would conduct presence operations
during peacetime, at a low level of risk.
6. The PRA model is a method for assessing the defensive capability of each
ship class against specific threats. The PRA value is an expression of the
degree of probability that no anti-ship cruise missiles in a particular raid
will hit a targeted ship. For example, a ship class that can generate a PRA
of 0.9 has a 90-percent probability of defeating cruise missiles directed
against it.
7. Aegis combat system is an integrated shipboard weapon system that
combines computers, radar, and missiles to provide a defense umbrella for
surface ships. The system is capable of automatically detecting, tracking,
and destroying airborne, seaborne, and land-launched weapons.
8. House Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (H.R. Rep.103-499 at 106-107)
required the Navy to submit annual updates up through fiscal year 1999 on
program objectives, plans, schedules, and funding requirements for anti-air
warfare programs.
9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 Conference report
(H.R. Rep.
104-450 at 668) required the Navy to include an assessment of progress in
establishing and meeting baselines in the above mentioned annual updates.
10. CORT stands for Coherent Receiver and Transmitter and refers to the Mk
92 Mod 6 weapons control system. The Navy upgraded the Mk 92 Mod 2 system to
the Mod 6 system, along with upgrades to radars and processors on 12
frigates. These 12 CORT frigates have improved detection and tracking
capability.
11. P. L. 105-56, section 8053, found at 10 USC 2241, note prohibits the
Navy from modifying ships that are within 5 years of retirement, unless the
Secretary of the Navy waives the prohibition.
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