High Risk Series: Asset Forfeiture Programs (Letter Report, 02/95,
GAO/HR-95-7).

In 1990, GAO began a special effort to identify federal programs at high
risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.  GAO issued a series of
reports in December 1992 on the fundamental causes of the problems in
the high-risk areas.  This report on asset forfeiture programs is part
of the second series that updates the status of this high-risk area.
Readers have the following three options in ordering the high-risk
series: (1) request any of the individual reports in the series,
including the Overview (HR-95-1), the Guide (HR-95-2), or any of the 10
issue area reports; (2) request the Overview and the Guide as a package
(HR-95-21SET); or (3) request the entire series as a package
(HR-95-20SET).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  HR-95-7
     TITLE:  High Risk Series: Asset Forfeiture Programs
      DATE:  02/01/95
   SUBJECT:  Assets
             Inventory control systems
             Customs administration
             Law enforcement
             Federal property management
             Interagency relations
             Search and seizure
             Surplus federal property
             Property disposal
             Law enforcement agencies
IDENTIFIER:  DOJ National Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Program
             Treasury Asset Forfeiture Fund
             DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund
             Customs Forfeiture Fund
             National Performance Review
             DOJ/Treasury Consolidated Asset Tracking System
             Customs Service Seized Asset Program
             High Risk Series 1995
             
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO        *
* report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles,       *
* headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are           *
* identified by double and single lines.  The numbers on the right end   *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the page       *
* numbers of the printed product.                                        *
*                                                                        *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure    *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble     *
* those in the printed version.                                          *
*                                                                        *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document    *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your        *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015,             *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time.                                    *
**************************************************************************


Cover
================================================================ COVER


High-Risk Series

February 1995

ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAMS

GAO/HR-95-7

Asset Forfeiture Programs


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV


Letter
=============================================================== LETTER



February 1995

The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

In 1990, the General Accounting Office began a special effort to
review and report on the federal program areas we considered high
risk because they were especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse,
and mismanagement.  This effort, which has been strongly supported by
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight, brought much needed focus to
problems that were costing the government billions of dollars. 

In December 1992, we issued a series of reports on the fundamental
causes of problems in designated high-risk areas.  We are updating
the status of our high-risk program in this second series.  Our
Overview report (GAO/HR-95-1) discusses progress made in many areas,
stresses the need for further action to address remaining critical
problems, and introduces newly designated high-risk areas.  This
second series also includes a Quick Reference Guide (GAO/HR-95-2)
that covers all 18 high-risk areas we have tracked over the past few
years, and separate reports that detail continuing significant
problems and resolution actions needed in 10 areas. 

This report discusses the asset forfeiture programs of the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury.  It describes the progress
made in the management of seized and forfeited property since our
December 1992 report.  The value of seized property inventories has
grown from a reported $33 million in 1979 to almost $2 billion in
1994.  Over the years, Justice and Treasury have transformed their
problem-ridden seized property programs into more businesslike
operations.  However, some significant problems remain with seized
property management.  In recent years, interest in the asset
forfeiture programs has extended beyond property management to
questioning whether forfeiture laws are applied appropriately and
effectively and consideration of how forfeiture proceeds should be
used.  This report focuses on the most recent program changes made
and highlights areas needing sustained management attention. 

Copies of this report series are being sent to the President, the
Republican and Democratic leadership of the Congress, congressional
committee chairs and ranking minority members, all other members of
the Congress, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Charles A.  Bowsher
Comptroller General
of the United States


OVERVIEW
============================================================ Chapter 0

For more than 200 years, the federal government has had the authority
to take property through forfeiture.  Beginning about 1980, the
number and value of seizures started growing dramatically as law
enforcement agencies began relying more heavily on forfeiture to
fight drug traffickers and other organized crime figures.  The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 expanded the government's
seizure authority and established forfeiture funds within the
departments of Justice and the Treasury.\1 Recently, asset forfeiture
laws were expanded to cover crimes associated with money laundering
and certain financial institutions-related offenses.  Collectively,
enforcement actions associated with these changes have resulted in
the value of Justice's and Treasury's seized property inventories
growing from a reported $33 million in 1979 to almost $2 billion in
1994. 

THE PROBLEM

As asset forfeiture programs grew in the 1980s, our attention was
focused primarily on the management of seized and forfeited property. 
We found that property was not being properly cared for after it was
seized, resulting in lost revenue to the government when the property
was sold.  Much has been accomplished in this area since the 1980s. 
However, some significant problems remain with seized property
management, and continued oversight is necessary.  Also, the
departments of Justice and the Treasury continue to operate two
similar but separate seized asset management and disposal programs
without plans for consolidation, despite legislation requiring them
to develop a plan to consolidate postseizure administration of
certain properties.\2

In recent years, interest in the asset forfeiture programs has
extended beyond asset management to questioning whether forfeiture
laws are applied appropriately and effectively and consideration of
how forfeiture proceeds should be used. 

PROGRESS

In our December 1992 high-risk report on asset forfeiture programs,
we reported that major operational problems relating to the
management and disposition of seized and forfeited property had been
identified and corrective actions were being initiated.  However,
although some management and systems changes have improved program
operations, our recent audits of the Customs Service's fiscal year
1992 and 1993 financial statements revealed serious weaknesses in key
internal controls and systems, which affected Customs' ability to
control, manage, and report the results of its seizure efforts,
including accountability and stewardship over property seized.  As a
result, tons of illegal drugs and millions of dollars in cash and
other property have been vulnerable to theft and misappropriation. 
Customs recognizes the need for long-term and systematic
improvements, and its Commissioner established a senior management
task force to review the seized property program in its entirety. 
Actions are being taken to address the internal control and systems
problems; however, many of these efforts are in various stages of
development. 

Problems also persist with the Marshals Service's maintenance and
disposal of seized and forfeited property, according to recent
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General audit reports. 
These audits show the need for continued emphasis on and vigilance
over seized property management. 

We also reported in December 1992 that Justice and Treasury were
pursuing an initiative for consolidating postseizure management of
noncash seized property inventories.  Legislation enacted in 1988
required them to develop a plan to consolidate postseizure
administration of certain properties.  Furthermore, in June 1991, we
identified substantial savings that could be realized through merging
postseizure noncash property management functions.  Although a small
scale pilot project for consolidation was in effect from October 1992
through September 1993, no significant progress has been made toward
consolidation.  Since eliminating duplicate programs is one of the
Vice President's National Performance Review goals, Justice and
Treasury should aggressively pursue options for efficiency gains
through program consolidation. 

Our December 1992 high-risk report also highlighted growing interest
in the forfeiture programs regarding the appropriate application of
the asset forfeiture laws.  In 1993, the Supreme Court issued three
decisions that more clearly define the appropriate use of asset
forfeiture authority.  Also, several bills were proposed in the last
Congress to put tighter controls on forfeiture.  The departments of
Justice and the Treasury have each taken several actions in an effort
to strengthen the integrity of the asset forfeiture program,
including implementing new policy guidance intended to ensure that
law enforcement agencies do not become overzealous in their use of
the asset forfeiture laws or become too dependent on the funds
derived from seizures. 

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

The two agencies with custodial responsibilities for seized property,
the Marshals Service for Justice and the Customs Service for
Treasury, have made improvements in seized property management and
disposition over the years.  However, significant problems remain and
continued oversight is necessary to ensure policies and procedures
are followed and adequate safeguards are in place.  In addition,
Justice and Treasury should aggressively pursue options for
efficiency gains through program consolidation.  We will continue to
monitor seized property management activities. 

Much attention has been focused on the appropriate application of the
asset forfeiture laws.  It is too soon to tell whether the recent
actions taken by Justice and Treasury will provide sufficient
safeguards against improper seizures.  Ensuring that adequate
safeguards are in place and adhered to will require considerable
forfeiture program management attention and oversight in the future. 


--------------------
\1 The funds were originally created within the Department of Justice
and U.S.  Customs Service.  The Congress established the Department
of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in October 1992 to supersede the
Customs Fund. 

\2 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law No.  100-690, 21
U.S.C.  887 (1988). 


BACKGROUND
============================================================ Chapter 1

Asset forfeiture programs were intended to (1) punish and deter
criminal activity by depriving criminals of property used or acquired
through illegal activities and (2) make seized property available as
assets to strengthen law enforcement.  Seized and forfeited property
can be cash, bank accounts, automobiles, boats, airplanes, jewelry,
art objects, or real estate.  Justice and Treasury also seize
thousands of tons of illegal drugs and counterfeit items that have no
resale value to the federal government.  These items are typically
held by the agencies until they are approved for destruction. 

Although the government has had forfeiture authority for over 200
years, it was rarely utilized as a law enforcement tool until the
1980s.  The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 expanded
forfeiture authority and established asset forfeiture funds within
the Department of Justice and the U.S.  Customs Service to hold the
proceeds of forfeitures and to finance program-related expenses (for
example, property management expenses) as well as certain law
enforcement activities, such as the payment of rewards for
information related to asset seizure and training directly related to
the asset forfeiture program. 

Until recently, Treasury law enforcement agencies other than Customs
(the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Criminal Investigation
Division of the Internal Revenue Service; and the U.S.  Secret
Service) participated in the Justice Fund.  In October 1992, the
Congress created the Treasury Forfeiture Fund to supersede the
Customs Fund.\3 The Treasury agencies that previously participated in
the Justice Fund began making deposits into the Treasury Fund in
October 1993.  Figure 1 shows the two fund receipts for the years
they have been in operation. 

   Figure 1:  Forfeiture Fund
   Receipts, Fiscal Years 1985
   Through 1994

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Sources:  Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and U.S. 
Customs Service. 

These funds have always collected more than the allowable expenses
that could be charged against them.\4 Year-end surpluses in the
Justice Fund have historically been used for law enforcement
purposes, such as building prisons, hiring U.S.  Attorney office
personnel, or funding special activities through the Office of
National Drug Control Policy.  Year-end surpluses in the Customs Fund
were transferred to the general fund of the Treasury.  Beginning in
fiscal year 1995, the year-end surpluses in the Treasury Forfeiture
Fund will be available to the Secretary of the Treasury for any law
enforcement activity of a federal agency. 

Asset forfeiture legislation authorizes Justice and Treasury to share
forfeiture proceeds with state and local law enforcement agencies and
foreign governments that participate in law enforcement efforts
leading to seizure and forfeiture.  From fiscal years 1986 through
1994, Justice and Treasury shared over $1.4 billion and $394 million,
respectively, in forfeited property and cash with over 3,000 state
and local law enforcement agencies. 

As the forfeiture programs grew in the 1980s, Justice and Customs
experienced significant problems with asset management and
disposition.  However, as the programs matured, the agencies gained
more control of them.  Improvements made in the areas of seized
property management and management information systems were discussed
in our December 1992 high-risk report.  For example, in 1987 Justice
and Customs established policies designed to minimize the unnecessary
holding of seized cash.  Also, legislation enacted in 1990 subjects
the funds to annual financial audits.  These audits have been done
each year since 1990.  However, problems remain with property
management and, therefore, continual oversight is necessary.  One
issue that still has not been resolved is the consolidation of
Justice's and Treasury's seized property management functions. 


--------------------
\3 Treasury Forfeiture Fund Act of 1992, Public Law No.  102-393, 31
U.S.C.  9703 (1992). 

\4 Allowable expenses exclude certain costs such as salaries and
benefits of seizing agents which are borne by the seizing agency. 


PROGRESS AND CONTINUING CONCERNS
============================================================ Chapter 2

In December 1992, we reported on the status of the asset forfeiture
programs and progress made as well as emerging issues.  The following
examples describe the progress that has been made since that time,
and the key continuing concerns. 

SEIZED PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS REMAIN

Our fiscal year 1992 and 1993 financial statement audits of the U.S. 
Customs Service revealed inadequate safeguards over, and incomplete
and inaccurate accounting and reporting of, seized property.  Customs
is taking steps to address these problems; however, these efforts are
in various stages of development. 

Customs conducted its first nationwide physical inventory of seized
property, drugs, and currency in February 1994.  As a result of this
inventory, Customs was able to identify and correct many significant
errors in the recorded quantities and values of seized property. 
This effort was also intended to establish an accurate baseline for
monitoring and reporting activity that results from Customs'
enforcement efforts.  However, some Customs locations did not
effectively perform all of the inventory procedures.  As a result,
reported seized property balances included erroneous values. 

Customs has also undertaken significant efforts to strengthen
safeguards at its storage locations.  Specifically, it has performed
a study and evaluation of the adequacy of its physical safeguards
over seized property and currency at 21 medium-to-high volume storage
facilities.  In addition, Customs constructed new facilities in two
districts and has plans for renovation at other facilities. 

While these efforts are commendable, Customs must establish and
implement additional policies and procedures, such as periodically
summarizing and assessing the results of its seizure efforts for a
period of time, and make significant enhancements to its seized
property tracking system to ensure proper accountability for and
stewardship over seized property.  In addition, a significant and
sustained effort by Customs management will be required to ensure
that established policies and procedures and planned improvements are
properly implemented.  Otherwise, Customs' ability to report reliable
financial information and effectively carry out its seizure program
will continue to be diminished.  Also, tons of illegal drugs and
millions of dollars in currency and other property will remain
vulnerable to theft and misappropriation. 

Problems also persist with the Marshals Service's maintenance and
disposal of seized and forfeited property, according to recent
Justice Department Office of Inspector General reports.  In March
1993, the Inspector General reported mismanagement by contractors
hired by the Marshals Service to maintain and dispose of property,
resulting in excessive costs and lost revenues of almost $2.8 million
in six districts.  Two and a half million dollars of the excessive
costs and lost revenue resulted from a lack of effective Marshals
Service oversight of real property management contracts.  For
example, the Marshals Service failed to detect improper payments for
property taxes, attorney fees, and title insurance.  In March 1994,
the Inspector General reported that the Marshals Service was not
disposing of forfeited property expeditiously, allowing property to
deteriorate, thus resulting in lost revenue.  The Marshals Service
has initiated various actions to address these problems, such as
revising procurement policies, conducting contract management reviews
at certain districts, and providing additional training to seized
assets management staff, according to the Inspector General. 

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CONSOLIDATION
EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL

In an effort to address duplication of effort, one of the provisions
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 required the Attorney General and
the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and maintain a joint plan to
coordinate and consolidate postseizure administration of property
seized for drug-related offenses.  In June 1991, we recommended
consolidating the management and disposition of all noncash seized
properties, designating the Marshals Service as the custodian.  We
estimated program administration costs could be reduced 11 percent
annually if Justice and Customs consolidated the postseizure
management and disposition of such items.  We also reported that
consolidation would likely result in lower contractor costs due to
economies of scale. 

Consolidation efforts to date have been unsuccessful.  The Marshals
Service and Customs entered into a memorandum of understanding in
October 1992 for a 1-year small scale pilot consolidation project
whereby the Marshals Service managed and disposed of Customs' real
property and Customs managed and disposed of vessels for the Marshals
Service at four districts.  A total of 52 properties were involved in
the pilot project, which dissolved at the end of the 1-year period. 
No cost analysis or evaluation of the effectiveness of the project
was done.  There are no future plans for consolidation of asset
management and disposition functions at this time. 

We still believe that consolidation of asset management and
disposition functions makes sense.  Both agencies seize similar types
of property that is generally located in the same geographic areas. 
However, under the current operating structure, each agency maintains
a separate and distinct program for managing and disposing of its
property.  Justice, through the Marshals Service, contracts directly
with vendors that provide the service.  Treasury, through the Customs
Service, has a nationwide contractor that provides custodial services
either directly or through subcontracts with other vendors. 

DUPLICATE ASSET FORFEITURE FUNDS
AND PROGRAMS

We see areas of possible duplication between the two funds and
programs that extend beyond property management and disposition
activities, to include forfeiture fund administration and management. 
The Treasury Forfeiture Fund structure essentially mirrors that of
the Justice Fund.  Both funds have their own management, operations
staff, custodial agencies (Marshals Service and Customs), and
contractors to maintain and dispose of property.  The funds work
closely together to develop policies that minimize variations in
forfeiture procedures and operations.  Although the funds coordinate
closely, the existence of two separate funds has the potential for
unnecessary duplication.  For example, each department recently
issued its own set of very similar program guidance. 

On the other hand, Justice and Treasury are pursuing consolidation of
asset tracking systems.  Both departments have agreed to develop,
implement, manage, operate, enhance, and support a Consolidated Asset
Tracking System (CATS).  CATS is intended to be the primary automated
system for asset tracking and management used by all agencies
participating in both the Justice and Treasury asset forfeiture
programs. 

CATS would make it possible to track the entire life cycle of an
asset from seizure, through forfeiture, to disposal.  The system
would avoid the duplicate data entry that occurs due to the various
participating components having incompatible systems.  With all
participating agencies using the same system, any user of CATS would
have available the current status and processing details for any
asset, regardless of which agency entered the information.  CATS is
being pilot tested, with participation from all Justice and Treasury
agencies, except Customs.  Customs plans to begin looking at the
feasibility of CATS participation in the near future.  The success of
a single automated tracking system is dependent on the participation
of all agencies, including Customs.  We encourage Justice and
Treasury to continue to identify areas of duplication and pursue
options for consolidation, such as their efforts with CATS. 

IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF
SHARED ASSETS

Continuing this consolidation theme, in July 1992 we concluded that
because state and local law enforcement agencies often see the
Justice and Customs asset sharing programs as one, the programs
should have the same guidelines, with the same interpretations of
appropriate asset use.  Officials in some state and local agencies
found the guidance vague and confusing, with Justice and Customs
allowing different uses of shared proceeds despite having similar
program policies.  We recommended that Justice and Customs issue
joint guidelines for asset sharing with clear, specific definitions
for concepts such as "law enforcement purposes" and "supplanting of
resources."

Joint guidelines have not been issued.  However, Treasury and Justice
issued separate sets of revised and mutually agreeable asset sharing
guidance in October 1993 and March 1994, respectively.  The clarified
guidance is intended to significantly reduce state and local law
enforcement agency confusion about appropriate uses of shared assets
and should lead to fewer improper uses of assets. 

EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS
AGAINST IMPROPER SEIZURES

As discussed in our 1992 high-risk report, increasing concerns have
been voiced by Members of Congress, the media, and law enforcement
officials about the potential for abuse of the property interests of
innocent owners and third parties in the asset seizure/forfeiture
process.  Because revenue generation is one of the clearly
articulated goals of the forfeiture program, concerns have also been
expressed that law enforcement agencies may have a vested interest in
receiving the proceeds of forfeitures and that this interest could
influence law enforcement priorities. 

Furthermore, in 1993 the Supreme Court issued three decisions that
have more clearly defined the appropriate use of asset seizure and
forfeiture authority.  For example, in Austin v.  United States, 113
S.  Ct.  2801 (1993), the Court concluded that the challenged
forfeiture constituted punishment and thus was subject to the
limitations of the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution.  The Eighth Amendment ban on excessive fines
requires that there be a relationship between the seriousness of an
offense and the property that is taken. 

Several bills were proposed in the last Congress that would have
significantly affected the forfeiture programs.  For example, one
bill mandated that certain forfeiture proceedings be conducted only
upon the conviction of the property owner for the relevant crime. 
That bill also required that a portion of the forfeiture proceeds be
used for community based crime control programs. 

The Department of Justice is also concerned about any appearance of
conflict of interest or overzealous use of seizure and forfeiture
laws.  Justice has taken several actions to address these concerns. 
To provide leadership to state and local law enforcement agencies,
Justice issued a National Code of Professional Conduct for Asset
Forfeiture officials.  Justice also initiated a project to coordinate
and expand federal forfeiture training in an effort to ensure that
state and local law enforcement agencies are in full compliance with
constitutional and statutory limitations on seizure and forfeiture. 

The departments of Justice and the Treasury have implemented new
policy guidance to strengthen the integrity of the asset forfeiture
program.  For example, to minimize any adverse effects of forfeiture
on innocent persons, Justice and Treasury issued new policies and
procedures that require expedited notice to owners of seized property
and payments to lienholders.  Justice also proposed regulations in
June 1994 that would clarify when innocent persons whose property is
used by others for criminal purposes are entitled to relief. 


FURTHER ACTION NEEDED
============================================================ Chapter 3

The asset forfeiture programs continue to remain highly visible, as
evidenced by the recent policy guidance and proposed regulations as
well as numerous proposed changes to forfeiture legislation.  Justice
and Treasury have made many improvements to their asset forfeiture
programs over the years.  However, enhancements to seized property
tracking systems and development and implementation of additional
policies and procedures are needed to help ensure adequate
accountability and stewardship over seized property.  In addition,
continued oversight will be required to ensure that existing policies
and procedures and planned improvement efforts are properly
implemented.  We will continue to monitor seized property management
activities. 

Possible duplication of resources within the two forfeiture funds and
programs is of particular interest in light of budget constraints. 
Justice and Treasury should aggressively pursue options for
efficiency gains through consolidation. 

Although significant problems remain with seized property management,
some of the attention has shifted toward concerns about law
enforcement agencies becoming overzealous in their use of the asset
forfeiture laws or too dependent on the funds derived from such
seizures.  It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the recent
efforts taken by Justice and Treasury to strengthen safeguards
against improper seizures.  Our future work will include keeping
abreast of these efforts and assessing any future legislative
changes. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 4

Financial Audits:  CFO Implementation at IRS and Customs
(GAO/T-AIMD-94-164, July 28, 1994). 

Restitution, Fines, and Forfeiture:  Issues for Further Review and
Oversight (GAO/T-GGD-94-178, June 28, 1994). 

Financial Audit:  Examination of Customs' Fiscal Year 1993 Financial
Statements (GAO/AIMD-94-119, June 15, 1994). 

Financial Management:  Customs' Accountability for Seized Property
and Special Operation Advances Was Weak (GAO/AIMD-94-6, Nov.  22,
1993). 

Financial Management:  First Financial Audits of IRS and Customs
Revealed Serious Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-93-3, August 4, 1993). 

Financial Audit:  Examination of Customs' Fiscal Year 1992 Financial
Statements (GAO/AIMD-93-3, June 30, 1993). 

High-Risk Series:  Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-93-17, Dec.  6,
1992). 

Tax Administration:  IRS's Management of Seized Assets
(GAO/T-GGD-92-65, Sept.  24, 1992). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Improved Guidance Needed for Use of Shared Assets
(GAO/GGD-92-115, July 16, 1992). 

Asset Forfeiture:  U.S.  Marshals Service Internal Control Weaknesses
Over Cash Distributions (GAO/GGD-92-59, May 8, 1992). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Customs Reports Improved Controls Over Sales of
Forfeited Property (GAO/GGD-91-127, Sept.  25, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Noncash Property Should Be Consolidated Under the
Marshals Service (GAO/GGD-91-97, June 28, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Need for Stronger Marshals Service Oversight of
Commercial Real Property (GAO/GGD-91-82, May 31, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Opportunities for Savings Through Program
Consolidation (GAO/T-GGD-91-22, Apr.  25, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Opportunities to Improve Program Administration
(GAO/T-GGD-91-16, Mar.  13, 1991). 

Oversight Hearings on Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/T-GGD-90-56,
July 24, 1990). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Legislation Needed to Improve Cash Processing and
Financial Reporting (GAO/GGD-90-94, June 19, 1990). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Helping Finance the War on Drugs (GAO/GGD-90-01VR,
Oct.  1989). 

Profitability of Customs Forfeiture Program Can Be Enhanced
(GAO/T-GGD-90-1, Oct.  10, 1989). 

Asset Forfeiture:  An Update (GAO/T-GGD-89-17, Apr.  24, 1989). 

Asset Forfeiture Programs:  Progress and Problems (GAO/T-GGD-88-41,
June 23, 1988). 

Asset Forfeiture Programs:  Corrective Actions Underway But
Additional Improvements Needed (GAO/T-GGD-88-16, Mar.  4, 1988). 

Seized Conveyances:  Justice and Customs Correction of Previous
Conveyance Management Problems (GAO/GGD-88-30, Feb.  3, 1988). 

Real Property Seizure and Disposal Program Improvements Needed
(GAO/T-GGD-87-28, Sept.  25, 1987). 

Asset Forfeiture Funds:  Changes Needed to Enhance Congressional
Oversight (GAO/T-GGD-87-27, Sept.  25, 1987). 

Millions of Dollars in Seized Cash Can Be Deposited Faster
(GAO/T-GGD-87-7, Mar.  13, 1987). 

Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of Forfeited Personal Property
(GAO/GGD-87-20, Dec.  10, 1986). 

Customs' Management of Seized and Forfeited Cars, Boats, and Planes
(Testimony, Apr.  3, 1986). 

Improved Management Processes Would Enhance Justice's Operations
(GAO/GGD-86-12, Mar.  14, 1986). 

Better Care and Disposal of Seized Cars, Boats, and Planes Should
Save Money and Benefit Law Enforcement (GAO/PLRD-83-94, July 15,
1983). 

Asset Forfeiture:  A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking
(GAO/GGD-81-51, Apr.  10, 1981). 


1995 HIGH-RISK SERIES
============================================================ Chapter 5

An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1)

Quick Reference Guide (GAO/HR-95-2)

Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-95-3)

Defense Weapons Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-95-4)

Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-95-5)

Internal Revenue Service Receivables (GAO/HR-95-6)

Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-95-7)

Medicare Claims (GAO/HR-95-8)

Farm Loan Programs (GAO/HR-95-9)

Student Financial Aid (GAO/HR-95-10)

Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO/HR-95-11)

Superfund Program Management (GAO/HR-95-12)

The entire series of 12 high-risk reports can be ordered by using the
order number GAO/HR-95-20SET. 
