Welfare Reform: States' Early Experiences With Benefit Termination
(Chapter Report, 05/15/97, GAO/HEHS-97-74).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' early
experiences with waiver provisions for Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC) benefit termination under the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, focusing on: (1) those families
whose benefits have been terminated and why; (2) federal or state
benefits that are available and are being received after termination;
and (3) states' experiences in implementing these provisions.
GAO noted that: (1) so far, states have seldom used benefit termination
provisions; (2) moreover, of the 18,000 families whose benefits were
terminated under waivers through December 1996, more than 99 percent
failed to comply with program requirements; (3) most terminations took
place in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin; (4) through June 1996,
prior recipients' failure to comply with new enrollment requirements
accounted for over half of the terminations nationwide; (5) by the end
of December 1996, failure to comply with work requirements increased by
one-third and became the most significant reason for termination; (6)
recipients' explanations for this noncompliance included wanting to stay
at home with their children and an unwillingness to do community service
or work for low wages; (7) terminating a family's AFDC benefit
represented the loss of a significant source of monthly income; (8)
although more than 80 percent of the cases GAO studied in Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin were subsequently found to have some source
of support or had returned to welfare, the percentages of such families
receiving food stamps and Medicaid declined significantly after
termination; (9) before termination, the percentage of cases receiving
these benefits ranged from 84 to 100 percent; after termination it
ranged from 26 to 61 percent; (10) many families did not take the steps
necessary to continue to receive these program benefits after losing
AFDC, even though the waivers provided for program eligibility to be
unaffected unless other family circumstances changed; (11) officials in
the three states generally believed their benefit termination program
effectiveness by contributing to increases in work activity, job
placements, and families moving off welfare more quickly; (12) these
officials emphasized that only a small percentage of cases had been
terminated; (13) nevertheless, they acknowledged that implementing these
provisions had been challenging; (14) for example, states had to develop
systems to accurately track hours worked to monitor compliance and to
correctly and adequately notify recipients of pending termination
actions; (15) in addition, states had to provide certain activities and
services before they could terminate a family's benefits; and (16) these
states' experiences with benefit termination provisions under waivers
highlight the challenges all states may face in implementing similar pr*
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: HEHS-97-74
TITLE: Welfare Reform: States' Early Experiences With Benefit
Termination
DATE: 05/15/97
SUBJECT: Public assistance programs
Welfare benefits
Welfare recipients
Workfare
State-administered programs
Noncompliance
Eligibility determinations
Families
IDENTIFIER: AFDC
HHS Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program
Medicaid Program
Supplemental Security Income Program
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program
AFDC Unemployed Parent Program
Iowa
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
Food Stamp Program
HHS Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
JOBS Program
Iowa Limited Benefit Plan
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate
May 1997
WELFARE REFORM - STATES' EARLY
EXPERIENCES WITH BENEFIT
TERMINATION
GAO/HEHS-97-74
Welfare Benefit Termination
(106611)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AFDC - Aid to Families With Dependent Children
CWEP - Community Work Experience Program
HHS - Department of Health and Human Services
HUD - Department of Housing and Urban Development
JOBS - Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training
LIHEAP - Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program
SSI - Supplemental Security Income
TANF - Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
TEEM - Training, Education, Employment, and Management
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-276396
May 15, 1997
The Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
Dear Senator Moynihan:
This report, prepared at your request, examines states' early
experiences with benefit terminations under welfare reform. The
report focuses on the extent to which states have used benefit
termination provisions, what happens to families after termination,
and states' experiences in implementing these provisions.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman, Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members,
Committee on Ways and Means and its Subcommittee on Human Resources,
House of Representatives; the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
the Assistant Secretary for Children and Families; and other
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on
request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please call me at (202) 512-7215 or David P. Bixler, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512-7201. Other GAO contacts and major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix XIII.
Sincerely yours,
Mark V. Nadel
Associate Director
Income Security Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(P.L. 104-193) was enacted in August 1996, instituting the most
fundamental reform of welfare since the program's inception. The new
law ends the individual entitlement to federally supported cash
assistance to needy families with children and provides for
terminating benefits to families failing to comply with program rules
or after a certain time period. With few exceptions, prior federal
welfare law has not allowed states to terminate benefits to an entire
household on the basis of sanctions for noncompliance or a time
limit.\1
Since 1987, however, most states had received waivers from statutory
requirements to experiment with such provisions.
The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance asked
GAO to review states' early experiences with waiver provisions for
benefit termination to provide information useful to other states as
they implement the new law. Specifically, this report describes (1)
those families whose benefits have been terminated under waivers and
why, (2) federal or state benefits that are available and are being
received after termination, and (3) states' experiences in
implementing these provisions.
--------------------
\1 Although referred to here as "prior law," in general, the law in
effect before passage of the new welfare reform law remains in effect
until July 1, 1997, or 6 months after the date the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) receives a state plan regarding
certain provisions. Effective dates could be accelerated at state
option.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Since its inception in 1935, the Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC) program provided benefits to economically
disadvantaged families with children lacking support from one or both
parents because of death, absence, or incapacity. AFDC was funded
with federal and state dollars; states administered the program and
HHS had federal oversight responsibility. States were required to
provide aid to all people eligible under federal law whose income and
assets were within state-prescribed limits. In fiscal year 1996,
AFDC paid benefits of over $20 billion in combined state and federal
funds to about 4.6 million families a month (average nationwide
caseload).
Before the recent reform, federal welfare law limited states' ability
to terminate benefits on the basis of sanctions or time limits.
Since welfare-to-work programs were initiated in 1968, certain
categories of recipients were required to work or participate in
other specified activities; however, if recipients failed to comply
as required, benefits could not be terminated but merely reduced.
With one minor exception, no time limits on benefits were allowed.\2
The new welfare reform law replaces AFDC with block grants to the
states under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). To
encourage work and end welfare dependence, the law has provisions for
terminating benefits for families' failure to comply with work and
child support enforcement requirements and for teen parents' failure
to comply with school attendance and living arrangement requirements.
In addition, the new law imposes a 5-year lifetime time limit on
receiving federal benefits.
Even before this new welfare reform law was passed, states had been
allowed to experiment with benefit termination under section 1115 of
the Social Security Act, which provides authority for HHS to waive
the statutory requirements for AFDC. Between January 1987 and
passage of the new federal welfare reform law in August 1996, 46
states had received approval for waiver provisions experimenting with
their AFDC and welfare-to-work programs, including 33 states with
benefit termination provisions similar to the new federal law's.\3
With increased flexibility under the new law, many states have
incorporated their benefit termination waiver provisions into the
state plans required by the new law.
To obtain information for this request, GAO reviewed the law and
discussed benefit termination issues with federal officials and
experts from private research organizations. GAO surveyed states
with waiver provisions for benefit termination based on sanctions or
time limits to (1) determine whose benefits have been terminated and
on what basis and (2) select three states with large numbers of
terminations for more detailed study. In each of these three
states--Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin--GAO analyzed statewide
automated and case file data to determine which families were being
terminated and why and federal or state benefits that were available
and were being received after termination (see app. I). To explore
states' experiences in implementing benefit termination provisions,
GAO staff talked to state officials, caseworkers, and representatives
of welfare advocacy groups.
--------------------
\2 Under the Unemployed Parent program, 12 states were allowed to
impose time limits on benefits for two-parent families.
\3 The term "state" includes the District of Columbia in this report.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
So far, states have seldom used benefit termination provisions.
Moreover, of the 18,000 families whose benefits were terminated under
waivers through December 1996, more than 99 percent failed to comply
with program requirements. Most terminations took place in Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin (referred to as "case study" states).
Through June 1996, prior recipients' failure to comply with new
enrollment requirements accounted for over half the terminations
nationwide. By the end of December 1996, failure to comply with work
requirements increased by one-third and became the most significant
reason for termination. Recipients' explanations for this
noncompliance included wanting to stay at home with their children
and an unwillingness to do community service or work for low wages.
Terminating a family's AFDC benefit represented the loss of a
significant source of monthly income. Although more than 80 percent
of the families in the cases GAO studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin were subsequently found to have some source of support or
had returned to welfare, the percentages of such families receiving
food stamps and Medicaid declined significantly after termination.
Before termination, the percentage of cases receiving these benefits
ranged from 84 to 100 percent; after termination, it ranged from 26
to 61 percent. Many families did not take the steps necessary to
continue to receive these program benefits after losing AFDC, even
though the waivers provided for program eligibility to be unaffected
unless other family circumstances changed.
Officials in the three states studied generally believed their
benefit termination provisions had improved program effectiveness by
contributing to increases in work activity, job placements, and
families moving off welfare more quickly. These officials emphasized
that only a small percentage of cases had been terminated.
Nevertheless, they acknowledged that implementing these provisions
had been challenging. For example, states had to develop systems to
accurately track hours worked to monitor compliance and to correctly
and adequately notify recipients of pending termination actions. In
addition, states had to provide certain activities and services
before they could terminate a family's benefits. These states'
experiences with benefit termination provisions under waivers
highlight the challenges all states may face in implementing similar
provisions of the new welfare reform law.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
MOST FAMILIES' BENEFITS
TERMINATED ON THE BASIS OF
SANCTIONS IN A FEW STATES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Through December 1996, 14 of the 33 states with benefit termination
provisions had not terminated any families' benefits. Of the 19
states that had terminated benefits, 7 had terminated benefits in
fewer than 100 cases, according to available data.\4 In addition to
relatively small, less urban caseloads, many states had a gradual
phase-in of the program, which limited the number of families whose
benefits were terminated. In addition, the program's
structure--which either required a minimum amount of time to elapse
before termination or excluded large portions of the caseload from
coverage--limited the number of terminations. States' view of the
role of benefit termination in their programs also affected the
number of cases terminated. For example, some states continued to
assume primary responsibility for ensuring that recipients complied
with program requirements and viewed benefit termination as a failure
of their programs to work as intended. These states established
rigorous processes to keep the number of terminations low. In
contrast, other states sought to shift primary responsibility for
compliance to recipients and viewed benefit termination as a needed
strengthening of their sanctions to enforce recipients' obligation to
move toward self-sufficiency. Most terminations took place in the
latter states. The three states with the most terminations--Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin--all shared this view and accounted for
about 13,000 of the approximately 18,000 (or about 72 percent)
terminations nationwide through December 1996.
Between June and December 1996, the proportion of terminations
nationwide based on failure to comply with enrollment requirements
decreased from 57 to 44 percent; terminations based on failure to
comply with work requirements increased from 34 to 47 percent. The
proportion of terminations for failure to comply with other
requirements--such as child support enforcement, teen parent school
attendance, and teen parent living arrangements--remained constant at
about 8 percent. Less than 1 percent lost benefits because of a time
limit, although this percentage will probably change as increasing
numbers of families begin reaching their time limits.
State surveys and discussions with caseworkers in selected sites
provided various explanations for families' failure to comply. For
example, state and local officials suggested that some families may
have had unreported employment, extended family support, or other
sources of income. According to state surveys and case file notes,
families did not comply for such reasons as not feeling well; caring
for a sick household member; wanting to stay home with their
children; wanting to follow their own career plans, including higher
education; and an unwillingness to do community service or work for
low wages.
In general, the demographic characteristics of families whose
benefits had been terminated in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin
were similar to the characteristics of families in the states'
overall caseloads. The most significant variations resulted from the
structure of states' programs. For example, a disproportionately
high number of parents under age 20 had their benefits terminated in
Massachusetts, which imposed school attendance and living arrangement
requirements on teen parents.
--------------------
\4 Neither North Carolina nor Ohio had data on the number of cases
terminated; data from Oregon were available only through Nov. 15,
1996 (see app. II).
AFTER LOSS OF AFDC, FAMILIES
HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF
SUPPORT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Under most states' waiver provisions, families whose benefits were
terminated for noncompliance could have had their AFDC cases reopened
if they subsequently complied with program requirements. From 18 to
47 percent of such families returned to welfare, according to
available data from seven states. In Massachusetts and Wisconsin,
about one-third of families whose benefits had been terminated after
enrollment subsequently had their cases reopened because of
demonstrated compliance or documented exemption or because their
cases had been closed due to administrative error, according to an
analysis of state data. In Iowa, families whose benefits are
terminated must wait 6 months before reapplying; however, once this
period had elapsed, about one-third of families studied also had
returned to welfare.
AFDC provided a significant source of income for most families before
termination, including those studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin. After AFDC benefits had been terminated, between 43 and
48 percent of the cases studied in these three states included
household members who reported income from wages, pensions, or child
support; and most likely, additional households had support that did
not have to be reported. In addition, about 75 percent of terminated
cases studied included household members who were receiving benefits
from one or more other federal programs--such as food stamps,
Supplemental Security Income, housing assistance, or Medicaid.\5
Although in many cases the sources of support were a continuation of
income or benefits that were being received before termination, the
percentage of cases receiving food stamps and Medicaid declined
significantly. Reductions ranged from 23 to 70 percent among cases
not returning to welfare. According to waiver provisions of all
three states, termination was not to affect eligibility to receive
these program benefits,\6 but many families did not take the steps
necessary to keep their benefits after losing AFDC, even though they
may have continued to be eligible. Because reported income and
receipt of benefits provide only a limited indication of the
well-being of families losing AFDC, states tried to locate such
families and determine their status.
--------------------
\5 GAO used household as the unit of analysis, which may include
household members not included in the AFDC family unit used for
determining AFDC eligibility and calculating AFDC benefit levels
before termination.
\6 In Wisconsin, however, termination of AFDC benefits could result
in a sanction reducing the food stamp allotment to $10 per month.
TERMINATION PROVISIONS WERE
EFFECTIVE BUT POSED
CHALLENGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
In all three case study states, benefit termination provisions had
encouraged those with other means of support to move off welfare more
quickly and those who truly needed assistance to cooperate more fully
with program requirements, according to state officials. Declines in
all three states' caseloads exceeded the national average. While
crediting the economy as a major factor, state officials believed at
least some of the decline was due to their waiver programs and that
the threat of benefit termination had significantly improved program
participation. Officials reported increases in job placements in all
three states.
In implementing these provisions, however, states faced challenges in
establishing systems to track recipients' work participation to
accurately determine when benefits should be terminated for
noncompliance and in adequately notifying recipients of these
actions. This was particularly true in Wisconsin, where monthly
benefits and sanctions were based on the number of hours worked in a
previous month and the state tried to implement its complex
provisions statewide with no pilot program. In Milwaukee County, 44
percent of benefit termination notices through August 1996 were
subsequently reversed because county officials determined that
program requirements had been met or the sanctions had been based on
inaccurate data.
Providing enough services to afford recipients a reasonable
opportunity to comply with requirements and avoid termination posed
another challenge for states. To meet increased demand for
activities and services under their new programs, all three states
opened or expanded job centers to help with job search activities,
created new partnerships with employers to provide placements, and
increased funds for child care. Despite such efforts, however, both
welfare advocates and state officials raised concerns that workers
were not adequately trained in case management. In addition, high
caseloads and complex new program rules prevented workers from paying
enough attention to individual cases to ensure that recipients, many
with barriers to employability, were assigned appropriate work
requirements and provided sufficient supports. For example, state
reviewers in Iowa found that 50 percent of the cases referred for
sanction for noncompliance with work requirements had not received
sufficient case management and the cases had been sent back to the
caseworkers for more services.
Although state officials acknowledged these challenges, they
maintained that the guiding principle of their new
programs--consistent with the new federal reform law--is that it is
ultimately the recipients' responsibility to either comply with
program requirements, inform their caseworkers of any barrier to
employment or service need, provide good cause reason for
noncompliance, or have their benefits terminated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
GAO obtained comments on a draft of this report from the three case
study states: Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The states
generally agreed with the report's findings and made technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Comments were
requested but were not received from HHS.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
With the stated intent of making our nation's welfare system "more
consistent with fundamental American values--by rewarding work and
self-reliance, encouraging personal responsibility, and restoring a
sense of hope in the future," the Congress enacted the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (P.L.
104-193) in August 1996. The law was passed amid a growing number of
families receiving benefits and increasing dissatisfaction with the
system (see fig. 1.1). Although more recently, caseloads had begun
to decline, many people continued to criticize a system that they
believed discourages work and encourages dependency and that,
according to the Congress, failed to promote personal responsibility.
Figure 1.1: Percentage of
Families Nationwide Receiving
Benefits From Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC),
1970-95
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Sources: Social Security Bulletin, "Annual Statistical Supplement -
1995," table 9.G1; Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1996;
and the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Series
P20-488, "Household and Family Characteristics: March 1995" and
earlier reports.
The new federal welfare reform law ended an individual's entitlement
to welfare benefits and replaced it with a block grant to the states,
changing the fundamental structure of the more than 60-year-old
welfare system. Among its provisions, the new law allows states to
terminate benefits to a family on the basis of penalties (called
sanctions) for noncompliance and requires states to terminate federal
benefits to a family who has reached a 5-year time limit. With few
exceptions, prior federal welfare law did not allow states to
terminate a family's benefits on the basis of sanctions or time
limits; however, it did allow for states to obtain waivers to
experiment with termination provisions.\7
--------------------
\7 Although referred to here as "prior law," in general, the law in
effect before the new welfare reform law was passed remains in effect
until July 1, 1997, or for 6 months after the date HHS receives a
state plan regarding certain provisions. Effective dates could be
accelerated at state option.
THE WELFARE SYSTEM BEFORE
RECENT FEDERAL REFORM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Since its inception in 1935, AFDC provided benefits to economically
needy families with children lacking support from one or both parents
because of death, absence, or incapacity. AFDC was funded with
federal and state dollars. States administered the program, and HHS
had federal oversight responsibility. States were required to
provide aid to all people eligible under federal law whose income and
assets were within state-prescribed limits. In fiscal year 1996,
over $20 billion in combined state and federal funds were paid in
benefits to a nationwide caseload that averaged about 4.6 million
families a month. Families with children could receive benefits if
they conformed with income eligibility criteria and lacked parental
support, until 1968 when work incentives and welfare-to-work programs
were established.\8 These programs introduced the ideas of mutual
obligation and transitional benefits, reflecting an expectation that
the recipient should move toward self-sufficiency in exchange for
welfare benefits and that receiving benefits should be temporary--not
a way of life. With passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, the
Congress combined elements of these earlier programs into a single,
more comprehensive program: Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Training (JOBS). The act also expanded the Unemployed Parent
program, introducing time-limited benefits for two-parent families in
some states.\9
The purpose of the JOBS program was to ensure that AFDC families
obtained the education, training, and employment that would help them
avoid long-term welfare dependence. JOBS required states to develop
employability plans based on assessments of each recipient's
employability skills and supportive services needs. JOBS also
required states to offer a broad range of education, training, and
work-related activities. States were further required to guarantee
child care if necessary for the recipient to work or participate in
education and training or other activities specified under JOBS and
to pay or reimburse recipients for transportation and other
work-related expenses. Recipients, on the other hand, who were
able-bodied individuals aged 16 or older were required to participate
in the activities specified in their employability plans. If a
recipient failed to comply with program requirements without good
cause, benefits could be reduced by the amount attributable to the
noncomplying recipient, but the entire family's benefits could not be
terminated.
More than half of AFDC recipients were exempt from participating in
JOBS, however, most often because they were caring for a young
child,\10 and a large portion of the nonexempt recipients were not
required to participate due to limited state funding. Historically,
less than a third of those required to participate actually
participated in JOBS because, according to program administrators,
the states could not provide all the needed services and
assistance.\11
--------------------
\8 See Welfare to Work: States Begin JOBS, but Fiscal and Other
Problems May Impede Their Progress (GAO/HRD-91-106, Sept. 27, 1991),
pp. 10-11.
\9 Beginning in 1961, states were given the option of providing AFDC
to two-parent families who were needy due to the unemployment of the
principal wage earner. The Family Support Act of 1988 required all
states to implement such programs, and those states that did not
already have a program in place were allowed to impose a time limit
on the receipt of benefits. The 29 states and territories with
programs already in place were required to continue operating their
programs with no time limit. However, remaining states implementing
new programs were allowed to deny benefits to two-parent families
once they had received benefits for at least 6 of the preceding 12
months. As of February 1996, 12 of these states had chosen to impose
time limits on benefits for two-parent families.
\10 Other recipients exempted from participation in JOBS included
those who were ill, incapacitated, or of advanced age; needed in the
home because of the illness or incapacity of another family member;
the parent or other relative of a child under age 3 (or younger than
3 but not younger than age 1 at states' option) who was personally
providing the care for the child; employed 30 or more hours a week; a
child under age 16 or attending an elementary, secondary, or
vocational school full time; a woman who was in at least the second
trimester of pregnancy; or residing in an area where the program was
not available.
\11 Federal matching funds for JOBS were available as a capped
entitlement, set at $1.0 billion in fiscal year 1996. See also
Welfare to Work: Current AFDC Program Not Sufficiently Focused on
Employment (GAO/HEHS-95-28, Dec. 19, 1994), pp. 5-8.
BENEFIT TERMINATION UNDER
WELFARE REFORM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The new federal welfare reform law ended the AFDC program, including
JOBS, and replaced it with block grants to the states under a new
title, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF allows
states more flexibility to operate programs designed to end
dependence on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriage. To accomplish these goals, states must submit plans
reflecting the obligations of both the state and the recipient.
These plans must outline how the state intends to conduct a program
that provides recipients with job preparation, work, and support
services enabling them to leave welfare and become self-sufficient as
well as how the state intends to require recipients to engage in
work.
To encourage recipients to fulfill their obligations, the law
includes provisions allowing states to terminate benefits to a family
for failure to comply with work and other requirements. After no
more than 24 months of receiving benefits (whether or not
consecutive), parents and caretakers must engage in work. The
recipient must work a minimum average of 20 hours a week (increasing
to 30 hours a week by the year 2000) in most circumstances to meet
this requirement. Unmarried teen parents under age 18 who do not
attend high school (or its equivalent), or who do not live with their
parents, legal guardian, or other adult relative, may not receive
assistance under TANF unless extenuating circumstances exist, as
specified in the law.\12 In addition, states are allowed to deny TANF
benefits to a family for not cooperating with child support
enforcement actions, including establishing paternity, or
establishing, modifying, or enforcing a support order. The new law
generally allows states to use their discretion in establishing
criteria for exempting families from these requirements; however, the
extent to which states exercise this discretion could affect their
ability to meet prescribed participation rates and avoid financial
penalties.
To ensure that assistance is temporary for most recipients, the law
also includes provisions for a 5-year lifetime time limit on benefit
receipt. After no more than 60 months of benefit receipt (whether or
not consecutive) by an adult in the family, the family may no longer
receive any federal assistance under the program. By allowing up to
20 percent of the caseload to be exempt from the time limit, the law
intends to protect those who experience genuine and intractable
hardship.
--------------------
\12 The new welfare reform law specifies that requiring teen parents
to live with their parents, legal guardians, or other adult relatives
would not be appropriate when (1) the teen parent has no living
parents, legal guardian, or other appropriate adult relative with
whom to live or the whereabouts of such individuals are unknown; (2)
such individuals will not allow the teen parent to live with them;
(3) the state determines that the teen parent is, has been, or may be
subject to serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or
exploitation in such individuals' home; or (4) the state determines
it is in the best interest of the teen to waive the requirement. In
cases in which living with parents, legal guardians, or other adult
relatives is not an option for the teen parent, the state must help
the teen locate an alternative adult-supervised living arrangement,
unless it determines that the teen parent's current living
arrangement is appropriate.
STATES' WAIVER PROVISIONS FOR
TERMINATION GENERALLY SIMILAR
TO NEW LAW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Although prior law limited states' ability to terminate benefits to
entire households on the basis of sanctions or time limits, it did
provide a way for states to experiment with such provisions. Section
1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to
grant states waivers of statutory requirements for the AFDC program,
including JOBS. Between January 1987 and the passage of welfare
reform in August 1996, 46 states\13 had received approval to
implement waiver provisions experimenting with changes to their AFDC
and JOBS programs, including 33 states that had provisions to
terminate benefits to entire families either for failure to comply
with program requirements or for reaching a time limit.\14 Such
provisions reflected states' belief that they needed stronger
measures to deal effectively with recipients who fail to meet program
requirements.\15 With their increased flexibility under the new
federal reform law, many states have incorporated their benefit
termination waiver provisions into their new state plans.\16
Thirty-one states had received approval to implement waiver
provisions terminating benefits to entire families (referred to as
full-family sanctions) for failure to comply with one or more
requirements similar to those in the new welfare reform law. In most
cases, such families could have had their benefits restored upon
compliance with the requirements; but in some cases families must
wait several months before being eligible to reapply. (For a more
detailed description of states' full-family sanction provisions, see
app. III.)
Fourteen states had received approval to implement waiver provisions
terminating benefits to a family after a specified of time period,
somewhat similar to the time-limit provision in the new welfare
reform law. However, states' waiver provisions to terminate benefits
due to a time limit differed from the new law in significant ways,
such as allowing an unlimited percentage of cases to be exempt and
providing for extensions or the opportunity to reapply after a
certain time period had elapsed.\17 (For a more detailed description
of states' time-limit provisions, see app. IV.)
--------------------
\13 The term "state" includes the District of Columbia in this
report.
\14 Under prior law, states could also choose to terminate a family's
benefits on the basis of failure to comply with teen living
arrangements without a waiver.
\15 See Welfare Waivers Implementation: States Work to Change
Welfare Culture, Community Involvement, and Service Delivery
(GAO/HEHS-96-105, July 2, 1996), pp. 30-32.
\16 In addition, the new law provides states the option of continuing
under certain conditions to implement any waiver provisions in effect
or requested before enactment of the new law if approved by July 1,
1997.
\17 In addition, several of these and other states had time-limit
provisions that called for imposing some consequence other than
benefit termination upon reaching a time limit, including work
requirements, benefit reduction, or use of vouchers. (See app. IV.)
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance asked
us to review states' early experiences with benefit termination
provisions under waivers to provide information useful to other
states as they implement the new law. Specifically, this report
describes (1) those families whose benefits have been terminated
under waivers and why, (2) federal or state benefits that are
available and are being received after termination, and (3) states'
experiences in implementing these provisions.
To obtain information for this request, we reviewed the law and
discussed benefit termination issues with federal officials and
experts from private research organizations. To determine which
states had terminated benefits under waivers and the bases for those
terminations, we examined waivers approved from January 1987 through
passage of the new law in August 1996 and surveyed all states with
approved benefit termination provisions. To determine whose benefits
had been terminated, identify what federal or state benefits were
available and were being provided after termination, and describe
states' experiences in implementing these provisions, we selected
Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin (three states with large numbers
of terminations) for more detailed study. In each of these states,
we chose a group of families whose AFDC benefits had been terminated
and relied upon state and federal automated records to determine if
these families were receiving benefits from various programs,
including food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, housing
assistance, and Medicaid. We also identified other sources of income
to the extent such information was reported, including partial data
on wages, pensions, and child support. (See app. I for a more
detailed discussion of case selection and analysis of automated
data.) To identify implementation issues, we discussed the provisions
with state officials and representatives of welfare advocacy groups
and caseworkers in selected sites.
We conducted our work between April 1996 and April 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
MOST FAMILIES' BENEFITS TERMINATED
ON THE BASIS OF SANCTIONS IN A FEW
STATES
============================================================ Chapter 2
Of the 33 states with waiver provisions to terminate AFDC benefits on
the basis of full-family sanctions or a time limit, most had
terminated the benefits of few, if any, families through December
1996. Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin had the highest number of
terminations. Of the 18,000 families whose benefits were terminated
nationwide, over 99 percent had failed to comply with program
requirements. Most failed to comply with new JOBS enrollment or work
requirements. The demographic characteristics of families losing
their AFDC benefits in these three states were generally comparable
to the characteristics of families in the states' overall caseloads.
The most significant variations were due to the state programs'
structure.
MOST STATES HAD FEW, IF ANY,
TERMINATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Through December 1996, 14 of the 33 states with benefit termination
provisions had not terminated the benefits of any families on the
basis of such provisions. (See fig. 2.1.) Of the 19 states that had
terminated benefits, 7 had terminated fewer than 100 cases, according
to available data.\18 Less than half of the 19 states had terminated
benefits for families living in large urban areas with populations
over 500,000--either because the state had no large urban areas or
because the waiver provisions had not been implemented statewide.
(For a more detailed description of states terminating benefits, see
app. II.)
Figure 2.1: States Terminating
Benefits to Families as of
December 31, 1996
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: NA = not available.
\a According to state officials surveyed, North Carolina and Ohio had
terminated benefits for some families because of noncompliance with
program requirements under waivers as of Dec. 31, 1996, but their
data systems could not provide the number of families losing
benefits.
\b Data from Oregon were available only through Nov. 15, 1996.
--------------------
\18 Neither North Carolina nor Ohio had data on the number of cases
terminated; data from Oregon were available only through Nov. 15,
1996 (see app. II).
PROGRAM STRUCTURE LED TO FEW
TERMINATIONS IN MOST STATES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
In addition to some states' having relatively small, less urban
caseloads, many had a limited number of terminations because of the
program's being gradually phased in, requiring a minimum amount of
time to elapse before termination, or excluding large portions of the
caseload from coverage. States' views of the role of benefit
termination in their programs also affected the number of families
losing benefits.
NOT ENOUGH TIME HAD
ELAPSED
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:1.1.1
Most of the 33 states with benefit termination provisions based on
either full-family sanctions or a time limit began implementing their
programs in 1995 and 1996. Because of this, not enough time had
elapsed through December 1996 for families to have been in the
programs long enough to have had full-family sanctions imposed or to
have reached a time limit. In some states, no terminations were yet
possible due to the structure of the programs. In addition, for
recipients cycling on and off welfare, the length of time required to
reach a time limit is extended beyond when it would have been met if
benefits had been received continuously.\19
Among the 26 states with termination provisions based on
noncompliance with work requirements, most terminated benefits only
after a specified time period had been reached (referred to as a
"work trigger")\20 or graduated sanctions imposed. For example,
Delaware and North Dakota had work trigger time limits of 24 months;
Vermont had a 30-month time limit for most families.\21 Other states,
such as Illinois, had graduated sanction processes lasting 6 months
to a year before terminating benefits. These states had terminated
the benefits of relatively few, if any, families.
Among the 14 states with termination provisions based on a time
limit, most allowed families to receive benefits for at least 24
months or longer before termination. Only one state, Florida, had
implemented its program long enough to have terminated the benefits
of any families because of a time limit through December 1996.\22
--------------------
\19 Researchers using monthly data have found that no more than 30
percent of recipients receive welfare in 24 consecutive months. Many
recipients leave welfare for a month or two and then cycle back on.
(See LaDonna Pavetti, The Number and Characteristics of Families Who
Will Potentially Be Affected by Policies to Time-Limit AFDC Benefits,
The Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.: 1996)).
\20 Of the 26 states terminating benefits on the basis of work
requirements, 12 provided for the requirements to be imposed after
work triggers ranging from 60 days to 60 months of receiving
benefits. The other 14 states either imposed the work requirement
immediately on families entering the program or set the length of
time before imposing the requirement on a case-by-case basis.
\21 Vermont had a work trigger time limit of 15 months for two-parent
families.
\22 In addition, Florida initially implemented its program in only 2
of its 67 counties (Alachua and Escambia), covering no large urban
areas. Because of the program's structure, terminations through
December 1996 based on Florida's time limit were restricted to these
two initial counties, which covered only about 8,000 families (or
about 4.3 percent) of a statewide caseload of about 187,000 families.
LARGE PORTIONS OF
CASELOADS EXCLUDED
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:1.1.2
Some states limited implementation of their waiver programs to
selected sites; those implementing their programs statewide generally
phased in implementation over periods lasting up to a year. Thus,
these states initially excluded large segments of their caseloads.
In addition, some states initially excluded large portions of their
caseloads from benefit termination primarily on the basis of
exemptions.\23 Variation in states' exemption provisions, especially
regarding the age of the youngest child, significantly affected the
portion of the caseload exempted from work requirements. For
example, Iowa set its age-of-youngest-
child exemption at 6 months and excluded 24 percent of its caseload
from having to comply with work requirements; Massachusetts set its
age-of-youngest-child exemption at 6 years and excluded 69 percent of
its caseload from having to comply with work requirements. (See app.
V.)
Under the new welfare reform law, states still have discretion in
establishing criteria for exempting families from work and other
requirements, with few exceptions.\24
The extent to which they exercise this discretion, however, will
affect their ability to meet the prescribed participation rates and
avoid financial penalties.\25
--------------------
\23 Families were also excluded from the waiver provisions because
they were assigned to a control group for evaluation purposes or for
other reasons (see app. V).
\24 For example, the law stipulates that a state may not reduce or
terminate assistance on the basis of a refusal to work if the
household includes a single parent and a child under 6 years old and
child care is unavailable due to (1) unavailability of appropriate
child care within a reasonable distance from the individual's home or
work site, (2) unavailability or unsuitability of informal child care
by a relative or under other arrangements, and (3) unavailability of
appropriate and affordable formal child care arrangements. Although
exempted, such families must still be counted in determining the
state's participation rate. The law also allows states not to
require a single parent caring for a child under 1 year old to engage
in work and to disregard such families in determining the state's
participation rate.
\25 The new law requires prescribed percentages of a state's caseload
to participate in specified work and work-related activities for the
state to avoid financial penalties. In fiscal year 1997, 25 percent
of a state's caseload must participate; by fiscal year 2002, 50
percent must participate. Separate, higher rates are prescribed for
two-parent families. For further discussion of these issues, see
Welfare Reform: Three States' Approaches Show Promise of Increasing
Participation Rates (GAO/HEHS-97-80, forthcoming report).
ROLE OF BENEFIT
TERMINATION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:1.1.3
Prior law placed primary responsibility for acting to move recipients
toward self-sufficiency on the states by requiring states to provide
specified activities and support services. Under waivers, some
states sought to shift primary responsibility for such action to the
recipients; other states continued to assume primary responsibility
for ensuring that recipients complied with program requirements. The
latter states often viewed benefit termination as a failure of their
program to work as intended. Their waiver programs required
caseworkers to provide intensive case management services, including
home visits if possible, and established a rigorous conciliation and
review process before termination. Such states terminated benefits
only after they had determined that recipients were making an
informed choice, were mentally and physically able to participate,
and barriers to participation had been identified and addressed.
Florida established a review panel consisting of seven community
members to advocate for recipients by reviewing cases of those not
meeting program requirements and finding ways to help, including
requiring provision of additional or new services when appropriate.
After 2 years of implementation, 74 families had reached their time
limits and had their benefits terminated; of these, 31 had a family
member who had found a job or who was working before termination.\26
In Michigan, rigorous conciliation efforts resulted in continued
benefits for 727 (81 percent) of the first 895 cases nearing benefit
termination.
In addition to intensive case management services and rigorous review
processes, some states also had flexible definitions of the
activities required to meet participation requirements, lessening
instances of noncompliance. For example, Utah exempted no one over
age 15 from program participation but defined a wide range of
activities as meeting the requirements. Utah allowed such activities
as attending postsecondary education programs, drug and alcohol
counseling, parenting classes, and even weight-reduction programs for
2 or 3 hours a week, to qualify as meeting the work requirement.
These activities, however, would not meet the more restrictive
definition of participation under the new federal welfare reform
law.\27
After more than a year of using these flexible definitions of
participation, Utah had terminated 180 families' benefits. Nebraska
also used a flexible definition of participation, allowing the hourly
participation requirement to be individually based and requiring
families with a child under 6 months to participate part time in such
activities as family nurturing and pre-employment skills. After more
than a year of implementation, Nebraska had terminated 59 families'
benefits for failure to participate.
--------------------
\26 These families had continued to be eligible for benefits until
reaching their time limit due to the increased amount of earned
income disregarded under the waiver program. In addition, under
Florida's waiver, officials had to determine whether terminating a
family's benefits could result in a child being placed in an
emergency shelter or foster care; if so, the family's benefits would
be reduced but not terminated. Through December 1996, three Florida
families who had reached their time limits continued to receive
reduced benefits because the state determined the children to be at
risk.
\27 The new law requires the recipient to work a minimum average of
20 hours a week (increasing to 30 hours a week by the year 2000) and
stipulates the following limited list of activities as meeting its
definition of work activities: unsubsidized employment, subsidized
private-sector employment, subsidized public-sector employment, work
experience (including work associated with the refurbishing of
publicly assisted housing) if sufficient private-sector employment is
not available, on-the-job training, job search and job readiness
assistance, community service programs, vocational educational
training (not to exceed 12 months for any individual), job skills
training directly related to employment, education directly related
to employment in the case of a recipient without a high school
diploma or certificate of high school equivalency, satisfactory
attendance at secondary school or in a course of study leading to a
certificate of general equivalence in the case of a recipient who has
not completed secondary school or received such a certificate, and
the provision of child care services to an individual who is
participating in a community service program.
THREE STATES ACCOUNT FOR
MOST TERMINATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
Most terminations based on implementation of full-family sanction or
time limit waiver provisions nationwide took place in three states:
Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.\28 Through June 1996, these three
states accounted for about 7,700 of the nearly 9,800 terminations or
about 78 percent. Through December 1996, these states still
accounted for about 13,000 of the approximately 18,000 terminations
or about 72 percent, according to available data.
All three states placed requirements on recipients immediately upon
entry into their new waiver programs. In Iowa, a family's failure to
comply meant placement in a Limited Benefit Plan, leading to benefit
termination. Families in the Limited Benefit Plan were to receive 3
months of full benefits (this period of receiving full benefits was
eliminated in February 1996), followed by 3 months of reduced
benefits and then 6 months of no benefits.\29 Families whose benefits
had been terminated could reapply only after the 6-month period of no
benefits had elapsed. Massachusetts and Wisconsin terminated
benefits more quickly for noncompliance, but families could reapply
at any time and have benefits restored once they had demonstrated
compliance.
Both Massachusetts and Wisconsin had large urban areas; therefore,
although Massachusetts excluded a large portion of its caseload from
coverage, it still had a large number of terminations. Finally, all
three of these states sought to shift primary responsibility for
moving toward self-sufficiency from the state to the recipient and
viewed benefit termination as a needed strengthening of their
sanctions to enforce recipients' obligation to move toward
self-sufficiency. Although the states provided support services to
help recipients become self-sufficient, recipients were responsible
for using these services if they wished to continue to receive AFDC
benefits. With the increased flexibility provided under the new
federal welfare reform law, all three states planned to continue
implementing the basic provisions of their programs. (For a more
detailed description of the benefit termination provisions
implemented as part of the reform programs in Iowa, Massachusetts,
and Wisconsin, see app. VI.)
--------------------
\28 On the basis of data provided in April 1997 as this report went
to press, Virginia also had a large number of terminations, nearly as
many as Massachusetts (see app. II).
\29 After February 1996, families in Iowa's Limited Benefit Plan
immediately entered the 3-month period of reduced benefits, followed
by 6 months of no benefits. In addition, if families entered a
second or subsequent Limited Benefit Plan, they would immediately
enter the 6 months of ineligibility without the initial 3 months of
reduced benefits.
MOST TERMINATIONS WERE BASED ON
FAILURE TO MEET ENROLLMENT AND
WORK REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Nearly all families having their AFDC benefits terminated through
December 1996 failed to comply with various program requirements.
Over 90 percent of terminations were based on failure to comply with
either JOBS enrollment or work requirements, although the proportions
shifted between June and December (see fig. 2.2). In our three case
study states, the demographic characteristics of the families losing
AFDC benefits were generally comparable to those of families in the
states' overall caseloads, with the most significant variations
attributable to the state programs' structure.
Figure 2.2: Bases for
Terminations Nationwide
(See figure in printed
edition.)
\a Terminations based on reaching a time limit were 0.2 percent
through June 1996 and 0.4 percent through Dec. 1996 (not included in
figure).
MANY FAMILIES HAD BENEFITS
TERMINATED IN TRANSITION TO
NEW PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
Over half the families losing their AFDC benefits nationwide failed
to meet new JOBS enrollment requirements under waiver programs, but,
by the end of December 1996, the percentage had dropped below half
(see fig. 2.2). Of the 11 states with termination provisions for
failure to comply with enrollment requirements, 4 states--Iowa, North
Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin--had terminated benefits to
families on the basis of these provisions.\30
In Wisconsin, converting the existing caseload of families to the new
program accounted for the relatively large proportion of terminations
for failure to appear and enroll in JOBS. Once the program was fully
implemented, the state expected that other reasons for termination
would predominate. In the first 4 months of program implementation,
Wisconsin terminated 1,634 ongoing cases for failure to meet this
requirement (about 74 percent of families whose benefits had been
terminated). For the most part, such cases included recipients who
had been under partial sanction for failure to participate in the
previous program but got a second chance to comply with the new
program. When told to enroll in JOBS and participate up to 40 hours
per week, about half of these recipients chose not to do so. Once
the state converted ongoing cases to the new program, cases
terminated for failure to enroll in JOBS were limited to existing
cases involving families who failed to appear after losing an exempt
status (such as families whose youngest child reached the age of 1
year). The state did not identify new applicants' cases as
terminations for failure to enroll in JOBS because they were not
eligible for AFDC benefits unless they first completed 60 hours of
JOBS activities; because these families had received no AFDC
benefits, none had benefits terminated. As expected, over time
monthly caseload statistics reflected a sharp drop in terminations
for failure to enroll--from about 1,300 in May 1996 to about 300 in
September 1996. A Wisconsin program official predicted the number
would level off at a few hundred per month.
Iowa's waiver required families to enter into a Family Investment
Agreement and stipulated a time frame and specific JOBS activities
leading to self-sufficiency. If they failed to enter into an
agreement, families would be placed in a Limited Benefit Plan,
leading to benefit termination. Under Iowa's waiver, however,
families could receive benefits for a limited time even when they
failed to enroll. As a result, although Iowa implemented the program
more than 2 years ago, over 80 percent of terminations continued to
result from families' failure to enter into such agreements.
--------------------
\30 For more details, see app. III for the states with termination
provisions based on enrollment requirements and app. VII for the
number of families whose benefits were terminated due to these
requirements, by state.
INCREASING PROPORTION OF
TERMINATIONS BASED ON
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH WORK
REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
Between June and December 1996, the proportion of families losing
their AFDC benefits due to failure to comply with work requirements
increased nationwide from 34 to 47 percent (see fig. 2.2). Of the
26 states with termination provisions for failure to comply with work
requirements, 15 had terminated benefits to families on the basis of
these provisions. Most states based compliance on recipients'
participation in activities specified in an individualized contract
or plan, with failure to participate resulting in termination. In
addition, some states also terminated benefits for recipients'
failing to accept job offers or quitting jobs. Explanations for
families' failure to comply varied.
The proportion of families losing their AFDC benefits due to failure
to comply with other requirements remained constant at about 8
percent, with less than 1 percent losing benefits due to reaching a
time limit (see fig. 2.2). These proportions are most likely to
change, however, over time and after existing cases are converted to
the new programs. (For details on the bases for termination, by
state, see app. VII.)
NONCOMPLIANCE DUE TO
VARIOUS REASONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.1
Recipients cited various reasons for not complying with work
requirements, according to state surveys of families losing AFDC
benefits and our review of case files in Des Moines, Boston, and
Milwaukee. For example, recipients said they would not participate
because they
wanted to continue an activity that no longer qualified, such as
attending beauty school or college;
were unwilling to do community service or work for low wages;
wanted to stay home with their children;
had other means of support;
did not feel well enough to work; and
needed to care for a sick household member.
In the three case study states, caseworkers generally believed that
families who allowed their benefits to be terminated had sufficient
other sources of income--such as from unreported employment, extended
family support, or other benefit programs. Caseworkers believed that
if such families truly needed the assistance, they would call, come
back into the office, and try to comply. According to surveys and
case file notes, those families whose benefits were terminated often
believed that the work activity available through the program was
beneath them or the family simply disappeared. Many cases were later
reopened or had other sources of support (see ch. 3). Welfare
advocacy groups have raised concerns that some families may truly
need the assistance and have good cause for their failure to comply
but nevertheless fail to contact the office to explain their
situation. State officials maintain, however, that it is recipients'
responsibility--not the caseworker's--to either comply or to inform
caseworkers of any good cause reason for noncompliance.\31
--------------------
\31 For further discussion of these issues, see Evelyn Z. Brodkin,
"The State Side of the `Welfare Contract': Discretion and
Accountability in Policy Delivery," Social Security Administration
Working Paper No. 6, Social Security Administration (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 1995.)
STATES HAVE LIMITED
EXPERIENCE WITH
TERMINATIONS BASED ON
TIME LIMITS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.2
Of the 14 states with termination provisions based on time limits,
only 1 state, Florida, had families reaching their time limits
through December 1996. Under Florida's waiver, families reaching
their time limits were allowed extensions and a job guarantee if they
had substantially complied with program requirements. Of the 74
Florida families whose benefits were terminated due to reaching a
time limit as of December 1996, 43 families had substantially
complied with program requirements and 31 families had not. All 43
families who complied nevertheless had their benefits terminated: 31
were employed and had continued to be eligible for AFDC until
reaching their time limits only because of the waiver's higher earned
income disregard provisions, and the remaining 12 recipients got job
offers from the state upon reaching their time limits) that they
declined for various reasons. The 31 families who did not comply
with program requirements had their benefits terminated and received
no job offers upon reaching their time limits.\32 In addition, more
than 30 families left the program voluntarily before reaching the
time limit because of employment or to retain some months of
eligibility for the future.
--------------------
\32 Another four Florida families who had not complied with program
requirements also had reached their time limit as of Dec. 1996 but
did not have their benefits terminated: three families continued to
receive reduced benefits because the state determined that the
children may be at risk for placement in foster care, and one family
had benefits reinstated upon appeal.
PROPORTIONS WILL MOST
LIKELY CHANGE OVER TIME
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.3
The proportion of families whose benefits are terminated due to time
limits will most likely increase significantly over time, although
this proportion was negligible in the early stages of program
implementation. As more families in Florida and the other 13 states
with time-limit waiver provisions begin to reach their time limits,
the number of such terminations will most likely increase
significantly. Under the new federal welfare reform law, families in
all 50 states will begin to reach the 5-year federal time limit and
have their benefits terminated in the year 2001 or 2002.
In addition, the proportion of terminations based on failure to
comply with work requirements will most likely increase over time,
compared with other nonwork requirements. Many states' waivers
called for work requirements to be imposed after a specified time
period, allowing families--including new applicants--to be enrolled
in the program and to receive benefits for a time without having to
comply. As a result, states would almost always identify cases
closed due to failure to comply with work requirements as
terminations. In contrast, those states with waivers calling for
benefit termination for failure to comply with other, nonwork
requirements often treated those other requirements as eligibility
criteria. As a result, states would identify as terminations only
ongoing cases that became subject to the requirements and failed to
comply. Thus, like the proportion of terminations for failure to
appear and enroll, the proportion of terminations for failure to
comply with these nonwork requirements often primarily reflected the
conversion of existing cases to the new programs during initial
implementation and will most likely decline once programs are fully
implemented. This trend will most likely continue under the new
federal welfare reform law as well because states may still provide
up to 24 months of federal benefits to families before imposing work
requirements; while states must impose school attendance and living
arrangement requirements on teen parents immediately as eligibility
criteria.\33
--------------------
\33 Under the new law, states have an incentive to keep the period of
time brief for which they provide benefits to families before
imposing work requirements, however, because participation rates and
federal funding levels under the block grant could be affected (see
footnote 25).
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES
LOSING AFDC VARIED DUE TO
STATE PROGRAMS' STRUCTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3
The characteristics of families losing AFDC benefits were generally
representative of states' overall caseloads. In Iowa, Massachusetts,
and Wisconsin, most of the families studied reflected the states'
overall caseloads: they had been receiving assistance less than 3
years and comprised a female head of household aged 20 to 39, with
one or two children (see app. VIII). The most significant
variations resulted from the structure of states' programs regarding
requirements placed on teen parents and the age-of-youngest-child
exemption.
In Massachusetts, for example, which had termination provisions for
families headed by teen parents who fail to comply with requirements
for school attendance and living arrangement, a disproportionately
high percentage of terminated cases studied were headed by a parent
under age 20. Although teen-headed families constituted about 6
percent of the state's overall caseload, they accounted for almost 19
percent of the terminated cases studied as of June 1996.
In addition, states' provisions for the age-of-youngest-child
exemption resulted in disproportionately fewer families with children
under the designated age having their benefits terminated. For
example, in Wisconsin, families were exempt if their youngest child
was under age 1. Such families constituted more than 18 percent of
the state's total caseload but less than 3 percent of the terminated
cases studied.\34 Similarly, Iowa exempted families if their youngest
child was under 6 months old.\35
Families with a child under age 1 constituted about 12 percent of the
state's total caseload but less than 7 percent of the terminated
cases studied. Massachusetts did not impose a mandatory work
requirement on families if their youngest child was under age 6.
Such families constituted 61 percent of the state's total caseload
but less than 33 percent of the terminated cases studied.\36
Most states had little information on family characteristics, such as
education, work experience, and primary language, for their overall
caseloads compared with those families losing benefits. In
Massachusetts, which did gather such data, recipients in families
losing their benefits were less likely to have finished high school
or to have worked in the past 10 years. (See app. IX.) Most of
these differences could be attributed, however, to the
disproportionately large percentage of teen parents among the
families losing their benefits. In Michigan, where state officials
also compiled data on the educational background of heads of
household, the data indicated that although 38 percent of the total
caseload was headed by a recipient who had not completed high school
or its equivalent, this was true in 61 percent of cases terminated as
of April 1996. Unlike in Massachusetts, however, this difference
could not be attributable to benefit termination provisions for teen
parents failing to comply with school attendance and living
arrangement requirements because Michigan had not yet implemented
such provisions.
--------------------
\34 According to a state analyst who examined these cases,
Wisconsin's terminations of families with a child under 1 year old
were mostly because these were two-parent families. Two-parent
families could only exempt one parent for the care of a child under
age 1, and noncompliance by the other parent resulted in benefit
termination.
\35 Iowa's age-of-youngest-child exemption was lowered to under 3
months of age in a waiver amendment implemented on Nov. 1, 1996.
\36 Massachusetts families with children under age 6 still had other
requirements, such as the teen school attendance and living
arrangement requirements, for which noncompliance resulted in benefit
termination.
AFTER LOSING AFDC, FAMILIES HAD
VARIOUS SOURCES OF SUPPORT
============================================================ Chapter 3
Families losing AFDC benefits lost a significant source of monthly
income. Although more than 80 percent of families in our analysis
were subsequently found to have one or more sources of support, or
had returned to welfare, the number of families continuing to receive
food stamps and Medicaid after losing AFDC dropped significantly in
all three states. Because reported income and receipt of benefits
provide only a partial indication of families' well-being after
losing AFDC, states tried to locate such families and determine their
status.
MANY FAMILIES HAD RETURNED TO
WELFARE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Under most states' waiver provisions, families whose benefits were
terminated for noncompliance could have had their AFDC cases reopened
if they had subsequently complied with program requirements. In
addition, families reaching a time limit could generally have had
their AFDC benefits extended (at least temporarily) if they had
complied with program requirements or could have had their cases
reopened after a specified time period. A few states had variations
to these basic provisions. For example, in Iowa, families placed in
the Limited Benefit Plan leading to benefit termination for not
signing a Family Investment Agreement may choose to comply and sign
such an agreement at any point before termination; once terminated,
however, all families must wait 6 months before their AFDC cases may
be reopened. Under the new federal welfare reform law, families may
have their cases reopened upon compliance only until they reach their
5-year lifetime time limit, after which no further federal cash
benefits may be provided under the TANF grant.
Several states had many families (ranging from about 18 to 47
percent) who lost AFDC benefits due to noncompliance and subsequently
had their cases reopened (see fig. 3.1).\37 In Massachusetts and
Wisconsin, about one-third of enrolled families whose cases had been
closed for noncompliance were subsequently receiving AFDC. States
reopened cases on the bases of demonstrated compliance and documented
exemption or because cases had been closed due to administrative
error. In Iowa, once the 6-month benefit termination period had
elapsed, about one-third of the families studied also had returned to
AFDC rolls.
Figure 3.1: Percentage of
Cases Reopened After
Termination for Noncompliance
(See figure in printed
edition.)
\a In Wisconsin, this figure represents the percentage of cases
reopened for those whose benefits were terminated for noncompliance
after enrolling in JOBS. Those families whose benefits were
terminated for failure to enroll had a much lower percentage of their
cases reopened--about 4 percent.
The number of reopened cases demonstrated that the stronger sanctions
were working as intended--to reinforce the need for recipients to
comply with requirements if they wished to continue receiving
benefits, according to state officials. As one Boston caseworker
said, "Many clients don't take the program seriously until the checks
stop. Loss of just the adult portion of the grant isn't enough to
get their attention. [But] when they get no benefits at all, they're
on the phone with their caseworker right away."\38 In most cases,
recipients agreed to comply or provided a reason for an exemption; in
some cases, however, administrative errors were revealed (see
"Establishing Tracking and Notification Systems Challenged States" in
ch. 4).
--------------------
\37 We gathered data on case status between Sept. and Dec. 1996,
which in most instances represented the case status 2 to 8 months
after case closure but varied by state (see app. I).
\38 Under the JOBS program, the sanction for noncompliance was
removing the adult portion of the grant, commonly referred to as
"reduced benefits" (rather than terminated benefits) or a "partial
sanction" (rather than a full-family sanction).
FAMILIES LOST INCOME, BUT MANY
HAD SOME SOURCES OF SUPPORT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Although AFDC represented a significant source of income for most
families before they lost their benefits, after AFDC benefits were
terminated, at least 75 percent of families studied in Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin reported having some source of income or
benefits.\39 In many cases, families' sources of support were a
continuation of income or benefits received before AFDC termination,
though the amount of reported income increased after termination.
The number of families receiving food stamps and Medicaid
significantly decreased after termination, however, despite waiver
provisions that eligibility was to be unaffected. Although some of
these decreases may have been due to increases in household income,
at least some decreases may have been due to families' no longer
receiving benefits for which they may still have been eligible.
--------------------
\39 We used household as our unit of analysis, which may include
household members not included in the AFDC family unit used for
determining AFDC eligibility and calculating AFDC benefits before
termination. (See app. X for a summary table of the percentage of
households studied receiving reported income and benefits and app. I
for more details on the methodology used in conducting the data
matches.)
FAMILIES LOST A SIGNIFICANT
SOURCE OF INCOME
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
The AFDC monthly benefit represented a significant source of income
for families in states terminating benefits under waivers--not only
because of the average dollar amount of the AFDC benefit, but also
because AFDC was the only reported source of income for some families
(see apps. XI and XII). Among the households studied in Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin whose cases remained closed, average
AFDC payments were smaller than other sources of income before
termination, but AFDC was the only source of income received by all
families (although most also received food stamps). Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and wages were the largest income sources, but
relatively few households reported such income.\40 (See table 3.1.)
Table 3.1
Sources of Income Before Termination for
Households Studied
Percent Percent Percent Percent
of of of of
househol househol househol househol
Average ds Average ds Average ds Average ds
monthly receivin monthly receivin monthly receivin monthly receivin
State amount\a g amount g amount g amount g
--------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Iowa $277 100.0 $279 83.6 $490 9.8 $692 17.4
Massachus 390 100.0 215 95.9 482 12.7 394 14.3
etts
Wisconsin 369 100.0 246\b 76.2 554 12.6 551\c 35.9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Average monthly AFDC benefits lost were lower than the statewide
averages (see app. XI) mainly because many families had been
sanctioned and were receiving reduced benefits before termination.
In addition, under benefit determination standards, families with
earned income often received a reduced AFDC benefit.
\b Does not include those households under food stamp sanction
receiving $10 per month.
\c May include other income such as pensions.
During winter months, fuel assistance provided through the federal
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program was also a significant
source of income. Families on AFDC were generally also enrolled in
this program, but the amount of assistance varied by state as
determined by the state allocation plan. In 1995, households
received fuel assistance averaging $197 a month in Iowa, $348 in
Massachusetts, and $300 in Wisconsin.\41 In addition, about 25
percent of the households studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin lived in subsidized housing.\42
In households in which the amount of the AFDC benefit was low
compared with the amount of other available benefits, states had less
leverage for encouraging compliance through threats of terminating
AFDC benefits. Among cases closed for noncompliance in our case
study states, 25 percent or more of the households were receiving
benefits from two or more other programs before termination, so that
the combined amount perhaps minimized the loss of the AFDC
benefit.\43
--------------------
\40 However, the percentage of families losing AFDC benefits who had
a household member receiving SSI was significantly higher than the
percentage of families in the general AFDC caseload who had a
household member receiving SSI (see apps. X and XII).
\41 No data were gathered for the amount of fuel assistance benefits
received by the individual households in our study because these
benefits were mainly provided only during winter months, and we
conducted our analysis before implementation of the 1997 winter
benefit allocation.
\42 At the time of our review, some families also received $50 per
month from a child support pass-through; however, no data were
available from Iowa and Wisconsin indicating which families received
such payments. The new welfare reform law has eliminated the $50
child support pass-through requirement.
\43 Analysis of benefits received included food stamps, SSI, and
housing assistance. The percentage of cases receiving benefits from
two or more of these programs before termination were 27.9 percent in
Iowa, 33.2 percent in Massachusetts, and 24.6 percent in Wisconsin.
MANY FAMILIES REPORTED
HAVING WAGES, PENSIONS, OR
CHILD SUPPORT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
Between 43 and 48 percent of the households whose AFDC cases remained
closed in Iowa,\44 Massachusetts, and Wisconsin reported having some
income from wages, pensions,\45 or child support after losing AFDC.
Between 23 and 32 percent of households had reported wages (see fig.
3.2). Because not all households had to report such income, these
percentages are likely to be understated. Households not applying
for or receiving AFDC or other benefits did not have to report such
income (about 25 percent of cases studied). In addition, neither
Iowa nor Wisconsin had data on pensions,\46 and all three states had
only partial data on child support.\47 As a result, households in our
study were likely to have additional unreported income, according to
state officials we spoke with.\48
Figure 3.2: Percentage of
Households Reporting Income
After Benefit Termination
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Although in many cases households had reported these sources of
income both before and after termination, some reported changes in
income sources after termination. For example, of those households
with reported wages after termination, about half had reported no
wages before termination, suggesting that household members found new
jobs or that household composition changed.\49 Of those reporting
wages both before and after termination, the amount of monthly wages
increased significantly.\50 (See table 3.2.)
Table 3.2
Reported Wages Before and After
Termination
Average Average
Average monthly wage monthly wage
monthly wage before after
---------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Iowa $667 $648 $741
Massachuse 594 373 540
tts
Wisconsin 754 607 870
----------------------------------------------------------
Note: Includes wages of all household members, including those who
may not have been part of the AFDC family unit before termination.
Despite the increases for some families, the amount of reported
average monthly wages among families losing AFDC still placed them
below the poverty level, even for the smallest family unit of one
adult and one child. This level is $875 a month, according to the
Census Bureau's 1995 poverty thresholds. Wisconsin state officials
pointed out, however, that a low-wage job, combined with the earned
income tax credit, would result in a significantly higher income than
the average AFDC grant--which was $465 a month for a three-person
family in Wisconsin in 1995. Massachusetts state officials agreed
with this observation and noted further that income would be even
greater for families using child care services, Medicaid benefits,
and food stamps (for which earned income is treated more generously
than AFDC income). In addition, officials noted that families with
earned income also realize self-esteem benefits from working and
being productive members of society.
Of those with reported child support income after termination,
average monthly payments received were $274 in Iowa, $249 in
Massachusetts, and $217 in Wisconsin. In accordance with prior
federal law, any child support payments received before termination
would have been signed over to the state, and the families would have
only received a pass-through of up to $50 a month. The new welfare
reform law has eliminated the $50 pass-
through requirement, and states are allowed to keep the full amount
of payments received for families on welfare.
Consistently in all three states, a lower percentage of households in
the urban areas studied had reported income from wages, pensions, and
child support than households in the rest of the state. The
percentage of cases reporting child support revealed the most
significant variations: 10 to 14 percent in Des Moines, Boston, and
Milwaukee, compared with 18 to 29 percent in cases outside these
urban areas. (See app. X for complete data on reported income and
benefits received by cases in urban areas compared with cases studied
in other areas.)
--------------------
\44 At the time of our analysis, 6 months had not yet elapsed and all
the Iowa cases included in our study were still closed.
\45 Pension income includes Social Security, Veterans' Benefits, and
employment-related pensions.
\46 Wisconsin's wage data may include some pension data.
\47 Once no longer receiving AFDC, some families may receive child
support payments privately, which they do not have to report to the
state and local offices of Child Support Enforcement, where we
obtained the child support data.
\48 Even when reporting is required, households sometimes fail to
report wages and other income. See Christopher Jencks and Kathryn
Edin, "The Real Welfare Problem," The American Prospect, No. 1
(1990), pp. 31-50; and Kathryn Edin, Single Mothers and Absent
Fathers: The Possibilities and Limits of Child Support Policy,
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University (New Brunswick,
N.J.: 1994).
\49 In Iowa, the percentage of households that reported wages after
termination but none before termination was 52.6 percent; in
Massachusetts, 61.5 percent; and in Wisconsin, 39.5 percent.
(Wisconsin data may include other income, such as pensions, which was
a likely income source before termination.)
\50 Although some households had members who were working before the
family's benefits were terminated, these families' benefits were,
nevertheless, terminated for noncompliance and are not included in
the statistics on those leaving welfare to go to work. Many of these
families' benefits were terminated for failure to enroll in JOBS. In
other cases, either (1) the household members who were working were
not part of the AFDC assistance unit, (2) those who were working were
part of the assistance unit but were not working consistently enough
to meet states' work requirements or had not reported their wages to
their caseworkers, or (3) the family's benefits were terminated for
failure to comply with some other requirement such as failure to
attend school.
MANY RECEIVE BENEFITS FROM
OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE
PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
As under the waivers, under the new federal welfare reform law,
families whose AFDC benefits are terminated for noncompliance
generally continue to be eligible for benefits from other federal and
state programs.\51 In the case of fuel assistance and housing, the
benefit amount may even increase when income falls from loss of AFDC.
At the time of our review, families continuing to receive food stamps
after their AFDC benefits were terminated also often had an increase
in their monthly food stamp allotment due to losing AFDC.\52
However, federal law now prohibits any increase in food stamps to
families losing AFDC (or TANF) benefits due to sanctions.\53
After losing AFDC, about 75 percent of households studied in Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin received benefits from one or more other
federal programs--including food stamps, SSI, housing assistance, and
Medicaid. Analyzing benefits received separately for each program
revealed variations among states (see fig. 3.3). The ranges of
percentages were fairly consistent for housing, SSI, and Medicaid but
varied significantly for food stamps, partly reflecting the states'
different food stamp policies.
Figure 3.3: Percentage of
Households Receiving Benefits
After Termination, by Program
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\51 The new law, however, provides that states may terminate Medicaid
eligibility for adults who fail to comply with work requirements
under TANF and that states may terminate food stamps to an entire
household if adults fail to comply with work requirements under TANF,
with some restrictions.
\52 On average, the increase ranged from $21 to $51 per month for
households studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. Households
with other sources of income had lowered the average amount of
increases.
\53 Federal regulations (7 C.F.R., Parts 272 and 273) were effective
May 31, 1996; however, states had until Nov. 27, 1996, to implement
the provisions.
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES
RECEIVING FOOD STAMPS AND
MEDICAID DECREASED
SIGNIFICANTLY
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:2.3.1
In general, according to program policies, termination of AFDC
benefits due to noncompliance was not to affect a family's
eligibility for SSI,\54 housing assistance, and Medicaid--and, in
most states, food stamps--unless the family's circumstances changed.
Consistent with these policies, the percentages of households studied
in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin receiving SSI and housing
assistance did not change before and after termination in all three
states; however, the statewide percentages of cases receiving food
stamps and Medicaid decreased significantly, with even greater
reductions in the urban areas. Michigan's study of terminated cases
found similar decreases.\55 While some of the decreases in each state
may legitimately be due to families' finding employment and no longer
meeting income eligibility standards, at least some of the decreases
reflect families' no longer receiving benefits for which they were
still eligible.
To maintain eligibility for food stamps and Medicaid after losing
AFDC benefits, families must continue to meet monthly reporting
requirements and appear for periodic eligibility reviews. To
maintain eligibility for food stamps in Massachusetts, families must
also appear for recertification. When families lose their AFDC
grant, some recipients fail to take the steps necessary to maintain
eligibility even though they would be eligible for continued food
stamp and Medicaid benefits, explained officials in our case study
states. On the basis of an internal review of cases closed for
failure to comply with work requirements over a 2-month period,
Massachusetts state officials concluded that most of such families
might have believed it not worth the effort to seek benefits or, in
fact, might not have been eligible for continued benefits due to
changes in their circumstances following case closure.\56
Nevertheless, officials in all three states expressed surprise at the
amount of the decline in receipt of food stamps and Medicaid among
households losing AFDC benefits (see fig. 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Percentage of
Households Receiving Food
Stamps and Medicaid Before and
After Termination
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Before losing AFDC, virtually all families were covered by Medicaid,
as required under prior federal law. In addition, due to comparable
income eligibility criteria, a high percentage of families receiving
AFDC also received food stamps: the national average was 90 percent
in 1995. After AFDC benefit termination, under most states' waivers
(including Iowa's and Massachusetts's) eligibility for food stamps
was to continue unaffected. In Iowa, state officials viewed
continued receipt of food stamps as part of a safety net for families
during the 6-month period they must wait to reapply for AFDC
benefits.
In contrast, other states' waivers required food stamps to be
sanctioned along with AFDC for failure to meet work requirements.\57
In Wisconsin, waiver provisions linked the two programs so that cases
closed due to failure to comply with JOBS enrollment and work
requirements would have their food stamp allotment reduced to $10 per
month indefinitely (that is, no 2-month limit) if they were not
exempt from the food stamp employment and training program.\58 As
shown in fig. 3.4, this food stamp sanction affected 8.1 percent of
the AFDC cases studied in Wisconsin before closure and 16.3 percent
after closure. Under the new federal welfare reform law, states may
still choose to link the work requirements of the food stamps and
TANF programs.\59
--------------------
\54 Aged, blind, and disabled individuals are eligible for SSI
benefits if they meet specified criteria and federal income
standards. Individuals receiving SSI may not receive AFDC and were
excluded from the benefit calculation for an AFDC family unit; SSI
recipients were included in our analysis of income and benefits of
household members (see footnote 39).
\55 Of those families whose benefits were terminated as of Apr. 1996
in Michigan, after 3 months, food stamp receipt had dropped to 57
percent and active Medicaid status had dropped to 59 percent.
\56 For a more detailed description of this case review and its
findings, see "Other Indicators of Family Well-Being" in this
chapter.
\57 Similar to AFDC, the food stamp program also provided for work
requirements, but the requirements were generally more lenient than
those included in states' AFDC waivers. For example, families with
children under age 6 were exempted from the food stamp work
requirements, and the sanction for failure to meet the requirement
was limited to 2 months.
\58 Wisconsin cases sanctioned but not closed for noncompliance with
AFDC work requirements would have their food stamp benefits reduced
on the basis of hours not worked, similar to the sanctions under AFDC
(see app. VI).
\59 In addition, if states had submitted waiver requests to lower the
age-of-youngest-child exemption, and such requests had been denied as
of Aug. 1, 1996, states were allowed to lower the age of youngest
child to 1 year for the food stamps work requirement, providing for
greater comparability in the two programs' requirements as an
experiment for up to 3 years. Furthermore, the law stipulated that
the food stamp sanction may last up to 6 months but not longer.
AVAILABILITY OF OTHER
SERVICES AND BENEFITS
VARIED
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:2.3.2
In addition to the programs discussed above--food stamps, SSI,
housing, fuel assistance, and Medicaid--states offered other benefits
and services to terminated families; such services varied somewhat by
state. For example, states generally offered mental health and
substance abuse counseling and treatment programs, often within the
same departments administering the AFDC program and with priority
given to AFDC recipients. Massachusetts administered such programs
by a separate department with no direct eligibility links to AFDC.
Of the households whose cases remain closed in Massachusetts, 33.6
percent had used such counseling and treatment services either before
or after termination, with 12.7 percent using services after
termination (including 3.9 percent who began receiving services only
after termination).
In addition, the availability of child care or transportation
assistance for those losing AFDC benefits varied by state. States
generally provided child care and transportation subsidies linked to
the AFDC program, including transitional help for those leaving AFDC
due to employment in all three of our case study states; however, for
those families losing AFDC benefits due to noncompliance,
state-provided subsidies varied. In Iowa, non-AFDC recipients could
receive state-assisted child care if they met the income criteria
(less than 110 percent of the federal poverty level), according to a
state official. Wisconsin also provided child care assistance on a
sliding scale. Although Massachusetts offered a similar child care
assistance program for non-AFDC recipients, funding was limited and
waiting lists were long. Non-AFDC families could expect to wait
several months, or even years, for a subsidized child care slot
depending on the location and type of care needed.
Although many states have general assistance programs (state- and
county-funded assistance programs, generally for adults), families
losing AFDC benefits do not always qualify for such assistance.\60 In
Massachusetts, less than 1 percent of the families studied were
receiving general assistance after losing AFDC. Iowa had no
statewide data on its county-funded general assistance program, and
Wisconsin had discontinued its statewide general assistance program
in January 1996.
--------------------
\60 Of the 42 states with general assistance programs, 12 states
provide assistance to all financially needy people who qualify; 30
states provide assistance only to certain categories of people. Of
these 30, 19 states provide assistance to low-income children or
families with children. (See State General Assistance Programs 1996,
The Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.: 1996.))
OTHER INDICATORS OF FAMILY
WELL-BEING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
Reported income and benefits receipt only partially describe the
well-being of families after losing AFDC. Some families may not
report income, and no data were available for some families. Also,
despite receiving some income and benefits, total household income
may still fall short of the poverty threshold, and children's
well-being may be at risk. In response to concerns about the
well-being of families losing AFDC for noncompliance under waivers,
states have tried to locate such families and determine their status.
In Iowa, the state public health workers have routinely tried to
visit families 1 month after benefit termination to check on their
well-being and make referrals for other services as needed. Of the
5,333 families they tried to visit in the year ending in June 1996,
they contacted less than half (2,270). Of those contacted,
caseworkers found no cases of severe deprivation. Results of their
contacts were as follows:
37 percent no longer need assistance,
18 percent planned to go back on AFDC when eligible,
29 percent received information or referral for other services, and
16 percent refused to cooperate.
In addition, Iowa's contracted evaluators, Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., and the Institute for Social and Economic
Development, conducted a survey of recipients whose cases had been
terminated between November 1995 and January 1996 to determine what
happened after termination. Tentative findings from this study
indicate that the effects of losing cash assistance varied widely.
Forty percent of families' incomes increased after benefit
termination, but nearly half the families' incomes decreased.
Despite such decreases, the study did not find evidence of extreme
economic distress among the survey's 137 respondents.
Massachusetts made a special effort to locate minor teens whose
benefits had been terminated. As of February 1997, state officials
reported that 192 of the 314 teens referred for follow-up (about 61
percent) had returned to welfare or had been located by the two
contractors hired to find and interview these teens. As of our
review, however, data on the status of those not returning to welfare
had not yet been compiled.
In addition, in December 1996, Massachusetts released the results of
a state study to determine the status of families who had left
welfare during September and October 1996. Data on those families
whose benefits had been terminated for noncompliance with work
requirements and who had not returned to welfare showed the
following:
51 percent had new jobs,
16 percent had new living arrangements,
14 percent had new unearned income,
6 percent had moved out of state, and
13 percent were in an "other" category.
Michigan gathered data on the 168 families whose AFDC benefits had
been terminated as of April 1996, surveying the 126 families whose
cases had not been reopened after 3 months. Interviewers did not
complete surveys with 59 (or about 47 percent) of these families
mainly because they could not be located or refused to cooperate. Of
the 67 families interviewed, when asked about their problems and how
they were managing without cash assistance, 22 percent responded that
they were having no problems. A few commented that closing their
case was the best thing that ever happened, that it was the push they
needed, and that it gave them the opportunity to better their lives.
The study concluded that of those interviewed, however, many faced
serious problems, with 27 percent indicating a problem providing
enough food for their family and 29 percent with insufficient money
to provide for personal needs. One family had been evicted, and
seven had received eviction notices. Families said they were getting
by financially by finding jobs and relying on help from family,
friends, or community resources, and some were receiving child
support or SSI; 3 percent said they were "not getting by."
A wide variety of family histories and characteristics may affect a
family's prospects after benefit termination. On the one hand,
according to caseworkers, families with previous work experience or
unreported income are most likely to be doing well. On the other
hand, caseworkers were less optimistic about other families'
prospects. In some cases, because the caseworkers believed the
families' situations were tenuous, they tried repeatedly but to no
avail to contact the families and encourage compliance.
TERMINATION PROVISIONS WERE
EFFECTIVE BUT POSED CHALLENGES
============================================================ Chapter 4
Benefit termination provisions have improved the effectiveness of
welfare programs in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin by increasing
work activity and job placements and decreasing the number of
families on the welfare rolls, state officials believed. In
addition, the percentage of the caseload terminated for noncompliance
was small compared with the total number of cases--generally about 1
percent or less per month. Nevertheless, implementing benefit
termination provisions has posed significant challenges. First,
states had to develop systems to accurately track hours worked to
monitor compliance and to correctly and adequately notify recipients
of pending termination actions. Second, states had to provide
certain activities and services or they could not terminate a
family's benefits.
PROVISIONS RESULTED IN
INCREASED COMPLIANCE AND
DECLINING CASELOADS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Benefit termination provisions in all three states encouraged those
with other sources of income to move off welfare more quickly and
those who truly needed assistance to cooperate more fully with
program requirements, according to state officials. With an
improving economy, welfare caseloads nationwide have generally
declined over the past 3 years; however, the declines in Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin have exceeded the average decline for
the country's 54 states and territories (see fig. 4.1). Wisconsin's
decline for the period was 38 percent, nearly three times the
national average of 13 percent. While crediting the economy as the
major factor, officials in all three states believed at least some of
the declines were due to their waiver provisions. Iowa's program has
succeeded, in part, because the prospect of benefit termination is a
much more effective motivator than the previous adult sanction, which
was a relatively minor grant reduction, according to the state
program administrator. Massachusetts's caseload fell after the
provisions of the new program were publicized in the press and in
mailings to and discussions with recipients. In Wisconsin, when
staff explained the benefit termination policy for noncompliance with
work requirements to new applicants, many chose to accept jobs rather
than go on welfare in the first place, explained state officials.
According to data compiled in one county, 46 percent of 880
applicants deemed likely to have gone on welfare between March and
July of 1996 were diverted from welfare through this process.
Figure 4.1: AFDC Caseload
Declines in Case Study States
Exceeded National Average,
1993-96
(See figure in printed
edition.)
\a Total caseload nationwide divided by 54 states and territories
(District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands).
\b The increase in Iowa's caseload in 1994 was due to the increase in
the amount of income disregarded, which allowed more people to be
eligible for assistance, and the expansion of the program for
two-parent families, according to the program coordinator.
Sources: 1993 to 1996, HHS data on states' total caseloads
representing the average of monthly caseloads during the fiscal year;
Sept. 1996 HHS and state monthly caseload data.
The threat of benefit termination significantly affected program
participation, stated officials in Wisconsin and Massachusetts. In
Wisconsin, in the first 3 months after implementation, participation
in JOBS sessions increased by 36 percent compared with the previous 3
months, according to staff at a Milwaukee job center we visited. In
addition, job placements at the center more than doubled between 1995
and 1996, from about 1,000 to about 2,500. Statewide, Wisconsin
reported 24,000 job placements in 1996. In Massachusetts, in less
than a year after implementing the waiver provisions, cases with
earned income had increased from 8 to 13 percent, and about 12,000
recipients left the rolls by finding work, according to state
officials. In addition, among recipients required to work, the
number participating in work activities increased 28 percent between
June and October 1996. In Iowa, where noncompliance did not result
in immediate termination of benefits, the percentage of recipients
participating in JOBS sessions had not increased significantly, and
state officials said they were considering program changes to impose
sanctions more quickly. Nevertheless, after 2 years of
implementation, state officials reported that 35,000 recipients had
been placed in jobs.
ESTABLISHING TRACKING AND
NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS CHALLENGED
STATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
The states faced challenges in establishing systems to track
recipients' work activity to accurately determine when benefits
should be terminated for noncompliance and in adequately notifying
recipients of these actions. This was particularly true for
Wisconsin's Pay for Performance project, which determined the amount
of each month's benefits and imposed sanctions on the basis of the
number of hours worked in a previous month. Wisconsin implemented
the project statewide without first pilot testing its provisions and
encountered many start-up difficulties. While Iowa and Massachusetts
phased in implementation over 7 to 10 months, these states also faced
challenges in accurately tracking cases and adequately notifying
recipients of pending sanctions.
In Wisconsin and Massachusetts, recipients and employers sometimes
failed to submit time stubs or verify hours on a timely basis, and
often pay periods did not correspond with calendar months. In
addition, work hours for recipients in low paying jobs often
fluctuated from week to week and month to month, making it difficult
for states to determine how many hours a recipient was required to
work and, if the hours dropped below that amount, what if any
additional requirements the recipient must fulfill to avoid a
sanction.
In Wisconsin, JOBS and AFDC workers, who often worked for different
organizations and were located at different sites, split
responsibility for handling cases. The JOBS workers determined the
number of hours each recipient must work and tracked the hours of
JOBS activities for their caseloads of up to 200 or more. The AFDC
workers received pay stubs from employers and entered hours worked
for their caseloads of up to 400. Both had difficulty gathering and
entering data in the short time frames required, and communication
between the two was often lacking. The computer system in Wisconsin
was fairly new, and the eligibility workers and case managers entered
information differently. As a result, sometimes the data they
entered conflicted and they often had a hard time determining the
status of individual cases.\61
Massachusetts, also initially split responsibilities between JOBS and
AFDC workers, but generally these workers were collocated at the
sites we visited. JOBS workers monitored hours worked, and AFDC
workers determined if recipients met requirements. Sometimes
difficulties arose because JOBS and AFDC workers did not know of each
others' actions, but workers we spoke with generally liked this
arrangement. To streamline operations, however, in September 1996
the state began integrating these two roles--expanding the AFDC
workers' job duties to include employment functions. Because of
this, Massachusetts's most significant implementation issues involved
training AFDC workers to assume these functions. Several AFDC
workers noted a dramatic increase in their workload due to the need
to constantly monitor recipients' participation in work activities on
a biweekly basis in addition to assessing compliance with other
eligibility requirements.
Due to the difficulties of accurately tracking recipients' hours
worked, as well as training workers to understand and apply all the
new program rules correctly, all three states had problems notifying
recipients of sanctions during initial program implementation.
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, issued 5,182 sanctions through August
20, 1996. Of these, 44 percent were later reversed because
recipients had met program requirements or inaccurate data had been
corrected. During the 2 months when the system converted to
automatically issuing sanction notices, the error rate was as high as
70 percent. In addition, staff had reopened cases on the computer
with no evidence that the recipient had begun to comply with program
requirements, according to our case file review. Because so many
incorrect sanction notices had been sent out, recipients were
confused by what was required of them and overwhelmed workers with
calls. Even when accurate, the notices confused recipients because
of the system's prospective aspect: hours worked in any given month
determined the amount of benefits 2 months in the future. Thus, when
recipients received a sanction notice and then began to participate,
they did not understand why they did not get any benefits the
following month.
In Massachusetts, program staff and welfare advocates also reported
initial difficulties in tracking recipients' work hours, applying new
program rules correctly in individual cases, and adequately notifying
recipients of termination actions. Initially, if multiple actions
took place, Massachusetts's computer system combined these into a
single notice to the recipient. This sometimes resulted in notices
that did not make sense. For example, we found one notice that
informed the recipient, "The Department will raise your [AFDC]
benefits from $55 to $343 . . . because you or a household member
failed to comply with the requirements of the work program without
good cause." State officials eventually resolved these problems by
issuing separate notices for each action. In addition, welfare
advocates raised concerns that termination notices did not provide
enough information on good cause reasons for failure to participate,
requirements for recipients to have benefits reinstated, and on the
continuation of food stamps and Medicaid eligibility. The notices
did state, however, that Medicaid benefits would continue
(subsequently revised to include food stamps), that recipients could
call their caseworker with questions, and that free legal services
were available. When the state learned of instances of its failure
to accurately track work hours or apply program rules correctly in
individual cases, those cases were reopened and recipients given
another opportunity to comply. As of December 1996, recipients
appealed 978 actions, and records show that 47 percent of actions
resolved had been decided, at least in part, in the recipients'
favor.
Iowa officials also reevaluated their notification procedures because
of concerns about recipients being overloaded with information and
instructions and the effectiveness of procedures in giving recipients
informed choice. Of the 2,073 cases entering the Limited Benefit
Plan between November 1995 and January 1996, about 28 percent
subsequently enrolled in the Family Investment Program before
termination due to either (1) recipients signing a Family Investment
Agreement or (2) the state determining that recipients had been
enrolled in the Limited Benefit Plan in error.
--------------------
\61 As part of its 1997 implementation plan, Wisconsin planned to
have one case manager handle both JOBS and AFDC functions. State
officials believed this would lead to reduced caseloads and eliminate
the work and confusion between the two staffs. In Dane County
(Madison) and in a few instances in Milwaukee County, where the AFDC
and JOBS workers have been collocated at one JOBS center,
administering cases has become easier, and program managers believe
that fully integrating the two roles would further facilitate case
management.
PROVIDING SUFFICIENT CASE
MANAGEMENT SERVICES ALSO
CHALLENGED STATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
Another challenge facing the states was providing sufficient services
to afford recipients a reasonable opportunity to comply with
requirements and avoid termination. States had to provide certain
activities and services to recipients consistent with JOBS
requirements. If states failed to meet this obligation, they could
not terminate a family's benefits. To meet increased demand for
activities and services under their new programs, all three states
opened or expanded job centers to help in job search activities,
created new partnerships with employers to provide placements, and
increased funds for child care. Despite such efforts, however, both
welfare advocates and state officials raised concerns that workers
were not adequately trained in case management and that large
caseloads and complex new program rules prevented workers from paying
enough attention to individual cases to ensure that recipients, many
with barriers to employability, were assigned appropriate work
requirements and provided sufficient support services.
In Iowa, for example, JOBS workers were to develop an individualized
Family Investment Agreement with each recipient. In most terminated
cases, however, recipients failed to come in and sign the agreement,
and workers had minimal contact with these recipients. For
recipients who did sign agreements, the prescribed activity in many
cases was "individual job search," according to our case file review.
Recipients had to make four face-to-face job contacts per day and
were recommended for sanction if they did not do so. State reviewers
concluded that not enough casework had been done in 50 percent of
these cases to determine whether the recipient knew about the
proposed action and its consequences and whether the barriers to the
recipient's participation had been adequately addressed. As a
result, the program required caseworkers to provide more case
management services before relegating cases to the Limited Benefit
Plan leading to benefit termination. In addition, Iowa had
established a special program to provide intensive case management
services to families identified with many or severe barriers to
employment. However, funding allowed less than 3 percent of the
state's caseload to participate in this program, and insufficient
contact with recipients hindered caseworkers' ability to identify
candidates for referral.
Massachusetts tried to implement a subsidized job program in which
the value of a recipient's AFDC and food stamp grants was paid as
subsidized wages from a private employer rather than provided
directly to the recipient as benefits. The state, however, found it
difficult to effectively fill job placements created through such
partnerships. Up to 2,000 slots had been authorized, but the state
had placed fewer than 200 recipients in positions at the time of our
review.
Finding a good match between employers and recipients presented
problems, according to state officials. About 40 to 50 percent of
recipients had no high school diploma or equivalent, and placing
recipients in jobs required them to have job development and
training. What a welfare caseworker was expected to do had its
limits, according to officials. Welfare advocates criticized the
state program, however, for terminating benefits to families for
noncompliance with work requirements without providing recipients
specific, available placements. As in Iowa, many Employment
Development Plans simply called for "60 days of job search" or "20
hours per week of work or community service." In some cases, the
state terminated benefits after recipients had received referrals for
community service assignments where no positions were actually
available. After the state decided an appeal in a recipient's favor
in August 1996 and the action to terminate voided for failure to
offer a specific job placement, the state provided guidance to
workers emphasizing the importance of securing a placement before
sanctioning recipients for noncompliance. As of December 1996, 121
appeals regarding work requirements and Employment Development Plans
had been decided or withdrawn in the recipients' favor.
In addition, some raised concerns about caseworkers' ability to
identify needs and inform families of available services. Welfare
advocates cited examples of families being allowed child care
assistance only when other family members were not available to
provide free care, contrary to program policy. Records show that 25
appeals regarding denials of child care services were later decided
or withdrawn in the recipients' favor.
Wisconsin's biggest implementation challenges occurred in Milwaukee,
where workers' caseloads were the largest and, according to state
officials, the number of recipients with multiple barriers to
employment was disproportionately large.\62
In 1996, Milwaukee County had 58 percent of the state's AFDC caseload
but accounted for 44 percent of the 24,500 job placements. Large
caseloads made it difficult for caseworkers to pay personal attention
to each case to help recipients meet program requirements and move
toward self-sufficiency rather than terminate benefits for
noncompliance. In addition to handling as many as 200 to 400 cases,
caseworkers had to spend time learning new roles and responsibilities
and performing such tasks as tracking hours of participation.
Caseworkers had little time left to understand the particular
circumstances of each case and identify services recipients might
need to comply with program requirements and avoid termination.
In all three states, officials acknowledged the challenges inherent
in the culture shift required of their caseworkers--from determining
eligibility to emphasizing work,\63 the difficulty of learning and
accurately applying complex new program rules, and of handling a
large number of cases. Nevertheless, state officials maintained that
the guiding principle of their waiver programs--consistent with the
new federal reform law--was that it is ultimately the recipient's
responsibility to either comply with program requirements, inform
their caseworkers of any barrier to employment or service need,
provide good cause reason for noncompliance, or have their benefits
terminated.
--------------------
\62 One reason Milwaukee's caseworkers' caseloads were the largest is
because the county had a hiring freeze due to uncertainty over its
role in future program administration. As part of its 1997
implementation plan, other public and private agencies would be
allowed to submit bids to administer the program. Some of the JOBS
programs had already been contracted to private organizations such as
Goodwill and the Young Men's Christian Association.
\63 For more discussion of these changes, see Welfare Waivers
Implementation: States Work to Change Welfare Culture, Community
Involvement, and Service Delivery (GAO/HEHS-96-105, July 2, 1996).
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS FROM THE
STATES
============================================================ Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
States' early experiences with benefit termination provisions reveal
that such provisions have seldom been used. Nevertheless, state
officials we spoke with consider these provisions successful in
discouraging those with other adequate means of support from
receiving benefits and encouraging those on welfare to comply with
requirements so that they might move toward self-sufficiency.
Although our analysis yielded little information on implementing
time-limit provisions, it provided several insights for states
implementing full-family sanction provisions under the new federal
welfare reform law.
First, states will probably experience relatively low percentages of
cases terminated for noncompliance with program requirements as
compared with their total caseloads. Although the states we studied
in detail were chosen for their relatively large numbers of
terminations, these states still terminated on average about 1
percent or less of their monthly caseloads.
Second, depending on program structure, states will probably have a
relatively higher proportion of terminations due to noncompliance
with enrollment and other nonwork requirements when initially
converting their existing caseloads to their new programs. Once
programs are fully implemented, the proportion of such terminations
will most likely decrease, while the proportion of terminations due
to failure to comply with work requirements and, eventually, that due
to reaching a time limit, will most likely increase.
Third, states will probably see a significant percentage of families
whose benefits are terminated for failure to comply with requirements
return to welfare. In the three states we studied, about one-third
did so. In most cases, families returning to welfare demonstrated
compliance with program requirements or provided a basis for
exemption. Although the federal 5-year lifetime limit on benefit
receipt will probably affect decisions to return to welfare, its
impact is not yet known.
Fourth, states will probably see significant reductions in the number
of families continuing to receive food stamps and Medicaid after AFDC
benefits are terminated. Many families do not take the steps
necessary to maintain food stamp and Medicaid benefits after losing
AFDC, even though they may continue to be eligible. Many families
not returning to welfare, however, do have some sources of support
according to data from federal and state programs--and most likely,
additional families have support they have not reported.
Fifth, states will probably face challenges in establishing reliable
tracking and notification systems and ensuring that families get
adequate case management and support services to meet program
requirements and avoid having benefits terminated.
Our analysis yielded little information on implementing time-limit
provisions. Only one state, Florida, had terminated benefits due to
reaching a time limit through December 1996. Of the 74 Florida
families losing benefits, those who complied with program
requirements and were not already employed upon reaching their time
limit received job offers from the state (which all declined); those
who failed to comply were not offered jobs. Once a family reaches
the new federal 5-year lifetime time limit, compliance with program
requirements neither secures more time on welfare nor a job
guarantee. To protect those experiencing genuine and intractable
hardship, the law allows up to 20 percent of a states' caseload to be
exempt from the time limit. Under waivers, however, states generally
excluded more than 20 percent of their caseloads from coverage. The
number of families who will ultimately reach the new federal 5-year
lifetime time limit under TANF is unclear. Also unclear is whether
states will devise other programs for addressing the needs of these
hard-to-serve families.
COMMENTS FROM THE STATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2
We obtained comments on a draft of this report from our three case
study states: Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The states
generally agreed with the report's findings and provided technical
clarifications about their programs and data interpretation. We
incorporated their comments in the report as appropriate. We
requested but did not receive comments from HHS.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
This appendix details our methodology, including information about
our AFDC case selection process and databases used in determining (1)
the number and characteristics of families with benefits terminated
in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin; (2) the number of cases later
reopened; and (3) the number of cases with other reported income and
benefits.
We obtained data on all cases terminated in Iowa through the Limited
Benefit Plan from April through June 1996, a total of 408 cases. The
data included cases assigned to the Limited Benefit Plan for failure
to sign a Family Investment Agreement and for failure to fulfill such
agreements. To determine benefits and reported income after
termination, we obtained data for the month of August 1996. At the
time of our analysis, none of the terminated cases had been reopened.
(Under Iowa's waiver, states could not reopen terminated cases for 6
months, and 4 months or less had elapsed when we obtained
post-termination data.)
We obtained data on all cases terminated and in closed status in
Massachusetts for failure to meet work, school attendance, or teen
living arrangement requirements as of the end of June 1996, a total
of 1,292 cases. We included in our analysis all cases closed for
failure of parents (including teen parents) and caretakers to comply
with these requirements, a total of 936 cases.\64 We obtained data
for these cases as of the end of September 1996 to determine the
number of cases reopened as well as benefits and reported income for
the 636 cases remaining closed.
We obtained data on all cases terminated in Wisconsin in May 1996 for
failure to enroll in the JOBS program and all cases closed in July
and August for failure to meet work requirements under the program
for 3 consecutive previous months (March through May or April through
June), a total of 759 cases. We obtained October 1996 data to
determine the number cases reopened as well as benefits and reported
income for the 651 cases remaining closed.
For cases chosen, we analyzed and matched data from electronic
databases provided to us by the states, as well as from the following
federal databases: HUD's Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System
and Tenant Rental Assistance Certification System and the Social
Security Administration's SSI database. State databases matched
included AFDC, food stamps, Medicaid, child support enforcement, and
child protective services.\65 To determine what benefits families had
received before termination, we obtained data for the month preceding
termination. Although we did not independently evaluate the overall
validity of the databases received from other federal and state
programs, we consulted with state database and program staff to
correct discrepancies in the data, and we reviewed case files for a
sample of cases from Des Moines, Boston, and Milwaukee.
For benefits and income matches, we obtained data not only for AFDC
recipients, but also for household members not in the AFDC assistance
unit who might have been receiving housing, SSI, or food stamp
benefits or who might have reported income from wages, pensions, or
child support. For most matches, we used heads' of household and
individual household members' Social Security numbers. For state
database matches, we also used state identification or case numbers.
We did our review between April 1996 and April 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\64 We did not include in our analysis the 356 cases closed for
failure of dependent children aged 16 to 18 to comply with work or
school attendance requirements.
\65 We determined that data obtained from child protective services
on substantiated reports of abuse or neglect and foster care
placements for terminated cases were too limited and inconclusive to
include in the report.
OVERVIEW OF STATES TERMINATING
BENEFITS UNDER WAIVERS AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1996
========================================================== Appendix II
AFDC caseload Cities
in covered covered with As of June As of June
jurisdictions populations Month first 30, 1996, 30, 1996, As of Dec.
Date waiver as of June 30, over Population Basis for terminated statewide\ in urban 31, 1996,
State implemented Coverage\a 1996 150,000\b in 1994\b termination cases d areas\d statewide
-------------- ------------ ------------ -------------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ ---------- ---------- ----------
Arizona 11/95 Statewide 61,538 Glendale 168,000 Sanction 11/95 66\e \f \50\e
Mesa 314,000
Phoenix 1,049,000
Scottsdale 152,000
Tucson 435,000
Connecticut 1/96 Statewide 56,017 None \g Sanction 6/96 11\h \g 477\h
Delaware 10/95 Statewide 10,253 None \g Sanction 10/96 0 \g 68
Florida 2/94 Two 9,083\j None\i \g Time limit 4/96 19 \g 74
counties\i
Illinois 1/96 Statewide 221,632 Chicago 2,732,000 Sanction 7/96 0 \g 8
Iowa 10/93 Statewide 28,581 Des Moines 194,000 Sanction 10/94 4,174 \f \5,288
Massachusetts 11/95 Statewide 82,237 Boston 548,000 Sanction 11/95 1,292 258 1,969
Worcester 165,000 50
Michigan 4/95 Statewide 174,176 Detroit 992,000 Sanction 4/96 307 56 765
Grand Rapids 190,000 58
Mississippi 10/95 Six 11,697 Jackson 193,000 Sanction 11/95 279 118 699
counties\k
Missouri 6/95 Statewide 80,426 Kansas City 444,000 Sanction 6/95 73 \f \279
St. Louis 368,000
Nebraska 10/95 Five 2,423 Lincoln 203,000 Sanction 3/96 8 5 59
counties\l
North Carolina 7/96 Statewide 110,451 Charlotte 438,000 Sanction 7/96 0 \g \m
Greensboro 196,000
Raleigh 237,000
Winston- 155,000
Salem
Ohio 7/96 Statewide 203,442 Akron 222,000 Sanction 10/96\n 0 \g \m
Cincinnati 358,000
Cleveland 493,000
Columbus 636,000
Dayton 179,000
Toledo 323,000
Oregon 7/96 Statewide 31,851 Portland 451,000 Sanction 9/96\n 0 \g 60\o
South Dakota 5/94 Statewide 5,891 None \g Sanction 5/94 289 \g 413
Utah 11/95 Pilot 14,320 Part of Salt 172,000 Sanction 12/95 62 26 180
7/96 sites\p Lake City\p
statewide
Vermont 7/94 Statewide 8,965 None \g Sanction 1/96 3 \g 3
Virginia 7/95 Statewide 63,399 Arlington 175,000 Sanction 7/95 985 20 1955
Chesapeake 181,000 13
Newport 179,000 27
News 241,000 43
Norfolk 201,000 19
Richmond 430,000 11
Virginia
Beach
Wisconsin 3/96 Statewide 52,765 Madison 195,000 Sanction 4/96 2,208 84 5,700
Milwaukee 617,000 1,020
=====================================================================================================================================================
Total 9,776 18,047
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a States implementing programs statewide generally phased in
implementation over periods lasting up to a year.
\b Based on 1994 data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as
published in table no. 46 in Statistical Abstract of the United
States - 1996.
\c Includes cases terminated in states implementing benefit
termination waiver provisions before passage of the new federal
welfare reform law in August 1996. In some states, such as
Massachusetts and Wisconsin, data represent cases in terminated
status as of the date shown. In other states, such as Iowa and
Connecticut, data represent cumulative totals that may include cases
that have subsequently been reopened and may double count some cases.
\d Data requested as of June 30, 1996, but data provided were from
June 15, 1996, to July 2, 1996.
\e According to the official surveyed, the most significant reason
for the drop in terminations over time is that many teen parents
become old enough to no longer have to meet living arrangement
requirements.
\f Breakdown for urban area(s) not available.
\g Not applicable.
\h Data do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply
with teen living arrangement requirements (not tracked).
\i The two Florida counties covered were Alachua and Escambia. As of
June 1996, seven additional counties were participating, but no
families in these counties could reach their time limits as of Dec.
31, 1996.
\j Cohort entering program through June 1994 that could possibly
reach a time limit as of June 1996 comprised 353 cases. Cohort
entering program through Dec. 1994 that could possibly reach a time
limit as of Dec. 1996 comprised 1,442 cases.
\k The six Mississippi counties covered included Adams, Harrison,
Jones, Lee, Hinds, and Washington.
\l The five Nebraska counties included Adams, Clay, Lancaster,
Nuckolls, and Webster.
\m Entire families' benefits had been terminated, but data system did
not track and no estimate could be provided, according to officials
surveyed.
\n The first month a family's benefits could be terminated after
waiver was implemented.
\o Terminations as of Nov. 15, 1996. Data as of Dec. 31, 1996,
were not available.
\p The pilot sites in Utah included Kearns office (covering part of
Salt Lake City), St. George, Roosevelt, Kanab (Kane County), Cedar
City, Beaver, Panguitch, American Fork, and Brigham City.
FULL-FAMILY SANCTION PROVISIONS IN
STATE WELFARE WAIVERS APPROVED
BETWEEN JANUARY 1987 AND AUGUST
1996
========================================================= Appendix III
Basis for full-family sanction
Waiver program (for cases without good cause for
(approval date) noncompliance) Sanction provisions
---------------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------------------
ARIZONA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employing and Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
Moving People of minor parents to live in an eligibility for AFDC.
Off Welfare and adult-supervised setting.
Encouraging
Responsibility
(5/95)
CONNECTICUT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Fair Chance Work: After 24 cumulative months Assistance unit is ineligible for
(9/94) of AFDC receipt, failure to comply an AFDC payment. Case can be
with activities required by reinstated through compliance.
employability plans.
Work: Voluntarily quitting a job Assistance unit is ineligible for
after 24 months of AFDC receipt AFDC cash assistance for 3 months.
under Pathways.
Reach for Jobs 1. Work: Not cooperating with JOBS First sanction: AFDC benefit
First (12/95) requirements; quitting a job. reduced 20 percent for 3 months.
2. Child support: Not cooperating Second sanction: AFDC benefit
with child support enforcement reduced 35 percent for 6 months.
requirements. Third and subsequent sanctions: No
3. Other: Not cooperating with AFDC benefit paid for 3 months.
quality control programs.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents to live in a eligibility for AFDC.
supervised setting.
Enrollment: Failure to complete AFDC benefit terminated for
redetermination of eligibility. failure to complete 6-month
redetermination. AFDC, food stamp,
and Medicaid benefits terminated
for failure to complete other
redeterminations. Families may
reapply for benefits at any time.
DELAWARE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Better Chance 1. Enrollment: Not cooperating in First sanction: One-third
(5/95) developing of Contract of Mutual reduction in AFDC benefit until
Responsibility. compliance. Second sanction: Two-
2. Work: Not cooperating with thirds reduction in AFDC benefit
employment-related provisions of until compliance. Third sanction:
contract. Termination of AFDC benefit for
duration of demonstration.
Other: Failure to comply with AFDC benefit initially reduced by
nonemployment-related requirements $50. Reduction increases by $50
of Contract of Mutual every month until compliance with
Responsibility, such as immunizing requirements if the state finds
children and attending parenting that adult has not taken
classes. reasonable steps to fulfill the
requirement.
Child support: Failure to comply AFDC benefit terminated until
with child support enforcement compliance.
requirements.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents to live in adult- eligibility for AFDC.
supervised setting.
Amendments to A 1. Enrollment: Not cooperating in AFDC benefit initially reduced by
Better Chance developing Contract of Mutual $50. Reduction increases by $50
(12/95) Responsibility. every month until compliance with
2. Other: Failure to comply with requirements.
nonemployment-related requirements
of contract, such as immunizing
children and attending parenting
classes.
1. Work: Not cooperating with First sanction: One-third
employment-related provisions of reduction in AFDC benefit for 3
Contract of Mutual months or until compliance,
Responsibility. whichever is sooner. Second
2. Other: Failure of dependent sanction: Two-thirds reduction in
children under age 16 to comply AFDC benefit for 3 months or until
with school attendance compliance, whichever is sooner.
requirements. Third sanction: Termination of
AFDC benefit for duration of
demonstration. Sanctions for
failure to meet school attendance
requirements will not be imposed
if parent or caretaker is working
with school officials or other
agencies to remedy situation.
Child support: Failure to comply AFDC benefit terminated until
with child support enforcement compliance.
requirements.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents to live in adult- eligibility for AFDC.
supervised setting.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Project on Work, Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
Employment, and of unmarried minor parents or eligibility for AFDC.
Responsibility pregnant minors to live in adult-
(8/96)\a supervised setting.
IDAHO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Temporary Work: Being fired from a job, Family is ineligible for AFDC
Assistance for quitting a job, or turning down a benefits for 90 days or until
Families in job offer that would provide compliance. Eligibility for the
Idaho (8/96) income equal to or greater than family may be reestablished during
the AFDC benefit. the sanction period if the adult
secures new employment comparable
in gross wages to the job he or
she quit, becomes exempt from the
work requirements, or the adult
who caused the sanction leaves the
family.
Work: Failure to participate in First sanction: Entire family's
work or JOBS activities. needs removed in determining the
amount of AFDC benefits for 1
month or until compliance,
whichever is longer. Second
sanction: Entire family's needs
removed in determining the amount
of AFDC benefits for 3 months or
until compliance, whichever is
longer. Third sanction: Entire
family's needs removed in
determining the amount of AFDC
benefits until the end of the
demonstration.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor, unmarried parents or eligibility for AFDC.
minors who are pregnant to live in
adult-supervised setting.
ILLINOIS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work and Work: Not cooperating with Sanctions for first three
Responsibility Targeted Work Initiative instances of noncooperation are in
(9/95) requirements, such as accord with JOBS policy for
participation in job search and noncooperation. Sanction for
subsidized work positions; not fourth and subsequent instances of
cooperating with Get a Job noncooperation is loss of entire
Initiative requirements, such as AFDC benefit for 6 months or until
participation in job search, individual complies, whichever is
community work experience, and longer.
short-term training.
Work: Failure to accept a full- Termination of family's AFDC
time or part-time job offer. benefit for 3 months or until
individual complies, whichever is
sooner.
Enrollment: Failure to cooperate Termination or denial of AFDC cash
in developing and signing a self- benefits for the entire family
sufficiency plan within 30 days of until compliance.
application or redetermination.
INDIANA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendments to Work: Failure to register for work Termination of family's AFDC
Indiana Manpower with local employment and training benefits until compliance.
Placement and office.
Comprehensive
Training Program
(8/96)
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents and their eligibility for AFDC.
children to live in an adult-
supervised setting.
IOWA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family 1. Enrollment: Failure to enter Family is placed in the Limited
Investment into a Family Investment Benefit Plan: For 3 months, the
Program (8/93) Agreement. family is eligible for full
benefits, followed by a 3-month
benefit period reflecting the
needs of the children only. At the
end of this period, the AFDC grant
is terminated and the family is
not eligible to apply for
assistance for 6 months. During
the Limited Benefit Plan, the
state will review the well-being
of the children. Before
termination, participants are
allowed to develop a Family
Investment Agreement and leave the
Limited Benefit Plan.
1. Work: Failure to comply with Family is placed in the Limited
terms of the Family Investment Benefit Plan: For 3 months, the
Agreement. family is eligible for full
2. Teen school attendance: Failure benefits, followed by a 3-month
to comply with terms of the Family benefit period reflecting the
Investment Agreement. needs of the children only. At the
end of this period, the AFDC grant
is terminated and the family is
not eligible to apply for
assistance for 6 months. During
the Limited Benefit Plan, the
state will review the well-being
of the children. Participants have
no reconsideration rights, that
is, they are not allowed to
redevelop a Family Investment
Agreement and leave the Limited
Benefit Plan.
Amendments to Enrollment: Failure to enter into Family is placed in the Limited
Family a Family Investment Agreement. Benefit Plan: For 3 months,
Investment adults' needs are removed in
Program (2/95) calculating AFDC benefit, followed
by 6 months of AFDC ineligibility
for the family. During the Limited
Benefit Plan, the state will
review the well-being of the
children. At any time in the first
3 months of the Limited Benefit
Plan, participants are allowed to
develop a Family Investment
Agreement and leave the Limited
Benefit Plan. If a participant
enters the Limited Benefit Plan
for a second or subsequent time,
the family will be immediately
ineligible for AFDC for 6 months
with no 3-month period of reduced
benefits.
1. Work: Failure to comply with Family is placed in the Limited
the terms of the Family Investment Benefit Plan: For 3 months,
Agreement. adults' needs are removed in
2. Teen school attendance: Failure calculating AFDC benefit, followed
to comply with terms of the Family by 6 months of AFDC ineligibility
Investment Agreement. for the family. During the Limited
Benefit Plan, the state will
review the well-being of the
children. Participants have no
reconsideration rights, that is,
they are not allowed to redevelop
a Family Investment Agreement and
leave the Limited Benefit Plan. If
a participant enters the Limited
Benefit Plan for a second or
subsequent time, the family will
be immediately ineligible for AFDC
for 6 months with no 3-month
period of reduced benefits.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents to live in adult- eligibility for AFDC.
supervised setting.
KANSAS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas Actively Work: Failure to attend a job If the noncomplying individual is
Creating interview if referred, failure to a parent or spouse, the family
Tomorrow for accept a bona fide offer of will not receive AFDC cash
Families (8/96) suitable employment, or benefits for 3 months for each
termination of employment. occurrence or until compliance.
Work: Failure to comply with JOBS The needs of a noncomplying parent
requirements, including or spouse are not taken into
participation in substance abuse account in determining the amount
screening and treatment when of AFDC cash benefits for up to 2
deemed necessary. months. If individual is not
cooperating after 2 months,
family's AFDC cash benefits are
eliminated for 2 months with no
cure. If individual is not
cooperating after this additional
2-month period, family's AFDC cash
benefits continue to be eliminated
until individual cooperates.
Child support: Failure to The needs of the caretaker are not
cooperate with child support taken into account in determining
enforcement requirements. the amount of AFDC cash benefits
for 2 months. If the individual is
still not cooperating after 2
months, the family's AFDC cash
benefits are eliminated until
compliance.
LOUISIANA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Individual Work: Failure to accept a full- The family's eligibility for AFDC
Responsibility time job offer. benefits is terminated for a
Project (2/96) mandatory 3-month period, after
which the sanction ends.
MAINE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welfare to Work Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
(6/96) of unmarried minor parents or eligibility for AFDC.
married minor parents not living
with their spouses to live in an
adult-supervised setting.
MARYLAND
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family 1. Work: Failure to participate in Termination of family's
Investment job search. eligibility for AFDC.
Program (8/95) 2. Teen living arrangement:
Failure of unmarried minor parents
to live in adult-supervised
setting.
Work: Failure to comply with Removal of the noncooperating
requirements of JOBS program. individual from the grant. This
sanction remains as long as the
cumulative months of sanction for
noncooperation do not exceed 6
months. The sanction for
noncooperation after the sanctions
have been imposed for 6 cumulative
months is case closure. Once the
case has been closed, the family
may reapply for AFDC and will be
reinstated after cooperation with
JOBS requirements for 30 days.
Families whose cases have been
closed may receive up to 3 months
of transitional noncash
assistance.
Amendments to Work: Failure to participate in Case is closed.
Family job search.
Investment
Program (8/96)
Work: Failure to comply with Case is closed. The family may
requirements of the JOBS program. reapply for AFDC and be reinstated
immediately upon compliance with
JOBS requirements in the first
instance of noncompliance, after
10 days of compliance in the
second instance, and after 30 days
of compliance in the third and
subsequent instances. Families
whose cases have been closed may
receive up to 3 months of
transitional noncash assistance.
Child support: Failure to Case is closed. Once the case has
cooperate with child support been closed, the family may
enforcement requirements. reapply for AFDC and will be
reinstated immediately upon
compliance.
Other: Commission of fraud by a The entire family is ineligible
member of the assistance unit. for cash assistance. The sanction
period for the first conviction is
6 months or until full restitution
is made, whichever is less; for
the second conviction, 12 months
or until full restitution is made,
whichever is less; and for the
third conviction, the sanction is
permanent.
MASSACHUSETTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welfare Reform Work: Failure to comply with Initial instance of noncompliance
'95 (10/95) requirements of Employment results in a warning. If
Development Program, including noncompliance continues,
participation in specified JOBS participant is required to
components. participate in community service.
Sanction for failure to
participate in community service
is reduction of AFDC benefit by
portion of benefit attributable to
participant. Sanction for
subsequent instances of
noncompliance is termination of
AFDC benefit until participant
complies.
Work: Failure of participants in Participants may be required to
the Full Employment Program to participate in community service.
maintain a job after at least Sanction for failure to
three attempts. participate in community service
is reduction of AFDC benefit by
portion of benefit attributable to
participant. Sanction for
subsequent instances of
noncompliance is termination of
AFDC benefit until participant
complies.
Work: Failure to participate in First sanction: Reduction of AFDC
community service when required in benefit by portion of benefit
the work program. attributable to participant.
Second and subsequent sanctions:
Termination of AFDC benefit until
participant complies.
Teen school attendance: Failure of First sanction: AFDC benefit
teen parents to attend at least 75 reduced by teen parent's portion
percent of assigned educational of benefit. If noncompliance
activities in any month. continues for more than 30 days,
and for any subsequent instances
of noncompliance, family becomes
ineligible for AFDC. Sanctions
will be removed if participant
demonstrates compliance for at
least 2 consecutive weeks.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of teen parents to live in adult- eligibility for AFDC.
supervised setting.
MICHIGAN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendments to Work: Failure to participate in First sanction: AFDC benefit
Strengthen job search; failure to meet JOBS reduced by 25 percent, and if no
Michigan program requirements. child in case is younger than age
Families (10/ 6, food stamp benefit is also
94) reduced by 25 percent for 12
months or until individual
complies, whichever is sooner.
Subsequent sanction: If
participant does not comply during
the 12-month period, the AFDC case
is closed until the individual
complies and the food stamp
sanction discontinued.
Amendments to Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
Strengthen of minor parents and their eligibility for AFDC.
Michigan children to live in adult-
Families (6/96) supervised setting.
Teen school attendance: Failure of Case is closed for at least 1
minor parents who have not month.
completed high school to attend
school.
Work: Failure to participate in First sanction: AFDC benefit
job search; failure to meet JOBS reduced by 25 percent, and if no
program requirements. child in case is younger than age
6, food stamp benefit is also
reduced by 25 percent for 12
months or until individual
complies, whichever is sooner.
Subsequent sanction: If
participant does not comply during
the 12-month period, the AFDC case
is closed until the individual
complies and the food stamp
sanction discontinued.
MINNESOTA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work First (8/ Work: Failure to comply with The entire family's needs are
96) community work experience program removed in determining the amount
requirements. of AFDC benefits for at least 6
months.
MISSISSIPPI
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi New Work: Refusal of a Work First job AFDC grant terminated until
Direction placement, termination of a participant complies.
Demonstration placement within a 2-week trial
Project (12/94) period or a pattern of accepting
placement but requesting early
termination.
MISSOURI
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
Families Mutual of minor parents to reside in an eligibility for AFDC.
Responsibility adult-supervised setting.
Plan (4/95)
NEBRASKA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welfare Reform Work: Continued failure to comply First sanction: AFDC cash benefit
Demonstration with terms of the self- terminated for 1 month or until
Project (2/95) sufficiency contract. participant complies, whichever is
longer. Second sanction: AFDC cash
benefit terminated for 3 months or
until participant complies,
whichever is longer. Third
sanction: AFDC cash benefit
terminated for remainder of
demonstration or until 48-month
time-limit benefit period expires,
whichever is sooner.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employment Work: Failure to comply with JOBS For the first occurrence of
Program (6/ requirements or work requirements noncompliance, or for occurrences
96)\b or, within 60 days of application, more than 6 months after the end
being fired from a job, quitting a of the most recent sanction
job, voluntarily reducing hours, period, the needs of the
or turning down a bona fide offer noncomplying participant are not
of an unsubsidized job. taken into account in calculating
the AFDC benefit amount for one
payment period or until the
failure to comply ceases,
whichever is longer. After 3
months of continued noncompliance,
the adjusted payment standard (the
payment standard with the needs of
the noncomplying participant
removed) is reduced by one-third
for one payment period or until
the failure to comply ceases,
whichever is longer. After an
additional 3 months of continued
noncompliance, the adjusted
payment standard is reduced by
two-thirds for one payment period
or until the failure to comply
ceases, whichever is longer. After
an additional 3 months of
continued noncompliance, the AFDC
case is closed.
Enrollment: Failure to attend the Termination of AFDC benefits.
employability assessment meeting.
NORTH CAROLINA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work First Enrollment: Failure to sign the Case is closed.
Program (2/96) personal responsibility contract.
NORTH DAKOTA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training, Enrollment: Failure to sign or Termination of the family's
Education, cooperate in developing the social Training, Education, Employment,
Employment, and contract within 2 months of and Management (TEEM) benefit--a
Management eligibility. cash payment constituting the
Project (9/95) family's AFDC, food stamps, and
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance
Program (LIHEAP) benefit.
Households may apply for food
stamps and LIHEAP benefits under
the regular programs. If a family
whose TEEM benefit is terminated
reapplies for assistance under
TEEM within 10 months of the month
of closure, the family would not
be eligible for TEEM benefits
until the social contract is
signed. If a family whose case had
been closed for failure to
complete the social contract
within the 2-month period
reapplies for assistance under
TEEM more than 10 months after the
month of closure, the household,
if found eligible under TEEM, will
be allowed another 2-month period
to develop and sign the social
contract.
1. Work: Failure to comply with The AFDC portion of the TEEM
self-sufficiency requirements of benefit has the following
the social contract. sanctions: First sanction: The
2. Child support: Failure to needs of the noncomplying
comply with child support individual are removed for a
enforcement requirements. minimum of 1 month; if the
individual fails to comply for 6
consecutive months, the entire
AFDC portion of the TEEM benefit
is terminated. Second sanction:
The needs of the noncomplying
individual are removed for at
least 2 months; if the individual
fails to comply for 3 consecutive
months, the entire AFDC portion of
the TEEM benefit is terminated.
Third and subsequent sanctions:
The needs of the noncomplying
individual are removed for at
least 3 months; if the individual
fails to comply for 3 consecutive
months, the entire AFDC portion of
the TEEM benefit is terminated.
AFDC eligibility can be
reestablished when the individual
complies with the original program
requirement or an alternative
approved activity.
OHIO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio First (3/ Work: Failure to comply with JOBS First sanction: The needs of the
96) requirements. noncomplying individual are
removed in calculating the AFDC
benefit for the assistance unit
for 1 month or until compliance,
whichever is longer. Second
sanction: No AFDC cash benefit is
issued for the assistance unit for
1 month or until compliance,
whichever is longer. Third
sanction: No AFDC cash benefit is
issued for the assistance unit for
2 months or until compliance,
whichever is longer. Fourth and
subsequent sanctions: No AFDC cash
benefit is issued for the
assistance unit for 6 months or
until compliance, whichever is
longer.
Work: Voluntary termination of AFDC ineligibility for the
employment. assistance unit for 6 months.
Child support: Failure to Caretaker relative's needs are
cooperate with child support removed in calculating the AFDC
enforcement requirements. benefit for the assistance unit.
If the caretaker does not request
to be added back to the assistance
unit and does not cooperate with
the requirements within 2 years of
the date of being penalized for
noncooperation, the AFDC cash
benefit for the remaining
assistance unit members is
terminated. The caretaker relative
may reapply for AFDC at any time.
However, the assistance unit
members will not be eligible to
receive AFDC cash benefits until
the caretaker relative cooperates
with child support enforcement
requirements.
Other: Refusal of pregnant First sanction: Recipient is
recipients to cooperate with ineligible for AFDC cash benefits
substance abuse assessment or for 1 month or until compliance,
treatment. whichever is longer. Second
sanction: The entire assistance
unit is ineligible for AFDC cash
benefits for 1 month or until
compliance, whichever is longer.
Third sanction: The entire
assistance unit is ineligible for
AFDC cash benefits for 2 months or
until compliance, whichever is
longer. Fourth and subsequent
sanctions: The entire assistance
unit is ineligible for AFDC cash
benefits for the longest of the
following: 36 months, for the
remainder of the recipient's 60-
month time period, or until
compliance.
OREGON
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oregon Option 1. Work: Failure to meet JOBS For individuals who have not been
(3/96) participation requirements. previously sanctioned or have been
2. Other: Failure to comply with sanctioned in only 1 previous
mental health and substance abuse month, the first 2 months of
diagnosis, counseling, and noncompliance result in a $50
treatment requirements. decrease in the grant. Individuals
who have been sanctioned in 2 or 3
previous months will be removed
from the grant, except that cases
including a work-eligible
alien parent continue to be
subject to a $50 decrease in the
grant for this sanction period.
For individuals who have been
sanctioned in 4 or more previous
months, the sanction is the
closure of the AFDC grant. All
sanctions are removed, at any
point in the sanction process,
when an individual complies.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents to live with eligibility for AFDC.
their parents or in another safe
living environment.
SOUTH CAROLINA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Carolina 1. Enrollment: Failure to sign an First instance of noncompliance:
Self- Individual Self-Sufficiency Plan. The caretaker's needs are removed
Sufficiency and 2. Work: Failure to comply with from the calculation of the AFDC
Parental the work requirements of the plan. benefit for a maximum of 30 days,
Responsibility curable at any time by compliance.
Program\c (1/ If at the end of 30 days the
95) caretaker has not complied, he or
she is notified that at the end of
the next 30 days, the whole family
will be removed from AFDC. During
the second 30 days, the sanction
can be removed at any time by
compliance. Second instance of
noncompliance: The family's AFDC
grant is terminated for at least
30 days. After 30 days, the
sanction can be removed at any
time by compliance. Third instance
of noncompliance: The family's
AFDC grant is terminated for at
least 90 days, after which the
caretaker would be given the
opportunity to comply. At the end
of 90 days, the sanction continues
until the caretaker complies.
Fourth and subsequent instances of
noncompliance: The family's AFDC
grant is terminated for at least
180 days, after which the
caretaker would be given the
opportunity to comply. At the end
of 180 days, the sanction
continues until the caretaker
complies.
Family 1. Enrollment: Failure to comply First instance of noncompliance:
Independence Act with developing an Individual The caretaker's needs are removed
(5/96) Self-Sufficiency Plan. from calculation of the AFDC
2. Work: Failure to comply with benefit for 30 days, curable at
the terms of the plan; refusing an any time by compliance. If at the
offer of employment. end of 30 days the caretaker has
not complied, he or she is
notified that at the end of the
next 30 days, the family's AFDC
grant will be terminated, curable
when the adult demonstrates
compliance for 30 days. Second and
successive instances of
noncompliance: The family's AFDC
grant is terminated, curable when
the adult demonstrates compliance
for 30 days.
SOUTH DAKOTA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthening Work: Voluntarily quitting a job The family's AFDC benefit is
South Dakota of 20 hours or more per week. terminated for 3 months or until
Families the participant complies with the
Initiative (3/ requirement to find a job
94) comparable to the one quit,
whichever is sooner.
TENNESSEE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Families First Work: Refusal or failure to First sanction: The assistance
(7/96) participate in employment, unit is ineligible for an AFDC
training, or other work payment until compliance. Second
preparation activities. and subsequent sanctions: The
assistance unit is ineligible for
AFDC for 3 months or until
compliance, whichever is longer.
The state will take action to
monitor and protect the safety and
well-being of the children in
families whose benefits are
terminated. If the state certifies
that AFDC assistance is needed to
prevent a child's loss of housing,
heat, light, or water or to
prevent removal of the child from
the custody of a parent, a cash or
vendor payment will be issued to
meet the child's needs.
Work: Voluntarily quitting a job. The assistance unit is ineligible
for AFDC for 3 months. AFDC
eligibility may be reestablished
during the disqualification period
if the caretaker secures new
comparable employment, becomes
exempt from work requirements, or
leaves the assistance unit. The
state will take action to monitor
and protect the safety and well-
being of the children in families
whose benefits are terminated. If
the state certifies that AFDC
assistance is needed to prevent a
child's loss of housing, heat,
light, or water or to prevent
removal of the child from the
custody of a parent, a cash or
vendor payment will be issued to
meet the child's needs.
1. Child support: Failure to Ineligibility for the entire
comply with child support assistance unit until compliance.
enforcement requirements.
2. Enrollment: Failure to sign a
Personal Responsibility Plan.
UTAH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendment to 1. Work: Failure to participate in AFDC benefit is reduced by $100
Single Parent JOBS or other Single Parent per month until individual
Employment Employment Demonstration complies. However, if individual
Demonstration activities. is a child aged 16 to 18 who is
Project (8/95) 2. Child support: Failure to not in school or working full
cooperate with child support time, the needs of the child will
enforcement requirements. instead be removed from the grant
calculation until the individual
complies. In instances where the
$100 sanction has been applied for
2 months and nonparticipation
continues, the case may be closed.
The case will be reopened
immediately upon compliance.
VERMONT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welfare 1. Work: Failure to participate in AFDC benefits are issued in the
Restructuring community service jobs program; form of vendor payments for the
Project (8/94) quitting, failing to accept, or assistance unit's expenses for
being fired from an unsubsidized housing, food, fuel, and other
job; or failure to participate in utilities, and any undisbursed
required job search. balance is issued to the
2. Teen school attendance: Failure assistance unit. Failure to comply
of pregnant or parenting minors to with any of the requirements under
attend school or participate in an the penalty, such as monthly
alternative education or training reporting on the individual's
activity. circumstances, results in
termination of all AFDC benefits
until the individual complies with
work requirements for 2 weeks.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of pregnant or parenting minors eligibility for AFDC.
who are not living in a supervised
setting to attend meetings with
caseworkers on 3 separate days
each month, at least 1 of which
must take place at teen's place of
residence.
VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia Enrollment: Refusing to sign an AFDC cash benefit terminated for
Independence agreement of personal entire case until case head of
Program (11/93) responsibility. household complies.
Teen living arrangement: Failure Termination of family's
of minor parents to live in adult- eligibility for AFDC.
supervised setting.
Work: Failure to participate in First sanction: AFDC cash benefit
required work program activities. terminated for 1 month, or until
compliance, whichever is longer.
Second sanction: AFDC cash benefit
terminated for 3 months, or until
compliance, whichever is longer.
Third and subsequent sanctions:
AFDC cash benefit terminated for 6
months, or until compliance,
whichever is longer.
Child support: Failure to AFDC cash benefit terminated for
cooperate with efforts to at least 1 month and until
establish paternity. caretaker relative cooperates with
paternity establishment.
WEST VIRGINIA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Work: Failure of a nonexempt adult First sanction: Adult's needs are
Opportunities in AFDC-Unemployed Parent case to removed in determining the amount
for Independence participate in the alternate work of the AFDC cash benefit for 3
(8/95) experience program. months or until the failure to
comply ceases, whichever is
longer. Second sanction: The AFDC
cash benefit is terminated for 6
months or until the failure to
comply ceases, whichever is
longer. The AFDC cash benefit is
reinstated upon successful
participation in the alternate
work experience program for 10
consecutive days.
WISCONSIN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pay for Enrollment: Failure of active Termination of a family's
Performance (8/ cases to enroll in the JOBS eligibility for AFDC.
95) program as assigned.
Work: Failure to complete assigned The AFDC grant is reduced by the
hours of JOBS activities. hourly federal minimum wage for
each hour of assigned activity a
recipient fails to complete
without good cause. The food stamp
allotment is reduced by the
minimum wage for each uncompleted
hour of assigned JOBS activity
that has not been taken into
account in reducing the AFDC
grant. If a recipient fails to
complete at least 25 percent of
hours assigned to JOBS activities,
he or she receives no AFDC payment
and the food stamp payment is $10.
Parents responsible for the care
of a child under 6 years of age do
not have their food stamp
allotment reduced due to failure
to complete their assigned hours
of JOBS activity.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In September 1996, HHS withdrew approval for the work requirement
and time limit components of the District of Columbia's Project on
Work, Employment, and Responsibility but let stand the teen parent
component.
\b The waiver terms and conditions stipulate that New Hampshire may
choose not to implement this provision or choose to discontinue it
once implemented.
\c South Carolina chose not to implement program.
Source: GAO analysis of the terms and conditions of approved state
waivers supplemented by information obtained from the states and HHS.
TIME-LIMIT PROVISIONS IN STATE
WELFARE WAIVERS APPROVED BETWEEN
JANUARY 1987 AND AUGUST 1996
========================================================== Appendix IV
Type of time
limit (amount of
time before
Waiver program limit is Provisions for extending
(approval date) reached) Time-limit provisions time limit
---------------- ---------------- --------------------------- ------------------------
ARIZONA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employing and Benefit Nonexempt adults are Extensions for 6-month
Moving People reduction limited to 24 months of periods can be granted
Off Welfare and (24 months) AFDC receipt during a to those who demonstrate
Encouraging consecutive 60-month good cause for not being
Responsibility period. After time limit is able to find and accept
(5/95) reached, family's benefits work with a specified
are reduced by adult's level of earnings. Up to
portion of grant. two 4-month extensions
may be granted to allow
for completion of an
education or training
program.
CALIFORNIA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
California Work Work trigger Mandatory JOBS participants None
Pays with sanctions are required to participate
Demonstration (22 months) 100 hours per month in the
Project Community Work Experience
Amendment (9/ Program (CWEP)(or if less,
95) the number of hours equal
to the AFDC grant divided
by the federal minimum
wage) if they have received
AFDC for 22 of the last 24
months, are unemployed or
employed fewer than 15
hours per week, have
received the services to
meet their employment
goals, and have completed
CWEP or are participating
in CWEP for less than 100
hours per month.
CONNECTICUT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Fair Chance Work trigger After receiving benefits None
(9/94) with full- for the first 24 cumulative
family sanction months under Pathways,
(24 months) assistance units may
continue to receive
benefits only if nonexempt
participants comply with
the activities required by
their employability plans.
Noncompliance results in
the assistance unit being
ineligible for AFDC.
Reach for Jobs Benefit AFDC receipt for all Extensions for 6-month
First (12/95) termination assistance units with a periods can be granted
(21 months) mandatory JOBS participant to those who have been
is limited to 21 months, unable to obtain or
except for units where retain employment
minor parents are heads of despite a good faith
household. After time limit effort to substantially
is reached, assistance comply with all JOBS
units' benefits are requirements.
terminated.
DELAWARE
A Better Chance Work trigger After receiving benefits Extensions to the 4-
(5/95) with sanctions for 24 months, nonexempt year time limit may be
up to full- households headed by granted if the state has
family sanction employable adults age 19 failed to provide
(24 months) and older may continue to services specified in
receive AFDC only if adults recipients' contracts;
Benefit participate in a work no suitable unsubsidized
termination experience program and job employment is available
(48 months) search or are working and in the local economy,
the household's income is despite recipients' good
below 75 percent of the faith efforts to obtain
federal poverty level. employment; or other
Sanctions for noncompliance unique circumstances
without good cause are prevent recipients from
increasing reductions in obtaining employment.
grant, followed by
termination of families'
benefits. After receiving
AFDC for 4 years, household
benefits are terminated if
the adult is determined to
be employable.
FLORIDA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family Benefit AFDC receipt is limited to Extensions for up to two
Transition termination 36 months in any 72-month 4-month periods can be
Program (1/94) (24 or 36 period for nonexempt granted if the state has
months) families that have a substantially failed to
caretaker relative or adult provide services, the
under age 24 who does not recipient would benefit
have a high school diploma from additional
or equivalent, is not in education or training
high school and has little regarding immediate
work history in the past employment prospects, or
year, or has received AFDC the recipient has
for 36 of 60 months before encountered
entering the program. AFDC extraordinary
benefit receipt for other difficulties in
nonexempt families is obtaining employment or
limited to 24 months in any completing his or her
60-month period. If the plan.
state determines that
benefit termination would
most likely result in
children being placed in
emergency shelter or foster
care, only the parent's or
caretaker's needs will be
removed from grant.
Transitional employment
program provides private-
sector employment
possibilities for
recipients who have
diligently completed their
employment plans but have
been unable to obtain
employment.
GEORGIA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work for Welfare Work trigger After receiving AFDC for 24 None
(10/95) with sanctions of the last 36 months,
(24 months) nonexempt adult recipients
and noncustodial parents
under court order are
required to participate in
up to 20 hours of work per
month at an assigned
agency. Sanction for
failure to participate
without good cause is
withholding of individual's
portion of grant for
increasing lengths of time.
HAWAII
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuit of New Benefit AFDC receipt limited to 60 Extensions for 3-month
Opportunities termination months for all nonexempt periods may be granted
(8/96) (60 months) families. if recipients who have
not found employment
have made a good faith
effort to find a job and
satisfactorily fulfilled
approved employment
training activity
requirements.
ILLINOIS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work and Work trigger After 12 months in the Extensions to the 24-
Responsibility with sanctions Targeted Work Initiative month time limit can be
(9/95) (12 months) program, participants who granted if recipients
are unemployed and have cannot find or maintain
Benefit completed approved JOBS full-or part-time
termination activities are required to employment at least
(24 months) participate in subsidized equal to the maximum
work positions. Sanction AFDC benefit for a
for failure to participate family of that size,
without good cause is plus the appropriate
nonpayment of wages by work expense deductions.
employer. Nonexempt cases
that receive a total of 24
months of AFDC are
ineligible to reapply for
assistance for 24 months.
INDIANA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indiana Manpower Benefit For any family that Extensions can be
Placement and reduction includes an adult in the granted to individuals
Comprehensive (24 months) placement track, the amount who have cooperated with
Training Program of AFDC cash benefits the JOBS program and
(12/94) taking into account the substantially complied
needs of the adult is with the requirements of
limited to 24 months from their self-sufficiency
the time of entry to this plans if (1) a temporary
track, followed by a 36- physical or mental
month period of the adult condition prevents the
not receiving AFDC. individual from
attaining and
maintaining employment
that would provide the
family at least a
specified level of
income; (2) the state
has substantially failed
to provide services
specified in self-
sufficiency plans; (3)
despite all appropriate
efforts, the person has
been unable to find, or
has lost without cause,
employment that would
provide at least a
specified level of
income; or (4) other
unique circumstances
prevent obtaining or
retaining employment.
Amendments to Benefit AFDC receipt for adults who An individual's
Indiana Manpower reduction are not exempt from JOBS is assistance unit may earn
Placement and (24 months) limited to 24 months in the 1 month of AFDC benefits
Comprehensive demonstration period. beyond the time limit
Training Program for each period of 6
(8/96) consecutive months
during which an
individual was employed
full time. Renewable
extensions of up to 1
year can be granted to
individuals who have
cooperated with the JOBS
program and
substantially complied
with the requirements of
their self-sufficiency
plans if (1) the state
has substantially failed
to provide services
specified in self-
sufficiency plans; (2)
despite all appropriate
efforts, the person has
been unable to find, or
has lost without cause,
employment that would
provide at least a
specified level of
income; or (3) other
unique circumstances
prevent obtaining or
retaining employment.
LOUISIANA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Individual Benefit Nonexempt families are Extension can be granted
Responsibility termination limited to 24 months of for up to 1 year to
Project (2/96) (24 months) AFDC cash benefits in a 60- enable adults to
month period. After time complete employment-
limit is reached, families' related education or
benefits are terminated. training.
MARYLAND
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family Work trigger Nonexempt recipients may Extensions can be
Investment with sanctions not receive more than 3 granted if a recipient
Program (8/ up to full- months of AFDC benefits cannot find necessary
95)\a family sanction unless they meet a work and adequate child care,
(3 months) requirement: full-time has a verified illness,
unsubsidized employment, 30 or is attending an
hours of subsidized educational or training
employment, a minimum of 20 program that will
hours of community service, substantially improve
or a minimum of 20 hours of his or her prospects of
community service combined obtaining a job.
with employment. Sanctions
for noncompliance are
removal of noncooperating
person from grant, followed
by case closure after 6
cumulative months.
MASSACHUSETTS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welfare Reform Work trigger Nonexempt adults whose None
'95 (10/95) with sanctions child is of mandatory full-
up to full- time school age are
family sanction required to work at least
(60 days) 20 hours per week after
receiving AFDC for 60 days.
Requirement may be met
through working 20 hours
per week in unsubsidized
employment, working full
time in a subsidized
employment program,
participating 20 hours per
week in the community
service program, or
combining work and
participation in the
community service program
for 20 hours per week.
Sanction for noncompliance
without good cause is
reduction in benefit
payment equal to adult's
portion of benefit. For
recipients required to
participate in the
community service program,
the sanction for repeated
failure to participate is
termination of the family's
AFDC benefit.
MINNESOTA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work First (8/ Work trigger If, at the end of the None
96) with full- required 60 days of job
family sanction search, a participant
(60 days) assigned to the immediate
employment track has not
been hired for at least 32
hours per week or does not
earn a net income from
self-employment equal to
his or her AFDC grant, the
individual is required to
participate in CWEP and
continue job search. If
participants do not comply
with CWEP requirements
within the time specified
in their conciliation
conference, the entire
family's needs are removed
in determining the amount
of AFDC benefits for at
least 6 months.
MISSOURI
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri Work trigger After reaching the 24- The 24-month time limit
Families Mutual with sanctions month time limit specified can be extended an
Responsibility (24 months) in their self-sufficiency additional 24 months
Plan (4/95) agreements, JOBS-mandatory when necessary to allow
Benefit individuals may be required individuals to complete
reduction (36 to participate in a job their self-sufficiency
months) search or CWEP. agreements.
Noncompliance without good
cause is subject to
sanctions in accord with
federal regulations.
Individuals who reapply for
benefits after completing a
self-sufficiency agreement
entered into after July 1,
1997, will be denied AFDC
if they received benefits
for at least 36 months;
however, other eligible
family members may receive
AFDC.
MONTANA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Families Work trigger Nonexempt single-parent None
Achieving with sanctions families have a 24-month
Independence in (18 or 24 time limit and nonexempt
Montana (4/95) months) two-parent families have an
18-month time limit after
which adult recipients are
required to participate an
average of 20 hours a week
in community services
program activities if such
activities are available.
The sanction for
noncompliance is removal of
the adult's needs from the
grant for increasing
periods of time.
NEBRASKA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welfare Reform Benefit AFDC receipt for families Benefits will not be
Demonstration termination assigned to the time- terminated if (1) no job
Project (2/95) (24 months) limited program is limited that provides at least a
to 24 months in a 48-month specified level of
period. After the time income is available to a
limit is reached, benefits recipient, (2)
are terminated. termination would result
in the family's
experiencing extreme
hardship, (3) adult
family members can no
longer meet the
conditions of their
self-sufficiency
contracts, or (4) the
state has failed to meet
the terms of a
recipient's self-
sufficiency contract.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employment Work trigger After 26 weeks of job None
Program (6/96) with sanctions search, adults nonexempt
up to full- from JOBS who are able to
family sanction work are required to work
(26 weeks) for 26 weeks, provided that
work is available. The work
requirement may be
fulfilled by unsubsidized
work, subsidized work, on-
the-job training, community
service, alternative work
experience programs, work
supplementation, or other
approved employment-
related activities.
Sanctions for noncompliance
without good cause are
increasing reductions in
AFDC grant, culminating in
case closure.
NORTH CAROLINA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work First Benefit AFDC receipt for families Extensions may be
Program (2/96) termination in the Work First granted if recipients
(24 months) employment and training have substantially
program is limited to 24 complied with their
months. After the time personal responsibility
limit is reached, families contracts (or have good
are ineligible for benefits cause reasons for not
for 36 months. doing so) and through no
fault of their own have
been unable to obtain or
maintain employment to
provide a specified
level of subsistence.
NORTH DAKOTA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training, Work trigger Nonexempt families are Not specified
Education, with sanctions required to sign a social
Employment, and (24 months, 42 contract that sets an
Management months, or 43 expected time limit for
Project (9/95) months or self-sufficiency based on
longer) factors related to
employability: 24 months,
42 months, or 43 months or
longer. Individuals not
employed full time in
unsubsidized employment by
end of time limit are
placed in a work experience
position or granted an
extension.
OHIO
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio First (3/ Benefit AFDC receipt for nonexempt None cited
96) termination assistance units headed by
(36 months) adults is limited to 36
months out of any 60-month
period. After the time
limit is reached,
assistance unit's benefits
are terminated.
OKLAHOMA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mutual Work trigger After 36 cumulative months Extensions may be
Agreement--A with sanctions of AFDC receipt out of 60 provided to individuals
Plan for Success (36 months) months for recipients who are making
(3/95) nonexempt from JOBS, satisfactory progress in
participation in workfare the program and are
(or other JOBS components within either one
leading to employment if semester of completing
workfare positions are an educational program
unavailable) becomes or 4 months of
mandatory. JOBS sanctions completing a training
may be imposed on program expected to lead
individuals who fail to directly to employment.
meet the minimum hourly
requirement.
OREGON
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oregon Option Benefit Nonexempt families are Extensions can be
(3/96) termination limited to 24 cumulative granted to the following
(24 months) months of AFDC receipt in recipients: (1) a
any period of 84 dependent child in a
consecutive months. two-parent household in
which the primary wage
earner has died; (2) a
dependent child living
with a person other than
the parent(s) with whom
the child lived at the
time the child was
receiving AFDC; or (3) a
parent of a dependent
child receiving AFDC,
and his or her dependent
children, if the state
determines that the
parent is making good
faith efforts to obtain
permanent employment.
SOUTH CAROLINA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family Benefit Nonexempt families are An extension of up to 6
Independence Act termination limited to 24 months of months may be granted if
(5/96) (24 months) AFDC receipt. an individual is
involved in a training
program that will not be
completed by the 24th
month. An extension of
up to 12 months can be
granted if an individual
has completed training
and has diligently
complied with the self-
sufficiency plan but
cannot obtain or
maintain employment that
provides at least a
specified level of
subsistence. When the 6-
or 12-month extensions
expire, month-by-month
extensions may be
granted if an individual
has complied with the
self-sufficiency plan
and the county
determines either that
benefit termination will
have detrimental effect
on the welfare of the
children or that the
family has no other
source of financial
support sufficient to
provide at least a
specified level of
subsistence.
SOUTH DAKOTA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthening Work trigger Nonexempt adults assigned An extension can be
South Dakota with sanctions to the employment track are granted if the state
Families (24 or 60 limited to 24 months of fails to make available
Initiative (3/ months) AFDC receipt. Nonexempt services it agreed to
94) adults assigned to the provide as part of an
education track are limited individual's self-
to 60 months of AFDC sufficiency plan and
receipt. When the time determines that an
limits are reached, adults individual needs
who are not working 30 additional time to
hours per week are required complete his or her
to perform 30 hours per plan.
week of approved volunteer
service. Noncompliance is
subject to either a JOBS
sanction or the grant being
reduced in any month of
noncompliance to an amount
equal to what the family
would receive if the
adult's needs were not
taken into account.
TENNESSEE
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Families First Benefit Receipt of AFDC cash The 18-month eligibility
(7/96) termination (18 benefits by an assistance period may be extended
months and 60 unit is limited to 60 for an additional 6
months) months, and periods of months for families in
eligibility within the 60 which the caretaker is
months are limited to 18 living in an economic
months. An assistance unit hardship county and is
whose benefit is terminated in substantial
after receiving AFDC cash compliance with the
assistance for 18 months Personal Responsibility
within an 18-month period Plan. The 18-month and
of eligibility is eligible 60-month periods can
to reapply for AFDC no also be extended on a
sooner than 3 months from case-by-case basis if
the last month of receipt good cause exists or the
of AFDC, with the following state has failed to
exception. The assistance provide timely services.
unit will not be subject to Good cause exists when
the 3-month waiting period all of the following
if the caretaker was criteria are met: (1)
employed when the case was the participant is in
terminated, loses the job compliance with the
through no fault of his or plan, (2) the
her own, and the assistance participant has been in
unit meets all other AFDC substantial compliance
eligibility requirements. with the plan during the
The state will act to entire current period of
monitor and protect the eligibility, (3) the
safety and well-being of assistance unit's income
the children in families is less than the payment
whose benefits are standard plus $90 (or a
terminated. If the state higher amount), and (4)
certifies that AFDC the participant is not
assistance is needed to currently refusing
prevent a child's loss of employment or
housing, heat, light, or voluntarily quitting
water or to prevent removal employment without good
of the child from the cause.
custody of his or her
parent, a cash or vendor
payment will be issued to
meet the child's needs.
TEXAS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Achieving Change Benefit On the basis of Extensions of no longer
for Texans (3/ reduction (12, availability of JOBS than 6 months at a time
96) 24, or 36 positions, AFDC receipt is can be granted upon
months) time limited for request if the
caretakers, second parents individual lives in an
in AFDC-Unemployed Parent area of economic
cases, and teen parents hardship or experiences
certified as caretakers. severe personal hardship
The length of the time and has complied with
limit--12, 24, or 36 all work-related
months--depends on the requirements.
extent of the individual's
education and work
experience. After the time
limit is reached, a
family's benefits are
reduced by the individual's
portion for 5 years.
VERMONT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family Work trigger Nonexempt parents who have None
Independence with sanctions not accepted an
Project (4/93) (15 or 30 unsubsidized job will be
months) required to participate in
community service jobs
after 30 months (single-
parent families and two-
parent families with
incapacitated adults) or 15
months (other two-parent
families). The sanction for
failure to participate is a
reduction of the AFDC
benefit based on the number
of hours the parent was
required to work under the
community service jobs
component.
Welfare Work trigger Nonexempt parents who have None
Restructuring with sanctions not accepted an
Project (7/94) up to full- unsubsidized job or who are
family sanction working in an unsubsidized
(15 or 30 job for fewer than the
months) required hours will be
required to participate in
community service jobs
after 30 months (single-
parent families and two-
parent families with
incapacitated adults) or 15
months (other two-parent
families). The sanction for
failure to participate is
issuance of the AFDC
benefit in the form of
vendor payments for
housing, food, fuel, and
utilities (with any
remaining balance paid in
cash). Failure to comply
with any requirements while
under the sanction will
result in termination of a
family's AFDC benefit.
VIRGINIA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia Work trigger Within 90 days of signing Hardship exceptions to
Independence with sanctions personal responsibility the 24-month time limit
Program (7/95) up to full- agreements, nonexempt can be granted for up to
family sanction recipients are required to 1 year if factors
(90 days) participate in work relating to job
activities such as availability are
Benefit unsubsidized employment, unfavorable or an
termination subsidized employment, or exception would enable a
(24 months) CWEP. The sanction for caretaker to complete
noncompliance is employment-related
termination of families' education or training.
benefits for increasing Hardship exceptions can
periods of time. In also be granted for up
addition, cases headed by to 90 days if an
nonexempt caretakers are individual has been
limited to 24 cumulative actively seeking
months of AFDC cash unsubsidized employment
benefits. and cannot find a job
that pays at least a
specified amount or the
individual demonstrates
extreme hardship because
of a job loss resulting
from factors unrelated
to job performance.
Extensions to hardship
exceptions may be
granted in very limited
circumstances.
WASHINGTON
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Success Through Benefit Assistance units in which None
Employment reduction (48 adults have received AFDC
Program (10/95) months) for 48 months in any 60-
month period will have
benefits reduced by 10
percent. Until an
assistance unit has been
off assistance for 1 month
or more, benefits will be
reduced by an additional 10
percent for each additional
12 months of AFDC receipt.
WISCONSIN
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work Not Welfare Work trigger After the first month, Extensions to the 24-
(11/93) with sanctions nonexempt recipients are month time limit can be
up to full- required to earn their granted to those who (1)
family sanction benefits through education, cannot work for reasons
(1 month and 12 training, or work such as personal
months) activities; after 12 months disability or
of AFDC receipt, they must incapacity, (2) need to
Benefit engage in work activities. care for a disabled
termination (24 The sanction for dependent, or (3) have
months) noncompliance without good made all appropriate
cause is a reduction of the efforts to find work but
combined AFDC/food stamp cannot find work because
grant based on the number local labor market
of hours of assigned conditions preclude a
activity not completed. reasonable job
Nonexempt cases are limited opportunity.
to 24 months of AFDC
receipt within a 48-month
period. After this time
limit is reached, families'
benefits are terminated for
36 months.
WYOMING
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Benefit Nonexempt individuals who One 6-month extension
Opportunities reduction complete an associate's or may be granted to
and New (varies) bachelor's program while individuals to update an
Responsibilities receiving AFDC will be expired certification,
(9/93) eligible for no more than 6 take a licensing or
additional months of certification
benefits. In addition, examination, or obtain a
nonexempt individuals will license or certificate
be ineligible for AFDC if to practice the trade or
they are pursuing a profession for which
bachelor's degree beyond a they have been trained.
sixth year; a vocational or
associate's degree beyond a
fourth year; or a second
associate's or bachelor's
degree or any kind of
graduate degree.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The District of Columbia's Project on Work, Employment, and
Responsibility, approved Aug. 19, 1996, contained a time-limit
provision. HHS withdrew approval for this provision in Sept. 1996.
\a The time-limit provision was eliminated when Maryland's Family
Investment Program was amended in Aug. 1996.
Source: GAO analysis of the terms and conditions of approved state
waivers, supplemented by information obtained from the states and
HHS.
REASONS FOR EXCLUDING CASES FROM
COVERAGE IN SELECTED STATES
=========================================================== Appendix V
Age-of-
youngest-
child
State Number Percent Number Percent exemption Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
------------------ ------------------ ------------------ -------- -------- --------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Arizona 61,538 100.0 0 0 (none) 1,100 1.8 0 0 60,438 98.2
Connecticut 56,017 100.0 7,595\c 13.6 1 year 1,900 3.4 24,110\d 43.0 22,412 40.0
Delaware 10,253 100.0 1,161 11.3 3 months 1,676 16.3 5,353\d 52.2 2,063 20.1
Florida\e 9,083 100.0 1,499 16.5 6 months 3,732 41.1 826\f 9.1 3,026 33.3
Illinois 221,632 100.0 575\g 0.3 13 5,694 2.6 0 0 215,363\ 97.2
years\h i
Iowa 28,581 100.0 6,777 23.7 6 months 918 3.2 0 0 20,886 73.1
Massachusetts 82,237 100.0 57,109\c 69.4 6 years 1,692 2.1 7,976\d 9.7 15,460 18.8
Michigan 174,176 100.0 46,806 26.9 4 months 12,888 7.4 0 0 114,482 65.7
Mississippi 11,697 100.0 5,248 44.9 3 years 1,297 11.1 0 0 5,152 44.0
Nebraska 2,423 100.0 319 13.2 6 878 36.2 0 0 1,226 50.6
months\j
Utah 14,320 100.0 0\k 0 none 5,230 36.5 32\l 0.2 9,058 63.3
Vermont 8,965 100.0 61 0.7 18 months 3,545 39.5 0 0 5,359 59.8
Virginia 63,399 100.0 5,600 8.8 18 months 3,000 4.7 0 0 54,800 86.4
Wisconsin 52,765 100.0 9,424 17.9 1 year 675 1.3 3,306\m 6.3 39,360 74.6
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Typical categories of exemptions to work requirements under
states' waiver programs were similar to those provided under the JOBS
program: having a disability, caring for a young child or a disabled
household member, or household headed by caretaker relatives (also
referred to as "ineligible grantees") with no legal obligation of
support. Some states provided exemptions for seniors (aged 62 or
older), for those in their last 3 or 4 months of pregnancy, or for
those lacking transportation or child care. Categories of exemptions
for other types of requirements leading to full-family sanctions
varied by the requirements. For example, exemptions relating to the
teen living arrangement requirement generally dealt with conditions
in the teens' parents' homes, and exemptions relating to child
enforcement requirements generally dealt with the unavailability, or
risk to the child of providing, information on the absent parent.
\b As a standard condition of obtaining HHS approval for a waiver,
states were required to provide for an evaluation based on a
comparison of those subject to the waiver provisions (treatment
group) versus those subject to previous program provisions (control
group). Cases were to be randomly assigned to the control groups in
each state, generally to be spread incrementally through the first
few years of implementation. As a result, the number of cases
excluded as control cases in each state depended on the number of
waivers being implemented and how long the state had been
implementing each of its waiver programs. Under the new federal
welfare reform law, states are no longer required to evaluate their
waiver programs, and they may discontinue maintaining their control
groups for study. As of April 1997, 16 states had requested HHS
funding to continue evaluations of their waivers, including
maintenance of control groups. Of these, 10 were states that had
implemented benefit termination waiver provisions.
\c The exemption data included here represent those who were not
subject to a nonmandatory work requirement; exemption data are
different for other requirements in which noncompliance can result in
full-family sanction, such as the teen living arrangement and teen
school attendance requirements.
\d Pending review for conversion to new program.
\e Data included here are for Alachua and Escambia counties only, the
two pilot counties where all terminations as of Dec. 31, 1996, had
taken place.
\f Nonvolunteers in Alachua County where participation was voluntary.
\g Represents the number exempt among the 15,000 cases otherwise
subject to work requirements under the Targeted Work Initiative and
Get a Job components of Illinois's Work and Responsibility waiver.
\h Age-of-youngest-child exemption among those subject to work
requirements. No exemptions provided for requirement to sign
self-sufficiency plan.
\i Of the total caseload, about 14,425 cases were subject to
provisions potentially leading to benefit termination on the basis of
noncooperation with work requirements; and the entire caseload
(except control cases) was subject to provisions potentially leading
to benefit termination on the basis of noncooperation with signing a
self-sufficiency plan.
\j However, cases with the youngest child age 12 weeks to 6 months
must participate part time in activities such as family nurturing or
pre-employment skills.
\k According to the waiver, no one over age 15 was exempt. However,
according to a May 1996 report prepared by the Utah Department of
Human Services, approximately 4 to 5 percent of families are at any
one time temporarily excused from active participation because of a
recent birth, personal illness, or unforeseen circumstance.
\l Seasonal fluctuation.
\m Represents cases in other waiver demonstration projects, such as
Work Not Welfare, Parental and Family Responsibility, and Learnfare.
OVERVIEW OF WAIVER PROGRAMS IN
IOWA, MASSACHUSETTS, AND WISCONSIN
========================================================== Appendix VI
IOWA'S FAMILY INVESTMENT
PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:1
Iowa was the first of the three case study states to implement
benefit termination provisions statewide under its waiver, called the
Family Investment Program. The goal of the program, as stated in
Iowa's waiver application, was to transform its welfare system from
one of income maintenance to one of self-sufficiency. The program
was designed to make welfare a transition to work by requiring
participants' involvement in some work or training activity and
providing consequences for those not participating. Iowa began
implementing some provisions under this waiver in October 1993 but
did not begin implementing its benefit termination provisions
statewide until April 1994.
At the core of Iowa's program was the Family Investment Agreement, an
individualized plan designed to help each family achieve
self-sufficiency. This plan generally called for entry into the
workforce as soon as possible, with state assistance in job search
activities and child care provision. In some cases, however, a
recipient's plan may have called for a period of education, training,
rehabilitation, or work experience to prepare the recipient for the
job market. As circumstances changed, the plan, including a time
table for achieving self-sufficiency, could be altered on the basis
of client and caseworker consultations. Recipients who failed to
sign the agreement, or who signed it but failed to subsequently
fulfill the terms of the agreement, had their benefits phased out
under a Limited Benefit Plan. Initially, the Limited Benefit Plan
consisted of 3 months of full benefits, followed by 3 months of
reduced benefits (eliminating the adult portion of the grant), then
benefit termination. In February 1996, the state shortened the
phase-out period by eliminating the 3 months of full benefits.
Before termination, recipients in the Limited Benefit Plan who had
not previously signed a Family Investment Agreement could request
having their full benefits reinstated by signing an agreement. Once
a case had been terminated, however, families were required to wait 6
months before reapplying for benefits.
Iowa contracted with Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and the
Institute for Social and Economic Development to evaluate its program
as required under the waiver. At the time of our review, the
evaluators were conducting a study including (1) a flow analysis to
obtain data on the number of and reasons why recipients entered and
exited the Limited Benefit Plan program and (2) a survey of
recipients whose benefits have been terminated to determine what
happened to them after termination. For the survey, the evaluators
contacted 137 of the 172 recipients whose benefits had been
terminated between November 1995 and January 1996. The state
received the draft report summarizing the results of this study in
October 1996, but the final report had not yet been released as this
report went to press. In addition, a request for funding from HHS to
continue the evaluation of Iowa's waiver program was pending at the
time of our review.
MASSACHUSETTS'S WELFARE REFORM
'95 PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:2
As stated in Massachusetts's waiver application, the underlying goal
of its program, called Welfare Reform '95, was to replace traditional
cash assistance with work or community service requirements for all
able-
bodied AFDC recipients with school-aged children. At the core of
this program was the expectation that recipients would assume
responsibility for moving toward self-sufficiency. Ongoing
recipients as well as new applicants had to appear for an eligibility
assessment under the new program requirements. Similar to Iowa's
Family Investment Agreement, Massachusetts required caseworkers to
develop an Employment Development Plan for each recipient subject to
the work requirement and for each teen parent.
Recipients subject to the work requirement had 60 days for job search
activities before the requirement was imposed. If recipients did not
find employment after 60 days, or if they subsequently lost their
job, their plans required participation in community service to meet
the 20 hours per week mandatory work requirement, and caseworkers
provided a list of community service work sites. Teen parents' plans
required enrollment in high school (or an equivalent program) and at
least 75-percent attendance; caseworkers provided referrals to
programs as needed. For both adults and teens, the plans also
allowed recipients to request support services such as transportation
or child care. If recipients failed to comply with their plans,
their benefits were reduced (removal of the adult portion of the
grant); continued noncompliance meant benefit termination for the
entire family. The state could reopen cases and restore full
benefits retroactively if recipients demonstrated compliance with
plan requirements for 2 consecutive weeks. The waiver explicitly
eliminated any formal reconciliation process before notifying
recipients of or implementing sanctions.
Although required under the waiver, the state had not yet contracted
with evaluators to study its program before the new federal welfare
reform law was enacted. At the time of our review, the state was
developing plans to evaluate the program under the new law; however,
the state did not intend to continue to maintain its control groups
for study.
WISCONSIN'S PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
PROJECT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:3
Wisconsin implemented its benefit termination provisions statewide in
March 1996 as part of the waiver demonstration project called Pay for
Performance. This project had two major components: provisions for
diverting AFDC applicants from ever receiving benefits and provisions
for requiring AFDC recipients to work in exchange for benefits.
The diversion component was designed to help applicants become self-
sufficient without going on welfare. Applicants met with a financial
planning resource specialist who would explain the alternatives to
going on welfare and the services available to help them find a job,
secure child care, or address other barriers to self-sufficiency.
Those seeking further assistance had to enroll in Wisconsin's JOBS
program and begin looking for work. If applicants completed 60 hours
of JOBS participation and were still not self-sufficient, they then
became eligible to receive welfare benefits. Although statewide data
on the effectiveness of these provisions were not yet available, the
number of applicants diverted from the welfare rolls due to these
provisions was significant, according to state and county officials.
Data compiled in one county revealed that 46 percent of 880
applicants deemed likely to have gone on AFDC between March and July
of 1996 were diverted from receiving benefits.
The work-in-exchange-for-benefits component was designed to replicate
working-world situations for those receiving benefits by reducing
benefits proportionately to the number of required hours not worked.
The program required recipients to work 20 to 40 hours per week.
Each month, caseworkers determined hours of participation in assigned
JOBS activities and calculated a monetary sanction for any missed
hours by multiplying the number of missed hours by the federal
minimum wage. If a recipient's participation fell below 25 percent
of the scheduled hours, the entire AFDC grant was reduced to zero,
and, because the AFDC and food stamp work requirements were linked,
food stamps were reduced to $10 for those who had no basis for
exemption under the food stamp employment and training program (such
as having a child under 6 years old).\66 Because calculating these
sanctions is difficult, sanctions were not to be imposed until the
second month after the month in question to allow a 30-day period for
data processing and for the recipient to request adjustments based on
good cause for failure to participate or on reporting and processing
errors. The state closed cases if the recipient failed to enroll in
the Pay for Performance JOBS program or received a full sanction (for
participation below 25 percent) for 3 consecutive months. Once the
state closed a case, a recipient would generally have to meet the
program requirements for new applicants in the diversion
component--60 hours of participation in JOBS--before becoming
eligible to receive benefits again.
Wisconsin had contracted with MAXIMUS to conduct the required
evaluations of the Pay for Performance waiver program. Although the
contract was canceled after passage of federal welfare reform, a
request for funding from HHS to continue the evaluation was pending
at the time of our review. In addition, a broader study group,
including the University of Wisconsin, had been formed to evaluate
the state's comprehensive reform effort, called Wisconsin Works, of
which Pay for Performance is one part. Phased-in implementation of
Wisconsin Works began in October 1996, and officials expected to have
the program fully implemented by September 1997.
--------------------
\66 Under the new federal welfare reform law, Wisconsin was allowed
to lower the age-of-youngest-child exemption for the food stamp
sanction from 6 years to 1 year of age for 3 years because the state
had previously submitted a waiver request to do so that had been
denied.
BASES FOR TERMINATIONS NATIONWIDE,
BY STATE
========================================================= Appendix VII
Table VII.1
Terminations as of June 30, 1996
Teen Teen
Child parent parent
support school living
Enrollmen enforcem attendan arrangemen Due to
t Work ent ce t Other reaching
Tota requireme requirem requirem requirem requiremen requirem a time
State l nts ents ents ents ts ents limit
---------- ---- --------- -------- -------- -------- ---------- -------- --------
Arizona 66 66
Connecticu 11\b 2 7 \b 2\c
t
Florida 19 19\d
Iowa 4,17 3,756\e 418\e
4
Massachuse 1,29 1,036 217\f 39\g
tts 2
Michigan 307 307
Mississipp 279 279
i
Missouri 73 73
Nebraska 8 8
South 289 289
Dakota
Utah 62 59 3
Vermont 3 3
Virginia 985 191 390 362 42
Wisconsin 2,20 1,634 574
8
=========================================================================================
Total 9,77 5,581 3,365 372 217 220 2 19
6
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In some states, such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin, data
represent cases in terminated status as of the date shown. In other
states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, data represent cumulative
totals that may include cases that have subsequently been reopened
and may double count recipients in some cases.
\b Data do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply
with teen living arrangement requirements, which are not tracked,
according to the state official surveyed.
\c Terminations for failure to comply with fingerprinting
requirements.
\d Of the 19 cases terminated upon reaching their time limit, 10 had
complied and 9 had failed to comply with program requirements.
\e Based on state official's estimates.
\f Does not include the 25 cases in which closure was for failure to
comply with living arrangement requirement as well as failure to
attend school.
\g Includes the 25 cases in which closure was for failure to attend
school as well as failure to comply with living arrangement
requirement.
Table VII.2
Terminations as of December 31, 1996
Teen Teen
Child parent parent
support school living
Enrollmen enforcem attendan arrangemen Due to
t Work ent ce t Other reaching
Tota requireme requirem requirem requirem requiremen requirem a time
State l nts ents ents ents ts ents limit
---------- ---- --------- -------- -------- -------- ---------- -------- --------
Arizona 50 50\b
Connecticu 477\ 460 12 \c 5\d
t c
Delaware 68 15\e 40 0\f 13\g
Florida 74 74\h
Iowa 5,28 4,691\i 597\i
8
Illinois 8 0 8
Massachuse 1,96 1,708\j 235\k 26\l
tts 9
Michigan 765 765
Missouri 279 279
Mississipp 699 699
i
Nebraska 59 59
North \m \n
Carolina
Ohio \m \n \n
Oregon 60\o 60\o
South 413 413
Dakota
Utah 180 177\p 3\q
Vermont 3 3
Virginia 1,95 704\r 390\s 810\t 51
5
Wisconsin 5,70 2,577 3,123
0
=========================================================================================
Total 18,0 7,972 8,477 865 235 406 18 74
47
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In some states, such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin, data
represent cases in terminated status as of the date shown. In other
states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, data represent cumulative
totals that may include cases that have subsequently been reopened
and may double count recipients in some cases.
\b Data do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply
with teen living arrangement requirements, which are not tracked,
according to the state official surveyed. The most significant
reason for the drop in terminations over time is because many teen
parents become old enough to no longer have to meet living
arrangement requirements.
\c Data do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply
with teen living arrangement requirements (not tracked).
\d Terminations for failure to comply with fingerprinting
requirements.
\e Of the 15, 6 cases terminated until the end of the demonstration
project; 9 cases could still be reopened on the basis of compliance
with requirement.
\f According to the official surveyed, provisions for terminating
cases for failure to comply with teen living arrangement requirement
predated implementation of the waiver. Although the number of cases
terminated for this reason has not been tracked, the official
believed it was probably zero.
\g Other reasons included nine cases for failure to attend parenting
classes; three cases for failure to provide proof that children had
been immunized; and one case for failure to attend a family planning
session.
\h Of the 74 cases terminated upon reaching their time limit, 43 had
complied and 31 had failed to comply with program requirements.
\i Based on state official's estimates.
\j Includes a partial estimate for terminations due to noncompliance
by dependent children aged 16 to 18.
\k Does not include the 16 cases in which closure was for failure to
comply with living arrangement requirement as well as failure to
attend school.
\l Includes the 16 cases in which closure was for failure to attend
school as well as failure to comply with living arrangement
requirements.
\m According to the official surveyed, families have had benefits
terminated under waiver provisions, but the number of cases
terminated has not been tracked. Efforts are under way to begin
collecting such data.
\n State's waiver included provisions for terminating benefits on
this basis, and, according to the official surveyed, cases have been
terminated. However, the number of cases terminated on this basis
has not been tracked.
\o Number of cases terminated as of Nov. 15, 1996. According to the
official surveyed, data as of Dec. 31, 1996, were not yet available
as this report went to press.
\p May include some cases terminated for failure to comply with child
support enforcement requirements (see table note q).
\q Number of cases terminated for failure to comply with child
support enforcement requirements as of June 30, 1996; data not
tracked and could not be updated through Dec. 31, 1996, according to
the official surveyed.
\r Does not include 23 cases that also had failed to comply with work
requirements.
\s State officials could not update the number of terminations based
on failure to comply with work requirements past June 30, 1996.
\t Does not include three cases that also had failed to comply with
work requirements.
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF TOTAL
CASELOAD COMPARED WITH TERMINATED
CASES STUDIED IN IOWA,
MASSACHUSETTS, AND WISCONSIN
======================================================== Appendix VIII
Statewide Statewide Statewide
- - -
Total no no Total no
statewide benefits Total benefits statewide benefits
AFDC or statewide or AFDC or
caseload reported AFDC caseload Statewid reported caseload Statewid Milwauke reported
(1995)\a Statewide Des Moines income\b (1995)\a e Boston income\b (1995)\a e e income\b
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ------------- -------- -------- ---------- ---------- -------- -------- ----------
Number of 36,435 408 77 56 100,852 936 196 138 72,366 759 280 123
cases
Household characteristics -percent\c of cases with
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
children 48.4 39.7 44.2 46.4 45.5 53.4 61.7 68.1 40.8 39.1 38.6 51.2
0 -1 32.1 34.8 26.0 30.4 31.3 29.0 21.0 19.6 28.9 29.9 28.2 26.8
2 13.5 16.7 18.2 7.1 15.7 11.4 12.2 6.5 17.0 19.5 21.4 15.4
3 6.0 8.8 11.7 16.1 7.6 6.2 5.1 5.7 13.3 11.5 11.8 6.5
4 or more
Youngest 12.1 6.6 2.6 10.7 9.6 3.6 3.1 5.1 18.4 2.6 2.9 4.1
child 24.6 30.2 39.0 32.1 25.3 22.0 19.9 38.4 28.2 32.0 30.4 22.8
under age 24.2 29.7 23.4 26.8 26.6 7.1 10.7 11.6 21.0 29.8 27.1 26.0
1 25.4 24.5 28.6 19.6 24.0 37.0 31.1 26.8 21.1 23.2 24.3 23.6
age 1-2 9.6 6.6 3.9 8.9 11.8 18.5 20.9 8.7 7.8 8.8 11.1 13.0
age 3-5 3.9 2.4 2.6 1.8 2.6 11.8 14.3 9.4 3.6 3.6 4.3 10.6
age 6-
11
age 12-
15
age 16-
18
Length of 25.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 17.0 45.7 45.9 46.4 24.9 30.7 32.5 30.9
current 12.9 21.3 22.1 19.6 11.9 16.9 16.8 13.0 11.6 20.2 16.4 31.7
stay 18.5 23.0 22.1 17.9 15.1 13.9 12.7 20.3 20.6 19.0 17.1 18.7
0-6 mos. 9.1 14.9 7.8 16.1 13.4 5.6 4.6 5.8 12.4 12.1 11.0 8.9
7-12 7.0 15.7 11.7 10.7 10.4 3.2 2.6 2.2 7.7 6.6 7.9 5.7
mos. 5.9 24.3 36.4 35.7 9.2 3.5 4.1 3.6 7.0 4.3 5.7 0.0
13-24 21.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 11.2 13.3 8.7 15.8 7.1 9.3 4.1
mos.
25-36
mos.
37-48
mos.
49-60
mos.
over 60
mos.
Head-of-household characteristics -percent\c of cases with head of household
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under age 6.7 6.4 5.2 5.4 5.7 18.9 19.9 38.4 6.2 2.4 1.4 2.4
20 48.5 51.7 48.0 62.5 43.8 19.8 16.8 25.4 50.6 50.1 49.6 43.9
age 20- 36.1 33.8 42.9 32.1 37.1 39.8 38.8 23.2 32.4 36.2 36.0 37.4
29 8.8 8.1 3.9 0.0 13.5 21.5 24.5 13.0 10.7 11.3 12.9 16.3
age 30-
39
40 and
over
Female 85.7 84.3 89.6 82.1 90.5 87.8 85.7 88.4 88.5 92.2 90.4 83.7
Nonwhite 16.7 12.1 21.1 5.4 55.0 57.6 82.7 55.8 56.6 45.6 80.4 45.6
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a These data are from Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of
AFDC Recipients - Fiscal Year 1995, HHS (Washington, D.C.: June
1996). Number of children data are from table 6. Age of youngest
child data are from table 11. Length of current stay data are from
table 12. Age of head-of-household percentages calculated on the
basis of combined figures from table 21.1 (mothers aged 11-17), table
22 (adult female recipients), and table 25 (adult male recipients).
Sex of head-of-household percentages calculated on the basis of
combined figures from tables 22 and 25. Race of head-of-household
data are from table 10 (race of natural or adoptive parent).
\b Data on demographic characteristics not broken down for "No
benefits or reported income" category for cases studied in selected
urban areas due to the small number of cases in the category: Des
Moines, 16; Boston, 37; and Milwaukee, 50.
\c Percentages exclude unknowns, which were generally less than 1
percent, except for race. Unknown percentages for race ranged from 0
to 8.4 percent.
MASSACHUSETTS DATA ON HIGH SCHOOL,
WORK EXPERIENCE, AND PRIMARY
LANGUAGE
========================================================== Appendix IX
Total
statewid
e AFDC
caseload Noncomplianc Noncomplianc Noncomplianc
(Feb. All e with work All e with work All e with work
1996) reasons requirements reasons requirements reasons requirements
----------- -------- -------- ------------ -------- ------------ -------- ------------
Number of 87,945 936 680 196 138 138 67
cases
Percent of cases with head of household
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not 49.6 65.3 54.1 65.8 52.9 71.0 46.3
completing
high
school or
equivalent
Not working 41.5 47.4 42.4 51.0 43.5 45.7 34.3
in last 10
years
Primary 18.4 21.9 23.5 23.5 25.4 27.5 31.3
language
not
English
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REPORTED INCOME AND BENEFITS
RECEIVED BY TERMINATED CASES
STUDIED IN IOWA, MASSACHUSETTS,
AND WISCONSIN
=========================================================== Appendix X
Total Total
Total cases Des Moines Rest of statewide Boston Rest of state statewide Milwaukee Rest of
statewide cases state cases cases cases cases cases cases state cases
---------------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------- ------------ -------------- -------------- -------------- ------------
Number of 408 77 331 936 196 740 759 280 479
terminated
cases
Number of cases \a \a \a 300 65 235 108 70 38
reopened
Number of cases 408 77 331 636 131 505 651 210 441
remaining
closed
Of cases remaining closed, percent with reported income from\b
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wages 30.4 24.7 31.7 23.0 22.9 23.0 31.5\c 27.1\c 33.6\c
Pensions\d \e \e \e 16.0 6.1 18.6 \e \e \e
Child support 19.1 14.3 20.2 16.4 9.9 18.0 24.0 13.8 28.8
Of cases
remaining
closed, percent 42.9 33.8 45.0 48.3 38.2 50.9 47.2 38.1 51.5
with any of the
above reported
income
Of cases remaining closed, percent receiving other non-AFDC benefits from
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Food stamps 60.8 55.8 61.9 25.6 20.6 26.9 39.3 34.8 41.5
SSI 9.8 18.2 7.9 12.7 10.7 13.3 12.6 10.5 13.6
Housing 27.2 24.7 27.8 26.4 33.6 24.6 22.1 16.7 24.7
General \f \f \f 0.3 0.0 0.4 \g \g \g
assistance
Percent 71.8 71.4 71.9 47.3 50.4 46.5 57.6 51.9 60.3
receiving any
of the above
non-AFDC
benefits
Of cases 54.4 45.5 56.5 58.5 52.7 60.0 53.5 44.8 57.6
remaining
closed, percent
with active
Medicaid status
Percent 74.3 74.0 74.3 75.5 73.3 76.0 75.4 69.0 78.5
receiving any
of the above
non-AFDC
benefits,
including
Medicaid
Percent with any 86.3 83.1 87.0 78.3 73.3 79.6 81.1 76.2 83.4
of the above
non-AFDC
benefits,
including
Medicaid, or
reported income
Percent with 13.7 16.9 13.0 21.7 26.7 20.4 18.9 23.8 16.6
none of the
above non-AFDC
benefits or
reported income
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: See app. I for details on scope and time frames of cases
studied in each state.
\a Not applicable, as data analysis was conducted before 6 months had
elapsed, the minimum time period required in Iowa before an AFDC case
could be reopened.
\b Families not applying for, or receiving, AFDC or other benefits
were not required to report their wages or other income. In
addition, once no longer receiving AFDC, some families may receive
child support payments privately, which they are not required to
report to the state and local offices of Child Support Enforcement,
where we obtained our data. For these reasons, the figures on wage,
pension, and child support income are likely to be understated.
\c These figures may include other income, such as from pensions.
\d Includes Social Security, Veterans' Benefits, and
employment-related pensions.
\e No data available.
\f In Iowa, the general assistance program was administered at the
county level, and statewide data were not available.
\g Not applicable. Wisconsin discontinued its statewide general
assistance program in Jan. 1996, though some counties have programs.
AVERAGE BENEFITS, CHILD SUPPORT
PAYMENTS, AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
IN STATES TERMINATING BENEFITS
UNDER WAIVERS
========================================================== Appendix XI
Housing Fuel
AFDC Food assistance assistance Child
average stamp SSI average average support
monthly average average maximum annual average
grant monthly monthly monthly household monthly Unemployme
amount benefit benefit benefit benefit payment nt rate
State (1995)\a (1995)\b (1996)\c (1996)\d (1995)\e (1995)\f (1995)\g
------------ --------- -------- -------- ---------- ---------- -------- ----------
Arizona $293 $202 $347 $508 $163 $235 5.1
Connecticut 523 141 355 730 411 266 5.5
Delaware 301 187 328 549 194 169 4.3
Florida 263 178 342 518 92 194 5.5
Illinois 317 172 378 407 267 235 5.2
Iowa 371 154 310 401 197 290 3.5
Massachusett 551 152 342 701 348 334 5.4
s
Michigan 413 165 372 442 182 334 5.3
Mississippi 122 174 308 363 150 156 6.1
Missouri 273 172 332 361 187 288 4.8
Nebraska 317 150 318 377 173 283 2.6
North 243 159 299 435 80 199 4.3
Carolina
Ohio 313 155 369 427 97 292 4.8
Oregon 394 155 342 493 215 268 4.8
South Dakota 331 181 300 401 394 207 2.9
Utah 371 173 346 446 219 246 3.6
Vermont 510 146 300 533 281 272 4.2
Virginia 273 163 319 493 174 138 4.5
Wisconsin 465 161 334 424 300 226 3.7
=========================================================================================
National 378 172 339 \h 172 238 5.6
average
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Average monthly AFDC payment for a family with two children.
(Source: Table 34 in Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of
AFDC Recipients - Fiscal Year 1995, HHS (Washington, D.C.: June
1996)).
\b Average monthly value of the food stamp benefit in dollars.
(Source: Table 6 in Characteristics of Food Stamp Households:
Fiscal Year 1995, (Advance Report) U.S. Department of Agriculture
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1996)).
\c Average monthly federal SSI payment, Dec. 1996. (Source: Social
Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics.)
\d The unweighted average of the fair market rent for a two-bedroom
unit as of Feb. 22, 1996, established by Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) housing authorities for each county in the
state. HUD will pay up to the fair market rent for a subsidized
family, less the "total tenant payment," which is based on the
family's gross income, less specified deductions. (Deductions
include $480 for each dependent, $400 for any elderly family or a
person with a disability, and some medical deductions.) The formula
used in determining the tenant payment is the highest of (1) 30
percent of monthly income (including AFDC cash payments) less
deductions; (2) 10 percent of monthly income; (3) welfare rent, if
applicable; or (4) a $25 minimum rent or higher amount (up to $50)
set by the housing authority. Therefore, a family losing AFDC
benefits with no other income would fall into this last category and
be eligible to receive a housing subsidy up to the amount of the fair
market rent minus the minimum rent payment set by the housing
authority.
\e Generally includes only heating assistance provided during winter
months under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)
during fiscal year 1995. The program also provides cooling
assistance, and winter and summer crisis assistance. According to
the program official contacted, income standards for the program are
fairly high, and AFDC families were likely to receive amounts greater
than the amounts indicated here. (Source: HHS, Administration for
Children and Families, Fiscal Year 1995 Summer LIHEAP Telephone
Survey Results, Mar. 1996.)
\f Based on preliminary data reported by the states: total
collections divided by total cases with collections, monthly average.
(Source: Child Support Enforcement FY 1995 Preliminary Data Report,
HHS (Washington, D.C.: May 1996)).
\g Percent unemployed in the civilian labor force in 1995. (Source:
Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1996, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1996)).
\h According to a HUD Issue Brief, HUD Reinvention From Blueprint to
Action, HUD (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1995), the average cost of
serving families through housing certificates nationwide was $440 per
month; and the average cost of a public housing subsidy nationwide
was $481 per month based on fiscal year 1995 appropriations.
AFDC CASELOAD PARTICIPATION IN
SELECTED PROGRAMS IN STATES
TERMINATING BENEFITS UNDER WAIVERS
========================================================= Appendix XII
Percent Percent Percent
receiving Percent receiving receiving
food receiving housing child
State Number Percent stamps SSI\a assistance\b support\c
-------------- ----------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ------------ ----------
Arizona 69,609 100 92.1 3.1 15.1 0.2
Connecticut 60,985 100 88.7 3.2 33.0 10.7
Delaware 10,775 100 83.6 3.1 36.4 11.4
Florida 230,807 100 93.6 6.0 15.4 2.0
Illinois 236,205 100 93.7 8.5 19.5 0.5
Iowa 36,435 100 88.3 5.1 26.8 11.8
Massachusetts 100,852 100 78.6 4.9 33.7 8.7
Michigan 201,696 100 94.4 10.4 10.5 1.6
Mississippi 52,528 100 93.5 13.4 22.5 12.3
Missouri 89,289 100 89.9 6.8 25.3 8.6
Nebraska 14,828 100 86.4 6.5 36.6 1.2
North Carolina 125,503 100 77.7 10.9 23.7 12.0
Ohio 228,171 100 91.3 9.2 25.3 8.4
Oregon 39,264 100 91.1 1.4 17.5 9.7
South Dakota 6,286 100 83.7 6.9 27.5 8.8
Utah 16,648 100 85.9 0.7 25.6 11.9
Vermont 9,648 100 97.7 0.7 21.7 11.2
Virginia 72,147 100 86.6 7.7 28.9 7.5
Wisconsin 72,366 100 85.5 9.8 15.1 4.1
=========================================================================================
U.S. total 4,873,398 100 89.8 5.4 20.1 4.8
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Data for SSI also include workers compensation.
\b Data include families in public housing or receiving a HUD rent
subsidy. Families receiving other rent subsidies were not included.
\c At the time of our review, states were required to pass through to
AFDC recipients up to $50 per month of child support collected by the
state from absent parents. This pass-through requirement was
eliminated under the new federal welfare reform law.
Source: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC
Recipients - Fiscal Year 1995, HHS (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).
Food stamps data are from table 5; housing assistance data are from
table 4; and child support data are from table 42; SSI data are from
tables 33 and 42. According to the program official contacted, table
42 includes only adults on SSI and must be combined with the number
of children on SSI from table 33 for the approximate total number of
families with an SSI recipient.
GAO CONTACTS AND STAFF
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
======================================================== Appendix XIII
GAO CONTACTS
David P. Bixler, Assistant Director, (202) 512-7201
Margie K. Shields, Evaluator-in-Charge, (415) 904-2228
STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following individuals also made important contributions to this
report: Donald J. Porteous conducted the analysis of automated
data, led the fieldwork in Wisconsin, and coauthored the draft;
Andrew Sherrill conducted the analysis of waivers; and Christina L.
Warren led the fieldwork in Iowa.
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Will Potentially Be Affected by Policies to Time Limit AFDC Benefits.
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, August 5, 1996.
_______, and others. Designing Welfare-to-Work Programs for Families
Facing Personal or Family Challenges: Lessons from the Field.
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, December 30, 1996.
Welfare Policy for the 1990s, eds. Phoebe H. Cottingham and David
T. Ellwood. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1989.
Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Issues. ed. Isabel V. Sawhill.
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, June 1995.
Wilson, William Julius. When Work Disappears: The World of the New
Urban Poor. New York: Knopf, 1996.
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 2
Welfare Reform: Three States' Approaches Show Promise of Increasing
Work Participation Rates (GAO/HEHS-97-80, forthcoming report).
Welfare Waivers Implementation: States Work to Change Welfare
Culture, Community Involvement, and Service Delivery
(GAO/HEHS-96-105, July 2, 1996).
Employment Training: Successful Projects Share Common Strategy
(GAO/HEHS-96-108, May 7, 1996).
Welfare to Work: Approaches That Help Teenage Mothers Complete High
School (GAO/HEHS/PEMD-95-202, Sept. 29, 1995).
Welfare to Work: Child Care Assistance Limited; Welfare Reform May
Expand Needs (GAO/HEHS-95-220, Sept. 21, 1995).
Welfare to Work: State Programs Have Tested Some of the Proposed
Reforms (GAO/PEMD-95-26, July 14, 1995).
Welfare to Work: Most AFDC Training Programs Not Emphasizing Job
Placement (GAO/HEHS-95-113, May 19, 1995).
Welfare Dependency: Coordinated Community Efforts Can Better Serve
Young At-Risk Teen Girls (GAO/HEHS/RCED-95-108, May 10, 1995).
Welfare to Work: Participants' Characteristics and Services Provided
in JOBS (GAO/HEHS-95-93, May 2, 1995).
Welfare to Work: Measuring Outcomes for JOBS Participants
(GAO/HEHS-95-86, Apr. 17, 1995).
Child Care: Recipients Face Service Gaps and Supply Shortages
(GAO/HEHS-95-96, Mar. 1, 1995).
Community Development: Comprehensive Approaches Address Multiple
Needs but Are Challenging to Implement (GAO/RCED/HEHS-95-69, Feb. 8,
1995).
Child Care: Child Care Subsidies Increase Likelihood That Low-Income
Mothers Will Work (GAO/HEHS-95-20, Dec. 30, 1994).
Welfare to Work: Current AFDC Program Not Sufficiently Focused on
Employment (GAO/HEHS-95-28, Dec. 19, 1994).
*** End of document. ***