Welfare Reform: State Sanction Policies and Number of Families Affected
(Letter Report, 03/31/2000, GAO/HEHS-00-44).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on state
sanctions for families under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program who do not comply with the program's requirements,
focusing on: (1) state sanction policies under TANF; (2) state
procedures to reconcile noncompliance before imposing sanctions and
state policies on families' right to appeal sanctions; (3) the number of
benefit reductions and terminations that result from sanctions; and (4)
state studies of families whose benefits are reduced or terminated as a
result of sanctions.
GAO noted that: (1) under TANF, all states have policies requiring
sanctions when a family member fails to comply with work requirements;
(2) the first time a family member fails to comply, policies in 36
states call for a reduction in the family's cash benefits, known as a
partial sanction; (3) if a family member fails repeatedly to comply,
policies in 37 states call for termination of the family's entire cash
benefit, known as a full-family sanction; (4) the details of these
policies vary considerably among states; (5) under most state policies,
the first sanction lasts up to a month or until the family member begins
to comply with work requirements, but for repeated noncompliance, the
sanction lasts at least 3 months, even if the family member comes back
into compliance during that time; (6) generally, states' policies
regarding mandatory sanctions for failing to cooperate with child
support enforcement efforts are similar to those for failing to meet
work requirements, but both policies tend to be more stringent than the
sanction policies for noncompliance with optional state requirements,
such as children's immunization and school attendance; (7) most states
hold caseworkers responsible for making sanction decisions; (8) before
sanction decisions are made, policies in 31 states require that
caseworkers contact TANF family members to try to resolve the
noncompliance through conciliation; (9) according to policies in these
states, the conciliation process should include actions such as
notifying TANF family members that they are not complying with program
requirements, warning them that their benefits will be reduced or
terminated, and offering them an opportunity to avoid benefit cuts or
terminations by justifying their failure to comply or by returning to
compliance; (10) the remaining 20 states either have no conciliation
process or have conciliation procedures that do not apply to all
instances of noncompliance; (11) once a sanction decision is made, all
states have policies that require TANF families to be notified by mail
before their cash benefits are reduced or terminated and to be informed
of their right to appeal the decision to a higher authority; (12) during
an average month in 1998, about 135,800 families received reduced
benefits or no TANF benefits at all as a result of sanctions; (13) most
sanctions were partial, reducing cash benefits to about 112,700 families
in an average month; (14) the remainder were full-family sanctions that
stopped all cash benefits for about 23,100 families in an average month;
and (15) limited information is available on the characteristics of
families who received sanctions and what happened to them.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: HEHS-00-44
TITLE: Welfare Reform: State Sanction Policies and Number of
Families Affected
DATE: 03/31/2000
SUBJECT: Public assistance programs
State-administered programs
Noncompliance
Welfare benefits
Workfare
Welfare recipients
Sanctions
IDENTIFIER: HHS Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program
Medicaid Program
Food Stamp Program
Supplemental Security Income Program
SSI
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children
WIC
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
AFDC
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GAO/HEHS-00-44
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
40
Appendix II: Policies on Sanctions for Noncompliance With
TANF Work Responsibilities, by State, in 1999
44
Appendix III: Policies on Sanctions for Noncompliance With
Child Support Enforcement Responsibilities, by State, in 1999
47
Appendix IV: Effect on Food Stamp Benefits of Noncompliance
With TANF Work and Other Requirements, by State, in 1999
50
Appendix V: Number of Families Under Partial Sanctions, by
Reason for Sanction, in an Average Month in 1998
52
Appendix VI: Number of Families Under Full-Family Sanctions,
by Reason for Sanction, in an Average Month in 1998
54
Appendix VII: Scope and Methodology of State Studies That
Examined the Characteristics and Outcomes of TANF Families
Under Sanction
56
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Health and
Human Services
58
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
59
60
Table 1: Federal Law on TANF Sanctions for Noncompliance
With Program Requirements 9
Table 2: Federal Law on Sanctions of Medicaid and Food Stamps
for TANF Noncompliance 10
Table 3: Type of Sanction Policy, and Number of States Using It, for
Noncompliance With Work Responsibilities in 1999 13
Table 4: State Conciliation Policies for Noncompliance, by Type
of State Sanction Policy for Noncompliance With Work
Requirements 23
Table 5: Number and Percentage of Families Under Sanctions in
an Average Month in 1998, by Sanction Type 29
Table 6: Number and Percentage of Families Under TANF Sanctions
for Any Reason, by Type of Work Sanction Policy, in an Average
Month in 1998 32
Figure 1: States' Sanction Policies for Failure to Comply With
TANF Work Requirements, 1999 15
Figure 2: The Typical TANF Conciliation and Appeal Process
in Effect During 1999 25
AFDC Aid to Families With Dependent Children
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
JOBS Job Opportunities and Basic Skills training
OIG Office of Inspector General
TANF Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Health, Education, and
Human Services Division
B-281712
March 31, 2000
The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Benjamin Cardin
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
The Honorable Sander Levin
House of Representatives
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a program that took effect
nationwide in mid-1997, represented a dramatic change in the way that cash
assistance was delivered to poor families.1 TANF replaced the welfare
entitlement program, Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), with
block grants to states, giving them increased flexibility to determine how
they will meet program goals.2 Most families who receive TANF must assume
responsibility for achieving self-sufficiency by participating in work
activities and cooperating with child support enforcement agencies.
Families' obligations are typically specified in individualized plans that
may include the types of work activities required, such as job search,
vocational training, and subsidized or unsubsidized employment. These plans
may also include other requirements, such as obtaining a high school
diploma, parenting education, or drug treatment, or ensuring that children
are immunized and attend school. Families who comply with these requirements
continue to receive cash benefits, while those who do not comply receive
sanctions--that is, they lose all or part of their TANF cash benefits and
possibly other public benefits as well. Recent news reports have raised
concerns about the extent and appropriateness of sanctions and the adequacy
of efforts to resolve noncompliance--through a process referred to as
conciliation--before families are placed under sanctions. As requested, this
report provides information on (1) state sanction policies under TANF, (2)
state procedures to reconcile noncompliance before imposing sanctions and
state policies on families' right to appeal sanctions, (3) the number of
benefit reductions and terminations that result from sanctions, and (4)
state studies of families whose benefits are reduced or terminated as a
result of sanctions.
We obtained state sanction policies in effect as of September 1999 from TANF
officials in all 51 states,3 as well as written procedures for conciliation,
where offered, and appeal of sanctions. To determine how many families have
been affected, we obtained the number of families with benefit reductions or
terminations due to sanctions for each month in 1998 from 49 states. Fifteen
states provided information from studies of the characteristics or status of
families receiving sanctions. We conducted our work from January 1999
through January 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. For a detailed description of our methodology, see
appendix I.
Under TANF, all states have policies requiring sanctions when a family
member fails to comply with work requirements. The first time a family
member fails to comply, policies in 36 states call for a reduction in the
family's cash benefits, known as a partial sanction. If a family member
fails repeatedly to comply, policies in 37 states call for termination of
the family's entire cash benefit, known as a full-family sanction. The
details of these policies vary considerably among states. Under most state
policies, the first sanction lasts up to a month or until the family member
begins to comply with work requirements, but for repeated noncompliance, the
sanction lasts at least 3 months, even if the family member comes back into
compliance during that time. Generally, states' policies regarding mandatory
sanctions for failing to cooperate with child support enforcement efforts
are similar to those for failing to meet work requirements, but both
policies tend to be more stringent than the sanction policies for
noncompliance with optional state requirements, such as children's
immunization and school attendance. About one-quarter of the states have
chosen to disqualify adults for Medicaid and one-third to disqualify the
whole family for food stamps when the head of household fails to comply with
TANF work requirements.
Although sanction policies are in place in all states, the extent to which
families actually experience benefit reductions or terminations depends in
part on the extent to which caseworkers and families try to resolve
noncompliance before sanctions result. Most states hold caseworkers
responsible for making sanction decisions, with at least 16 states requiring
supervisory concurrence or other review of caseworkers' sanction decisions.
Before sanction decisions are made, policies in 31 states require that
caseworkers contact TANF family members to try to resolve the noncompliance
through conciliation. According to policies in these states, the
conciliation process should include actions such as notifying TANF family
members that they are not complying with program requirements, warning them
that their benefits will be reduced or terminated, and offering them an
opportunity to avoid benefit cuts or terminations by justifying their
failure to comply or by returning to compliance. The remaining 20 states
either have no conciliation process or have conciliation procedures that do
not apply to all instances of noncompliance. However, once a sanction
decision is made, all states have policies that require TANF families to be
notified by mail before their cash benefits are reduced or terminated and to
be informed of their right to appeal the decision to a higher authority.
The proportion of TANF families who actually lose part or all of their TANF
cash benefits as a result of sanctions is not large, but a substantial
number of families have been affected. During an average month in 1998,
about 135,800 families received reduced benefits or no TANF benefits at all
as a result of sanctions for failure to comply with TANF work and other
responsibilities.4 This number represents 5 percent of the total average
monthly TANF caseload for the 49 states that provided these data. Most
sanctions were partial, reducing cash benefits to about 112,700 families in
an average month. The remainder were full-family sanctions that stopped all
cash benefits for about 23,100 families in an average month. Sanction rates
varied considerably among states, with partial sanctions affecting from 0 to
29 percent and full-family sanctions affecting from 0 to 7 percent of the
average monthly state caseload.
Limited information is available on the characteristics of families who
received sanctions and what happened to them. In the nine states that
examined TANF family demographics or families' reasons for noncompliance,
TANF adults receiving sanctions were more likely to have dropped out of high
school than adults not under sanctions or to have reported that
transportation, child care, or health difficulties contributed to their
noncompliance. Across the 10 states where information was available on what
happened to TANF adults receiving sanctions, about one-third returned to
participate and comply with TANF program requirements. Another 41 percent
found work, in some cases at low-paying jobs that did not provide health
insurance coverage. Many of the remaining families depended on family and
friends for support. In addition, after they left TANF, over 50 percent
received food stamps or Medicaid in the seven state studies that reported
this information.
TANF was enacted as title I of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). It replaced the AFDC
entitlement with a program of state block grants that requires work in
exchange for time-limited cash assistance. TANF went into effect in July
1997, unless states chose to implement it earlier.5 Federal rules governing
TANF were issued in April 1999 by HHS, which oversees states' administration
of TANF programs. Compared with AFDC, the responsibilities of families on
cash assistance have increased under TANF, and if they fail to meet their
responsibilities, families may face more stringent sanctions. In addition,
TANF law no longer guarantees these families opportunities for conciliation
but continues to allow them to appeal state sanction decisions.
Most families receiving TANF benefits must agree to undertake major new
responsibilities in order to obtain cash benefits and avoid sanctions. Under
federal law, the responsibilities include (1) participating in work
activities and (2) actively seeking child support payments, and at state
option may also include (3) achieving other goals that will improve their
circumstances. Generally, these responsibilities are specified in individual
plans that applicants sign when entering the TANF program. Many adults are
responsible for participating at least 25 hours a week in scheduled program
activities, such as job search, vocational training, or subsidized
employment, designed to help them obtain work.6 Additionally, adults are
required by federal law to cooperate with child support enforcement agencies
in establishing paternity and obtaining, enforcing, and modifying support
orders, as needed, to further enhance their self-sufficiency. At state
option, adults may be expected to obtain the equivalent of a high school
diploma and to ensure that their children attend school and obtain
immunizations. Depending on their circumstances, adults may also be required
by states to attend parenting classes or drug treatment programs.
Fulfilling their new responsibilities and achieving self-sufficiency becomes
increasingly important as adults near the federal 5-year limit on receipt of
TANF cash assistance.7 To assist TANF family members to meet their
obligations, support services such as child care may be available. To
motivate family members to follow through with their new responsibilities,
their activity is monitored, and failure to participate fully may result in
financial penalties referred to as sanctions. This cause-and-effect
relationship is designed to reflect the real work environment and to prepare
TANF families for jobs, where employers deduct wages or fire employees for
unexcused absences.
Responsibilities Under Federal Law
Federal law establishes broad time frames for states' implementation of key
TANF requirements. For states to avoid financial penalties, an increasing
percentage of adults in families on TANF must be enrolled each year in work
activities. All adults must be enrolled in work or work-related activities
after receiving TANF benefits for 2 years, but 26 states have elected to
require adults to enroll within 6 months or less. Because states have the
flexibility to implement work requirements at different times for different
percentages of their caseloads, the extent of states' use of sanctions is
likely to differ over time.
Federal law establishes minimum sanctions but gives states broad authority
to increase and extend sanctions with the policies that they establish.
Specifically, federal law requires states to reduce TANF benefits pro
rata--that is, impose partial sanctions--for families who do not adhere to
work responsibilities or do not cooperate with child support enforcement.8
For such noncompliance, states must impose partial sanctions on TANF
benefits lasting as long as the noncompliance or face financial penalties
themselves. States may choose stricter sanctions and terminate the family's
benefit--that is, impose full-family sanctions--for noncompliance with work
and child support responsibilities. If full-family sanctions are selected,
states either suspend cash benefits or close the case. If cash benefits are
suspended, families remain on the rolls and may be eligible for noncash
benefits. If their case is closed, families must reapply for TANF in order
to receive benefits. States can also extend the duration of partial and
full-family sanctions beyond what is required under federal law. Finally,
states can impose sanctions for noncompliance with other TANF
responsibilities, such as immunizing children. See table 1 for a summary of
the mandated and optional TANF sanctions under federal law.
Table 1: Federal Law on TANF Sanctions for Noncompliance With Program
Requirements
Nature of sanction or
Type of noncompliance Legal citationineligibility for benefits
(paraphrased from the law)
Mandated sanctions of TANF cash benefits
State may reduce the amount of
assistance payable to the
family pro rata or more, at
state option, or terminate
Refusal to engage in work 42 U.S.C. assistance , subject to such
activities 607(e) good cause and other
exceptions the state may
establish, unless day care for
a child under 6 is not
available.
State may reduce assistance by
not less than 25% or may deny
family any assistance if state
agency determines that an
Failure to cooperate with 42 U.S.C. individual is not cooperating
child support enforcement 608(a)(2) in establishing paternity or
establishing, modifying, or
enforcing a support order,
unless good cause or other
exception established by the
state is shown.
Optional sanctions of TANF cash benefits
State may reduce, by an amount
the state considers
Failure to comply with appropriate, assistance to a
individual responsibility 42 U.S.C. family that includes an
plan or its components 608(b) individual who fails without
good cause to comply with a
responsibility plan signed by
the individual.
State is not prohibited from
imposing a sanction on a
Failure to work toward family with a noncompliant
attaining a high school 42 U.S.C. adult under age 51, unless a
diploma or equivalent 604(j) professional determines the
adult lacks the requisite
capacity to achieve it.
State may not be prohibited
Failure to ensure that 42 U.S.C. from imposing a TANF and Food
children attend school 604(i) Stamp sanction on a family
with a noncompliant adult.
State may not be prohibited
from testing welfare
Positive test for controlled recipients for use of
substances 42 U.S.C. 862bcontrolled substances nor from
imposing sanctions on those
who test positive.
Note: Phrases in boldface type indicate options for states to impose more
stringent sanctions than the minimum required.
States may also limit Medicaid and Food Stamp Program benefits for certain
family members who do not comply with TANF requirements. Specifically,
states may end Medicaid benefits for adults whose TANF benefits are
eliminated for noncompliance with work responsibilities. Medicaid benefits
for children and pregnant women, however, are protected under federal law
and cannot be altered by state policy decisions. See table 2 for ways that
these benefit programs may be affected by TANF noncompliance.
For Food Stamp benefits, three federal rules apply. First, states must
impose partial Food Stamp sanctions at a minimum when Food Stamp household
members fail to meet TANF work responsibilities, and the states may impose
full-family sanctions if the noncompliant members are also the heads of the
household, unless they are exempt from work requirements under Food Stamp
rules. Second, for any noncompliance with TANF requirements, states must
ensure that TANF sanctions do not result in increased Food Stamp benefits.
Third, states may provide for comparable sanctions under TANF and the Food
Stamp Program within certain limits. For example, states may impose partial
Food Stamp sanctions for failure to meet any TANF responsibility, including
TANF work responsibilities, even if the noncompliant family member is exempt
from Food Stamp work requirements and therefore not subject to the mandatory
Food Stamp sanctions. However, full-family sanctions of Food Stamps under
this rule are not allowed. Proposed federal regulations on the TANF-related
provisions of Food Stamp law were published in December 1999 by the
Department of Agriculture, which oversees states' administration of Food
Stamp benefits. Final regulations are expected in 2000.
Table 2: Federal Law on Sanctions of Medicaid and Food Stamps for TANF
Noncompliance
Nature of sanction or
Type of noncompliance Legal citation ineligibility for benefits
(paraphrased from the law)
Effect of TANF noncompliance on Medicaid
State may terminate the
adult's Medicaid
eligibility if the adult's
Failure to meet TANF work 42 U.S.C. TANF benefits are
requirements 1396u-(1)(b)(3) terminated for
noncompliance with work
requirements. Eligibility
of children and pregnant
women is not affected.
Effect of TANF noncompliance on food stamps
State must remove
individual from Food Stamp
Program eligibility for at
least 1 month for first
violation, 3 months for
second, and 6 months for
third violation, except for
Failure to meet TANF work exempt individuals,
requirements is the including those responsible
equivalent of failure to 7 U.S.C. 2015(d) for children under age 6.
meet Food Stamp work State may extend the
requirements duration of these sanctions
and make individuals
permanently ineligible for
third or later violations.
Also, state may impose
full-family sanctions for a
maximum of 6 months in
cases where the violator is
the head of household .
State must ensure that the
household will not receive
Failure to comply with a food stamp increase as a
any TANF requirements or result of a decrease in
with requirements for 7 U.S.C. 2017(d) income because of the TANF
other means-tested public sanction. State may reduce
assistance programs the household's food stamp
allotment by not more than
25% for the duration of the
TANF sanction.
State may disqualify an
Failure to comply with individual from the Food
any TANF requirements 7 U.S.C. 2015(i) Stamp Program if he or she
receives a comparable TANF
sanction.
Note: Phrases in boldface type indicate options for states to impose more
stringent sanctions than the minimum required.
Like TANF families currently, AFDC families were required to demonstrate
their continued eligibility for welfare at regular intervals or face
possible termination of benefits. If AFDC families did not provide the
required paperwork or appear for scheduled appointments to discuss their
income, assets, and household status, they could have lost all benefits for
failure to comply with eligibility procedures. Additionally, about 16
percent of AFDC adults nationwide participated as required in the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, which was designed
to help them achieve self-sufficiency through education, training, and
employment.9 If the adult failed to attend program activities or to accept
employment, states were required to impose partial sanctions of the AFDC
benefit that could have lasted up to 6 months. The threat of reduction in
AFDC benefits might not have encouraged JOBS participation, however, because
families' reduced welfare payments could be offset by higher Food Stamp
benefits, which are based on household income, including welfare payments.
In summary, TANF has broadened AFDC responsibilities and sanctions in
several ways. First, more families are subject to work requirements. In
addition, most families are now required to comply with an expanded set of
program activities and may be subject to full-family sanctions if they do
not comply, while they continue to be subject to loss of benefits for
noncompliance with eligibility procedures. Furthermore, families who do not
comply with TANF responsibilities are no longer eligible for higher Food
Stamp benefits, and may have their Food Stamp benefits, as well as their
TANF benefits, cut. Nonpregnant adults who do not comply with TANF work
responsibilities may also lose eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
and TANF
Conciliation was designed for the JOBS program as a way to notify
noncompliant family members of problems that might result in sanctions and
to provide an early opportunity to resolve these problems before sanction
decisions were made and cash benefits were reduced. This early opportunity
to reconcile problems was guaranteed in federal law, along with the right to
appeal the sanction decision if conciliation failed.
Conciliation was expected to begin as soon after noncompliance as possible,
according to federal guidance. Generally, a warning notice was to be sent
and a meeting scheduled with the family member. At the meeting, the
caseworker explained the family member's rights and responsibilities under
the program and the consequences of continued failure to participate. The
family member had the opportunity to contest the facts, justify the
noncompliance, agree to comply, or provide a reason for an exemption from
the requirement. The caseworker determined whether the justification met the
"good cause" criteria set forth in state policy as an allowable reason for
the particular noncompliance.
If the caseworker made reasonable efforts to schedule and hold at least one
conciliation meeting, and the family member failed to respond or appear, the
caseworker was not required to make further attempts at conciliation,
according to federal guidance. The guidance recommended that conciliation be
completed within 30 days. In practice, the process often consumed more time
and included more steps than the minimum recommended. As a result, some
family members were able to delay their sanctions without actually complying
with program requirements.
If conciliation ended without achieving resolution, the sanction process
began and the family lost its guarantee of benefits. A sanction notice was
sent describing the amount and effective date of the sanction, as well as
the family member's right to appeal the decision and obtain a fair hearing.
If the appeal was lodged within 10 days, benefits could continue pending the
outcome of the appeal. If an unfavorable decision resulted, the family
member was required to repay benefits received during the appeal period.
In line with the greater flexibility afforded states under TANF, families
retain the right to appeal sanction decisions, but their right to
conciliation is no longer guaranteed. Instead, states now have discretion to
retain, alter, or eliminate conciliation, depending on whether they view the
process as advantageous or an obstacle to the operation of a successful TANF
program. However, conciliation provides an opportunity for family members to
justify their behavior while continuing to receive their full benefits.
State sanction policies are generally more stringent and more extensive than
the minimum required under TANF. All state policies require sanctions for
noncompliance with the two federally mandated
responsibilities--participation in work-related activities and cooperation
with child support enforcement. State policies may also require sanctions
for noncompliance with other responsibilities, such as children's
immunizations and school attendance. For the first time that a TANF family
member fails to participate in work-related activities, policies in 36
states require the minimum partial sanction, but for repeated failures, most
impose the full-family sanction and increase the length of the sanction
period. Failure to cooperate with child support enforcement is usually
treated in a similar manner. Sanction policies for noncompliance with other
responsibilities, such as children's immunization and school attendance, may
be less stringent than policies for noncompliance with work and child
support responsibilities. All states prohibit an increase in Food Stamp
benefits when families lose some or all of their TANF benefits as a result
of sanctions. Furthermore, about one-third of the states have chosen the
option of eliminating Food Stamp benefits for the entire household and
one-fourth eliminate Medicaid benefits for the nonpregnant adult when the
adult head of household does not comply with TANF work requirements.
Noncompliance With Work Requirements Often Exceed Federally Mandated
Minimums
For noncompliance with TANF work-related responsibilities, state sanction
policies under TANF fit into three broad categories: (1) policies that call
for the imposition of partial sanctions in all instances of noncompliance,
(2) graduated-sanction policies that call for the imposition of partial
sanctions for initial instances of noncompliance and full-family sanctions
for repeated or prolonged noncompliance, and (3) policies that always call
for the imposition of full-family sanctions. See table 3 for the number of
states with policies in each of these categories.
Table 3: Type of Sanction Policy, and Number of States Using It, for
Noncompliance With Work Responsibilities in 1999
Type of sanction policy States using policy
Partial sanction 14
Graduated sanction 22
Full-family sanction 15
Total 51
Under federal law, for noncompliance with TANF work responsibilities, states
are required to impose, at a minimum, partial sanctions that should last as
long as the noncompliance. Sanction policies in all states except Arkansas,
Rhode Island, and Washington are more stringent than TANF requires: 48
states have policies that either call for full-family sanctions or set a
minimum duration for the sanction that could extend beyond the point at
which the TANF family begins to comply.10
State decisions to adopt a specific TANF sanction policy have remained
unchanged in most cases, but states continue to review these policies. Five
states chose more stringent policies in 1998 and 1999 than they had in place
in 1997. Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, and North Carolina increased the amount of
benefits cut, applying full-family, instead of partial, sanctions at some
stage for noncompliance with work responsibilities. Connecticut shortened
the duration of its sanctions so that noncompliant families would reach
full-family sanctions more quickly and compliant families would have their
benefits restored earlier. States gave various reasons for the changes. Some
state officials said that they believed too many clients were accepting
partial sanctions rather than complying with work responsibilities. Another
state official said that the state made the change to simplify its policies
and make the consequences of noncompliance more immediate.
The trend toward more stringent policies for noncompliance with work
responsibilities has not been universal, however. Before TANF, Indiana,
Minnesota, and New Hampshire received waivers to experiment with the use of
full-family sanctions, but after TANF was passed, these states discontinued
full-family sanctions and now impose partial sanctions only. In 1999,
Arkansas moved to ease its sanction policy, eliminating full-family
sanctions and adopting partial sanctions instead for noncompliance with work
requirements. A state official explained that the state was concerned that
children might suffer as a result of their parents' noncompliance under a
full-family sanction. (See fig. 1 for sanction policies by state.)
Figure 1: States' Sanction Policies for Failure to Comply With TANF Work
Requirements, 1999
Source: Sanction policies provided by the states.
Noncompliance With Work Responsibilities
For the first time that a family does not comply with work responsibilities,
36 states have adopted policies that impose the minimum TANF requirement of
a partial sanction.11 Policies in the remaining 15 states impose the maximum
TANF penalty of a full-family sanction for the first time that a family does
not comply with work responsibilities.
The extent of the partial sanctions in the 36 states varies considerably and
may represent a modest or significant loss of cash assistance, depending on
the state and the family. The amount of the benefit reduction is determined
in one of three ways: by withholding the adult share, by taking a percentage
of the family's grant, or by taking a fixed dollar amount. The adult's share
is withheld in 17 states, where maximum monthly benefits for a family of
three range from $190 to $923. In another 16 states, the partial sanction
reduces the family's benefits by 25 percent in most cases, but the reduction
ranges from 10 to 50 percent. For example, under their respective state
sanction policies, Minnesota's grant of $783 a month would be cut by 10
percent, while Illinois' grant of $377 a month would be cut by 50 percent.
The remaining three states cut benefits from $50 to $100 when the partial
sanctions are calculated. (See app. II, which describes, by state, the
sanction policies for noncompliance with TANF work responsibilities.)
In most of the 51 states, the first sanction imposed, whether it is partial
or full-family, lasts for 1 month or until the TANF family member begins to
comply. In 23 states, benefits are restored fully as soon as compliance
occurs, although some states expect families to demonstrate that they can
comply for 2 weeks or some similar trial period. In another 21 states, the
first sanction continues for 1 month or until families return to compliance,
whichever is longer, while the remaining 7 states extend the length of the
first sanction for a minimum of 2 or 3 months. If noncompliance continues,
however, the family may be subject to a second, third, or more sanctions,
depending on the state's policy. In states where the first sanction is
full-family and it results in case closure, the case cannot be reopened
before the minimum number of months has elapsed.
Noncompliance With Work Responsibilities
For repeated or prolonged noncompliance with work responsibilities, 37
states have adopted policies that impose the maximum TANF penalty of a
full-family sanction.12 The remaining 14 state policies call for a partial
sanction, but they generally increase the amount or duration of the cut in
benefits.
How quickly a noncompliant family reaches the state's last and most
stringent sanction under these policies varies considerably among states.
For example, Massachusetts' policy moves a noncompliant family from a
partial to a full-family sanction in 1 month, while Kentucky, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont delay imposition of the full-family sanction for 24 to 28
months. In most states with graduated policies, the family would reach the
full-family sanction in 3 to 6 months.
In 32 states, sanctions for repeated or prolonged noncompliance remain in
effect longer than first-time sanctions for noncompliance with work
responsibilities. Under these states' policies, the sanction generally
remains in effect for 3 to 6 months, regardless of how quickly the family
returns to compliance, but in 7 states--Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin--the sanction may last a
lifetime. Under full-family sanctions, when a case is closed, it cannot be
reopened until the minimum sanction period for repeated or prolonged
noncompliance has passed.
Other Noncompliance, Policies Often Less Stringent
As required by federal law, all state policies call for sanctions when
families fail to comply with child support responsibilities. In 34 states,
the first time that TANF families do not help establish paternity or obtain
support orders for their children, they may receive a partial sanction.
These states reduce the cash benefit by a dollar amount, the adult portion,
or some percentage of the total. For repeated noncompliance, in 29 states
families may receive a full-family sanction. The child support sanctions are
comparable to the work sanctions in most states in terms of the amount of
benefits cut. In nine states they are less stringent, and in six states they
are more stringent than the sanctions for noncompliance with work-related
responsibilities. However, in most states there is no minimum duration of
the child support sanction for first-time or repeated noncompliance.
Instead, the sanction is lifted as soon as the family member complies with
child support enforcement requirements. (See app. III for state policies on
sanctions for noncompliance with child support enforcement
responsibilities.)
Less stringent sanction policies may apply to noncompliance with other
responsibilities in a TANF family's individual plan, such as attending
parenting classes or substance abuse treatment, or ensuring that their
children are immunized and attend school. At least two states impose no
sanctions when families fail to meet these responsibilities. Six other
states impose partial sanctions for noncompliance with one or more of these
responsibilities but impose full-family sanctions at some stage for
noncompliance with work responsibilities. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, and
Texas consider children's immunizations or school attendance equivalent to
the adults' work responsibilities and apply the same sanctions for
noncompliance.
Policies on the treatment of noncompliance with more than one responsibility
vary by state. Some states, such as Arizona and North Carolina, impose only
one sanction at a time, even when there is noncompliance with more than one
responsibility. Other states increase the sanction when there is
noncompliance with more than one responsibility. In Alabama, for example, a
family of three receiving the maximum monthly benefit of $164 would
experience a cut of 25 percent for first-time noncompliance with work and
another 25 percent for noncompliance with child support, leaving $82 in
benefits.13
TANF Noncompliance
Under sanction policies in 13 states, adults may lose Medicaid eligibility
if they fail to comply with TANF work responsibilities, but in accordance
with federal law, children and pregnant women are not affected.14 In the
remaining 38 states, Medicaid eligibility is not affected by noncompliance
with TANF work-related responsibilities.
In accordance with federal law on food stamps, no state policies permit Food
Stamp benefits to increase when TANF benefits are reduced or eliminated as a
result of sanctions. To ensure that no inadvertent increase occurs, some
states automatically decrease food stamps by a set percentage when TANF
sanctions are imposed. Also in accordance with federal law, state policies
require that eligibility for food stamps ends for the noncompliant adult or,
optionally, for the entire household if TANF work responsibilities are not
met and if the noncompliant adult head of household is not exempt from Food
Stamp work requirements.15 In 33 states, the noncompliant adult becomes
ineligible for food stamps, as required by federal law, according to a
September 1999 survey conducted by the Department of Agriculture. The
remaining 18 states have opted to disqualify the entire household if the
head of the household fails to meet TANF work responsibilities and is not
otherwise exempt under Food Stamp rules. (See app. IV for a description of
the effects on Food Stamp benefits of noncompliance with TANF work and other
requirements, by state.)
An adult's ineligibility for food stamps because of noncompliance with TANF
responsibilities can last for 1 month or longer, depending on state policy.
Ineligibility of the entire household for food stamps because of
noncompliance with TANF work responsibilities can last up to 6 months,
according to the law. Sanctions of Food Stamp benefits for noncompliance
with TANF may not occur at exactly the same time as TANF sanctions, however.
For example, in Pennsylvania, the TANF sanction is imposed first, but no
action is taken on a possible Food Stamp sanction until the next scheduled
Food Stamp recertification. Noncompliance may have long-term consequences.
In Oklahoma, Food Stamp benefits will not increase for a family that has
lost TANF benefits as a result of receiving a sanction until the TANF
noncompliance has been resolved and the sanction lifted.
In prior work, we reported that some families may not know whether they
remain eligible for food stamps and Medicaid or what steps they may take to
ascertain their eligibility.16 To some extent, this may be because of
confusion among both caseworkers and the families about eligibility
requirements. For food stamps, the situation is complicated by differences
in state and federal interpretations of the law. The Department of
Agriculture revised its guidance in November 1997 to make clear that
full-family Food Stamp sanctions could be imposed only for noncompliance
with TANF work requirements, not for noncompliance with other TANF
responsibilities. Contrary to this guidance, Michigan was imposing
full-family Food Stamp sanctions when a family member failed to meet the
TANF requirement to cooperate in obtaining child support. Without final
regulations, it was not clear if Agriculture could require Michigan to
correct its sanction policy. However, in March 1998, a federal district
court directed Michigan to stop imposing full-family Food Stamp sanctions
for noncooperation with TANF child support requirements.17 Proposed
regulations were published in December 1999, with final regulations planned
for 2000. Agriculture officials expect that the regulations will help
resolve differences in interpretation of federal law and clear up the
confusion about requirements among caseworkers and families eligible for
food stamps.
Are Made; All Allow Appeal of Sanction Decisions
Regardless of state sanction policies, whether sanctions actually occur
depends to some degree on caseworkers' efforts and the steps that TANF
family members take to resolve noncompliance. The ultimate decision to
impose sanctions rests with caseworkers in most states, with supervisory
review and concurrence required in 16 states. An HHS Office of Inspector
General's (OIG) review has identified problems faced by both TANF
caseworkers and families, and ways to improve the sanctions process.18
Before sanction notices are issued, 31 states continue to provide TANF
family members opportunities for conciliation that were required previously
under the JOBS component of AFDC but are no longer required under TANF. The
remaining 20 states either have no conciliation process or have procedures
that do not apply to all instances of noncompliance. Once the decision to
impose a sanction is made, all state policies allow families to appeal the
state agency's decision and obtain an administrative hearing, as required by
TANF.
Decisions With Caseworkers
Most states rely on the judgment of caseworkers to determine whether TANF
family members have good cause for their noncompliance and whether sanctions
should be imposed. States vary in how much guidance and oversight they make
available to facilitate this process. In 16 states, written procedures
specify that the caseworkers' decisions are subject to agency review to
ensure that sanctions are applied fairly, appropriately, and uniformly.
Georgia requires that the first sanction receive the supervisor's written
approval, but the second sanction that bans welfare receipt for a lifetime
must have an agency panel's approval.
While we focused on states' written policies and procedures that guide
sanction decisions, the HHS OIG examined how these policies were being
implemented in eight states.19 After meeting with caseworkers and TANF
family members, the OIG reported that case managers with access to multiple
services under a single roof can more easily address the noncompliance of
TANF families and more efficiently administer sanctions. Elsewhere, large
caseloads and increased responsibilities may hamper caseworkers. The average
number of family members served by each caseworker at the sites visited
ranged from a low of 40 in Idaho to a high of 286 in Ohio for the TANF, Food
Stamp, and/or Medicaid programs. Faced with large caseloads, some
caseworkers felt frustrated because they lacked sufficient time to provide
intensive case management. Others had received insufficient training or
written guidance on how to apply sanctions, so they could not answer the
questions that TANF family members asked about sanctions.
The OIG also reported that in some cases where the service delivery
structure of the TANF program was fragmented or subcontracted to third
parties, TANF family members were confused about whom to call regarding
their sanction, had to explain their circumstances more than once to
different people, and sometimes received conflicting information. Although
TANF offices provided information on sanction policies and procedures to
TANF families orally and in writing, the information was not consistently
clear, complete, or accurate. As a result, TANF family members understood
that they would have benefits cut off if they violated program rules, but
rarely understood the details or expected sanctions to be applied to them.
The OIG recommended that HHS encourage states to improve both the general
information they provide to TANF families concerning sanctions and the
specific information included in sanction notices mailed to noncompliant
TANF families.20
Before Sanction Notices Are Issued
To permit TANF families to resolve their noncompliance before sanction
decisions are made, 31 states have established procedures that guarantee all
TANF families at least one opportunity for conciliation for each instance of
noncompliance. (See table 4 for state conciliation and sanction policies.)
Table 4: State Conciliation Policies for Noncompliance, by Type of State
Sanction Policy for Noncompliance With Work Requirements
Number of states
…requires …limits …does not
require any
State conciliation for the number of conciliation Total
all families for conciliation
each instance opportunities opportunities for
any families
…has
partial
sanction 10 0 4 14
policy
…has
graduated
sanction 11 4 7 22
policy
…has
full-family
sanction 10 1 4 15
policy
Total 31 5 15 51
Of the states guaranteeing at least one such opportunity, 14 retain the
conciliation procedures they established before TANF without any significant
changes. Another 9 of the 31 states allow less time for conciliation than
they did before TANF. They set tighter limits on the number of days they
give TANF families to respond to warning notices or otherwise shorten the
process. For example, 1 of the 9 states has cut the time allowed for
conciliation from 30 to 10 days. In another state, family members now have
14 instead of 30 days to respond to warning notices before facing sanctions.
In contrast, five states offer enhanced opportunities for conciliation, such
as requiring caseworkers to visit the homes of TANF families to discuss how
to resolve their noncompliance, often in order to avoid a more stringent
sanction for repeated or prolonged noncompliance.
In these 31 states, conciliation starts shortly after the caseworker
receives information that the family member has failed to meet a TANF
program responsibility. Failure to meet a program responsibility may
involve, for example, the family member's neglecting to sign the individual
responsibility plan, not showing up for an appointment with the child
support enforcement agency, not responding to a letter from the caseworker,
or not attending all the scheduled hours of the assigned work activity. The
family member is contacted by telephone or mail to arrange a meeting to
discuss the reasons for noncompliance. Nine states require the caseworker to
telephone the TANF family member directly, while in 22 states, a warning
notice is mailed to the family member that identifies the noncompliance
problem and asks the TANF family member to contact the caseworker within a
specified number of days. The warning notice may include the date and time
of an appointment scheduled with the caseworker.
Figure 2: The Typical TANF Conciliation and Appeal Process in Effect During
1999
State procedures either emphasize the personal intervention of caseworkers
or rely chiefly on written notifications. Where caseworkers are directed to
intervene, there is considerable variation in the effort they are required
to expend. Some states require caseworkers to make several attempts to
schedule meetings, and a few insist on home visits before the family
receives a full-family sanction. Others require only a single attempt. Where
written notices predominate, they are often generated by computers and
mailed to TANF families, who are expected to take the next steps to resolve
their noncompliance within specified time frames. TANF families who fail to
contact their caseworkers before the deadline may lose their opportunity to
avoid a sanction.
At the conciliation meeting, the caseworker has an opportunity to find out
why the noncompliant family member failed to meet TANF responsibilities. In
some cases, the information previously provided to the caseworker may be
erroneous, and the conciliation meeting provides an opportunity to rectify
such errors. In other cases, the family member has a valid reason for the
noncompliance that fits the state's good cause criteria, such as ill health,
a family crisis, child care difficulties, or lack of transportation. The
reason may justify the noncompliance, but it may also reveal a need for
additional support services, a change in the family's responsibilities, or
an exemption from certain TANF requirements. Even with a valid reason for
noncompliance, in order to avoid a sanction, the TANF family member must
also demonstrate a willingness to comply.
Some state officials believe that an effective conciliation process can
resolve many problems of noncompliance before they result in a sanction.
Where conciliation has been retained, the process is credited with a
reduction in the number of families under sanctions and increased compliance
for those families involved in conciliation. For example, Rhode Island
reported that 36 percent of instances of noncompliance are resolved through
its conciliation process without imposing a sanction.
Families
Policies in 15 states do not guarantee any TANF families the opportunities
for conciliation that were guaranteed previously to welfare families
enrolled in JOBS activities. These states do not require that caseworkers
contact noncompliant TANF family members to request their cooperation in
determining good cause and avoiding sanctions before the caseworkers decide
to impose a sanction. Three of the 15 states do not guarantee conciliation
statewide, although individual counties in these states have the option to
provide conciliation.
Policies in another five states limit the number of opportunities for
conciliation. Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, and South Dakota allow
conciliation only the first time that a family member fails to comply with
work responsibilities or child support enforcement. In these states, if the
family member fails a second time to comply, no second opportunity for
conciliation is available.21 Vermont allows each TANF family a total of two
conciliation opportunities during 3 years of TANF benefit receipt.
Some state officials believe that families who do not intend to comply may
abuse conciliation opportunities. These families may receive a
disproportionate amount of caseworker attention that could otherwise be
spent with families genuinely seeking help in overcoming barriers to
compliance. State policies that restrict or that do not provide conciliation
opportunities are intended to make this kind of abuse less likely or
impossible.
State decisions under TANF to not require conciliation might be expected to
correspond to more stringent state sanction policies, but there appears to
be no correlation. Instead, states that do not require conciliation for any
TANF families are evenly distributed among states with partial, graduated,
and full-family sanction policies for noncompliance with work
responsibilities. For example, 10 of the states with the most stringent
full-family sanction policies provide full opportunities for conciliation,
while four of the states with the least stringent partial sanction policies
provide no opportunities for conciliation.
According to their policies, all states must mail sanction notices to
noncompliant TANF families to advise them that the state has found them
noncompliant and has decided to reduce or terminate their cash benefits. A
written sanction notice marks the end of the conciliation process and
informs TANF families of their right to appeal the sanction decision. TANF
families who receive these notices may accept the state's sanction decision,
appeal it, or withdraw from TANF voluntarily. In addition, some states, such
as Alabama, allow TANF families a fourth option--to request reconsideration
of the state's decision before filing a formal appeal. This option must
generally be exercised within 10 days of the date the notice was mailed;
otherwise, the opportunity is forfeited. If the option is exercised and
resolves the noncompliance, both the TANF agency and the family can avoid
the time and expense of a formal appeal process.
The HHS OIG found that sanction notices in some states were deficient and
recommended that HHS encourage states to ensure that all such notices are
clear, complete, and accurate.22 Specifically, the OIG recommended that the
notices identify the following: the amount by which benefits would be cut,
the duration of the reduction, the reason for the sanction, the name and
telephone number of the caseworker to contact about the sanction, the steps
necessary to avoid or to remedy the sanction, the steps in the appeal and
fair hearing process, and a local legal aid group.
As required by TANF, all states provide for an administrative review of any
sanction decision that is contested. The review permits the family member to
appeal a sanction decision within a specified period of time and receive a
hearing before a state official, as was the case before TANF. While the case
is pending, the family's benefits may continue but must be repaid in full if
the sanction decision is upheld. Except in Wisconsin,23 all states offer the
traditional administrative review and due-process protections outlined in a
1970 Supreme Court decision that recognized a welfare family member's right
to a hearing before cash benefits are terminated.24
Sanctions
By 1998, many family members receiving TANF benefits were required to
participate in work activities and meet other program responsibilities. For
failure to comply with these responsibilities, about 135,800 families in an
average month in 1998 received reduced TANF cash benefits or none at all
because of the imposition of sanctions.25 This number represented a sanction
rate of about 5 percent of the average monthly caseload for the 49 states
that provided data. (See table 5.) Most of these families received partial
sanctions, but about 23,100 families received full-family sanctions. The
sanctions covered all areas of noncompliance--work and child support as well
as children's schooling and immunization; adults' substance abuse treatment;
and attendance at orientation, assessment, and parenting classes. There were
significant variations across states in the number of families affected each
month and the proportion of the caseload subject to sanctions.
Table 5: Number and Percentage of Families Under Sanctions in an Average
Month in 1998, by Sanction Type
Families under sanctions
Type of sanction Percentage of all TANF Number of states
Number covered
families
Partial 112,700 4.5 42
Full-family 23,100 0.9 48
Overall 135,800 5.1 49
Some of the 49 states were able to provide specific reasons for the
imposition of partial or full-family sanctions. The primary reason specified
for sanctions was noncompliance with work responsibilities. About 83,000
families were under sanction in an average month in the 45 states that
identified sanctions for this reason. For failure to cooperate with child
support responsibilities, about 14,400 families were under sanctions in 24
states. For failure to verify that their children were immunized or to
ensure that they were attending school, another 19,700 families were under
sanctions in 13 states. Over 2,600 families were under sanctions for failure
to comply with plan requirements, while about 400 were under sanctions for
other reasons such as failure to attend parenting skills classes or
substance abuse treatment. States did not provide specific reasons for the
remaining 15,700 families under sanctions in an average month. (See apps. V
and VI for reasons for sanctions, by state.)
Partial sanctions accounted for most of the sanctions in effect in 1998.
About 112,700 families in an average month had their TANF benefits reduced
for noncompliance with their TANF responsibilities. This represented 4.5
percent of the average monthly caseload in the 42 states that provided data.
In states that provided data on reasons for partial sanctions, nearly 70,400
families in 34 states were under partial sanctions for failure to comply
with work-related responsibilities. Another 13,700 families in 12 states
were under partial sanctions for failure to cooperate with child support
enforcement, and about 19,700 families in 8 states were under partial
sanctions for noncompliance with children's school attendance or
immunization responsibilities. In Louisiana, however, almost all partial
sanctions were imposed for noncompliance with child support enforcement, and
in Maryland almost all partial sanctions were imposed for noncompliance with
children's school attendance or immunization requirements.
Most partial sanctions were imposed for first-time noncompliance.
Significantly fewer partial sanctions were imposed for repeated or prolonged
noncompliance in the eight states that supplied such data. In these eight
states, about 75 percent of the partial sanctions were imposed for
first-time noncompliance with program requirements, while 24 percent were
imposed for second instances and 1 percent for additional instances. In New
Hampshire, for example, the state reduced the benefits of 182 families in an
average month for first-time noncompliance. For additional instances of
noncompliance, it reduced benefits for 56 families in an average month.26
Partial sanction rates varied greatly across states in 1998. As a percentage
of average monthly caseloads, partial sanction rates ranged from less than 1
percent in four states to 28.6 percent in North Carolina. Possible
explanations for the variation include state policies on sanctions and
conciliation, the degree to which states enforce their policies, the TANF
program design and demographics, and the timing of TANF implementation.
Full-family sanctions resulted in a loss of all cash benefits and often
resulted in case closure for about 23,100 families in an average month in
1998. This number represented 0.9 percent of the average monthly caseload in
the 48 states that provided data. Among those receiving full-family
sanctions were at least 28 families in which the adult was banned for life
from receipt of TANF benefits because of repeated or prolonged
noncompliance.27
The majority of full-family sanctions were imposed for failure to comply
with work-related responsibilities, according to reports from states that
supplied details. Nearly 12,600 families were under full-family sanctions
for this reason in an average month in 41 states. Another 1,500 families in
eight states were under full-family sanctions for failure to comply with
responsibilities in their individualized plans, which may include
work-related responsibilities. About 600 families in 17 states were under
full-family sanctions for failure to cooperate with child support
enforcement. Some states, such as Illinois, however, did not provide
detailed reasons for their sanctions.
Full-family sanction rates also varied across states, but not as greatly as
did partial sanctions. As a percentage of their average monthly caseloads,
full-family rates ranged from less than 1 percent in 26 states to 5 percent
in Florida and 7 percent in Wyoming. Possible explanations for the variation
are similar to those for the variation in partial sanction rates across
states.
As might be expected, the number of families affected and the sanction rates
generally varied in relation to the type of state sanction policy for
noncompliance with work responsibilities in 1998. (See table 6.) States with
partial sanction policies accounted for more families with partial sanctions
and a higher partial sanction rate, on average, than states with graduated
or full-family sanction policies. States with full-family sanction policies
accounted for more families affected and a higher average full-family
sanction rate, on average, than states with graduated or partial sanction
policies. The actual sanction data in table 6 are for all reasons, including
noncompliance with work responsibilities as well as noncompliance with other
responsibilities, such as children's school attendance, which are often
subject to less stringent sanctions than noncompliance with work.
Table 6: Number and Percentage of Families Under TANF Sanctions for Any
Reason, by Type of Work Sanction Policy, in an Average Month in 1998
State sanction policy Families under Families under Total
for noncompliance partial sanctions full-family number of
with work sanctions states
responsibilities Number Percentage Number Percentage with the
policya
Partial 67,400 5.5 1,100b 0.1 15
Graduated 36,900 4.1 10,100 1.1 22
Full-family 8,400 2.1 11,900 2.4 14
Total 112,700 4.5 23,100 0.1 51
a The number of states with partial and full-family sanction policies for
noncompliance with work responsibilities changed from 1998 to 1999. The
state policies, number of families under sanctions, and the sanction rates
in this table reflect those in effect in calendar year 1998.
b Case closures in three states accounted for most of these full-family
sanctions--California, Indiana, and North Carolina. California officials
explained that when a partial sanction reduces a family's monthly benefits
to $10 or less, the family's benefits are terminated and the case is closed.
An Indiana official said that cases are not closed because of sanctions, but
when the cases of families under partial sanctions are closed for other
reasons, they may be reported as closed because of sanctions. North Carolina
closes cases when family members fail to sign their personal responsibility
contracts.
Sanctions
Limited information is available on the characteristics of families who
received sanctions and on what happened to them afterward. We looked at
reports from the states that did track such information. The studies were
conducted for various purposes, and some are more rigorous than others.
Studies in nine states reported that TANF families who received sanctions
were less educated or faced more problems in complying with work
responsibilities than TANF families who did not receive sanctions. For
one-third of these families, the sanctions served their intended purpose,
bringing the families back into compliance within a few months. Another 41
percent found employment and did not return to TANF. Those who did not
become employed often turned to relatives and friends for support. Many
families who received sanctions and left TANF continued to rely on publicly
funded programs for food and medical care. Generally, these families
reported that they managed to make ends meet, and few indicated that they
had trouble paying bills, had to place their children in the care of others,
or had become homeless. (See app. VII for a list of the studies described in
this section.)
Six state studies found that family members who received full-family or
partial sanctions were more likely to have dropped out before completing
high school than those who did not receive sanctions.28 Limited work
experience and lengthy welfare receipt were also more characteristic of
sanctioned families, according to several studies.29 Early studies in four
states identified barriers to compliance, such as problems with
transportation, child care, and health, as significant factors regarding the
imposition of sanctions.30
Delaware researchers concluded that having less education and other factors
may make it more difficult for sanctioned TANF families to understand the
complex program requirements and the consequences of noncompliance, and also
may make it less likely that the families have the organizational skills and
abilities needed to comply with these requirements. Observing a group of
2,279 families for 18 months after they were enrolled in the state's welfare
reform demonstration program, the researchers found a correlation between
the adult's education level and the probability of receiving sanctions with
higher sanction rates among adults who had not completed high school.
Furthermore, the families' responses to their sanctions appeared to vary
with their education level. The less educated were less likely to take
positive action either to comply or to quit the program. Instead, they were
more likely to do nothing while in sanction status and, as a result, for
their sanction to progress until they were dropped from TANF.
Four early state studies found that transportation, child care, and health
difficulties were most often identified as reasons that families did not
comply with program responsibilities and received sanctions.31 Examples of
transportation difficulties in Utah included the commuting time and
distances from rural areas to available work in urban areas, and the lack of
transportation to access child care providers. Some specific health
difficulties cited, such as diabetes, emphysema, asthma, and depression,
made it difficult to work but were not at stages severe enough to qualify
TANF family members for disability. In Minnesota, a 1996 study found that
the difficulties faced by families under sanctions were similar to those
reported for TANF families in general but were more prevalent among the
families under sanctions. Furthermore, these families often had multiple
barriers to compliance. Among families under sanctions, 76 percent had at
least one barrier to compliance and 39 percent had multiple barriers, more
than double the rates among all TANF families.
Iowa researchers suggested that the reported difficulties may stem from more
fundamental issues such as poor communications and problem-solving skills,
low self-esteem, and an inability or unwillingness to make work a priority.
They recommended that TANF staff and families work together to address
immediate difficulties, such as transportation, as well as the underlying
issues. Furthermore, they recommended that families under sanctions receive
intensive case management and additional services as needed.
Families Under Sanctions
In 10 states, researchers found that an average of about one-third of family
members came back into compliance after receiving partial sanctions or
returned to TANF after receiving full-family sanctions.32 Most did so within
a few months of receiving a sanction. Another 2 to 9 percent were back on
TANF but exempt from compliance after their family circumstances were
reconsidered.33 Arizona and Maryland reported that families who left TANF
because of full-family sanctions were significantly more likely to return
within 3 months than families who left the program for all other reasons. To
achieve higher rates of compliance, Delaware researchers recommended that
TANF staff consider limiting the number of program requirements subject to
sanctions, making certain they are understood and enforced, and working to
remove barriers to compliance.
Some of these state studies also provided information on families who did
not come back into compliance. In five states, from 17 to 51 percent of
families under sanctions remained in sanction status, while 15 to 35 percent
left the program voluntarily. Delaware researchers found that although
nearly one-third of families with partial sanctions came back into
compliance, families under sanctions left the program at twice the rate of
families who did not receive sanctions. In Iowa, about one-quarter of those
who returned to the program later received a second sanction.
Sources of Support
An average of 41 percent of families who had received sanctions were working
after they left TANF, on the basis of results from 10 studies in nine
states.34 This ranged from 15 percent in Utah to over 50 percent in Iowa,
North Carolina, and Oklahoma. Most were working for low wages in jobs not
covered by health insurance or other fringe benefits. Overall, their
employment rates and average earnings were higher after they left TANF than
while they were on TANF, but lower than the employment rates and earnings of
families who left TANF for all other reasons, such as employment, procedural
violations, or time limits, for the three studies that made the
comparison.35 Many who left TANF and were no longer receiving cash
assistance reported that they turned to family and friends for housing,
transportation, or other support.
Iowa researchers credited sanctions with spurring TANF family members to
obtain employment who might otherwise have remained in the program. In Iowa,
43 percent of respondents with a second full-family sanction were employed
in 1998 in at least one job, while 12 percent were employed in two or more
jobs concurrently. On average, they earned $925 a month in full-time jobs
that paid more than the minimum wage but provided no health insurance or
other fringe benefits. In Arizona, 40 percent of the 2,155 families who
received sanctions were employed after they left TANF. Their earnings
averaged $1,649 over the 3 months since leaving the program in 1998, with 42
percent earning $1,000 or less and 58 percent earning more. Both the
employment rates and average earnings of families who had received sanctions
were higher after leaving TANF than before, but lower than those of families
who left TANF for all other reasons. In North Carolina, 52 percent of
sanctioned families who responded to state study questions were working in
December 1998, including 5 percent who were self-employed. This rate was
lower than the employment rate of respondents whose cases were closed for
other reasons, and the employment rate was generally lower even as the
number of sanctions the respondents had received went up.
In the state studies that asked such questions, families who were no longer
receiving TANF cash assistance because of sanctions often reported that they
depended on family, friends, or neighbors for support such as housing, use
of an automobile, access to a telephone, or loans. In Iowa, 33 percent
depended on family or friends for housing, 44 percent for transportation, 49
percent for use of a telephone, and 28 percent for cash assistance.36 Child
support was also an important source of income for some respondents, ranging
from 3 percent of respondents in New Jersey to 19 percent in Iowa.
Sanctions Received Food Stamps and Medicaid
Many families managed to meet their essential needs through income from
employment, the support of family and friends, benefits from other
government programs, or some combination of these after they left TANF
because of sanctions. The majority of families continued to receive Food
Stamp, Medicaid, or other publicly funded program benefits. However, some
families reported that they were experiencing hardships.
Many families continued to rely on food stamps and Medicaid whether or not
they were working, according to the seven studies in six states where this
information was reported.37 From 57 to 71 percent received food stamps, and
59 to 88 percent received Medicaid within a few months of leaving TANF.
Other government programs cited for their value were the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children and/or
Supplemental Security Income. In Arizona, sanctioned families depended on
these government programs to a greater extent after their cases were closed
than families who had not received a sanction. While on TANF, nearly 90
percent of these Arizona families received food stamps and 100 percent
received Medicaid coverage. After leaving TANF, Food Stamp and Medicaid
benefit receipt declined steadily for families who had received sanctions
and those who had not, but less sharply for sanctioned families. About 59
percent of sanctioned families received food stamps and 73 percent received
Medicaid coverage in Arizona at least 3 months after case closure. In Iowa's
case study interviews, sanctioned family members emphasized repeatedly the
value they place on continued Medicaid receipt, especially for their
children. Iowa researchers stressed that continued participation in these
government programs is critical to the well-being of families who leave TANF
because of sanctions.
While many families appeared able to meet their immediate family needs after
they left welfare, a few reported that they experienced hardships in the
state studies that asked the question. The hardships included inability to
pay bills, loss of utilities, inability to continue to care for their
children, and homelessness. In Florida, 5 percent said they were unable to
pay their bills and 18 percent in Michigan said they had received notices
that their utilities would be cut off. In New Jersey and Utah, 3 percent of
respondents found it necessary to place their children in the care of
relatives, and in Iowa, 5 percent of respondents said their minor child was
no longer living with them. Homelessness was reported by 3 percent of
respondents in Michigan and 4 percent in Iowa, down from the 12 percent
reported in the preceding year.
Although sanction rates in the states during 1998 were low, about 135,800
families nationwide were under sanctions in an average month during that
year. State studies of these families indicate that they tended to have
adults with lower levels of education and less work experience than the TANF
population in general. Moreover, when TANF payments stopped, sanctioned
families relied on support from family and friends rather than income from
employment to a greater extent than families who left the program for other
reasons. The characteristics of families affected by sanctions lend further
support to the HHS OIG's recent recommendations intended to help ensure that
families understand their work and other responsibilities under TANF and the
penalties for not meeting these responsibilities.
We provided HHS with a draft of this report for comment. HHS said the report
was timely and provided important information on the sanction policies
states have implemented within the flexibility afforded under TANF. HHS also
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate.
(HHS' comments are in app. VIII.)
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we will make no further distribution of this report until 7 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
Honorable Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and
program officials in each of the states and the District of Columbia. We
also will make copies available to others on request.
If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me on (202)
512-7215. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in
appendix IX.
Cynthia M. Fagnoni
Director, Education, Workforce, and
Income Security Issues
Scope and Methodology
This appendix describes our scope and methodology for collecting (1)
information on state sanction, conciliation, and appeal policies; (2) state
data on the number of benefit reductions and terminations due to sanctions,
and the reasons for these benefit reductions and terminations; and (3)
information from state studies on families under sanction. We conducted our
review between January 1999 and January 2000 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
To obtain information on state sanction policies affecting TANF and Medicaid
benefits, we extracted information from reports issued by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the Congressional Research Service, and the
Urban Institute, as well as prior GAO reports, on policies in effect during
1997 and 1998. We then contacted state TANF program directors or their
policy specialists in all 50 states and the District of Columbia to confirm,
correct, clarify, and update this information for 1999. For information on
state TANF sanction policies affecting Food Stamp benefits, we relied
primarily on information about the states and the District of Columbia
provided by the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture.
All of the state sanction policies described in this report were in effect
as of September 1999.
To obtain information on state conciliation policies in effect in 1999, we
requested documents from all 50 states and the District of Columbia that
describe the procedures to be followed before sanction notices are mailed to
TANF family members. We also interviewed all state TANF directors or policy
officials to clarify the information provided and to confirm whether the
states require TANF staff to follow conciliation procedures similar to those
previously required for the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training
(JOBS) program component of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC).
Where available, we relied on descriptions of state TANF conciliation
procedures published in research studies to increase our understanding of
state policies. We coordinated our policy review with the HHS Office of
Inspector General's (OIG) review of the implementation of state sanction
policies and conciliation procedures, and observed focus groups the OIG
conducted with caseworkers, TANF family members, and the TANF agency
director at one site in California to discuss the use of sanctions in order
to increase compliance with program responsibilities.
To obtain information on state appeal policies in effect in 1999, we
contacted state attorneys to determine whether the policies for TANF
families were the same as those under AFDC. The AFDC appeal policies were
prescribed by HHS in federal regulations. States had previously reported to
HHS that they applied the AFDC policies to welfare families enrolled in
JOBS. We also obtained information from a 1999 survey of state appeal
procedures conducted by the Center for Law and Social Policy.
to Sanctions
To determine the number of TANF families affected by sanctions, we requested
data from TANF programs in each of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia for calendar year 1998, the most recent year for which complete
data were available in the majority of states. All states except Hawaii and
New York provided data in response to our request.
We asked each state for data on the number of sanctions in effect for each
month during the year. For each month, we requested the number of TANF
families (that is, cases) in benefit reduction status as a result of partial
sanctions and the number of benefit terminations due to full-family
sanctions. Not all states were able to provide data for both partial and
full-family sanctions.
Although we asked for the number of TANF cases in benefit reduction status,
some states were only able to provide the number of individuals in benefit
reduction status. In these states, we used data on the number of TANF
recipients rather than cases.38 A few states provided an estimate derived
from samples of cases.
We considered partial sanctions to be benefit reductions of less than 100
percent. We defined benefit terminations to include case closures resulting
from sanctions and other cases in which a family's benefit amount was zero
because of the imposition of a sanction but the family's case remained open.
We relied on the data states gave us from information systems they use to
manage their programs, and we did not independently verify these data.
We also asked the states to provide data on their TANF caseload during each
month in calendar year 1998. Some states gave us data based on the caseload
as of a given day during the month. Others provided cumulative totals of all
cases open or receiving TANF assistance at any point during the month. Most
states gave us actual numbers of cases. A few provided an estimate derived
from samples of cases.
The data in this report include sanctions for noncompliance with work, child
support enforcement efforts, and children's schooling and immunization
responsibilities as well as all noncompliance with TANF responsibilities
identified in federal or state law and individualized plans.39 The data do
not include penalties for failing to follow procedural requirements such as
reporting household income, verifying Social Security numbers, submitting to
fingerprinting, or for committing fraud. We also did not include penalties
for families that failed to meet eligibility requirements, such as teen
parents who did not live at home or attend school. Although most states were
able to provide numbers of sanctions in general, some were not able to break
out these numbers by the specific reason for sanction.
To determine the average monthly sanction rate during 1998 for each state,
we divided the number of sanctions in an average month for a state by the
state's caseload in an average month. We calculated the number of sanctions
in an average month in a state by summing the number of cases in sanction
status for each month provided and dividing this total by the number of
months for which data were provided. We calculated a state's caseload in an
average month by summing its caseload in each month for which caseload data
were provided and dividing this total by the number of months.
To determine the average monthly sanction rate nationwide during 1998, we
divided the sum of the number of sanctions in an average month for all
states by the sum of the caseload in an average month for all states. We
also grouped the states by the type of sanction policy the state had in 1998
for noncompliance with work requirements (see table 6). For each group, we
calculated the overall average monthly sanction rate using the same method
used for calculating the average monthly sanction rate nationwide.
To obtain published studies of the characteristics and status of families
that received partial or full-family sanctions, we contacted TANF directors
or evaluation staff in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well
as HHS and national organizations that track state evaluation efforts.
Through this process, we located 17 studies of families under sanctions in
15 states that were published between March 1996 and November 1999. The
studies described in this report are those we identified that relied on
administrative data, survey data, or both. They represent a mix of studies
designed to meet research objectives, management needs, or some combination
of these, with varying time frames and resource constraints. Several studies
that relied exclusively on survey data were designed to provide early
information on the effects of state policy and program decisions for
internal use in order to improve state program administration. Of six
studies that relied exclusively on survey data, one obtained a response rate
of at least 70 percent, and four that had lower response rates compared the
characteristics of respondents and nonrespondents and found no significant
differences. Although respondents and nonrespondents may still differ in
their unmeasured characteristics, because of the limited number of studies
on this subject, we chose not to exclude studies on the basis of their low
response rates. Also, we included the results of the one survey that did not
compare respondents with nonrespondents where its findings paralleled those
of other studies. (See app. VII for a list of the studies described in this
report.)
These studies varied in the time period covered, population examined,
methodology used, information they focused on, and generalizability of their
results statewide. Four state studies reported the results of sanctions
imposed under waivers to the AFDC program rules that permitted early
experimentation with TANF requirements. Four studies in three states
examined families receiving cash assistance who were under partial
sanctions. Another 13 studies in 12 states examined families who left cash
assistance. Studies in Delaware and Indiana tracked a cohort of adults from
one or more counties longitudinally. Administrative data alone or combined
with survey data were used in 12 studies. Where studies were early, sample
sizes small, or response rates low, results may not reflect the situations
of TANF caseloads with the study states.
Policies on Sanctions for Noncompliance With TANF Work Responsibilities, by
State, in 1999
Continued
Maximum Min. time
monthly Most stringent sanctions between
cash for repeated or imposition
benefit prolonged noncompliance of first
State for partial
family Sanctions for first sanction and
with 1 instance of imposition
adult and noncompliance of first
2 full-family
children Effect on At minimum, Effect on At minimum, sanction
cash
benefit lasting . . cash benefit lasting . .
amount . amount .
Partial sanction policy
Adult
Alaska $923 portion 1 month Adult portion 12 months N/A
deducteda deducteda
Arkansas 204 Reduced 25% Until Reduced 25% Until N/A
compliance compliance
Adult All but
California 626 portion Until rent/utility 6 months N/A
deducted compliance allowances
deducted
District of Adult Until Adult portion
Columbia 379 portion compliance deducted 6 months N/A
deducted
Adult
Indiana 288 portion 2 months Adult portion 36 months N/A
deducted deducted
Adult
Maine 461 portion Until Adult portion 6 months N/A
deducted compliance deducted
Reduced 30%
plus
Minnesota 783b Reduced 10% 1 month rent/utility 6 months N/A
allowances
deductedc
Missouri 292 Reduced 25% Until Reduced 25% 3 months N/A
compliance
Adult
Montana 468 portion 1 month Adult portion 12 months N/A
deducted deducted
Adult
Adult portion, +
New Hampshire550 portion month 2/3 of month N/A
deducted remainder,
deducted
Adult
New York 577 portion Until Adult portion 6 months N/A
deducted compliance deducted
Adult Reduced by
Rhode Island 554 portion Until 140% of adult Until N/A
deducted compliance portion compliance
Reduced by Reduced by
$78 if one $78 if one
Texas 197 adult does 1 month adult does 6 months N/A
not comply; not comply;
reduced by reduced by
$125 if two $125 if two
Adult Adult portion
Washington 546 portion Until deducted or Until N/A
deducted compliance reduced 40% compliance
Graduated sanction policy
Alabama 164 Reduced 25% Until Reduced 100% 6 months 3 months
compliance
Arizona 347 Reduced 25% 1 month Reduced 100% 1 month 3 months
Colorado 357 Reduced 25% 1-3 months Reduced 100% 3-6 months 3-6 months
Connecticut 543 Reduced 20% 3 months Reduced 100% 3 months 9 months
Delaware 338 Reduced 33% Until Reduced 100% Lifetime 4 months
compliance
Georgia 280 Reduced 25% 1 month Reduced 100% Lifetime 3 months
Illinois 377 Reduced 50% Until Reduced 100% 3 months 3 months
compliance
Adult
Kentucky 262 portion Until Reduced 100% Until 24 months
deducteda compliance compliance
Adult
Louisiana 190 portion 3 months Reduced 100% Until 3 months
deducted compliance
Adult
Massachusetts579 portion Until Reduced 100% Until 1 month
deducted compliance compliance
Michigan 459 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% 1 month 4 months
25%a
North
Carolina 272 Reduced 25% 3 months Reduced 100% 1 month 3 months
Adult
North Dakota 549 portion 1 month Reduced 100% Until 6 months
deducted compliance
Adult
New Jersey 424 portion 1 month Reduced 100% 3 months 3 months
deducted
New Mexico 439 1 month of 1 month of Reduced 100% 6 months 6 months
compliance compliance
Nevada 348 Reduced 33% 1 month Reduced 100% Lifetime 3 months
Oregon 460 Reduced by Until Reduced 100% Until 6 months
$50 compliance compliance
Adult
Pennsylvania 403 portion 1 month Reduced 100% Lifetime 24 months
deducted
South Dakota 430 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% 1 month 1 month
50%a
Utah 197 Reduced by Until Reduced 100% Until 2 months
$100 compliance compliance
Adult
Vermont 639 portion Until Reduced 100% Until 28 months
reduced compliance compliance
West Virginia303 Reduced 33% 3 months Reduced 100% 6 months 6 months
Full-family sanction policy
Florida 303 Reduced Until Reduced 100% 3 months N/A
100% compliance
Hawaii 712 Reduced Until Reduced 100% 3 months N/A
100% compliance
Iowa 426 Reduced Until Reduced 100% 6 months N/A
100% compliance
Idaho 276 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% Lifetime N/A
100%
Kansas 429 Reduced Until Reduced 100% 2 months N/A
100% compliance
Maryland 461 Reduced Until Reduced 100% 1 month N/A
100% compliance
Mississippi 170 Reduced 2 months Reduced 100% Lifetime N/A
100%
Nebraska 364 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% 12 months N/A
100%
Ohio 362 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% 6 months N/A
100%
Oklahoma 292 Reduced Until Reduced 100% Until N/A
100% compliance compliance
South Reduced 1 month of 1 month of
Carolina 201 100% compliance Reduced 100% compliance N/A
Tennessee 232 Reduced Until Reduced 100% 3 months N/A
100% compliance
Virginia 291 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% 6 months N/A
100%
Wisconsin 673 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100%d Lifetime N/A
100%d
Wyoming 340 Reduced 1 month Reduced 100% 1 month N/A
100%
Note: N/A = not applicable.
a The cash benefit is reduced by 100% in Alaska and South Dakota if the TANF
adult quits or refuses to work, in Kentucky if the TANF adult does not
complete an assessment, and in Michigan if the noncompliant family has
received TANF for less than 2 months.
b In Minnesota, the TANF cash benefit and Food Stamp benefit are combined.
c In Minnesota, for the second and subsequent instances of noncompliance,
the family's benefit is reduced by 30% after rent and, at a county's option,
utility allowances are deducted and paid directly to the landlord or utility
companies.
d In Wisconsin, reduction in cash benefit is based on the number of hours
worked in the previous month. If recipient worked part of the time, benefit
reduction could be partial.
Policies on Sanctions for Noncompliance With Child Support Enforcement
Responsibilities, by State, in 1999
Continued
Maximum Minimum time
monthly Sanctions for between
cash repeated/prolonged imposition
benefit noncompliance of first
State for Sanctions for first partial
family instance of sanction and
with 1 noncompliance imposition
adult and of first
2 Effect on At minimum, Effect on At minimum, full-family
children cash lasting . . cash lasting . . sanction
benefit benefit
amount . amount .
Partial sanction
policy
Alaska $923 $368-$371 Until $368-$371 Until N/A
deducted compliance deducted compliance
Arkansas 204 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
California 626 Reduced Until Reduced 6 months N/A
25% compliance 25%
District of Reduced Until Reduced Until
Columbia 379 25% compliance 25% compliance N/A
Adult Adult
Indiana 288 portion Until portion Until N/A
deducted compliance deducted compliance
Iowa 426 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Kentucky 262 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Adult Adult
Maine 461 portion Until portion Until N/A
deducted compliance deducted compliance
Adult Adult
Massachusetts579 portion Until portion Until N/A
deducted compliance deducted compliance
Minnesota 783a Reduced 1 month Reduced Until N/A
25% 25% compliance
Missouri 292 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Adult Adult
Montana 468 portion Until portion Until N/A
deducted compliance deducted compliance
Nebraska 364 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
New Hampshire550 Reduced month Reduced month N/A
25%b 25%
New York 577 Reduced Until Reduced 6 months N/A
25% compliance 25%
North Reduced Until Reduced Until
Carolina 272 25% compliance 25% compliance N/A
Oklahoma 292 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Pennsylvania 403 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Rhode Island 554 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Texas 197 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
by $78 compliance by $78 compliance
Vermont 639 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Washington 546 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
25% compliance 25% compliance
Graduated sanction policy
Alabama 164 Reduced Until Reduced 6 months 3 months
25% compliance 100%
Arizona 347 Reduced 1 month Reduced 1 month 2 months
25% 100%
Colorado 357 Reduced 1-3 months Reduced 3-6 month 3-6 months
25% 100%
Illinois 377 Reduced Until Reduced 3 months 3 months
50% compliance 100%
Adult
Michigan 459 portion Until Reduced Until 4 months
deducted compliance 100% compliance
Adult
North Dakota 549 portion 1 month Reduced Until 6 months
deducted 100% compliance
New Mexico 439 Reduced Until Reduced 6 months 6 months
25% compliance 100%
Nevada 348 Reduced 1 month Reduced Lifetime 3 months
33%c 100%
Oregon 460 Reduced Until Reduced Until 4 months
25% compliance 100% compliance
Adult
Utah 197 portion Until Reduced Until 2 months
deducted compliance 100% compliance
Virginia 291 Reduced Until Reduced Until 6 months
25% compliance 100% compliance
West Virginia303 Reduced 3 months Reduced 6 months 3 months
33% 100%
Full-family sanction policy
Connecticut 543 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Delaware 338 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Florida 303 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Georgia 280 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Hawaii 712 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Idaho 276 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Kansas 429 Reduced Until Reduced 2 months N/A
100%d compliance 100%
Louisiana 190 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Maryland 461 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Mississippi 170 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
New Jersey 424 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Ohio 362 Reduced 1 month Reduced 6 months N/A
100% 100%
South Reduced Until Reduced Until
Carolina 201 100%d compliance 100% compliance N/A
South Dakota 430 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Tennessee 232 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Wisconsin 673 Reduced Until Reduced Until N/A
100% compliance 100% compliance
Wyoming 340 Reduced 1 month Reduced 1 month N/A
100% 100%
Note: N/A = not applicable.
a In Minnesota the TANF cash benefit and Food Stamp benefit are combined.
b In New Hampshire the monthly grant is reduced by an amount equal to 25% of
the payment standard for the first and subsequent instances of
noncooperation.
c In Nevada the monthly grant is reduced by 33% or the adult share,
whichever is greater, for the first month and 66% for the second month of
noncooperation. Continued noncooperation reduces the grant by 100% for a
minimum of 3 months. Repeated noncooperation may result in the maximum
lifetime sanction.
d In Kansas and South Carolina, the reduction affects the benefits of the
adult and the children for whom child support cooperation is withheld, not
the benefits of other children in the TANF family.
Effect on Food Stamp Benefits of Noncompliance With TANF Work and Other
Requirements, by State, in 1999
Continued
Effect on Food Stamp benefits of
Noncompliance with Noncompliance with
TANF work Noncompliance any TANF
State requirements by with any TANF requirement for
nonexempt family requirement at comparability at
member, as required state option at 7 state option at 7
in 7 U.S.C. 2015(d) U.S.C. 2017(d)a U.S.C. 2015(i)
Alabama Reduced 100% None None
Alaska Partial reduction 25% reduction None
Partial reduction
Arizona initially; 100% on 25% reduction None
3rd instance of
noncompliance
Arkansas Partial reduction None None
California Partial reduction None Partial reduction
Colorado Partial reduction None None
Connecticut Partial reduction 20% reduction None
Delaware Reduced 100% None None
District of
Columbia Partial reduction None None
Florida Reduced 100% None Partial reduction
Georgia Reduced 100% None None
Hawaii Partial reduction None None
Idaho Partial reduction 25% reduction Partial reduction
Illinois Partial reduction None None
Indiana Partial reduction None None
Partial reduction
initially; 100% for
Iowa repeated or 10% reduction Partial reduction
prolonged
noncomplianceb
Kansas Reduced 100% None Partial reduction
Kentucky Partial reduction 25% reduction None
Louisiana Reduced 100% None None
Maine Partial reduction None Partial reduction
Maryland Partial reduction None None
Massachusetts Reduced 100% None Partial reduction
Michigan Partial reduction 25% reduction Partial reduction
Minnesota Partial reduction None None
Partial reduction
initially; 100% for
Mississippi repeated or 25% reduction Partial reduction
prolonged
noncomplianceb
Missouri Partial reduction None None
Montana Partial reduction None Partial reduction
Partial reduction
initially; 100% for
Nebraska repeated or 10% reduction None
prolonged
noncomplianceb
Nevada Partial reduction None None
New Hampshire Partial reduction None None
New Jersey Reduced 100% None None
New Mexico Partial reduction 20% reduction None
New York Partial reduction None None
North Carolina Partial reduction None None
North Dakota Reduced 100% None Partial reduction
Ohio Reduced 100% None Partial reduction
Oklahoma Reduced 100% None None
Oregon Partial reduction None None
Pennsylvania Partial reduction None None
Rhode Island Partial reduction 20% reduction None
South Carolina Partial reduction None None
South Dakota Reduced 100% None Partial reduction
Tennessee Partial reduction 10% reduction Partial reduction
Texas Reduced 100% None None
Utah Reduced 100% None None
Vermont Partial reduction None None
Virginia Reduced 100% None None
Washington Partial reduction None Partial reduction
West Virginia Partial reduction None None
Wisconsin Partial reduction None None
Wyoming Partial reduction None Partial reduction
Note: States that do not impose sanctions on Food Stamp benefits for a
family member's noncompliance with TANF work requirements or for a family
member's noncompliance with other TANF requirements are cited as "none" in
the effect column.
a Reduction is used by some states to ensure that Food Stamp benefits do not
increase with the application of TANF sanctions.
b Reported to GAO by state TANF officials in detail not obtained from the
Department of Agriculture's survey.
Source: Except as noted, September 1999 survey conducted by the Department
of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service of its regional officials
concerning states' Food Stamp sanction policies for noncompliance with TANF
requirements.
Number of Families Under Partial Sanctions, by Reason for Sanction, in an
Average Month in 1998
Continued
Not Not compliant Total Average
number
Not compliant cooperating with child of cases monthly
State Reason not with work with child immunization Other in an rate
specified support or school reasons (percent)
requirements average
enforcement attendance for all
efforts requirements month, reasons
1998a
Alabama 0 1,683 0 0 0 1,683 7.37
Alaska 0 105 20 0 143 268 2.75
Arizona b 1,553 b b b 1,553c 4.11
Arkansas 265 b b b b 265 2.02
California b 6,527 b b b 6,527c 0.91
Colorado 870 b b b b 870 4.56
Connecticut b 641 b b b 641c 1.57
Delaware 0 668 0 0 395 1,063 14.46
District of
Columbia 1,144 b b b b 1,144 5.58
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 608 0 0 66 674 0.87
Hawaiid
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 6,323 2,228 2 0 8,553 5.31
Indiana 0 1,115 0 0 467 1,582 4.74
Iowa b 594 b b b 594c 2.44
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky b 2,628 b b b 2,628c 5.29
Louisiana 0 28 975 0 0 1,003 2.13
Maine 0 584 61 0 0 644 4.30
Maryland 0 0 0 4,869 31 4,901 10.89
Massachusetts0 970 527 339 0 1,836 2.89
Michigan 0 2,204 920 68 0 3,192 2.79
Minnesota 3,022 b b b b 3,022 6.29
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 5,786 715 0 0 6,501 11.30
Montana 435 b b b b 435 7.25
Nebraska 0 0 3 3 0 6 0.05
Nevada 0 185 0 0 31 216 2.21
New Hampshireb 238 b b b 238c 4.03
New Jersey b 5,032 b b b 5,032c 7.02
New Mexicoe
New Yorkd
North
Carolina 0 10,731 4,062 4,753 22 19,568 28.60
North Dakota b 178 b b b 178c 5.46
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oklahoma 0 0 55 54 0 109 0.48
Oregond
Pennsylvania 0 5,340 1,606 0 0 6,946 5.38
Rhode Island 194 b b b b 194 1.01
South
Carolina 1,175 b b b b 1,175 5.14
South Dakotad
Tennesseed
Texas 0 11,240 2,545 9,600 363 23,748 15.46
Utah 283 b b b b 283 2.69
Vermontd
Virginiad
Washington b 3,538 b b b 3,538c 4.83
West
Virginiad
Wisconsin b 1,899 b b b 1,899c 18.18
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a Totals may not add because of rounding.
b State did not provide data on sanctions for this reason.
c Total represents sanctions as a result of noncompliance with work
requirements only.
d State did not provide monthly data.
e New Mexico provided data on the number of new sanctions imposed each month
but could not provide the number of families in sanction status.
Source: Data provided by the states.
Number of Families Under Full-Family Sanctions, by Reason for Sanction, in
an Average Month in 1998
Continued
Not compliant Total
with Not number Average
Not compliant requirements cooperating of cases monthly
State Reason not with work in individual with child Other in an rate
specified support reasons (percent)
requirements plans (may average
include work enforcement month, for all
requirements) efforts 1998a reasons
Alabamab
Alaska 0 23 0 0 0 23 0.23
Arizona 540 49 0 5 0 594 1.57
Arkansas 11 187 97 25 0 320 2.44
California 0 228 0 0 0 228 0.03
Colorado 174 c c c c 174 0.91
Connecticut 0 79 0 32 0 110 0.27
Delaware 0 22 39 0 0 61 0.83
District of
Columbia 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.01
Florida 5 4,705 0 297 14 5,021 5.06
Georgia 0 4 0 0 0 4 0
Hawaiib
Idaho 0 7 69 2 1 79 4.70
Illinois 7,214 c c c c 7,214 4.48
Indiana 0 410 0 0 0 410 1.23
Iowa 0 195 0 0 0 195 0.80
Kansas 0 240 0 62 0 302 2.25
Kentucky 0 23 0 0 0 23 0.05
Louisiana 0 62 0 0 0 62 0.13
Maine 0 5 0 1 0 5 0.03
Maryland 0 647 0 0 0 647 1.44
Massachusetts0 168 0 0 0 168 0.26
Michigan 0 437 0 11 36 483 0.42
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 0 323 0 99 0 422 1.98
Missouri 0 7 0 0 0 7 0.01
Montana 0 12 5 1 0 19 0.31
Nebraska 66 c c c c 66 0.53
Nevada 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.01
New Hampshire0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 732 0 0 0 732 1.02
New Mexico 1 c c c c 1 0
New Yorkb
North
Carolina 0 4 351 0 0 355 0.52
North Dakota 7 c c c c 7 0.20
Ohio 0 2,798 0 0 0 2,798 2.18
Oklahoma 0 605 0 0 0 605 2.65
Oregon 117 c c c c 117 0.67
Pennsylvania 0 20 0 0 0 20 0.02
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South
Carolina 0 1 613 24 5 643 2.81
South Dakota 0 37 0 3 0 40 1.12
Tennessee 179 c 0 c 0 179 0.31
Texas 0 8 0 3 0 11 0.01
Utah 0 4 59 0 0 63 0.60
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia 0 0 274 63 19 356 0.86
Washington 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
West Virginia0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wisconsin 0 477 0 0 0 477 4.57
Wyoming 0 71 0 5 0 71 7.04
a Totals may not add because of rounding.
b State did not provide monthly data.
c State did not provide data on sanctions for this reason
Scope and Methodology of State Studies That Examined the Characteristics and
Outcomes of TANF Families Under Sanction
Continued
Study
State Report(s) containing population/time Study design
study results
frames
Cash Assistance Exit 10,647 families who Used statewide
Study: First Quarter left TANF for any administrative data
1998 Cohort reason, for 3 months before
Arizona (Phoenix, AZ: 1/1/98-3/31/98, quarter in which
Arizona Department including 2,155 who family left TANF and
of Economic left because of up to 9 months
Security, May 1999) sanctions. after.
The ABC Evaluation: 2,279 families who Used administrative
Carrying and Using were enrolled in the data to track and
the Stick: Financial welfare reform compare families in
Sanctions in demonstration the demonstration
Delaware Delaware's A Better program, including program with those
Chance Program those who received not in the
(Bethesda, MD: Abt sanctions, and who demonstration for 18
Associates, Inc, May stayed or left for months; survey data
1999) any reason, for subset of these
12/96-6/98. groups.
Robert Crew, Jr, and
Joe Eyerman,
Sanctions in the Used survey data and
WAGES Program 1,083 families who data from a review
left TANF after of administrative
Florida (Florida State receiving a records for a sample
University,
Tallahassee, FL: sanction, of families; 80
Dec. 1998) 10/96-9/98. percent response
rate.
Pamela Holcomb and
Caroline Ratcliffe,
When Welfare
Recipients Fail to Used administrative
Comply With Work Families under data to track a
sample of TANF
Indiana Requirements: partial sanctions recipients in Marion
Indiana's Experience anytime between May
With Partial Benefit 1996-May 1997. County
Sanctions (Indianapolis) over
(Washington, D.C.: time.
Urban Institute,
Oct. 1998)
Iowa's Limited
Benefit Plan: Used administrative
Summary Report Families who left data on all
(Washington, D.C.: the welfare reform families; surveyed a
sample of these
Iowa Mathematica Policy program because of families; 85 percent
Research, Inc., and full-family
the Institute for sanctions, response rate;
Social and Economic 11/95-1/96. in-depth case study
Development, May interviews with 12
1997) of these families.
Used statewide
administrative data
Second Assignments tracking families
to Iowa's Limited Families who left for 20 months; used
Benefit Plan TANF a second time data from a sample
(Washington, D.C.: because of of these families;
Mathematica Policy full-family response rate of
Research, Inc., Aug. sanctions, 76%; in-depth case
1999) 3/98-5/98. study interviews of
the same 12 families
as study above.
Unpublished data on
selected outcomes
for all TANF cases
that received All families who Used statewide
Kansas sanction notices received TANF administrative data
from the Kansas sanction notices, tracking universe
Employment 3/97-3/99. over this period.
Commission, Apr.
1999.
Life After Welfare: Used statewide
A Look at Sanctioned administrative data
Families (College Families who left to track these
TANF because of
Maryland Park, MD.: full-family families over 18
University of months, compared
Maryland School of sanctions, with a random sample
Social Work, Nov. 10/96-3/98. of all those leaving
1999) TANF for any reason.
Used review of
A Study of AFDC Case administrative
Closures Due to JOBS All families who records statewide;
Sanctions. April left the welfare survey data from
Michigan 1996 (Lansing, MI: reform program in-person interviews
Michigan Family because of with 53 percent of
Independence Agency, full-family all families;
May 1997) sanctions in 4/96. compared results
with results of 3
other studies.
Used data from
caseworkers and
Study of Sanctioned All families under administrative
Cases (St. Paul, MN: partial sanctions in records for a random
Minnesota Minnesota Department welfare reform sample of cases in
of Human Services, program in 2/96 and 7-county program
Mar. 6, 1996) in 8/96. selected at 2 points
in time; compared
results with active
caseload.
Report on Sanctions
in the Statewide Used statewide
MFIP Program (St. All families under administrative data;
Paul, MN: Minnesota TANF partial survey of TANF
Department of Human sanctions in 1998. service providers
Services, Jan. 20, with 96% response
1999) rate.
FNJ (TANF) Sanction Used survey data;
Survey (Trenton, NJ: All families who 51.5% response rate;
New Jersey New Jersey left TANF because of no comparison of
Department of Human sanctions, characteristics of
Services, July 2, 1/98-2/98. respondents and
1998) nonrespondents.
Evaluation of the All families who Used survey data;
response rate of
North North Carolina Work left TANF after 76%; supplemented
Carolina First Program reaching their data with
(McLean, VA: 24-month time limit
Maximus, May 1999) in July 1998. longitudinal
administrative data.
Family Health & Well
Being in Oklahoma: Used survey data
An Exploratory from a random sample
Analysis of TANF All families who of families;
Cases Closed and left TANF for any reported 54%
Oklahoma Denied, October 1996 reason, 10/96-11/97, response rate;
to November 1997 including those who comparison of
(Oklahoma City, OK: later returned. respondents and
Oklahoma Department nonrespondents shows
of Human Services, no important
Sept. 1998) differences.
Summary of Surveys Used survey data
of Welfare from sample of
Recipients Employed All families who families; response
rate of 56%;
Tennessee or Sanctioned for left TANF because of comparison of
Noncompliance sanctions,
(Memphis, TN: 1/97-10/97. respondents and
University of nonrespondents shows
Memphis, Mar. 1998) no important
differences.
Used administrative
Work-First Clients data from a random
in Longer-Term sample of the
Sanction Status All families who had universe; compared
received partial characteristics of
Washington (Olympia, WA: sanctions for 3 families in this
Washington DSHS
Economic Services months or more as of sample with those of
Administration, Mar. July 1998. sample of families
1999) who received no
sanctions from
11/97-11/98.
Used survey data
Michelle Derr, The All families who from universe of
Impact of Grant left the welfare families; 37%
Sanctioning on reform program response rate;
Utah Utah's TANF Families because of comparison of
(Salt Lake City, UT: full-family respondents and
University of Utah, sanctions, nonrespondents shows
Oct. 1998) 12/95-4/97. no important
differences.
Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Clarita A. Mrena, (415) 904-2245
Patricia Elston, (916) 486-6450
In addition to those named above, Daniel Alspaugh, Patrick DiBattista, and
Annde Ewertsen made key contributions to this report.
Related GAO Products
Welfare Reform: Implementing DOT's Access to Jobs Program in Its First Year
(GAO/RCED-00-14, Nov. 26, 1999 ).
Medicaid Enrollment: Amid Declines, State Efforts to Ensure Coverage After
Welfare Reform Vary (GAO/HEHS-99-163, Sept. 10, 1999 ).
Welfare Reform: Assessing the Effectiveness of Various Welfare-to-Work
Approaches (GAO/HEHS-99-179, Sept. 7, 1999 ).
Food Stamp Program: Various Factors Have Led to Declining Participation
(GAO/RCED-99-185, July 2, 1999 ).
Welfare Reform: States' Implementation Progress and Information on Former
Recipients (GAO/T-HEHS-99-116 , May 27, 1999).
Welfare Reform: Information on Former Recipients' Status (GAO/HEHS-99-48,
Apr. 28, 1999 ).
Welfare Reform: States' Experiences in Providing Employment Assistance to
TANF Clients (GAO/HEHS-99-22, Feb. 26, 1999).
Welfare Reform: Status of Awards and Selected States' Use of Welfare-to-Work
Grants (GAO/HEHS-99-40, Feb. 5, 1999 ).
Welfare Reform: Few States Are Likely to Use the Simplified Food Stamp
Program (GAO/RCED-99-43, Jan. 29, 1999 ).
Welfare Reform: Child Support an Uncertain Income Supplement for Families
Leaving Welfare (GAO/HEHS-98-168, Aug. 3, 1998 ).
Welfare Reform: States Are Restructuring Programs to Reduce Welfare
Dependence (GAO/HEHS-98-109, June 17, 1998 ).
Welfare Reform: Transportation's Role in Moving From Welfare to Work
(GAO/RCED-98-161, May 29, 1998 ).
Welfare Reform: Effects of Changes Made to the Summer Food Service Program
(GAO/T-RCED-98-120, Mar. 10, 1998 ).
(116024)
Table 1: Federal Law on TANF Sanctions for Noncompliance
With Program Requirements 9
Table 2: Federal Law on Sanctions of Medicaid and Food Stamps
for TANF Noncompliance 10
Table 3: Type of Sanction Policy, and Number of States Using It, for
Noncompliance With Work Responsibilities in 1999 13
Table 4: State Conciliation Policies for Noncompliance, by Type
of State Sanction Policy for Noncompliance With Work
Requirements 23
Table 5: Number and Percentage of Families Under Sanctions in
an Average Month in 1998, by Sanction Type 29
Table 6: Number and Percentage of Families Under TANF Sanctions
for Any Reason, by Type of Work Sanction Policy, in an Average
Month in 1998 32
Figure 1: States' Sanction Policies for Failure to Comply With
TANF Work Requirements, 1999 15
Figure 2: The Typical TANF Conciliation and Appeal Process
in Effect During 1999 25
1. Title I of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) was enacted Aug. 22, 1996, and
took effect July 1, 1997, or earlier in states that submitted complete plans
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
2. TANF program goals are to provide temporary assistance to needy families
for the care of their children; end welfare dependence by promoting job
preparedness, work, and marriage; prevent or reduce out-of-wedlock
pregnancies; and encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families.
3. For this report, the term "state" includes the District of Columbia.
4. "Family" is generally the same as "case." The number of families subject
to sanctions in an average month cannot be used to calculate the total
number of families under sanctions in a year, since some families may
receive sanctions for multiple months or on more than one occasion during
the year.
5. States that submitted complete plans to HHS were allowed to implement
TANF following its enactment in 1996. Prior to TANF, many states operated
AFDC programs under HHS waivers that permitted them to experiment with
requirements later incorporated into TANF. Under these waivers, 26 states
sought to increase the number of AFDC adults subject to work requirements
and to impose full-family sanctions for noncompliance with the work
requirements.
6. Work participation was mandatory for almost three of every five adults in
TANF in fiscal year 1998, according to HHS, and the proportion of adults
required to work increases each year thereafter.
7. States have the flexibility to set shorter limits on receipt of TANF cash
benefits. Sixteen states have limits of 2 years or less, according to HHS.
8. The determination that a family member has failed to cooperate with child
support enforcement can be made only by the state child support enforcement
agency, not by the state TANF agency. Depending on the state's assignment of
responsibility, either the child support or the TANF agency may decide
whether the family member has good cause for noncooperation.
9. JOBS participation was mandatory for two of every five AFDC adults in
fiscal year 1996, but fewer than one of every five actually participated,
according to HHS, due primarily to limited funding and service availability.
10. In this latter respect, current state policies reflect those under the
JOBS program, which increased the duration of partial sanctions to a 6-month
maximum following repeated instances of noncompliance.
11. Policies in five states allow for local variations in or differentiate
among work responsibilities, hours worked, or length of program
participation when imposing sanctions. Colorado has a statewide policy of
graduated sanctions but allows counties to apply full-family sanctions.
Alaska and South Dakota impose partial sanctions the first time TANF
recipients do not participate in assigned work activities, but full-family
sanctions if they quit or refuse a job. Wisconsin deducts benefits for work
hours missed, which may result in either a partial or full-family sanction.
Michigan applies a partial sanction for first-time noncompliance if the
family has been on TANF for 2 months or more, but a full-family sanction if
the family has been on TANF less than 2 months.
12. A few states allow for exceptions to full-family sanctions in order to
protect children. On a case-by-case basis, the state may impose a less
stringent sanction if it determines that the welfare of the children would
be compromised by loss of all cash assistance. For example, the state may
provide payments to a protective payee or to a landlord or utility companies
to cover the family's rent, utilities, and other essentials if there is a
concern that the noncompliant adult would otherwise mismanage the TANF grant
and place the children at risk.
13. Depending on state policy, a family with more than one child could also
receive one sanction for each child not receiving immunizations or attending
school as required.
14. The 13 states are Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, and
Wyoming.
15. Generally, a household member receiving food stamps who is responsible
for the care of a child under 6 years of age is exempt from Food Stamp work
requirements.
16. See Medicaid Enrollment: Amid Declines, State Efforts to Ensure Coverage
After Welfare Reform Vary (GAO/HEHS-99-163, Sept. 10, 1999). See also Food
Stamp Program: Various Factors Have Led to Declining Participation
(GAO/RCED-99-185, July 2, 1999). Regarding state concerns about links
between TANF and food stamps, see Welfare Reform: Few States Are Likely to
Use the Simplified Food Stamp Program (GAO/RCED-99-43, Jan. 29, 1999).
17. Walton v. Hammons , 192 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 1999).
18. HHS OIG issued three reports, the first of which was HHS OIG, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families: Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Client Sanctions , OEI-09-98-00290 (Washington, D.C.: HHS, July 1999). The
two later reports are cited in the footnotes that follow.
19. The eight states were California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, and Texas.
20. HHS OIG, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Educating Clients
About Sanctions , OEI-09-98-00291 (Washington, D.C.: HHS, Oct. 1999).
21. If a TANF family member in New Mexico comes back into compliance for 6
months, the family member earns another opportunity for conciliation.
22. HHS OIG, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Improving Client
Sanction Notices , OEI-09-98-00292 (Washington, D.C.: HHS, Oct. 1999).
23. Wisconsin created a new process for TANF that relies on a local agency's
fact-finding, which is subject, upon request, to a state-level
administrative law judge review.
24. Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. New York and Hawaii did not supply monthly data.
26. The pattern was similar in Delaware, where partial sanctions for
first-time noncompliance with work responsibilities reduced the benefits of
476 families in an average month and for the second instance of
noncompliance for 193 families. The pattern differed in Montana, where
partial sanctions for second instances of noncompliance were imposed on more
families than first instances. For first-time noncompliance, Montana reduced
the benefits of 150 families in an average month and for 182 families for
the second instance.
27. From 1995 through mid-1999 in the seven states with policies calling for
lifetime bans, Delaware banned the adults in 750 families; Pennsylvania the
adults in 131; Georgia, 29; Wisconsin, 3; and Nevada, none. Idaho and
Mississippi were not able to provide information on the number of families
affected by lifetime bans.
28. The studies were conducted in Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota,
Tennessee, and Washington. See app. VII for full citations for each of these
studies.
29. Arizona researchers found differences in the length of time a family had
received welfare and in marital and minority status, with sanctioned
families three times as likely to have received welfare continuously for 2
years before case closure. In Delaware, sanctions were more prevalent among
family members who had been on welfare longer, were younger, were nonwhite,
had more children, and had lower earnings before exposure to welfare reform.
In Maryland, proportionately more sanctioned family members were younger,
white, and lacked prior work experience.
30. The states were Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Utah.
31. Child care difficulties may be regarded differently by TANF caseworkers
and families, according to the HHS OIG. For example, some caseworkers
considered the referrals and subsidies provided for child care to be
adequate and refused to accept lack of quality child care as an acceptable
reason to exempt TANF family members from work and other program
requirements.
32. We calculated the average on the basis of data from Arizona, Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Washington. Five of these provided data for families who returned to
compliance within 3 months.
33. Four of the states provided data on exemptions.
34. We calculated the average on the basis of data from Arizona, Florida,
Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah.
35. Arizona and Iowa studies showed increased employment rates and average
earnings for sanctioned families. Arizona and North Carolina studies showed
that employment rates of sanctioned families were lower than those of
families who left TANF for other reasons.
36. In New Jersey and Utah, 52 and 63 percent, respectively, said family or
friends were supporting them after their cases were closed because of
sanctions. In Tennessee and Florida, 33 and 19 percent, respectively, said
they received help in paying their bills from family or friends.
37. These states were Arizona, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessee, and
Utah.
38. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Wisconsin. It should be noted that since most cases are
single-parent families, the individual recipient is a fairly close proxy for
a family case count.
39. In most states, a family that was noncompliant was counted only once,
regardless of the number of reasons for sanctions, but in four states, a
family might have been counted for each type of noncompliance.
*** End of document. ***