Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
(Letter Report, 05/19/99, GAO/GGD-99-44).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the
Attorney General's strategy for reducing and deterring illegal entry
along the southwest border, focusing on: (1) the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's (INS) progress in implementing the southwest
border strategy during fiscal year (FY) 1998; (2) interim results of the
strategy; and (3) actions taken on GAO's recommendation that the
Attorney General develop and implement a plan for formal,
cost-effective, comprehensive, and systematic evaluation of the
strategy.

GAO noted that: (1) INS is continuing to implement its southwest border
strategy; (2) although some of the expected interim results continue to
occur, available data do not yet answer the fundamental question of how
effective the strategy has been in preventing illegal entry; (3) in FY
1998, INS' Border Patrol transitioned into the second phase of its
four-phased approach, which called for increasing Border Patrol agents
and resources to sectors in Arizona and South Texas; (4) INS allocated
740 of 1,000 new agent positions authorized in FY 1998 to sectors in
these locations; (5) INS also added 18 miles of fencing in California
and Arizona, increased both the proportion and total amount of time
Border Patrol agents at the southwest border spent collectively on
border enforcement, and deployed additional technologies such as remote
video surveillance cameras; (6) INS was testing a resource and
effectiveness model to help it determine the right mix of staffing,
equipment, and technology for all of its Border Patrol sectors; (7) to
complement the Border Patrol's efforts between ports of entry, INS
Inspections added 179 inspectors to southwest land-border ports of entry
in FY 1998 and undertook training and enforcement efforts in conjunction
with other agencies located at these ports; (8) INS also began testing
an inspections program designed to measure how well it conducted
inspections of travellers; (9) although evaluative data on the overall
impact of the strategy continue to be limited, available data suggested
that several anticipated interim effects of the strategy have occurred;
(10) the southwest border ports of entry inspectors apprehended an
increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry and there were
reports of higher fees being charged by smugglers, which INS said
indicated an increased difficulty in illegal border crossing; (11)
available information on the interim results of the strategy does not
provide answers to the most fundamental questions surrounding the INS'
enforcement efforts along the southwest border; (12) pursuant to GAO's
1997 report recommendation to conduct a comprehensive evaluation, INS
contracted with private research firms in September 1998 for evaluative
studies; (13) as of April 1999, according to INS, one contractor was
working on an evaluation design and analysis plan; (14) INS could
provide GAO with no other information on the contractor's progress; and
(15) consequently, GAO does not know to what extent the contractor's
evaluation plan will provide the information needed to determine the
extent to which the Attorney General's strategy has been effective.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GGD-99-44
     TITLE:  Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy
	     Implementation
      DATE:  05/19/99
   SUBJECT:  Performance measures
	     Illegal aliens
	     Immigration or emigration
	     Law enforcement information systems
	     Program evaluation
	     Strategic planning
	     Arrests
	     Law enforcement
	     Smuggling
	     Human resources utilization
IDENTIFIER:  INS Geographical Information Systems Project
	     El Paso (TX)
	     San Diego (CA)
	     Tucson (AZ)
	     INS Southwest Border Strategy
	     INS IDENT Automated Fingerprinting System
	     INS Border Safety Initiative
	     INS Priorities and Performance Management Plan

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ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: Status of Southwest Border Strategy
Implementation (GAO/GGD-99-44) ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 1999 

GAO/GGD-99-44

May 1999   GAO/GGD-99-44

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548

General Government Division Page 1 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border
Strategy

GAO B-281961 May 19, 1999 The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch Chairman
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Minority Member Committee
on the Judiciary United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman The Honorable John Conyers,
Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on the Judiciary House of
Representatives

Illegal immigration is a long- standing problem, and it has been
exacerbated by the pull of the strong domestic economy, economic
and/ or political turmoil in the developing world, and recent
natural disasters in Central America. To address this continuing
problem, the Attorney General in 1994 announced a broad, five-
part strategy to strengthen the nation's immigration laws
including, among other things, strengthening border enforcement.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (1996 Act) requires us to track, monitor, and evaluate the
Attorney General's strategy and to report our findings to Congress
annually for 6 years. Our first report 1 discussed the Immigration
and Naturalization Service's (INS) progress toward implementing
the Attorney General's strategy for reducing and deterring illegal
entry along the southwest border. This, our third report, 2
provides additional information on the key issues raised in our
first report. Specifically, this report addresses (1) INS'
progress in implementing the southwest border strategy during
fiscal year 1998, (2) interim results of the strategy, and (3)
actions taken on our recommendation that the Attorney General
develop and implement a plan for a formal, cost- effective,
comprehensive, and systematic evaluation of the strategy.

1 Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results
Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11,
1997). 2 Our second report, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles
to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/GGD-99-33,
April 2, 1999), focused on the strategy's objective to enforce
workplace immigration laws.

B-281961 Page 2 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

INS is continuing to implement its southwest border strategy.
Although some of the expected interim results continue to occur,
available data do not yet answer the fundamental question of how
effective the strategy has been in preventing and deterring
illegal entry.

In fiscal year 1998, INS' Border Patrol transitioned into the
second phase of its four- phased approach, which called for
increasing Border Patrol agents and resources to sectors in
Arizona and South Texas. Consistent with this planned approach,
INS allocated 740 of 1,000 new agent positions authorized in
fiscal year 1998 to sectors in these locations. INS also added 18
miles of fencing in California and Arizona, increased both the
proportion and total amount of time Border Patrol agents at the
southwest border spent collectively on border enforcement, and
deployed additional technologies such as remote video surveillance
cameras. In addition, in January 1999, INS was testing a resource
and effectiveness model to help it determine the right mix of
staffing, equipment, and technology for all of its Border Patrol
sectors.

To complement the Border Patrol's efforts between ports of entry,
INS Inspections added 179 inspectors to southwest land- border
ports of entry in fiscal year 1998 and undertook training and
enforcement efforts in conjunction with other agencies located at
these ports. INS also began testing an inspections program
designed to measure how well it conducted inspections of
travelers.

Although evaluative data on the overall impact of the strategy
continue to be limited, available data suggested that several
anticipated interim effects of the strategy have occurred. For
example, apprehensions of illegal aliens continued to shift from
traditionally high entry points like San Diego and El Paso to
other locations along the border, as resources were deployed.
Also, southwest border ports of entry inspectors apprehended an
increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry and there
were reports of higher fees being charged by smugglers, which INS
said indicated an increased difficulty in illegal border crossing.
However, data were not available on whether the other expected
results-- a decrease in attempted reentries by illegal aliens who
previously have been apprehended and a reduction in border area
crime-- had occurred.

Available information on the interim results of the strategy does
not provide answers to the most fundamental questions surrounding
INS' enforcement efforts along the southwest border. That is,
given the billions of dollars that INS has invested in
implementing the strategy, how effective has the strategy been in
preventing and deterring aliens from illegally Results in Brief

B-281961 Page 3 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

crossing the border? Pursuant to our 1997 report recommendation to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation, INS contracted with private
research firms in September 1998 for evaluative studies. As of
April 1999, according to INS, one contractor was working on an
evaluation design and analysis plan. INS could provide us with no
other information on the contractor's progress. Consequently, we
do not know to what extent the contractor's evaluation plan will
provide the information needed to determine the extent to which
the Attorney General's strategy has been effective.

In February 1994, the Attorney General and INS Commissioner
announced a five- part strategy to strengthen enforcement of the
nation's immigration laws. The strategy's first priority was to
strengthen enforcement along the southwest border. The strategy to
strengthen the border called for prevention through deterrence,
that is, raising the risk of apprehension for illegal aliens to
make it so difficult and so costly to enter this country illegally
that fewer individuals even try. 3 The objectives of the strategy
were to close off the routes most frequently used by smugglers and
illegal aliens (generally through urban areas) and shift traffic
through the ports of entry that inspect travelers or over areas
that were more remote and difficult to cross. With the traditional
routes disrupted, INS expected that illegal alien traffic would
either be deterred or forced over terrain less suited for
crossing, where INS believed it would have the tactical advantage.

To carry out the strategy, the Border Patrol was to

 concentrate personnel and resources in a four- phased approach 4
starting with the areas of highest illegal alien activity,

 increase the time Border Patrol agents spend on border- control
activities,

 make maximum use of physical barriers, and

 identify the appropriate quantity and mix of technology and
personnel needed to control the border.

To complement the Border Patrol's efforts, the strategy called for
INS Inspections to enhance efforts to deter illegal entry at the
ports of entry and increase the use of technology to improve
management of legal traffic and commerce.

3 Building A Comprehensive Southwest Border Enforcement Strategy
(Washington, D. C.: Immigration and Naturalization Service, June
1996), p. 3. 4 Phases I, II, and III pertain to Border Patrol
sectors on the southwest border; phase IV pertains to all other
Border Patrol sectors. Background

B-281961 Page 4 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

INS' Border Patrol and Inspections are the two components chiefly
responsible for deterring illegal entry along the southwest
border. These two components represented 28 percent of INS' total
budget of $3.8 billion in fiscal year 1998. INS also provides
support for the strategy by allocating funds to other INS programs
for computer automation, technology procurement, construction of
facilities and barriers, and detention and removal of illegal
aliens.

INS' Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting
illegal entry along the border between the nation's ports of
entry. The Border Patrol is divided into 21 sectors, 9 of which
are along the southwest border. The Border Patrol's budget for
fiscal year 1998 was $877 million, a 20- percent increase over its
fiscal year 1997 budget of $730 million. As of September 1998,
there were about 8, 000 Border Patrol agents nationwide. About
7,400, or 93 percent, were located in the 9 sectors along the
southwest border. (App. I contains detailed staffing and selected
workload data for the Border Patrol.)

INS Inspections and the U. S. Customs Service 5 share
responsibility for inspecting all applicants seeking admission at
U. S. ports of entry. Among other things, these inspections are to
prevent the entry of inadmissible applicants by detecting
fraudulent documents, including those representing false claims to
U. S. citizenship or permanent residence status. INS' Inspections
fiscal year 1998 budget for land- border inspections was about
$171 million, a 12- percent increase over its fiscal year 1997
budget of about $152 million. As of September 30, 1998,
Inspections had about 2,000 inspectors at land ports of entry
nationwide, of which about 1,500 were located at the southwest
border land ports of entry. In fiscal year 1998, INS and Customs
inspectors along the southwest border inspected about 303 million
people, including 213 million-- or 70 percent-- who were aliens,
and 90 million-- or 30 percent-- who were U. S. citizens. (App. I
contains detailed staffing and selected workload data for INS
Inspections.)

To determine the progress made in implementing the strategy during
fiscal year 1998, we (1) analyzed INS staff allocations to
determine if they were consistent with its strategy, (2) reviewed
INS performance reviews of its fiscal year 1998 Priorities and
Performance Management Plan, (3) analyzed INS' budget and Border
Patrol and Inspections workload data, and (4) interviewed INS
Border Patrol and Inspections headquarters officials.

5 INS and Customs inspectors perform inspections at the primary
inspection booths at land ports of entry. INS and Customs
inspectors are cross- trained and cross- designated to carry out
both agencies' inspection responsibilities at U. S. land ports of
entry. Scope and

Methodology

B-281961 Page 5 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Also, we reviewed a study commissioned by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which estimated the number of Border
Patrol agents needed to control the southwest border. In addition,
we reviewed a Department of Justice Office of Inspector General's
(OIG) report on INS' implementation of its automated biometrics
identification system (IDENT) along the southwest border.

To determine the strategy's interim effects, we analyzed INS data
on apprehensions made along the southwest border and the number of
persons apprehended while attempting to enter the United States
illegally at the southwest border land ports of entry. We also
reviewed sections from INS' performance reviews of its fiscal year
1998 Priorities and Performance Management Plan that reported on
the strategy's interim effects.

To determine what actions have been taken to implement our
recommendation that INS develop and implement a comprehensive
evaluation of the strategy, we obtained written comments on INS'
evaluation plans from INS' Executive Associate Commissioner for
Policy and Planning; and we discussed the comments with an
official from INS' Office of Policy and Planning.

We did not independently verify the validity of INS computer-
generated workload or apprehensions data. However, as we did for
our first report, 6 we discussed with INS officials their data
validation efforts. These officials were confident that the data
could be used to accurately portray trends over time.

We conducted our work between August 1998 and February 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the
Attorney General. The Attorney General did not provide comments
but instead requested INS to respond to our request. INS' oral
comments are discussed on page 28.

During fiscal year 1998, INS continued to make progress toward
implementing the Attorney General's strategy. As called for in the
strategy, INS allocated its new Border Patrol agent positions
according to its fourphased approach and increased the amount of
time agents spent on border enforcement activities. INS
constructed additional fencing along the southwest border and
continued to deploy technologies such as night

6 GAO/GGD-98-21, p. 10. INS Continued to

Implement the Attorney General's Strategy

B-281961 Page 6 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

vision devices and remote video surveillance systems. Further, INS
was testing a computer model designed to determine the appropriate
mix of staffing, equipment, and technology in Border Patrol
sectors.

During fiscal year 1998, INS completed phase I of its strategy,
which called for concentrating resources in the San Diego, CA, and
El Paso, TX, sectors, and transitioned to phase II, which called
for increasing resources in the Tucson, AZ, sector and three
sectors in south Texas Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen, according to
INS officials. Consistent with the strategy, INS allocated 740 (74
percent) of the additional 1, 000 Border Patrol agent positions
authorized in fiscal year 1998 to phase II sectors in Arizona and
Texas.

The strategy was designed to allow for flexibility in responding
to unexpected changes in the illegal immigration flow. To address
an increase in the number of apprehensions of illegal aliens in
the El Centro, CA; Yuma, AZ; and Marfa, TX, sectors, INS allocated
215 agents authorized in fiscal year 1998 to these sectors, even
though these sectors were not originally scheduled to receive
resources until phase III of the strategy.

As a result of these and previous staff increases, the number of
agents along the southwest border increased from 3,389 as of
October 1993 to 6,315 as of September 1997 to 7,357 as of
September 1998, an increase of 117 percent between October 1993
and September 1998. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the increase in the
number of agents in sectors along the southwest border during this
period. New Agents Allocated

According to Strategy

B-281961 Page 7 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

Figure 1: Number of On- Board Border Patrol Agents Increased in
Phase I Sectors Between October 1993 and September 1998

B-281961 Page 8 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

Figure 2: Number of On- Board Border Patrol Agents Increased in
Phase II Sectors Between October 1993 and September 1998

B-281961 Page 9 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

To accommodate the increased number of Border Patrol staff, INS
budgeted almost $29 million in fiscal year 1998 for the expansion
and replacement of older Border Patrol facilities. INS' hiring of
Border Patrol agents is slowing, despite congressional direction
that INS continue hiring and a study that estimated that the
Border Patrol may need substantially more agents along the
southwest border. The 1996 Act 7 states that the Border Patrol
shall hire 1,000 agents each year for fiscal years 1997 through
2001. In addition, a study commissioned by ONDCP estimated that
the Border Patrol would need about 16,100 agents in the 9
southwest border sectors to control and deter unauthorized
crossings. 8 This number 7 P. L. 104- 208, sec. 101. 8 F. Bean, R.
Capps, and C. W. Haynes, An Estimate of the Number of Border
Patrol Personnel Necessary to Control the Southwest Border
(Austin, TX: Center for U. S.- Mexico Border and Migration
Research, University of Texas), July 1998.

Figure 3: Number of On- Board Border Patrol Agents Increased in
Phase III Sectors Between October 1993 and September 1998

B-281961 Page 10 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

is more than twice the 7,357 agents on board along the southwest
border as of September 1998.

INS does not expect to meet Congress' requirement that it hire
1,000 Border Patrol agents each year. INS brought on board 449 new
Border Patrol agents between the end of September 1998 and the
middle of March 1999. However, INS lost 377 agents during the same
time period, resulting in a net gain of 72 agents. An INS
headquarters official said that INS expects to fall short of its
fiscal year 1999 Border Patrol agent hiring goal by 600 to 800
agents. In addition, the administration's fiscal year 2000 budget
does not request any additional Border Patrol agent positions. In
March 1999, the INS Commissioner testified 9 that nearly 48
percent of the Border Patrol agents had less than 3 years of
experience, and law enforcement experts had indicated that it is
risky to allow an agency's overall ratio of inexperienced to
experienced officers to exceed 30 percent. Also, according to an
INS official, INS lacks adequate facilities to support the
increased number of agents along the southwest border. Therefore,
according to INS, maintaining staffing at the fiscal year 1999
level will give INS time to develop more experienced agents and
allow INS to allocate the funds it needs to improve facilities.

The strategy also called for the Border Patrol to increase the
amount of time agents spend on border enforcement activities, as
opposed to program support activities-- such as processing aliens
who have been apprehended supervision, and training. During fiscal
year 1998, agents in the nine sectors along the southwest border
collectively spent 66 percent of their total time on border
enforcement activities, 6 percent more than the 60 percent spent
in fiscal year 1997.

Due to the increase in the number of on- board agents, INS also
has increased the total amount of time agents spend on border
enforcement activities. The fiscal year 1998 Priorities
Implementation Plan set a goal that 8.1 million hours nationwide
should be devoted to border enforcement activities. 10 According
to INS data, the Border Patrol spent about 9 million hours on
border enforcement in fiscal year 1998, exceeding its goal by
about 11 percent and representing a 32 percent increase over the
6. 8 million hours spent on border enforcement in fiscal year
1997.

9 Testimony of Commissioner Doris Meissner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service Concerning the President's FY 2000 Budget
Request before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Commerce, State, and the Judiciary, United States Senate, March
16, 1999.

10 Border enforcement operations include activities such as,
patrolling the immediate border areas, examining vehicles at
traffic checkpoints, and boat and air patrol. Amount of Time Spent
on

Border Enforcement Activities Has Increased

B-281961 Page 11 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

The strategy called for maximum utilization of lighting, fencing,
and other barriers to deter illegal entry. In our 1997 report, 11
we stated that as of July 1997, INS had about 46 miles of fencing
in place and another 23 miles under construction. A Border Patrol
official told us that between August 1997 and September 1998, INS
constructed about 18 miles of fencing in the Yuma, Tucson, and San
Diego sectors. 12 INS also built barriers between the ports of
entry to prevent vehicles from driving across the border
illegally.

It is not clear how much additional fencing and other barriers INS
plans to build. The House report accompanying INS' fiscal year
1999 appropriations 13 required INS to prepare a report by
November 15, 1998, on its plans for road and fencing improvements
along the New Mexico border. INS reported to Congress on February
12, 1999, 14 that it is developing initial assessments of border
fence and road improvements for New Mexico and other border areas
for archaeological and other environmental considerations. INS
expects to complete these assessments in the summer of 1999. 15
According to an INS headquarters official, the final report will
include an integrated plan for lighting and technology in urban
corridors along the southwest border and will be phased in over a
3 to 5 year period. Two specific border projects are currently
scheduled for fiscal year 1999 in New Mexico. Both projects were
funded with military engineering support funds. 16

With respect to automation and technology, INS received $47
million in fiscal year 1998 for increases in these areas at the
border. 17 Of these funds,

11 GAO/GGD-98-21. 12 The San Diego sector built 9 miles of fencing
(including 3 miles of secondary fencing), Tucson built 5 miles,
and Yuma built 4 miles. 13 H. R. 105- 636 at 34 (1998).

14 According to an INS official, INS was granted an extension to
February l5, 1999. 15 INS is performing these assessments as part
of an update to a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement done
in 1994 for projects along the entire southwest border, in order
to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.

16 Department of Defense (DOD) engineers provide engineering and
construction services to construct roads and fences along U. S.
borders as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991, sec. 1004. DOD assistance is provided to
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, such as the
Border Patrol, which may request assistance in controlling the
flow of illegal drugs across the southwest border.

17 The House report accompanying INS' fiscal year 1999
appropriations required INS to develop and submit a plan by
December 1, 1998, on its long- term modernization plan for the
development, testing, and deployment of all current technologies,
as well as any other additional technologies that the INS is
pursuing. The report also directed that this plan address INS's
plans to train Border Patrol agents in New Barriers and

Technology Deployed Along the Border

B-281961 Page 12 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

INS spent $16.2 million to expand IDENT 18 and ENFORCE, 19 systems
designed to track and identify illegal crossers and criminal
aliens, $7.5 million to purchase 26 remote video surveillance
systems, $3 million to upgrade its integrated sensor and mapping
system, and $1 million to purchase additional sensors.

INS also used its automation and technology funds for the Border
Patrol to initiate, along with the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) project. The goal of the
GIS project is to develop a computerized mapping system for the
Border Patrol nationwide, 20 adapting technology originally
designed for military use. The Border Patrol anticipates that GIS
will be used for such purposes as (1) displaying where
apprehensions are made, (2) displaying where agents or ground
sensors are deployed, (3) analyzing intelligence data, and (4)
displaying the terrain agents will be patrolling to help ensure
officer safety. The first of three phases of GIS developing system
requirements began in January 1999 at a cost of $800,000.

To identify the appropriate quantity and mix of personnel,
equipment, and technology needed to control the border, in January
1999, INS headquarters was testing a Resource and Effectiveness
Model designed to measure how changes in resources affect the
Border Patrol's effectiveness in apprehending illegal aliens and
seizing narcotics. In fiscal years 1997 and 1998, INS spent
approximately $1.37 million on contractor costs to develop the
computer model, according to a Border Patrol official. At the time
of our review, the model was not yet operational in any of the
southwest border sectors. The Border Patrol official stated that
INS plans to issue another contract to deploy the model to sectors
at a cost of $700,000 in fiscal year 1999.

the use of these technologies and how current operational doctrine
would need to be adjusted to effectively utilize the information
gathered with high technology systems (H. R. 105- 36 at 34). INS
submitted its report to Congress on February 19, 1999.

18 IDENT is an automated fingerprinting system that uses a
personal computer, camera, and single fingerprint scanner. IDENT
captures left and right index fingerprints, photographs, and basic
apprehension data for illegal aliens apprehended by INS.

19 ENFORCE is a computer- based system, which standardizes INS
processing forms into one centralized database. ENFORCE is
intended to provide the full range of case- tracking information
from arrest processing through deportation.

20 The Del Rio, Laredo, Tucson, and San Diego sectors developed
independent mapping applications, and did not use standardized
data or formats. The GIS project proposes to use field experiences
to develop a standardized nationwide system. INS Is Testing a
Model to

Help Identify Appropriate Resource Mix

B-281961 Page 13 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

The model uses data such as the number of apprehensions; the
amount of technology and equipment-- such as lighting, fencing,
and barriers-- used to deter and detect aliens; and the number of
agents. In addition, the model is to include an estimate of the
number of aliens who eluded INS apprehension. The model is
designed to help identify the appropriate mix of personnel and
technology by measuring the impact that any changes in either of
these factors would have on the level of effectiveness, with
effectiveness defined as the proportion of the estimated number of
illegal aliens who had entered the United States and were
apprehended.

We did not review the model; therefore, we cannot assess how well
it is likely to measure the Border Patrol's effectiveness.
However, one of the factors in the model-- an estimate of the
number of aliens who eluded apprehension-- historically has not
been amenable to reliable measurement.

The strategy postulated that increased enforcement between the
ports of entry would cause an increase in port- of- entry
activity, including increased attempts to enter through fraudulent
means. Since March 1997, INS added 179 inspectors to ports along
the southwest border to handle this anticipated increased
activity, bringing its inspector staffing level to 1,454 as of
September 1998, just short of the 1,485 inspectors that were
authorized. These land ports of entry are under the jurisdiction
of five INS district offices located along the southwest border.
(See fig. 4 for the number of inspectors in southwest border
districts.) Inspections Activities

Continued to Support Strategy

B-281961 Page 14 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

According to an INS official, during fiscal year 1997, INS and
Customs officials began discussing the level of staffing necessary
to conduct primary inspections along the southwest border. As of
April 1999, no staffing decisions had been made. Consequently, INS
did not request any additional southwest land- border inspector
positions in its fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budgets.

According to INS' fiscal year 1998 review of its Priorities and
Performance Management Plan, at land- border crossings, INS
Inspections has concentrated on increasing the use of technology
to facilitate the entry of

Figure 4: Number of On- Board Inspectors Increased at Land Ports
of Entry in INS District Offices Along the Southwest Border
Between September 1994 and September 1998

B-281961 Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

legal traffic into the United States. One such effort has been the
construction of dedicated commuter lanes that use technology to
automatically identify vehicles and validate the identity of
occupants who have passed a preclearance process. 21 The goal of
the dedicated commuter lanes is to reduce the time it takes to
complete an inspection at ports of entry by segregating high
frequency, low- risk, prescreened travelers from other traffic.
Construction delays prevented INS from adding two dedicated
commuter lanes at the San Ysidro, CA, port of entry as originally
planned. INS plans to complete these two lanes and a new lane in
El Paso, TX, during fiscal year 1999. 22

To increase enforcement efforts, southwest border ports continued
activities such as using joint enforcement teams to inspect
travelers and conducting multiagency cross- training, according to
INS reports.

To improve its effectiveness in deterring illegal entry, in July
and August 1998, INS conducted a 2- month test of the Inspections
Travelers' Examinations (INTEX) process. INTEX consists of
reinspecting a randomly selected number of travelers to determine
if the primary inspector made the correct decision. 23 The INTEX
test included 10 air and 10 land ports of entry. Of the 3,511
travelers inspected during the INTEX test, 3,452 people, or 98
percent, were correctly admitted into the United States by the
primary inspector. Primary inspectors incorrectly admitted 59
people or about 2 percent. According to an INS official, while the
preliminary INTEX test was satisfactory, the sample was too small
for INS to be able to project the results to the universe of
nearly 500 million inspections INS conducts yearly.

By the end of fiscal year 1999, INS plans to have conducted enough
random inspections to be able to project the results. Contingent
on INS' appropriations, INS plans to expand INTEX to 65 additional
ports in fiscal year 2000, bring the total number of ports using
INTEX to 85 ports. INTEX is to be used to suggest how the
inspection process can be improved as well as help INS comply with
the Government Performance and Results

21 The Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid Inspection
(SENTRI) program is an interagency initiative that uses automated
technology to process individuals who have been prescreened for
the program. The automated photo identification and card system is
designed to allow registered vehicles and occupants to pass
through the port of entry quickly.

22 A dedicated commuter lane is operational in the Otay Mesa port
of entry in the San Diego sector. 23 A primary inspector can
either admit the traveler or refer the traveler to secondary,
where other inspectors conduct a more detailed inspection.

B-281961 Page 16 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Act of 1993, 24 which requires agencies to establish systems for
measuring program performance.

As the strategy along the southwest border is carried out, the
Attorney General has anticipated the following interim effects:
(1) an initial increase in the number of illegal aliens
apprehended in locations receiving an infusion of Border Patrol
resources, followed by a decrease in apprehensions; (2) a shift in
the flow of illegal alien traffic from sectors that traditionally
accounted for most illegal immigration to other sectors; (3)
increased attempts by aliens to enter the United States illegally
at the ports of entry; (4) increased fees charged by alien
smugglers and the use of more sophisticated smuggling tactics; (5)
an eventual decrease in attempted reentries by illegal aliens who
previously have been apprehended; and (6) reduced violence at the
border.

Although evaluative data continue to be limited, available data
indicated that some of the anticipated effects continued to occur
since our last report. INS' apprehension data indicated a
continued shift in illegal alien traffic from traditionally high
illegal entry points to other areas as INS resources were deployed
according to the planned approach. Such shifts in apprehensions
have been associated with a change in the causes and locations of
alien deaths along the border, leading INS to initiate a Border
Safety Initiative in cooperation with the Mexican government.
Inspectors at southwest border ports of entry apprehended an
increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry and,
according to an INS report, smugglers in the Tucson sector were
charging higher fees.

However, data are inconclusive or lacking on certain key aspects
of the strategy. For example, INS has not analyzed data on whether
the strategy's prediction of an initial increase in apprehensions
followed by a decrease, as resources are applied, has occurred in
sectors receiving resources in phase II of the strategy. Further,
data were unavailable on whether there has been a decrease in
attempted reentries made by illegal aliens who previously have
been apprehended. In addition, crime data being collected do not
appear to be useful for gauging the strategy's impact on reducing
border violence.

24 P. L. 103- 62 (1993). Interim Effects of the

Strategy

B-281961 Page 17 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

The strategy anticipated an initial increase in the number of
apprehensions of illegal aliens in locations that had received an
infusion of Border Patrol resources, followed by a decrease in the
number of apprehensions when a decisive level of resources had
been achieved, indicating that illegal aliens were being deterred
from entering. INS had not defined the criteria for achieving a
decisive level of resources in a particular area, so the timing of
such changes in apprehension levels remains unclear. In addition,
INS had not analyzed apprehension data over time to determine if
the predicted pattern of increases followed by decreases had
occurred in the phase II sectors that received resources in fiscal
year 1998.

Figures 5 through 7 present data on apprehensions by Border Patrol
sector and strategy phase. It is difficult to determine the
meaning of these numbers at this time, because INS is still
implementing phase II of the strategy. Apprehension levels in
fiscal years 1997 and 1998 in the two phase I sectors (San Diego
and El Paso) were considerably lower than they were in fiscal year
1993. (See fig. 5.) Changes in Illegal Alien

Apprehensions

B-281961 Page 18 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

In two of the phase II sectors (Tucson and Del Rio), apprehension
levels increased in both fiscal years 1997 and 1998. In the other
two phase II sectors (Laredo and McAllen), apprehension levels
increased between fiscal years 1993 and 1997, then decreased in
fiscal year 1998. However in fiscal year 1998, apprehension levels
in these two sectors were still higher than in fiscal year 1993.
(See fig. 6.)

Figure 5: Number of Apprehensions Decreased in Phase I Border
Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and 1998

B-281961 Page 19 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

In two of the three phase III sectors (El Centro and Yuma),
apprehension levels increased in both fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
as compared with fiscal year 1993, whereas in Marfa apprehension
levels have remained relatively constant during these 3 years.
(See fig. 7.)

Figure 6: Number of Apprehensions Increased in Phase II Border
Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and 1998

B-281961 Page 20 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

The strategy also anticipated a shift in the flow of illegal alien
traffic from sectors that had traditionally accounted for most
illegal immigration activity to other sectors as well as shifts
within sectors from urban areas, where the enforcement posture is
greater, to rural areas. Our analysis of INS apprehension data
indicated, since our previous report, that such a shift continued
to occur. We found that apprehensions in San Diego and El Paso
sectors that had traditionally accounted for the most illegal
alien traffic decreased 9 percent, from 408,265 apprehensions in
fiscal year 1997 to 373,127 apprehensions in fiscal year 1998. As
a percentage of all southwest border apprehensions, apprehensions
in El Paso and San Diego decreased from 68 percent in fiscal year
1993 to 30 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 24 percent in fiscal
year 1998. (See fig. 8.)

Figure 7: Number of Apprehensions Increased in Two of Three Phase
III Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and 1998

Shift in Illegal Alien Apprehensions

B-281961 Page 21 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

a Other sectors include El Centro, Yuma, Tuscon, Marfa, Del Rio,
Laredo, and McAllen. Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

The percentage of southwest border apprehensions increased
significantly in some sectors. For example, the Tucson sector's
percentage of all southwest border apprehensions increased from 8
percent in fiscal year 1993 to 26 percent in fiscal year 1998.
Similarly, the percentage in the El Centro sector, east of San
Diego, increased from 2 percent of all southwest border
apprehensions to 15 percent over the same time period.

Some data indicated that preventing illegal entry in certain
traditional entry points along the southwest border and shifting
illegal alien traffic to areas that are more remote and difficult
to cross has resulted in an unanticipated effect-- that is, a
change in the causes and locations of the deaths of some illegal
aliens who attempt to cross the border at these remote border
areas. A 1998 University of Houston study estimated the number of
undocumented migrant deaths at more than 1,600 between 1993

Figure 8: Percentage of Southwest Border Apprehensions Decreased
in San Diego and El Paso Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal
Years 1993 and 1998

B-281961 Page 22 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

and 1997. 25 Although the study did not find that the overall
number of migrant deaths had increased significantly over the 5-
year period, it concluded that the causes and locations of the
deaths had changed markedly. Death from environmental causes, such
as hypothermia and dehydration, increased in California and Texas,
as did deaths from drowning in the All- American Canal in Imperial
County, CA. Deaths from automobile/ pedestrian accidents,
homicides, and drowning in the San Diego area decreased.

According to INS officials, reports of migrant deaths prompted the
INS Commissioner to announce, in June 1998, a Border Safety
Initiative designed to reduce injuries and prevent fatalities
along the southwest border. INS developed the initiative in
cooperation with the Mexican government and state and local
officials in border communities to (1) prevent deaths and injuries
by informing and warning potential illegal aliens of the realities
and dangers of crossing the border at particular routes, (2)
target search and rescue operations in hazardous areas, and (3)
establish procedures and resources to help local officials
identify the bodies of persons who have died while attempting to
cross the border.

INS developed a methodology to track migrant deaths in 40 counties
that are contiguous to the border or have historically been known
for migrant deaths due to routes of travel and environmental
conditions. INS estimated that 254 migrants died while trying to
cross the border in fiscal year 1998. INS was also developing a
model to track Border Patrol rescues along the border, beginning
in fiscal year 1999.

The strategy postulated that there would be increased attempts by
illegal aliens to enter the United States illegally at the ports
of entry as it became more difficult to enter between the ports.
No direct indicators of the number of illegal entry attempts
currently exist. However, land ports of entry along the southwest
border experienced a 17- percent increase in the number of
fraudulent documents intercepted, from 70,155 in fiscal year 1997
to 82,101 in fiscal year 1998. These ports of entry also had a 4-
percent increase in the number of false claims to United States
citizenship, from 19,667 in fiscal year 1997 to 20,496 in fiscal
year 1998. It is difficult to determine whether the increases in
the number of fraudulent documents intercepted and false claims to
U. S. citizenship were a result of actual increases in illegal
entry attempts at the ports and/ or a result of greater efforts
made to detect fraud.

25 K. Eschbach, J. Hagan, N. Rodriguez, R. Hernandez- Leon, and S.
Bailey, Death at the Border (Houston: Center for Immigration
Research, University of Houston), October 1998. Increases in
Fraudulent

Entries

B-281961 Page 23 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

As it became more difficult to cross the border illegally, INS
anticipated an increase in fees charged by alien smugglers and the
use of more sophisticated smuggling tactics. There is some
evidence that these interim effects have occurred. For example, a
January 1999 report by the Tucson Border Patrol sector indicates
the cost of smuggling and the sophistication of smuggling
techniques through that sector increased. 26 According to this
report, based on interviews with apprehended illegal aliens
conducted by personnel from Tucson's Anti- Smuggling Unit, the
cost of being smuggled from the border to the interior of the
United States had increased. For example, the cost of being
smuggled 1, 000 miles reportedly increased from about $1,000 in
fiscal year 1996 to an estimated $1, 350 in fiscal year 1998. At
the same time, the Tucson report also stated that alien smugglers
were using more sophisticated smuggling tactics. The report
attributed these changes to the increase in Tucson sector
personnel that resulted from the implementation of the border
strategy.

Currently, INS is expanding data collection on smuggling fees
across the entire southwest border. In fiscal year 1998, the El
Paso Intelligence Center 27 collected baseline data for a 2- month
period, on fees charged for smuggling Central American and Mexican
aliens from the southwest border to secondary staging areas and
final destination points or work locations. A summary of the
findings in INS' fiscal year 1998 Priorities and Performance
Management Plan review stated that smuggling fees from border
areas to various cities in the interior of the United States, such
as New York and Los Angeles, ranged from $600 to $1,200. Although
the review stated that the quantity and quality of the data were
not comprehensive, 28 INS intends to refine its data collection
efforts in fiscal year 1999. INS officials also cited concerns
that INS' collection and analysis of intelligence data on alien
smuggling is limited because some INS offices do not have full-
time intelligence officers.

The strategy postulated that there would be a decrease in
recidivism-- that is, in attempted reentries by illegal aliens who
previously had been apprehended-- as control was gained in
particular locations. According to INS, this would be an indicator
that the strategy was deterring illegal alien

26 Managing the U. S. Attorney General's Strategy for Controlling
Illegal Immigration in the Tucson Sector Area of Operations
(Tucson, AZ: Tucson Sector Strategy Response to the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA)), January 1999.

27 The El Paso Intelligence Center is responsible for collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information related to
drug, alien, and weapons smuggling. 28 Fiscal Year 1998 Fourth
Quarter Performance Review: Border Enforcement (Washington, D. C.:
U. S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service), December 1998, p. 7. Some Evidence of Increased

Smuggling Fees INS Beginning to Measure Attempted Reentries

B-281961 Page 24 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

entry. INS planned to use IDENT, its automated fingerprinting
system, to identify recidivists and analyze their crossing
patterns along the southwest border.

In our 1997 report, we stated that computer problems had affected
the usefulness of IDENT data and INS' ability to track recidivism
over several years. 29 At that time, INS officials told us that
although IDENT data gathered since January 1996 were reliable and
accurate, they had not done any analysis to examine trends in
recidivism.

In April 1999, INS officials told us that since IDENT began as a
prototype in October 1994, several modifications have been made to
the system's hardware and software, which have resulted in
improved matching and data accuracy. In addition, the proportion
of apprehended aliens enrolled in IDENT has been increasing as
more Border Patrol sectors have begun using IDENT. For example,
during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998, 85 percent of the
illegal aliens apprehended by southwest border sectors were
enrolled in the IDENT system compared with 56 percent during the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 1997.

As a result, INS determined that IDENT data beginning in October
1997 were sufficiently complete and reliable for internal
analysis. INS officials said that, as of April 1999, INS'
Statistics Branch was analyzing this more recent IDENT data. An
INS official stated that the contractor currently evaluating the
southwest border strategy for INS (see page 26 for a discussion of
this evaluation) is also using recent IDENT data as part of its
report.

Data continue to be limited on the strategy's effects on
decreasing attempted reentries by illegal aliens. A March 1998
review of IDENT implementation on the southwest border by
Justice's OIG found that less than two- thirds of apprehended
illegal aliens were being enrolled in IDENT. 30 The OIG reported
that, although IDENT and related biometrics technologies could be
useful in many INS operations, INS is not yet making consistent
and effective use of IDENT as a tool for border enforcement. The
report said that (1) not all apprehended aliens were enrolled in
IDENT, (2) INS was not entering the fingerprints of all deported

29 GAO/GGD-98-21, p. 43. 30 Review of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT) (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Justice Office of
the Inspector General, Inspections Division, Report No. I- 98-
10), March 1998.

B-281961 Page 25 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

aliens and known criminal aliens into the IDENT lookout database,
31 and (3) INS needed to coordinate with the U. S. Attorneys for
each district along the southwest border to establish a border
enforcement and prosecution strategy that takes advantage of
IDENT. The report also noted that there were virtually no controls
in place to ensure the quality of the data entered into the IDENT
lookout database."

In March 1999, an official with the Justice OIG told us that INS
had satisfactorily responded to most of the report's
recommendations. For example, INS was entering a greater
proportion of apprehended aliens into IDENT. To ensure deported
and criminal aliens were in IDENT, INS established new procedures
and criteria for placing individuals in the IDENT lookout
database. INS instructed Border Patrol Sector chiefs to initiate
contact with their local U. S. Attorney to inform them about the
usefulness of IDENT in prosecuting recidivists and alien
smugglers. Lastly, according to this official, INS added
additional data integrity checks to ensure the accuracy of data
entered into IDENT.

INS plans to deploy IDENT systems nationwide. According to INS'
fiscal year 1998 Priorities and Performance Management Plan
review, INS deployed IDENT at 194 additional locations in fiscal
year 1998, exceeding its goal of 100 locations and bringing the
total IDENT locations nationwide to 370. However, the use of IDENT
has been uneven at these locations. During fiscal year 1998, the
percentage of apprehended aliens enrolled in the IDENT system at
locations nationwide varied from 17 to 90 percent, with an average
of 85 percent, just short of INS' targeted goal of 88 percent.
Until IDENT is fully implemented, INS will not have complete
estimates of the number of attempted reentries.

The strategy anticipated a reduction in border violence as border
control was achieved. INS officials told us that they anticipated
that crime would decline in sections of the border where INS
invested more enforcement resources. However, INS does not have
data that would reliably measure the impact of the strategy's
implementation on border crime.

31 According to the March 1998 OIG review of IDENT implementation,
INS' lookout database contains information on deported and
criminal aliens. Fingerprints for these aliens are entered in the
lookout database at a central location in Washington, D. C., from
10- print cards sent by INS offices around the country. Index
fingerprints, photographs, and basic text information are scanned
and retyped from the 10- print cards to create individual lookout
records in the database. At the time of the OIG's review, INS had
entered the fingerprints of 41 percent of the aliens deported and
excluded in fiscal year 1996 in the IDENT lookout database; 24
percent of the fingerprint records in the IDENT lookout database
were accompanied by the aliens' photograph. Strategy's Effects on
Border

Violence Remains Unknown

B-281961 Page 26 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

During the first half of fiscal year 1998, the Border Patrol began
contacting local law enforcement agencies in certain southern
border locations 32 to collect crime statistics to determine the
impact that the national border control strategy has made on crime
in target cities. The crime statistics from these locations
identify crimes committed such as homicide, rape, robbery,
burglary but not persons arrested or their immigration status. In
its fourth quarter report on the 1998 Priorities, INS raised
concerns about using these data as a measure of effectiveness
because it could not determine the extent to which illegal aliens
accounted for violent crimes along the border.

Although the interim results of the strategy indicate that the
strategy to date has made certain areas of the southwest border
more difficult to breach, large numbers of illegal aliens continue
to make their way into the United States. Given the intractability
of the problem and the billions of dollars invested in border-
control measures, it is important for INS to assess which aspects
of the strategy are most effective. Similarly, if the strategy's
goals are not being achieved, INS should determine the reasons
they are not. Thus, in our 1997 report 33 we recommended that the
Attorney General develop and implement a plan for a formal, cost-
effective, systematic evaluation of the strategy.

Pursuant to our recommendation, INS entered into agreements in
September 1998 with three independent contractors to provide
evaluative studies. The Executive Associate Commissioner for
Policy and Planning wrote us that these agreements will enable INS
to develop a southwest border strategy evaluation and to initiate
the analysis that fulfills these evaluation plans.

INS contracted with Advancia Corporation of Lawton, OK, to (1)
design an evaluation strategy, (2) identify data needs and
analytical approaches, and (3) conduct a study of the southwest
border strategy. The contract is in the amount of $340, 000 and
the final report is due May 1, 1999. In April 1999, an official
with INS' Office of Policy and Planning said that the contractor
was developing a formal analysis plan intended to assess the
effectiveness of the southwest border strategy to date, as well as
an evaluation design and analysis plan for continuing evaluation
of the strategy. These results would, in part, be used to provide
a baseline for future evaluation of the strategy.

32 Locations include San Diego East County and Calexico, CA; Yuma,
Nogales, and Douglas, AZ; and El Paso, Laredo, and Brownsville,
TX. 33 GAO/GGD-98-21. INS Is Responding to

Our Recommendation

B-281961 Page 27 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

INS also contracted for $200,000 with CNA Corporation in
Alexandria, VA, to study how illegal migration and alien and drug
smuggling in the Caribbean affect the southern coast of the United
States, including Puerto Rico. A final report on this project is
due August 1, 1999. An additional contract for $60,000 was made
with San Diego Dialogue, of the University of California, San
Diego, to study issues related to the ports of entry. At the time
of our review, this study was still under way. INS could provide
us with no other information on the contractors' progress.

INS continued in fiscal year 1998 to implement its 1994 strategy
by allocating additional personnel in accordance with the
strategy, increasing the time Border Patrol agents spend on border
enforcement activities, and attempting to identify the appropriate
quantity and mix of technology and personnel needed to control the
border.

Data on the interim effects of the Attorney General's strategy
along the southwest border continue to be limited. The available
data indicated that some of the changes anticipated by the
strategy have occurred. For example, traditional routes of entry
for illegal immigration, such as San Diego and El Paso, have shown
significant declines in illegal alien apprehensions, while
apprehensions in other areas have increased. While it does not
appear that there has been an increase in the overall number of
undocumented migrant deaths, some evidence exists that deaths
resulting from attempted crossings in remote areas are increasing,
which is an unintended consequence of the strategy. In addition,
there is some evidence of increases in the number of attempted
illegal entries at the ports of entry and increased smuggling
fees. However, data are still lacking on some key aspects of the
strategy, including the impact of the strategy on reducing
attempted reentries of illegal aliens and reducing crime in border
cities.

As we recommended in our 1997 report, 34 a comprehensive and
systematic evaluation of the border strategy would go a long way
towards providing information about the effectiveness of the
strategy in reducing and deterring illegal entry. The evaluation
studies that INS is funding, and INS' plans to use findings from
these studies as a baseline for future evaluation, could
potentially begin to provide such needed information. However,
information on these studies was too limited at this stage for us
to assess

34 GAO/GGD-98-21. Conclusions

*** End of document. ***