Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related
Employee Corruption (Chapter Report, 03/30/99, GAO/GGD-99-31).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service's efforts to
address employee corruption on the Southwest Border, focusing on: (1)
the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with policies and
procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) identifying and
comparing the Department of Justice's (DOJ) and Department of the
Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for
handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct and whether the
policies and procedures are followed; (3) the types of illegal
drug-related activities in which INS and Customs employees on the
Southwest Border have been involved; and (4) the extent to which lessons
learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997
have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the
drug-related corruption of INS and Customs employees.

GAO noted that: (1) both INS and Customs have policies and procedures
designed to ensure the integrity of their employees; (2) however,
neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and
the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to fully address
the increased threat of employee corruption on the Southwest Border; (3)
these policies and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background
investigations for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees,
as well as basic integrity training; (4) while the agencies generally
completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their
first year on the job, as required, reinvestigations were typically
overdue, in some instances, by as many as 3 years; (5) both INS and
Customs said the basic training that new employees are to receive
includes integrity training; (6) agency records for 284 of 301 randomly
selected INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border showed that
they received several hours of integrity training as part of their basic
training; (7) DOJ and Treasury have different organizational structures
but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of
drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees; (8) DOJ's Office
of the Inspector General (OIG) is generally responsible for
investigating criminal allegations against INS employees; (9) GAO found
that the Justice OIG generally complies with its policies and
procedures; (10) at the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is
generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal
allegations against Customs employees; (11) GAO could not assess
Customs' compliance with its procedures because its automated case
management system and case files did not provide the necessary
information; (12) some INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border
have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities; (13) INS
and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and change their
policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of
their employees; (14) the Justice OIG and Customs' Internal Affairs
Office are required to formally report internal control weaknesses
identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so; and (15)
GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees assigned to
the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related crimes in
fiscal years 1992-1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were
not formally reported or corrected.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GGD-99-31
     TITLE:  Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent 
             Drug-Related Employee Corruption
      DATE:  03/30/99
   SUBJECT:  Smuggling
             Drug trafficking
             Internal controls
             Federal employees
             Personnel management
             Customs administration
             Ethical conduct
             Bribery

             
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gg99031 DRUG CONTROL INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics
Control


March 1999 

GAO/GGD-99-31

March 1999   GAO/GGD-99-31

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548

General Government Division

B-279226

Page 1 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

GAO March 30, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman,
Caucus on International

Narcotics Control United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman: The corruption of some INS and Customs
employees along the Southwest Border by persons involved in the
drug trade is a serious and continuing threat. The enormous sums
of money being generated by drug trafficking have increased the
threat for bribery. It is a challenge that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the U. S. Customs Service, and other
law enforcement agencies must overcome at the border.

This report responds to your request that we review INS' and
Customs' efforts to address employee corruption on the Southwest
Border. As agreed with you, our objectives were to (1) determine
the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with policies
and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) identify and
compare the Departments of Justice's and the Treasury's
organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling
allegations of drug- related employee misconduct and determine
whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) identify the
types of illegal drug- related activities in which INS and Customs
employees on the Southwest Border have been involved; and (4)
determine the extent to which lessons learned from corruption
cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes
in policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related
corruption of INS and Customs employees.

Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to
ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency
is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the
lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to fully
address the increased threat of employee corruption on the
Southwest Border. These policies and procedures consist mainly of
mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5- year
reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity
training. While the agencies generally completed background
investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the
job, as required, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some
instances, by as many as 3 years. Both INS and Customs said the
basic training that new employees are to receive includes
integrity training. Agency records for 284 of 301 randomly Results
in Brief

B-279286 Page 2 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

selected INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border showed
that they received several hours of integrity training as part of
their basic training.

The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have different
organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for
handling allegations of drug- related misconduct by INS and
Customs employees. At Justice, the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) is generally responsible for investigating criminal
allegations against INS employees. We found that the Justice OIG
generally complied with its policies and procedures for handling
allegations of drug- related misconduct. At the Treasury, Customs'
Office of Internal Affairs is generally responsible for
investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against
Customs employees. We could not assess Customs' compliance with
its procedures for handling allegations of drug- related
misconduct because its automated case management system and its
investigative case files did not provide the necessary
information.

Some INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have
engaged in a variety of illegal drug- related activities,
including waving drug loads through ports of entry, coordinating
the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting
drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, and
disclosing drug intelligence information.

INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and
change their policies and procedures for preventing the drug-
related corruption of their employees. The Justice OIG and
Customs' Office of Internal Affairs are required to formally
report internal control weaknesses identified from closed
corruption cases, but have not done so. Our review of 28 cases
involving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest
Border, who were convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years
1992 through 1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were
not formally reported and/ or corrected. 1 These weaknesses
included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection
lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not
recuse themselves from inspecting individuals with whom they had
close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel
were allowed to cross the Southwest Border or pass Border Patrol
checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs had not
formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their
effectiveness. For example, we determined that financial
information

1 In this report, if employees entered guilty pleas, we considered
them to have been convicted of the crime.

B-279286 Page 3 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

required for background investigations and reinvestigations was
either limited or not fully reviewed.

Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach,
CA, the Southwest Border has been a long- standing transit area
for illegal drugs entering the United States. According to the
Department of State, the Southwest Border is the principal transit
route for cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the
United States.

INS and Customs are principally responsible for stopping and
seizing illegal drug shipments across the Southwest Border. At the
ports of entry, about 1,300 INS and 2, 000 Customs inspectors are
to check incoming traffic to identify both persons and contraband
that are not allowed to enter the country. Between the ports of
entry and along thoroughfares in border areas, about 6,300 INS
Border Patrol agents are to detect and prevent the illegal entry
of persons and contraband.

The corruption of INS or Customs employees is not a new
phenomenon, and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on
ensuring employee integrity and preventing corruption. 2 A corrupt
INS or Customs employee at or between the ports of entry can help
facilitate the safe passage of illegal drug shipments. The
integrity policies and procedures adopted by INS and Customs are
designed to ensure that their employees, especially those in
positions that could affect the smuggling of illegal drugs into
the United States, are of acceptable integrity and, failing that,
to detect any corruption as quickly as possible.

Our report objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which
INS and Customs have and comply with policies and procedures for
ensuring employee integrity; (2) identify and compare the
Departments of Justice's and the Treasury's organizational
structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of
drug- related employee misconduct and determine whether the
policies and procedures are followed; (3) identify the types of
illegal drug- related activities in which INS and Customs
employees on the Southwest Border have been involved; and (4)
determine the extent to which lessons learned from corruption
cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes
in policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related
corruption of INS and Customs employees.

2 During the 1970s, the Justice Department conducted a
comprehensive investigation of corruption in INS called Operation
Clean Sweep. During the 1990s, the Customs Service's Blue Ribbon
Panel reviewed corruption on the Southwest Border. Background

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

B-279286 Page 4 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

We did our review in Washington, D. C., at the Department of
Justice's OIG, INS' Office of Internal Audit, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Department of the
Treasury's Customs Service, Office of Internal Affairs, and OIG.
We also visited and/ or obtained data from several offices with
Southwest Border responsibilities, including the El Paso and San
Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA, and Phoenix, AZ; INS district offices;
the El Paso, Laredo, TX, and San Diego Border Patrol Sector
offices; the Customs Management Centers (CMC) in El Paso, Laredo,
San Diego, and Tucson, AZ; and Justice OIG offices in El Paso,
McAllen, TX, Tucson, and San Diego.

To answer these objectives, we used various methods. We (1)
interviewed appropriate agency officials, (2) reviewed documents
containing relevant policies and procedures, (3) reviewed training
information for selected INS and Customs employees in the above
locations, (4) analyzed computerized personnel data on background
investigations and reinvestigations of selected inspectors and
agents in the above locations, (5) conducted structured file
reviews of drug- related allegation cases, and (6) reviewed the
case files for all INS and Customs Southwest Border employees who
were convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992
through 1997. For a more detailed discussion of our objectives,
scope, and methodology, see appendix I.

We performed our work from January through November 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. Comments from
Justice, Justice OIG, and Customs are summarized at the end of
this letter and are contained in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII.

While both INS and Customs had various integrity- related
procedures in place, their compliance with these procedures
varied. Like Justice's and Treasury's other federal law
enforcement agencies, both INS and Customs seek to ensure the
integrity of their personnel by conducting background
investigations and reinvestigations and requiring employees to
undergo basic integrity training. Both INS and Customs completed
nearly all background investigations for new hires by the end of
their first year on the job, as required. However,
reinvestigations required at 5- year intervals were typically
overdue, in some cases, by as many as 3 years. For the employee
files that we reviewed, INS and Customs generally complied with
procedures requiring new employees to receive basic integrity
training. Integrity training requirements vary among Justice and
Treasury agencies. For example, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration INS' And Customs'

Compliance With Their Integrity Procedures Varied

B-279286 Page 5 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

(DEA), and the Secret Service require employees to receive basic
and advanced 3 integrity training. INS and Customs provide basic
and advanced integrity training but do not require employees to
take the advanced training. According to the Justice OIG, INS, and
Customs officials, advanced integrity training reinforces the
integrity concepts presented during basic training. However, over
two- thirds of the INS and almost onequarter of the Customs
employees on the Southwest Border with anti- drug smuggling
responsibilities that we sampled did not elect to take advanced
integrity training during the almost 2  -year period we examined.

None of the five law enforcement agencies required all of their
field agents to file annual financial disclosure statements or to
relocate periodically for integrity assurance purposes. See
appendix II for a comparison of the integrity requirements for
INS, Customs, and other selected law enforcement agencies' field
agents.

INS and Customs follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
regulations, which require background investigations to be
completed for new hires by the end of their first year on the job.
Contractors performed the investigations on behalf of INS and
Customs, who made the final determinations on suitability.
Prospective employees provided background information and
authorization to obtain personal information to conduct the
investigation. Generally, the background investigations included a
credit check, criminal record check, contact with prior employers
and personal references, and an interview with the prospective
employee. Our review found that background investigations for over
99 percent of the immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents,
and Customs inspectors hired during the first half of fiscal year
1997 were completed by the end of their first year on the job. 4

OPM also requires immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents,
and Customs inspectors to be reinvestigated at 5- year intervals
from the date they enter on duty. The objective of these
reinvestigations is to ensure these employees' continuing
suitability for their positions. As with background
investigations, contractors did the reinvestigations and INS

3 For this report, advanced integrity training is any
nonmanagerial integrity training provided to employees following
their completion of basic training. 4 We restricted our analysis
of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents hired in fiscal
year 1997 to those hired by March 8, 1997, and of Customs
inspectors hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hired by March 25,
1997. This is because we received personnel data current as of
March 1998, the 1- year anniversaries of those dates, and because
OPM allows agencies to employ individuals in a subject to
investigation status for up to 1 year. A background investigation
should be completed during that time. INS and Customs Generally

Completed Background Investigations For New Hires On Time

INS and Customs Did Not Complete Most Reinvestigations When Due

B-279286 Page 6 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

and Customs were responsible for making the final determinations
on suitability. However, as shown in table 1, INS and Customs did
not complete reinvestigations within the required 5- year time
frame for over three- fourths of the selected Southwest Border
personnel scheduled for reinvestigations in fiscal years 1995
through 1997. In many instances, reinvestigations were more than 3
years overdue. To the extent that a reinvestigation constitutes an
important periodic check on an employee's continuing suitability
for employment in a position where he or she may be exposed to
bribery or other types of corruption, the continuing
reinvestigation backlogs at both agencies leave them more
vulnerable to potential employee corruption.

Reinvestigations Completed when due Not completed when due

Agency Required to be completed a Number Percent Number Percent

Needing to be completed as of

March 1998

INS 1, 218 280 23 938 77 513 Customs 782 161 21 621 79 421

a Includes reinvestigations due in fiscal years 1995 through 1997.
See appendix V for further detail on INS and Customs
reinvestigations. Source: GAO analysis of INS and Customs Service
data.

As of March 1998, INS had not yet completed 513 overdue
reinvestigations of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol
agents. According to the Justice OIG, INS' reinvestigation backlog
has been a continuing concern, and its neglect of reinvestigations
is historic. In a September 1995 report, the Justice OIG noted
that INS performed reinvestigations principally on individuals
with access to national security information. Generally, this
excluded INS inspectors and Border Patrol agents from
reinvestigation.

As of March 1998, Customs had a backlog of 421 overdue
reinvestigations. According to a Customs official, several factors
contributed to this backlog. First, when reinvestigations are
scheduled, employees are required to complete and return the forms
needed to initiate the reinvestigation to the Office of Internal
Affairs. However, the official said that inspectors had been lax
in returning required information to allow the reinvestigations to
proceed. According to another Customs official, Customs has
revised its procedure for initiating reinvestigations to require
concurrent notification of employees and their managers so that
managers can help ensure timely responses. Second, in 1989 and
1992, respectively, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)
legally challenged Customs' designation of sensitive positions
requiring reinvestigation and

Table1: INS and Customs Compliance With the 5- year
Reinvestigation Requirement for Selected Southwest Border
Personnel as of March 1998

B-279286 Page 7 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

the need for some medical, financial, or drug- related information
from certain employees. According to Customs and NTEU officials,
the litigation led Customs to temporarily suspend
reinvestigations. Third, Customs officials told us that they had
insufficient staff to complete the reinvestigations on time.

Newly hired immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and
Customs inspectors are required to attend basic training. As part
of their basic training, new employees are to receive training
courses on integrity concepts and expected behavior, including
ethical concepts and values, ethical dilemmas and decisionmaking,
and employee conduct expectations. This integrity training
provides the only required integrity training for all immigration
inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors. For
Border Patrol agents, 7 of 744 basic training hours are devoted to
integrity training. For Customs inspectors, 8 of 440 basic
training hours are devoted to integrity training. INS immigration
inspectors are to receive integrity training as part of their
basic training, but it is interspersed with other training rather
than provided as a separate course. Therefore, we could not
determine how many hours are devoted specifically to integrity
training.

We selected random samples of 100 immigration inspectors, 101
Border Patrol agents, and 100 Customs inspectors to determine
whether they received integrity training as part of their basic
training. Agency records we reviewed showed that 95 of 100
immigration inspectors, all 101 Border Patrol agents, and 88 of
100 Customs inspectors had received basic training. According to
INS and Customs officials, the remaining employees likely received
basic training, but it was not documented in their records.

Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials advocated advanced
integrity training for their employees to reinforce the integrity
concepts presented during basic training. The Justice OIG, INS'
Office of Internal Audit, and Customs provide advanced integrity
training for INS and Customs employees. For example, according to
officials from the Justice OIG, advanced integrity awareness
training was provided to 2,552 INS employees in fiscal year 1997.
In addition, officials from INS' Office of Internal Audit said
that since 1995, they have provided advanced integrity training to
over 3,000 INS employees on the Southwest Border. According to
Customs officials, between 1996 and 1998, over 5,000 Customs
employees received advanced integrity training.

While this advanced training has been available to immigration
inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors, they
were not required to INS and Customs Require

Basic Integrity Training and Advocate Advanced Training

Justice OIG, INS, and Customs Provide Advanced Integrity Training

B-279286 Page 8 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

take it nor any additional integrity training beyond what they
received in basic training. Consequently, some immigration
inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned
to the Southwest Border had not received any advanced integrity
training in over 2 years.

Based on random samples of immigration inspectors, Border Patrol
agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest Border,
we found that during fiscal years 1995 through 1997, 60 of 100
immigration inspectors and 60 of 76 Border Patrol agents received
no advanced integrity training during the almost 2   year period
we examined. 5 The Customs sample showed that 24 of 100 Customs
inspectors received no advanced integrity training during this
period. Thus, the agencies missed an opportunity to reinforce
integrity concepts with some of their employees.

The Departments of Justice and Treasury have established
procedures for handling allegations of employee misconduct. The
Department of Justice's OIG is generally responsible for
investigating criminal allegations against all INS employees, as
well as noncriminal allegations against INS employees above the
GS- 14 level. INS' Office of Internal Audit is generally
responsible for investigating noncriminal allegations involving
employees at the GS- 14 level and below, as well as any
allegations that have been reviewed and referred by the Justice
OIG.

In the Department of the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs is responsible for investigating both criminal and
noncriminal misconduct allegations against Customs employees
through the GS- 14 level. Treasury's OIG is responsible for
investigating criminal and noncriminal allegations against higher-
level Customs officials and all Office of Internal Affairs staff.

The Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs have
formal procedures for handling employee misconduct allegations.
The areas covered by the procedures include (1) reporting
suspected misconduct, (2) monitoring progress in the handling of
allegations, (3) ensuring that allegations receive an appropriate
level of attention, (4) conducting investigations, and (5)
pursuing employee misconduct to an appropriate prosecutorial or
administrative end.

Misconduct allegations arise from numerous sources, including
confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, anonymous
tipsters, and

5 INS did not provide us with requested training data for 25 of
the 101 Border Patrol agents in our sample. Justice OIG And INS

Generally Complied With Investigative Procedures, But Customs'
Compliance Was Uncertain

B-279286 Page 9 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

whistle- blowers. For example, whistle- blowers can report alleged
misconduct through the agencies' procedures for reporting any
suspected wrongdoing. INS and Customs have policies that require
employees to report suspected wrongdoing. If an employee alleges
retaliation, he or she is referred to the Office of Special
Counsel, which has specific legislative responsibility for
handling retaliation cases.

Information on the funding, staffing, and the number of
allegations received by the Justice OIG, INS' Office of Internal
Audit, the Treasury OIG, and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs
during fiscal years 1995 through 1997 is presented in appendix
III.

In a majority of the cases we reviewed, the Justice OIG complied
with its procedures for receiving, investigating, and resolving
drug- related employee misconduct allegations. To determine
compliance with investigative procedures, we randomly selected 72
of 91 cases alleging drug- related misconduct by INS employees on
the Southwest Border that were opened and closed by the Justice
OIG during fiscal year 1997. We selected five Justice OIG
procedures to evaluate compliance with the processing of employee
misconduct allegations. As shown in table 2, for example, monthly
interim reports were prepared as required in 28 of 39 opened
cases. In the remaining 11 cases, either some interim reports were
missing or there were no interim reports in the case files.

INS' Office of Internal Audit complied with its procedures for
receiving and resolving employee misconduct allegations in all of
its cases. We reviewed all 37 allegations involving INS Southwest
Border employees opened and closed by INS' Office of Internal
Audit during fiscal year 1997. We identified five processing steps
that apply to allegation processing by INS' Office of Internal
Audit and determined if the 37 cases complied with applicable
requirements. As shown in table 2, all 37 allegations were entered
into an automated, centralized database and were evaluated for
investigation, referred to local management, or referred to the
Justice OIG. Justice OIG and INS Office

of Internal Audit Generally Complied With Their Investigative
Procedures

B-279286 Page 10 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Compliance (number of cases)

Description of procedure Number of sample cases Yes No

Could not determine a Justice OIG:

1. The allegation was entered into an automated, centralized
database.

72 72 2. The allegation was evaluated for investigation, referred
to INS, or closed without referral.

72 72 3. The monthly memoranda of investigative activity were
prepared.

39 28 9 2 4. The final investigation report was completed and
reviewed. 39 36 3 5. The final investigation report was sent to
INS for action and/ or review.

3 3

INS Office of Internal Audit:

1. The allegation was entered into an automated, centralized
database.

37 37 2. The allegation was evaluated for investigation, referred
to local management, or referred to the Justice OIG.

37 37 3. An investigation was initiated by INS and completed
within the required time period.

None 4. A report was sent to the appropriate local management
official when investigation supported administrative action, and a
response was received within the required time period.

None 5. INS determined whether the investigated case involved
systemic weaknesses.

None a Information needed to determine compliance was not in the
case file. Source: GAO review of Justice OIG and INS Office of
Internal Audit data.

Because Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' automated case
management system did not track adherence to Customs' processing
requirements, we could not readily determine if the Office of
Internal Affairs staff complied with their investigative
procedures.

Table 2: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a Sample of
Allegations Involving INS Southwest Border Employees, Opened and
Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Justice OIG or INS' Office of
Internal Audit

Customs' Compliance With Investigative Processing Procedures Is
Uncertain

B-279286 Page 11 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Customs' automated system is the official investigative record. It
tracks and categorizes misconduct allegations and resulting
investigations and disciplinary action. The investigative case
files are to support the automated system in tracking criminal
investigative activity and contain such information as printed
records from the automated system, copies of subpoenas and arrest
warrants, and a chronology of investigative events. Based on these
content criteria and our file reviews, the investigative case
files are not intended to and generally do not document the
adherence to processing procedures.

We selected 10 Office of Internal Affairs' procedures to evaluate
their compliance with the processing of employee misconduct
allegations. For example, the procedures require that allegations
be recorded in the automated system as soon as feasible and
approved by three supervisors, including a headquarters manager,
within specified time frames. We randomly selected 51 of the 71
drug- related cases involving Customs Southwest Border employees
that were opened and closed in fiscal year 1997 to determine if
the Office of Internal Affairs complied with the 10 procedures. As
shown in table 3, the files did not contain any data to enable us
to determine whether the Office of Internal Affairs complied with
six procedures. For three procedures, the Office of Internal
Affairs complied with the requirements for all cases. For the
remaining procedure, the Office of Internal Affairs complied for
two- thirds of the cases.

Compliance (number of cases)

Description of procedures Number of

applicable cases Yes No

Could not determine a

1. The allegation was entered into an automated, centralized
database within the required time period.

51 34 17 2. Field supervisors and the responsible headquarters
manager approved entry of the allegation into the automated system
for tracking.

51 51 3. The alleged wrongdoing and the viability of investigative
leads were assessed.

51 51 4. The allegation was categorized on the basis of its
severity. 51 51 5. Specific criteria were considered in
determining whether the allegation warranted formal investigation.

51 51 6. The allegation was approved for formal investigation. 2 2
7. Field supervisors conducted periodic reviews. 2 2

Table 3: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a Sample of
Allegations Involving Customs Southwest Border Employees, Opened
and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs

B-279286 Page 12 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Compliance (number of cases)

Description of procedures Number of

applicable cases Yes No

Could not determine a

8. A final investigation report was prepared within the required
time period.

2 2 9. Management was notified of the investigation's completion
and that action was required.

2 2 10. Management notified the investigated employee of the
action to be taken within the required time period.

2 2 a Information was not available in the automated system or the
case file. Source: GAO review of Customs data.

Despite INS and Customs integrity procedures to prevent drug-
related corruption, 28 INS and Customs employees on the Southwest
Border were convicted for drug- related crimes in fiscal years
1992 through 1997. By definition, these cases represented a
failure of the procedures in place to prevent drug- related
corruption. These cases also represented an opportunity to
identify internal control weaknesses and to improve agency
integrity procedures. However, the Justice OIG and Customs did not
take advantage of the opportunity to learn lessons from these
cases. Our analysis of the 28 cases identified several weaknesses
in internal controls and integrity procedures. Appendix IV
provides a summary of each of the 28 cases we reviewed.

Our analysis of the 28 closed cases revealed that drug- related
corruption in these cases is not restricted to any one type,
location, agency, or job. Corruption occurred in many locations
and under various circumstances and times, underscoring the need
for comprehensive integrity procedures that are effective.

The 28 INS and Customs employees engaged in one or more drug-
related criminal activities including

 waving drug- laden vehicles through ports of entry,

 coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border,

 transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints,

 selling drugs, and

 disclosing drug intelligence information. Opportunities to Learn

Lessons From Closed Corruption Cases Have Been Missed

Convicted INS and Customs Employees Had Varied Employment
Histories

B-279286 Page 13 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

The 28 convicted employees (19 INS employees and 9 Customs
employees) were stationed at various locations on the Southwest
Border. Six each were stationed in El Paso, TX, and Calexico, CA;
four were stationed in Douglas, AZ; three were stationed in San
Ysidro, CA; two each were stationed in Hidalgo, TX, and Los
Fresnos, TX; and one each was stationed in Naco, AZ, Chula Vista,
CA, Bayview, TX, Harlingen, TX, and Falfurrias, TX.

Source: GAO review of INS, Justice OIG, FBI, and Customs files.

The 28 INS and Customs employees who were convicted for drug-
related crimes included 10 immigration inspectors, 7 Customs
inspectors, 6 Border Patrol agents, 3 INS Detention Enforcement
Officers (DEO), 1 Customs canine enforcement officer, and 1
Customs operational analysis specialist. All but three of these
employees had anti- drug smuggling responsibilities. Twenty- six
of the convicted employees were men; two were women. As

Figure 1: Southwest Border Duty Stations of INS and Customs
Employees Who Were Convicted for Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal
Years 1992 Through 1997.

B-279286 Page 14 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

shown in table 4, the employment histories of the convicted
employees varied substantially.

Range Selected data Low High Average

Age at termination 26 56 38 Years with agency 1 21 10 Years at
last duty station 1 15 7 Source: INS, Justice OIG, Customs, and
FBI data.

In 19 cases, the employees acted alone, that is, no other INS or
Customs employees were involved in the drug- related criminal
activity. In the remaining nine cases, two or more INS and/ or
Customs employees acted together. Of the 28 cases, 23 originated
from information provided by confidential informants or
cooperating witnesses, and 5 cases originated from information
provided by agency whistle- blowers. Prison sentences for the
convicted employees ranged from 30 days, for disclosure of
confidential information, to life imprisonment for drug
conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery. The average sentence
was about 10 years. 6

Both the Justice OIG and Customs procedures require them to
formally report internal control weaknesses identified during
investigations, including drug- related corruption investigations
involving INS and Customs employees. Generally, the Justice OIG
and Customs Office of Internal Affairs, respectively, have lead
responsibility for investigating criminal allegations involving
INS and Customs employees. Reports of internal control weaknesses
are to identify any lessons to be learned that can be used to
prevent further employee corruption. The reports are to be
forwarded to agency officials who are responsible for taking
corrective action. Reports are not required if no internal control
weaknesses are identified.

In the 28 cases involving INS or Customs employees who were
convicted for drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through
1997, no reports were prepared. We are left to conclude from this
that either (1) there were no internal control weaknesses revealed
by, or lessons to be learned from, these corruption cases or (2)
opportunities to identify and correct internal control weaknesses
have been missed, and thus, INS' and Customs' vulnerability to
employee corruption has not been reduced.

6 The average prison sentence calculation does not include two
former employees sentenced to life imprisonment, and one former
employee who fled the country prior to sentencing. Information is
provided only on the imprisonment portion of the sentences.

Table 4: Selected Employment Data on INS and Customs Employees
Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1997

Drug- Related Corruption Cases Were Not Used To Learn Lessons

B-279286 Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Justice's OIG investigated 13 of the 28 cases. The investigative
files did not document if procedures were reviewed to identify
internal control weaknesses. Further, there were no reports
identifying internal control weaknesses. According to a Justice
OIG official, no reports are required if no weaknesses are
identified, and he could not determine why reports were not
prepared in these cases.

Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' Internal Affairs Handbook
provides for the preparation of a procedural deficiency report in
those internal investigations where there was a significant
failure that resulted from (1) failure to follow an established
procedure, (2) lack of an established procedure, or (3)
conflicting or obsolete procedures. The report is to detail the
causal factors and scope of the deficiency. The appropriate
Customs manager is to be charged with developing and implementing
the corrective procedures, and the Management Inspections Division
is to track the corrective procedures and coordinate with the
appropriate manager to ensure continuing compliance.

We identified eight cases involving Customs employees investigated
by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs. No procedural deficiency
reports were prepared in these cases. Further, the investigative
files did not document whether internal control weaknesses were
identified. A Customs official said the reports are generally not
prepared.

Although the Justice OIG and Customs Office of Internal Affairs
have lead responsibility for investigating allegations involving
INS and Customs employees, the FBI is authorized to investigate
INS or Customs employees. Of the 28 cases, the FBI investigated 7
involving 6 INS employees and 1 Customs employee. Under current
procedures, the FBI is not required to provide the Justice OIG or
Customs Office of Internal Affairs with case information that
would allow them to identify internal control weaknesses, where
the FBI investigation involves an INS or Customs employee. In
addition, while Attorney General memorandums require the FBI to
identify and report any internal control weaknesses identified
during white- collar or health care fraud investigations, a
Justice Department official told us that these reporting
requirements do not apply to drug- related corruption cases.
According to FBI officials, no reports were prepared in the seven
cases because they were not required.

B-279286 Page 16 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

The Justice OIG and Customs did not identify and report any
internal control weaknesses involving the procedures that were
followed at the ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints
along the Southwest Border. Our review of the same cases
identified several weaknesses.

We identified 14 cases in which INS or Customs inspectors
knowingly passed drug- laden vehicles through ports of entry.
Traditionally, INS and Customs have relied on internal controls to
minimize this type of corruption. These have included the random
assignment and shifting of inspectors from one lane to another and
the unannounced inspection of a group of vehicles. However, in the
cases we reviewed, these internal controls did not prevent corrupt
INS and Customs personnel from allowing drug- laden vehicles to
enter the United States. In some cases, the inspectors
communicated their lane assignment and the time they would be on
duty to the drug smuggler, and in other cases, they did not. In
one case, for example, an inspector used a cellular telephone to
send a prearranged code to a drug smuggler's beeper to tell him
which lane to use and what time to use it. In contrast, another
inspector did not notify the drug smuggler concerning his lane
assignment or the times he would be on duty. In that case, the
drug smuggler used an individual, referred to as a spotter, to
conduct surveillance of the port of entry. The spotter used a
cellular telephone to contact the driver of the drug- laden
vehicle to tell him which lane to drive through.

The drug smugglers' schemes succeeded in these cases because the
drivers of the drug- laden vehicles could choose the lane they
wanted to use for inspection purposes. These cases support the
implementation of one or more methods to deprive drivers of their
choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry. At the time of our
review, Customs was testing a method to assign drivers to
inspection lanes at ports of entry.

In 10 of 28 cases, drug smugglers relied on friendships, personal
relationships, or symbols of law enforcement authority to move
drug loads through a port of entry or past a Border Patrol
checkpoint. In these 10 cases, drug smugglers believed that
coworkers, relatives, and friends of Customs or immigration
inspectors, or law enforcement officials, would not be inspected
or would be given preferential treatment in the inspection
process. For example, a Border Patrol agent relied on his
friendships with his coworkers to avoid inspection at a Border
Patrol checkpoint where he was stationed. In another case, an
inspector agreed to allow her boyfriend to smuggle drugs through a
port of entry. The boyfriend used his personal and intimate
relationship with the inspector to solicit drug shipments from
drug dealers. Two DEOs working together used INS detention buses
and Our Review of Closed

Corruption Cases Revealed Internal Control Weaknesses on the
Southwest Border

B-279286 Page 17 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

vans to transport drugs past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In two
separate cases, former INS employees relied on friendships they
had developed during their tenure with the agency to smuggle drugs
through ports of entry and past Border Patrol checkpoints.

INS and Customs do not have written recusal policies concerning
the performance of inspections where the relationship of
immigration or Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents to the
person being inspected is such that they may not objectively
perform the inspection. Nor do they have a written inspection
policy for law enforcement officers or their vehicles. For
example, our review determined that on numerous occasions, INS
DEOs drove INS vehicles with drug loads past Border Patrol
checkpoints without being inspected.

INS and Customs have not evaluated the effectiveness of their
integrity assurance procedures to identify areas that could be
improved. According to Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials,
agency integrity procedures have not been evaluated to determine
if they are effective. The Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs
said that there were no evaluations of the effectiveness of
Customs integrity procedures. Similarly, officials in INS' Offices
of Internal Audit and Personnel Security said that there are no
evaluations of the effectiveness of INS' integrity procedures.
According to the Justice Inspector General, virtually no work had
been done to review closed corruption cases or interview convicted
employees to identify areas of vulnerability.

Based on our review, one way to evaluate the effectiveness of
agency integrity procedures would be to use drug- related
investigative case information. For example, the objective of
background investigations or reinvestigations is to determine an
individual's suitability for employment, including whether he or
she has the required integrity. All 28 of the INS and Customs
employees who were convicted for drug- related crimes received
background investigations or reinvestigations that determined they
were suitable. According to INS and Customs security officials,
financial information, required to be provided by employees as
part of their background investigations or reinvestigations, is to
be used to determine whether they appear to be living beyond their
means, or have unsatisfied debts. If either of these issues
arises, it must be satisfactorily resolved before INS or Customs
can determine that the employee is suitable. In addition, Justice
policy provides for the temporary removal of INS and Customs Have
Not

Evaluated Their Integrity Procedures

B-279286 Page 18 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents if they are unable
and/ or unwilling to satisfy their debts. 7

Our review of background investigation and reinvestigation files
for convicted INS employees showed that immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol agents were required to provide limited financial
information on liabilities, including bankruptcies, wage
garnishment, property repossession, and liens for taxes or other
debts or judgements that have not been paid. 8 They were not
required to provide information on their assets. In comparison,
Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers were required
to provide information on both their assets and liabilities,
including financial information for themselves and their immediate
families on their bank accounts, automobiles, real estate,
securities, safe deposit boxes, business investments, art, boats,
antiques, inheritance, mortgage, and debts and obligations
exceeding $200. 9

Our review of the 28 cases involving convicted INS and Customs
employees disclosed that 26 of 28 employees were offered or
received financial remuneration for their illegal acts. At least
two were substantially indebted, and at least four were shown to
be living beyond their means. For example, one of the closed cases
we reviewed involved an immigration inspector who said he became
involved with a drug smuggler because he had substantial credit
card debt and was on the verge of bankruptcy. Given the limited
financial information immigration inspectors are required to
provide, this inspector might not have been identified as a
potential risk. In another case, a GS- 12 Border Patrol agent
owned a house valued at approximately $200,000, an Olympic- sized
swimming pool in its own separate building, a 5- car garage, 5
automobiles, 1 van, 2 boats, approximately 100 weapons, $45,000 in
treasury bills, 40 acres of land, and had no debt. Given the
current background investigation or reinvestigation financial
reporting requirements for Border Patrol agents, this agent would
not have had anything to report, since he was not required to
report his assets, and he had no debts to report.

7 Justice Department policy defines debt as lawful financial
obligations that are just debts that are past due. 8 Immigration
inspectors and Border Patrol agents are to complete a
Questionnaire for National Security Positions as part of their
background investigation and reinvestigation. 9 Customs inspectors
and canine enforcement officers are to complete a Questionnaire
for Public Trust Positions and a Financial Statement on Customs
Form 257 as part of their background investigation and
reinvestigation.

B-279286 Page 19 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Our review of Customs files for eight of the nine convicted
Customs employees showed that Customs inspectors and canine
enforcement officers completed financial disclosure statements
that included their assets and liabilities as part of their
employee background investigations and reinvestigations. However,
based on our case file review, Customs does not fully use all of
the financial information. For example, according to a Customs
official, reported liabilities are to be compared with debts
listed on a credit report to determine if all debts were reported.
Thus, their current use of the reported financial information
would not have helped to identify an employee who was living well
beyond his means or whose debts were excessive.

Another source of evaluative information for INS and Customs could
be the experiences of other federal agencies with integrity
prevention and detection policies and procedures. For example,
while INS' and Customs' procedures were similar to those used by
other federal law enforcement agencies, several differences exist.
As shown in appendix II, according to agency officials, INS and
Customs did not require advanced integrity training, polygraph
examinations, or panel interviews before hiring, while the FBI,
DEA, and Secret Service did have these requirements. Among the
five agencies, only DEA required new employees to be assigned to a
mentor to reinforce agency values and procedures. Since these
policies and procedures are used by other agencies, INS and
Customs may want to consider their applicability to their
employees.

During our review, the Justice OIG, INS, the Treasury OIG, and
Customs began to review their anticorruption efforts. These
efforts have not been completed, and it is too early to determine
what their outcomes will be.

In May 1998, the Justice OIG established a Research and Analysis
Unit to identify critical management and enforcement issues,
develop and implement strategies and/ or policy recommendations,
and monitor and measure their impact. This unit's proposed
projects include: (1) finding ways to strengthen the Justice OIG's
role in controlling corruption on the Southwest Border and (2)
developing a nationwide integrity awareness training program.

In February 1998, INS' Office of Internal Audit created a Special
Investigations and Projects Branch, which is responsible for (1)
developing and implementing integrity training programs, (2)
reviewing and analyzing cases in which INS employees are arrested
or indicted on drug or other corruption charges, and (3)
recommending corrective action, as needed. Outcomes of Recent
AntiCorruption

Efforts Are Unknown

B-279286 Page 20 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

The Department of the Treasury has established an Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) that was tasked with conducting
a comprehensive review of integrity issues related to the
potential vulnerability of Customs to corruption and to analyze
the efficacy of departmental and bureau internal affairs systems.
10 According to a Treasury OPR official, these efforts are
intended to identify weaknesses and to help prevent the corruption
of Customs employees.

Within Customs, at the time of our review, the Acting Deputy
Commissioner of Customs was heading a task force to develop an
Integrity Awareness Program. This task force included
representatives from several offices, including those of Field
Operations, Human Resources, and Internal Affairs. The Office of
Internal Affairs had initiated an Integrity Indicator Research
Program that is to provide a capability to identify human
behavioral indicators of integrity characteristics to prevent and
investigate propensities for misconduct and corruption. One of the
intended benefits of this effort is to improve policies and
procedures. The Office of Field Operations has initiated an
Officer Integrity Project whose goal is to develop policies and
processes that prevent corruption.

These initiatives, aimed at improving integrity programs, are
steps in the right direction. However, it is too early to tell
what their outcomes will be and how well they will address
shortcomings in both agencies' internal control procedures for
preventing employee corruption.

Given the enormous sums of money being generated by drug
trafficking, the corruption of some INS and Customs employees
along the Southwest Border is a serious and continuing threat.
Both INS and Customs are vulnerable to this threat. This situation
exists, in part, because neither INS nor Customs has fully availed
itself of opportunities to better ensure the integrity of its
employees. Neither agency has (1) completed evaluation of its
policies and procedures to determine what works and what
improvements are needed, (2) fully complied with its integrity
policies and procedures, or (3) identified and corrected internal
control weaknesses that surfaced during past corruption episodes.
As a result, neither agency can be sure that adequate internal
controls are in place to detect and prevent employee corruption.

10 An Assessment of Vulnerabilities to Corruption and
Effectiveness of the Office of Internal Affairs, U. S. Customs
Service, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Under Secretary
(Enforcement), Office of Professional Responsibility, February
1999. Conclusions

B-279286 Page 21 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Neither the Justice OIG nor Customs Office of Internal Affairs
documented that they used closed drug- related corruption cases to
identify weaknesses and develop suitable internal controls. In
addition, the FBI did not identify and report internal control
weaknesses in the cases it investigated because it was not
required to do so. Our review of closed drug- related corruption
cases identified internal control weaknesses that allowed (1) drug
smugglers to choose their inspection lanes at ports of entry; (2)
law enforcement officers and their vehicles to pass uninspected
through ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints; and (3)
immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs
inspectors to inspect individuals with whom they had close
personal relationships.

INS did not require immigration inspectors and Border Patrol
agents to fully report their assets and liabilities. Consequently,
INS lacked financial information needed in background
investigations and reinvestigations to identify individuals who
may have been living beyond their means. Customs collected
financial information including assets and liabilities from
Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers as part of
their background investigations and reinvestigations. However,
Customs did not fully use the financial information to identify
employees who appeared to be living beyond their means.

We recommend that the Attorney General

 direct the Commissioner of INS to evaluate the effectiveness of
integrity assurance efforts such as training, background
investigations, and reinvestigations;

 require the Commissioner of INS to comply with policies that
require employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are
due;

 direct the Commissioner of INS to strengthen internal controls at
Southwest Border ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints
by establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of
their choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry; (2) a policy
for the inspection of law enforcement officers or their vehicles
at ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints; and (3) a recusal
policy concerning the performance of inspections by immigration
inspectors and Border Patrol agents where their objectivity may be
in question;

 direct the Commissioner of INS to require Border Patrol agents
and immigration inspectors to file financial disclosure
statements, including a listing of their assets and liabilities,
as part of the background investigation or reinvestigation
process, as well as fully review this information to identify
financial issues such as employees who appear to be living beyond
their means; Recommendations

B-279286 Page 22 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

 require the Justice OIG to document that policies and procedures
were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in cases
where an INS employee is determined to have engaged in drug-
related criminal activities; and

 require the Director of the FBI to develop a procedure to provide
information from closed FBI cases, involving INS or Customs
employees, to the Justice OIG or Customs Office of Internal
Affairs so they can identify and report internal control
weaknesses to the responsible agency official. The procedure
should only apply in those cases where (1) the Justice OIG or
Customs' Office of Internal Affairs were not involved in the
investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation was an INS or
Customs employee, and (3) the employee was convicted of a drug-
related crime.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury

 direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the effectiveness
of integrity assurance efforts, including training, background
investigations, and reinvestigations;

 require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with policies that
require employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are
due;

 require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies and
procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses,
in cases where a Customs employee is determined to have engaged in
drugrelated criminal activities;

 direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal
controls at Southwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1)
one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of
inspection lanes; (2) a policy for inspection of law enforcement
officers and their vehicles; and (3) a recusal policy concerning
the performance of inspections by Customs inspectors where their
objectivity may be in question; and

 require that Customs fully review financial disclosure
statements, which employees are required to provide as part of the
background investigation or reinvestigation process, to identify
financial issues such as employees who appear to be living beyond
their means.

The Department of Justice generally agreed with the substance of
the report and recognized the importance of taking all possible
actions to reduce the potential for corruption. However, Justice
expressed reservations about implementing two of the six
recommendations addressed to the Attorney General.

Justice expressed reservations about implementing our
recommendation that Border Patrol agents and immigration
inspectors file financial Agency Comments

B-279286 Page 23 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

disclosure statements as part of their background investigations
or reinvestigations. Specifically, it noted that implementing
financial disclosure has obstacles to be met and at present the
DOJ has limited data to suggest that they would provide better
data or greater assurance of a person's integrity. The obstacles
included obtaining Office of Management and Budget approval of a
form, labor organization negotiations, and the potential need to
develop financial verification procedures as part of background
investigations and reinvestigations. Justice also cited Customs'
experience with financial reporting and litigation involving the
use of the financial disclosure reports.

We recognize that implementation of this recommendation will
require some administrative actions by INS. However, these actions
are consistent with the routine management practices associated
with making policy changes within the agency. Therefore, the
obstacles do not appear to be inordinate or insurmountable.
Concerning the limited data about the benefits of financial
reporting, according to OPM officials and the adjudication manual
for background investigations and reinvestigations, financial
information can have a direct bearing and impact on determining an
individual's integrity. The circumstances described in our case
studies suggest that financial reporting could have raised issues
for followup during a background investigation or reinvestigation.
We recognize that there may be questions on the effectiveness of
this procedure; therefore, this report contains a recommendation
for an overall evaluation of INS' integrity assurance efforts.
Customs' experience with the effectiveness of financial reporting
may have been limited by their limited analysis of the data. In
that regard, this report contains a recommendation that Customs
make full use of the information they already collect. Concerning
Customs litigation, financial reporting by Customs inspectors and
canine enforcement officers is not and has never been an issue in
litigation, according to Customs officials and the President and
Deputy General Counsel of the NTEU.

Justice also expressed reservations about implementing our
recommendation that the FBI develop a procedure to provide
information to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs on internal control weaknesses. Therefore, we clarified
our recommendation to indicate that the procedure should only
apply in those cases where (1) the Justice OIG or Customs' Office
of Internal Affairs were not involved in the investigation, (2)
the subject of the investigation was an INS or Customs employee,
and (3) the employee was convicted of a drug- related crime. If
internal control weaknesses in INS or Customs are known to the FBI
and

B-279286 Page 24 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

not disclosed to those agencies, then the agencies are not in the
best position to correct the abuses.

Because there are potential sensitivity and liability issues
involved in disclosing investigative case- related information,
our recommendation gives the FBI the broadest possible latitude in
determining how, when, and what information it will disclose for
the purpose of identifying and correcting internal control
weaknesses within INS or Customs. For example, the procedure could
include, as appropriate: (1) referring the case for investigation
to the Justice OIG, Customs Office of Internal Affairs, or one of
the corruption task forces on the Southwest Border; (2) inviting
the Justice OIG or Customs Office of Internal Affairs to
participate in the investigation; or (3) preparing a report that
identified the internal control weakness and providing it to the
agency. According to FBI officials, it routinely and regularly
shares investigative case information with the Justice OIG and
Customs Office of Internal Affairs from cases investigated by
corruption task forces. Therefore, our recommendation is within
the realm of current FBI disclosure practices.

Justice accepted our recommendation that INS evaluate the
effectiveness of its integrity assurance efforts and indicated
that a contractor was evaluating INS' integrity/ ethics training.
However, Justice's response gave no indication that it intended to
evaluate its background investigations or reinvestigations. INS
needs to determine empirically for its integrity assurance efforts
what works and how well. The evaluation should include an
assessment of the extent to which each integrity procedure
achieves the objectives of preventing or identifying drug- related
corruption. For example, if an INS employee is convicted of a
drug- related crime, INS should determine whether the convicted
employee's background investigation or reinvestigation contributed
to identifying the individual. Without such assessments, INS
cannot ensure that its efforts are achieving their objectives of
preventing or identifying drug- related corruption.

Justice agreed with our recommendation that INS comply with
policies to complete employment reinvestigations when they are
due, and we believe that INS' recent efforts to eliminate its
reinvestigations backlog are steps in the right direction. Once
the backlog has been eliminated, INS should continue to monitor
and ensure that they are done on time.

Justice agreed with our recommendation that INS strengthen
controls at Southwest Border ports of entry and Border Patrol
checkpoints. However, the controls cited by INS do not appear
fully responsive to our recommendation because the controls INS
plans to implement do not

B-279286 Page 25 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

deprive drivers of their choice of lanes at ports of entry. The
cases we reviewed showed that corrupt inspectors and drug
smugglers had developed numerous methods of bypassing existing
internal controls, particularly those controls related to denying
drug smugglers knowledge of the corrupt inspector's lane
assignment and duty time. With this information, the drug smuggler
could proceed directly to the corrupt inspector's lane and be
passed without inspection.

The Justice OIG agreed with our recommendation concerning the need
to identify and document internal control weaknesses discovered
during criminal investigations of INS employees.

The Department of the Treasury provided comments from Customs that
generally concurred with our recommendations and indicated that
they are taking steps to implement them. However, Customs
requested that we reconsider our recommendation that Customs fully
review financial disclosure statements that are provided as part
of the background and reinvestigation process. Customs indicated
that implementing this recommendation may violate the provisions
of the Computer Matching Act. The Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act of 1988, P. L. 100- 503, generally requires that
agencies engaging in computer matching must do so pursuant to
written matching agreements that state such things as the purpose
and legal authority of the match, the justification for the
matching program, its anticipated results, a description of the
records to be matched, as well as other information on the
program. Our recommendation expects Customs to make more thorough
examination of the financial information it collects to determine
if employees appear to be living beyond their means. We leave it
to Customs' discretion to determine the type of examination to be
performed. Since implementing the recommendation does not require
electronically matching financial disclosure information with
other data, there is no violation of the Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act.

Justice's , Justice's OIG, and Customs' comments are provided in
appendixes VI, VII, and VIII.

We are sending copies of this report to The Honorable Janet Reno,
Attorney General; and The Honorable Robert Rubin, Secretary of the

B-279286 Page 26 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Treasury. Copies will also be made available to others upon
request. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
IX.

Sincerely yours, Richard M. Stana Associate Director,
Administration

of Justice Issues

Page 27 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Page 28 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Contents 1 Letter Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
30 Appendix II: Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected

INS, Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel

33 Appendix III: Resources and Workload Data For Selected

Organizations 34

Appendix IV: Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

35 Appendix V: Completion of Employment Background

Reinvestigations 44

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Justice 45 Appendix
VII: Comments From the Department of

Justice, Office of the Inspector General 50

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Customs Service 52 Appendix IX:
Major Contributors to This Report 63 Appendixes

Table1: INS and Customs Compliance With the 5- year
Reinvestigation Requirement for Selected Southwest Border
Personnel as of March 1998

6 Table 2: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a

Sample of Allegations Involving INS Southwest Border Employees,
Opened and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Justice OIG or INS'
Office of Internal Audit

10 Table 3: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a

Sample of Allegations Involving Customs Southwest Border
Employees, Opened and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Customs'
Office of Internal Affairs

11 Table 4: Selected Employment Data on INS and Customs

Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992
Through 1997

14 Table II. 1: Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected

INS, Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel as of
June 1998

33 Tables

Table III. 1: Resource and Workload Data for Selected
Organizations Responsible for Investigating Alleged Wrongdoing by
INS and Customs Employees, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997

34

Contents Page 29 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Table V. 1: Completion of Employment Reinvestigations Due in
Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997 for Southwest Border Customs
Inspectors, INS Immigration Inspectors, and INS Border Patrol
Agents

44 Figure 1: Southwest Border Duty Stations of INS and

Customs Employees Who Were Convicted for DrugRelated Crimes,
Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1997.

13 Figures

Abbreviations

CMC Customs Management Center DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DEO Detention Enforcement Officer FBI Federal Bureau of
Investigation FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center INS
Immigration and Naturalization Service NTEU National Treasury
Employees Union OIG Office of the Inspector General OPM Office of
Personnel Management OPR Office of Professional Responsiblity

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 30 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

In responding to your request, we adopted the following approach
to meet the objectives agreed upon with your staff.

We did our review at the Department of Justice's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's (INS) Office of Internal Audit, and at the Department of
the Treasury's Customs Service, Office of Internal Affairs, and
OIG in Washington, D. C; and at several Southwest Border
locations. These included INS district offices in El Paso, San
Antonio, San Diego, and Phoenix; Border Patrol Sector offices in
El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, and Tucson; Customs Management Center
offices (CMC) in El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, and Tucson; and
Justice OIG offices in McAllen, TX, El Paso, Tucson, and San
Diego.

To determine the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply
with their policies and procedures to ensure employee integrity,
we reviewed and analyzed agency- provided documentary and
testimonial evidence and interviewed appropriate officials on
agency policies and procedures, ethics and integrity training,
personnel rotation, background investigations, and investigating
allegations of wrongdoing. We also obtained information from INS,
Customs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Secret Service on their
mandatory integrity procedures for selected field personnel.

We took various steps to verify whether employees had received
integrity training. We selected random samples of 201 INS and 100
Customs employees. Our samples included 25 employees each from 7
of the INS and the 4 Customs offices mentioned above and 26
employees from 1 of the INS offices. Due to increased hiring in
INS and Customs, we stratified employee positions into two
categories those who entered on duty during or prior to fiscal
year 1997. For each of INS' and Customs' offices, we selected our
samples based on the percentage of inspectors or Border Patrol
agents in each category. We obtained information on whether they
had received the required training at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. For training provided
at Customs' CMCs, INS districts, and INS Border Patrol sectors, we
interviewed relevant officials and obtained policies on ethics and
integrity training at each of the Southwest Border locations
selected. To verify whether ethics and integrity training had
actually occurred, we obtained training information for the above-
mentioned random samples of INS and Customs inspectors and Border
Patrol agents in each location. Concerning background
investigations, we analyzed INS and Customs computerized data on
the most recent background investigations completed as of March
1998 for all INS and Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents
at the

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 31 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

above Southwest Border locations. We analyzed these data to assess
the extent to which policy requirements had been followed for
initial background investigations when personnel entered on duty
and for reinvestigations for personnel with sufficient years of
service. We did not independently verify the accuracy of the
computerized personnel data provided to us by INS and Customs to
hard copy files. However, we did perform some limited analyses (e.
g., checked whether there were duplicate entries for the same
employees and whether the values for data variables seemed
generally reasonable) to determine whether the data were reliable.

To identify and compare the Departments of Justice's and the
Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for
handling allegations of drug- related employee misconduct and
determine whether the policies and procedures are followed, we
reviewed and analyzed applicable program information from the
respective departments and/ or agencies and interviewed relevant
agency officials. In addition, we reviewed random samples of drug-
related allegations. These allegations were made about INS and
Customs Southwest Border personnel and were opened and closed
during fiscal year 1997 by the Justice OIG, INS' Office of
Internal Audit, and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs. We
allowed the agencies to define a drug- related allegation. We
reviewed 72 of 91 allegations about INS employees handled by the
Justice OIG, all 37 allegations opened and closed by INS' Office
of Internal Audit, and 51 of 71 cases handled by Customs' Office
of Internal Affairs.

We developed structured data collection instruments and reviewed
the case files to determine whether these organizations followed
their policies and procedures. We relied on data from the
agencies' official automated or hard copy case files that included
processing information to determine compliance with processing
requirements.

To determine what types of illegal drug- related activities INS
and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been involved
in, we identified employees who were convicted of drug- related
crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997. We were unable to
identify a single source for this information. Therefore, we
requested background information on previous corruption efforts in
INS and Customs; performed a literature search; and requested the
names of employees convicted of drug- related crimes from Customs'
Office of Internal Affairs, Justice's OIG, the FBI, and the
Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section. From the information
provided, we developed a consolidated list of these individuals.
To be included, an individual had to have been (1) an INS or
Customs employee during the

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 32 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

time he or she was determined to have engaged in criminal drug-
related activity and (2) convicted of a drug- related crime
between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 1997.

We requested and reviewed investigative files, personnel files,
and background investigation files for each individual in our
study where they were available. INS could not locate one
personnel file, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had
no record of a background investigation for two INS employees.
Customs could not locate the background investigation file for one
former employee. We collected the same information on each
individual to determine the drug- related activities for which
they were convicted. We also collected information on the methods
used to carry out the illegal activities, their occupations, how
their illegal activities were brought to the attention of
investigative authorities, their lengths of agency service, their
final duty stations, and the lengths of their prison sentences. We
summarized the information from all of the cases.

To determine the extent to which lessons learned from corruption
cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes
in policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related
corruption of INS and Customs employees, we interviewed agency
officials to identify what policies or procedures had been changed
as a result of specific drug- related corruption cases. Agency
procedures provide for the preparation of internal control
weakness reports only if a weakness is identified during the
criminal investigation. Because there were no reports that would
have led to policy or procedural changes, we reviewed the
agencies' investigative case files to determine if there were any
internal control weaknesses that could have been identified from
the cases involving convicted INS or Customs employees. We
reviewed each case individually and then grouped cases that
involved similar criminal activities and reviewed them for
patterns that could identify weaknesses.

Appendix II Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected INS,
Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel

Page 33 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Integrity procedures a INS Customs FBI DEA Secret Service

Basic training X X X X X Advanced integrity training X X X
Management integrity training X X X X X Background investigation X
X X X X 5- year reinvestigation X X X X X Subscribe to the Federal
Code of Conduct X X X X X Subscribe to the Federal Code of Ethics
X X X X X Drug testing before hire X X X X X Random drug testing X
X X X X Suitability or psychological testing X X X X Polygraph
examination X X X Panel interview before hire b X X X Employee
certification of understanding Standards of Conduct X X X X
Whistle- blower procedures X X X X X Organization that receives
and resolves allegations of employee wrongdoing X X X X X
Proactive undercover operations X X Mentor program X a The
selected personnel include DEA, FBI, and Secret Service special
agents, INS' immigration

inspectors and Border Patrol agents, and Customs' inspectors and
canine enforcement officers. b The requirement applies to Border
Patrol agent job applicants, but not to immigration inspector job

applicants. Source: INS, Customs, the FBI, DEA, and Secret Service
information.

Table II. 1: Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected INS,
Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel as of June
1998

Appendix III Resources and Workload Data For Selected
Organizations

Page 34 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Fiscal Year Description 1997 1996 1995

Percent change from fiscal year

1995 to fiscal year 1997 INS employees:

Justice OIG Funding (in millions) $10.5 $10.4 $10.4 1. 0 Staff
positions 81 75 80 1. 3 Allegations received 2,415 2,121 1,999
20.8

INS Office of Internal Audit Funding (in millions) $2.3 $1.1 $0.9
156 Staff positions 13 7 5 160 Allegations received 2,866 1,813
1,558 84

Customs employees:

Treasury OIG a Funding (in millions) $4.93 $4.16 $4.91 0.4 Staff
positions 33 37 39 -15.4 Allegations received 107 139 146 -26.7

Customs Internal Affairs a Funding (in millions) $38.7 $35.4 $32.7
18.3% Staff positions 283 290 286 -1.0 Allegations received 2,198
2,506 2,367 -7.1 a The data shown for the Treasury OIG and
Customs' Office of Internal Affairs are for both criminal and

administrative misconduct allegations handled by the agencies.
Neither agency's records permitted us to reliably estimate the
allocation of resource use between criminal and administrative
allegations.

Source: Justice OIG, INS, Treasury OIG, and Customs data.

Table III. 1: Resource and Workload Data for Selected
Organizations Responsible for Investigating Alleged Wrongdoing by
INS and Customs Employees, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of DrugRelated Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997

Page 35 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

This appendix summarizes each of the cases involving 28 individual
INS or Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border who were
convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through
1997. The cases are grouped by the type of criminal activity in
which each individual was principally engaged.

Case 1 A Customs inspector assigned to San Ysidro, CA, conspired
to wave a load of cocaine through the port and provided sensitive
law enforcement information to drug smugglers. Both prior to and
during work, the inspector communicated information about his
shift and lane assignments to drug smugglers by telephone and
pager. The smugglers planned to use the information to ensure that
the drug load passed through the inspector's lane while he was on
duty. He was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and
sentenced to 15 years and 8 months imprisonment.

Case 2 An immigration inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, was
recruited by his brother- in- law to assist in smuggling marijuana
and cocaine through the port of entry. For several years, the
inspector provided the drug smugglers with his scheduled duty time
and lane assignments using a pay telephone or cellular telephone.
On occasion, the smugglers drove to the inspector's lane where the
inspector would hand the driver a piece of paper giving the lanes
and times he would be on duty. The smugglers drove their vehicles,
loaded with up to 1,000 pounds of marijuana each, to the
inspector's lane and were waved through the port of entry without
inspection. The investigation established that the inspector was
living beyond his means. He was convicted of conspiracy to import
marijuana, importation of marijuana, and bribery. Prior to his
sentencing, the inspector was released on bond. He fled and
remains a fugitive.

Case 3 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, waved
drug- laden vehicles through his lane at the port of entry over a
period of about 2 years. The investigation established that he
paid over $25,000 cash for a new motor vehicle. The inspector pled
guilty to conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and was
sentenced to 6 years and 6 months imprisonment. Waving Drug- Laden

Vehicles Through a Port of Entry Without Inspection

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 36 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Case 4 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA,
conspired with another immigration inspector (see case 6), a
Customs inspector (see case 8) and a former INS detention
enforcement officer (DEO) to smuggle drugs into the United States.
Over an 18- month period, the inspector waved vehicles bearing
approximately 6 tons of cocaine through the port of entry without
inspection. The smugglers used spotters, radio, telephone, verbal
communications, and a prearranged signaling system to guide
drivers to the corrupt inspectors' lanes. The inspector was
convicted of charges that included conspiracy to import cocaine
and importation of cocaine. He was sentenced to 8 years and 1
month imprisonment.

Case 5 An immigration inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, waved
approximately 10 shipments of marijuana through a port of entry
without inspection. The inspector notified the smuggler of his
lane assignments using encrypted messages. The smuggler drove to
the inspector's lane and notified him which vehicle( s) that were
following him contained the marijuana. The inspector allowed the
marijuana- laden vehicles to pass through his lane uninspected.
After his shift, the inspector met the smuggler at a local
restaurant and received his payment. According to the inspector,
he became involved with the drug smuggler because he had
substantial credit card debt and was on the verge of bankruptcy.
He was convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana and bribery and
was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.

Case 6 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, was
recruited to smuggle drugs by a woman he met while off duty. The
woman's mother acted as a spotter and used a pager to relay
information about the inspector's lane assignment to her daughter,
who rode in the drug- laden car. When the vehicle reached the
inspector's booth, he recognized his accomplice and waved the
vehicle through his lane without inspection. After his shift
ended, the inspector went to a prearranged location to receive
payment. The inspector was also implicated in another drug
conspiracy (see case 4). He pled guilty to bribery charges and was
sentenced to 8 years and 8 months imprisonment.

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 37 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Case 7 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, agreed
to allow her boyfriend, a member of a narcotics smuggling family,
to drive a vehicle loaded with marijuana through her lane without
inspection. She was arrested for conspiracy to import marijuana
and pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to import marijuana.
She was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months imprisonment.

Case 8 A Customs inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, conspired
with two immigration inspectors (see cases 4 and 6), a former INS
DEO, and six other individuals to smuggle thousands of pounds of
cocaine and marijuana into the United States between 1983 and
1992. The former DEO used his friendships with the Customs
inspector and the immigration inspectors to bring drugs through
the port of entry. The drug smugglers used spotters, radio,
telephone, verbal communications, and a prearranged signaling
system to coordinate the drug movements. The Customs inspector and
the immigration inspectors permitted the drug vehicles to enter
the United States without inspection. The Customs inspector was
convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana and was
sentenced to 24 years and 4 months imprisonment.

Case 9 A Customs inspector assigned to Douglas, AZ, was arrested
after a marijuana shipment was seized from a vehicle trying to
pass through the inspector's lane at the port of entry. When
narcotics dogs alerted canine enforcement officers to the vehicle,
the driver attempted to flee in his vehicle, but was apprehended.
After the driver's arrest, the inspector admitted that he had
known that the vehicle contained drugs. He also admitted that he
had waved the same vehicle through his lane without inspection
twice during the previous week. When the driver reached the
inspection booth, he used a prearranged signal to notify the
inspector that the vehicle should be passed without inspection.
The inspector pled guilty to conspiracy to import marijuana and
bribery and was sentenced to 5 years and 8 months imprisonment.

Case 10 A Customs inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, recruited and
conspired with a second Customs inspector (see case 11) to allow
drug loads through a

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 38 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

port of entry. Because the first inspector was not working at the
port of entry, he recruited the second inspector who was assigned
to the port. The two were arrested after they arrived at a local
restaurant to receive payment in exchange for allowing a load of
cocaine to pass through the port of entry. The inspector was
convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and three counts of
bribery. He was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months imprisonment.

Case 11 A Customs inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, conspired
with another Customs inspector (see case 10) to wave drug loads
through his lane without inspection. The drug crossings were
prearranged by telephone. The inspector used a pager and a code to
notify the drug smuggler of the lane he would be working and the
time to pass through the port of entry. The inspector waved all
vehicles through his lane without inspecting any vehicles or
referring any for secondary inspection. The inspector was arrested
after he went to a local restaurant to receive a bribe for
allowing a 1,000- kilogram load of cocaine through the port of
entry. He pled guilty to bribery and was sentenced to 7 years and
6 months imprisonment.

Case 12 An immigration inspector assigned to the Hidalgo, TX, port
of entry was arrested after he accepted bribes to wave drug loads
through the port of entry uninspected. The inspector met the drug
smuggler in Mexico and told him when he would be on duty. On one
occasion, the smuggler parked his drug- laden vehicle in Mexico
and walked half way across the international bridge that leads to
the port of entry. From there, the smuggler determined what lane
the inspector was assigned to work. He returned to his vehicle and
drove to the inspector's lane. After the drug smuggler was
arrested for smuggling marijuana, the inspector admitted he had
accepted bribes to wave drug loads through the port of entry. He
pled guilty to bribery charges and was sentenced to 4 years and 9
months imprisonment.

Case 13 An immigration inspector assigned to the San Ysidro, CA,
port of entry was arrested for waving drug- laden vehicles through
the port. A social acquaintance and drug trafficker asked the
inspector to allow him to admit a small amount of marijuana
through the port. The inspector agreed and over the course of a
year admitted between 10 and 15 drug loads through

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 39 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

his lane without inspection. The trafficker would telephone the
inspector at his home to determine his schedule. The trafficker
would locate the inspector on the line the next workday, or meet
with the inspector at a local restaurant after the inspector
started his shift. At these meetings, the inspector would tell the
trafficker what lanes and times he was working. After his arrest,
the inspector pled guilty to conspiracy to import a controlled
substance and bribery charges. He was sentenced to 30 years
imprisonment.

Case 14 An immigration inspector assigned to Hidalgo, TX, assisted
Mexican drug trafficking organizations by allowing thousands of
kilograms of cocaine and tons of marijuana to pass through his
inspection lane at the port of entry. He also obtained law
enforcement information and passed it on to drug traffickers. In
addition, the inspector received and attempted to sell drugs. He
was arrested and charged with conspiracy with intent to distribute
cocaine and marijuana. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 10
years and 1 month imprisonment.

Case 15 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Douglas, AZ, engaged in
marijuana trafficking using his Border Patrol vehicle to transport
marijuana from a predetermined pickup point at the border to a
different location. After he arrived at work and received his
assignment, the agent coordinated the movement of drug loads by
telephoning his accomplice( s) in Mexico and providing a code to
indicate where the loads could be safely brought across the
international boundary. Once the marijuana had been brought across
the border, he picked it up and loaded it into his Border Patrol
vehicle, and drove it to a predetermined location, where it was
then transferred to another vehicle. The agent pled guilty to
conspiracy to import marijuana, conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, and bribery. He was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months
imprisonment.

Case 16 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Chula Vista, CA, worked
with a relative to smuggle loads of marijuana across the border.
The relative would transport approximately three 250- pound loads
of marijuana across the border per week. During his shift, the
agent picked up the drugs and loaded them into his government
vehicle. He then transferred the Coordinating the

Movement of Drugs Across the Southwest Border Between Ports of
Entry

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 40 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

marijuana to his personal vehicle and transported the marijuana to
his residence. The agent was arrested after a search of his
residence revealed approximately 1 pound of marijuana, drug
scales, packaging material, and $16,700 in cash. He pled guilty to
possession of marijuana for sale and was sentenced to 9 months
imprisonment.

Case 17 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Douglas, AZ, assisted
drug traffickers in transporting a shipment of cocaine across the
border. He was not on duty at the time he attempted to assist the
drug smugglers. Two Border Patrol agents who were on duty
patrolling the border at night intercepted radio transmissions
among what sounded like drug smugglers coordinating the movement
of drugs across the border. One of the Border Patrol agents
thought he recognized the voice of one of the drug smugglers as
belonging to a Border Patrol agent whom he knew. A short time
later, the agents encountered the off- duty agent dressed in
black, wearing a two- way radio, and riding a bicycle along the
border. At the Border Patrol agent's trial, prosecutors presented
evidence that the agent had spent large sums of cash to buy cars
and real estate. Convicted of 11 felonies involving narcotics
smuggling and money laundering, he was sentenced to 30 years
imprisonment.

Case 18 An INS DEO assigned to Los Fresnos, TX, conspired with two
colleagues 1 (see case 19) and a former DEO to transport drug
loads past Border Patrol checkpoints using official INS vehicles.
These DEOs generally transported aliens to Houston for
deportation. The former DEO, who had become a drug smuggler,
recruited a former colleague, who, in turn, recruited another DEO.
On at least three occasions, the DEOs transported drugs past
Border Patrol checkpoints. One method the smugglers used was to
load drugs in the luggage compartment of an INS bus prior to
reaching a Border Patrol checkpoint. The Border Patrol agents at
the checkpoint did not inspect the official government vehicles
the smugglers used. After the drugs had been successfully
transported past the checkpoint, they were removed from the INS
vehicle. The DEO was arrested and convicted of drug conspiracy,
money laundering, and bribery. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment.

1 One of the DEOs involved in the conspiracy was indicted but fled
prior to trial and remains a fugitive. Because he was not
convicted, his case is not included among the 28 listed in this
appendix. Transporting Drugs

Past Border Patrol Checkpoints Within the United States

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 41 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Case 19 An INS DEO assigned to Los Fresnos, TX, conspired with two
colleagues and a former DEO to transport drug loads past INS
checkpoints using INS vehicles (see case 18). The DEO was
convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine and marijuana, conspiracy to launder money, and two counts
of bribery. He was sentenced to 5 years and 3 months imprisonment.

Case 20 A Border Patrol agent stationed at the Falfurrias, TX,
checkpoint was recruited by a DEO, who was a longtime friend, to
assist in a drugsmuggling operation (see case 21). He aided the
smugglers by waving drug loads through the checkpoint without
inspection. In addition, he drove loads of marijuana through the
checkpoint just prior to going on duty. The agent checked his work
schedule to see who was working at the checkpoint during the shift
preceding his own. He would only drive the marijuana through the
checkpoint when certain Border Patrol agents, who he was friends
with, or who he felt comfortable with, were working. He deposited
the drug loads at a safe house located beyond the checkpoint. He
would then return to the checkpoint to work his shift. He pled
guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
marijuana and was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months imprisonment.

Case 21 An INS DEO was recruited by a narcotics smuggler to
facilitate drug shipments from the Rio Grande Valley to Chicago,
IL. He recruited a longtime friend, who was a Border Patrol agent,
to wave loads through the Falfurrias, TX, checkpoint (see case
20). The officer was arrested attempting to drive a pickup truck
loaded with 292 pounds of marijuana through the Falfurrias
checkpoint. He pled guilty to bribery charges and was sentenced to
2 years imprisonment.

Case 22 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Naco, AZ, skimmed
legitimate drug seizures he made from aliens and either sold the
drugs to drug dealers or accepted a share of the profits from the
drug dealer's sale of the drugs. One of the drug dealers was the
agent's girlfriend's brother. After the brother's arrest, he
testified at the agent's trial. The investigation established that
the agent was living beyond his means. After the agent Selling
Drugs

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 42 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

was arrested, he was released on bond and fled to New Zealand. He
was apprehended and extradited to the United States. He was
convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The agent was
sentenced to 27 years and 6 months imprisonment.

Case 23 A Customs operational analysis specialist, responsible for
identifying importers who were suspected of smuggling drugs
through the Rio Grande Valley, agreed to sell confidential drug-
related intelligence information. He was convicted of bribery and
disclosure of confidential information and sentenced to 2 years
imprisonment.

Case 24 A Customs inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, was arrested
after an investigation revealed that she was disclosing sensitive
law enforcement information to her boyfriend, who was a drug
trafficker. She pled guilty to disclosure of confidential
information and was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment.

Case 25 A Customs canine enforcement officer assigned to El Paso,
TX, drove a drug- laden vehicle from Mexico to the United States
through a port of entry. The officer relied on his friendships
with coworkers at the port to ensure that his vehicle would not be
inspected. In addition, he agreed to drive a load of marijuana
through a checkpoint if it was closed. After his arrest, the
officer pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute. He was sentenced to 3 years and 4 months imprisonment.

Case 26 A Border Patrol agent assigned to El Paso, TX, was
associated with the leader of a vehicle theft ring that stole new
vehicles from dealerships and traded them for drugs. He was
arrested after he traded a stolen truck's engine and transmission
for a kilogram of cocaine. The agent was convicted for possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 6 years
and 6 months imprisonment. Disclosing Drug

Intelligence Information

Other

Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs
Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992-
1997

Page 43 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Case 27 An immigration inspector assigned to San Ysidro, CA, was
arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. The inspector, who was a drug user, committed his
crime while off duty. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 4 months
imprisonment.

Case 28 A Customs inspector assigned to Douglas, AZ, was arrested,
along with three coconspirators, and charged with conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute. One of the
coconspirators was a former INS immigration inspector who resigned
from INS after drugs were seized from a car that he had waved
through the port of entry. The Customs inspector was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment.

Appendix V Completion of Employment Background Reinvestigations

Page 44 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Reinvestigations overdue Total reinvestigations completed when due

Total reinvestigations

overdue Total reinvestigations

completed after due date

Total reinvestigations not completed as

of March 1998 Fiscal Year Position

Total reinvestigations

due Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

1997 Customs Inspector 368 99 27 269 73 25 7 244 66 INS
Immigration Inspector 103 46 45 57 55 12 12 45 44 INS Border
Patrol Agent 393 64 16 329 84 85 22 244 62

1996 Customs Inspector 294 46 16 248 84 124 42 124 42 INS
Immigration Inspector 67 29 43 38 57 8 12 30 45 INS Border Patrol
Agent 233 44 19 189 81 107 46 82 35

1995 Customs Inspector 120 16 13 104 87 51 43 53 44 INS
Immigration Inspector 78 28 36 50 64 31 40 19 24 INS Border Patrol
Agent 344 69 20 275 80 182 53 93 27

Source: GAO analysis of INS and Customs data.

Table V. 1: Completion of Employment Reinvestigations Due in
Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997 for Southwest Border Customs
Inspectors, INS Immigration Inspectors, and INS Border Patrol
Agents

Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice

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Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice

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Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice

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Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice

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Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice

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Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Justice, Office of
the Inspector General

Page 50 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Justice, Office of
the Inspector General

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service

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Appendix IX Major Contributors to This Report

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Weldon McPhail, Assistant Director Jay Jennings, Evaluator- in-
Charge Mark Tremba, Senior Evaluator David Alexander, Senior
Social Science Analyst Michael Little, Communications Analyst

Fredrick D. Berry, Senior Evaluator Enemencio S. Sanchez,
Evaluator Michael H. Harmond, Evaluator

Jan Montgomery, Assistant General Counsel General Government

Division, Washington, D. C.

Dallas Field Office Office of the General Counsel

Page 64 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control

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