Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM (Letter Report, 09/07/1999,
GAO/GGD-99-173).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on
background investigations conducted by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), focusing on: (1) the circumstances that led DEA to
consider relinquishing its authority to conduct personnel background
investigations; and (2) whether the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
acted in an independent and objective manner in choosing to review DEA
and its background investigations.
GAO noted that: (1) a series of evaluations in the 1990s critical of
DEA's background investigations and personnel security program caused
DEA to consider relinquishing its background investigation authority;
(2) the findings of OPM's assessments over much of the 1990s, an
assessment by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1998, and its own
assessment in 1999 triggered DEA's consideration of this issue; (3)
DEA's relinquishment of investigation authority would be consequential
because DEA and its contractor performed an estimated 5,600 background
investigations in 1998; (4) during the late 1990s, OPM reviewed a sample
of 265 background investigation reports prepared by DEA and its
contractors and determined that all but 1 investigation was deficient in
meeting the investigative requirements that DEA had agreed to follow;
(5) DOJ audited DEA's personnel security program in 1997 and found
deficiencies similar to what OPM had found in 1992 and again in 1998;
(6) based on the DOJ audit and the recurring finds of OPM, DOJ's
Assistant Attorney General for Administration told the DEA Administrator
in October 1998 that he believed that DEA should relinquish all of its
background investigation authority to OPM; (7) in early 1999, DEA
conducted its own examination of the personnel security program,
focusing on background investigations, and concluded that DEA was not
able to capably perform or oversee background investigations; (8) this
lack of capability allowed security clearances to be granted, regardless
of whether the related background investigations were adequate; (9) DEA
had allowed contract investigators to perform background investigations,
even though the investigators had not gone through required background
investigations because DEA did not have funds to finance such
investigations; (10) as of July 1999, subsequent to its examination of
the personnel security program, DEA was considering relinquishing its
authority for background investigations to OPM, except for the authority
to investigate backgrounds of applicants for DEA Special Agent
positions; (11) DEA believed that it would be unwise to separate the
background investigation from the overall applicant selection process by
having them conducted by an independent entity not familiar with DEA's
unique requirements for Special Agents; and (12) OPM appeared to have
been objective and independent in choosing to review DEA's personnel
security program and background investigations.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-99-173
TITLE: Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead
DEA to Relinquish Its Authority to OPM
DATE: 09/07/1999
SUBJECT: Federal employees
Personnel management
Human resources utilization
Security clearances
Interagency relations
Personnel recruiting
Internal controls
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to Congressional Requesters September 1999 BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to Relinquish Its
Authority to OPM GAO/GGD-99-173 United States General Accounting
Office
General Government Division Washington, D.C. 20548 B-283410
September 7, 1999 The Honorable Frank R. Wolf House of
Representatives The Honorable Charles S. Robb United States Senate
To become federal employees, work for federal contractors, or gain
access to federally restricted information and areas, individuals
commonly undergo personnel background investigations to determine
their suitability for employment or access to classified national
security information. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
responsible for ensuring that background investigations are
adequately conducted. OPM can delegate authority to agencies to
perform background investigations, as it did for the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), a component of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). However, as of July 1999, DEA was considering
relinquishing background investigation authority to OPM, except
for the authority to investigate the backgrounds of applicants for
DEA Special Agent positions. As you requested, this report
describes the circumstances that led DEA to consider relinquishing
its authority to conduct personnel background investigations. It
also assesses whether OPM acted in an independent and objective
manner in choosing to review DEA and its background
investigations. This latter objective came about because OPM would
be contractually obligated to use its own contractor to do DEA's
background investigations if DEA relinquished authority. This
contracting firm was established in 1996, when OPM privatized much
of its background investigation function.1 Most of the firm's
employees were former OPM employees. A series of evaluations in
the 1990s critical of DEA's background RESULTS IN BRIEF
investigations and personnel security program caused DEA to
consider relinquishing its background investigation authority. The
findings of OPM's assessments over much of the 1990s, an
assessment by DOJ in 1998, and its own assessment in 1999
triggered DEA's consideration of this issue. DEA's 1The U. S.
Investigations Services, Inc. (USIS) was created when the OPM
function was privatized. Under OPM's contract with USIS, OPM must
order all of its requirements for background investigation
services from USIS during the term of the contract. This contract
is for a term of 36 months plus two 12-month options for a total
contract term of 60 months. Page 1
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410
relinquishment of investigation authority would be consequential
because, although the numbers varied by year, DEA and its
contractor performed an estimated 5,600 background investigations
in 1998. During the late 1990s, OPM reviewed a sample of 265
background investigation reports prepared by DEA and its
contractors and determined that all but 1 investigation was
deficient in meeting the investigative requirements that DEA had
agreed to follow. The deficiencies included, for example, a
failure to conduct searches related to foreign travel and searches
of law enforcement records. In addition, in 1992 and again in
1998, OPM reviewed DEA's personnel security program. It identified
numerous deficiencies in 1992 that persisted in 1998. DOJ audited
DEA's personnel security program in 1997 and found deficiencies
similar to what OPM had found in 1992 and again in 1998. Based on
the DOJ audit and the recurring findings of OPM, DOJ's Assistant
Attorney General for Administration told the DEA Administrator in
October 1998 that he (the Assistant Attorney General) believed
that DEA should relinquish all of its background investigation
authority to OPM. In early 1999, DEA conducted its own examination
of the personnel security program, focusing on background
investigations, and concluded that DEA was not able to capably
perform or oversee background investigations. This lack of
capability allowed security clearances to be granted, regardless
of whether the related background investigations were adequate.
Budget concerns also led DEA to consider relinquishing its
background investigation authority. DEA had allowed contract
investigators to perform background investigations, even though
the investigators had not gone through required background
investigations because DEA did not have funds to finance such
investigations. As of July 1999, subsequent to its examination of
the personnel security program, DEA was considering relinquishing
its authority for background investigations to OPM, except for the
authority to investigate backgrounds of applicants for DEA Special
Agent positions. DEA believed that it would be unwise to separate
the background investigation from the overall applicant selection
process by having them conducted by an independent entity not
familiar with DEA's unique requirements for Special Agents.
Special Agents had historically conducted the background
investigations of applicants and would continue to do so,
according to DEA. Page 2 GAO/GGD-99-
173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 OPM appeared to us to
have been objective and independent in choosing to review DEA's
personnel security program and background investigations. We
assessed whether OPM acted objectively and independently by
examining OPM's responsibilities for the security program and
background investigations and by examining whether OPM treated
other agencies differently from DEA. Under an executive order and
an agreement with DEA, OPM was required to review the security
program and background investigations. Given DEA's history of
deficient background investigations, we believe OPM had a
responsibility to review the investigations often. OPM reviewed
most other agencies that currently possessed delegated authority
with roughly the same frequency as DEA. OPM was comparably
critical in its assessment of other agencies' background
investigations, as it was of DEA's. Rather than raising a question
regarding OPM's independence and objectivity, the evidence raises
the question of why OPM did not act to rescind DEA's delegated
authority. According to an OPM official, OPM had made commitments
at the time it privatized its investigation function that it would
not rescind delegations of authority in order to give new business
to the privatized company. The official said OPM had been
sensitive to these commitments. We have not evaluated OPM's
explanation of this situation. However, at your request we are
separately reviewing related issues concerning OPM's oversight
function regarding background investigations. Except for summer
employees and some contractors, the scope of DEA Background
background investigations was designed to assess whether
individuals met the requirements to receive a "top-secret"
clearance. DEA used the results of these background investigations
to (1) help determine whether individuals were suitable for
employment and (2) provide a basis for granting a security
clearance. Employees with top-secret clearances can have access to
information classified up to and including the top-secret level.
The unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause
irreparable damage to the national interest and loss of human
life. Unless otherwise provided by law, the investigation of a
person entering or employed by the federal government in the
competitive service, or by career appointment in the Senior
Executive Service, is the responsibility of OPM.2 Agencies may
request delegated authority from OPM to conduct or contract out
investigations of their own employees and applicants. 2The
competitive service includes (1) all civilian positions in the
executive branch of the federal government not specifically
excepted from civil service laws, and not in the Senior Executive
Service, Page 3
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 DEA obtained
this authority from OPM in the early 1980s. The two agencies
executed a Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement, which
transferred authority to DEA and set forth the general
requirements that DEA must follow. The memorandum has been renewed
periodically, but the most recent one expired in September 1998.
Nevertheless, OPM and DEA have continued to follow it, according
to officials from both agencies. The Memorandum of Understanding
and Agreement between OPM and DEA required DEA to follow the
background investigation standards used by OPM. These standards
held that background investigations, needed to provide employees a
top-secret clearance, must meet investigation requirements
established by Executive Order 12968, "Access to Classified
Information." This executive order directed the President's
Security Policy Board to develop a common set of investigative
standards to be used by executive agencies for determining
eligibility for access to classified information. The President
approved the standards that the Board developed in March 1997.
DEA's background investigations were part of its personnel
security program. DEA's Office of Security Programs was
responsible for operating the program and, in connection with that
responsibility, was to provide policy guidance and management of
background investigations. This office was responsible for
ensuring that appropriate investigations were completed on
applicants and employees as well as providing security
adjudication services for DEA. As part of these adjudication
services, this office used the results of background
investigations to determine whether individuals were suitable for
employment and whether a security clearance should be granted. In
addition to DEA, OPM and DOJ both had responsibility for
overseeing the program and DEA's background investigations. DEA
Special Agents did the initial background investigations on
applicants for DEA Special Agent positions, which was DEA's core
occupation. DEA usually contracted out for initial background
investigations for other employees, including Intelligence
Research Specialists, Diversion Investigators, Chemists, and
Contractors, and the periodic reinvestigation for all employees,
including Special Agents. An executive order required agencies to
renew employees' security clearances periodically, and the and (2)
all positions in the legislative and judicial branches of the
federal government and in the government of the District of
Columbia made subject to the civil service laws by statute. Page 4
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 background
investigations that were made for these renewals were referred to
as reinvestigations. In fiscal year 1998, an estimated 5,583
background investigations were conducted of DEA applicants and
employees. Of that number, about 3,401 were initial background
investigations and another 2,182 were reinvestigations. Most of
the investigations (about 74 percent) and all of the
reinvestigations in 1998 were done by one contractor. However, DEA
Special Agents conducted the background investigations of persons
who applied for Special Agent positions, which accounted for about
26 percent of all initial background investigations. Based on
investigative standards implementing Executive Order 12968, a
typical background investigation for a top-secret clearance would
include major investigative components such as * proof of birth
and citizenship for subjects and their immediate family members; *
a search of investigative files and other records held by federal
agencies, including the FBI and CIA (referred to as a national
agency check); * financial review, including a credit bureau
check; * review of state and local law enforcement and court
records (referred to as a local agency check); * verification of
recent education; * record checks and personal testimony at
places of employment; * interviews of references including
coworkers, employers, friends, educators, neighbors, and other
individuals such as an ex-spouse; and * a personal interview with
the applicant. To identify and describe the circumstances that led
DEA to consider Scope and relinquishing its delegated
authority to conduct personnel background Methodology
investigations, we interviewed cognizant officials of DEA, DOJ,
and OPM. We obtained and reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding
and Agreement between DEA and OPM regarding this authority. We
obtained and reviewed all appraisals of DEA's personnel security
program and/or the quality of background investigations done by
OPM and DOJ since 1992, when DEA was first appraised by OPM as a
separate DOJ component. We did not review individual background
investigations or DEA's personnel security program. We also did
not determine whether any employee who received a security
clearance based on a deficient background investigation would have
been denied clearance if the investigation had been performed
according to required standards. Page 5
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 We obtained
and reviewed an internal DEA assessment of its personnel security
program. We also obtained and reviewed relevant correspondence
between DEA, DOJ, and OPM related to DEA's security program and
its background investigations. To assess whether OPM acted in an
independent and objective manner in choosing to review DEA's
background investigations and security program, we applied three
criteria posed in the following questions: * What was OPM's
responsibility for reviewing background investigations performed
by DEA and/or its contractors? * Did the frequency of OPM's
reviews seem reasonable given the state of DEA's background
investigations and program? * Was the frequency of OPM's
oversight activities at other agencies with delegated authority
similar or dissimilar to the frequency of OPM's oversight at DEA?
For this second objective, we reviewed Executive Order 10450,
"Security Requirements for Government Employment," which among
other things specified OPM's responsibilities for reviewing
federal agencies' personnel security programs. We also identified
all agencies, in addition to DEA, that had received delegated
authority from OPM to perform background investigations. We
compared OPM's oversight activities-the frequency of reviews and
the results-to OPM's oversight activities at DEA. We requested
comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General of
the United States on behalf of DOJ and DEA. We also requested
comments from the Director, OPM. OPM's comments are discussed near
the end of this letter and are reprinted in appendix I. DOJ orally
provided technical and clarifying comments, which we incorporated
into this report. We did our work in Washington, D.C., from May
through July 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. As of July 1999, DEA was considering whether
to relinquish its personnel- DEA Was Considering
security background investigation authority to OPM. It had been
brought Relinquishing Its to this point by the
deficiencies found by OPM over much of the decade and because of
an assessment DOJ made in 1997. DOJ initiated discussions
Background with DEA in late 1998 about
relinquishing its authority. Partially in Investigation Authority
response to this initiative, DEA conducted an assessment and
concluded that it lacked the expertise and resources to capably
perform or oversee all of its background investigations. Page 6
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 Through a
Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement with OPM, DEA OPM
Continually Found was required to forward all background
investigation reports to OPM when Background Investigations
they were completed. OPM was required to review samples of reports
to Deficient determine whether investigative
requirements called for by the agreement were met. In addition to
reviewing completed investigation reports, OPM was required to
assess DEA's overall personnel security program under which
background investigations were conducted. OPM's reviews of
background investigation reports submitted by DEA continually
found the investigations deficient. Between 1996 and 1998, OPM
reviewed a total of 265 background investigations conducted by DEA
and its contractors.3 OPM found all but one investigation
deficient (i. e., all but one failed to fully comply with OPM
investigative requirements, which DEA agreed to follow). Some of
these background investigations contained a single deficiency
while others contained more than one deficiency. There was no
readily available tabulation of the deficiencies for all 264
investigations found deficient and the nature of those
deficiencies. However, some information was available. The 49 DEA
investigative reports that OPM found deficient in 1998 contained
221 deficiencies. Six reports contained one deficiency, and the
remaining 43 reports contained multiple deficiencies. The types of
deficiencies OPM identified include * not determining the nature
and extent of contact between a personal source and the subject of
the investigation; * gaps in coverage of the verification,
through personal sources, of all of the subject's major
activities, unemployment, and means of support; * lack of or
inadequate follow-up of issues admitted during the personal
interview or disclosed on the Questionnaire for National Security
Positions; * failure to search Central Intelligence Agency files
related to subject's foreign-born status or foreign travel; *
failure to provide information from public sources that was
complete, such as bankruptcies, financial matters, and divorce; *
neglecting to supply verification of subject's citizenship through
Immigration and Naturalization Service searches; and * failure to
obtain appropriate verification of an individual's name, date of
birth, and place of birth through state and local bureaus of vital
statistics. 3The 265 reports were randomly selected, according to
an OPM official, but were not representative of all DEA background
investigations. DEA did not send all completed reports to OPM. Of
the 265 reports, OPM reviewed 145 in 1996, 70 in 1997, and 50 in
1998. DEA did not have data on the number of investigations
conducted in 1996 and 1997. Page 7
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 Generally,
there is no standard for stating how serious a deficiency might be
or what type is the most serious, because the deficiencies
generally are errors of omission, such as failing to check a law
enforcement record. Ultimately, a deficiency's seriousness depends
on what type of activity might have been found if the appropriate
search had been conducted or if a particular investigative
technique had been used. Also, a seemingly less serious deficiency
may provide an investigative lead that uncovers activity that
might compromise the nation's security interest. OPM returned the
reports that it found deficient to DEA for further work and
correction. However, in 1998, when OPM followed up on the
deficient reports that it identified in 1996 and 1997, OPM
generally found that DEA had not corrected the deficiencies. OPM
also found that even though the background investigations were
deficient, DEA still granted security clearances. In addition to
its periodic review of investigations, OPM also reviewed DEA's
overall personnel security program in 1992 and again 6 years later
in 1998. OPM found numerous deficiencies in 1992, and it found
that DEA still had not corrected most of those deficiencies in
1998. The OPM findings include the following: * The
reinvestigation program did not effectively identify employees who
were subject to routine reinvestigations. At DEA, employees were
required to have their security clearances renewed every 5 years.
Many employees in "Critical Sensitive/Top-Secret" positions were
overdue for reinvestigation. * DEA's Planning and Inspection
Manual provisions were insufficient because they did not include
pertinent OPM and DOJ regulatory guidelines. The manual, among
other deficiencies, failed to incorporate administrative due
process guidelines for applicants, employees, and contract
employees to appeal the denial or revocation of a security
clearance. * Physical security safeguards for the storage and
protection of investigative files were insufficient. * Personnel
security adjudicators whose job was to decide who would be granted
security clearances needed additional training and oversight. *
DEA's Background Investigation Handbook did not include mandatory
OPM investigative requirements. * DEA did not forward copies of
all its completed background investigations to OPM, as required by
the conditions of its delegated authority. Page 8
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 In addition
to OPM reviews, DEA's security program was subject to DOJ
Requested That DEA compliance reviews by DOJ, which was
responsible for the development, Consider Relinquishing Its
supervision, and administration of security programs within the
Delegated Authority department. In 1997, DOJ audited
the DEA program and reported the results to DEA. Based on the
results of this review and OPM's reviews, DOJ initiated
discussions with DEA in 1998 on relinquishing its background
investigation authority to OPM. DOJ's audit identified
deficiencies that were similar to those that OPM identified in its
review of DEA's security program in 1992. OPM also found the same
sort of deficiencies in 1998 after the DOJ audit. The DOJ findings
identified issues and deficiencies in (1) periodic
reinvestigations; (2) background investigations; (3) due process
procedures; (4) resources for monitoring, tracking, and
controlling the investigation process; (5) adjudication (process
for deciding whether security clearances should be granted); and
(6) staff competence. DOJ referred to its findings as critical
security issues and deficiencies. In October 1998, the Assistant
Attorney General for Administration wrote to the DEA Administrator
expressing his belief that DEA's investigative function should be
relinquished to OPM but said as well that he would like to hear
the DEA Administrator's comments. The memorandum was based on the
DOJ audit and on the recurring findings of OPM. In that
memorandum, DOJ's Assistant Attorney General also expressed
concern with what DOJ saw as DEA's inability to maintain an
effective overall personnel security program. This inability came
about, the memorandum stated, because resources were consumed in
doing certain functions-checking federal records and performing
quality control-that OPM performed when doing background
investigations for other agencies. OPM checked the files of
various federal agencies, such as the investigative and criminal
history files of the FBI, by computer. Unlike OPM, DEA lacked the
extensive computer links to federal files and did many file checks
manually. Checking federal files were referred to as National
Agency Checks in background investigations. In the Spring of 1999,
DEA assessed its personnel security program, DEA Conducted a Self-
concentrating on background investigations. This assessment,
according to Assessment and Concluded DEA officials, was done in
response to the Assistant Attorney General for It Lacked Expertise
and Administration's October memorandum, subsequent
meetings with DOJ Resources officials, and
DEA's own awareness of the condition of its personnel security
program. The assessment covered areas such as the (1) results of
reviews performed by OPM and DOJ, (2) requirements of the Page 9
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 Memorandum
of Understanding and Agreement with OPM, (3) efforts to correct
deficiencies with the security program and background
investigations, (4) contract with the company that currently did
background investigations for DEA, and (5) other management issues
related to background investigations. Although its assessment
noted efforts to resolve concerns raised by OPM and DOJ, DEA
identified several issues that led to the conclusion that it did
not have the capability to effectively perform or oversee
background investigations. It also concluded that some security
clearances were granted based on deficient background
investigations. As of July 1999, DEA was considering whether to
relinquish its background investigation authority to OPM.
Following are some of the issues that the assessment identified,
which led to DEA's conclusion that it had not effectively
performed or overseen background investigations. * DEA had
historically failed to capably perform or oversee its background
investigations. * DEA found that the majority of people working
in its personnel security unit had not been adequately trained
regarding the laws, regulations, executive orders, policies, and
technical practices central to initiating, and performing and
overseeing background investigations, as well as providing
personnel security adjudicative services to DEA. * DEA had not
ensured, as required by the conditions of its delegated authority,
that each investigator performing investigations under its
delegation had been screened by an investigation that met no less
than OPM's top-secret clearance requirements. DEA did not comply
with this requirement for its current contractor because DEA did
not have funds to finance such investigations. * DEA had not
developed or implemented an integrity follow-up program to monitor
contract investigators, as required under its delegated authority.
DEA concluded that under current circumstances without relief that
OPM would provide, it was likely that DEA would remain in
violation of the integrity follow-up program requirement. * DEA
personnel performed National Agency Checks, a requirement of each
background investigation. DEA's costs for performing these checks
was associated with DEA's need to conduct many of these checks
manually. In its self-assessment, DEA stated that OPM, however,
had sophisticated computer facilities that permitted it to conduct
required National Agency Checks through direct-access computer
links with all the relevant Page 10
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 agencies.
DEA concluded that it saw no advantage to duplicate a capability
that already existed in OPM. * DEA bears ultimate responsibility
for ensuring that background investigations performed under its
delegation from OPM conform to mandated investigative criteria.
DEA had been heavily criticized for its performance in this
regard. DEA concluded that OPM has a fully qualified and
experienced quality-control staff and that it was not reasonable
for DEA to continue to attempt to duplicate this capability. As of
July 1999, DEA had not made a final decision on relinquishing its
background investigation authority. From what DEA officials told
us, it was considering retaining the authority to investigate
individuals who apply for DEA Special Agent positions but
relinquishing the authority to do all other background
investigations, including periodic reinvestigations of Special
Agents. In his October 1998 memorandum, the Assistant Attorney
General for Administration said that he believed that DEA should
relinquish all authority, including the authority to investigate
the backgrounds of Special Agent applicants. According to DEA,
relinquishing all other background investigation authority would
allow DEA to redirect resources into the investigative process for
Special Agent applicants. The redirected resources would go into
increased training, policy guidance, and oversight. DEA said it
believed that it would be unwise to segregate the background
investigation from the overall Special Agent applicant selection
process by having them conducted by an independent entity not
familiar with DEA's unique requirements for Special Agents.
Special Agents did the background investigations of applicants and
would continue to do these investigations if that authority was
retained, according to DEA. DEA would not be the first agency to
relinquish background investigation authority to OPM. According to
an OPM official, five agencies have done so: (1) the Federal
Emergency Management Agency in 1991, (2) the Department of
Commerce in 1994, (3) the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Office of Inspector General in 1994, (5) the U.S.
Soldiers and Airmens Home in 1994, and (5) the Department of
Education Office of Inspector General in 1998. Page 11
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 As
previously mentioned, OPM had a sole-source contract with USIS, a
OPM Appeared to firm that OPM was instrumental in creating,
to do all background Have Acted in an investigations except
those done by agencies under delegation agreements. If DEA were to
relinquish its background investigation authority to OPM,
Objective and the contract between OPM and USIS would
require OPM to order this Independent Manner investigative work
from USIS until the contract expired. Because of the relationship
between OPM and USIS, we reviewed whether OPM acted in an
objective and independent manner in choosing to review DEA's
background investigation reports and personnel security program.
To gauge whether OPM acted objectively and independently, we
considered OPM's responsibilities towards the security program and
the program's background investigations and whether OPM's
treatment of DEA differed from its treatment of other agencies.
OPM appeared to have acted in an objective and independent manner.
OPM was required to review DEA's personnel security program and
background investigations. This requirement was contained in the
Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement between OPM and DEA,
which provided that OPM would monitor the agreement as part of its
security program appraisal process. In addition, Executive Order
10450, "Security Requirements for Government Employment," required
OPM to make a continuing study of the order's implementation. The
purpose of this continuing study is to determine whether
deficiencies exist in security programs that could harm the
national interest and weaken national security. As already noted,
OPM repeatedly found deficiencies in both the security program and
the background investigations, which DEA usually did not correct,
and DEA concluded that it could not capably perform or oversee
background investigations. Given DEA's history of noncompliance,
we believe that it was reasonable for OPM to do reviews of DEA's
investigations. The frequency with which OPM reviewed DEA's
investigation program appeared to be generally in line with the
frequency with which OPM reviewed other agencies. In addition to
DEA, three other agencies-the U.S. Marshals Service, the Small
Business Administration, and the U.S. Customs Service-possessed
authority delegated from OPM to conduct background investigations
in fiscal year 1999. OPM reviewed the security program of the U.S.
Marshals Service in 1989 and 1999 (in progress as of July 1999),
the Customs Service in 1989 and 1994, and the Small Business
Administration in 1983 and 1992. In comparison, it reviewed the
DEA program in 1992 and followed up in 1998. Page 12
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 OPM reviewed
a sample of the background investigation reports of the U.S.
Marshals Service and the Small Business Administration from July
1996 through April 1999, as it did for DEA. According to an OPM
official, OPM did not routinely review the background
investigation reports of the U.S. Customs Service because the
Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement delegating the
investigative authority to Customs did not include this
requirement. However, one OPM review of 89 Customs investigations,
completed in 1993, found 46 percent to be deficient. OPM was
critical in its assessment of other agencies, as it was with DEA.
For the aggregate samples of background investigation reports that
OPM reviewed from July 1996 through April 1999, the rate of
deficiency for the Small Business Administration was 75 percent.
It was 93 percent for those from the U.S. Marshals Service. In
comparison, the rate of deficiency for background investigation
reports from DEA, which DEA and two contractors prepared over
several years (1996 to 1999), was 98 percent. OPM computed these
percentages by dividing the total number of reports it reviewed
into the number it found deficient. Rather than raising a question
regarding DEA's independence and objectivity in choosing to review
background investigations performed by DEA and its contractors,
the evidence raises the question of why OPM did not act to rescind
DEA's delegated authority. According to OPM, the Administration
announced in late 1994 that OPM's Investigative Unit was to be
privatized. The privatization occurred in July 1996. During that
period, two private investigative firms sued OPM. According to
OPM, these firms believed that OPM was going to take work away
from them to support its privatized contractor. The suits were
settled when OPM agreed, among other things, that it would not
rescind delegations of authority, such as the DEA delegation,
except for unsatisfactory performance. Also during this period, a
former director of OPM testified before Congress on its
privatization plans and emphasized that OPM did not intend to
rescind any delegated authorities in order to give new business to
the privatized company. According to OPM, the agency has been
sensitive to these commitments as well as to the potential
perceptions of OPM's motivation for rescinding any such
delegation. We have not evaluated OPM's explanation of this
situation. However, at your request we are separately reviewing
related issues concerning OPM's oversight function regarding
background investigations. DEA had a long history of deficiencies
in its personnel security program, Conclusion including
background investigations done by both contractor and agency Page
13 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background
Investigations B-283410 employees that did not meet federal
standards. Federal agency security programs are aimed at
protecting national security interests and are predicated on
thoroughly reviewing the backgrounds of federal job applicants and
employees to ensure their suitability for employment and/or access
to national security information. Given DEA's difficulties in
ensuring the quality of its personnel background investigations
and its conclusion that it is not able to capably perform or
oversee background investigations, its consideration of
relinquishing its delegated authority is not unreasonable. Nor do
OPM's periodic appraisals of DEA background investigations for
adherence to prescribed standards appear unreasonable. OPM has a
mandated responsibility to oversee agency security programs,
including background investigations, and appeared not to have
treated DEA significantly differently, in terms of oversight from
other agencies with delegated authority. We received written
comments on a draft of this report from the Director Agency
Comments and of OPM and oral comments on August 17, 1999, from the
Director, Audit our Evaluation Liaison Office,
DOJ. The OPM Director said that she was pleased that we concluded
that OPM was objective and independent in its oversight of the DEA
personnel security program. Regarding the report's statement that
the evidence raises a question of why OPM did not rescind DEA's
delegated authority, the Director said that OPM had worked with
DEA over several years to help it correct deficiencies that OPM
had identified and that several factors mitigated against the
rescission of DEA's authority. In addition to the factors cited on
page 13 of this report, OPM said that it continued to work with
DEA and DOJ to resolve the continuing personnel security problems
and that OPM had let a reasonable amount of time elapse for DOJ,
which is responsible for all of the department's security
programs, to take the necessary action. In October 1998, DOJ
advised DEA to relinquish its authority. OPM's complete comments
are reprinted in appendix I. The DOJ Audit Liaison Director orally
provided technical and clarifying comments, which we incorporated
into this report. The Audit Liaison Director said that DOJ had no
other comments. We are sending copies of this report to Senators
Daniel K. Akaka, Robert C. Byrd, Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Thad
Cochran, Susan M. Collins, Byron L. Dorgan, Richard J. Durbin,
Judd Gregg, Orrin G. Hatch, Ernest F. Hollings, Patrick J. Leahy,
Carl Levin, Joseph I. Lieberman, Charles E. Schumer, Ted Stevens,
Fred Thompson, Strom Thurmond, and George V. Page 14
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations B-283410 Voinovich
and Representatives Dan Burton, John Conyers, Jr., Elijah
Cummings, Jim Kolbe, Steny H. Hoyer, Henry J. Hyde, Bill McCollum,
John L. Mica, Patsy T. Mink, David Obey, Harold Rogers, Joe
Scarborough, Robert C. Scott, Jose E. Serrano, Henry A. Waxman,
and C. W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or Ranking
Minority Members of Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees.
We will also send copies to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney
General of the United States, Department of Justice; The Honorable
Janice R. Lachance, Director, Office of Personnel Management; and
Mr. Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice and other interested
parties. We will make copies of this report available to others on
request. If you have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me or Richard W. Caradine at (202) 512- 8676. Key
contributors to this assignment were John Ripper and Anthony
Assia. Michael Brostek Associate Director, Federal Management and
Workforce Issues Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-173
DEA Background Investigations Contents 1 Letter 18 Appendix I
Comments From the Office of Personnel Management Abbreviations DEA
Drug Enforcement Administration DOJ Department of Justice
OPM Office of Personnel Management Page 16
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations Page 17 GAO/GGD-
99-173 DEA Background Investigations Appendix I Comments From the
Office of Personnel Management Page 18 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA
Background Investigations Appendix I Comments From the Office of
Personnel Management Page 19
GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations Page 20 GAO/GGD-
99-173 DEA Background Investigations Ordering Information The
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