Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (Chapter
Report, 07/21/1999, GAO/GGD-99-108).

High demand for illegal drugs in the United States has persisted
throughout the 1990s, as has the flow of illegal drugs into this
country. The cost of illegal drug use in this country has been pegged at
about $110 billion annually, including lost jobs and productivity,
health problems, and economic hardships to families. Also, many violent
crimes are drug related. Funding for federal drug control efforts has
risen by nearly 50 percent during the 1990s, reaching about $18 billion
in fiscal year 1999. Funding for the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) nearly doubled, from $806 million in 1990 to about $1.5 billion in
1999. DEA staff grew from 6,000 in 1990 to 8,400 in 1998. During the
1990s, DEA strengthened many of its operations. The agency began to work
more closely with state and local law enforcement and help combat
drug-related violent crime in local communities. DEA intercepted the
communications of drug trafficking groups at home and abroad in order to
target their leaders and dismantle their operations. DEA began to
participate in two interagency programs to investigate major drug
trafficking groups in Latin America and Asia. DEA also changed its
foreign operations by screening and training special foreign policy
units to combat drug trafficking in key foreign countries. DEA has major
responsibilities under the Office of National Drug Control Policy's
national drug control strategy for reducing the drug supply. However,
DEA has yet to develop measurable performance targets for its programs
and initiatives that are consistent with those adopted for the national
strategy. Consequently, it is difficult to assess how successful DEA's
programs have been in reducing the supply of illegal drugs into the
United States. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress;
see: Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s, by
Norman J. Rabkin, Director of Administration of Justice Issues, before
the Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on the Judiciary.
GAO/T-GGD-99-149, July 29 (13 pages).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GGD-99-108
     TITLE:  Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s
      DATE:  07/21/1999
   SUBJECT:  Performance measures
	     Drug trafficking
	     International relations
	     Narcotics
	     Strategic planning
	     National policies
	     Law enforcement
	     Federal/state relations
	     Interagency relations
	     Organized crime
IDENTIFIER:  DOJ Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program
	     DEA Mobile Enforcement Team Program
	     National Drug Control Policy
	     DEA State and Local Task Force Program
	     DEA Kingpin Strategy
	     National Strategy Performance Measurement System
	     DEA Vetted Unit Program
	     DEA Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program
	     ONDCP High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program
	     Customs Service/DEA/FBI Operation Reciprocity
	     Customs Service/DEA Operation Limelight
	     DEA Operation Tiger Trap
	     DOJ Violent Crime Reduction Program

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO               Report
    to Congressional Requesters July 1999         DRUG CONTROL DEA's
    Strategies and Operations in the 1990s GAO/GGD-99-108 United
    States General Accounting Office
    General Government Division Washington, D.C.  20548 B-279033 July
    21, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on
    International Narcotics Control United States Senate The Honorable
    Bill McCollum Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime Committee on the
    Judiciary House of Representatives As you requested, this report
    discusses the strategies and operations of the Drug Enforcement
    Administration (DEA) in the 1990s.  Specifically, the report
    discusses (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs,
    initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to
    carry out its mission, including its efforts to (a) target and
    investigate national and international drug traffickers and (b)
    help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug
    offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2)
    whether DEA's goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and
    performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control
    Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing
    needs and allocated the additional staff.  It includes a
    recommendation to the Attorney General regarding the development
    of measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and
    dismantling drug trafficking organizations. We are sending copies
    of this report to the Honorable Janet F. Reno, Attorney General;
    the Honorable Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrator of the Drug
    Enforcement Administration; the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey,
    Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the
    Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director of the Office of Management and
    Budget; and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of
    State. Copies will be made available to others on request. Page 1
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s B-279033 If you have
    any questions, please call me or Dan Harris at (202) 512-8777. Key
    contributors to the report are acknowledged in appendix III.
    Norman J. Rabkin Director, Administration of Justice Issues Page 2
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 3    GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary During the
    1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted
    Purpose               at very high levels and continued to
    adversely affect American society. The Office of National Drug
    Control Policy (ONDCP), in its 1999 National Drug Control
    Strategy, notes that illegal drugs cost our society about $110
    billion annually. The costs of drug abuse include lost jobs and
    productivity, health problems, and economic hardships to families.
    In addition, many violent crimes are drug related, according to
    ONDCP. Funding for federal drug control efforts has increased, in
    constant 1999 dollars, by about 49 percent in the 1990s to the
    fiscal year 1999 level of about $18 billion. Funding for the Drug
    Enforcement Administration (DEA) almost doubled, in constant 1999
    dollars, from about $806 million in fiscal year 1990 to about $1.5
    billion in fiscal year 1999; the number of DEA staff increased
    from about 6,000 in fiscal year 1990 to about 8,400 in fiscal year
    1998. In view of the increased funding for federal drug control
    efforts and the nation's persistent drug problem, the Chairmen of
    the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Senate Caucus on
    International Narcotics Control requested that GAO determine,
    among other things, *  what major enforcement strategies,
    programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the
    1990s to carry out its mission; and *  whether DEA's strategic
    goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance
    measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy.
    During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of
    its Results in Brief      operations, i.e., its strategies,
    programs, initiatives, and approaches. *  DEA expanded its
    domestic enforcement operations to work more with state and local
    law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related violent
    crime in local communities. *  DEA implemented an investigative
    approach, domestically and internationally, focusing on
    intercepting the communications of major drug trafficking
    organizations to target the leaders and dismantle their
    operations. *  DEA started participating in two interagency
    programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking
    organizations in Latin America and Asia. *  DEA changed its
    foreign operations by screening and training special foreign
    police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign
    countries. Page 4                                 GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary DEA has significant
    responsibilities for the drug supply reduction portion of ONDCP's
    National Drug Control Strategy. DEA's strategic goals and
    objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives, in the
    1990s have been consistent with the National Drug Control
    Strategy. However, DEA has not developed measurable performance
    targets for its programs and initiatives that are consistent with
    those adopted for the National Strategy. As a result, it is
    difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Congress, and
    the public to assess how effective DEA has been in achieving its
    strategic goals and the effect its programs and initiatives in the
    1990s have had on reducing the illegal drug supply. GAO is making
    a recommendation to help improve this situation. DEA's overall
    mission is to enforce the nation's drug laws and regulations
    Background                       and to bring drug traffickers to
    justice. DEA is the lead agency responsible for enforcing the
    federal drug control laws and for coordinating and pursuing U.S.
    drug investigations in foreign countries. DEA's primary
    responsibilities include (1) investigating major drug traffickers
    operating at interstate and international levels and criminals and
    drug gangs who perpetrate violence in local communities; (2)
    managing a national drug intelligence system; (3) seizing and
    forfeiting traffickers' assets; (4) coordinating and cooperating
    with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on mutual
    drug enforcement efforts; and (5) working on drug law enforcement
    programs with its counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out
    its responsibilities, in December 1998, along with its
    headquarters offices, DEA had 21 field divisions throughout the
    United States and its territories, each with numerous suboffices,
    and 79 offices in 56 foreign countries. At the end of fiscal year
    1998, DEA had about 8,400 persons on board, including about 4,300
    special agents. Principal Findings Since it was established in
    1973, DEA's top priority has been to disrupt and DEA's Enforcement
    dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. During the 1990s,
    DEA Operations Reach From the broadened the focus of its
    enforcement operations. DEA now focuses on International Level to
    the       what it calls the "seamless continuum" of drug
    trafficking, with programs Local Level                      and
    initiatives directed at major regional, national, and
    international trafficking organizations; violent, street-level
    drug gangs and other local community problems; and domestically
    cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. Page 5
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary
    During the 1990s, DEA increased its emphasis on intercepting
    communications between top-level drug traffickers and their
    subordinates to identify and target the leaders and dismantle
    their operations. DEA also started working with other federal
    agencies on two programs to target and investigate major drug
    trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia. In 1996, to
    improve its effectiveness in several key foreign countries, DEA
    began to screen and train special foreign police units. The intent
    of this effort is to improve the capabilities of foreign police
    and to build trustworthy and reliable foreign antidrug units with
    which DEA can work. At the same time, DEA attempted to improve its
    effectiveness in the 1990s by giving domestic drug trafficking a
    higher priority than in the past, including focusing resources on
    regional and "local impact" drug problems. In this regard, during
    the 1990s, DEA devoted more resources to its State and Local Task
    Force Program. Also, in 1995, DEA established the Mobile
    Enforcement Team (MET) Program to assist local police with violent
    drug gangs and other local drug problems. The principal objectives
    in the National Drug Control Strategy relating to DEA Has Not Yet
    DEA are: Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the *
    combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and
    arrest National Strategy                   the leaders of illegal
    drug syndicates and *  disrupt and dismantle major international
    drug trafficking organizations and arrest, prosecute, and
    incarcerate their leaders. DEA's strategic goals and objectives
    and its enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s have been
    consistent with the National Strategy. Both the National Strategy
    and DEA hope to reduce the illegal drug supply and drug-related
    violence by disrupting and dismantling domestic and international
    drug trafficking organizations. For domestic drug trafficking
    organizations, the National Strategy calls for increasing by 5
    points the percentage of drug trafficking organizations disrupted
    or dismantled by 2002 as measured against the percentage recorded
    in the base year using a prioritized list of designated targets.
    It calls for at least a 10 percentage point increase above the
    base year by 2007. For international drug trafficking
    organizations, the National Strategy calls for achieving by 2002 a
    50 percent success rate in the number of organizations disrupted
    or dismantled as measured against a designated target list
    established in the base year. The Strategy also calls for Page 6
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary
    increasing the success rate to 100 percent by 2007 as measured
    against the base year list. According to ONDCP and DEA, neither
    the domestic nor international designated target lists referred to
    above have been developed. Unlike the National Strategy, DEA's
    performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 do not contain
    performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations. DEA has no annual, mid-, or long-range
    measurable performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations. In the absence of such targets, it is
    difficult to quantitatively assess DEA's overall effectiveness in
    achieving its strategic goals. GAO recommends that the Attorney
    General direct the DEA Administrator Recommendation
    to work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA
    performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets
    in the National Drug Control Strategy. DEA provided written
    comments on a draft of this report. These comments Agency Comments
    and are discussed at the end of chapters 2 and 3. DEA, along with
    ONDCP and GAO's Evaluation               the Office of Management
    and Budget, also provided technical changes and clarifications,
    which have been incorporated throughout this report where
    appropriate. DEA stated that, overall, the report provides a
    detailed and factual background of DEA strategies and special
    operations. Although not directly agreeing with GAO's
    recommendation, DEA agreed with GAO's principal finding that DEA
    had not included measurable performance targets for disrupting or
    dismantling drug trafficking organizations in its fiscal years
    1999 and 2000 performance plans. However, DEA disagreed with GAO's
    draft conclusion that little can be said about DEA's effectiveness
    in achieving its strategic goals in the absence of measurable
    performance targets.  DEA commented that this statement and
    supporting information in chapter 3 implied that DEA had not
    attempted to develop such targets. DEA pointed out various actions
    it was taking relating to GAO's recommendation. DEA said that,
    among other things, it has developed "preliminary performance
    targets," which it included in its fiscal year 2001 budget
    submission to DOJ. Page 7                                 GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary DEA's stated
    action is consistent with the intent of GAO's recommendation.
    However, because these targets are preliminary and under review
    within the executive branch, they are subject to change until
    February 2000 when DEA issues its annual budget submission and
    performance plan, as part of DOJ's submission, to Congress.
    Further, DEA indicated that it cannot finalize its performance
    targets and measures until a designated targeted list of drug
    trafficking organizations, as called for in the National Strategy,
    is completed. Therefore, GAO is retaining its recommendation until
    DEA's preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion
    in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency
    with those in the National Strategy. Page 8
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 9    GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents 4 Executive Summary 16
    Chapter 1                      Drug Use and Supply Trends in the
    1990s                                       16 Introduction
    Federal Drug Control Budget in the 1990s
    22 1999 National Drug Control Strategy
    24 DEA's Mission, Role, and Responsibilities
    26 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
    29 32 Chapter 2                      DEA Modified Its Operational
    Strategy in the 1990s                            32 DEA Expanded
    Its               DEA More Involved With State and Local Police
    34 DEA Developed an Investigative Approach Focusing on
    48 Focus in the 1990s to            the Communications of Major
    Drug Trafficking Target Local Drug                Organizations
    Key Changes in DEA's Foreign Operations
    54 Dealers in Addition to         Conclusions
    59 Major Drug Trafficking Agency Comments
    60 Organizations 61 Chapter 3                      DEA's Strategic
    Goals and Objectives, and Its Programs,                       61
    DEA Has Not Yet                  Are Consistent With the National
    Strategy DEA Has Not Developed Performance Targets Consistent
    68 Developed                        With Those in the National
    Strategy Performance Targets            Conclusions
    78 Recommendation
    79 Consistent With the            Agency Comments and Our
    Evaluation                                            79 National
    Drug Control Strategy 81 Chapter 4                      Federal
    Budget Formulation Guidance Provides Basis for
    81 DEA's Staffing Needs             DEA Staffing Needs
    Determination Process Fiscal Year 1998 Process for Determining
    DEA's Staffing                       82 Determination and
    Needs Allocation Process for Congress Added Staff for a New
    Caribbean Initiative and                               95 Changed
    Staffing Recommended for Other DEA Fiscal Year 1998
    Initiatives DEA's Fiscal Year 1998 Allocation Process Considered a
    96 Variety of Factors Page 10
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Conclusions
    97 Appendix I: Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field
    98 Appendixes      Divisions and Foreign Offices Appendix II:
    Comments From the Drug Enforcement                            163
    Administration Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
    Acknowledgments                       167 168 Glossary
    Performance Measurement Terms
    168 Table 2.1:  Budget for and Number of DEA State and
    35 Tables          Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999
    Table 2.2:  Number of Law Enforcement Officers on DEA
    35 State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1998, as
    of the End of Each Fiscal Year Table 2.3: Number of DEA State and
    Local Task Force                         36 Case Initiations,
    Arrests, Convictions, and Seizures, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998
    Table 2.4:  Geographic Scope of State and Local Task
    37 Force Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Table
    2.5: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Years 1995
    39 to 1999 Table 2.6: Selected Data on MET Deployments, Fiscal
    41 Years 1995 Through 1998 Table 2.7:  Geographic Scope of MET
    Program Cases                           44 Initiated During Fiscal
    Years 1995 Through 1998 Table 2.8:  Funding for DEA's Domestic
    Cannabis                             46 Eradication/Suppression
    Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Table 2.9: Domestic
    Cannabis Eradication/Suppression                        47 Program
    Statistical Results, 1990 Through 1998 Table 2.10: Number of
    Electronic Surveillance Orders and                    51
    Facilities Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998 Table 2.11:
    Number of Vetted Units and Officers on Board                    57
    by Country, as of September 30, 1998 Table 3.1:  National Strategy
    Goals and Objectives for                      63 Which DEA Has
    Responsibilities Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals With
    66 National Strategy Goals Page 11
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Table 3.3:
    Comparison of Selected DEA and National
    67 Strategy Objectives Table 3.4:  National Drug Control Strategy
    Performance                       70 Target and Performance
    Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Domestic Drug Trafficking
    Organizations Table 3.5:  National Strategy Performance Target and
    71 Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
    International Drug Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their
    Leaders Table 3.6:  National Drug Control Strategy Performance
    71 Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
    Drug Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs Table 4.1: Comparison of
    DEA and DOJ Estimated                               91 Additional
    DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table
    4.2: Comparison of DOJ's Estimates and the
    94 President's Request for Additional DEA Total and Special Agent
    Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table 4.3: Comparison of the
    President's Request and                         96 Congress'
    Appropriations Guidance for DEA Additional Total and Special Agent
    Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress'
    Appropriations                            97 Guidance and DEA's
    New Staffing Allocation for Additional DEA Staffing and Special
    Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table I.1:  Drug Seizures for
    Washington Division and                       130 Baltimore
    District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Table I.2:
    Caribbean Field Division's Use of Wire
    159 Intercepts Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean
    Division, by                   161 Case Type, for Fiscal Years
    1997 and 1998 Figure 1.1:  Trend in the Number of Current Drug
    Users,                      17 Figures      Aged 12 and Older,
    Since 1990 Figure 1.2:  Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and
    12th                  18 Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since
    1991 Figure 1.3:  Composition of Total Federal Government
    23 Funding for Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal Years 1990
    Through 1999 Figure 1.4:  Budget Trends in Programs for Federal
    Drug                      24 Control Activities to Reduce Drug
    Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Page 12
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Figure 1.5:
    DEA's Total Budget Authority, Fiscal Years                     27
    1990 Through 1999 Figure 1.6:  DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years
    1990                          28 Through 1998, as of the End of
    Each Fiscal Year Figure 1.7:  Composition by Position Type of
    Total                          29 Number of DEA On-Board Staff, as
    of the End of Fiscal Year 1998 Figure 4.1:  Flowchart of DEA's
    Fiscal Year 1998 Staffing                   84 Needs Determination
    Process Figure 4.1: Continued
    85 Figure I.1:  Los Angeles Division Map
    100 Figure I.2:  Miami Division Map
    108 Figure I.3:  New Orleans Division Map
    118 Figure I.4:  Washington, D. C. Division Map
    125 Figure I.5:  Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map
    133 Figure I.6:  La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map
    141 Figure I.7:  Mexico City, Mexico, Country Office Map
    148 Figure I.8:  DEA Caribbean Division Map
    156 Page 13                              GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Contents Abbreviations ASAC
    Assistant Special Agent in Charge ATF         Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco and Firearms BNP         Bolivian National Police BTF
    Border Task Force CA          country attache CIA         Central
    Intelligence Agency CNP         Colombian National Police DAWN
    Drug Abuse Warning Network DEA         Drug Enforcement
    Administration DOD         Department of Defense DOJ
    Department of Justice FBI         Federal Bureau of Investigation
    FELCN       Fuerzas Especiales Para la Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico
    FMP         field management plan HCL         hydrochloride HIDTA
    High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area IRS         Internal Revenue
    Service JMD         Justice Management Division LSD
    lysergic acid diethylamide MET         Mobile Enforcement Team
    OCDETF      Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force OMB
    Office of Management and Budget ONDCP       Office of National
    Drug Control Policy OPBAT       Operation Bahamas, Turks, and
    Caicos Islands PCP         phencyclidine PME         Performance
    Measures of Effectiveness RET         Regional Enforcement Team
    SAC         Special Agent in Charge SAMHSA      Substance Abuse
    and Mental Health Services Administration SIU         Sensitive
    Investigative Unit or Special Investigative Unit SOD
    Special Operations Division TKO         targeted kingpin
    organization VCRP        Violent Crime Reduction Program Page 14
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 15    GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction During the
    1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted
    at very high levels and have continued to adversely affect
    American society in terms of social, economic, and health costs
    and drug-related violent crime. During the same period, funding
    for federal drug control efforts overall and for the Drug
    Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is dedicated to
    controlling the supply of illegal drugs, increased significantly.
    According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),
    drug Drug Use and Supply    use and its consequences threaten
    Americans of every socioeconomic Trends in the 1990s
    background, geographic region, educational level, and ethnic or
    racial identity. Drug abuse and trafficking adversely affect
    families, businesses, and neighborhoods; impede education; and
    choke criminal justice, health, and social service systems. A
    report prepared for ONDCP showed that drug users in the United
    States spent an estimated $57 billion for illegal drugs in 1995.1
    Other costs to society include lost jobs and productivity, health
    problems, and economic hardships to families. ONDCP, in its 1999
    National Drug Control Strategy, noted that illegal drugs cost our
    society approximately $110 billion each year. On the basis of the
    National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the Substance Abuse and
    Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) estimated that in
    1997 there were 13.9 million current users2 of illegal drugs in
    the United States aged 12 and older, representing 6.4 percent of
    the total population. As figure 1.1 shows, this number has
    fluctuated somewhat but has remained fairly constant overall since
    1990, as have the numbers of current users of cocaine and
    marijuana, with 1.5 million cocaine users and 11.1 million
    marijuana users in 1997. 1 What America's Users Spend on Illegal
    Drugs, 1988-1995; prepared for the Office of National Drug Control
    Policy by William Rhodes, Stacia Langenbahn, Ryan Kling, and Paul
    Scheiman; September 29, 1997. 2 A current user is an individual
    who consumed an illegal drug in the month prior to being
    interviewed. Page 16
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    Figure 1.1:  Trend in the Number of Current Drug Users, Aged 12
    and Older, Since 1990 Source: Preliminary Results from the
    National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, SAMHSA, Department of
    Health and Human Services, 1996 and 1997. Page 17
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    As shown in figure 1.2, current drug use among youth rose
    significantly from 1992 to 1996. The trend then improved, with
    drug use declining for 8th and 10th graders in 1997 and 1998.
    Figure 1.2:  Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and 12th
    Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since 1991 Source: Monitoring
    the Future Study, Institute for Social Research, University of
    Michigan (Dec. 1998). Abuse of illegal drugs has serious
    consequences. For example, SAMHSA's Drug Abuse Warning Network
    (DAWN) reported 9,310 drug-related deaths in 1996, an increase of
    65 percent from the 5,628 deaths reported in 1990. The number of
    drug-related hospital emergency room visits reported to DAWN rose
    42 percent from 1990 to 1997. There were 371,208 emergency room
    episodes in 1990 and 527,058 episodes in 1997. According to DEA
    and ONDCP, illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana,
    and methamphetamine, have inflicted serious damage and continued
    to threaten our nation during the 1990s. National and Page 18
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    international drug trafficking organizations continued to bring
    these drugs into the United States, and certain illegal drugs are
    clandestinely produced in this country. Drug trafficking gangs and
    individuals dealing in drugs, as well as drug users, have caused
    violence in local communities. DEA considers cocaine to be the
    primary drug threat to the U.S. Cocaine      population. Cocaine
    use has remained at a relatively constant high level during the
    1990s, as indicated by the National Household Survey on Drug
    Abuse. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
    reported that the use of "crack," a potent and highly addictive
    form of cocaine that first became widely available in the 1980s,
    also remained at a high level in the 1990s. ONDCP reported in the
    summer of 1998 that crack was failing to attract new users,
    although established users persisted in using it. Regarding
    cocaine trafficking trends, DEA intelligence information shows
    that Colombian trafficking organizations, although more fragmented
    than in the past, continue to control the worldwide supply of
    cocaine. However, Mexican organizations have played an increasing
    role in the U.S. cocaine trade in the 1990s. The Southwest Border
    is now the primary entry point for cocaine smuggled into the
    United States. Heroin is readily available in major cities in the
    United States, and its use is Heroin       on the rise in many
    areas around the country, according to DEA. ONDCP has noted that
    the increasing availability of high-purity heroin has made
    snorting and smoking more common modes of ingestion than
    injection, thereby lowering inhibitions to heroin use. DEA
    intelligence information indicates that the heroin available in
    the United States comes from Southeast Asia (principally Burma);
    Southwest Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and
    Turkey); Mexico; and South America (Colombia). Although Southeast
    Asian heroin dominated the U.S. market in the 1980s and into the
    1990s, Colombian heroin emerged as a significant problem in the
    mid-1990s. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized and analyzed
    in the United States was Colombian. DEA reported that independent
    Colombian drug traffickers established themselves in the U.S.
    heroin market by distributing high- quality heroin (frequently
    above 90-percent pure), undercutting the price of their
    competition, and using long-standing drug distribution networks.
    According to DEA, marijuana is the most readily available and
    commonly Marijuana    used illegal drug in the country. Further, a
    resurgence of marijuana trafficking and use has taken place in
    urban centers across the United Page 19
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    States. ONDCP noted that this market is driven by a high level of
    demand, with users from virtually all age groups, demographic
    groups, and income levels. According to DEA intelligence
    information, most of the foreign marijuana available here is
    smuggled into the country across the Southwest Border. Mexican
    drug trafficking organizations are responsible for supplying most
    of the foreign marijuana, whether grown in Mexico or shipped
    through Mexico from other locations such as Colombia. Marijuana is
    also grown domestically in remote outdoor locations in the United
    States, including on public lands, and indoors. In the 1990s,
    major outdoor marijuana growths have been found in California,
    Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington.
    DEA uses the term "dangerous drugs" to refer to a broad category
    of Methamphetamine and      controlled substances other than
    cocaine, opiates such as heroin, and Other Dangerous Drugs
    cannabis products such as marijuana. The list of dangerous drugs
    includes drugs that are illegally produced; drugs legally produced
    but diverted to illicit use (e.g., pharmacy thefts, forged
    prescriptions, and illegal sales); as well as legally produced
    drugs obtained from legitimate channels (e.g., legally and
    properly prescribed). Some of the dangerous drugs are
    methamphetamine; lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); phencyclidine
    (PCP); diazepam (Valium); and flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), commonly
    called the "date rape" drug. DEA reports that methamphetamine use
    has increased in the 1990s, resulting in a devastating impact on
    many communities across the nation. A powerful stimulant,
    methamphetamine is the most prevalent synthetic controlled
    substance clandestinely manufactured in the United States.
    Historically, methamphetamine has more commonly been used in the
    western United States, but its use has been spreading to other
    areas of the country. According to DEA, methamphetamine suppliers
    have traditionally been motorcycle gangs and other independent
    groups. However, organized crime groups operating in California,
    some with ties to major Mexico- based trafficking organizations,
    now dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and
    distribution in the United States. Mexican trafficking
    organizations use their well-established cocaine, heroin, and
    marijuana distribution networks to smuggle methamphetamine
    throughout the country. Although large-scale production of
    methamphetamine is centered in California, it is increasingly
    being produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States. Page
    20                                 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
    in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction Trafficking organizations have
    continued to supply domestic drug Drug Trafficking
    consumers despite short-term achievements by both federal and
    foreign Organizations                     law enforcement agencies
    in apprehending individuals and disrupting the flow of illegal
    drugs. When confronted with threats to their operations, drug
    trafficking organizations have become adept at quickly changing
    their modes of operation. For example, as we previously reported,3
    when law enforcement agencies have successfully carried out
    efforts to intercept drugs being smuggled by aircraft, traffickers
    have increased their use of maritime and overland transportation
    routes. In another example, DEA reported that a 1989 drug
    enforcement operation, which involved the seizure of nearly 40
    metric tons of cocaine, led to a new arrangement between Mexican
    transportation organizations and Colombian cocaine organizations.
    To reduce the complex logistics and vulnerabilities associated
    with large cash transactions, Mexican organizations started
    receiving part of the cocaine shipments they smuggled for the
    Colombians in exchange for their transportation services. By the
    mid-1990s, Mexican organizations were receiving up to one-half of
    a cocaine shipment as payment. This arrangement radically changed
    the role and sphere of influence of the Mexican organizations in
    the U.S. cocaine trade. By relinquishing part of each cocaine
    shipment, the Colombian organizations ceded a share of the U.S.
    cocaine market to the Mexican traffickers. In addition, although
    overall violent crime has steadily declined during the Drug-
    Related Violent Crime 1990s, many of the violent crimes committed
    are drug-related, according to ONDCP. There are no overall
    quantitative data on drug-related violent crime and the
    relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent crime,
    but ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking
    drug abuse or trafficking and other crimes, including violent
    crimes.4 According to ONDCP, many crimes (e.g., murder, assault,
    and robbery) are committed under the influence of drugs or may be
    motivated by a need for money to buy drugs. In addition, drug
    trafficking and violence often go hand in hand. Competition and
    disputes among drug dealers can cause violence, as can the
    location of drug markets in disadvantaged areas where legal and
    social controls against violence tend to be ineffective. In this
    regard, DEA reported in 1996 that violent drug gangs, which were
    once largely confined to major cities, had migrated to and/or
    emerged in rural areas and small cities throughout the country.
    One example cited was 3 Drug Control: Observations on U.S.
    Counternarcotics Activities (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249, Sept. 16, 1998).
    4 See ONDCP's Fact Sheet: Drug-Related Crime (Apr. 1997, NCJ-
    163928). Page 21
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    Vidalia, GA, where a violent crack cocaine gang was linked to
    numerous homicides and drive-by shootings. Nevertheless, the
    Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that overall violent crime in
    the United States in 1997 had fallen more than 21 percent since
    1993 and had reached its lowest level in at least 24 years.
    Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported in
    its 1997 Uniform Crime Reports that the murder rate in 1997 had
    declined 28 percent since 1993. It also reported that the number
    of drug-related murders decreased by 7 percent between 1996 and
    1997.5 According to ONDCP, from fiscal years 1990 through 1999 the
    federal Federal Drug Control    government spent about $143.5
    billion, in constant 1999 dollars, on four Budget in the 1990s
    functional areas that can be divided between two categories-(1)
    those that are aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs and
    (2) those that are aimed at reducing the availability or supply of
    such drugs in the United States. As figure 1.3 indicates, about
    33.8 percent of the total funds were used for drug demand
    reduction. About 66.2 percent of the total funds were used for the
    three functional areas intended to reduce the drug supply, with
    the largest share-49.5 percent-dedicated to domestic law
    enforcement programs, 3.8 percent to international programs, and
    12.9 percent to interdiction programs. 5 Although the Uniform
    Crime Reports contain data on drug-related murder, they do not
    contain such data for other types of violent crime, such as
    assault, robbery, or rape. Page 22
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    Figure 1.3:  Composition of Total Federal Government Funding for
    Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999
    Note: This figure is based on budget amounts for each fiscal year
    converted to constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from
    ONDCP data. As figure 1.4 indicates, total funds for federal drug
    control activities increased, in constant 1999 dollars, by about
    49 percent-from about $12 billion to almost $18 billion-between
    fiscal years 1990 and 1999. However, funding trends varied for the
    four functional areas. Although funds for the drug demand
    reduction functional area generally increased steadily overall by
    50 percent from about $3.9 billion in 1990 to about $5.8 billion
    in 1999, funding trends for the three drug supply reduction
    functional areas were mixed. Funds for domestic law enforcement
    programs increased steadily overall by about 66 percent from about
    $5.4 billion in 1990 to almost $8.9 billion in 1999. Funds for
    interdiction programs fluctuated within the time period,
    increasing overall by about 9 percent from about $2.2 billion in
    1990 to almost $2.4 billion in 1999. Funds for international
    programs increased by 23 percent from 1990 to 1992, to a peak of
    $759.1 million; they then decreased by 60 percent to a low of Page
    23                                           GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction $303.5 million in
    1996; they rose by 163 percent to about $796.9 million in 1999.
    Figure 1.4:  Budget Trends in Programs for Federal Drug Control
    Activities to Reduce Drug Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal Years
    1990 Through 1999 Note 1: The budget amounts for fiscal years 1990
    through 1998 are actual, and the fiscal year 1999 budget amount is
    as enacted. Note 2: The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in
    constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from ONDCP data.
    The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), as amended,
    established 1999 National Drug                       ONDCP to set
    federal priorities for drug control, implement a National Control
    Strategy                         Drug Control Strategy, and
    certify federal drug control budgets. The act specifies that the
    National Strategy must be comprehensive and research based;
    contain long-range goals and measurable objectives; and seek to
    reduce drug use (demand), availability (supply), and related
    consequences. Page 24
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    ONDCP has produced annual strategic plans since 1989. These
    strategies recognized that no single approach could solve the
    nation's drug problem; rather, drug prevention, education, and
    treatment must be complemented by drug supply reduction actions
    abroad, on our borders, and within the United States. Each
    strategy also shared a commitment to maintain and enforce antidrug
    laws. In 1998, ONDCP's National Drug Control Strategy established
    performance targets to reduce illegal drug use and availability in
    the United States by 25 percent by the year 2002 and 50 percent by
    2007.6 The strategy focuses on reducing the demand for drugs
    through treatment and prevention and attacking the supply of drugs
    through domestic law enforcement, interdiction efforts, and
    international cooperation. ONDCP's 1999 National Strategy includes
    the performance targets and 5 goals along with 31 supporting
    objectives intended to serve as the basis for a coherent, long-
    term national effort. *  Goal 1: Educate and enable America's
    youth to reject illegal drugs as well as tobacco and alcohol. *
    Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially
    reducing drug-related crime and violence. *  Goal 3: Reduce the
    health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use. *  Goal
    4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug
    threat. *  Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.
    As discussed in detail in chapter 3, strategic goals 2, 4, and 5
    address drug supply reduction and involve drug law enforcement
    activities, including those for which DEA is responsible. Goal 2
    seeks, among other things, to reduce the rate of drug-related
    crime and violence in the United States by 15 percent by the year
    2002 and achieve a 30-percent reduction by the year 2007. Goal 4
    seeks a 10-percent reduction in the rate at which illegal drugs
    successfully enter the United States by the year 2002 and a 20-
    percent reduction in this rate by 2007. Goal 5 seeks a 15-percent
    reduction in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries by
    the year 2002 and a 30- percent reduction by 2007. The goal also
    seeks a 20-percent reduction in domestic marijuana cultivation and
    methamphetamine production by 2002 and a 50-percent reduction by
    2007. 6 The National Drug Control Strategy established 1996 as the
    base year for determining percentage reductions in drug use and
    availability. Page 25
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    The mission of DEA, which is a component of DOJ, is to (1) enforce
    the DEA's Mission, Role,      drug laws and regulations of the
    United States and bring drug traffickers7 and Responsibilities
    to justice and (2) recommend and support nonenforcement programs
    aimed at reducing the availability of illegal drugs in domestic
    and international markets. DEA is the lead agency responsible for
    federal drug law enforcement and for coordinating and pursuing
    drug investigations in foreign countries. According to DEA, its
    primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement include the
    following: *  investigating major drug traffickers operating at
    interstate and international levels and criminals and drug gangs
    who perpetrate violence in local communities; *  coordinating and
    cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement
    agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including interstate
    and international investigations; *  managing a national drug
    intelligence system in cooperation with other federal, state,
    local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate
    strategic and operational drug intelligence information; *
    seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers' assets; *  coordinating
    and cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement
    agencies and foreign governments on programs designed to reduce
    the availability of illegal drugs on the U.S. market through
    nonenforcement methods, such as crop eradication, crop
    substitution, and the training of foreign officials; and *
    operating, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and
    U.S. Ambassadors, all programs associated with drug law
    enforcement counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out its
    mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its headquarters
    office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United
    States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of December
    1998. Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by
    a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), were a total of 30 district
    offices, 115 resident offices, and 46 posts of duty in the United
    States, with at least 1 office in every state. Overseas, DEA had
    79 offices in 56 foreign countries. This included 56 country
    offices, each headed by a country attach (CA), and 23 resident
    offices reporting to the country offices. (App. I contains
    profiles 7 Drug traffickers include those organizations and
    principal members involved in the growth, manufacture, or
    distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for
    illicit traffic in the United States. Page 26
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    of the five field divisions and three country offices included in
    our review.) In addition, DEA manages a multiagency intelligence
    center in El Paso, TX; conducts training at Quantico, VA; and
    maintains seven drug analytical laboratories in various regions of
    the country and a special drug testing facility in McLean, VA. As
    shown in figure 1.5, DEA's budget almost doubled, in constant 1999
    dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999 and totaled
    about $11.3 billion during that period. Figure 1.5:  DEA's Total
    Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Note 1: The
    budget amounts for fiscal years 1990 through 1998 are actual, and
    the fiscal year 1999 budget amount is as enacted. Note 2: The
    budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.
    Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. Commensurate with its
    increased funding, as shown in figure 1.6, the size of DEA's staff
    also increased during the 1990s by 40 percent-from 5,995 employees
    in 1990 to 8,387 employees in 1998. Page 27
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    Figure 1.6:  DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998,
    as of the End of Each Fiscal Year Note: According to DEA, on-board
    positions are the number of persons employed by DEA at specified
    time periods as opposed to the number actually authorized. Source:
    Developed by GAO from DEA data. During this period, the number of
    intelligence specialists increased by about 116 percent, special
    agents by 40 percent, and other positions8 by 32 percent. As shown
    in figure 1.7, of the total on-board positions in fiscal year
    1998, special agents made up about 51.4 percent, other positions
    about 41.8 percent, and intelligence specialists about 6.9
    percent. 8 These include diversion investigators and various
    professional, administrative, technical, and clerical positions.
    Page 28
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    Figure 1.7:  Composition by Position Type of Total Number of DEA
    On-Board Staff, as of the End of Fiscal Year 1998 Note:
    Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
    Developed by GAO from DEA data. The Chairmen of the House
    Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Objectives, Scope, and
    Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control requested that we
    Methodology                                 determine (1) what
    major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and
    approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its
    mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate
    national and international drug traffickers and (b) help state and
    local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-
    related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA's strategic
    goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance
    measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy;
    and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and
    allocated the additional staff. We did our review at DEA
    headquarters, as well as at DEA offices in five domestic field
    divisions and three foreign countries. We also obtained
    information from officials representing DOJ, ONDCP, the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of State. Because
    the funding and other statistical data we collected from DEA and
    other agencies and used in this report were used primarily for
    background and descriptive purposes and were not directly related
    to our findings, conclusions, and recommendation, we did not
    independently validate or verify their accuracy and reliability.
    Page 29                                         GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction The five DEA
    domestic field division offices we visited are located in Los
    Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans, LA; San Juan, Puerto Rico
    (the Caribbean Division); and Washington, D.C. We also visited one
    DEA district office located in Baltimore, MD, which is part of
    DEA's Washington, D.C., Field Division. The three DEA foreign
    country offices we visited are located in La Paz, Bolivia; Bogota,
    Colombia; and Mexico City, Mexico. In Bolivia, we also visited
    resident offices in Santa Cruz and Trinidad and the Chimore base
    camp. (See app. I.) In Mexico, we also visited the Guadalajara
    Resident Office. These locations were judgmentally selected on the
    basis of geographic location, differences in the drug threat in
    these areas, and a variety of domestic and foreign drug
    enforcement operational characteristics. We also obtained
    information from the U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Baltimore, Los
    Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Puerto Rico; from local police
    agencies in Baltimore; Los Angeles; South Miami, FL; Pine Bluff,
    AR; and Puerto Rico; and from State Department officials in
    Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico. To determine what major enforcement
    strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has
    implemented to carry out its mission in the 1990s, we collected
    and analyzed pertinent DEA, DOJ, and ONDCP documents. We also
    interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials in the
    selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, and
    DOJ and ONDCP officials. We also collected ONDCP and DEA budget
    data for each fiscal year from 1990 to 1999, which we adjusted to
    constant 1999 dollars where appropriate. In addition, we obtained
    and analyzed DEA special agent work-hour statistics; case
    initiation data; statistical results (e.g., arrests, convictions,
    and seizures) of investigations; and other information relating to
    DEA's enforcement programs. We did not evaluate the effectiveness
    of the individual strategies, programs, initiatives, and
    approaches discussed in chapter 2. To determine whether DEA's
    strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and
    performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control
    Strategy, we analyzed and compared DEA's annual performance plans
    for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 with ONDCP's 1998 and 1999 (1)
    National Drug Control Strategies, (2) National Drug Control Budget
    Summaries, and (3) Performance Measures of Effectiveness reports.
    We also reviewed DOJ's (1) Strategic Plan for 1997-2002, (2)
    performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and (3) Drug
    Control Strategic Plan. We interviewed DEA and ONDCP officials
    about their plans and how they interrelated. We used the
    Government Performance and Results Act as our basic criteria along
    with OMB, DOJ, and our guidance Page 30
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
    on the act, including OMB Circular A-11 and our guides for
    assessing agency annual performance plans and strategic plans. To
    determine how DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing estimates for its
    enforcement programs and initiatives were developed, we collected
    and analyzed information on the process, criteria DEA used, and
    staffing recommendations made during DEA's budget formulation
    process. We interviewed DEA officials in headquarters and in the
    selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, as
    well as DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB officials to obtain information on how
    staffing needs were determined and how the budget review process
    affected staffing estimates, requests, and allocations. We
    reviewed documents dealing with staffing recommendations and
    allocations; policies and procedures; DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB budget
    reviews; and congressional appropriations. We performed our work
    from December 1997 to May 1999 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.  In June 1999, we provided
    a draft of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of
    ONDCP for comment. We also provided relevant sections of the
    report to OMB and State Department officials for a review of the
    facts that pertain to those agencies.  We received written
    comments on June 23, 1999, from the Deputy Administrator, DEA,
    which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and reprinted in appendix
    II.  In addition, DEA provided a number of technical changes and
    clarifications, which we have incorporated throughout the report
    where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, ONDCP's Acting Deputy
    Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, orally informed us that
    ONDCP reviewed the report from a factual standpoint because the
    overall conclusions and recommendation are directed at DEA.  He
    stated that the report was factually correct from ONDCP's
    perspective and provided a few technical clarifications, which we
    incorporated where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, OMB officials
    responsible for examining DEA's budget orally communicated a few
    technical comments, which we incorporated in chapter 4.  The State
    Department's liaison for GAO informed us on June 21, 1999, that
    the Department had no comments. Page 31
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Since its creation in 1973,
    DEA has focused its efforts primarily on investigating the highest
    levels of national and international illegal drug trafficking. In
    addition, DEA has supported state and local law enforcement
    efforts directed at the lower levels of drug trafficking. In the
    1990s, however, DEA revised its strategy to focus its operations
    on what it refers to as the "seamless continuum" of drug
    trafficking, from international drug trafficking organizations
    residing outside the United States to local gangs and individuals
    illegally selling drugs on city streets. Consequently, during the
    1990s, DEA gave a higher priority than in the past and increased
    resources to working with and assisting state and local law
    enforcement agencies, including starting a new program to help
    combat drug-related violent crime in local communities.
    Concurrently, in the 1990s, DEA made the following enhancements to
    its already high priority enforcement operations directed at
    national and international drug trafficking organizations. *  DEA
    established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into the Special
    Operations Division (SOD), placing greater emphasis on
    intercepting communications between top-level drug traffickers and
    their subordinates (i.e., attacking the "command and control"
    communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to
    dismantle their entire trafficking operations. *  DEA started
    participating in two interagency programs to target and
    investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America
    and Asia. *  DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign
    police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign
    countries, primarily in Latin America. Since its establishment,
    DEA has directed its resources primarily toward DEA Modified Its
    disrupting or dismantling major organizations involved in
    interstate and Operational Strategy in international drug
    trafficking. DEA has concentrated on investigating those
    traffickers functioning at the highest levels of these
    enterprises, often by the 1990s                        developing
    conspiracy cases for U.S. Attorneys to prosecute and seizing the
    traffickers' assets.  Federal drug control policymakers considered
    this investigative approach to be the most effective for reducing
    the illegal drug supply in the United States. Consistent with this
    approach, DEA's operational strategy in the early 1990s was to
    identify and exploit trafficker vulnerabilities and to disrupt or
    dismantle their organizations by conducting investigations leading
    to (1) the prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of leaders
    and key players in drug organizations and (2) the seizure and
    forfeiture of the assets of these organizations. DEA's enforcement
    operations were to focus and Page 32
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations apply pressure in four
    principal areas: source (production overseas and in the United
    States), transit (smuggling of drugs and essential chemicals),
    domestic distribution (sales of illegal drugs in the United
    States), and proceeds (money and assets derived from
    distribution). DEA operations were also to control the
    distribution of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs and
    prevent the diversion of legally produced controlled substances.
    In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of DEA's
    policies and strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately
    responding to the drug trafficking problem and related violent
    crime. The results of the review included recommendations by DEA
    SACs and senior managers that DEA refocus its investigative
    priorities by increasing its efforts against domestic drug
    trafficking, including violent drug organizations, street gangs,
    local impact issues, regional trafficking organizations, and
    domestically produced illegal drugs, while, at the same time,
    continuing to investigate major national and international
    trafficking organizations.  As a result, in 1995, the DEA
    Administrator established the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET)
    Program, which focuses a small percentage of DEA's resources on
    drug-related violent crime in local communities. Then, in a 1997
    memorandum to DEA's field offices, he indicated that over the next
    5 years DEA was to focus its operations on the "seamless
    continuum" of the organized crime systems that direct drug
    trafficking, with agencywide programs and initiatives directed at
*  major regional, national, and international cases; *  violent
    drug organizations, gangs, and local impact issues; and *
    domestically cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. According
    to DEA, the international aspects of drug trafficking cannot be
    separated from the domestic aspects because they are
    interdependent and intertwined. The operations of major
    trafficking organizations can involve the cultivation and
    production of drugs in foreign countries, transportation to the
    United States, and eventual distribution on city streets.
    Accordingly, the Administrator emphasized that DEA was to target
    the highest level drug traffickers and their organizations, as
    well as violent, street-level drug gangs operating in communities.
    To implement this strategy, DEA was to pursue a vigorous
    international enforcement program, while domestically using the
    MET Program and other enforcement approaches to combat the threat
    and impact of drugs in local communities. The Administrator cited
    cooperation with other agencies as a guiding principle for all
    aspects of DEA's international operations and domestic operations,
    which included Page 33
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations assisting state and local law
    enforcement agencies with their most serious drug and drug-related
    violence problems. Although DEA has always worked formally and
    informally with state and DEA More Involved             local law
    enforcement agencies, it increased its involvement in, and With
    State and Local          devoted more resources to, task forces
    and other multiagency operations with state and local law
    enforcement agencies in the 1990s. Major DEA Police
    programs for working with and assisting state and local police on
    multiagency operations are the State and Local Task Force Program,
    MET Program, and Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
    Program. Through its State and Local Task Force Program, which
    originated in 1970 State and Local Task Force    with DEA's
    predecessor agency, DEA coordinates with state and local law
    Program                       enforcement agencies, shares
    information, participates in joint investigations, and shares
    assets forfeited federally as a result of cases made against drug
    dealers. In addition, state and local officers often receive drug
    investigation training and enhanced drug enforcement authority.
    Throughout the 1990s, DEA substantially increased the number of
    its state and local task forces and the number of special agents
    assigned to them. DEA's budget for state and local task forces
    also increased substantially during this period. Table 2.1 shows
    DEA's budget for its state and local task forces and the number of
    task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1999. As the table
    indicates, DEA spent $45.7 million, in constant 1999 dollars, on
    this program in fiscal year 1991 and budgeted $105.5 million for
    fiscal year 1999. The total number of DEA-sponsored state and
    local task forces increased by about 90 percent during these
    years. Page 34                                     GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
    the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
    Trafficking Organizations Table 2.1:  Budget for and Number of DEA
    State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999 Fiscal year
    Budget (millions)a      Funded task forces           Provisional
    task forcesb                 Total task forcesc 1991
    $45.7                           71
    23                               94 1992
    58.2                          73
    25                               98 1993
    82.1                          75
    25                              100 1994
    92.7                          83
    20                              103 1995
    107.5                           79
    36                              115 1996
    48.0                          92
    41                              133 1997
    158.0                          100
    51                              151 1998
    146.5                          122
    50                              172 1999
    105.5                          131
    48                              179 aThe budget amounts for each
    fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts are
    based on actual costs for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 and the
    approved budget for fiscal year 1999. The budget amounts for each
    year include DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
    Program, which DEA could not separate out. The budget amounts for
    fiscal years 1997 through 1999 include approximated payroll costs.
    bProvisional task forces are operational in the field with
    assigned full-time agents but awaiting authorized funding approval
    from DEA Headquarters under the State and Local Task Force
    Program. cThe numbers of task forces include DEA's state and local
    task forces in ONDCP's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
    Program. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. Similarly, as
    shown in table 2.2, the number of special agents assigned to DEA-
    sponsored state and local task forces increased by about 84
    percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1998, while the number of
    assigned state and local law enforcement officers increased by
    about 34 percent during the same time period. About 22 percent of
    DEA's 4,309 special agents in fiscal year 1998 were assigned to
    state and local task forces, compared to about 14 percent of the
    total 3,542 special agents at DEA in fiscal year 1991. Table 2.2:
    Number of Law Enforcement      Fiscal year
    DEA special agents                  State and local officers
    Officers on DEA State and Local Task       1991
    511                                     1,153 Forces, Fiscal Years
    1991 Through 1998, as of the End of Each Fiscal Year          1992
    516                                     1,209 1993
    566                                     1,226 1994
    601                                     1,221 1995
    616                                     1,251 1996
    595                                     1,296 1997
    721                                     1,435 1998
    940                                     1,548 Note: The table
    includes the number of DEA special agents and state and local
    officers assigned to DEA's state and local task forces in ONDCP's
    High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program. Source: Developed by
    GAO from DEA data. The amount of time spent by DEA special agents
    overall on state and local task forces also increased steadily in
    the 1990s. DEA special agents spent Page 35
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations about 19.5 percent of all
    domestic investigative work hours on these task forces in fiscal
    year 1998 compared to about 9.2 percent during fiscal year 1990.1
    Table 2.3 shows the number of cases, arrests, convictions, asset
    seizures, and drug seizures that resulted from the state and local
    task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1998. Table 2.3: Number
    of DEA State and
    Fiscal years Local Task Force Case Initiations,     Activity
    1991           1992            1993            1994           1995
    1996           1997            1998 Arrests, Convictions, and
    Seizures, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998              Cases initiated
    5,294          6,323           5,265          4,256
    5,738           5,684          6,622           6,853 Cases closed
    4,992          5,383           5,993          5,167
    5,130           5,172          5,668           5,854 Arrests
    6,648          7,430           6,464          6,036
    7,324           7,757          9,902 11,569 Convictions
    4,524          4,800           4,987          4,274
    4,161           4,597          4,705           5,477 Assets seized
    $265           $149            $159            $122           $118
    $85          $112              N/A (millions)a Heroin seized
    73              77             82              86              72
    172            117             111 (kilograms) Cocaine seized
    8,683 14,102                   5,433          6,031
    6,269           7,460          9,687           8,695 (kilograms)
    Marijuana seized 22,314 32,392 21,646 20,234 25,005 27,726 24,833
    22,933 (kilograms) Methamphetamine                        214
    145            205             192            254             251
    444             464 seized (kilograms) Note 1: Other drugs were
    also seized. Note 2: N/A means not available. aThe amounts of
    assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.
    Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. DEA categorizes each case
    as local, regional, domestic, foreign, or international, according
    to the geographic scope covered. 2  As shown in table 2.4, a
    little over 50 percent of the task force cases initiated in fiscal
    years 1997 and 1998 were local and regional. They involved
    suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas covered
    by the DEA offices conducting the investigations, and most of them
    were local violators. Less 1 The work-hour data that DEA provided
    us for fiscal year 1998 were not yet complete, and the percentage
    of DEA special agent investigative work hours spent on state and
    local task forces in fiscal year 1998 may have actually been
    greater than 19.5 percent. 2 A local case involves a domestic
    target who operates principally within a local geographic area
    less extensive than a regional case; a regional case involves a
    domestic target who is criminally active throughout the geographic
    region of the DEA office conducting the investigation; a domestic
    case is an investigation of a target who is active principally
    within the jurisdiction of the United States; a foreign case
    involves a target active principally outside the jurisdiction of
    the United States; and an international case involves a target
    whose criminal activities are both domestic and foreign. Page 36
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations than 10 percent of the task
    force cases targeted people suspected of drug trafficking on an
    international scale. Table 2.4:  Geographic Scope of State
    Fiscal year 1997                 Fiscal year 1998 and Local Task
    Force Cases Initiated       Scope of case
    Number           Percent         Number        Percent During
    Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998          Local
    2,401                  36.3      2,633             38.4 Regional
    992                  15.0        979             14.3 Domestic
    2,606                  39.4      2,612             38.1 Foreign
    36                   0.5         30              0.4 International
    587                   8.9        599              8.7 Total
    6,622             100.1          6,853             99.9 Note:
    Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
    Developed by GAO from DEA data. The following are examples of
    state and local task force investigations conducted by the Los
    Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; and Washington, D.C., field
    divisions, respectively, that DEA considered to be successful. *
    DEA's task force in Santa Ana, CA, targeted a Mexican
    methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution organization
    operating throughout southern California. The investigation
    employed wiretaps of nine telephones, along with extensive
    surveillance, use of informants, and other investigative
    techniques. Primarily on the basis of information from the
    wiretaps, the task force conducted 11 raids in 4 cities resulting
    in the arrest of 27 Mexican nationals on state drug charges and
    the seizure of 26 pounds of methamphetamine, 25 gallons of
    methamphetamine in solution form (estimated to be the equivalent
    of 50 to 100 pounds of methamphetamine), 100 pounds of ephidrine
    in powder form, an estimated 164 pounds of ephidrine in solution
    form, other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, 3
    ounces of cocaine, and about $93,000 in cash. Two methamphetamine
    laboratories and four ephidrine extraction laboratories were
    seized and dismantled. *  In Operation Emerald City, DEA, along
    with state and local law enforcement agencies and state regulatory
    agencies, targeted a drug trafficking organization that was
    selling drugs in a Riviera Beach, FL, bar in 1997. Some of the
    biggest known drug dealers in the greater West Palm Beach area had
    used the bar and its attached property for drug dealing since the
    1960s; and numerous murders, stabbings, drive-by shootings, and
    robberies had occurred there over the years. Two leaders of one
    drug organization had been arrested, and another organization had
    taken control of the bar. DEA obtained a court order allowing
    surreptitious entry of the bar and installation of covert closed
    circuit television cameras to record drug transactions, identify
    traffickers, and afford undercover Page 37
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations officers the ability to buy
    drugs while under constant camera surveillance. As a result, 38
    people were arrested for violations of federal and state drug
    laws. In addition, the bar's liquor license was revoked, and the
    business and surrounding property were forfeited to the
    government. *  DEA's REDRUM ("murder" spelled backward) task force
    group, which focuses on drug and drug-related homicide cases,
    targeted a violent heroin trafficking organization operating in
    New Orleans, LA. DEA conducted the investigation jointly with the
    New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division and the FBI. As a
    result of the investigation, which included wiretaps,
    surveillance, and debriefings of informants, 13 individuals were
    indicted on a variety of federal drug, firearms, and murder
    charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to trial, and the head
    of the organization was found guilty of all charges and received a
    life sentence. In addition, five homicides in the city of New
    Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-
    related assets were seized. According to DEA, the investigation
    had a significant local impact by reducing violent crime and
    disrupting the flow of heroin into New Orleans. *  DEA's Richmond
    District Office City Strike Force in Virginia learned about a
    trafficking organization bringing Colombian heroin to the Richmond
    and Columbus, OH, areas from New York. Through the arrest and
    debriefing of drug couriers, the task force obtained evidence
    regarding the organization's distribution of more than 100 pounds
    of Colombian heroin in the Richmond area over approximately 1
    year's time. The task force arrested the 2 heads of the
    organization and 24 co-conspirators. Three kilograms of Colombian
    heroin and $17,000 were seized. In February 1995, DEA established
    the MET Program to help state and Mobile Enforcement Teams local
    law enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking
    in their communities, particularly crime committed by violent
    gangs. This was consistent with the Attorney General's Anti-
    Violent Crime Initiative, which was initiated in 1994 to establish
    partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement
    agencies to address major violent crime problems, including gangs.
    The MET Program was also consistent with ONDCP's 1995 National
    Drug Control Strategy, which cited the program as an example of
    how federal agencies would help state and local agencies address
    drug trafficking and associated violence. According to DEA
    officials, federal assistance through the MET Program was designed
    to help overcome two challenges facing state and local agencies in
    drug enforcement: Page 38
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations *  State and local police
    agencies did not have sufficient resources to effectively enforce
    drug laws. *  Local law enforcement personnel were known to local
    drug users and sellers, making undercover drug buys and
    penetration of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous.
    Unlike DEA's traditional State and Local Task Force Program,
    previously discussed, in the MET Program, upon request from local
    officials, DEA deploys teams of special agents (referred to as
    METs) directly to communities affected by drug-related violence.
    The METs are based in DEA field divisions throughout the country.
    The METs are to work cooperatively with the requesting local law
    enforcement agency-sharing intelligence, coordinating activities,
    and sometimes combining staff and other resources-to target drug
    gangs and individuals responsible for violent crime. Since its
    creation in fiscal year 1995, funds for the MET Program have
    totaled about $173 million in constant 1999 dollars. Table 2.5
    shows the MET budget, the number of active METs, and the number of
    agents authorized for those METs from the inception through fiscal
    year 1999. Table 2.5: Selected MET Program Data,      MET Fiscal
    Years 1995 to 1999
    Fiscal years Program data                       1995a
    1996             1997              1998             1999 METs
    19                19               23                24
    24 DEA special                  167              167
    250              250               250 agentsb Budget
    d            $55.1d            $19.7            $46.9
    $51.1 (millions) c aFiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month
    period. bThe number of special agent positions were authorized as
    of the end of each fiscal year, except for fiscal year 1999
    positions, which were as of March 1999. c The budget amounts for
    each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts
    include actual payroll costs for fiscal year 1996 and approximated
    payroll costs for fiscal years 1997 through 1999. Other costs are
    actual for fiscal years 1996 through 1998 and as approved for
    fiscal year 1999. dThe fiscal year 1996 budget includes funds
    spent in fiscal year 1995. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.
    A typical MET is made up of 8 to 12 DEA special agents. Each MET
    operation starts with a request to the local DEA field office from
    a police chief, sheriff, or district attorney for assistance in
    dealing with drug-related violence. DEA then evaluates the scope
    of the problem and the capability of local law enforcement to
    address it. Each assessment is supposed to give particular
    attention to the violent crime rate in the requesting Page 39
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations community and the impact of
    the identified drug group on the violence occurring there. Once
    DEA decides to deploy a MET, an action plan is to be developed,
    including identification of the suspects to be targeted. Following
    this initial planning, the MET is to conduct the deployment
    outfitted with the necessary surveillance and technical equipment.
    During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law
    enforcement officials to investigate and arrest targeted violent
    drug offenders. According to DEA officials, the MET generally
    collects intelligence, initiates investigations, participates in
    undercover operations, makes arrests, seizes assets, and provides
    support to local or federal prosecutors. Evidence developed in MET
    investigations may also be used to prosecute the same individuals
    for related crimes, including murder, assault, or other acts of
    violence. According to DEA, each MET deployment plan establishes a
    time frame of between 90 and 120 days for completing the
    deployment.3 At the time of our review, DEA had 24 METs in 20 of
    its 21 domestic field divisions (with the Caribbean Division being
    the only exception). Table 2.6 shows the number of MET deployments
    and their results from the program's inception in fiscal year 1995
    through fiscal year 1998. 3 In discussing a draft of our report,
    DEA noted that a review of all 187 MET deployments completed as of
    April 20, 1999, showed that the average deployment length was 167
    days. Page 40
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.6: Selected Data on
    MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998 Fiscal years
    Selected data on MET deployments                1995 (6 months)-
    1996                          1997                     1998
    Total Requests
    112                        67                      79
    258 Deployments initiated
    79                       46                      56
    181 Deployments completed
    79                       45                      34
    158 Deployments active
    0                          1                    22
    23 Arrestsa
    1,973                    2,200                     2,199
    6,372 Convictionsb
    240                       415                    1,071
    1,726 Cocaine seized (pounds)
    95                      747                     342
    1,184 Methamphetamine seized (pounds)
    68                      115                     199
    382 Heroin seized (pounds)
    3                       31                      18
    52 Marijuana Seized (pounds)
    158                       493                     646
    1,297 Assets seized (millions)c
    $3.6                       $2.7                    $3.8
    $10.0 aIn addition to DEA arrests, MET deployments from the
    program's inception through 1998 also led to a total of 612
    arrests by other law enforcement agencies. bAccording to DEA,
    actual convictions are higher than these numbers indicate due to
    sentencing delays and the lack of reporting of prosecutorial
    dispositions in the state systems. Also, the conviction totals may
    increase due to the delay between arrest and final disposition. c
    The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999
    dollars. The yearly amounts, when added, do not equal the total
    due to rounding. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. The DEA
    offices in Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C.,
    had completed 33 MET deployments at the time we made our visits
    during 1998. In conducting our work at these offices, we spoke
    with local police officials in selected cities-Baltimore, MD; Los
    Angeles, CA; Pine Bluff, AR; and South Miami, FL-who had requested
    MET deployments. The officials said they were pleased with the
    results of the MET deployments and that the accomplishments met
    their expectations. Following are summaries of the MET deployments
    in these four cities. *  A MET deployment conducted for about 2-
    1/2 months during 1996 in the Rampart area of Los Angeles targeted
    six violent street gangs: 18th Street, Mara Salvatruches, Orphans,
    Playboys, Crazy Riders, and Diamonds. In addition to the MET, the
    Los Angeles Police Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
    Firearms, and the California Department of Corrections
    participated. The operation resulted in 421 arrests, including 144
    by DEA's MET, and seizures of 1,200 grams of heroin, 630 grams of
    cocaine, 104 pounds of marijuana, 28 weapons, and $70,000 in
    currency. According to a Los Angeles Police Department official,
    crime statistics (e.g., homicides and aggravated assaults) in the
    Rampart area fell immediately after the MET deployment was
    completed. However, DEA's post-deployment assessment of violent
    crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment
    ended to the 6 months prior to the Page 41
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations deployment, showed that
    homicides increased from 42 to 47, aggravated assaults increased
    from 738 to 1,008, robberies increased from 1,091 to 1,275, and
    sex crimes increased from 130 to 207. In addition, the assessment
    indicated that drug sales appeared to increase shortly after the
    deployment was completed, approaching levels observed before the
    deployment started. It further indicated that a significant number
    of drug dealers reportedly changed the location of their
    distribution activities while remaining in the Rampart area.4 *
    The South Miami Police Department requested DEA support in going
    after crack cocaine dealers. Initially, the police collected
    intelligence, purchased drugs, and arrested 17 street-level drug
    dealers. DEA's MET then became involved. The MET bought crack
    cocaine from drug dealers who came out to sell the drugs after the
    initial arrests had been made. The MET, which deployed for about 3
    months in 1998, made 13 arrests (7 for federal prosecution and 6
    for state prosecution) and seized 386.7 grams of crack cocaine.
    South Miami police officials said some of those arrested had
    committed weapons violations and some violence (e.g., assaults,
    batteries, and armed robberies) in the past. According to DEA's
    post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area,
    comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6 months
    prior to the deployment, homicides decreased from 1 to 0, assaults
    decreased from 11 to 4, aggravated batteries decreased from 9 to
    3, and robberies decreased from 14 to 5. The assessment noted that
    illegal drug activity in the South Miami area had been greatly
    reduced. The assessment further noted that the availability of
    crack cocaine in the area had been reduced, as well as drug
    distribution in surrounding areas. *  A MET deployment conducted
    for 6 months during 1997 in Pine Bluff targeted violent
    organizations dealing in crack cocaine and methamphetamine. A
    total of 46 people were arrested, including 15 who were indicted
    by a federal grand jury. Four people were suspects in four
    different homicides. Six ounces of crack cocaine were seized,
    along with 15 vehicles and $118,026. The Pine Bluff Police Chief
    told us that the MET deployment had successfully helped reduce
    both the city's homicide rate and its crack cocaine problem.
    However, DEA's post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the
    area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6
    months prior to the deployment, showed that homicides increased
    from 4 to 7, assaults increased from 677 to 1,098, rapes increased
    from 44 to 51, and robberies increased from 168 to 190. 4 In
    discussing a draft of our report, DEA officials said this MET
    deployment was not typical.  It was conducted during a time when
    DEA was refining the program.  The Los Angeles Rampart area
    deployment focused on a specific area, and DEA now requires each
    MET deployment to focus on targeted criminal drug organizations.
    Page 42
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations *  A MET deployed in eastern
    Baltimore for 5 months during 1997 successfully targeted a drug
    organization-the M&J Gang-in a housing project. This case resulted
    in 81 arrests, many of which were already "in the works" before
    the MET deployment, according to Baltimore police officials we
    contacted. The officials said the MET deployment also reduced
    violent crime in that area. DEA's post-deployment assessment
    showed fewer major crimes overall in the area during the 6-month
    period starting about 1 month before the deployment ended compared
    to the 6 months prior to the deployment. Shootings decreased from
    527 to 389, aggravated assaults decreased from 3,273 to 2,950,
    robberies decreased from 4,888 to 3,889, burglaries decreased from
    5,775 to 5,684, larcenies decreased from 16,475 to 15,976, and
    stolen automobiles decreased from 4,851 to 3,213. However, murders
    increased from 143 to 156, and rapes increased from 175 to 202.
    DEA's assessment also reported that narcotic activity in two areas
    covered by the deployment was significantly reduced, and gang-
    related criminal activity had decreased in the sections of
    Baltimore controlled by the M&J Gang and another drug gang. DEA
    officials we met with in the four field division offices told us
    that although MET deployments typically focused on local violent
    drug offenders, they sometimes led to investigations of higher
    level drug traffickers. In response to our request for
    quantitative data on this, a DEA headquarters official responded
    that it is difficult for DEA to provide statistics on the exact
    number of deployments that have led to investigations of higher
    level drug traffickers through MET operations because this
    information was not systematically maintained in an automated
    database. However, DEA did provide us with some examples of MET
    deployments that led to higher level drug traffickers. For
    example, DEA reported that a MET deployed from DEA's Phoenix
    office identified connections in Mexico to MET targets in Lake
    Havasu City, AZ, and family members in southern California. The
    resulting intelligence revealed that this Mexican-based
    organization was responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals
    from Mexico to clandestine laboratory sites in southern
    California, where methamphetamine was produced. Multiple-pound
    quantities of methamphetamine were transported to Lake Havasu
    City. According to DEA, the organization was also transporting
    large shipments of methamphetamine to Oregon, Washington,
    Colorado, and New Mexico. As shown in table 2.7, the MET
    deployments conducted in fiscal years 1995 through 1998 resulted
    in mostly local and regional drug cases. Local and regional cases
    involve suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas
    covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. As
    expected, given the MET program's purpose, local cases were the
    single Page 43                                     GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
    the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
    Trafficking Organizations largest category, making up about 47
    percent of the total during that period. About 6 percent of the
    MET cases involved criminals trafficking in drugs on an
    international scale. Table 2.7:  Geographic Scope of MET Program
    Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998 Fiscal year
    1995a     Fiscal year 1996         Fiscal year 1997
    Fiscal Year 1998         Total Scope of case             Number
    Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
    Number Percent Local                           21      40.4
    52       40.0           87        54.4             69      48.6
    229       47.3 Regional                        18      34.6
    38       29.2           32        20.0             38      26.8
    126       26.0 Domestic                         8      15.4
    30       23.1           36        22.5             23      16.2
    97       20.0 Foreign                          0       0.0
    0         0.0           0             0.0           0      0.0
    0        0.0 International                    4       7.7
    10         7.7           5             3.1         12       8.5
    31        6.4 Other                            1       1.9
    0         0.0           0             0.0           0      0.0
    1        0.2 Total                           52     100.0
    130     100.0         160        100.0            142     100.1
    484       99.9 Note:  Percentages may not total 100 percent due to
    rounding. aFiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period. Source:
    Developed by GAO from DEA data. After completing a MET deployment,
    DEA may carry out efforts to help a community maintain a lower
    level of drug trafficking and violent crime. For example, DEA
    offers follow-up training to those communities carrying out drug
    demand reduction activities.  In addition, if feasible, DEA may
    respond to a request for the re-deployment of a MET to prevent
    drug- related violent crimes from resurging to the level that
    existed prior to the initial deployment. In a June 1998 memorandum
    to all SACs of domestic field offices, DEA headquarters directed
    that the field divisions proactively promote the MET Program to
    increase the number of requests for deployments. The memorandum
    stated that despite the MET Program's success, much more could and
    should be done to stimulate interest in the program on the part of
    state and local law enforcement agencies.  The DEA offices were
    instructed to collect crime statistics in specific areas within
    their geographic boundaries to determine the existence of drug
    trafficking problems related to violent crime. After making such
    determinations, the DEA SAC or a designated assistant was to
    contact the local police chief or sheriff in those areas to
    explain the benefits of a MET deployment in their jurisdictions
    and inform them of the availability of MET resources. The
    memorandum noted that each SAC or assistant was expected to visit
    local police officials each month. The memorandum further noted
    that each office's proactive MET Program activities would be a
    significant factor in the SACs' annual performance appraisals.
    According to DEA, the proactive contacts have generated numerous
    additional requests for MET assistance, Page 44
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations and the majority of recent
    deployments have been the result of such proactive contacts. With
    regard to the results of the MET Program, DEA officials reported
    decreases in the number of murders, robberies, and aggravated
    assaults in local areas covered by the program based on an
    analysis of local crime statistics gathered from the targeted
    geographic locations before and after 133 deployments that had
    been completed as of April 20, 1999.5 According to DEA, its post-
    deployment assessments cumulatively showed a 12- percent decline
    in murders, 14-percent decline in robberies, and 6-percent decline
    in aggravated assaults in the 133 deployment areas during the 6
    months after the deployments ended when compared to the 6 months
    prior to the deployments.  Further, DEA's analysis showed that 28
    of the 133 deployment areas had decreases in all 3 major violent
    crime categories (i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault)
    during the 6 months after the deployments ended, while only 5 of
    the areas had increases in all 3 crime categories. (These five
    deployments included two of the examples summarized above). In
    commenting on these results, DEA noted that the effectiveness of
    MET deployments in removing a specific, targeted violent drug
    gang, for example, cannot by itself eliminate a community's drug
    trafficking problems because DEA cannot continue to control the
    deployment areas to prevent other drug dealers from filling the
    void that a MET deployment might have created. DEA started
    assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in their
    Domestic Cannabis          efforts to control domestically grown
    marijuana in 1979, when it helped Eradication/Suppression
    agencies in California and Hawaii. DEA's Domestic Cannabis Program
    Eradication/Suppression Program was established in 1982 to more
    formally help the states eradicate domestic marijuana while
    building cases leading to the arrest and prosecution of growers.
    The program became active in all 50 states in 1985. To implement
    the program, DEA provides funds to state and local law enforcement
    agencies. The funds are to be used by these agencies for program
    expenses, such as aircraft rentals and fuel, vehicles, equipment,
    supplies, and overtime payments for state and local officers
    working on eradication operations. As table 2.8 indicates, funds
    provided by DEA for the program increased about 177 percent, in
    constant 1999 dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999.
    5 According to DEA, 187 deployments had been completed as of April
    20, 1999. However, DEA only had FBI Uniform Crime Report
    statistical information for the 6-month period following 133 of
    the completed deployments. Page 45
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.8:  Funding for DEA's
    Domestic    Dollars in millions Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
    Fiscal year
    Dollarsa Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999
    1990
    4.7 1991
    16.2 1992
    11.5 1993
    11.2 1994
    10.9 1995
    10.7 1996
    10.5 1997
    13.9 1998
    13.7 1999
    13.0 aThe fund amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999
    dollars. The fund amounts do not include DEA's payroll costs.
    Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. DEA encourages state and
    local agencies to assume the major responsibility for eradicating
    domestic marijuana. In coordinating the program in each state, DEA
    is to assist efforts to detect and eradicate marijuana plants
    (including coordinating the support of other agencies, arranging
    for needed equipment, and helping with surveillance); exchange
    intelligence; investigate marijuana trafficking organizations; and
    provide training. Table 2.9 shows the statistical results of DEA's
    Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program for 1990 through
    1998. Page 46                                          GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus
    in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major
    Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.9: Domestic Cannabis
    Eradication/Suppression Program Statistical Results, 1990 Through
    1998 Output                             1990           1991
    1992           1993       1994        1995            1996
    1997      1998a Cultivated outdoor plants            7.3
    5.3         7.5           4.0        4.0         3.1
    2.8       3.8       2.1 eradicated (millions) Indoor plants
    eradicated            N/A                0.3         0.3
    0.3        0.2         0.2             0.2       0.2       0.2
    (millions) Ditchweed plants                   118.5          133.8
    264.2          387.9     504.4        370.3           419.7
    237.1     127.9 eradicatedb (millions) Arrests
    5,729          9,364       12,639          12,397    13,115
    14,274      18,733        17,070    10,507 Weapons
    3,210          4,200         5,541          6,062     5,959
    4,151           4,699     4,713     7,351 seized Assets seized
    (millions)c          $47.7          $62.4         $79.7
    $58.2     $62.1        $47.3           $39.7     $40.7     $20.9
    Note: N/A means not available. aThe 1998 data provided by DEA at
    the time of our work were not complete. bDitchweed is uncultivated
    marijuana that grows wild. c The amounts of assets seized each
    year are in constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from
    DEA data. In addition to its State and Local Task Force, MET, and
    Domestic Cannabis DEA Works With State and
    Eradication/Suppression Programs, DEA also participates in other
    Local Agencies on Other                     multiagency task force
    operations involving state and local law Multiagency Operations
    enforcement agencies. These include the following: *  The
    Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program is
    coordinated by U.S. Attorneys. This program is designed to promote
    coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law
    enforcement agencies involved in drug enforcement in each task
    force region. The goal of the OCDETF Program is to identify,
    investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking
    organizations and related enterprises. In fiscal year 1998, DEA
    sponsored 847, or 62 percent, and participated in 1,096, or 81
    percent, of the 1,356 OCDETF investigations that were initiated.
    DOJ reimburses DEA for its expenditures on OCDETF investigations.
    For fiscal year 1998, DEA was reimbursed $94.4 million for the
    OCDETF Program. *  The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
    (HIDTA) Program is administered by ONDCP. The mission of the HIDTA
    Program is to coordinate drug control efforts among federal,
    state, and local agencies in designated areas in order to reduce
    drug trafficking in critical regions of the United States. At the
    time of our work in September 1998, ONDCP had designated 20 areas
    as HIDTAs. According to ONDCP, a HIDTA organization typically
    consists of a major task force led by federal agencies, drug and
    money laundering task forces led by state or local agencies, a
    joint intelligence center and information-sharing network, and
    Page 47                                           GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
    the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
    Trafficking Organizations other supporting initiatives.6 DEA
    receives funds from ONDCP based upon its participation in the
    HIDTA Program. For fiscal year 1998, DEA received $14.8 million in
    direct HIDTA funding. Since it was established, DEA's highest
    priority has been to investigate DEA Developed an
    major drug trafficking organizations, both domestic and foreign,
    Investigative Approach responsible for supplying illegal drugs
    consumed in the United States. Over the years, DEA has adopted
    various techniques for focusing its efforts on Focusing on the
    such investigations. In 1992, DEA started using an investigative
    approach Communications of                designed to identify and
    target drug kingpins and their supporting Major Drug Trafficking
    infrastructures, primarily through the use of wiretaps and other
    types of Organizations                    electronic surveillance
    within the United States and the use of intelligence information.
    DEA called this approach the Kingpin Strategy. This approach,
    which has led to the dismantling or disruption of major
    trafficking organizations, was later adopted by SOD when it was
    established in 1995. More recently, DEA has established the
    Regional Enforcement Team (RET) initiative to address regional,
    national, and international drug trafficking in small towns and
    rural areas within the United States. Developed in 1992, the
    Kingpin Strategy targeted major Colombian cocaine The Kingpin
    Strategy             and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin
    trafficking organizations. This strategy was DEA's top priority
    and its primary enforcement approach for addressing the national
    priority of reducing the availability of illegal drugs in the
    United States. The Kingpin Strategy primarily targeted cocaine
    trafficking organizations operating out of Medellin and Cali,
    Colombia, with most of its focus on one organization referred to
    as the Cali cartel. According to DEA, the heads of the Colombian
    organizations tightly controlled all aspects of their operations
    and telephoned subordinates to give directions. DEA concluded that
    this was a weakness in the operations of these organizations. DEA
    decided to exploit this weakness by monitoring their
    communications and analyzing telephone numbers called to identify
    the kingpins and their key subordinates for U.S. and/or foreign
    investigation, arrest, and prosecution and for seizure of their
    domestic assets. The Office of Major Investigations at DEA
    headquarters was responsible for implementing the Kingpin
    Strategy. Various intelligence, financial, and operational
    functions were consolidated within this office to facilitate
    focusing DEA's investigative resources and capabilities on
    targeted 6 Drug Control: Information on High Intensity Drug
    Trafficking Areas Program (GAO/GGD-98-188, Sept. 3, 1998). Page 48
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations kingpin organizations (TKO).
    The office disseminated tips and leads, collected from
    intelligence sources worldwide, to help agents in the field carry
    out investigations and enforcement activities. The office
    centrally directed, coordinated, oversaw, and funded
    investigations that were being carried out in multiple U.S. cities
    and foreign countries in cooperation with state, local, and
    foreign police. DEA's SOD and its investigative approach evolved
    out of the Office of Special Operations Division Major
    Investigations and the Kingpin Strategy. According to DEA, the
    Kingpin Strategy was enhanced by the creation of SOD as a separate
    division. SOD was established at DEA headquarters in August 1995
    and given its own budget and additional staff.7 As with the
    Kingpin Strategy, SOD's approach focuses on the command and
    control communications of major drug trafficking organizations.
    However, a major difference is that its scope was expanded beyond
    Colombian cocaine and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin
    trafficking organizations to coordinate and support investigations
    of major organizations trafficking in methamphetamine and
    Colombian heroin, as well as organizations trafficking illegal
    drugs along the Southwest Border. SOD's primary emphasis currently
    is Colombian and Mexican organizations responsible for smuggling
    illegal drugs into the United States. Another major difference
    from the Kingpin Strategy is that representatives from other law
    enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S. Customs Service,
    are detailed to SOD. The FBI has had agents detailed to SOD since
    1995, and the Deputy SAC of SOD is an FBI agent. Similarly, the
    Customs Service has detailed agents to SOD since 1996. Most of
    SOD's workload supports cases being conducted by DEA field
    offices. However, the SOD SAC told us that the workload was
    increasingly supporting FBI and Customs Service cases. The
    intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) also
    participate by providing drug intelligence to SOD. In addition,
    DOJ's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section participates by
    providing legal advice to SOD on investigations. Like the Kingpin
    Strategy, SOD's investigative approach and initiatives are to
    support domestic and foreign investigations of major drug
    traffickers and trafficking organizations in two principal ways.
    First, SOD is to disseminate tips and leads collected from
    intelligence sources worldwide to help agents in the field carry
    out investigations and enforcement activities. Second, SOD is to
    assist agents in building and coordinating multijurisdictional
    drug conspiracy cases that are based primarily on the 7 The DEA
    Administrator approved 40 positions, including 31 Special Agent
    positions, for the new SOD. Page 49
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations use of wiretaps.
    Multijurisdictional efforts, such as Operation Reciprocity
    (described later) with 35 wiretaps in 10 U.S. cities, can involve
    many different individual investigations across the country. In
    May 1999, the SOD SAC estimated that SOD was supporting and
    coordinating about 240 cases throughout the United States. He said
    that SOD typically had approximately six to eight ongoing major
    operations at any one time, each having multiple related cases.
    Similar to the Kingpin Strategy, SOD does not control the cases
    that it supports; rather, decisionmaking on cases is left to field
    supervisors and agents. According to DEA officials, if SOD
    determines that field offices in different parts of the country
    are conducting investigations related to the same major drug
    trafficking organization, it attempts to bring the responsible
    agents together to develop the best cases for prosecution. In so
    doing, it is to coordinate and guide the agents' efforts,
    including their intelligence and electronic surveillance
    operations, and assist with intelligence collection and analysis.
    SOD essentially funds the same types of investigative activities
    as the Office of Major Investigations funded under the Kingpin
    Strategy. According to the SOD SAC, SOD provides funds to DEA
    field offices primarily for conducting electronic surveillance in
    support of investigations. It also funds payments for informants
    and drug purchases if doing so is essential to an investigation.
    However, he said it does so only when an electronic surveillance
    is being conducted or planned and only in connection with an
    ongoing case with which SOD is involved. (For example, in the
    course of an investigation, an agent may acquire a phone number
    that is determined to be connected with a current SOD-funded
    investigation.) SOD does not fund individual FBI and Customs drug
    investigations, but it does support some of those investigations
    through its various activities. SOD is responsible for the
    oversight of and guidance for DEA's Title III Collection,
    Analysis, and    (electronic surveillance) program. In Title III
    of the Omnibus Crime Dissemination of             Control and Safe
    Streets Act of 1968, Congress set forth the circumstances
    Intelligence Information     under which the interception of wire
    and oral communications may be Enhanced
    authorized (P.L. 90-351,18 USC 2510, et seq.). SOD is to help
    special agents in the field focus their intercept operations on
    the best available targets, choose the best telephone numbers for
    intercept, correctly conduct the intercepts, make the best use of
    collected information, and make the most efficient use of
    transcribers and translators. SOD also is to send teams to the
    field to assist special agents with their wire intercept
    operations. Page 50                                     GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its
    Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations According to DEA officials
    and data, since the Kingpin Strategy and SOD initiatives have been
    in operation, DEA has greatly increased the number of wiretaps and
    other electronic surveillances it conducts. The number of
    electronic surveillance court orders requested and conducted by
    DEA, as shown in table 2.10,  increased by 183 percent; and the
    number of facilities (e.g., telephone, pager, and fax machine)
    covered by the orders increased by 158 percent, from fiscal year
    1990 to fiscal year 1998. Most noteworthy is that the number of
    orders increased by 30 percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1992
    after the Kingpin Strategy was initiated, and they increased by 65
    percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1996 after SOD was
    established. Table 2.10: Number of Electronic
    Orders requested and Surveillance Orders and Facilities    Fiscal
    year                                          conducted
    Facilities covered Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through    1990
    223                               219 1998
    1991                                                          256
    311 1992
    332                               302 1993
    320                               320 1994
    357                               339 1995
    330                               284 1996
    546                               584 1997
    592                               544 1998
    631                               564 Note: The number of orders
    requested and conducted is sometimes greater than the number of
    facilities covered because some DEA requests were for extensions
    of previous wiretap orders. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA
    data. DEA's Special Intelligence Division is to support SOD's
    operations by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
    intelligence and other information from a variety of sources. For
    example, the unit is to analyze and disseminate information from
    telephone records and access and disseminate information from DEA,
    FBI, and Customs computerized drug intelligence systems. The unit
    has expanded both in size and computer and other technological
    capability. There were 186 staff in October 1998, including DEA,
    FBI, Customs, DOD, and contractor personnel. According to the SOD
    SAC, although DEA did not systematically compile Major
    International Drug              results data on all of the Kingpin
    and SOD operations, cases supported, Trafficking Organizations
    and leads disseminated, DEA has used both initiatives to
    successfully Disrupted                             dismantle or
    disrupt drug trafficking organizations responsible for large
    amounts of illegal drugs brought into the United States. For
    example, according to DEA, the Kingpin Strategy contributed to
    dismantling the Cali cartel, which DEA considered the most
    powerful criminal organization that law enforcement has ever
    faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel Page 51
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations leaders have been captured by
    or surrendered to the Colombian National Police (CNP), with the
    exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the
    time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through
    years of investigations by DEA and other federal, state, and local
    law enforcement agencies and CNP led to the identification,
    indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel
    leaders and some of their subordinates on drug charges in Colombia
    and the United States. According to DEA, a number of other
    successful operations have resulted from the Kingpin Strategy and
    SOD initiatives. These include the following: *  Operation Tiger
    Trap was a joint operation carried out by DEA and the Royal Thai
    Police in 1994. Tiger Trap produced U.S. indictments against
    members of the 20,000-man Shan United Army, a heroin TKO that
    operated the principal trafficking network in the Golden Triangle
    area of Thailand, Burma, and Laos for decades. *  Zorro I and
    Zorro II were multijurisdictional operations involving DEA, the
    FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local law enforcement
    agencies. Zorro I targeted Colombian drug traffickers based in
    Cali, Colombia, and their key subordinates operating in Los
    Angeles, New York, and Miami. Zorro I operated from 1992 to 1994
    and included 10 DEA domestic field divisions. Zorro II targeted
    Mexican transportation groups used by the Colombians, as well as
    Colombian distribution cells located throughout the United States.
    It operated from 1995 to 1996 and included 14 DEA field divisions.
    The two operations relied heavily on the use of wiretaps. There
    were 117 wiretaps conducted, generating leads that identified
    Colombian distribution cells, Mexican traffickers' command and
    control networks, money laundering routes, cocaine cache sites,
    and other important information. According to DEA, these
    operations disrupted both Colombian and Mexican organizations.
    Specifically, Zorro I resulted in 209 arrests, 6.5 tons of cocaine
    seized, and $13.5 million seized. Zorro II resulted in 182
    arrests, 5.7 tons of cocaine and 1,018 pounds of marijuana seized,
    $18.3 million seized, and $2.5 million in assets seized. *
    Operation Limelight was a multijurisdictional operation involving
    DEA, Customs, and numerous state and local law enforcement
    agencies. The operation targeted a Mexican drug transportation and
    distribution organization, which intelligence indicated was
    responsible for importing over 1- tons of cocaine monthly into the
    United States. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997,
    included the use of 37 wiretaps and other electronically generated
    intelligence, which helped identify groups in Houston and McAllen,
    TX; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, CA; New York, NY;
    and Chicago, IL. The operation resulted in 48 arrests, 4 tons Page
    52                                     GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in the
    1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
    Trafficking Organizations of cocaine seized, 10,846 pounds of
    marijuana seized, and $7.1 million seized. *  Operation
    Reciprocity was a multijurisdictional investigation involving DEA,
    the FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local agencies.
    In this operation, DEA combined several independent, but related,
    investigations being simultaneously conducted by federal, state,
    and local agencies into one investigation and helped other offices
    start investigations of other subjects by providing leads. The
    operation focused on two independent group heads based in the
    Juarez, Mexico, area who were responsible for importing,
    transporting, and distributing more than 30 tons of cocaine from
    Mexico to Chicago and New York. The operation involved 35 wiretaps
    and other electronically generated intelligence information in 10
    cities. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997, resulted in 53
    arrests, 7.4 tons of cocaine seized, 2,800 pounds of marijuana
    seized, and $11.2 million seized. According to DEA, information
    from some of the above SOD operations Regional Enforcement
    and other intelligence sources indicates that some major drug
    trafficking Teams                     organizations are adapting
    to drug law enforcement efforts in large U.S. cities by shifting
    their operations to small towns and rural areas within the United
    States. DEA investigations and other information have provided
    evidence that these trafficking organizations have established
    command and control centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment
    points in many small communities. Consequently, according to DEA,
    these communities have become major distribution centers, as well
    as production centers in some cases, for illegal drugs, such as
    cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. To respond to
    this threat, DEA established the RET initiative in fiscal year
    1999, for which Congress provided $13 million and authorized 56
    positions. The RETs are designed to be proactive, highly mobile
    regional investigative teams whose mission is to (1) target drug
    organizations operating or establishing themselves in small towns
    and rural areas where there is a lack of sufficient drug law
    enforcement resources and (2) better develop and exploit drug
    intelligence developed by SOD and other sources. The RET
    initiative's objective is to identify and dismantle these drug
    organizations before they become entrenched in the communities.
    The RETs are similar to METs, previously discussed, only in that
    they are mobile teams.  The RET initiative differs significantly
    from the MET Program in that the RETs are to only target major
    drug violators operating at the regional, national, or
    international level; while the METs, upon Page 53
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations request from local
    authorities, are to assist urban and rural communities in
    investigating and eliminating drug-related violence. DEA is
    implementing two RETs, which are to become operational in
    September 1999, one in Charlotte, NC, and one in Des Moines, IA.
    According to DEA, each RET will consist of 22 personnel, including
    15 special agents. In addition, the RETs are to be provided with
    the investigative equipment and vehicles needed to ensure a high
    degree of mobility and capability to support the performance of
    even the most complex investigations. According to DEA,
    international drug trafficking organizations have Key Changes in
    DEA's    become the most dangerous organized crime forces in the
    world, and Foreign Operations      Colombian and Mexican
    organizations are the most threatening to the United States. DEA
    documents state that such international trafficking organizations
    are often headquartered in foreign countries where there is little
    or no potential for extradition to the United States. Because of
    the international nature of drug trafficking, DEA had 79 offices
    in 56 foreign countries as of December 1998. DEA opened 16 offices
    in 15 foreign countries, and closed 4 offices in 4 countries, from
    fiscal years 1990 through 1998. Each foreign DEA office is part of
    the U.S. Embassy's country team. As a country team member, how DEA
    operates in a foreign country must be consistent with the
    embassy's Mission Program Plan, which is a strategic plan required
    by the State Department for U.S. government activities within each
    country where there is a U.S. Embassy. Mission Program Plans
    discuss the embassies' human rights, democratic, economic, law
    enforcement, and other goals, strategies, and objectives,
    including efforts to combat drug trafficking. The plan for each
    country is to be reviewed and approved by DEA and other agencies
    represented on the country team. DEA cannot operate in foreign
    countries as it does in the United States because of various
    limitations. For example, DEA said its agents cannot make arrests
    or conduct electronic surveillances in any foreign country, nor
    can they be present during foreign police enforcement operations
    without a waiver from the Ambassador.8 DEA's primary goal in the
    countries where it operates is, through bilateral law enforcement
    8 The Mansfield Amendment, Section 481(c) of the Foreign
    Assistance Act, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2291(c), regulates the
    involvement of U.S. government personnel in foreign drug law
    enforcement activities. Page 54
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations cooperation, to disrupt
    and/or dismantle the leadership, command, control, and
    infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations that threaten the
    United States. To accomplish this goal, DEA engages in cooperative
    investigations and exchanges intelligence with its host nation
    counterparts. In addition, DEA provides training, advice, and
    assistance to host nation law enforcement agencies to improve
    their effectiveness and make them self-sufficient in investigating
    major drug traffickers and combating the production,
    transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs. In addition to
    SOD operations, DEA has been a participant in two Interagency
    International    interagency investigative programs that were
    established during the 1990s Investigative Programs       to
    address drug trafficking in certain foreign countries where major
    trafficking organizations were based. They are the Linear and
    Linkage Approach Programs. Linear Approach Program      This
    program was established in 1991 as a U.S. interagency forum to
    disrupt and dismantle the key organizations in Latin America
    responsible for producing and shipping illegal drugs to the United
    States. The program's foundation rests on three basic tenets:
    focus law enforcement and intelligence community resources on key
    targets, foster community collaboration, and enhance host nation
    capabilities. The Washington Linear Committee, which comprises 15
    organizations and is cochaired by DEA, was designed to help better
    coordinate the counterdrug efforts of U.S. Embassy country teams,
    field-based regional intelligence centers, and U.S. Military
    Commands. The Linear Approach Program initially focused on
    Colombian and Mexican cocaine organizations. It has since been
    expanded to include other Latin American trafficking organizations
    that are primary recipients of significant amounts of drugs
    directly from the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
    Some of these organizations may traffic in heroin and/or
    methamphetamine, in addition to cocaine. DEA reported that, for
    the period of 1994 through 1998, 21 main targets of the Linear
    Program and 22 associates had been arrested.9 All of the Cali
    cartel leaders who were arrested as part of the previously
    discussed Kingpin Strategy were also primary targets of the Linear
    Approach Program. This program was established in 1992 and has
    been DEA's principal Linkage Approach Program     international
    strategy to address the heroin threat from Asia. The program is
    cochaired by DEA. It focuses law enforcement and intelligence
    community resources on efforts to disrupt and dismantle major
    Asian 9 DEA did not track the number of Linear Approach Program
    arrests until 1994. Page 55
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations trafficking organizations
    producing heroin for distribution to the United States. Linkage
    Approach Program targets are to have a significant role in one of
    the Southeast or Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations
    and be subject to extradition to, and arrest and prosecution in,
    the United States. According to DEA, prior to this program, which
    was designed to make use of U.S. drug conspiracy laws, major
    Southeast and Southwest Asian traffickers exploited the lack of
    conspiracy laws in their own countries by insulating themselves
    from the actual drugs. The Linkage Program uses a multinational
    and multiagency approach to gather evidence for use in the U.S.
    judicial system, securing indictments in federal courts, and
    pursuing the extradition of the targeted traffickers to the United
    States for prosecution. DEA reported that through 1998, 33 Linkage
    Approach Program targets had been arrested, 10 defendants had been
    extradited to the United States, and 1 defendant was incarcerated
    pending extradition. In 1996, DEA initiated its Vetted Unit
    Program, under which foreign police Vetted Units of Foreign
    participate in special host country investigative and intelligence
    collection Police Established         units in selected foreign
    countries. According to DEA officials, the foreign police
    participants are screened and then trained by DEA with the
    intention of enhancing their professionalism and creating an
    atmosphere of increased trust and confidence between participating
    foreign police and DEA agents working with the vetted units. DEA
    believes that these units will (1) enhance the safety of DEA
    agents in those participating countries and (2) increase the
    sharing of sensitive information between DEA and foreign police.
    All foreign police participating in the DEA program must be
    successfully "vetted," that is, pass a computerized criminal
    background investigation, a security questionnaire and background
    interview, medical and psychological screening, polygraph testing,
    and urinalysis testing. They then attend a 4- to 5-week DEA
    investigative training course in Leesburg, VA. After they are
    screened and trained, the vetted foreign police are to receive
    ongoing training as well as random polygraph and urinalysis
    testing. The Vetted Unit Program initially began in Mexico in May
    1996. After the Government of Mexico approved the concept, 21
    Mexican police were screened and then trained by DEA. The vetting
    process was completed in November 1996, and the Mexico National
    Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) became operational in January
    1997. Page 56                                     GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
    the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
    Trafficking Organizations DEA then expanded the program to other
    countries. For fiscal year 1997, Congress appropriated $20 million
    to support vetted units in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In
    March 1997, the DEA Administrator authorized immediate
    implementation of vetting in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. He also
    authorized programs in Brazil and Thailand for 1998. The $20
    million appropriation for vetted units in fiscal year 1997 is now
    part of DEA's budget base and has recurred each subsequent fiscal
    year. According to DEA, as of October 1998, vetted units, which
    were designed to engage in intelligence collection, investigations
    of drug traffickers, or both, were operational in Bolivia,
    Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Program start-up costs in fiscal years
    1997 and 1998 amounted to a total of $7.4 million for Bolivia,
    $5.3 million for Colombia, $4.6 million for Mexico, and $4.4
    million for Peru.10 According to a DEA official, it took an
    average of about 6 months to complete the screening and training
    of the foreign police from the time they were identified to DEA as
    candidates selected by the host governments for the program,
    although the actual length of time varied because of factors such
    as limited availability of polygraphers. As shown in table 2.11,
    the number of vetted officers varied by country. Each vetted unit
    had one or two DEA agents assigned for assistance, liaison, and
    case support. Table 2.11: Number of Vetted Units and
    Number of                                            Number of
    Officers on Board by Country, as of         Country
    vetted units                                    vetted officers
    September 30, 1998                          Bolivia
    4                                                172 Colombia
    4                                                112 Mexico
    3                                                232 Peru
    2                                                135 Total
    13                                                  651 Source:
    Developed by GAO from DEA data. The following summarizes the
    status and accomplishments of the existing vetted units under the
    program as of September 30, 1998, according to DEA. *  Bolivia had
    four SIUs with vetted personnel. Three SIUs each had 25 Bolivian
    National Police, and a fourth unit had 97 personnel. The SIUs were
    located in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Two of the SIUs
    collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and arrest targeted
    drug traffickers, while the other two SIUs concentrate primarily
    on collecting 10 Program start-up costs for the vetted units
    included expenditures for such items as recruiting, vetting,
    training, equipment, facilities maintenance, salary supplements
    for foreign police, operational support, and conducting
    investigations. Page 57
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations intelligence. DEA reported
    that the Bolivian SIUs' efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted
    in 1,206 arrests and seizures of 3,201 kilograms of cocaine
    hydrochloride (HCL), 5,392 kilograms of cocaine base, and $15.8
    million in assets. *  Colombia had 4 vetted units consisting of
    112 members. The Major Investigations Unit in Bogota had 39
    personnel, including both investigators and prosecutors. This unit
    focused on drug trafficking in the major cities of Colombia, such
    as Cali, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The Financial Investigation
    Unit had 14 investigators who focused on money laundering in
    financial institutions in Colombia's major cities. The
    Intelligence Group consisted of 39 personnel headquartered in
    Bogota and operating in the major drug producing regions. This
    unit collected intelligence to support investigations of Colombian
    drug trafficking organizations by other CNP units. The fourth
    vetted unit, consisting of 20 members, monitors the diversion of
    precursor substances from legitimate manufacturers for the
    production of illegal drugs. DEA reported that the Colombian
    vetted units' efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 63
    arrests and seizures of 6,398 kilograms of cocaine HCL and cocaine
    base, 6 kilograms of heroin, and $250,000 in U.S. currency. *
    Mexico had 3 vetted units made up of 232 vetted and trained
    personnel. The Mexico National SIU, operating out of Mexico City,
    had 14 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators assigned to collect
    intelligence on Mexican drug traffickers. The Border Task Forces
    had 106 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators. The task forces
    operated out of regional headquarters in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez,
    and Monterrey-all along the U.S.- Mexico Border-and Guadalajara.
    The task forces had a mission similar to the SIU, but the task
    force investigators were also responsible for executing warrants
    and making arrests. The narcotics section of the Organized Crime
    Unit was made up of 112 Mexican federal attorney- investigators
    and narcotics investigators. This unit's mission was to use
    information from court-ordered electronic intelligence collection
    to investigate high-level drug trafficking groups, as well as
    drug-related money laundering groups, throughout Mexico. The
    unit's headquarters was in Mexico City, but the assigned personnel
    were often located in other cities. DEA did not report the number
    of arrests or seizures for the Mexican vetted units, but noted
    there had been arrests made in three major organizations,
    including one of the largest drug cartels in Mexico. *  Peru had 2
    vetted units, with a total of 135 personnel. One unit, an
    intelligence group, consisted of 52 vetted personnel and
    specialized in collecting intelligence and targeting drug
    traffickers to support the second unit, the investigation group
    with 83 vetted police. Both units were headquartered in Lima and
    operated throughout the cocaine production regions of Peru. DEA
    reported that the Peruvian vetted units' efforts Page 58
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
    Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations through fiscal year 1998
    resulted in 199 arrests and seizures of 819 kilograms of cocaine
    HCL, 2,297 kilograms of cocaine base, 4,350 gallons of precursor
    chemicals, and numerous weapons and ammunition. In commenting on a
    draft of our report, DEA officials informed us that as of April
    1999, 2 vetted units with 25 and 75 vetted personnel,
    respectively, were fully operational in Thailand; 1 vetted unit
    with a total of 16 vetted personnel was operational in Brazil; and
    vetted antinarcotics police were expected to be operational in
    Pakistan in early fiscal year 2000.  The officials also noted that
    assessments were scheduled for Ecuador and Nigeria in May and
    June, respectively, to examine the future suitability of vetted
    units in those countries. DEA expanded its enforcement strategy in
    the 1990s to focus its Conclusions    operations on what it refers
    to as the seamless continuum of drug trafficking. It placed
    emphasis on investigating gangs, drug dealers, and drug-related
    violence in local communities while continuing to target higher
    level drug traffickers involved in major national and
    international drug trafficking organizations. DEA's programs and
    initiatives discussed in this chapter-for example, its state and
    local task forces, its MET Program, SOD's initiatives, and its
    foreign operations-are consistent with DEA's mission and
    responsibilities to enforce the nation's drug laws and bring drug
    traffickers to justice, as described in chapter 1. In carrying out
    its strategy, DEA's domestic enforcement efforts placed more
    emphasis on, and devoted more resources to, assisting and working
    with local law enforcement agencies than in the past.
    Consequently, funds and staff devoted to DEA's State and Local
    Task Force Program increased in the 1990s. Also, although not in
    substantial numbers in comparison to DEA's total dollar and staff
    resources, DEA began and continued to fund and dedicate agents to
    the MET Program during the 1990s. These programs targeted drug
    traffickers operating primarily at the local and regional levels.
    DEA provided examples of what it considered to be successful
    program operations at these levels and reported various program
    results, including federal and state arrests and convictions and
    seizures of drugs and assets. To improve the effectiveness of its
    domestic and international efforts directed at national and
    international drug trafficking organizations in the 1990s, DEA
    established and invested increased resources in SOD to continue
    and enhance the investigative approach initiated under its former
    Kingpin Strategy. SOD, like the Kingpin Strategy, emphasizes
    targeting the Page 59                                     GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its
    Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
    Major Drug Trafficking Organizations command and control
    communications of major traffickers. Consequently, the number of
    DEA electronic surveillances rose significantly in the 1990s. DEA
    documented the results of some Kingpin and SOD operations that it
    considered to be successful in disrupting and dismantling major
    national and international trafficking organizations. However, DEA
    did not compile results data on all Kingpin and SOD operations,
    cases they supported, or leads they disseminated. DEA also made
    changes to improve its foreign efforts directed at international
    drug trafficking organizations. In this regard, it has
    participated in two major interagency programs established in the
    1990s to target major organizations in Latin America and Asia. The
    programs have led to the arrests of some high-level drug
    traffickers. In addition, the specially trained vetted units of
    foreign police initiated in recent years by DEA may help increase
    the sharing of information and the trust level between DEA and
    foreign police participating in those units. This, in turn, may
    help DEA and its foreign counterparts in targeting major
    traffickers and disrupting and dismantling trafficking
    organizations based in the participating foreign countries, as
    indicated by the initial results reported by DEA. In its written
    comments on a draft of this report, DEA stated that, overall,
    Agency Comments    the report provides a detailed and factual
    background of DEA strategies and special operations.  DEA also
    provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which
    we incorporated in this chapter and other sections of this report.
    Page 60                                     GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet Developed
    Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control
    Strategy DEA's strategic goals and objectives, along with its
    enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s discussed in
    chapter 2, are consistent with the strategic goals of ONDCP's
    National Drug Control Strategy. Both the National Strategy and DEA
    hope to reduce illegal drug supply and drug- related crime and
    violence by disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
    organizations. The National Strategy contains mid- and long-term
    measurable performance targets1 for 2002 and 2007 that identify
    the extent to which the National Strategy seeks to disrupt and
    dismantle drug trafficking organizations. However, DEA has not yet
    established comparable measurable performance targets for its
    operations. Throughout this chapter, we use footnotes to explain
    various planning and performance measurement terms as defined by
    OMB, ONDCP, and DOJ. We also include a glossary at the end of this
    report, which provides an alphabetical listing of the various
    planning and performance measurement terms used in this report and
    their definitions. DEA's strategic goals and objectives, and
    enhanced programs and DEA's Strategic Goals
    initiatives in the 1990s for carrying out its mission are
    consistent with the and Objectives, and Its National Strategy's
    strategic goals and objectives defining a 10-year commitment to
    reduce drug abuse. DEA's mission, as described in chapter
    Programs, Are                       1, is an important element of
    the National Strategy and DEA, through the Consistent With the
    implementation of its programs and initiatives as discussed in
    chapter 2, is National Strategy                   a major
    participant in the National Strategy. As discussed below, we
    reviewed the National Strategy's strategic goals and objectives,
    and compared them with DEA's strategic goals and objectives and
    its programs for consistency. ONDCP has produced National
    Strategies annually since 1989. Since 1996, National Strategy
    Goals and the National Strategy has included five strategic goals
    (listed in ch. 1) and Objectives                          related
    strategic objectives. These goals and objectives are the basis for
    a long-term national antidrug effort aimed at reducing the supply
    of and demand for illicit drugs and the consequences of drug abuse
    and trafficking. The goals define the major directives of the
    strategy. The objectives, which are more narrowly focused,
    stipulate the specific ways in which goals are to be obtained. The
    1998 strategy provided a 10-year plan to reduce illegal drug use
    and availability by 50 percent by the year 2007. 1 A performance
    target, as defined by ONDCP for the purpose of the National
    Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved; it is a
    measurable level of performance against which actual achievement
    can be compared. Page 61
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy The 1999 National Strategy also continued
    the goals but eliminated 1 objective, reducing the total number of
    objectives to 31. The National Strategy is intended to guide the
    approximately 50 federal agencies with drug control
    responsibilities. DEA has significant responsibilities for helping
    to achieve the following three National Strategy goals.2 *
    Strategy goal 2: Increase the safety of American citizens by
    substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. *
    Strategy goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers
    from the drug threat. *  Strategy goal 5: Break foreign and
    domestic drug sources of supply. For these 3 strategy goals, the
    National Strategy has 15 supporting objectives, at least 10 of
    which relate to DEA. Table 3.1 identifies the strategy goals and
    objectives for which DEA has responsibilities. 2 DEA has a small
    drug demand reduction program ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999)
    that supports strategy goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth
    to reject illegal drugs as well as the use of alcohol and tobacco.
    Page 62
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Table 3.1:  National Strategy Goals and
    Objectives for Which DEA Has Responsibilities Strategy goals
    Strategy objectives Strategy goal 2-Increase the safety of
    American citizens by          Objective 1-Strengthen law
    enforcement-including federal, state, substantially reducing drug-
    related crime and violence.              and local drug task
    forces-to combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal
    organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leaders of illegal
    drug syndicates. Objective 2-Improve the ability of High Intensity
    Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) to counter drug trafficking.
    Objective 3-Help law enforcement to disrupt money laundering and
    seize and forfeit criminal assets. Strategy goal 4-Shield
    America's air, land, and sea frontiers        Objective 1-Conduct
    flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, from the drug
    threat.                                                and seize
    illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at its borders.
    Objective 2-Improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S.
    drug law enforcement programs with particular emphasis on the
    Southwest Border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
    Objective 3-Improve bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico
    as well as other cocaine and heroin transit-zone countries in
    order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
    Strategy goal 5-Break foreign and domestic drug sources of
    Objective 1-Produce a net reduction in the worldwide cultivation
    of supply.
    coca, opium, and marijuana and in the production of other illegal
    drugs, especially methamphetamine. Objective 2-Disrupt and
    dismantle major international drug trafficking organizations and
    arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders. Objective 3-
    Support and complement source country drug control efforts and
    strengthen source country political will and drug control
    capabilities. Objective 4-Develop and support bilateral, regional,
    and multilateral initiatives and mobilize international
    organizational efforts against all aspects of illegal drug
    production, trafficking, and abuse. Source: GAO analysis of
    ONDCP's 1998 Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) document
    and DEA's performance plan for fiscal year 2000. Page 63
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Recently, as part of its reauthorization
    legislation,3 ONDCP became responsible for monitoring the
    consistency between the drug-related goals and objectives of drug
    control agencies to ensure that their goals and budgets support
    and are fully consistent with the National Strategy. In its
    National Drug Control Budget Summary for 1999, ONDCP reported that
    DEA has various programs and initiatives that support strategy
    goals 1,4 2, 4, and 5. DEA's most recent planning document is its
    performance plan for fiscal DEA's Strategic Goals and      year
    2000,5 which it issued in February 1999, in response to the
    Objectives                     Government Performance and Results
    Act of 19936 (the Results Act).7 That plan contains information on
    DEA's vision, mission, strategic goals, strategic objectives, and
    performance indicators.8 DEA listed three strategic goals and nine
    strategic objectives for carrying out its mission: *  DEA
    strategic goal 1-disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command,
    control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and
    traffickers of illicit drugs; *  DEA strategic goal 2-reduce the
    impact of crime and violence that is the result of drug
    trafficking activity by providing federal investigative resources
    to assist local communities; and *  DEA strategic goal 3-
    facilitate drug law enforcement efforts directed against major
    drug trafficking organizations by cooperating and coordinating
    with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and
    intelligence counterparts. 3 Office of National Drug Control
    Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
    2681- 670 (1998). 4 DEA has a small drug demand reduction program
    ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999) that supports strategy goal 1:
    Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well
    as the use of alcohol and tobacco. 5 Drug Enforcement
    Administration GPRA Annual Performance Plan FY 2000, February
    1999. 6 P.L. 103-62. 7 DOJ prepares strategic and annual
    performance plans to meet the requirements of the Results Act and
    requires its component organizations, such as DEA, to prepare
    annual performance plans even though they are not required to do
    so under the Act. DOJ considers its components' performance plans
    to be an integral part of the department's annual summary
    performance plan. 8 A performance indicator, as defined by OMB for
    the purposes of the Results Act, means a particular value or
    characteristic used to measure output or outcome. Performance
    indicators are associated with performance goals in the annual
    performance plan. Page 64
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Along with its strategic goals, DEA listed
    the following nine strategic objectives: *  DEA strategic
    objective 1--attack the command and control of international and
    domestic drug trafficking organizations through the arrest,
    prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of their criminal
    leaders and surrogates; *  DEA strategic objective 2-concentrate
    enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt,
    dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups operating from
    Mexico; *  DEA strategic objective 3-direct enforcement efforts at
    the escalating threat posed by heroin; *  DEA strategic objective
    4-address the dual threats presented by methamphetamine and
    resurgence in marijuana trafficking; *  DEA strategic objective 5-
    assist local law enforcement by deploying METs into communities
    where drug trafficking and related violent crime are rampant; *
    DEA strategic objective 6-prevent the diversion of controlled
    substances and control the distribution of chemicals used to
    manufacture illicit drugs; *  DEA strategic objective 7-enhance
    intelligence programs to facilitate information sharing and
    develop new methods to structure and define drug trafficking
    organizations; *  DEA strategic objective 8-support interdiction
    efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United
    States; and *  DEA strategic objective 9--seize and forfeit assets
    and proceeds derived from drug trafficking. DEA did not align each
    of its objectives with any particular goals. Because DEA is the
    nation's lead drug enforcement agency, its strategic Comparison of
    DEA                goals and objectives and its programs should be
    consistent with the Strategic Goals and              National
    Strategy. Table 3.2 shows DEA's strategic goals compared to
    Objectives, and Its              National Strategy goals for drug
    supply reduction. Programs, With the National Strategy Page 65
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals
    With National Strategy Goals DEA strategic goals
    National Strategy goals for drug supply reduction DEA strategic
    goal 1-In order to safeguard Americans, DEA
    National Strategy goal 2-Increase the safety of American citizens
    will disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and
    by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
    infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of
    illicit drugs that threaten Americans and erode the quality of
    life in our          National Strategy goal 4-Shield America's
    air, land, and sea communities.
    frontiers from the drug threat. DEA strategic goal 2-In order to
    reduce the impact of crime and             National Strategy goal
    5-Break foreign and domestic drug violence that is the result of
    drug trafficking activity, DEA will          sources of supply.
    provide federal investigative resources to assist local
    communities. DEA strategic goal 3-In order to facilitate drug law
    enforcement efforts directed against major drug trafficking
    organizations, DEA will cooperate and coordinate with our federal,
    state, local, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence
    counterparts Source: GAO analysis of ONDCP's 1999 National Drug
    Control Strategy and DEA's performance plan for fiscal year 2000.
    DEA's first strategic goal aimed at dismantling and disrupting
    drug trafficking organizations is consistent with National
    Strategy goal 4, which calls for shielding America's air, land,
    and sea frontiers from the drug threat, as well as with goal 5,
    which calls for breaking foreign and domestic sources of drug
    supply. DEA's goal for dismantling and disrupting trafficking
    organizations applies to all drug trafficking organizations
    regardless of where they operate-in the United States, in drug
    transshipment areas, at U.S. border areas, and in foreign
    countries. Similarly, DEA's strategic goal 2, which calls for
    providing federal investigative resources to local communities for
    reducing drug-related crime and violence, is consistent with
    National Strategy goal 2, which also calls for reducing drug-
    related crime and violence. DEA's strategic goal 3, which calls
    for DEA to cooperate and coordinate with federal, state, local,
    and foreign law enforcement and intelligence counterparts, is
    consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5. By
    coordinating and cooperating with other law enforcement and
    intelligence groups, DEA's coordinated efforts reach out in
    support of the National Strategy's three supply reduction goals.
    As with its goals, DEA's strategic objectives are also consistent
    with the objectives of the National Strategy. For example, as can
    be seen in table 3.3, various DEA strategic objectives for
    dismantling and disrupting domestic and international drug
    trafficking organizations, providing Page 66
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy assistance to local communities to reduce
    drug-related violence, and supporting drug interdiction efforts
    align with National Strategy objectives. Table 3.3:  Comparison of
    Selected DEA and National Strategy Objectives DEA strategic
    objectives
    National Strategy objectives Assist local law enforcement by
    deploying METs into communities               Strengthen law
    enforcement, including federal, state, and local where drug
    trafficking and related violence are rampant (DEA
    drug task forces, to combat drug-related violence, disrupt
    criminal strategic objective 5).
    organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leader of illegal drug
    syndicates (National Strategy objective 1 for goal 2). Concentrate
    enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt,
    dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups
    Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize
    operating from Mexico (DEA strategic objective 2).
    illegal drugs in transit to the United States and U.S. borders
    (National strategy objective 1 for goal 4). Support interdiction
    efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United
    States (DEA strategic objective 8).
    Disrupt and dismantle major international drug trafficking
    organizations and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders
    Attack the command and control of international and domestic drug
    (National Strategy objective 2 for goal 5). trafficking
    organizations through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
    incarceration of their criminal leaders and surrogates (DEA
    strategic objective 1). Source: GAO's analysis of ONDCP's 1999
    National Drug Control Strategy and DEA's performance plan for
    fiscal year 2000. In addition, as with its strategic goals and
    objectives, DEA's programs and initiatives in the 1990s as
    discussed in chapter 2 are also consistent with the goals of the
    National Strategy. During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed
    important aspects of its operations, that is, its strategies,
    programs, initiatives, and approaches. *  DEA gave a higher
    priority than in the past to and increased resources for working
    with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies
    through its State and Local Task Force Program and started the MET
    Program to help combat drugrelated violent crime in local
    communities. *  DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which
    evolved into SOD, placing greater emphasis on intercepting
    communications between top-level drug traffickers and their
    subordinates (i.e., attacking the "command and control"
    communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to
    dismantle their entire trafficking operations. *  DEA started
    participating in two interagency programs-Linear Approach and
    Linkage Approach-to target and investigate major drug trafficking
    organizations in Latin America and Asia. *  DEA helped establish,
    train, and fund special foreign police units to combat drug
    trafficking in certain key foreign counties, primarily in Latin
    America. Page 67
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy These and other drug law enforcement
    programs and initiatives discussed in detail in chapter 2 are
    consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5 previously
    discussed in this chapter and described in table 3.1. For example,
    DEA's MET Program, started in 1995, is consistent with National
    Strategy goal 2, which calls for increasing the safety of American
    citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and
    violence. The 1999 National Strategy established performance
    targets calling for DEA Has Not                     specific
    increases in the percentage of drug trafficking organizations
    Developed                       disrupted and dismantled. These
    targets are measurable and can be used to assess the collective
    performance of drug control agencies responsible Performance
    Targets             for achieving them. However, although DEA is
    the lead drug enforcement Consistent With Those agency, it has not
    established similar measurable performance targets for in the
    National                 its own operations. Strategy
    To measure the effectiveness and performance of the National
    Strategy, ONDCP established 5 and 10 year performance targets and
    performance measures.9  These performance targets and measures are
    intended, in part, to enable policymakers, program managers, and
    the public to determine efforts that are contributing to the
    strategic goals and objectives of the National Strategy. To track
    and measure progress in achieving the strategic goals and National
    Strategy               strategic objectives of the National
    Strategy, ONDCP issued its Performance Measurement
    Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system in February
    1998.10 System                          This system is a 10-year
    plan that identifies performance targets and related performance
    measures as the means for assessing the progress of the National
    Strategy in achieving its strategic goals and objectives. The PME
    system contains 97 performance targets. Although originally
    undertaken as a policy decision to bring more accountability to
    drug policy, the PME system is now grounded in legislation. The
    Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998
    requires ONDCP to submit an annual report to Congress on the PME
    system. ONDCP issued its first annual status report in February
    1999.11 9 A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for the
    purposes of the National Strategy, means data, variables, and
    events used to track progress toward performance targets. Measures
    show how progress toward targets will be tracked. 10 Performance
    Measures of Effectiveness, A System for Assessing the Performance
    of the National Drug Control Strategy, 19982007, Office of
    National Drug Control Policy, Feb. 1998. 11 National Drug Control
    Strategy 1999 Performance Measures of Effectiveness:
    Implementation and Findings, Office of National Drug Control
    Policy, Feb. 1999. Page 68
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Beginning in 1996, interagency working
    groups involving federal agencies, including DEA, along with
    outside experts developed the PME performance targets through a
    consensual process. The performance targets were incorporated into
    the PME plan issued in February 1998. After the initial PME plan
    was issued, interagency working groups, including those involving
    DEA, continued developing, refining, and implementing the PME
    system during 1998. The working groups, among other things,
    focused on *  developing specific action plans identifying the
    responsibilities of each agency in working towards the PME
    performance targets and *  identifying annual targets that
    correspond to the achievement of the 5 and 10 year performance
    targets. For each performance target, the PME system identifies a
    "reporting agency" (or "agencies" when there is shared
    responsibility) and "supporting agencies." A reporting agency(s)
    is required to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving the
    performance target. However, the reporting agency is not
    necessarily the only agency responsible for achieving the target.
    Supporting agencies are to assist with data collection and
    assessment or have programs that contribute to achieving the
    target. The initial 1998 PME system document identified
    performance targets relating to disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations and arresting drug traffickers. These
    performance targets called for specific percentage increases in
    the number of domestic and international drug trafficking
    organizations disrupted or dismantled and the number of drug
    traffickers arrested by 2002 and 2007. DEA was designated as the
    sole reporting agency for performance targets aimed at decreasing
    the capabilities of domestic and international drug trafficking
    organizations and traffickers. DEA shared reporting-agency
    responsibilities with HIDTAs for the performance target aimed at
    drug trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat
    assessments. As a result of the PME implementation process in
    1998, changes were made to performance targets for drug
    trafficking organizations and drug traffickers. These changes were
    reported in the 1999 PME report. The performance target for
    domestic drug traffickers was deleted.  The target for
    international drug traffickers was combined with the target for
    international drug trafficking organizations to focus on one
    manageable Page 69                                   GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet
    Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug
    Control Strategy target. In addition, DEA was deleted as a
    reporting agency for the performance target aimed at drug
    trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat assessments.
    Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the performance targets and related
    performance measures for disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations, along with the current status of
    achieving the targets as reported by ONDCP in its 1999 PME report.
    Table 3.4:  National Drug Control Strategy Performance Target and
    Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Domestic Drug
    Trafficking Organizations Performance target
    Performance measure                            ONDCP current
    status statement Target: By 2002, using a prioritized list
    Measure: The percentage of targeted            Data source: To be
    determined. of domestic drug law enforcement
    organizations on the counterdrug community designated targets,
    increase       community's designated target list that are
    Relevant data: None by 5 points the percentage of drug
    disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise organizations disrupted,
    dismantled, or      rendered ineffective, measured annually.
    Status: ONDCP will charter an interagency otherwise rendered
    ineffective as
    working group to develop a consolidated measured against the
    percentage              Reporting agency: DEA
    Major Drug Trafficking Organization Target recorded in the 1997
    base year. By 2007,
    List. The working group will more clearly increase the target
    percentage by at         Supporting federal agencies: Department
    define what constitutes a major drug least 10 points above the
    base year.         of Defense (DOD), Department of State,
    trafficking organization and what criteria will FBI, U.S. Customs
    Service, and the             be used to determine when an
    organization Department of the Treasury.                    has
    been disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise rendered ineffective.
    Since no such list currently exits, the base year will need to be
    adjusted once the list has been developed. Annual performance
    targets will be constructed after the target list has been
    developed. Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME
    report. Page 70                                       GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet
    Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug
    Control Strategy Table 3.5:  National Strategy Performance Target
    and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
    International Drug Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their
    Leaders Performance target
    Performance measure                              ONDCP current
    status statement Target: By 2002, measuring against the
    Measure: The percentage of designated            Data Source: To
    be determined. prioritized list of community designated
    drug trafficking organizations dismantled or targets established
    in the 1998 base year,         significantly disrupted either
    through the       Relevant Data: None achieve a 50 percent success
    rate of               incarceration of their principal leaders or
    targeted organizations dismantled or               through the
    substantial seizure of their         Status: This target was
    revised by significantly disrupted by either (1) having
    assets or the incarceration of their network     combining two
    targets-trafficking their principal leaders arrested and
    key associates, measured annually.               organizations and
    traffickers-identified in incarcerated or otherwise rendered
    the initial 1998 PME plan. Annual ineffective; or (2) making
    substantial seizures Reporting agency: DEA
    performance targets are under of those organizations' narcotics,
    money, or
    development. other assets, or arrests of their key network
    Supporting federal agencies: Central associates, that
    significantly impair their        Intelligence Agency (CIA), DOD,
    FBI, and ability to operate at normal levels for an         the
    U.S. Customs Service. extended period of time. By 2007, increase
    the success rate to 100 percent as measured against the 1998 base
    year list. For additional targets added to the list after the 1998
    base year, achieve a similar success rate of at least 10 percent
    per year as measured against the year in which they were added to
    the list. Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME
    report. Table 3.6:  National Drug Control Strategy Performance
    Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Drug
    Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs Performance target
    Performance measure                              ONDCP current
    status statement Target: By 2002, increase the proportion of
    Measure: The proportion of identified drug             Data
    Source: HIDTA threat assessments will drug trafficking
    organizations disrupted or       trafficking organizations
    disrupted or           serve as the foundation of the list.
    dismantled as identified in HIDTA threat          dismantled by or
    within HIDTAs. assessments by 15 percent above the
    Relevant Data: The Bureau of Justice proportion in the 1997 base
    year. By 2007, Reporting agency: Each HIDTA
    Statistics collects data on the number of increase the proportion
    disrupted or
    traffickers convicted and sentenced. In 1991, dismantled to 30
    percent above the base           Supporting federal agencies: DEA,
    DOD,           drug trafficking offenses accounted for 19 year
    ratio.                                       Department of State,
    FBI, U.S. Customs           percent of all defendants convicted.
    Service, and the Department of the Treasury.
    Status: The ONDCP HIDTA Director will develop a consolidated list
    of the number of drug trafficking organizations targeted by each
    HIDTA. This HIDTA target will be prepared prior to the beginning
    of each year. At the end of each year, ONDCP will measure the
    proportion of those targeted organizations that have been
    disrupted or dismantled. After the base year proportion has been
    determined for 1997, the annual target will be revised to reflect
    the target proportion for each year. Page 71
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control
    Strategy PME report. As can be seen in the tables, the National
    Strategy performance targets and measures are quantifiable and
    outcome oriented and can be readily used to assess performance
    following collection of proposed baseline data on lists of drug
    trafficking organizations. DEA, with assistance from supporting
    agencies such as the FBI, is to report progress by the drug law
    enforcement community in dismantling or disrupting a percentage of
    identified domestic and international drug trafficking
    organizations. However, ONDCP, in reporting on the current status
    of the performance targets for which DEA is the reporting agency,
    noted that data on drug trafficking organizations needed to assess
    performance had not been identified nor had annual performance
    targets been established. Further, according to ONDCP and DEA,
    neither the domestic nor international designated target lists
    referred to in tables 3.4 and 3.5 have been developed. According
    to ONDCP officials, DEA and various supporting agencies are
    working toward developing lists of domestic and foreign drug
    trafficking organizations for use in pursuing the performance
    targets. ONDCP officials said that the time frames for reporting
    on performance targets for dismantling and disrupting drug
    trafficking organizations and their leaders are (1) 1999 for
    defining organizations and developing trafficker lists, (2) 2000
    for collecting data, and (3) 2001 for reporting on data and
    gauging performance. According to ONDCP's 1999 report, its PME
    system tracks the performance of the numerous programs that
    support each strategy goal and objective. The accomplishment of
    National Strategy goals and objectives generally require the
    contributions of many agency programs. The PME system does not
    track an individual agency's performance nor is it designed to do
    so. According to ONDCP, agencies such as DEA are required to track
    their own performance through their Results Act plans, and these
    plans should be consistent with the National Strategy and the PME
    system. Over the years, DEA has used arrest and seizure data
    (drugs and assets) DEA Goals Do Not Include    along with examples
    of significant enforcement accomplishments, such as Measurable
    Performance      descriptions of successful operations, to
    demonstrate its effectiveness in Targets
    carrying out its enforcement programs and initiatives. However,
    these data are not useful indicators for reporting on results
    because arrest and seizure data relate to outputs (activities) and
    not to outcomes (results). These arrest and seizure data do not
    present a picture of overall Page 72
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy performance or of DEA's level of success in
    achieving its goals. Further, the use of arrest data as a
    performance indicator can be misleading without information on the
    significance of the arrests and the extent to which they lead to
    prosecutions and convictions. In addition, using arrest data as a
    performance target can lead to undesirable consequences when law
    enforcement agencies place undue emphasis on increasing the
    numbers of arrests at the expense of developing quality
    investigations. More recently, with passage of the Results Act,
    DEA has been attempting to go beyond reporting outputs to
    reporting outcomes. In response to the Results Act, DEA prepared
    annual performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 that
    contain information on its strategic goals and objectives and its
    performance indicators.12 DEA's Performance Plan for    In its
    fiscal year 1999 performance plan issued in January 1998, DEA
    Fiscal Year 1999              described its strategic goals,
    strategies for achieving those goals, annual goals, and
    performance indicators. DEA associated these goals, strategies,
    and performance indicators with its various programs and
    initiatives. For example, DEA's strategic goals for "enforcement"
    provided that DEA will "... disrupt/dismantle the leadership,
    command, control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs,
    and traffickers, of licit and illicit drugs that threaten
    Americans and American interests." Under this goal, DEA's primary
    strategy provided that DEA will "... implement drug law
    enforcement strategies that target and attack the leadership and
    infrastructure of major drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of
    licit and illicit drugs that threaten America." Under its
    strategic goal for enforcement and related strategy, DEA listed
    annual goals for its domestic enforcement program, including its
    Southwest Border, Caribbean Corridor, methamphetamine, and heroin
    initiatives. These annual goals generally stated that DEA would
    continue or increase its investigative efforts leading to
    increased arrests and seizures and a reduction in the trafficking
    capability of drug organizations. For 12 Among other requirements,
    the Results Act requires that performance plans (1) establish
    performance goals; (2) express those goals in an objective,
    quantifiable, and measurable form, unless OMB approves otherwise;
    (3) establish performance indicators for assessing progress toward
    or achievement of the goals; and (4) provide a basis for comparing
    actual program results with the established goals. Page 73
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy example, DEA's annual goal for its general
    enforcement activities, including its Southwest Border initiative,
    stated that: "DEA will continue its investigative efforts,
    including the application of forfeiture laws, especially along the
    Southwest border. This will produce an increase in the number of
    arrests, removals, and seizures. The primary outcome will be a
    reduction in the trafficking capability of drug organizations,
    particularly those associated with the Mexican Federation, that
    use the southwest border in transshipment." To assess the extent
    to which it was accomplishing its strategic and annual goals to
    reduce trafficking capability, DEA's plan listed performance
    indicators that were not results oriented. DEA planned to measure
    performance, using data on total numbers of arrests and total
    number of major criminal enterprises and other drug trafficking
    organizations disrupted or dismantled. However, DEA did not
    identify performance targets for its goals, such as the proportion
    of identified drug trafficking organizations to be disrupted and
    dismantled, against which its performance could be assessed. DEA's
    fiscal year 1999 plan had no annual, mid- or long-range
    performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations. DEA noted in its performance plan for
    fiscal year 1999 that data on the number of drug trafficking
    organizations had not been previously collected and reported and
    would be available by March 1, 1998. But it never reported these
    data in its subsequent performance plan for fiscal year 2000. DEA
    also pointed out that although several of its performance
    indicators were in the developmental stage, their establishment
    would help to provide the framework for future evaluations of
    DEA's efforts. DEA's Performance Plan for    DEA organized its
    fiscal year 2000 performance plan-issued in February Fiscal Year
    2000              1999-differently from its 1999 plan to align it
    with its three major budget activities-enforcement, investigative
    support, and program direction. DEA organized its fiscal year 2000
    plan around what it identified as its three core business systems:
    (1) enforcement of federal laws and investigations, (2)
    investigative support, and (3) program direction. Along with
    information on its 3 core business systems and 15 subsystems, the
    plan, as previously described, listed DEA's strategic goals and
    objectives. However, unlike its 1999 performance plan, the fiscal
    year 2000 plan did not have clearly identifiable annual goals. For
    its core business system for the enforcement of federal laws and
    investigation, DEA listed the following: Page 74
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy "Through effective enforcement effort, DEA
    will disrupt/dismantle the command & control, and infrastructure
    of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit
    drugs that threaten Americans and American interests, including
    providing enforcement assistance to American Communities to fight
    drug-related crime and violence." Related to its core business
    system for enforcement, DEA's fiscal year 2000 performance plan
    listed a strategic goal and objectives for disrupting drug
    trafficking organizations. DEA's description of its core business
    system and its strategic goal and objective are similar. However,
    as with its fiscal year 1999 plan, DEA's fiscal year 2000 plan
    does not include annual, mid- or long-range measurable performance
    targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
    organizations. Although DEA does not have a performance target for
    dismantling international drug trafficking organizations, it does
    have a performance indicator that may lead to a performance target
    that is consistent with the target in the National Strategy. DEA's
    fiscal year 2000 performance plan contains a performance indicator
    specifying that DEA plans to use data on the number of targeted
    organizations disrupted or dismantled as a result of DEA
    involvement in foreign investigations compared to the total number
    of targeted organizations as a basis for measuring performance.
    The plan notes, however, that DEA is currently not collecting data
    for this performance indicator but expects to do so during fiscal
    year 1999. For domestic drug trafficking organizations, DEA's plan
    does not include a performance indicator that is quantifiable and
    results oriented similar to the one it specified for international
    drug organizations. DEA has no performance indicator specifying
    that it will measure performance on the basis of the number of
    targeted domestic organizations disrupted and dismantled compared
    to the total number of targeted organizations. Further, DEA's
    fiscal year 2000 performance plan does not indicate that DEA plans
    to collect data on domestic drug trafficking organizations for
    development of a performance target that is consistent with the
    target in the National Strategy. It is unclear whether DEA plans
    to develop a performance target for its program aimed at
    disrupting and dismantling domestic drug trafficking that would be
    consistent with the performance target and the national effort
    called for in the National Strategy. DEA's fiscal year 2000
    performance plan indicates that DEA will be reporting on prior
    year arrests resulting in prosecutions and convictions as a
    performance indicator for measuring its enforcement efforts. As
    required by DOJ policy, to avoid perceptions of "bounty hunting"
    DEA and other DOJ component organizations cannot specify
    performance targets for arrests. However, DOJ's policy would not
    preclude DEA from developing a Page 75
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy performance target and performance indicator
    for domestic drug trafficking organizations consistent with those
    in the National Strategy. The National Strategy performance
    targets do not involve projecting increased numbers of arrests;
    rather, they call for increasing the percentage of targeted drug
    trafficking organizations dismantled or disrupted. In addition to
    the lack of result-oriented performance indicators and performance
    targets for its programs aimed at domestic drug trafficking
    organizations, DEA's plan lacks performance targets and related
    performance indicators for other mission-critical programs. For
    example, DEA's core business system for enforcement and one of its
    strategic goals call for assistance to local communities to reduce
    drug-related crime and violence. However, DEA has not established
    a performance target and performance indicator that could be used
    to measure the results of its assistance to local communities. In
    this regard, DEA has a strategic objective calling for assistance
    to local law enforcement by deploying METs, discussed in chapter
    2, into communities where drug trafficking and related crime are
    rampant. However, DEA has not identified a performance target and
    performance indicator to measure the results of its MET Program
    even though, as discussed in chapter 2, resources dedicated to
    METs and other forms of assistance to local law enforcement have
    continued to grow in the 1990s. Thus, it is unclear how DEA will
    measure the results of its strategic objective calling for MET
    deployments. In the program accomplishment and highlight section
    of its performance plan for fiscal year 2000, DEA states that
    "[t]he effect of METs in reducing violent crime has been clearly
    established in 1998." The plan further points out that a
    comparison of violent crime statistics before and after MET
    deployments indicated reductions in violent crime in areas where
    MET deployments occurred. Using this type of results-oriented
    data, DEA should be able to specify a performance indicator that,
    when tied to a measurable performance target, could be used to
    assess the results of the MET Program in terms of actual versus
    expected performance. In August 1998, DEA's Chief for Executive
    Policy and Strategic Planning, told us that DEA had not yet
    identified the performance goals and indicators it will ultimately
    use. She told us that at the direction of the Administrator, DEA
    was planning to bring its field representatives together with
    headquarters officials to obtain their views and input on DEA's
    goals, strategies, and performance indicators. In April 1999, she
    told us that the meeting with field representatives, which was
    initially planned for the fall of 1998 but was delayed pending
    hiring of a contractor, was expected to be Page 76
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy held by the summer of 1999. However, with
    the recent resignation of DEA's Administrator, these plans were
    placed on hold and not addressed in DEA comments on a draft of
    this report. In addition, in April 1999, DEA's Chief for Executive
    Policy and Strategic Planning told us that DEA would have to work
    with DOJ in developing performance goals and indicators. In this
    regard, she said that DEA would be following the direction
    provided by DOJ in its departmentwide drug strategy.13 She also
    pointed out that ONDCP had not yet established a baseline (agreed-
    upon target list) for its National Strategy performance targets
    aimed at disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking
    organizations. In commenting on a draft of this report in June
    1999, DEA pointed out that DEA (1) has developed preliminary
    performance targets that were included in DEA's fiscal year 2001
    budget submission to DOJ; (2) had established a working group
    consisting of representatives from its operations, strategic
    planning and executive policy, and resource management staffs to
    further refine its performance targets; and (3) is working with
    other DOJ components to develop performance targets and
    measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the
    National Strategy. Measuring and evaluating the impact of drug law
    enforcement efforts is Difficulties in Measuring    difficult for
    several reasons. First, antidrug efforts are often conducted by
    Drug Law Enforcement         many agencies and are mutually
    supportive. It is difficult to isolate the Outcomes
    contributions of a single agency or program, such as DEA's
    domestic enforcement program aimed at disrupting and dismantling
    major drug traffickers, from activities of other law enforcement
    agencies. Other factors that DEA has little control over, such as
    drug demand reduction efforts, may also affect drug trafficking
    operations. Second, the clandestine nature of drug production,
    trafficking, and use limits the quality and quantity of data that
    can be collected to measure program performance. History has shown
    that drug trafficking organizations continually change their
    methods, patterns, and operations as law enforcement concentrates
    its resources and efforts on a specific region or method. Drug law
    enforcement agencies must continuously deal with unknown and
    imprecise data, such as the number of drug trafficking
    organizations and the amount of illegal drugs being trafficked. 13
    Drug Control Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Justice, March 31,
    1998. Page 77
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy Third, some of the data that are currently
    collected are not very useful in assessing the performance of
    individual programs and agency efforts. As previously mentioned,
    data collected on arrests, drug seizures, and assets forfeited
    generally measure enforcement outputs but not outcomes. Further,
    data collected on drug availability and consumption are generally
    not designed to measure the performance of a single program or
    agency, and such data are influenced by other factors in addition
    to enforcement efforts. DEA's strategic goals and objectives as
    well as its programs and initiatives Conclusions    are consistent
    with the National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA has not
    developed performance targets for its programs and initiatives
    aimed at disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations
    and arresting their leaders. We recognize the complexity and
    difficulty of measuring outcomes and impact for drug law
    enforcement agencies operating in a clandestine drug trafficking
    environment. Nevertheless, without measurable performance targets
    and related performance indicators for its mission-critical
    programs, it is difficult for program managers, policymakers, and
    others to quantitatively assess DEA's overall effectiveness and
    the extent to which DEA's programs are contributing to its
    strategic goals and objectives and those of the National Strategy.
    ONDCP has set specific measurable performance targets in the
    National Strategy for achieving strategic goals that it shares
    with DEA. DEA has worked with ONDCP and other federal drug control
    agencies to develop performance targets for the National Strategy
    and for measuring the progress of federal efforts toward those
    targets. However, although DEA is the lead federal drug
    enforcement agency and reporting agency for several National
    Strategy performance targets, it has not established similar
    measurable performance targets for its own operations. In this
    regard, DEA has not established similar measurable performance
    targets for its operations in either its fiscal years 1999 or 2000
    annual performance plans although, as discussed below, it stated
    in its comments on a draft of this report that it has developed
    preliminary targets for inclusion in its fiscal year 2001
    performance plan. Measurable DEA performance targets, once
    finalized, coupled with continued refinement of the National
    Strategy performance targets on the basis of DEA input and
    leadership, along with DOJ guidance, should bring DEA and ONDCP
    closer in pursuing their shared goals and objectives for
    disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. Such
    Page 78                                   GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet Developed
    Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control
    Strategy performance targets also should provide DEA with a better
    basis for measuring its own progress in achieving its mission and
    for making decisions regarding its resource needs and priorities
    as discussed in the next chapter. We recommend that the Attorney
    General direct the DEA Administrator to Recommendation
    work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA
    performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets
    in the National Drug Control Strategy. In its written comments on
    a draft of this report, although not directly Agency Comments and
    agreeing with our recommendation, DEA agreed with our principal
    finding Our Evaluation                 regarding measurable
    performance targets.  However, it disagreed with our draft
    conclusion relating to the finding, pointed out actions it was
    taking relating to our recommendation, and requested guidance on
    bringing closure to the recommendation. DEA agreed with our
    principal finding that it had not included measurable performance
    targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
    organizations in its fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans.
    However, it disagreed with our draft conclusion that "In the
    absence of such targets, little can said about DEA's effectiveness
    in achieving its strategic goals." DEA indicated that this
    statement and supporting information in this chapter gave the
    impression that DEA had not attempted to develop performance
    targets. DEA said that it has developed "preliminary performance
    targets" that have been included in its fiscal year 2001 budget
    submission to DOJ and that are to be refined for inclusion in
    subsequent budgets. To further refine its performance targets, DEA
    said that it had established a working group consisting of
    representatives from its operations, strategic planning and
    executive policy, and resource management staffs. DEA also noted
    that it is working with other DOJ components to develop
    performance targets and measurements that will be consistent with
    the targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. To recognize
    these actions, we added them to the pertinent section of this
    chapter as an update to information previously provided by DEA. We
    also modified our draft conclusion that little can be said about
    DEA's effectiveness without performance targets to clarify our
    intent that it is difficult to quantitatively assess DEA's overall
    effectiveness without such targets. Page 79
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
    Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
    Drug Control Strategy DEA's stated actions are consistent with the
    intent of our recommendation. However, because DEA performance
    targets are preliminary and under review within the executive
    branch, they are subject to change until February 2000 when DEA
    issues its annual budget submission and performance plan, as part
    of DOJ's submission, to Congress.  Further, DEA indicated that it
    cannot finalize its performance targets and measures until a
    designated targeted list of international drug trafficking
    organizations, as called for in the National Strategy, is
    completed. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation until
    DEA's preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion
    in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency
    with those in the National Strategy. DEA and ONDCP also provided
    technical comments, which we incorporated in this chapter where
    appropriate. Page 80                                   GAO/GGD-99-
    108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's Staffing Needs
    Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998 In order
    to carry out its mission and operations during the 1990s,
    including the programs and initiatives discussed in chapter 2 and
    the strategies discussed in chapter 3, DEA received funds to staff
    its operations through several sources. These included its annual
    appropriations salaries and expenses budget; DOJ's Violent Crime
    Reduction Program (VCRP);1 and other reimbursable programs, such
    as OCDETF. This chapter focuses on the process used to determine
    and allocate additional DEA positions provided through its
    salaries and expenses budget. Specifically, it discusses the
    process used in fiscal year 1998, which was, according to DEA and
    DOJ officials, generally typical of the approach DEA has used in
    other years. The process used to determine the need for and to
    allocate additional DEA staff is linked to the federal budget
    formulation and execution process and reflects federal laws and
    budget guidelines promulgated by OMB. In fiscal year 1998, the DEA
    process considered field input, changes in drug abuse and drug
    trafficking patterns, and the Administrator's priorities to
    prepare its staffing enhancement estimates for its budget
    submission to DOJ. DEA's submission to DOJ estimated the need for
    989 new total positions, including 399 special agent positions. As
    a result of reviews by DOJ, OMB, and ONDCP and consideration of
    the resources provided in DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation,2
    the President's fiscal year 1998 budget, which was submitted to
    Congress in February 1997, requested a total of 345 new positions
    for DEA, including 168 special agent positions. Congress provided
    531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent
    positions, with guidance as to how the positions were to be
    allocated. DEA senior management then determined the allocation of
    additional staff, considering congressional guidance and such
    other factors as field office prior requests. The process used to
    determine the staffing resources necessary to carry Federal Budget
    out DEA's mission is generally typical of the federal budget
    processes and Formulation Guidance procedures that federal
    agencies are expected to follow. These processes and procedures
    are established in federal law and budget guidelines Provides
    Basis for               promulgated by OMB. DEA Staffing Needs
    Determination Process Each legislative session, the president is
    required by law to submit a budget to Congress. The Budget and
    Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, 1 VCRP was established by the
    Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-
    322, as amended). 2 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
    State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
    1997, P.L. 104-208 and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863 (1996). Page 81
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 provides the legal basis for the president's budget,
    prescribes much of its content, and defines the roles of the
    president and the agencies in the process. During budget
    formulation, the president establishes general budget and fiscal
    policy guidelines. Policy guidance is given to agencies for the
    upcoming budget year and later to provide initial guidelines for
    preparation of agency budget requests. OMB Circular A-11 provides
    instructions on the preparation of agency submissions required for
    OMB and presidential review of budget estimates and for
    formulation of the president's budget. The budget formulation
    process begins at the lowest organizational levels of a federal
    agency and moves to the higher levels. A consolidated agencywide
    budget is prepared for submission to OMB. This approach is typical
    of federal agencies, although some have elaborate planning
    processes that allow for objectives established at the top to
    guide budget preparation. OMB reviews agency requests according to
    a process that includes several stages-(1) staff review, (2)
    director's review, (3) passback, (4) appeals, and (5) final
    decisions. The final budget is prepared and printed by OMB for
    submission to Congress no later than the first Monday in February
    of each year, as required by law. According to DEA and DOJ
    officials, the DEA fiscal year 1998 staffing Fiscal Year 1998
    needs determination process began in the summer of 1995 and was
    typical Process for          of DEA's staffing determination
    process. Prior to the commencement of the official budget
    formulation process, DEA domestic and foreign field Determining
    DEA's    offices provided estimates of their staffing needs to DEA
    headquarters Staffing Needs       program staff.  Program and
    budget staff reviewed and considered these estimates in the
    development of DEA's budget submission with staffing estimates,
    which were sent to DOJ in June 1996. In accordance with the
    federal budget process, DOJ and OMB reviewed DEA's budget
    submission and staffing estimates, which resulted in some changes
    in the estimates. ONDCP reviewed DOJ's budget submission to OMB as
    part of the national drug budget certification process,3 which is
    distinct from, but occurs simultaneously with, the budget
    formulation process and may also affect DEA's staffing estimates.
    Figure 4.1 depicts DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing determination
    process. 3 The Drug Budget Certification process was established
    by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690. The
    act required that the ONDCP director certify, in writing, that
    drug budget submissions to ONDCP from program managers, agency
    heads, and department heads with national drug control program
    responsibilities are adequate to implement the objectives of the
    National Drug Strategy for the budget request year. Page 82
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 [Figure 4.1 begins on the next page.] Page 83
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 Figure 4.1:  Flowchart of DEA's Fiscal Year 1998
    Staffing Needs Determination Process 1995
    1996 Aug.            Sept.           Oct.     Nov.         Dec.
    Jan.          Feb.         Mar.            Apr.         May DEA 12
    3 4 DOJ OMB Legend:                                             1
    DEA: Aug.-Oct.                    3 DEA: Apr.-May
    4 DEA: May Domestic and foreign field         In accordance with
    the              Administrator approved Pre-budget staffing
    estimate                offices prepared and               budget
    formulation process,         the budget submission/ preparation
    process                         submitted staffing estimates
    DEA headquarters program            staffing estimates. to DEA
    headquarters.               and budget staff prepared and revised,
    on the basis of Budget formulation process
    the Administrator's              5 DEA: June 2 DEA: Dec.-Apr.
    comments, DEA's FY 98               Budget submission/ DEA
    headquarters                   initiative-based submission
    staffing estimates were program and budget staff           and
    staffing estimates.             sent to DOJ. reviewed field office
    submissions and began development of staffing
    6 DOJ: June-Aug. DOJ budget staff estimates.
    received, reviewed, and analyzed DEA submission/staffing estimates
    and sent them back to DEA. Page 84
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 Figure 4.1: Continued 1996
    1997 June                July     Aug.           Sept.
    Oct.           Nov.              Dec.          Jan.
    Feb. 5
    11 7 6                         8
    10 12 9
    $ Budget 13       14          15 7 DEA: Aug.                    9
    OMB: Sept.-Dec.                        10 DOJ: Dec.
    14 OMB: Dec.-Jan. DEA reviewed DOJ's            OMB budget staff
    DOJ budget staff reviewed                 OMB prepared final
    budget budget staff analysis.        reviewed and analyzed
    OMB's passback and sent                   submission with
    assistance DEA administrator             DEA's budget submission/
    DOJ's interpretation of the               from and review by DEA
    participated in Attorney      staffing estimates.
    passback to DEA.                          and DOJ. General's
    hearing and subsequently presented        OMB staff sent their
    results DEA's appeal.                 to the OMB Director.
    11 DEA: Dec.                                 15 OMB: Feb. DEA
    prepared its appeal to                OMB transmitted budget the
    OMB passback and                      submission to President 8
    DOJ: Aug.-Sept.                OMB Director reviewed
    sent it to DOJ.                           for submission to
    Congress Attorney General held         examiners' recommendations.
    on Feb. 6th. DEA budget hearing and on receipt of DEA appeal
    OMB Director generally                 12 DOJ: Dec. reviewed it
    and made her      discusses the overall                        DEA
    submitted its appeal, final decision.               federal budget
    with                          including the DEA appeal, to the
    President at this time.                  OMB DOJ sent DEA budget
    submission/staffing           OMB prepared DEA/DOJ
    13 OMB: Dec. estimates to OMB.             passback.
    OMB reviewed DEA/DOJ's passback appeal, including OMB sent DEA/DOJ
    staffing estimates. passback to DOJ
    DOJ and OMB agreed on an overall spending level for the
    department, and DOJ distributed the appeal amounts. Source: GAO
    analysis of DEA, OMB, and other information. Page 85
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing process began in the
    summer of 1995. Each DEA Domestic and Foreign DEA domestic field
    division submitted a field management plan (FMP), Field Offices
    Provided          and foreign offices followed a less structured
    and more informal staffing Staffing Estimates              request
    process. In an August 1995 memorandum to its domestic field
    divisions, DEA headquarters provided direction and guidelines for
    preparation of the fiscal year 1996-1997 FMPs.  DEA requested
    detailed, specific, and realistic enhancements for fiscal year
    1998 for use in the formulation of DEA's fiscal year 1998
    budget/staffing submission. According to DEA officials, an FMP is
    supposed to be based on the Administrator's vision statement,
    which is provided to the field divisions; the local SAC's vision
    statement, which has previously been reviewed and approved by DEA
    headquarters; and the drug threat that the division expects to
    confront. The 1995 memorandum directed each field division to
    indicate the resources it would need. Through the FMPs, which were
    due in October 1995, DEA's domestic field divisions requested a
    total of 591 positions, including 369 special agent positions.
    According to DEA officials, recommendations and requests for DEA
    foreign office staffing enhancements and new foreign offices for
    fiscal year 1998 came from a variety of sources, including DEA
    country attachs (CA)4 and the foreign country through the U.S.
    Ambassador. Each of the four foreign sections (Central America and
    the Caribbean, Europe and the Middle East, Far East, and South
    America) within the Office of International Operations at DEA
    headquarters was tasked with identifying the issues, including
    staffing needs, within specific countries. In March 1996,
    according to a DEA official, the International Operations staff,
    including the Chief, Deputy Chief, and section heads of
    International Operations, met to discuss recommendations from the
    four sections. The official said that to assess and justify
    staffing requests for their respective regions, DEA foreign
    section staff used regional and individual DEA country plans, as
    well as foreign situation and quarterly trends in trafficking
    reports, which provided context and background. Foreign
    operational needs were discussed in terms of DEA's goals and
    objectives and prioritized. DEA officials told us that
    International Operations 4 DEA provided the following description
    of the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD 38) Process.
    NSDD 38 requires DEA to gain an ambassador's approval prior to
    opening an office or adding additional positions to an existing
    office.  Before seeking ambassadorial approval under NSDD 38, DOJ
    policy requires that DEA obtain approval from DOJ's Executive
    Office of National Security.  Various bureaus within the State
    Department are to provide an ambassador with advice pertaining to
    any NSDD 38 request, but the ambassador is the final approving
    authority.  As a matter of course, an ambassador is to seek host
    nation consent prior to granting NSDD 38 approval. Page 86
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 communicated the results of this meeting (as a
    discussion document) to DEA's budget section. In accordance with
    the federal budget formulation process, DEA budget DEA's Fiscal
    Year 1998      staff prepared the agency's spring budget
    submission to DOJ, including Budget Submission to DOJ    staffing
    estimates. After review and approval by its executive staff and
    the Included Estimates of       Administrator, DEA sent DOJ its
    budget submission, which included 6 Additional Staff Needed
    initiatives with identified additional staffing needs of 9895
    total positions; 399 were special agent positions, and 590 were
    support positions. For preparing DEA's budget submission to DOJ,
    DOJ budget officials said DOJ provides instructions and usually
    guidance; and, according to DEA officials, the DEA Administrator
    also usually provides guidance. Although the documents sent to the
    agencies varied each year, DOJ provides written planning guidance
    and instructions in April, about 17 months prior to the beginning
    of the budget year. However, officials said that informal guidance
    was usually available earlier. The DEA Administrator may also
    issue a budget call memorandum to all program managers listing his
    priorities. According to DEA and DOJ budget officials, for its
    fiscal year 1998 guidance, DOJ used an amended version of its
    fiscal year 1997 guidance. In addition, DEA budget officials said
    that the DEA Administrator sent out a budget call memorandum in
    February 1996 indicating his priorities. However, DEA budget
    officials said that they actually began to develop DEA's fiscal
    year 1998 budget submission/staffing estimates in December 1995,
    prior to the guidance, and continued to work through May 1996. As
    part of this process, officials said that DEA budget staff
    considered the needs of field and headquarters offices, analyzed
    information on emerging drug trends, and held discussions with DEA
    program managers. Budget staff said that after canvassing the
    program managers, they presented the proposed budget submission
    and staffing request to the Administrator in March 1996. According
    to these staff, on the basis of the Administrator's comments, they
    then prepared DEA's final fiscal year 1998 budget
    submission/staffing request to DOJ, which DEA's Executive Staff
    and the Administrator reviewed and approved in May. In June 1996,
    DEA sent its fiscal year 1998 budget request with estimates of
    additional staffing needs to DOJ. In its submission, DEA estimated
    a 5 This number does not include positions to be funded through
    DEA's Diversion Fee Account, which are included in a separate
    program-specific budget request. DEA enforces the Comprehensive
    Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-513) as
    it applies to the registration of handlers of controlled
    substances (e.g., manufacturers, distributors, importers,
    exporters, and others). Page 87
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 need for 989 additional positions, including 399 special
    agent positions and 590 support positions (e.g., diversion
    investigators, chemists, intelligence analysts, and professional
    and clerical staff). DEA identified, prioritized, and requested
    funding, including staffing enhancements, for six specific
    initiatives. *  Countering violent crime: This included staffing
    estimates (193 total/98 special agents) for the MET Program and
    for converting 8 provisional state and local task forces to
    program-funded status. *  Methamphetamine strategy: This
    initiative included estimated staffing enhancements (279 total/127
    special agents), including positions to convert 7 provisional
    state and local task forces to program-funded status, to fund a
    comprehensive approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. *
    Southwest Border project: This included estimated staffing
    enhancements (212 total/96 special agents) to continue DOJ's
    interagency strategy against drug trafficking on the Southwest
    Border. *  Domestic heroin enforcement: This initiative included
    estimated staffing enhancements (104 total/53 special agents) to
    continue implementation of DEA's 5-year heroin strategy. *
    International crime: This included estimated staffing enhancements
    (76 total/25 special agents) to (1) open DEA country offices in
    Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Vientiane, Laos; Abu Dhabi, United Arab
    Emirates; Lisbon, Portugal; and Managua, Nicaragua; (2) provide
    additional support to DEA offices in Mexico City, Panama City, New
    Delhi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong; and (3) establish an International
    Chemical Control Center in order to address the growing
    international aspects of drug production, transshipment, and
    trafficking. *  Investigative shortfalls: This initiative included
    estimates of resources and staffing enhancements (125 total)
    needed to replace lost asset forfeiture revenues, provide support
    staff for domestic field offices, and provide additional basic and
    refresher training for special agents and DEA support staff. The
    submission included justifications for each initiative and
    reflected DEA's internal budget/staffing determination process.
    For example, on the basis of changing trends and input from the
    field, DEA's fiscal year 1998 budget submission proposed a
    methamphetamine initiative,6 including domestic and international
    staff enhancements, to fund a comprehensive 6 According to
    officials, however, DEA did not wait for the completion of the
    fiscal year 1998 budget cycle to address the methamphetamine
    problem. Although DEA had no base budget for the methamphetamine
    problem in 1996, it dedicated 405,000 agent hours, or the
    equivalent of 195 full-time agents, to methamphetamine
    investigations in fiscal year 1995. The hours dedicated to
    methamphetamine were expected to rise in fiscal year 1996. Page 88
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. To justify
    its fiscal year 1998 estimates, DEA provided (1) DAWN data that
    indicated a steady increase in the number of methamphetamine-
    related emergency room episodes and deaths and (2) statistics
    indicating an increased use of and trafficking in methamphetamine
    and the proliferation of clandestine drug laboratories in both
    traditional and new locations. In accordance with the budget
    formulation process, DEA's fiscal year 1998 DOJ Changed Staffing
    budget submission was reviewed by DOJ Justice Management Division
    Estimates for DEA's       (JMD) budget staff and the Attorney
    General between June and August, Initiatives               1996.
    According to DOJ budget staff, as in other years, to assess DEA's
    fiscal year 1998 enhancements and the corresponding
    justifications, the budget staff considered the (1) overall
    illegal drug situation at the time, including drug trends and
    patterns; (2) link between the specific request and ONDCP, DOJ,
    and DEA goals, strategies, and indicators; (3) facts and arguments
    used by DEA to justify the request; and (4) level of resources
    requested relative to the justified need, including prior year
    appropriations. As a result of their analysis of DEA's fiscal year
    1998 budget submission, DOJ budget staff estimated that DEA would
    need 771 additional positions, including 311 special agents, to
    support the 6 initiatives.  This was 218 fewer total positions,
    including 88 special agent positions, than DEA estimated. Over
    half of the difference between DEA's and DOJ's estimates can be
    accounted for by DOJ's not having included positions to convert
    certain state and local task forces to permanent funding status
    under the violent crime and methamphetamine initiatives. DOJ
    argued that (1) local entities must continue to contribute to
    these efforts to maintain the integrity of the intergovernmental
    relationship; (2) additional resources were available to these
    entities through other DOJ state and local grant programs; and (3)
    in the case of the methamphetamine initiative, further assessment
    was needed before conversions were made. DOJ budget staff
    recommended fewer positions than DEA for five of the DEA
    initiatives but concurred with DEA's staffing estimates for the
    investigative shortfall initiative. These recommended changes in
    staffing estimates, including the justifications provided, are
    summarized below. *  Violent crime: In addition to not including
    positions to convert state and local task forces to permanent
    status, as previously discussed, budget staff recommended fewer
    additional agent positions for the MET Program. DOJ staff
    concluded that four new MET teams for deployment to areas with
    higher numbers of outstanding requests were sufficient to keep the
    waiting time for a MET deployment to acceptable limits. Page 89
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 *  Methamphetamine: Most of the difference between DEA's
    and DOJ's staffing estimates for this initiative can be attributed
    to DOJ's not including positions for state and local task force
    conversion. DOJ also did not recommend additional chemists,
    concluding that DEA had sufficient chemist resources; or an
    additional agent for demand reduction to increase public awareness
    of methamphetamine, given DEA's other critical needs. Budget staff
    recommended 2 DEA clandestine lab regional training teams to teach
    26 classes annually, rather than 4 teams to teach 40 classes
    annually. *  Southwest Border: DOJ budget staff did not recommend
    5 additional chemists and 14 additional support staff, which were
    included in DEA's submission. DOJ concluded that DEA had
    sufficient resources to meet these needs. *  Domestic heroin:
    Asserting that DEA had sufficient chemists to meet its desired
    staffing ratio, DOJ budget staff did not recommend the five
    chemists and two clerical support positions included in DEA's
    estimates for this initiative. *  International: DOJ budget staff
    recommended 22 fewer total positions, including 6 fewer special
    agent positions, than DEA estimated for this initiative. More than
    half of these 22 positions (2 chemists, 4 foreign diversion
    investigators, and 6 support staff) were to establish an
    International Chemical Control Center. DOJ argued that DEA could
    use chemists from other places to meet these needs and use
    diversion investigators from key locations in other parts of the
    world to provide intelligence to the Center. DOJ also did not
    recommend opening new DEA offices in Abu Dhabi, United Arab
    Emirates, or Lisbon, Portugal, contending that DEA lacked
    "substantive rationale" for offices in these locations. DOJ's
    estimates also included no staffing enhancements for Bangkok,
    Thailand, asserting that DEA had sufficient staffing resources to
    assist Thai police in collecting intelligence about the emerging
    methamphetamine problem and no additional special agent for
    Panama, concluding that DEA had not provided "substantive reasons"
    for that agent. The DOJ budget staff review was followed on August
    2, 1996, by the Attorney General's hearing7 on DEA's fiscal year
    1998 budget submission. Three working days before the hearing, DOJ
    budget officials provided their analysis to DEA. According to DOJ
    budget officials, during the hearing DEA had the opportunity to
    appeal DOJ's proposed changes in DEA's 7 The hearing is usually
    attended by the Attorney General, the DEA Administrator, the DOJ
    budget analyst, and JMD officials. Page 90
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 submission and to provide additional information to
    justify its budget initiatives and enhancements before the
    Attorney General's final decision. On August 12, 1996, the
    Administrator submitted an appeal to the Attorney General in which
    he requested reconsideration of some of the DOJ budget staff's
    recommended changes. The appeal asserted DEA's need for staff
    positions to convert certain state and local task forces,
    associated with its violent crime reduction and methamphetamine
    efforts, from provisional to program-funded status. It also
    addressed DEA's need for resources for its clandestine laboratory
    cleanup efforts; items previously funded partially by asset
    forfeiture funds, including awards to informants and marijuana
    eradication efforts; and in-service training. Nevertheless, for
    fiscal year 1998, the estimates for additional staffing for DEA
    included in DOJ's OMB submission were the same as those
    recommended by DOJ budget staff and previously discussed. Table
    4.1 shows the differences between DEA's estimates for additional
    staffing and those proposed to OMB by DOJ. Table 4.1: Comparison
    of DEA and DOJ
    Additional total and special agent positions Estimated Additional
    DEA Total and                                                 DEA
    staffing                DOJ's DEA staffing Special Agent Positions
    for Fiscal Year 1998
    estimates to DOJ               estimates to OMB June 1996
    September 1996 Special                      Special Initiative
    Total          agents          Total         agents Violent crime
    193              98             94                  48
    Methamphetamine                            279             127
    208                  96 Southwest Border
    212               96           193                  96 Domestic
    heroin                            104               53
    97                  53 International crime
    76               25            54                  18
    Investigative shortfall                    125                 0
    125                   0 Total
    989             399            771             311 Source: DEA
    Fiscal Year 1998 Spring Planning Estimates, June 1996, and DEA
    Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management and Budget Submission,
    September 1996. DEA's fiscal year 1998 budget submission was sent
    to OMB for review in OMB Specified Minimum
    September 1996 as part of DOJ's budget request. According to OMB
    Funding for Certain DEA                    officials, an OMB
    budget examiner initially reviewed the DOJ budget Initiatives, but
    Indicated No submission, and the results were presented to and
    reviewed by the OMB Staffing Levels
    policy officials. Generally, a complete set of budget proposals is
    presented to the president by early December for his approval.
    Subsequently, OMB staff prepares the agency passbacks. An OMB
    official described OMB's approach to DOJ's fiscal year 1998 budget
    submission as "flexible." That is, as in other years, OMB made
    suggestions regarding specific DOJ activities, providing DOJ with
    an Page 91                                       GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's Staffing Needs
    Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998 overall
    dollar level and specifying minimum funding for certain funding
    floors. OMB officials said that OMB did not make account-level
    recommendations, leaving those decisions to the Attorney General
    to ensure that the budget reflected DOJ's priorities. By early
    December 1996, OMB sent DOJ's fiscal year 1998 passback in which
    it recommended an overall DOJ budget lower than DOJ's submission.
    For DEA, the passback specified minimum funding for the
    methamphetamine strategy, the Southwest Border project, and the
    domestic heroin strategy, but it did not discuss specific staffing
    estimates or foreign enhancements. Prior to the passback, DEA had
    received its fiscal year 1997 appropriation, but we were unable to
    ascertain how it affected the passback. According to DOJ budget
    officials, DOJ reviewed OMB's fiscal year 1998 DEA/DOJ Reviewed
    OMB          DOJ passback to determine what could be funded
    according to the Passback and Appealed It      Attorney General's
    priorities. They said that as a result of OMB's specifying With
    Some Success             funding levels for DEA's methamphetamine,
    Southwest Border, and heroin initiatives, no funds for the
    enhancements in other initiatives were available within the DEA
    budget submission. The DOJ budget officials said that they then
    sent DOJ's interpretation-which was based on the Attorney
    General's priorities-of the OMB passback to DEA. According to DOJ
    budget section officials, DEA developed its appeal to the OMB
    passback and then presented it to OMB, through DOJ, in early
    December 1996. DEA's specific staffing-related appeals and
    outcomes were as follows: *  Methamphetamine initiative: DEA
    requested additional resources, including 131 positions. DOJ and
    OMB agreed to a slight increase in the funded amount to cover 74
    positions. *  Southwest Border initiative: DEA sought 131
    additional positions, including 90 special agents. DOJ and OMB
    agreed to increase the funded amount to cover the additional
    agents. OMB and DOJ officials reported that the method used to
    settle appeals varied from year to year. In fiscal year 1998, OMB
    and DOJ agreed on an overall spending level on appeal and DOJ's
    spread of the increase, which provided DEA with funding to cover
    additional positions for both the methamphetamine and Southwest
    Border initiatives described above. Page 92
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 Concurrent with departmental and OMB reviews of budget
    submissions, ONDCP Certified DOJ/DEA each agency with a drug
    mission is required by the drug budget Budget Submission
    certification process to submit a drug control budget to ONDCP.
    However, in 1996, due to the appointment of a new ONDCP Director
    and the reformulation and consequent late release of ONDCP's drug
    strategy, the national drug budget certification process did not
    follow ONDCP's established procedures and schedule. Specifically,
    ONDCP requested only one fiscal year 1998 budget submission in
    September 1996, coincident with the OMB deadline. On November 8,
    1996, while OMB was reviewing DOJ's budget submission, DOJ sent
    its budget request to ONDCP. On November 18, 1996, for
    consideration before finalizing DOJ's fiscal year 1998 budget
    request, the ONDCP Director advised the Attorney General of two
    DEA program initiatives that did not appear to have been included
    in DOJ's submission. The initiatives in question were (1) the
    continued expansion of vetted law enforcement units in key source
    and transit countries and (2) a request for additional resources
    for DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. The
    Director's letter did not specifically discuss staffing related to
    the initiatives.8 Final ONDCP budget certification was withheld
    until ONDCP reviewed DOJ's final budget submission. According to
    DOJ and ONDCP officials, DEA received sufficient resources in its
    fiscal year 1997 appropriation to address the ONDCP Director's
    concerns. Therefore, on the basis of ONDCP's final review, the
    Director notified the Attorney General on February 7, 1997-1 day
    after the President submitted the fiscal year 1998 budget request-
    that the resources requested by DOJ were certified as adequate to
    implement the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control
    Strategy. The President submitted his fiscal year 1998 budget to
    Congress on The President's Fiscal Year     February 6, 1997. As a
    result of the iterative process between DEA/DOJ 1998 Budget
    Submission          and OMB over DEA staffing estimates and after
    consideration of the resources provided in DEA's fiscal year 1997
    appropriation,9 the President's budget requested 345 new
    positions, including 168 special agents, for DEA domestic offices.
    As shown in table 4.2, the number of total positions requested was
    approximately one-half the number DOJ 8 Although no specific
    mention of DEA staffing was made in the ONDCP certification
    correspondence for fiscal year 1998, DEA officials indicated that
    during fiscal year 1998, DEA acted on the ONDCP Director's
    recommendations for additional staffing for DEA offices in Santo
    Domingo, Dominican Republic; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and Nassau. 9
    DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation, as part of DOJ's
    appropriation, was enacted on September 30, 1996.  See Department
    of Justice Appropriations Act of 1997, P.L. 104-208; and H.R.
    Conf. Rep. No. 104- 863. Page 93
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 initially estimated in its OMB submission. The number of
    special agents requested was approximately 50 percent of the
    original DOJ estimates. Some of the differences between the DOJ
    estimates and the DEA staffing request in the President's budget
    submission reflected changes recommended by DOJ or OMB, which were
    previously discussed. However, other revisions took into account
    DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation. For example, according to
    DOJ officials, although DEA's international crime initiative was
    not included in the President's budget submission for fiscal year
    1998, DEA was able to staff the Vientiane and Managua offices,
    included in that initiative, with fiscal year 1997 funds from the
    Source Country Initiative.10 In addition, because Congress
    provided almost twice the funds for the MET Program requested by
    DEA in fiscal year 1997, the program was fully funded (130 agents
    were provided) as of that year. Additional funds for the MET
    Program, which had been included in the fiscal year 1998 violent
    crime initiative, were no longer necessary. Table 4.2: Comparison
    of DOJ's
    Additional total and special agent positions Estimates and the
    President's Request
    DOJ's DEA staffing                             President's DEA
    staffing for Additional DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for
    Fiscal Year 1998
    estimates to OMB                                  request to
    Congress September 1996
    February 1997 Special
    Special Initiative
    Total                  agents                        Total
    agents Violent crime
    94                         48                           a
    a Methamphetamine
    208                          96                        74
    60 Southwest Border
    193                          96                      192
    96 Domestic heroin
    97                         53                        60
    12 International crime
    54                         18                           a
    a Investigative shortfall
    125                            0                       19
    0 Total
    771                       311                        345
    168 aThe conference report for DEA's fiscal year 1997
    appropriation provided an additional 75 agents for source
    countries and 130 special agents for the MET Program, thereby
    addressing at least some of DOJ's initial estimates for the
    violent crime and international crime initiatives (H.R. Conf. Rep.
    No. 104-863). Source: DEA Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management
    and Budget Submission, September 1996, and DEA Fiscal Year 1998
    Authorization and Budget Request to Congress. 10 The conference
    report for DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation included a source
    country/international strategy, which provided an additional 75
    agents, to increase on-site DEA agents in source countries.  See
    H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863. Page 94
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 As shown in table 4.3, the conference committee
    recommended 531 Congress Added Staff             additional
    positions, of which 240 were special agent positions. On the for a
    New Caribbean              basis of the recommendations of the
    House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the conference
    committee also provided guidance as to how Initiative and Changed
    those positions were to be allocated, including a new Caribbean
    initiative. Staffing Recommended for Other DEA
    During the fiscal year 1998 appropriations process, the House
    Initiatives                      Appropriations Committee
    recommended, and Congress approved as part of the conference
    committee's report on DEA's appropriation, a new Caribbean
    initiative, which was not included in the President's budget.
    According to the House Appropriations Committee report, this
    initiative was proposed to address the increase in drug
    trafficking throughout the Caribbean. The initiative provided 60
    additional DEA special agents for Puerto Rico, the Northern
    Caribbean, and south Florida. In addition, the conference
    committee recommended additional positions, above the President's
    request, for the heroin and investigative shortfall initiatives.
    On the basis of the Senate Appropriations Committee's
    recommendation, the Conference Committee's report included 120 new
    positions, 24 of which were special agents (twice the number of
    total and special agent positions in the President's budget
    request), to continue efforts to reduce heroin trafficking within
    the United States. The Conference Committee also identified the
    need for 85 additional intelligence analysts for the investigative
    shortfall initiative. The President signed DEA/DOJ's fiscal year
    1998 appropriation into law on November 26, 1996. Page 95
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 Table 4.3: Comparison of the President's Request and
    Congress'
    Additional total and special agent positions Appropriations
    Guidance for DEA
    Fiscal year 1998 DOJ Additional Total and Special Agent
    appropriation conference Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
    President's DEA staffing              report with DEA staffing
    request to Congress                        guidance February 1997
    November 1997 Special                            Special
    Initiative                                    Total
    agents              Total           agents Methamphetamine
    74a                 60             74                  60b
    Southwest Border                                192
    96            192                   96 Domestic heroin
    60                  12            120                  24c
    Investigative shortfall                          19
    0              85                    0 Caribbean
    N/A                 N/A             60                   60 Total
    345                 168            531                  240 Notes:
    N/A-Initiative not included at that point in the process.
    aFourteen of the positions were requested through VCRP. bThe
    conference report called for 54 special agents in accordance with
    the House report.  The House report also identified six additional
    agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training.  Fourteen
    positions were provided through VCRP. cThe conference report
    called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate report.
    The Senate language specified that 24 of the positions be special
    agents. Source: DEA FY 1998 Authorization and Budget Request to
    Congress; the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
    Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L.
    105-119 (1997); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-
    207; and S. Rep. No. 105-48. After receipt of its annual
    appropriation, DEA is responsible for budget DEA's Fiscal Year
    1998 execution and the allocation of new staff. In addition to the
    guidance Allocation Process                    provided by
    Congress, DEA officials said they consider factors, such as
    recently changing drug trends, to determine that allocation.
    Considered a Variety of Factors                               For
    fiscal year 1998, according to a DEA official involved in the
    allocation process that year, DEA's Executive Policy and Strategic
    Planning, Operations Division, Financial Management Division, and
    Office of Resource Management staff prepared a draft allocation
    for the additional resources provided in DEA's appropriation. The
    official indicated that among the factors considered in
    determining the allocation of additional staff were congressional
    direction; the number of agents added by Congress, broken out by
    mission and team; FMPs and any other written requests from the
    field divisions; DEA and DOJ strategies, initiatives, and
    priorities, including the Southwest Border and methamphetamine
    plans; actual hours worked by agents on particular types of cases;
    and drug trends that had emerged since the original fiscal year
    1998 budget submission. The recommendations were sent to the DEA
    Administrator for review and final approval. Page 96
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
    Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
    Year 1998 DEA allocated 531 new positions, including 240 special
    agent positions, for the 5 initiatives included in its
    appropriation. As shown in table 4.4, DEA's fiscal year 1998
    staffing allocation followed Congress' appropriations guidance.
    Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress'
    Additional total and special agent positions Appropriations
    Guidance and DEA's
    Fiscal year 1998 DOJ New Staffing Allocation for Additional DEA
    Staffing and Special Agent
    appropriation conference Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
    report and DEA staffing              DEA fiscal year 1998 guidance
    staffing allocation November 1997                       February
    1998 Special                            Special Initiative
    Total          agents              Total              agents
    Methamphetamine                                 74a
    60               74                 60 Southwest Border
    192                 96              192                 96
    Domestic heroin                                120
    24b              120                 24 Investigative shortfall
    85                 0               85                   0
    Caribbean                                        60
    60               60                 60 Total
    531                240              531                240c aThe
    conference report called for the 54 special agents in accordance
    with the House report.  The House report also identified six
    additional agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training.
    Fourteen positions were provided through VCRP. bThe conference
    report called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate
    report.  The Senate language specified that 24 of the positions be
    special agents. cDEA also allocated 45 additional positions
    provided through other funding sources for a total of 576
    positions allocated, of which 245 were special agents. Source: The
    Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
    Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L. 105-119 (1997);
    H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-207; S. Rep. No.
    105-48; and DEA. The process used for determining DEA's staffing
    needs, as carried out in Conclusions
    fiscal year 1998, was systematically linked to its budget
    formulation process. The DEA process was typical of and consistent
    with the processes and procedures that federal agencies are
    expected to follow, according to federal laws and regulations and
    procedures promulgated by OMB. Moreover, the DEA process
    considered factors related to DEA's ability to carry out its
    mission, including emerging drug trafficking trends, staffing
    requests from the field, the Administrator's vision statement, and
    the SAC's vision statement from each field office. Once Congress
    approved DEA's fiscal year 1998 appropriation, DEA senior
    management systematically determined the allocation of the
    additional staff to headquarters and field offices, taking into
    consideration congressional guidance and such factors as field
    office requests. Page 97
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices During
    our review, we visited four Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
    domestic field divisions-Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans,
    LA; and Washington, D.C./Baltimore, MD. We also visited three
    foreign country offices-Bogota, Colombia; LaPaz, Bolivia; and
    Mexico City, Mexico-and the Caribbean (Puerto Rico) Division,
    which has both foreign and domestic responsibilities. The
    following profiles provide a snapshot of each division/office at
    the time we performed our work at those locations between February
    and September 1998. The profiles include information, as of that
    time (unless otherwise noted), on the (1) geographic region
    covered by each division/office and its organizational structure;
    (2) drug trafficking situation and threat faced by each
    division/office; (3) enforcement response of each division/office
    in terms of priorities, programs, and initiatives; and (4)
    enforcement statistics and case examples.  Many of the programs
    and initiatives referred to in the profiles are generally
    described in chapter 2 of this report.  We developed the profiles
    on the basis of information-including various documents and
    statistical data-provided by DEA field officials, although we
    could not always obtain comparable information from all
    divisions/offices. We did not independently verify the accuracy of
    the information provided. Page 98
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Los
    Angeles Division DEA's Los Angeles Division covers a vast
    geographic area that includes Geographic Region and       portions
    of California and all of Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, the
    Organizational Structure    Republic of Palau, and American Samoa.
    Los Angeles has the busiest maritime container port complexes in
    the United States at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. Los
    Angeles International airport is the third busiest in the world.
    In addition, there are major airports in Orange and San Bernardino
    Counties, Las Vegas, and Honolulu. California and Nevada are also
    served by an extensive highway system. The Los Angeles Division is
    headed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), two Associate SACs, and
    seven Assistant SACs (ASACs).  It includes the division office,
    three district offices, four resident offices, and three posts of
    duty, as shown in figure I.1.1 1 The maps included in the profiles
    in this appendix are not drawn precisely to scale. Page 99
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.1:  Los Angeles Division Map Reno Pacific
    South Lake Tahoe Ocean Nevada California Las Vegas Honolulu Maui
    Ventura Hawaii
    Los Angeles Riverside Hilo
    Santa Ana Guam Division office District office Resident office
    Post of duty Source: DEA's Los Angeles Division. Page 100
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
    time of our visit in February 1998, the division was authorized to
    have 445 staff, including 283 special agents. There also were 114
    state and local officers from various law enforcement agencies
    assigned to task forces operated by the division. According to
    DEA, the region covered by the Los Angeles Division is one
    Overview of Drug             of the most significant worldwide
    centers of drug trafficking, money Trafficking Situation and
    laundering, and drug-related violence. The region serves as a
    source, Threat                       transit area and distribution
    site for a variety of illegal drugs. The division's size,
    multiplicity of jurisdictions, and ethnic diversity all pose law
    enforcement challenges, as do its myriad entry points and transit
    corridors. The proximity to the Southwest Border makes the region
    easily accessible to trafficking organizations bringing cocaine,
    heroin, and other drugs into the United States. The region is also
    a major source of methamphetamine clandestinely produced in
    laboratories and high-grade marijuana cultivated in outdoor and
    indoor operations.  In addition, DEA reported that much of the
    region is plagued by drug-related violent crime, often gang
    related, and that most of California's violent gang activity is in
    Los Angeles county. Cocaine                      At the time of
    our review, DEA considered cocaine to be one of the biggest drug
    trafficking problems for the division. Los Angeles is a major
    transshipment point for cocaine en route to other parts of the
    United States and Canada. Cocaine is smuggled into Southern
    California primarily across the U.S.-Mexico border. According to
    DEA, Mexican drug trafficking organizations smuggle most of the
    cocaine coming into and through Los Angeles. Although Colombian
    traffickers control the worldwide supply of cocaine, they prefer
    to move their cocaine into Mexico and sell it to Mexican
    organizations. Cocaine traffickers use various means, such as
    automobiles and tractor-trailers with hidden compartments, to move
    cocaine across the border. Other points of entry for cocaine
    include airports and maritime ports in the region. DEA reported
    that traffickers were using "stash houses" to store cocaine in Los
    Angeles and Riverside counties. From these stash houses, cocaine
    was being distributed locally or moved to other destinations in
    the United States and Canada. Mobile street gangs were involved in
    handling the local cocaine distribution. These gangs were also
    transporting cocaine and crack cocaine to other destinations. Page
    101                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the time of our
    review, Mexican heroin was the heroin of choice for Heroin
    users in the area covered by the Los Angeles Division, according
    to DEA. Heroin was also coming into the region from Southeast Asia
    (principally Thailand and the Philippines) and Canada, and to a
    lesser extent from Southwest Asia/Middle East (Turkey, Pakistan,
    Lebanon) and Colombia. Although heroin was being smuggled into the
    country in a variety of ways, DEA reported that most was arriving
    in maritime containers or aircraft for passengers or cargo. Also,
    according to DEA, black tar heroin and Mexican brown heroin, the
    most available and popular form of heroin in the Los Angeles area,
    were both supplied by Mexican traffickers. Trafficking in
    Southeast Asian heroin, which was being imported into the Los
    Angeles area and transshipped to the East Coast, was dominated by
    Thai nationals and Thailand-based Nigerian traffickers.
    Methamphetamine and Other    At the time of our review,
    methamphetamine was the most manufactured Dangerous Drugs
    and distributed illegal drug in the geographic area covered by the
    Los Angeles division, according to DEA. It is the division's top
    enforcement priority. Although methamphetamine trafficking takes
    place throughout the region, it is predominantly concentrated in
    Riverside and San Bernardino counties, where there has been a
    tremendous increase in clandestine methamphetamine laboratories.
    These two counties have been designated as the methamphetamine
    capital of the nation. The division's most serious methamphetamine
    threat is from Mexican drug trafficking organizations that
    dominate the production of high-quality methamphetamine in
    southern California. At the time of our review, DEA reported that
    the number of Mexican methamphetamine laboratories was increasing
    at an alarming rate. Other individuals were operating small,
    unsophisticated methamphetamine laboratories that made up most of
    the clandestine laboratories in southern California. The diversion
    of legitimately produced controlled substances is also a serious
    threat in the region, particularly in the Los Angeles area.
    Numerous means are used to divert these drugs to local abusers and
    traffickers. At the time of our review, traffickers were shipping
    the drugs throughout the United States and abroad, according to
    DEA. Other dangerous drugs are also trafficked in the area covered
    by the division, including PCP and LSD. Marijuana
    According to DEA, marijuana importation, cultivation, and
    trafficking remain an ongoing enforcement challenge throughout the
    division. Marijuana is prolific throughout the region, and Los
    Angeles is a major Page 102
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    transshipment area for marijuana destined for other parts of the
    United States. Mexican trafficking organizations smuggle marijuana
    into the region. DEA reported that these organizations had
    cornered the wholesale and retail distribution markets for
    marijuana in Southern and Central California. Colombian
    organizations also were involved in marijuana trafficking, using
    Mexican organizations to transport marijuana across the U.S.-
    Mexico border. Domestic cultivation also is a problem, with high-
    grade marijuana being grown in outdoor gardens and on farms in
    Hawaii, California, and Nevada. According to DEA, Hawaii leads the
    nation in domestic marijuana cultivation. The division reported
    seeing an increase in the number of large-scale indoor operations
    in California and Nevada. At the time of our review, the Los
    Angeles Division reported operating Priorities, Programs, and
    various programs and initiatives in response to the drug
    trafficking threat Initiatives                  in the region. The
    division was working with other federal, state, and local law
    enforcement agencies to carry out its programs and initiatives.
    For fiscal year 1998, the division's goal was to focus available
    resources on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting criminal
    drug enterprises, their support systems, and the individuals
    responsible for their origin and proliferation. Another priority
    of the division was to use federal asset forfeiture laws to affect
    criminal organizations by seizing proceeds derived from their
    criminal activity. Division resources to carry out its programs
    and initiatives included task force operations, an asset
    forfeiture group, an intelligence program, a drug diversion
    control program,2 investigative initiatives aimed at gangs
    involved in drug-related violent crimes, Mobile Enforcement Team
    (MET) Program operations, the Southwest Border Initiative, and a
    methamphetamine initiative. At the time of our review, the
    division had planned to continue expanding its Title III
    (electronic surveillance) program; promote greater cooperation in
    developing joint investigations with other federal, state, and
    local agencies aimed at the highest level of drug trafficking; and
    widen the scope of interagency task forces. 2 DEA's drug diversion
    control program is designed to enforce federal laws and
    regulations controlling the legal production and distribution of
    legitimately manufactured controlled substances; prevent and
    detect, through criminal, civil, and administrative actions, the
    diversion of controlled substances from legitimate channels; and
    control the diversion of legally produced precursor and essential
    chemicals to the illicit manufacture of drugs. Page 103
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
    division office in Los Angeles had nine enforcement groups at the
    time of our review. According to the SAC, three of the groups were
    working on the Southwest Border Initiative,3 a major drug
    enforcement operation along and across the Mexican border using
    resources from DEA, FBI, the Customs Service, and state and local
    law enforcement agencies. The office also had groups focusing on
    Southeast Asian heroin, Mexican heroin, drugs primarily from
    Southeast Asia and Europe, methamphetamine, and violent drug
    trafficking groups. In addition to the enforcement groups, the
    division office had support groups, including technical
    operations, asset removal, intelligence, and diversion control.
    The division's district offices, resident offices, and posts of
    duty all had enforcement groups focusing primarily on specific
    drug trafficking problems in their areas. For example, the
    Riverside district office, with four enforcement groups,
    concentrated on methamphetamine trafficking and the Southwest
    Border Initiative. These outlying offices are encouraged to
    cooperate and conduct joint efforts with state and local law
    enforcement agencies in developing cases and conducting other
    operations. The division had state and local task forces in
    Riverside, Santa Ana, Reno, Las Vegas, Honolulu, Saipan, and Guam.
    Though not part of a DEA-funded state and local task force, the
    Ventura office assisted three narcotics task forces in its area.
    Also, DEA's group at Los Angeles International airport was an
    informal task force with officers from the Los Angeles Police
    Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office working
    together with DEA special agents. At the time of our review, the
    division had one MET that it was using to target organizations
    engaged in violent drug-related crimes, particularly with regard
    to cocaine and crack cocaine trafficking. In commenting on a draft
    of our report, DEA officials informed us that a second MET was
    established in October 1998. The officials also informed us that
    as of May 1999, the first MET had 10 special agents assigned to
    it, and the second MET had 11 special agents assigned. Further, as
    of May 1999, the first MET had received 19 requests for assistance
    since 1995 and was deployed for 14.  Since its inception, the
    second MET had received two requests for assistance and was
    deployed for both. 3 In addition, four DEA special agents were
    assigned to a Southwest Border Initiative group located at the Los
    Angeles FBI office. Page 104
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
    division is a major participant in the Los Angeles High Intensity
    Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), which is the largest HIDTA in the
    country. At the time of our review, a DEA Associate SAC headed the
    Southern California Drug Task Force (SCDTF) in the HIDTA, and a
    DEA ASAC headed one of three SCDTF divisions. The SCDTF is a
    multiagency, integrated task force that comprised 105 federal,
    state, and local law enforcement officers, including 40 DEA
    special agents, at the time of our review. SCDTF's primary
    objective is to conduct investigations targeting major drug
    trafficking organizations that operate on a regional, national,
    and international level.  The Los Angeles HIDTA's fiscal year 1998
    strategy referred to SCDTF as the "cornerstone" of the HIDTA. DEA
    also had an intelligence group assigned to SCDTF, as well as staff
    assigned to other Los Angeles HIDTA units. Other major programs
    and initiatives being implemented by DEA's Los Angeles Division at
    the time of our review included the following: (1) the
    Methamphetamine Strategy, which was aimed at major domestic and
    Mexican traffickers involved in producing methamphetamine and
    other dangerous drugs and was being carried out with state and
    local law enforcement agencies; (2) money laundering
    investigations and seizures of criminally derived drug-related
    assets, which were carried out in conjunction with the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Customs Service, Internal
    Revenue Service (IRS), and California Bureau of Narcotics
    Enforcement; and (3) the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
    Program (marijuana program), particularly initiatives conducted in
    cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies in
    Hawaii. Most of the division's resources have been devoted to
    cases involving cocaine, methamphetamine, and other dangerous
    drugs. For example, in fiscal year 1997, the division's special
    agents spent about 35.7 percent of their investigative work hours
    on cocaine cases and about 35.7 percent on cases involving
    dangerous drugs, including methamphetamine. In fiscal year 1998,
    they spent about 33.2 percent of their investigative work hours on
    cocaine cases and about 41.8 percent on cases involving dangerous
    drugs, including methamphetamine. Enforcement activity results
    reported by the  Los Angeles Division Enforcement Statistics and
    indicated that the division initiated 1,573 cases in fiscal year
    1997 and 1,446 Case Examples                 cases in fiscal year
    1998. The division reported 1,892 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and
    2,214 arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division also reported
    seizing approximately 4,500 kilograms of cocaine, 25 kilograms of
    heroin, 16,400 kilograms of marijuana, and 268 kilograms of
    methamphetamine in Page 105
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices fiscal
    year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division reported seizing
    approximately 4,656 kilograms of cocaine, 59 kilograms of heroin,
    9,235 kilograms of marijuana, and 673 kilograms of
    methamphetamine. In addition, the division reported seizing assets
    amounting to $52.4 million in fiscal year 1997 and assets
    amounting to $122.2 million in fiscal year 1998. Further, the
    division reported seizing 87 clandestine laboratories in fiscal
    year 1997 and 90 clandestine laboratories in fiscal year 1998. The
    following are two examples of what the Los Angeles Division
    considered to be successful major investigations. *  DEA's Los
    Angeles Division conducted an investigation targeting a Mexican-
    based cocaine trafficking organization operating in the Los
    Angeles area. The organization was responsible for smuggling large
    quantities of cocaine into the United States from Mexico,
    stockpiling it in the Los Angeles area, and distributing it
    throughout the United States. Members of the organization
    collected drug proceeds and transported the money to Mexico. The
    investigation involved the wire interception of 29 cellular
    telephones and the electronic interception of 19 digital paging
    devices. It resulted in the arrest of 52 individuals and seizures
    of over $15 million, 3.5 tons of cocaine, and 570 pounds of
    marijuana. On the basis of leads developed from this
    investigation, DEA offices in San Diego, San Francisco, Chicago,
    New York, and Calexico, Mexico initiated related investigations
    and wiretaps. Surveillance teams comprising state and local
    agencies assisted DEA with this investigation. *  DEA's Los
    Angeles Division and Islamabad Country Office worked with the
    Pakistan Antinarcotics Force to conduct a controlled delivery4 of
    Southwest Asian heroin. DEA, U.S. Customs agents, local law
    enforcement officers, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were
    subsequently involved in the arrest of several drug traffickers.
    The operation resulted in the seizure of 106 kilograms of
    Southwest Asian heroin and approximately $509,000 in U.S.
    currency, as well as three arrests in the United States, three in
    Canada, and one in Pakistan. 4 A controlled delivery is an
    investigative tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a
    shipment of illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual
    seizure. Page 106
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Miami
    Division DEA's Miami Division is responsible for federal drug law
    enforcement in Geographic Region and       Florida, the Bahamas,
    the Cayman Islands, and Cuba. The division's 8,462 Organizational
    Structure    miles of coastline and 14 deep-water ports have made
    it very attractive for maritime smugglers, and its 18 commercial
    cargo and passenger carrier airports also pose a smuggling threat.
    The Miami Division, which is headed by a SAC, 2 Associate SACs,
    and 8 ASACs, includes the division office, 3 district offices, 10
    resident offices, 1 post of duty, and 1 country office, as shown
    in figure I.2. Page 107
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.2:  Miami Division Map Pensacola
    Jacksonville Tallahassee Panama City
    Gainesville Florida Orlando Tampa Ft. Pierce Freeport W. Palm
    Beach Ft. Myers Ft. Lauderdale Miami
    Bahamas Nassau Key Largo Key West Division office Country office
    District office Resident office Post of duty Cuba Source: DEA's
    Miami Division. Page 108
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
    time of our visit in June 1998, the division was authorized to
    have 600 staff, including 400 special agents. In addition, there
    were 99 staff from state and local agencies authorized for various
    task forces and groups in the division, including 92 law
    enforcement officers. According to DEA, at the time of our review,
    South Florida continued to be Overview of Drug             one of
    the principal gateways for cocaine entering the United States. The
    Trafficking Situation and    Miami Division reported that South
    American drug traffickers were Threat
    shifting their trafficking patterns back to routes in the
    Caribbean, as evidenced by the amount of trafficking activity in
    the Bahamas and Florida. Further, as Colombian traffickers have
    become increasingly involved in heroin trafficking, Miami
    International Airport became the principal port of entry for
    Colombian heroin into the United States. Other drugs were also a
    concern of the division. For example, DEA reported that marijuana
    trafficking through the Caribbean has traditionally been a
    problem, and there had been an increase in the amounts of
    marijuana and methamphetamine from the Southwest Border being
    transshipped through central and northern Florida.  DEA also
    reported an increase in the production of methamphetamine in
    clandestine laboratories in the Florida area. Cocaine
    The Miami Division reported that as drug law enforcement efforts
    increased along the Southwest Border in recent years, South
    Florida became the North American command and control center for
    major South American trafficking organizations. Colombians
    dominate the major South Florida drug-smuggling organizations, and
    they continued to finance and control the wholesale cocaine
    distribution market in the area. The division further reported
    that drug intelligence indicated that the Colombian traffickers
    did not completely trust Mexican trafficking organizations;
    consequently, cocaine trafficking patterns had begun to shift in
    1997 and 1998. Once again, large shipments of cocaine were being
    sent from South America, through Mexico and the Caribbean, to
    South Florida. The Caribbean serves as a major transit zone for
    cocaine from Central and South America, and Florida is a
    significant importation and transit area for cocaine smuggled
    through the Bahamas. According to DEA, airdrops of cocaine from
    planes coming directly from Colombia to the Bahamas were taking
    place at an accelerating rate in 1998. The primary threat,
    however, was "go-fast" boats and pleasure craft. Such vessels were
    being used to carry up to 1,500 kilograms of cocaine through the
    Bahamas to the United States. Small commercial cargo vessels were
    also being used to smuggle drugs through the Bahamas. Page 109
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Cocaine
    was also smuggled in other ways into the area covered by the
    division.  For example, DEA reported that aircraft were used to
    smuggle cocaine directly into Florida from the Eastern Caribbean.
    Maritime smuggling continued to be a significant factor, including
    the shipment of cocaine hidden within containerized cargo on ships
    travelling from South America to Florida. There also were
    indications that the Florida Keys were increasingly being used as
    an off-load point for Cuban traffickers. According to DEA, crack
    cocaine was the most significant problem for the division's
    offices outside South Florida. South Florida traffickers were
    supplying most of the state, except for the Florida panhandle
    area, which was being supplied by trafficking organizations along
    the Southwest Border. Heroin                       According to
    DEA, the drug threat in the area covered by the Miami Division has
    expanded to include increased heroin importation from South
    America to the United States through Florida. Opium poppy
    cultivation and heroin trafficking have become part of the
    Colombian illegal drug trade, and Colombian traffickers were
    increasing their efforts to sell multikilogram quantities of
    heroin to distributors in the United States. Miami International
    Airport replaced New York's John F. Kennedy Airport as the
    principal port of entry for Colombian heroin into the United
    States. Another significant heroin smuggling route was from the
    Caribbean directly to Orlando, where the heroin was then
    transported through Florida and on to large markets in major
    northeastern cities. Methamphetamine and Other    According to
    DEA, methamphetamine trafficking and use had increased Dangerous
    Drugs              throughout Florida, particularly in central and
    northern Florida. Mexican organizations in Florida were the
    primary sources of methamphetamine. DEA reported that most of
    these organizations had ties to similar organizations in Southern
    California and/or Mexico where they were obtaining the drug. In
    addition to smuggling methamphetamine into Florida, local
    organizations were becoming increasingly adept at clandestinely
    manufacturing it. DEA also reported there was a great amount of
    drug-related violence associated with the distribution and use of
    methamphetamine. The diversion of legal pharmaceutical drugs to
    illegal channels continued to be a problem in Florida. Physicians
    and pharmacists were the source of most of these drugs through
    activities such as indiscriminate and illegal prescribing
    practices and forged prescriptions. In addition, numerous chemical
    companies and brokers in Florida were diverting and supplying Page
    110                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices chemicals used by
    clandestine laboratory operators to produce methamphetamine,
    cocaine, and heroin. Marijuana           Marijuana was widely
    available throughout the area covered by the division, according
    to DEA. Although marijuana trafficking through the Caribbean has
    traditionally been a concern, the division also reported an
    increase in the amount of marijuana coming from the Southwest
    Border and being transshipped through central and northern
    Florida. Traffickers were using a variety of smuggling routes and
    methods to bring marijuana into Florida. For example, DEA reported
    that trafficking groups were transshipping marijuana from Colombia
    through Florida using private vessels. Other traffickers were
    using commercial trucks to bring marijuana into Florida from Texas
    and Mexico. Smaller quantities of marijuana were being dispatched
    in luggage on commercial airline flights or via AMTRAK.
    Additionally, Federal Express and other package delivery services
    were frequently used to transport small quantities of marijuana. A
    large percentage of the marijuana consumed in South Florida was
    being grown locally. DEA reported that indoor marijuana
    cultivation had reached record levels. Typically, indoor growing
    operations were located in private residences and consisted of
    about 200 to 300 plants. Larger indoor operations consisting of up
    to 10,000 plants were becoming more prevalent. Outdoor growing
    operations, sometimes amounting to several thousand plants, were
    usually located on private property in more rural areas or on
    protected forest land. Money Laundering    According to DEA, South
    Florida continues to be a major center for Colombian drug
    traffickers' money laundering activities. At the time of our
    review, recent financial investigations indicated that traffickers
    were using electronic fund transfers to move narcotics proceeds
    from the United States to Central and South America. Traffickers
    were also using both legitimate and illegitimate import/export
    businesses to purchase products with illegal drug proceeds for
    export mostly to South America, thus hiding the source of the
    proceeds and providing additional profit. Intelligence also
    indicated that smuggling of large shipments of bulk United States
    currency from Florida to Colombia has continued. In recent cases,
    traffickers wrapped and shipped bulk currency in hollowed
    appliances and containers. At times, these bulk shipments were
    sent to Colombia via third countries, such as Venezuela or Panama.
    Page 111                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The Miami Division's
    traditional priority has been regional, national, and Priorities,
    Programs, and    international investigations aimed at disrupting
    the ability of major South Initiatives                  American
    traffickers to import and distribute cocaine, as well as their
    ability to move the proceeds of their operations to South America.
    The division believes such investigations have become increasingly
    important as drug trafficking through the Caribbean has increased.
    In this regard, the division's management plans, at the time of
    our review, called for it to (1) direct investigative efforts
    towards major international organizations, targeting every aspect
    of their operations; and (2) increase cooperative efforts with
    foreign counterparts as well as other federal, state, and local
    law enforcement agencies.  The plan also called for the division
    to (1) attack street-level drug gangs through the MET Program,
    task forces, and drug enforcement training for state and local
    officers; and (2) continue to take a proactive role with the
    media, business and community groups, and schools to increase
    awareness of DEA's mission and the dangers of drug abuse. At the
    time of our review, the division office in Miami had eight
    enforcement groups as well as four HIDTA task force groups and two
    METs. In addition to these groups, the division office had a
    diversion control group and support groups, including technical
    operations, asset removal, and intelligence. The division's
    outlying district, country, and resident offices had various
    enforcement groups, including eight state and local task forces
    and a HIDTA task force group. Also, the Orlando and Tampa district
    offices each had a diversion control group. The Miami Division
    received 62 new positions in fiscal year 1998. Most of these
    positions resulted from a congressional appropriation designed to
    increase DEA's efforts against drug trafficking in the Caribbean
    and Florida (referred to as the Caribbean initiative). The
    additional positions were added to offices throughout the
    division, particularly in South Florida, the Bahamas, and the
    Florida Keys. The division office's four HIDTA task force groups
    were part of the Miami HIDTA established in 1990. The Miami
    HIDTA's fiscal year 1998 goals were to reduce drug trafficking,
    money laundering, and drug-related crime and violence as well as
    to prevent and reduce drug abuse. DEA officials said that all four
    HIDTA groups focused primarily on Colombian cocaine cases.
    However, one group also investigated indoor marijuana growing
    operations, and another group also conducted "street sweeps" with
    City of Miami and Miami-Dade police.  Miami HIDTA task force group
    participants Page 112                                    GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
    DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices included special
    agents from DEA, Customs, IRS, and the FBI as well as officers
    from various state and local law enforcement agencies. The Central
    Florida HIDTA was established in Orlando, FL, in 1998. Its fiscal
    year 1998 mission was to measurably reduce drug trafficking and
    related money laundering and apprehend violent drug fugitives,
    thereby reducing the impact of drug-related crimes in Central
    Florida. As part of this HIDTA, the Miami Division's Orlando
    District Office operated a multiagency heroin task force, and its
    Tampa District Office managed a multiagency methamphetamine task
    force. Financial investigations are a priority of the division.
    Enforcement groups have carried out investigations targeting money
    launderers, such as Operation Cali-Man, and also initiated
    Operation Greenskeeper to penetrate major trafficking
    organizations by offering money laundering services to
    traffickers. In addition, the division reestablished its asset
    removal group, whose primary goal was to provide asset forfeiture
    training to special agents and task force officers. The division
    planned that this group would expand its role to support the
    division's financial investigations and then eventually assume a
    proactive role in conducting and assisting financial
    investigations. The division's efforts to combat marijuana
    trafficking included investigations of organizations responsible
    for smuggling marijuana into the United States, transporting
    marijuana to Florida from the Southwest Border, and transporting
    marijuana to other locations within the United States. DEA offices
    located in the Florida Panhandle, for example, participated in
    Operation Pipeline with state and local agencies to interdict
    marijuana being shipped on Florida highways. In addition, the
    division participated in DEA's marijuana eradication program to
    assist in the detection and eradication of marijuana plants grown
    in Florida. DEA provided the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
    (FDLE) with $320,000 to implement this program in fiscal year
    1998. The division's marijuana eradication program manager in
    Tallahassee, along with DEA field coordinators in various district
    and resident offices, are to work with the FDLE and maintain
    liaison with the various federal, state, and local agencies
    involved in the program to coordinate their activities. DEA also
    participates in eradication operations and investigations of
    growers and provides program training. The Miami Division had two
    METs at the time of our review. The first was established in
    February 1995 and the second in February 1997. Each MET Page 113
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices had 12
    special agents.  According to the ASAC responsible for the METs,
    in assessing a request from a police chief or sheriff for MET
    assistance, the teams decide whether they can make an impact on
    the drug-related violence in the community. The assessment
    includes, but is not limited to, the extent of drug-related
    violence as measured by criteria such as the murder rate and the
    number of violent gangs.  At the time of our review, the first MET
    had been deployed to four local communities in the geographic area
    covered by the division; the second MET had completed deployments
    to three local communities and was conducting a fourth. At the
    time of our review, another major program conducted by the Miami
    Division was Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands (OPBAT).
    OPBAT was designed to interdict illegal drugs being shipped
    through the Bahamas to the United States. The division's Nassau
    Country Office works with the Bahamian police, U.S. Coast Guard,
    and U.S. Army to carry out this operation.  The DEA ASAC
    responsible for OPBAT said it is basically a response force. Some
    patrols are conducted, but OPBAT personnel primarily react to
    specific intelligence about drug shipments. Most of the division's
    resources have been devoted to cocaine cases.  For example, in
    fiscal year 1997, the division's special agents spent about 71.6
    percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine cases.  In
    fiscal year 1998, they spent about 70.6 percent of their
    investigative work hours on cocaine cases. The Miami Division
    reported 3,945 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 3,417 Enforcement
    Statistics and    arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division
    reported seizing 17,860 kilograms Case Examples                 of
    cocaine, 34.1 kilograms of heroin, and 14,935 kilograms of
    marijuana in fiscal year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division
    reported seizing 24,484 kilograms of cocaine, 96 kilograms of
    heroin, and 26,849 kilograms of marijuana. The division also
    reported that 108,178 marijuana plants were eradicated in calendar
    year 1997, and 55,311 marijuana plants were eradicated in calendar
    year 1998.  In addition, the division reported seized assets
    totaling $142 million in fiscal year 1997 and $68 million in
    fiscal year 1998. Operation Zorro II is an example of what DEA
    officials considered a successful major investigation by the Miami
    Division. Operation Zorro II targeted Colombian drug trafficking
    organization cell or group heads responsible for importing and
    distributing large shipments of cocaine and laundering money
    throughout the United States. The groups were associated with the
    Colombian Cali cartel. Operation Zorro II consisted of joint
    investigations initiated by DEA offices in Miami, New York, and
    Los Page 114                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Angeles in
    coordination with DEA Headquarters' Special Operations Division
    (SOD) and the Department of Justice, targeting the Colombian group
    heads in their respective cities. In addition, DEA's Miami
    Division worked jointly with the City of Miami Police Department
    and received assistance from several other local law enforcement
    agencies during this operation. Operation Zorro II was conducted
    in three phases. During the first phase, Miami Division special
    agents arrested 26 group members responsible for importing and
    distributing throughout the United States multithousand- kilogram
    quantities of cocaine. During the second phase, the special agents
    used Title III (electronic surveillance) intercepts to monitor the
    activities of the money launderers associated with the
    organization. As a result of this phase of the investigation, 11
    Colombian money launderers were indicted and arrested, and over $1
    million in cash and assets were seized. Finally, during the third
    phase, the special agents targeted the distribution networks that
    were assisting the organization in distributing multikilogram
    quantities of cocaine in the South Florida area. An additional 11
    defendants were indicted. At the time of our review, a total of 47
    arrests had been made in Miami as part of Operation Zorro II.
    Another example of what DEA officials considered a successful
    major investigation involved the Miami Division's district office
    in Orlando, FL. Working in cooperation with the division's Fort
    Lauderdale office, special agents in Orlando identified a drug
    trafficking organization headed by two individuals, including a
    transportation specialist for Colombian drug traffickers. The
    transportation specialist's primary role was to accept delivery of
    drugs in Puerto Rico, store the drugs, and later transport the
    drugs to central Florida and other regions of the United States.
    The Orlando office led an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
    Force (OCDETF) investigation targeting this trafficking
    organization, and representatives of the Customs Service, IRS,
    Marshal's Service, Postal Service, and local law enforcement
    agencies participated. The investigation revealed that from 1994
    through June 1998 (the time of our visit), the organization had
    transported over 166,000 kilograms of cocaine and about 200
    kilograms of heroin from Colombia, via Puerto Rico, into the
    United States. Cocaine and heroin were distributed and sold in
    Miami, New York, Orlando, and Charleston, SC, as well as in Puerto
    Rico. The investigation also uncovered numerous acts of violence
    committed by organization members, including three homicides. Page
    115                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the time of our
    review, DEA reported that the investigation had resulted in the
    arrest of 61 individuals, including both of the principal targets.
    Fifty- six of the individuals had been convicted in federal court,
    and 4 were convicted in state court. The drug transportation
    specialist and another individual were each sentenced in federal
    court to life in prison, and several organization members received
    prison sentences exceeding 20 years. Over 800 kilograms of
    cocaine; 1 kilogram of heroin; numerous firearms; over $19 million
    in U.S. currency; and $4 million in real estate, cars, and boats
    were seized. In addition, two of the homicides were solved. Page
    116                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices New Orleans Division
    DEA's New Orleans Division is responsible for federal drug law
    Geographic Region and       enforcement in the states of Alabama,
    Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi Organizational Structure
    and covers an area of 205,882 square miles within 10 federal
    judicial districts. Although largely rural and heavily forested,
    the division has seven metropolitan areas within its jurisdiction.
    Three of the states border the Gulf of Mexico and provide
    substantial maritime access to the interior portion of the region.
    The New Orleans Division, which is headed by a SAC and five ASACs,
    includes the division office, two district offices, eight resident
    offices, and three posts of duty, as shown on figure I.3. Page 117
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.3:  New Orleans Division Map Fayetteville Fort Smith Huntsville
    Little Rock Oxford Arkansas Birmingham Mississippi Alabama
    Shreveport
    Montgomery Jackson Louisiana Mobile Gulfport Baton Rouge Lafayette
    New Orleans Division office District office Resident office Post
    of duty Source: DEA's New Orleans Division. Page 118
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
    time of our visit in March 1998, the division was authorized to
    have 220 staff, including 136 special agents. In addition, there
    were 141 staff from state and local agencies authorized for
    various task forces and groups in the division, including 133 law
    enforcement officers. According to DEA, the major drug-producing
    countries of Central and Overview of Drug             South
    America have a significant impact on the New Orleans Division
    Trafficking Situation and    because of its proximity to the Gulf
    Coast. Ports on the Gulf coastline and Threat
    vast waterways, which are not patrolled, provide opportunities for
    smuggling, thereby making the area potentially attractive to drug
    traffickers. Cocaine                      Cocaine and crack
    cocaine pose the most significant drug threats in the area covered
    by the division, according to DEA. At the time of our review,
    cocaine was readily available, with distribution and use trends
    either stable at high levels or increasing in every metropolitan
    area, while crack cocaine continued to make inroads into rural
    areas. DEA reported that Colombian and Mexican organizations
    operating out of Texas were responsible for bringing in most of
    the cocaine. Local cocaine trafficking organizations varied
    widely. Some organizations were loose- knit local violators with
    ties to traffickers in the source areas, while others were well-
    organized small groups with well-established markets. Some of the
    organizations were in the form of "street gangs" modeled after,
    and affiliated with, certain Los Angeles gangs. Violence common
    with gang activity was occurring in some areas within the
    division. Heroin                       At the time of our review,
    heroin was not considered a significant threat to most of the area
    covered by the New Orleans Division, according to DEA. Heroin
    availability and trafficking were confined mainly to the Greater
    New Orleans area. However, there were indications that higher
    purity Colombian heroin in the New Orleans area was surfacing.
    Methamphetamine and Other    DEA reported that the manufacture and
    use of methamphetamine have Dangerous Drugs              continued
    to grow. DEA identified several organizations that were bringing
    methamphetamine into the area from California, Arizona, and Texas.
    Methamphetamine laboratories have proliferated, especially in
    Arkansas. The diversion of legal drugs to illicit use was
    occurring primarily at the pharmacy and practitioner level,
    according to DEA. Such diversion resulted from indiscriminate
    prescribing and dispensing of drugs, forgeries, illegal call-ins
    of prescriptions, and people "doctor-shopping" to Page 119
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices obtain
    numerous prescriptions. Diverted drugs were either being sold or
    used by individuals. Marijuana                    According to
    DEA, marijuana is the most widely abused drug in the area covered
    by the division, and the profit margin for marijuana trafficking
    is second only to that of cocaine. Although most of the marijuana
    encountered was coming from Mexico, at the time of our review, DEA
    reported that a substantial portion was domestically cultivated,
    and marijuana cultivation was extensive in each of the four states
    in the division's area. The New Orleans Division's management plan
    called for it to focus Priorities, Programs, and    enforcement
    activities, beginning in fiscal year 1998, on (1) disrupting the
    Initiatives                  flow of drugs in the area covered by
    the division and (2) responding more effectively to drug-related
    crime and the attendant violence plaguing its communities. The
    plan's domestic operational strategy attempted to strike a balance
    between major regional cases with interstate ties and local impact
    cases targeting violent drug organizations and gangs. The
    cornerstone of the division's plan is increased cooperation with
    counterpart law enforcement agencies at all levels, making optimum
    use of resources available in programs such as OCDETF, HIDTA, and
    MET. According to the division's SAC, although cooperation with
    state and local police agencies has long been a hallmark of DEA,
    his intent was to make DEA more visible, accessible, and "user
    friendly" to such agencies. He noted that unilateral DEA
    investigations would become a thing of the past, and every
    involved agency would benefit by pooling its resources. As part of
    the plan, the SAC directed all the offices in the New Orleans
    Division to develop a targeting strategy for all types of drugs in
    their areas. Individuals and organizations are to be identified
    and prioritized for joint investigations with federal, state, and
    local agencies. The division's enforcement components are to use
    the various resources available through the OCDETF and HIDTA
    Programs. According to the SAC, he is committed to aggressively
    pursuing joint federal, state, and local investigations where
    productive and practical. At the time of our review, the New
    Orleans Division had 12 state and local task forces in the 4
    states it covers.5  Two of the state and local task forces were at
    the division office in New Orleans, and, according to DEA, one of
    5 Four of the 12 task forces were provisional, awaiting authorized
    funding approval from DEA Headquarters. Page 120
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices these
    worked mostly OCDETF conspiracy cases. This task force was staffed
    by four DEA special agents, including a supervisor, and seven
    officers from local police and sheriff's departments. The other
    state and local task force at the division office was called the
    REDRUM ("murder" spelled backward) task force. It was established
    in 1992 to identify and dismantle the most violent groups involved
    in drug- related crimes in the city of New Orleans. At the time of
    our visit, the task force was staffed by six DEA special agents
    (including a supervisor), a deputy U.S. Marshal, an INS agent, a
    Louisiana state police officer, a New Orleans police department
    homicide detective, and a National Guard intelligence analyst. In
    addition to carrying out the REDRUM mission, the task force
    sometimes conducts drug investigations that do not involve
    violence. The New Orleans Division had two METs at the time of our
    review. According to the division's management plan, the major
    portion of the division's response to the cocaine and crack
    cocaine problems is an enhanced MET Program, with a second MET
    added. The division's first MET was established in 1995, and the
    second MET became operational at the start of fiscal year 1998.
    Each MET was made up of 10 DEA special agents. Between May 1995
    and March 1998, the METs had been deployed to nine local
    communities in the geographic area covered by the division. The
    deployments were short-term operations conducted to identify and
    arrest local violent drug dealers. The division had six HIDTA task
    force groups in three states at the time of our review. In
    December 1996, ONDCP established the Gulf Coast HIDTA in the
    states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana to reduce the impact
    of Gulf Coast drug trafficking on other parts of the United States
    and to reduce violent drug trafficking in the three-state area.
    DEA is one of many agencies participating in the Gulf Coast HIDTA.
    In participating, DEA carries out its own mission and strategies
    in coordination with other agencies participating on multiagency
    teams. The division office had one enforcement group made up
    entirely of DEA special agents who concentrated primarily on
    interstate and international drug investigations. According to DEA
    officials, most of the group's cases involve high-level drug
    traffickers and result in federal drug conspiracy charges. This
    group had more OCDETF cases than any other group in the division.
    The group was staffed with nine DEA special agents, including a
    supervisor. Page 121                                    GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
    DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Most of the
    division's resources have been devoted to cocaine cases. For
    example, in fiscal year 1997, the division's special agents spent
    about 68.6 percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine
    cases. In fiscal year 1998, they spent about 71.9 percent of their
    investigative work hours on cocaine cases. The division made 1,864
    arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 2,286 arrests in Enforcement
    Statistics and    fiscal year 1998. In addition, the division made
    688 seizures of assets Case Examples                 valued at
    $12.5 million in fiscal year 1997 and 644 seizures of assets
    valued at $11.5 million in fiscal year 1998. In fiscal year 1997,
    the division opened 839 cases and closed 563 cases. In fiscal year
    1998, it opened 950 cases and closed 356 cases. An example of what
    the New Orleans Division considered a successful major
    investigation involved the REDRUM task force. In 1996, the task
    force initiated an investigation targeting a violent heroin
    trafficking organization operating in the city of New Orleans.
    This case evolved into an OCDETF investigation and was worked
    jointly with the New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division
    and the FBI.  Various investigative techniques were used,
    including conducting two federally court-authorized wiretaps. As a
    result, 13 people were indicted by a federal grand jury in the
    Eastern District of Louisiana for violations including murder,
    engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise,6 conspiracy, and
    other drug-related charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to
    trial. In June 1997, the head of the organization was found guilty
    of all charges and received a life sentence. According to DEA, as
    a result of this investigation five homicides in the city of New
    Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-
    related assets were seized. DEA also reported that this
    investigation significantly reduced violent crime locally and
    disrupted the flow of heroin into the inner city. Another example
    of what the division considered a successful major case involved
    the Mobile, AL, resident office. In 1997, the resident office
    collaborated with a U.S. Customs Service undercover group in
    "Operation Skymaster" to initiate an investigation of an
    individual who was seeking transportation for a multikilogram
    shipment of cocaine from South America to the United States. After
    a series of undercover meetings in Alabama and Florida, a fake
    delivery of cocaine took place. Since that time, the investigation
    has resulted in the arrest of 26 individuals and the 6 The federal
    Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (21 U.S.C. 848) is directed
    at major drug traffickers and the forfeiture of their assets. A
    person is considered as engaging in a continuing criminal
    enterprise if he or she occupies a position of authority over five
    or more people engaged in a series of drug violations from which
    substantial income is derived. Page 122
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices seizure
    of approximately $145,000 in U.S. currency and 8 vehicles. The
    investigation identified international smugglers of multikilogram
    quantities of cocaine as well as the recipients of the cocaine in
    Alabama, Florida, and Michigan. The case led to several domestic
    investigations in Florida, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.
    Page 123                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Washington Division
    and Baltimore District Office The Washington Division is located
    on the East Coast corridor between Geographic Region and       two
    major drug import cities, Miami and New York. Its area of
    Organizational Structure    responsibility extends through
    Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Colombia.
    Three international airports, two international seaports, railway
    systems, and an extensive interstate highway network provide
    commercial and noncommercial transit to and through the region.
    The area's population is ethnically diverse and international,
    with urban, suburban, and rural communities. At the time of our
    July 1998 visit, the division, which was headed by a SAC and five
    ASACs, comprised the division office in Washington, D.C.; two
    district offices; three resident offices; and seven posts of duty,
    as shown on figure I.4. Page 124
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.4:  Washington, D. C. Division Map Wheeling Hagerstown Maryland
    Clarksburg                                            Baltimore
    Winchester West Virginia
    Washington, D.C. Charleston Salisbury Virginia Richmond Roanoke
    Newport News Abingdon
    Norfolk Division office District office Resident office Post of
    duty Source: DEA's Washington Division. As of March 1998, the
    Washington Division had 262 staff, including 158 special agents.
    In response to the interests of the congressional requesters, this
    section also provides information on the Baltimore District
    Office, which is part of the Washington Division. At the time of
    our review, the office included two of the division's seven posts
    of duty, as shown on figure I.4. As of March 1998, it had 60
    staff, including 39 special agents. Page 125
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
    Washington region, according to DEA officials, is both a drug
    transit Overview of Drug                    zone between Miami and
    New York and a final destination point for drugs, Trafficking
    Situation and           serving as a secondary distribution
    region. Cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and Threat
    methamphetamine are available throughout the area. The most
    significant threat is cocaine and crack distribution, dominated
    primarily by Dominican traffickers, and the violence associated
    with these activities. However, the division has recently seen a
    dramatic increase in heroin trafficking and distribution. Jamaican
    traffickers also threatened the region because of their wide-
    ranging distribution of marijuana and other drugs. Also available
    are LSD, MDMA (Ecstasy), Rohypnol, Ketamine, and GHB,7 drugs that
    are consumed at "raves,"8 in nightclubs, and on college campuses.
    According to DEA officials, three levels of drug violators operate
    in the Washington division's area of responsibility. These include
    (1) major international organizations; (2) mid-level
    organizations, which include major national and regional
    organizations, usually made up of longtime local traffickers; and
    (3) retail groups, including street-level violators and violent
    drug gangs. The majority of the violators are mid- and retail-
    level. Small neighborhood-based drug trafficking groups or "crews"
    use violence to control their areas and protect their drug
    trafficking enterprises from rival groups. Baltimore Overview
    Baltimore, according to DEA, although primarily a consumer drug
    market, is also a drug source for smaller Maryland cities and
    towns, including Annapolis, Hagerstown, and Salisbury. Cocaine,
    heroin, and marijuana are the primary drug threats to the area.
    Typically, drugs are transported into Baltimore from Miami, New
    York, and other source states by car, train, airline, bus, or
    sometimes via ship through the port. However, DEA officials
    indicated that airports are relied upon less, possibly due to past
    enforcement successes. Traffickers tended to be street- to mid-
    level violators. Cocaine Trafficking in Baltimore At the time of
    our review, according to DEA, cocaine was a major drug of choice
    in the Baltimore area, and the urban crack threat was migrating to
    smaller towns and cities throughout the surrounding suburban
    jurisdictions. Generally, local independent dealers go to New York
    City 7 MDMA (methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine) has hallucinogenic
    effects. Rohypnol (flunitrazepam), smuggled primarily from Mexico,
    is a depressant not approved for sale in the United States.
    Ketamine is an animal tranquilizer with legitimate uses in
    veterinary medicine. GHB (gamma hydroxy butyrate) is used as a
    date rape drug. 8 A rave is a party designed to enhance a
    hallucinogenic experience through music and behavior. Page 126
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices weekly,
    buy 2 to 3 kilograms of cocaine from Dominican sources, bring the
    drugs back to Baltimore, and distribute them over a several block
    area. These distributors have no ties to larger organizations. Law
    enforcement officials reportedly believed that youth gangs were
    increasingly involved in drug distribution and related criminal
    activity, primarily violent crime. Heroin Trafficking in Baltimore
    Baltimore is also one of the largest and most active heroin
    markets in the country, according to both DEA and ONDCP. Dominican
    traffickers bring wholesale quantities of high-quality Colombian
    heroin into the city, and Nigerians distribute Southeast Asian
    heroin from Thailand. Traffickers are street- to mid-level
    violators, distributing drugs in open-air drug markets and in
    housing projects. Violence has increased, even at the lower level
    of drug street sales. Moreover, in 1996, the Drug Abuse Warning
    Network9 (DAWN) reported that Baltimore had the highest rate of
    heroin-related emergency room episodes per 100,000 population.
    Marijuana Trafficking in           According to DEA, marijuana is
    transported into the Maryland area from Baltimore
    the Southwest border states and Mexico. Much of the marijuana
    entering the area is conveyed by individuals using highways and
    mass transportation. Jamaicans supply wholesale quantities of
    marijuana in Baltimore. In addition, marijuana is also cultivated
    along Maryland's Eastern Shore. At the time of our review, the
    majority of the Washington Division's efforts Priorities,
    Programs, and          were, according to DEA, directed toward
    violent drug trafficking gangs. In Initiatives
    Baltimore, an Assistant U.S. Attorney said that since the mid-
    1990s, that office had received cases involving violence from DEA.
    Moreover, DEA and the U.S. Attorney were responding to requests
    for assistance and now prosecuting cases from the state's
    attorneys' offices in order to obtain higher federal penalties for
    defendants. The division's and Baltimore district office's
    targeting of drug trafficking gangs was reflected in the
    distribution of its investigative work hours. By geographic scope,
    combined domestic and local cases for fiscal years 1997 and 1998
    accounted for about two-thirds of the total investigative work
    hours expended each year by the division and more than one-half
    and two- thirds of the total investigative work hours,
    respectively, for those years, expended by the district office.
    Investigative work hours expended on international and regional
    cases, in contrast, accounted for approximately 30 percent of the
    division's investigative work hours and almost 40 percent 9 Since
    the early 1970s, DAWN has collected information on patients
    seeking hospital emergency room treatment related to illegal drug
    use or nonmedical use of legal drugs. Page 127
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices and 30
    percent of the district's investigative work hours in those years,
    respectively. By type of organizations targeted, the division
    expended the greatest portion of its investigative work hours on
    independent traffickers (31 percent and 42 percent for fiscal
    years 1997 and 1998, respectively). The Baltimore Office expended
    the greatest portion of its investigative work hours on violent
    organizations (almost one-third) in both fiscal years 1997 and
    1998. As indicated above, cocaine and heroin presented the major
    drug threats to the region. By drug, both the division and the
    Baltimore district work- hour statistics for fiscal years 1997 and
    1998 reflect the cocaine and heroin threats.  Each year, the
    division expended more than half its investigative work hours on
    cocaine-related cases and about 20 percent of its investigative
    work hours on heroin-related cases. The Baltimore office also
    spent about half its investigative work hours each year on
    cocaine-related cases and 33 percent on heroin-related cases. As
    proposed in its 1998-2000 Field Management Plan, the number of
    Washington Division cases accepted as OCDETF cases increased in
    fiscal year 1998. During that year, the division had 73 of its
    cases accepted as OCDETF cases compared to 36 cases in 1997, an
    increase of 103 percent. Similarly, the percentage of the
    division's investigative work hours, by source of case, expended
    on OCDETF cases increased from about 29 percent in fiscal year
    1997 to 31 percent in fiscal year 1998. Most of the division's
    higher level cases were handled through OCDETF. The Baltimore
    District Office reported 6 cases accepted as OCDETF cases in
    fiscal year 1997 and 22 in fiscal year 1998. The Washington
    Division's 1998-2000 plan also called for the continued targeting
    of violent drug traffickers through the MET Program. The division
    had 1 MET team that had 10 special agents. In fiscal years 1997
    and 1998, the team conducted deployments in Washington, D.C.;
    Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA. Division
    officials emphasized to us the importance of their undertaking
    enforcement efforts with state and local law enforcement agencies
    to address the drug problems of the region. According to these
    officials, the division worked with approximately 240 state and
    local law enforcement agencies in Washington, D.C., and the 3
    states in its area of responsibility. In addition, the division
    was involved in training state and local law enforcement personnel
    throughout the division. The Baltimore District Office had a task
    force, including DEA agents and Baltimore City police Page 128
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    officers, which investigated major heroin distribution networks or
    distributors in open-air markets. In fiscal year 1998, 10 HIDTA
    task forces were operating within the division's area of
    responsibility, including 3 led by the Baltimore District Office.
    The latter three comprised law enforcement officers from DEA, the
    Baltimore Police Department, the Baltimore County Police
    Department, the Maryland State Police, and other local police
    agencies. One task force investigated violent drug traffickers and
    trafficking organizations that affected safety in the Baltimore
    metropolitan area; the second concentrated on major heroin and
    cocaine traffickers and targets of opportunity; and the third
    conducted interdiction operations-"hit and runs"-targeting the
    movement of drug and currency shipments at the
    Baltimore/Washington International Airport and the train and bus
    stations. During fiscal year 1998, the Washington Division also
    participated in several special enforcement programs coordinated
    by DEA Headquarters. The Division reported that in fiscal year
    1998, 20 investigations had resulted from its participation in a
    special enforcement program that focused on traffickers operating
    in the United States under the direction of Colombian, Dominican,
    and/or Mexican drug organizations. As part of another such
    program, the Baltimore District Office investigated West African
    drug trafficking organizations dealing in heroin, their foreign
    sources of supply, and their distributors within the United
    States. In addition, the division participated in DEA's Domestic
    Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. However, this effort was
    undertaken state by state. The Baltimore and Richmond District
    Offices and the Charleston, WV, Resident Office each provided
    assistance to drug enforcement groups in their respective states.
    As a result of its efforts, the Washington Division reported 2,056
    Enforcement Statistics and    defendants arrested in fiscal year
    1997 and 2,156 defendants arrested in Case Examples
    fiscal year 1998. Approximately 60 percent of those arrested in
    both years were categorized as being involved in cocaine-related
    cases. In fiscal year 1997, almost 50 percent (985) of the
    defendants arrested were categorized as independent traffickers,
    19 percent as associated with violent crime organizations (382),
    and 15 percent (309) as involved in criminal organizations. Fiscal
    year1998 data showed the continued predominance of independent
    traffickers, 51 percent (1,093), among defendants arrested; this
    compared to defendants associated with violent crime
    organizations, 13 percent (275), or criminal organizations, 12
    percent (251). Page 129
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
    Baltimore Office reported 745 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 705
    arrests in fiscal year 1998. For these fiscal years, respectively,
    55 and 61 percent of these arrests were cocaine-related, and 22
    and 20 percent were heroin-related. In addition, DEA reported
    defendants arrested in OCDETF cases in which the Washington
    Division participated-409 in fiscal year 1997 and 729 in fiscal
    year 1998. Over half of the arrests each year were cocaine-
    related. The Baltimore Office reported 100 and 248 defendants
    arrested in OCDETF cases in fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
    respectively. For fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the division and the
    Baltimore Office reported drug seizures of cocaine, heroin, and
    marijuana, as well as other dangerous drugs. These data are
    presented in table I.1. Table I.1:  Drug Seizures for Washington
    Division and Baltimore District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and
    1998 Washington Division                      Baltimore District
    Office Fiscal year                                 Fiscal year
    Drug seized                                                   1997
    1998                   1997                   1998 Heroin (Kgs)
    17.7                 14.8                   12.4
    9.6 Cocaine (Kgs)
    1,158.2                125.9                1,053.6
    56.8 Marijuana (Kgs)
    254.8                401.4                  159.3
    127.8 Hashish (Kgs)
    1.0                 5.7                    1.0
    1.4 Stimulants (D.U.)
    313,328              303,602                 15,988
    27,637 Depressants (D.U.)
    10,936                1,799                    782
    587 Hallucinogens (D.U.)
    13,922               10,860                    305
    43 Other narcotics (D.U.)
    7,886                4,083                  7,231
    38 Note: D.U. refers to dosage unit. Source: DEA. As a result of
    its fiscal years 1997 and 1998 MET deployments in Washington,
    D.C.; Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA, at the
    time of our visit, the Washington Division reported 165 arrests,
    in total. These deployments resulted in the seizure of about 2.5
    kilograms of crack, 1.8 kilograms of cocaine, 176 grams of heroin,
    and 1.2 kilograms of marijuana, as well as a number of weapons,
    more than $34,000 in cash, and over $120,000 in assets. This
    included the Baltimore deployment, which accounted for 81
    defendants arrested and 950 grams of crack, 501 grams of cocaine,
    176 grams of heroin, and 453.5 grams of marijuana seized. The
    Washington Division's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
    Program, carried out by the DEA office with state and local law
    enforcement within the three states in the division's area of
    responsibility, resulted in the eradication of marijuana plants
    and arrests. For example, in Page 130
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices calendar
    year 1997, with the support of DEA's Baltimore Office, DEA
    reported that 4,826 marijuana plants (836 cultivated indoors and
    3,990 cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 120 persons were
    arrested in Maryland. In calendar year 1998, DEA reported that
    3,442 marijuana plants (2,724 cultivated indoors and 718
    cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 89 persons were
    arrested. In addition, the Division also provided the following
    examples of cases it considered successful. *  The Baltimore
    Office conducted an investigation with the Baltimore City Police
    and the Offices of the U.S. Attorney and local State's Attorney
    that led to the conviction of local drug dealer on such charges as
    conspiracy to murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering
    enterprise, murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise, attempted
    murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise, conspiracy to
    retaliate against a witness, and conspiracy to distribute heroin
    and cocaine.  In addition, nine other members of the organization
    were found guilty of a variety of charges, including conspiracy to
    murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering enterprise and
    conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine.  Evidence of 10
    murders was presented at the trials.  Moreover, according to DEA,
    witnesses testified that the dealer sold $30,000 worth of heroin
    and cocaine a day in the Eastern District of Baltimore City.
    Sixty-six arrests were made during this investigation. The
    Division identified this case as an OCDETF case. *  According to
    DEA, in the investigation of one trafficker, DEA, with other state
    and local agencies-the Fairfax County, VA, Police Department;
    Arlington County, VA, Police Department; Washington, D.C.,
    Metropolitan Police Department; and Maryland State Police-
    dismantled a violent drug distribution organization in the
    Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and solved the attempted
    murder of a Maryland State trooper.  In December 1995, while
    transporting a kilogram of cocaine from New York to Washington,
    D.C., in a vehicle owned by the trafficker, a long-time kilogram-
    level cocaine distributor in the District was stopped and arrested
    by a Maryland State trooper.  Subsequently, the distributor
    conspired with other individuals to kill that trooper to eliminate
    him as a witness in an upcoming trial; however, the wrong trooper
    was shot. During March 1997, investigations by the Fairfax,
    Arlington, and Washington, D.C., Police Departments focused on the
    trafficker's cocaine activities.  DEA reported that the
    distributor was involved in a conspiracy, with others, to
    distribute cocaine in the Washington, D.C., area, and launder the
    proceeds through legitimate businesses.  As a result of this
    investigation, a total of 18 individuals were found guilty of
    various charges, and nearly half a million dollars in criminally
    acquired assets were seized. Page 131
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Bogota,
    Colombia, Country Office At the time of our visit in July 1998,
    DEA's Bogota, Colombia Country Geographic Regional and     Office
    was the second largest DEA office in South America. It covers the
    Organizational Structure    country of Colombia, which is bordered
    by the Caribbean Sea, Pacific Ocean, and four other countries and
    divided by the Andes Mountains. The Bogota Country Office, which
    is headed by a Country Attach, includes a DEA resident office in
    Barranquilla, Colombia, as shown in figure I.5. Page 132
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.5:  Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map Caribbean Sea
    Barranquilla Venezuela Bogota North Pacific Ocean Colombia Brazil
    Ecuador Peru Country office Resident office Source: DEA's Bogota,
    Colombia, Country Office. The country office was staffed with 65
    DEA personnel, including 43 special agents. Also, representatives
    from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Customs
    Service, FBI, IRS, Secret Service, and the Department of Defense
    (DOD) were working with DEA in Colombia. DEA had two enforcement
    groups and an intelligence group located in Bogota and one
    enforcement group in the Barranquilla office. Page 133
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA is a
    member of the U.S. Embassy's Bogota Country Team, which is headed
    by the Ambassador and consists of U.S. agencies attached to the
    embassy in Colombia. DEA works with Colombian law enforcement
    authorities, primarily the Colombian National Police (CNP), to
    carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. However,
    DEA agents in Colombia do not have police authority and cannot
    make arrests or seize drugs in that country.10 According to DEA,
    Colombian drug traffickers continue to supply most of Overview of
    Drug             the world's cocaine. However, Colombian
    trafficking organizations had Trafficking Situation and    become
    much more fragmented in the 1990s. In the past, large Colombian
    Threat                       cartels controlled the cocaine
    industry. There are now numerous independent traffickers and
    organizations with decentralized operations. According to DEA,
    clandestine laboratories in Colombia are used to convert cocaine
    base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) for eventual export to the
    United States and Europe. The cocaine base is either imported from
    other countries, primarily Peru, or made from coca leaves grown in
    Colombia. The cocaine laboratories are primarily located in jungle
    areas southeast of the Andes Mountains in Colombia, referred to by
    DEA as the Colombian Source Zone. After processing, the cocaine is
    typically flown across the Andes mountains to northwest Colombia
    for further transport out of Colombia. The major cocaine
    transportation points in northwest Colombia, according to DEA, are
    located in an area that includes the Pacific and Caribbean coasts
    and all of Colombia's major population centers. The transportation
    points include clandestine airstrips, major airports, seaports,
    and locations from which small "go-fast" boats and commercial
    containerized cargo vessels can transport cocaine. Preferred
    transshipment areas for drugs originating from Colombia are Costa
    Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, and Puerto
    Rico. Mexico- and Caribbean-based transportation groups are
    involved in shipping cocaine to the United States. The diversion
    of chemicals essential to cocaine production continues to increase
    in Colombia, according to DEA. For the most part, these chemicals
    are legally imported into Colombia from the United States, 10 We
    recently reported on the narcotics situation in Colombia, U.S. and
    Colombian efforts to address drug trafficking activities in
    Colombia, and the continuing challenges each government faces to
    combat these activities: Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From
    Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/NSIAD-99- 136, June 22, 1999).
    Page 134
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Europe,
    and the Far East. They are then diverted for the production of
    cocaine. The availability of heroin produced in Colombia and
    smuggled into the United States dramatically increased in recent
    years, according to DEA. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized
    and analyzed in the United States was Colombian. The Colombian
    heroin trade is dominated by trafficking groups operating
    independently of the major cocaine trafficking organizations.
    Colombia's climate allows for year-round cultivation of opium
    poppies, from which opium gum is processed into heroin in
    clandestine laboratories throughout the country. At the time of
    our review, according to DEA, the majority of the heroin produced
    in Colombia was being exported through the international airports
    in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and, to a lesser extent, Barranquilla.
    DEA estimated that about 90 percent of the Colombian heroin
    destined for the United States was transported via couriers (also
    known as "mules") on commercial airlines. Miami, Dallas, and New
    York City were principal "gateways" for Colombian heroin entering
    the United States. Heroin traffickers were also transporting
    heroin into the United States through other countries in South and
    Central America and the Caribbean. The primary method of smuggling
    heroin was ingestion or concealment on the couriers' bodies.  The
    heroin might also have been concealed in such items as false-sided
    luggage, clothing, food, or equipment. Insurgent guerrilla groups
    have been associated with cocaine and heroin trafficking in
    Colombia. Guerrillas have provided security for cocaine
    laboratories, opium poppy fields, and clandestine airstrips. They
    have also been known to charge a "tax" for guarding coca and opium
    poppy fields, for permission to transport opium gum or morphine to
    sites for sale within the guerilla territory, for kilograms of
    coca leaf sold to produce cocaine base, and for kilograms of
    cocaine exported from the Colombian Source Zone. The "tax" has
    often been paid in weapons instead of currency. According to DEA,
    the guerillas have increased the risk of conducting drug
    enforcement operations. For example, a guerilla ambush of a CNP
    unit at a clandestine airstrip and cocaine storage complex in
    March 1998 left one CNP officer dead, two officers wounded, and
    five officers captured. According to DEA, marijuana is exported in
    tons from Colombia to the United States and Europe. It is
    reportedly grown in mountain ranges near the Colombian Caribbean
    coast and is usually compressed into bales. The primary method of
    transportation is containerized commercial cargo and commercial
    cargo vessels departing from ports on the northern coast of Page
    135                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Colombia. It might be
    off-loaded at sea onto smaller ships or speedboats for delivery to
    locations in Mexico and onward transport to the United States. The
    Bogota Country Office is involved in activities to combat the
    Priorities, Programs, and      Colombian drug trafficking threat
    and support DEA's South America Initiatives
    Regional Plan.11  The September 1997 South America Regional Plan
    contains the following seven objectives: *  identify, investigate,
    and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; *  support
    U.S. domestic investigations; *  enhance host nation counterdrug
    capabilities; *  develop a country intelligence program; *
    control essential chemicals; *  conduct financial investigations;
    and *  promote regional counterdrug cooperation. DEA's Bogota
    Country Office also supports the U.S. Embassy's Flow Reduction
    Strategy, which is designed to reduce the flow of cocaine and
    heroin from Colombia. This strategy is carried out by the
    embassy's Bogota Country Team. The goal of the strategy, which
    focuses on the Colombian Source Zone southeast of the Andes
    Mountains, is to reduce the amount of cocaine crossing the Andes
    into northwest Colombia by 50 percent. The Flow Reduction Strategy
    concentrates on eradicating coca plants and opium poppies,
    destroying cocaine laboratories, and controlling the
    transportation of cocaine base and HCL into and out of the
    Colombian Source Zone by aircraft or rivercraft. For its part, DEA
    focuses primarily on the organizations responsible for controlling
    the manufacture and transportation of cocaine, while the State
    Department is responsible for eradication efforts. At the time of
    our review, DEA was involved in three intelligence initiatives
    focused on the Colombian Source Zone. *  Information
    Analysis/Operations Center (IA/OC): The IA/OC was created to
    collect drug intelligence from U.S. and Colombian agencies and
    other sources, particularly regarding the production and
    transportation of cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone; serve as a
    focal point for U.S. and Colombian agencies' requests for
    information; and support drug enforcement operations in the
    Colombian Source Zone. The center was 11 DEA's South America
    Regional Plan, which is updated periodically, provides strategic
    guidance for DEA's operations in South American countries,
    including Colombia and Bolivia. Page 136
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices staffed
    by DEA, Customs, and U.S. military personnel at the time of our
    review. *  Operation Papagayo: The objective of this operation is
    to intercept traffickers' communications in the Colombian Source
    Zone to help identify organizations controlling the manufacture
    and transportation of cocaine. The operation is conducted by a
    vetted or screened CNP unit that is to share the collected
    intelligence with DEA. *  Operation Selva Verde: The objective of
    this operation is to identify the organizations manufacturing
    cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone, locate and destroy their
    laboratories, collect evidence and intelligence, and arrest those
    involved. CNP, Colombian military, and DEA personnel operating in
    the Colombian Source Zone collect intelligence and provide it to
    IA/OC. Using this and other intelligence, IA/OC identifies targets
    for enforcement operations. CNP jungle units, in coordination with
    the Colombian military, then raid the targeted cocaine
    laboratories. Evidence and intelligence collected at the raided
    laboratories are used to help identify the trafficking
    organizations involved. The DEA office in Bogota had committed one
    of its enforcement groups to investigations of major drug
    traffickers, including those on DEA's list of major targets in
    Colombia. The DEA agents in this group work with a CNP Special
    Investigative Unit (SIU), which was vetted by DEA. The SIU
    collects intelligence and targets and investigates major
    traffickers. At the time of our visit, another Colombian SIU had
    been vetted by DEA and was starting to work with this DEA
    enforcement group. This SIU was established to target major money
    laundering organizations, and an IRS agent assigned to the embassy
    was slated to assist the SIU. There were three vetted Colombian
    prosecutors assigned to work with the two SIUs. At the time of our
    review, DEA's other enforcement group in Bogota was committed to
    working with CNP on several different programs, including the
    major programs discussed below. *  Aircraft Control Program
    (Operation Gemini Clipper): This is a CNP- operated general
    aviation aircraft inspection and enforcement program designed to
    help identify trafficking organizations using aircraft to
    transport illegal drugs. The program is based on a requirement by
    the Colombian government that all general aviation aircraft in
    Colombia be registered and inspected. Under the program, CNP
    inspects aircraft and their registrations, immobilizes or seizes
    aircraft found to be illegal, and collects information to help
    identify those responsible for using the aircraft to transport
    drugs. Page 137                                    GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices *  Chemical Control
    Program: A DEA diversion investigator and special agent were
    working with a CNP chemical control unit. This unit, which was
    vetted by DEA in 1998, audits companies authorized to legally
    import the chemicals essential to cocaine processing and companies
    that distribute chemicals in Colombia. The unit is authorized to
    seize or immobilize unauthorized or illegal chemicals and can
    coordinate with another Colombian government agency to revoke the
    licenses of chemical importers violating the law. *  Heroin
    Program: DEA and CNP established a heroin task force to focus on
    Colombian heroin trafficking organizations. The CNP on this task
    force were not vetted at the time of our visit. Although the task
    force primarily concentrates on heroin transportation
    organizations, it has also identified and targeted heroin
    laboratories, according to DEA. The Bogota Country Office reported
    the following as significant Enforcement Statistics and
    accomplishments for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Case Examples *
    Operation Papagayo was established, and CNP officers assigned to
    this operation identified 13 different drug trafficking
    organizations. *  Operation Selva Verde destroyed 189 cocaine
    laboratories. *  CNP vetted units carried out 10 major
    investigations with DEA domestic offices. One of the vetted units'
    investigations produced the first two "controlled deliveries"12 of
    cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the United States. This
    investigation resulted in 17 arrests in Cali, Colombia, as well as
    wiretaps in Miami and Newark. *  The vetted units had a total of
    17 investigations; 30 arrests that DEA considered significant; and
    seizures of 2,666 kilograms of cocaine, 1.5 kilograms of heroin,
    520 real estate properties, 17 vehicles, and $4.6 million in U.S.
    currency. *  The Aircraft Control Program resulted in 29 aircraft
    seized by CNP in calendar year 1997, with a value estimated at $57
    million. During calendar year 1998, 81 aircraft were grounded or
    seized, 10 of which were returned due to innocent third party
    ownership. In addition, 5 stolen aircraft were recovered in 1998.
*  The Chemical Control Program produced the first two arrests of
    chemical diverters in Colombia. In addition, the Colombian
    government revoked five chemical licenses during this period. In
    fiscal year 1997, 26.7 tons of chemicals were seized by the CNP
    chemical control unit; and in fiscal year 1998, the CNP unit
    seized 2,191 tons of solid chemicals and about 1.5 million gallons
    of liquid chemicals. 12 A controlled delivery is an investigative
    tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a shipment of
    illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual seizure.
    Page 138
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices *  The
    heroin task force destroyed 11 heroin laboratories and seized 237
    kilograms of heroin, 55 kilograms of morphine, and 85.5 kilograms
    of opium. *  Since its inception in October 1997, the Airport
    Passenger and Cargo Inspection Program had yielded 175 arrests and
    seizures of 911 kilograms of cocaine and 58 kilograms of heroin. *
    The Barranquilla Resident Office reported drug seizures of 16,133
    kilograms of cocaine, 18 kilograms of heroin, 22 kilograms of
    morphine, 17 kilograms of opium, and 17 metric tons of marijuana.
    This office also contributed to the seizure of 12,741 kilograms of
    cocaine, 2 kilograms of heroin, and 2 tons of marijuana being
    smuggled outside of Colombia. According to DEA, a major success in
    Colombia was the dismantlement of the Cali cartel, which DEA
    considered to be the most powerful criminal organization that law
    enforcement had ever faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel
    leaders have been captured by or surrendered to CNP, with the
    exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the
    time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through
    years of investigations by DEA, CNP, and other federal, state, and
    local law enforcement agencies led to the identification,
    indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel
    leaders on drug charges in Colombia. Page 139
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices La Paz,
    Bolivia, Country Office At the time of our visit in July 1998, the
    La Paz, Bolivia, Country Office was Geographic Region and
    DEA's second largest foreign office worldwide.  The Office covers
    the Organizational Structure    country of Bolivia, which is
    surrounded by the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
    and Peru.   The Office, which is headed by a Country Attach,
    included resident offices in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Trinidad,
    Bolivia, as shown on figure I.6. Page 140
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.6:  La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map Brazil Peru Trinidad
    Bolivia La Paz Cochabamba Santa Cruz Chile
    Paraguay Argentina Country office Resident office Source: DEA's La
    Paz, Bolivia, Country Office. The country office was staffed with
    114 personnel, including 43 special agents.  Some of these
    personnel were located at a Bolivian police camp in the Chapare
    region where coca is grown.  In addition, representatives from DOD
    were assigned to work with DEA in Bolivia. The U.S. Ambassador is
    responsible for the drug control efforts of all U.S. agencies in
    Bolivia. The U.S. Embassy gives a high priority to drug control
    activities, such as the State Department's crop eradication
    efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development's support
    for alternative Page 141
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    development activities enabling farmers to support themselves and
    their families without the need to cultivate coca, and DEA's drug
    enforcement programs and operations. In carrying out its
    responsibilities, DEA works with and assists Bolivian law
    enforcement authorities. However, DEA special agents in Bolivia do
    not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize drugs
    in that country. DEA reported that coca leaf cultivation continues
    in Bolivia. Bolivia is also Overview of Drug             a source
    country for cocaine, which is processed from coca leaves and
    Trafficking Situation and    smuggled into the United States and
    Europe.13 Threat Coca cultivation in Bolivia occurs primarily in
    two areas-the Chapare region in the Cochabamba Department and the
    Yungas region situated in the Altiplano of the La Paz Department.
    DEA estimated that 90 to 95 percent of the coca leaves produced in
    the Chapare region, Bolivia's major cultivation area, is illegally
    processed into cocaine products. Most of the coca leaf cultivated
    in the Yungas region is cultivated in accordance with Bolivian law
    for legal consumption. After Bolivian peasants harvest their coca
    fields, the leaves are dried and packaged in 100-pound bags. Low-
    echelon producers or the coca growers themselves process the dried
    leaves into cocaine base in clandestine laboratories, mostly in
    the Chapare region. The cocaine base is sold to buyers who act as
    agents for cocaine trafficking organizations and consolidate
    shipments for transport out of the Chapare. In the past, according
    to DEA, the cocaine base was primarily transported out of Bolivia,
    usually to Colombia, for further processing into cocaine HCL. In
    recent years, however, Bolivian trafficking organizations have
    begun producing cocaine HCL in clandestine laboratories as well as
    distributing Bolivian-produced cocaine. At the time of our review,
    DEA reported that traffickers were moving cocaine base out of the
    Chapare region, primarily to the Santa Cruz and El Beni regions of
    Bolivia, using a variety of land, river, and air transportation
    methods. Once the cocaine base reaches the Santa Cruz and El Beni
    regions, it is either processed locally into cocaine HCL or
    transported into Brazil or Colombia for processing. 13 Coca has
    deep cultural roots in Bolivia, where it has been cultivated for
    at least 2,000 years. Today, coca cultivation and consumption
    still have considerable cultural and economic importance, and even
    legal acceptance, in Bolivia. At the time of our review, it was
    estimated that 400,000 to 500,000 Bolivians chewed coca leaf to
    alleviate the effects of cold, hunger, fatigue, and altitude
    sickness. A type of tea is also brewed from coca. In general, the
    leaf is a focus for rituals and social occasions. Page 142
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    According to DEA, at the time of our review, several Bolivian
    family-based transportation/production networks dominated cocaine
    trafficking in the country. The networks were managing the
    majority of cocaine moved within Bolivia as well as the cocaine
    shipped out of the country. The trafficking networks were
    financing cocaine base purchases from Chapare- based suppliers,
    arranging for transportation from the Chapare, operating base
    purification and/or cocaine laboratories, and consolidating large
    shipments for international transport. A few of these networks
    still dealt with Colombian drug organizations; but Bolivians were
    also working with traffickers from other countries, such as
    Brazil, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, and Nigeria. During the
    1990s, the La Paz Country Office shifted from conducting
    Priorities, Programs, and      predominantly "jungle operations"
    in Operation Snowcap-which Initiatives
    identified and destroyed cocaine base laboratories and interdicted
    cocaine base shipments-to placing increased emphasis on
    identifying, targeting, and investigating cocaine trafficking
    organizations. Using funds appropriated for DEA's Andean Ridge
    Initiatives and vetted Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) of the
    Bolivian National Police (BNP), DEA reported that drug
    intelligence collection efforts in Bolivia have been enhanced; and
    the investigative capabilities of BNP's  Special Forces for the
    Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (Fuerzas Especiales Para la
    Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico, or FELCN) have been improved with more
    personnel, additional equipment, and better training. The La Paz
    Country office's programs and initiatives were designed to combat
    the Bolivian drug trafficking threat and support DEA's South
    America Regional Plan.14 The South America Regional Plan contains
    the following seven objectives: *  identify, investigate, and
    dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; *  support U.S.
    domestic investigations; *  enhance host nation counterdrug
    capabilities; *  develop a country intelligence program; *
    control essential chemicals; *  conduct financial investigations;
    and *  promote regional counterdrug cooperation. According to DEA,
    at the time of our review, the country office's priority was
    investigating Bolivia-based drug trafficking organizations with 14
    DEA's South America Regional Plan, which is updated periodically,
    provides strategic guidance for DEA's operations in South American
    countries, including Bolivia and Colombia. Page 143
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    connections to the United States. However, DEA officials said this
    has become more difficult. In the past, there was a link from
    Bolivia to the United States through Colombia. At the time of our
    review, however, fewer Colombian drug traffickers were involved
    with the Bolivian cocaine trade, and Bolivian traffickers were
    dealing with people from a number of different countries. The
    country office was focusing most of its operations in two areas:
    the Chapare region, where most of the cocaine base comes from, and
    the Santa Cruz area, where most of the cocaine HCL comes from. The
    country office, according to DEA, was working closely with FELCN
    to carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. FELCN
    exercises operational control over various Bolivian drug law
    enforcement units, such as the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (Unidad
    Movil de Policia Rural, or UMOPAR); Financial Investigative Unit
    (FIU); Grupo de Inteligencia y Operaciones Especial (GIOE),
    FELCN's intelligence arm; and Grupo Investigaciones de Substancias
    Quimicas (GISUQ), FELCN's Chemical Investigations Group. The
    police units are supported by the Bolivian Air Force's Red Devil
    Task Force, which provides aviation support, and the Bolivian
    Navy's Blue Devil Task Force, which patrols rivers. At the time of
    our review, FELCN/UMOPAR units were stationed throughout Bolivia
    and were based primarily in the Chapare region, Trinidad, and the
    Yungas region. Members of UMOPAR are considered specialists in
    paramilitary counterdrug operations, including jungle patrol and
    reconnaissance, air insertions, mobile roadblocks in rural areas,
    and river operations. DEA started Operation Gatekeeper primarily
    to focus UMOPAR resources on interdicting cocaine base leaving the
    Chapare. With specialized teams of police conducting mobile
    roadblocks on highways, Operation Gatekeeper provides a rapid
    response in areas of Bolivia where intelligence indicates the
    movement of large quantities of drugs or chemicals. In 1998,
    UMOPAR established new mobile enforcement teams (called Border
    Enforcement Teams), headquartered in La Paz, to conduct
    intelligence-driven drug interdiction operations, including
    roadblocks, along Bolivia's borders with Chile, Peru, Brazil, and
    Argentina. DEA refers to this program as Operation GRIRMO. At the
    time of our review, FELCN/GIOE had 3 SIUs with approximately 75
    vetted personnel. The SIUs were located in Cochabamba, La Paz, and
    Santa Cruz. They were collecting information through surveillance
    operations, with special emphasis on violators operating at the
    highest levels. The intelligence was being used to help
    investigate and dismantle Page 144
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices major
    drug trafficking organizations in support of both Bolivian and
    U.S. drug enforcement objectives. The La Paz, Bolivia, Country
    Attach told us that he believed the Bolivian SIUs are helping to
    create a DEA-like organization in Bolivia. He said the vetting
    process for members of these units is similar to DEA's hiring
    process, and the SIUs consist of police with integrity, training,
    expertise, equipment, and other tools needed to successfully
    conduct drug enforcement operations. He said DEA is building the
    infrastructure of FELCN and trying to do more intelligence-driven
    investigations of drug trafficking organizations. In addition, the
    following efforts were ongoing at the time of our review,
    according to DEA: *  The country office had established a Major
    Violators Task Force with FELCN officers. This program focused on
    arresting high-level traffickers involved in transporting cocaine
    and dismantling their organizations.  Task force operations were
    being carried out in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa Cruz. *
    Operation Argus had consistently been the most valuable
    intelligence resource in Bolivia, according to DEA. This FELCN
    intelligence operation was feeding actionable intelligence to
    FELCN/GIOE, which led to arrests and seizures in numerous cases.
    The program has been funded almost entirely by DOD and the State
    Department and was expanded to several locations in Bolivia. *
    Operation Camba is an enforcement and intelligence-gathering
    program that was targeting drug traffickers who used trains in
    Bolivia's Santa Cruz and Tarija Departments to transport cocaine
    and precursor chemicals to and from the Bolivian frontiers with
    Brazil and Argentina. According to DEA, Operation Camba enabled
    the country office and FELCN to gather extensive intelligence
    that, combined with enforcement operations, significantly
    increased seizures of cocaine and precursor chemicals being
    transported on Bolivian trains. *  FELCN/FIU is responsible for
    investigating money laundering and other links between finances
    and drug trafficking and for providing case support when financial
    assets are seized in drug investigations. According to DEA, the
    country office has been working with the FIU to refine a 1998
    Bolivian money laundering law to help make it fully functional. *
    According to DEA, the country office had a diversion investigator
    working with FELCN/GISUQ, which is responsible for investigating
    violations of Bolivia's laws against trafficking in chemicals
    essential to processing cocaine. GISUQ intercepts contraband
    chemicals entering Bolivia from Page 145
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices foreign
    countries, develops intelligence concerning precursor chemical
    diverters throughout Bolivia, has operated checkpoints to seize
    precursor chemicals in the Chapare, and investigates established
    chemical handlers in conjunction with the Bolivian National
    Directorate for the Control of Chemicals. *  Operation Mugshot is
    an airport intelligence program that was being conducted by the
    country office. In the program, names from passengers' passports
    and airport employee lists were being run through DEA's worldwide
    computer database containing information on known and suspected
    drug traffickers. *  Operation Civic Action Plan is a television,
    radio, and poster campaign that advertised rewards for information
    about drug trafficking. *  Operation Education was designed to
    develop schools for Bolivian law enforcement personnel to enhance
    their investigative capability through specialized training. *
    Through Operation Night Watch, the country office assisted in
    restructuring FELCN to make it a more effective and less
    bureaucratic organization. The La Paz Country Office provided us
    with the results of drug Enforcement Statistics and
    enforcement operations in Bolivia during fiscal years 1997 and
    1998. Case Examples In fiscal year 1997, the country office
    initiated 219 investigations. Of this total, 99 investigations
    involved cocaine HCL, 90 involved cocaine base, 26 involved
    cocaine-related chemicals, 3 involved marijuana, and 1 involved
    heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident Office initiated 94 of the
    investigations; the Cochabamba Resident Office initiated 93
    investigations; and the office in La Paz initiated 32
    investigations. The country office reported that BNP made 1,483
    arrests and seized 11,452 kilograms of cocaine HCL and base during
    fiscal year 1997 in association with DEA's activities in Bolivia.
    In fiscal year 1998, the country office initiated 487
    investigations. Of these, 483 investigations involved cocaine, 3
    involved marijuana, and 1 involved heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident
    Office initiated 262 of the 487 investigations, the Cochabamba
    Resident Office initiated 156 investigations, the Trinidad
    Resident Office initiated 12 investigations, and the office in La
    Paz initiated 57 investigations. BNP made 2,112 arrests and seized
    11,554 kilograms of cocaine base and HCL during fiscal year 1998
    in association with DEA's activities in Bolivia. An example of
    what DEA officials considered a successful investigation involved
    the Santa Cruz resident office. In May 1997, DEA and BNP's FELCN
    initiated an investigation into the cocaine air shipment
    activities of Page 146                                    GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
    DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices a Bolivian
    trafficking organization. Intelligence revealed that the
    organization was shipping multihundred-kilogram loads of cocaine
    to a Brazilian organization located in Campo Grande, Brazil,
    several times a month. In addition, through intelligence, DEA and
    FELCN were able to identify the majority of the members of the
    organization and their operating areas. In October 1997,
    information surfaced about a scheduled air shipment of cocaine by
    the Bolivian organization. On the basis of this information, in
    November 1997 a joint operation resulted in the arrest of the
    Bolivian organization's head and 17 members of his organization.
    In addition, 354.4 kilograms of cocaine base and $1.4 million in
    trafficker- owned assets were seized. In another example provided
    by DEA officials, 602 kilograms of cocaine base were seized in
    July 1997 at a checkpoint in the Yungas region. This drug seizure,
    along with subsequent arrests and document seizures, led to the
    discovery of a large, multifaceted trafficking organization.
    Document analysis and related research of personal telephone
    directories, financial documents, business papers, and personal
    papers seized from members of the organization revealed a network
    of drug and illicit chemical traffickers numbering over 100
    persons. Investigative developments revealed that the organization
    was responsible for the full range of cocaine trafficking,
    including obtaining cocaine-essential chemicals, operating cocaine
    base laboratories, transporting cocaine base out of the Chapare
    region for further processing into HCL, and shipping the drugs out
    of Bolivia. Although the majority of the organization members
    identified were Bolivian nationals, other possible targets were
    located in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
    United States. Arrests tied to this cocaine trafficking
    organization numbered over 55, and the value of seized assets
    exceeded $1 million. Page 147
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Mexico
    City, Mexico, Country Office DEA's Mexico City Country Office
    covers all of Mexico, which is Geographic Region and
    approximately 761,600 square miles in size, or about three times
    larger Organizational Structure                     than Texas.
    Mexico has a 2,000-mile border with the United States, 5,804 miles
    of coastline, and is situated between the United States and the
    South American countries that supply much of the illegal drugs
    smuggled into the United States. At the time of our visit in
    September 1998, the Mexico City Country Office, which was headed
    by a Country Attach, included seven resident offices spread
    throughout Mexico, as shown in figure I.7.15 Figure I.7:  Mexico
    City, Mexico, Country           Tijuana Office Map Ciudad Juarez
    Hermosillo Gulf of Mexico
    Mexico Monterrey Mazatln Guadalajara
    Merida Pacific Ocean
    Mexico City Country office Resident office Source: DEA's Mexico
    City, Mexico, Country Office. 15 The country office had resident
    offices in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Ciudad Juarez, Mazatl n,
    Merida, Monterrey, and Tijuana. Page 148
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices There
    were 88 DEA staff authorized, 45 of which were special agent
    positions. The Government of Mexico limits the number of special
    agents DEA can have in Mexico, and it permitted DEA to increase
    the number of special agents in the country from 39 to 45 in July
    1997. Also, representatives from the FBI and DOD were assigned to
    the country office. DEA is the principal U.S. agency for drug
    investigation and drug intelligence coordination in Mexico. DEA
    works with Mexican law enforcement authorities to carry out drug
    enforcement and intelligence operations. DEA agents in Mexico do
    not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize drugs
    in that country.16 According to the State Department, no country
    poses a more immediate Overview of Drug             drug threat to
    the United States than Mexico. Mexico is the principal Trafficking
    Situation and    transit country for cocaine entering the United
    States, with an estimate of Threat                       almost 60
    percent of the U.S. cocaine supply smuggled across the U.S.-
    Mexico border in 1998, typically coming from Colombia through
    Mexico. Mexico is also a major source country for heroin,
    marijuana, and methamphetamine. Since the late 1980s, according to
    DEA, the Mexican/Central American corridor has been the primary
    smuggling route for cocaine destined for the United States from
    source countries in South America. Cocaine is shipped to Mexico in
    various ways (e.g., in fishing vessels, in containerized cargo on
    commercial ships, and on small planes and trucks). Once in Mexico,
    most of the cocaine is smuggled into the United States by vehicle.
    In recent years, Mexican drug trafficking organizations have
    expanded their cocaine operations. According to DEA, Mexican
    trafficking groups were once solely transporters for Colombian
    cocaine traffickers. In the early 1990s, however, major Mexican
    organizations began receiving payment in cocaine for their
    services. These organizations ultimately emerged as wholesale
    distributors of cocaine within the United States, significantly
    increasing their profit margin. Mexico has been a significant
    source of heroin used in the United States for many years,
    according to DEA. Analysis of drug seizures indicates that 14
    percent of the heroin available in the United Sates is produced in
    Mexico. Opium poppy cultivation takes place in the central and 16
    In June 1998, we reported on the status of counternarcotics
    activities in Mexico: Drug Control: U.S.- Mexican Counternarcotics
    Efforts Face Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30,
    1998). We later updated that report in congressional testimony:
    Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-98, March 4, 1999). Page 149
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    southwestern parts of the country. Clandestine laboratories are
    used to produce heroin from opium with essential chemicals that
    are widely available in Mexico. DEA reported that Mexico has also
    been increasingly used as a transit country for heroin from other
    source countries. According to DEA, Mexico is the primary foreign
    supplier of marijuana to the United States, and Mexican
    organizations have been involved with marijuana trafficking for
    decades. Marijuana is cultivated in Mexico, with the heaviest
    concentration in the western states. In recent years, growers have
    increased their efficiency and are cultivating higher grade
    marijuana, which commands a higher price in the United States.
    Mexican drug trafficking organizations, according to DEA, have
    expanded their methamphetamine operations, using their well-
    established cocaine, heroin, and marijuana distribution networks
    to dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and
    distribution in recent years. At the time of our review, DEA
    estimated that the majority of the methamphetamine available in
    the United States was either produced in Mexico and transported to
    the United States or manufactured in the United States by Mexican
    drug traffickers. DEA reported that Mexican drug trafficking
    organizations are becoming stronger. According to DEA, Mexican
    organizations have billions of dollars in assets and have at their
    disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications
    equipment, and weapons that rival the capabilities of some
    legitimate governments. One such Mexican organization generated
    tens of millions of dollars in profits per week. The State
    Department reported that Mexico has become a major money
    laundering center. Drug trafficking organizations launder the
    proceeds of illegal drug sales in legitimate businesses in both
    Mexico and the United States. They favor transportation and other
    industries that can be used to facilitate drug, cash, and arms
    smuggling and other types of illegal activities. DEA reported that
    Mexican traffickers are also a growing threat to citizens within
    Mexico and the United States because of their willingness to
    murder and intimidate witnesses and public officials. According to
    the Justice Department, the number of threats to U.S. law
    enforcement officials in Mexico has also increased. Page 150
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
    Mexico City Country Office maintains liaison with Mexican law
    Priorities, Programs, and      enforcement and intelligence
    organizations, and it promotes interagency Initiatives
    cooperation and coordination in the areas of drug law enforcement
    activities and intelligence collection and dissemination. The
    country office's mission is to (1) coordinate with Mexican law
    enforcement authorities on investigations directed against major
    drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, (2) collaborate in
    developing a connection to the United States for the
    investigations initiated in Mexico, and (3) engage in cooperative
    "institution building" to improve the capabilities and
    effectiveness of Mexican drug law enforcement authorities. The
    office's work plan cited the following priorities for fiscal year
    1998: *  develop focused intelligence-gathering activities, *
    increase the impact of counterdrug efforts in Central America on
    drug trafficking in the United States, *  enhance host nation
    counterdrug capabilities, and *  initiate regional counterdrug
    cooperation. According to DEA's Country Attach, the country office
    focuses on investigating major drug trafficking organizations in
    Mexico involved in supplying illegal drugs to the United States.
    He said that at the time of our visit, the Mexico City Country
    Office had a list of 10 major targets, and virtually all of the
    office's efforts were devoted to investigations of these targets.
    In these investigations, the country office was attempting to
    attack the "command and control" communications of targeted
    organizations and was working closely with DEA's Special
    Operations Division at headquarters. Another priority of the
    Mexico City Country Office has been the attempt to locate a
    fugitive accused of participating in the June 1994 murder of a DEA
    special agent in Arizona. According to DEA, the country office has
    dedicated all available staff and equipment, in coordination with
    and in support of the Mexican government, to apprehend this
    fugitive. The Country Attach told us that the key change to DEA's
    operations in Mexico in the 1990s was the establishment of Mexican
    vetted units for drug law enforcement. He said this was a dramatic
    departure from the way the country office previously operated and
    coordinated with Mexican law enforcement authorities. At the time
    of our review, DEA's Mexico office was essentially working only
    with the vetted units, which are part of the Mexican Special
    Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) and include personnel
    assigned to the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) and the Page 151
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Border
    Task Forces (BTF). FEADS reports to Mexico's Office of the
    Attorney General (PGR). OCU, located in Mexico City, is the
    principal agency responsible for enforcing a Mexican organized
    crime law passed in November 1996 covering drug trafficking, money
    laundering, conspiracy, electronic surveillance, and organized
    crime corruption. The narcotics section of OCU has vetted
    personnel whose mission is to investigate high-level drug
    trafficking groups, as well as drug-related money laundering
    groups, throughout Mexico. OCU is also the umbrella agency for the
    Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), which has vetted personnel.
    The SIU collects and analyzes intelligence from various sources,
    develops investigations against major organizations, and
    disseminates actionable information to other law enforcement
    units. At the time of our review, the BTFs were investigating what
    DEA considered the most significant drug trafficking organizations
    along the U.S.-Mexico border as well as a major organization in
    Central Mexico considered key to the booming U.S. methamphetamine
    trade.17 The primary work of the BTFs is intelligence; i.e., they
    gather, analyze, integrate, and interpret information from various
    sources. The FEADS officers assigned to the BTFs are vetted; and,
    at the time of our work, they were assigned to BTF locations in
    Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, and Guadalajara and their
    respective suboffices in several other locations in Mexico. Mexico
    passed a law in May 1996, and expanded it in December 1997,
    establishing trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals as a
    criminal offense. These chemicals can be used in the production of
    heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs of abuse. The implementation
    of the law and development of an administrative infrastructure for
    enforcing it were under way at the time of our visit. As part of
    the U.S. assistance and training to Mexico for carrying out the
    law, the country office was participating in a Bilateral Chemical
    Control Working Group and encouraging the establishment of Mexican
    chemical control programs. The country office was also working
    with specialized chemical control units in FEADS and CENDRO, a
    Mexican intelligence unit, to exchange chemical import/export
    information and other intelligence. In addition, the BTF that 17
    The Guadalajara BTF was instrumental in apprehending two brothers
    who headed this organization in June 1998. As of May 1999, the
    brothers were incarcerated in Mexico awaiting extradition to the
    United States. Page 152
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    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA
    works with in Guadalajara was considered to be the first Mexican
    chemical task force and had targeted the Amezcua-Contreras
    organization, which DEA reported as the most powerful and dominant
    methamphetamine trafficking organization in Mexico. The country
    office also participates in the U.S. Embassy's Money Laundering
    Task Force. Membership includes the FBI, Customs, IRS, and the
    Economic, Political, and Narcotics Affairs sections of the
    embassy. The task force oversees joint financial investigations,
    provides training to Mexican counterparts, and coordinates an
    exchange of information with Mexico. In addition, the task force
    encouraged the Mexican government to develop major investigations
    to test Mexico's May 1996 law making money laundering a criminal
    offense. Also located at the country office is an Information
    Analysis Center (IAC) that develops tactical intelligence for
    interdicting drugs and chemicals being smuggled. According to DEA,
    the IAC interacts daily with CENDRO and an antismuggling unit of
    the Mexican military. The IAC is staffed with DEA intelligence
    analysts, DOD analysts and computer support personnel, a Customs
    air officer, and assigned liaison personnel from an intelligence
    agency. At the time of our review, DEA special agents in the
    Mexico City Country Office were spending the majority of their
    investigative work hours on programs and initiatives involving
    cocaine.  During fiscal year 1997, cocaine operations accounted
    for 71.4 percent of the special agents' reported investigative
    work hours. In fiscal year 1998, the special agents reported
    spending 62.8 percent of their investigative work hours on
    operations involving cocaine. The Mexico City Country Office
    provided us with a statistical summary of Enforcement Statistics
    and    the results of its operations during fiscal years 1997 and
    1998. Case Examples In fiscal year 1997, the country office
    initiated 90 investigations. The office's operations resulted in
    57 arrests, 26 of which were related to cocaine and 23 of which
    were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures of
    approximately 4,025 kilograms of cocaine, 3 kilograms of heroin,
    24,290 kilograms of marijuana, and 264,314 dosage units of
    dangerous drugs such as amphetamines. In fiscal year 1998, the
    country office initiated 77 investigations, 44 of which were
    related to cocaine and 23 of which were related to marijuana. The
    office's operations resulted in five arrests, of which three were
    related Page 153                                    GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices to cocaine and two
    were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures of 573
    kilograms of cocaine, 26 kilograms of heroin, 860 kilograms of
    marijuana, and 64,000 dosage units of dangerous drugs. An example
    of what DEA considered a successful major investigation involved
    the Mexican drug trafficking organization known as the Gulf
    cartel. This organization transported cocaine, marijuana, and
    heroin into the United States from Mexico and was closely aligned
    with the Colombian Cali cartel. The organization was headquartered
    in both Matamoros and Monterrey, Mexico, and had significant
    influence in the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Quintana
    Roo, and Veracruz. DEA, in conjunction with the FBI and the
    Customs Service, initiated an investigation that was expanded to
    include task forces from U.S. federal, state, and local agencies
    and international agencies. The Mexican Attorney General's Office
    took the lead in the investigation, arrested several key
    organization members, and provided valuable information from
    cooperating defendants and intelligence sources. DEA's Monterrey
    resident office cultivated and used informants, resulting in the
    arrest of other organization members and, eventually, the head of
    the organization. The individuals were indicted on 30 counts of
    drug and money laundering violations. After the arrest of the Gulf
    cartel's leader, another individual took control of the
    organization. DEA's Monterrey office took the lead in an
    investigation that involved DEA domestic offices, the FBI, U.S.
    Attorneys' Offices, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. The
    new organization head was arrested and charged with numerous drug
    and money laundering violations. At the time of our review, he was
    incarcerated in a Mexican prison. Despite the incarceration of the
    second leader, the Gulf cartel continued to bring ton quantities
    of cocaine into the United States, according to DEA. Thus, at the
    time of our review, investigations of the remaining organization
    members were being conducted and coordinated by U.S. and Mexican
    law enforcement agencies, including DEA's Monterrey office. Page
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    Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Caribbean Division
    Established in October 1995, the Caribbean Division is unique in
    that it has Geographic Region and       both foreign and domestic
    responsibilities. The Division's area of Organizational Structure
    responsibility is the entire Eastern Caribbean Corridor, including
    the commonwealth of Puerto Rico;18 the U.S. Virgin Islands; and
    the countries of Barbados, the Netherlands Antilles (Curacao), and
    Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Hispaniola (the Dominican Republic
    and Haiti) in the Central Caribbean and Jamaica in the Western
    Caribbean. At the time of our visit in September 1998, the
    division's field office, which was headed by a SAC and two ASACs,
    was located in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It also had six foreign
    county offices and three domestic resident offices, as shown in
    figure I.8. 18 Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth, in
    union with the United States. Page 155
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
    I.8:  DEA Caribbean Division Map Cuba Haiti Dominican
    San Juan Republic
    St. Thomas Jamaica
    Puerto                                                      U.S.
    Virgin Port-Au-Prince               Santo Domingo
    Rico                                              Islands Kingston
    Ponce                    St. Croix Barbados Bridgetown Division
    office
    Curacao (Netherlands Antilles) Country office Resident office Port
    of                 Trinidad Spain                       and
    Colombia
    Venezuela
    Tobago Source: DEA's Caribbean Division. As of March 1998, the
    division's 161 staff (140 in domestic offices, 21 in foreign
    offices) included 105 special agents (87 domestic and 18 foreign),
    12 domestic intelligence staff, 13 diversion staff, and 31 other
    support staff.19 According to DEA, in recent years the Caribbean
    Corridor has reemerged Overview of Drug
    as a major trafficking route between Colombia and the continental
    United Trafficking Situation and                    States. In
    1995, the El Paso Intelligence Center estimated that Threat
    approximately 100 drug trafficking organizations were working in
    the Caribbean area. Caribbean drug organizations are generally
    multinational, but dominated primarily by Colombians, who were the
    command and control managers, and Dominican nationals, who
    operated the 19 DEA's Fiscal Year 1998 appropriation included a
    Caribbean initiative, which increased the number of staff in the
    division (see ch. 4). Page 156
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    transportation networks. The traffickers transport cocaine,
    heroin, and marijuana through the Caribbean corridor using private
    planes and yachts; commercial airlines; cargo air;  "motherships";
    fishing vessels; small, motorized, high-performance "go-fast"
    boats; cruise ships; and cargo container vessels. Once in Puerto
    Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the southernmost entry points of
    the United States, drugs are more easily smuggled into the
    continental United States, because no additional Customs
    inspections are required. Cocaine    According to DEA, cocaine, in
    both powder and crack forms, continues to be the drug of choice of
    both traffickers and users in the region. The Caribbean basin is a
    major transshipment point for cocaine destined for the continental
    United States and Europe.  The primary routes are the Western
    Caribbean (Jamaica-Bahamas), the Central Caribbean (Hispaniola),
    and the Eastern Caribbean (Lesser Antilles-Puerto Rico). The El
    Paso Intelligence Center has estimated that 140 tons of cocaine
    flow through the Eastern Caribbean each year and, according to the
    Interagency Flow Assessment Committee, approximately one-third of
    the cocaine arriving in the continental United States comes
    through Puerto Rico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. DEA also
    reported the emergence of new local markets in Puerto Rico and the
    Caribbean due to Colombian traffickers paying for services using
    drugs, not currency. Cocaine traffickers use a variety of
    smuggling methods-via air, land, and sea, according to DEA. For
    example, cocaine destined for the United States may be dropped
    from private planes to waiting maritime vessels or smuggled in
    "go-fast" boats into the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the
    U.S. Virgin Islands. From Puerto Rico cocaine may be transported
    into the continental United States in airfreight cargo. Couriers
    on commercial airlines from Colombia and Panama are also used to
    move cocaine through the Dominican Republic, from Haiti to Miami,
    and from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland. DEA attributed the
    dramatic rise in drug-related violence in Puerto Rico to the
    increased influx of cocaine into the region. Competition for
    control of the domestic Puerto Rican cocaine market, which makes
    up an estimated 10 to 20 percent of the total cocaine smuggled
    onto the island, accounted for some of the drug-related violence,
    according to DEA. Citing statistics from the Puerto Rico Police
    Department (PRPD), DEA officials reported that between 1995 and
    1998, the percentage of homicides in Puerto Rico that were drug-
    related had risen from 63 to 81 percent. Page 157
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA
    sources indicated that Puerto Rico has become an arrival area and
    a Heroin                       major transshipment point for high-
    purity Colombian heroin entering the United States. The Eastern
    Caribbean island nations are used as transshipment points for
    heroin, which is then transshipped through Puerto Rico to the
    continental United States. Heroin is also transshipped through
    Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic, with Puerto Rico as a
    second transshipment point, and on to the United States. According
    to DEA, heroin from Colombia may be transported through Central
    America into Haiti via couriers on commercial airlines. Moreover,
    the availability of heroin in Puerto Rico itself has also
    increased. Marijuana                    According to DEA,
    marijuana continues to be cultivated throughout the Eastern
    Caribbean islands (particularly on St. Vincent and the
    Grenadines), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Puerto Rico.
    Jamaica is one of the major marijuana producers in the world.
    Marijuana grown in other parts of the Eastern Caribbean is
    transshipped through Puerto Rico to external markets. In Puerto
    Rico, marijuana is not only cultivated both indoors and outdoors
    in its central mountains, but also smuggled onto the island from
    the continental United States. Containerized cargo ships have been
    the preferred concealment and transportation method for large-
    scale, well-established marijuana traffickers. Express mail is
    another method used to smuggle marijuana into Puerto Rico. At the
    time of our review, both the domestic and foreign priority of the
    Priorities, Programs, and    Caribbean Division was to stem the
    flow of drugs through the region into Initiatives
    the United States. In 1998, the division's overall objective was
    to reduce the capabilities of major drug trafficking organizations
    by immobilizing their command and control centers and distribution
    networks through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
    incarceration of both leaders and members. Puerto Rico was
    considered to be the "linchpin" of DEA's strategy in the Caribbean
    because it is the outermost entry-point to the continental United
    States. As noted above, the Caribbean Division included both
    domestic and foreign offices.  The Domestic Subdivision included
    eight enforcement groups and the diversion program.  The Foreign
    Subdivision included six Country Offices and the Foreign
    Operations Group. The division's response to the international and
    transit character of the drug threat in the region was underscored
    by its work-hour statistics. During fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
    more than 50 percent of its investigative work hours, categorized
    by geographic scope of the case, were expended on international
    cases, which involve both foreign and U.S. domestic Page 158
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
    components. Moreover, during those same fiscal years, 52.6 percent
    and 39.9 percent, respectively, of the division's investigative
    work hours, categorized by case target, were expended on
    transportation-related cases. In order to stem the flow of drugs
    into the region, the division's investigative priorities for
    fiscal year 1998 included: (1) cocaine-related investigations
    involving violent organizations, (2) the initiation of major
    heroin investigations, and (3) marijuana-related investigations.
    The division's investigative work-hour statistics for fiscal year
    1998, categorized by the drug involved indicated that 71 percent
    of investigative work hours were expended on cocaine-related
    cases; 19 percent on heroin- related cases (about double the
    previous year); and 10 percent on other drugs, including
    marijuana. The increased investigative work hours expended on
    heroin investigations corresponded to the changing drug threat-the
    increased availability and use of heroin within, and transshipment
    through, the region. According to DEA officials, although the
    Caribbean Division used a variety of investigative methods to
    accomplish its priorities, during the late 1990s the division
    pursued a strategy that included the use of wire intercepts. For
    example, in a 1995 DEA-led OCDETF case (See ch. 2 for discussion
    of OCDETF), "Operation Omega," DEA used undercover buys, on-site
    surveillance, liaison with local law enforcement, confidential
    source information, and cooperating defendant testimony to
    investigate the Ponce-based Angela Ayala-Martinez cocaine-
    trafficking organization. However, the 1996 DEA-led OCDETF
    investigation, "Operation Santa Isabel," used Title III
    (electronic surveillance) telephonic intercept orders extensively
    in Puerto Rico. As in DEA generally (see ch. 2) and as shown in
    table I.2, the division increased its use of wire intercepts from
    1995 through 1998. Table I.2: Caribbean Field Division's Use
    Fiscal year
    Wire intercepts of Wire Intercepts                           1995
    0 1996
    6 1997
    12 1998
    30 Source: DEA. During 1998, the division worked domestically with
    various task forces that included other federal and/or
    commonwealth and local agencies. In Page 159
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Puerto
    Rico, DEA carried out investigations with PRPD,20 Hacienda
    (Treasury Department), and the Special Investigations Bureau21 of
    the Attorney General's Office. One DEA-led enforcement group,
    which included FBI agents and officers from PRPD, worked at the
    airport. A task force group, comprising DEA agents and members of
    PRPD, targeted lower level individuals in drug organizations with
    the objective of working toward the upper echelons of the
    organization. In addition, in San Juan and Ponce, DEA led task
    forces, supported by HIDTA funds from ONDCP (see ch. 2 for
    discussion of HIDTA). The San Juan task force, which included DEA
    and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service among
    other federal agencies as well as officers from the Puerto Rico
    Police Department, focused on major drug organizations in San Juan
    and along the northern coast of Puerto Rico. The Ponce task force,
    which included agents from DEA, FBI, IRS, and the Customs Service,
    among others; a Coast Guard investigator; an Assistant U.S.
    Attorney on site; local officials from PRPD and Hacienda; and a
    special local prosecutor, focused on major drug organizations in
    the Ponce area. Investigative work-hour statistics for the
    division, when analyzed according to source of cases, highlight
    the significance of its cooperative efforts. State and local task
    force efforts accounted for 36.4 percent and 28.8 percent of the
    division's investigative work hours expended in fiscal years 1997
    and 1998, respectively. Joint state and local cases accounted for
    another 5.5 and 12.9 percent of its investigative work hours
    expended during those years, respectively. In addition,
    investigative work hours dedicated to OCDETF cases by the division
    almost doubled, from 7.9 to 15.1 percent, between fiscal years
    1997 and 1998. Internationally, the division's six country offices
    in the islands worked with their foreign counterparts in those
    countries to respond to the drug threat in the region. Cooperative
    law enforcement efforts varied from country to country. For
    example, in Haiti, DEA was engaged in vetting (see ch. 2 for
    discussion of vetting) local law enforcement personnel. The
    division was involved in a number of special operations. For
    example, Operation Buccaneer, an ongoing campaign to eradicate
    marijuana, was 20 In Puerto Rico, the police are primarily
    commonwealth police, and law enforcement matters are handled
    through them. 21 According to its director, the Special
    Investigations Bureau was formed 20 years ago and focuses on
    organized crime and public corruption in Puerto Rico. At the time
    of our review, it had 250 agents, of whom 40 were assigned to
    federal task forces. The bureau has a drug section, which develops
    cases. Some of these cases are worked with DEA. Page 160
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices carried
    out by the Jamaicans and supported by DEA, DOD, and the State
    Department. In Operation Summer Storm, the division and DEA's
    Belize Country Office worked with the 26 Caribbean nations,
    Belize, Suriname, and Guyana to conduct a combined, coordinated
    air, land, and maritime counternarcotics operation within each
    nation's territorial borders to interdict, disrupt, and dismantle
    the flow of drugs. In the Dominican Republic, the DEA country
    office provided wire intercept assistance. During fiscal years
    1997 and 1998, joint federal foreign efforts accounted for 35.3
    percent and 24.2 percent, respectively, of investigative work
    hours categorized by source of cases. The Caribbean Division
    provided enforcement statistics for fiscal years Enforcement
    Statistics and               1997 and 1998. These data indicated
    the division's involvement in 654 Case Examples
    arrests in 1997 and 1,147 arrests in 1998. DEA also provided
    arrest data reported by type of case-international, national, and
    foreign. Domestic arrests were categorized as international or
    national and included arrests related to OCDETF cases. Table I.3
    below shows the distribution of the division's arrests by type of
    case. Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean Division, by
    Case Type, for
    Number of arrests Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998
    Type of cases Fiscal year              International a
    National a            Foreigna                    Total 1997
    403                  182                    69
    654 1998                                  483                  556
    108                   1147 aAn international case includes targets
    involved in U.S. domestic and foreign criminal activities; a
    foreign case includes targets operating principally outside the
    jurisdiction of the United States. Source: DEA. The division
    reported seizures of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in both
    domestic and foreign cases. For fiscal year 1997, the division
    reported total seizures of 7,780.2 kilograms of cocaine, 25.3
    kilograms of heroin, and 18,835.8 kilograms of marijuana. For
    fiscal year 1998, the division reported cocaine seizures of
    5,442.2 kilograms, heroin seizures of 40.2 kilograms, and
    marijuana seizures of 5,910.8 kilograms. DEA also provided
    information on the results of specific cases mentioned above.
    Operation Omega, which targeted the Ponce-based Angela Ayala-
    Martinez cocaine-trafficking organization, resulted in 77 arrests
    and the seizure of more than $1 million in drug-related assets.
    Indictments against another 20 defendants were expected in late
    1998. In Operation Santa Isabel, the Ponce Resident Office used
    information gathered through traditional investigative techniques
    to apply for Title III wiretap orders for 12 telephones associated
    with the Rivera-Rosa cocaine importation and Page 161
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
    Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices cocaine
    and heroin distribution organization. These intercepts produced
    more than 60 calls related to drug trafficking and resulted in a
    seizure of 1,300 kilograms of cocaine in November 1996. With
    information on Rivera- Rosa's activities in the Dominican Republic
    gathered from these intercepts, DEA's Santo Domingo Country Office
    worked with Dominican officials to arrest 25 members of the
    organization, including Rivera-Rosa, and to seize cocaine, heroin,
    marijuana, and drug-related assets. As of August 1998, DEA
    reported 81 arrests and the complete dismantling of this drug
    organization. Page 162                                    GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the
    Drug Enforcement Administration Note: GAO comments supplementing
    those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. See
    comment 1. Now on pp. 6. Page 163    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
    in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug Enforcement
    Administration See comment 2. See comment 3. Now on p. 7. See
    comment 4. Page 164                                GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug
    Enforcement Administration We did not reproduce the enclosure.
    Page 165                                GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug
    Enforcement Administration The following are GAO's comments on the
    Drug Enforcement Administration's letter of  June 23, 1999. 1.  We
    inserted the word "measurable" to cover any measurable level of
    GAO Comments    performance, whether numerical or percentage,
    against which actual achievement can be compared. 2.  We added the
    phrase "against the base year list" and a statement to indicate
    that neither the domestic nor the international target lists of
    drug trafficking organizations called for by the National Strategy
    have yet to be developed. 3.  We did not add DEA's suggested
    statement.  However, in our evaluation of DEA's comment at the end
    of chapter 3, we noted DEA's inference that it cannot finalize
    performance targets and measures until a designated targeted list
    of drug trafficking organizations, as called for in the National
    Strategy, is completed. 4.  We revised the statement that little
    can be said about DEA's effectiveness without performance targets
    to clarify our intent that it is difficult to quantitatively
    assess DEA's overall effectiveness without such targets. Page 166
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix III GAO
    Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Norman J. Rabkin, (202) 512-
    8777 GAO Contacts       Daniel C. Harris, (202) 512-8777 In
    addition to those named above, Ronald G. Viereck, Samuel
    A.Caldrone, Acknowledgments    Lemuel N. Jackson, Barbara A.
    Stolz, Michael H. Little, Barry J. Seltser, Ann H. Finley,
    Katherine M. Raheb, and Donna M. Leiss made major contributions to
    this report. Page 167                              GAO/GGD-99-108
    DEA Operations in the 1990s Glossary This glossary contains
    definitions of performance measurement terms Performance
    used in this report.  Because limited standard definitions exist,
    we used Measurement Terms        definitions from a variety of
    sources, including OMB's circular A-11, DOJ's guidance to
    components on the preparation of fiscal year 2000 budget estimates
    and related annual performance plans, and ONDCP's 1998 performance
    measure of effectiveness plan.  Essentially, OMB and DOJ
    definitions relate to measuring agency performance as provided for
    in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results
    Act). ONDCP definitions relate to assessing the performance of the
    National Drug Control Strategy (the National Strategy). A
    performance goal, as defined by OMB for purposes of the Results
    Act, Performance Goal         means a target level of performance
    expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which
    actual achievement can be compared.  As used in this report, the
    terms performance goal and performance target (defined below) are
    largely interchangeable.  DEA uses the term performance goal, and
    ONDCP uses performance target. A performance indicator, as defined
    by OMB for purposes of the Results Performance Indicator    Act,
    means a particular value or characteristic used to measure output
    or outcome (defined below).  Performance indicators are associated
    with performance goals in annual performance plans.  As defined by
    DOJ, performance indicators are signs that point to success or
    failure in performance and answer the question, "How will we know
    when we have been successful?"  They refer to what specifically is
    to be measured.  As used in this report, the terms performance
    indicator and performance measure (defined below) are largely
    interchangeable.  DEA uses the term performance indicator, and
    ONDCP uses performance measure. A performance measure, as defined
    by ONDCP for purposes of the Performance Measure      National
    Strategy, means data and variables and events used to track
    progress toward performance targets.  Measures show how progress
    toward performance targets will be tracked.  As used in this
    report, the terms performance measure and performance indicator
    are largely interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance
    measure, and DEA uses performance indicator. A performance target,
    as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National Performance
    Target       Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved.
    It is a measurable level of performance against which actual
    achievement can be compared. As used in this report, the terms
    performance target and performance goal are largely
    interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance target, and DEA
    uses performance goal. Page 168
    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Glossary Outcomes, as
    defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on the Results Act,
    Outcomes             means an event, occurrence, or condition that
    indicates progress toward achievement of the mission of the
    program.  Outcomes can be measured in terms of the extent to which
    they are achieved, or they can reflect the quality of service
    delivery or customer satisfaction.  Intermediate outcomes are
    expected to lead to the desired ends but are not in themselves
    ends.   In many programs, a progression or sequence of outcomes
    usually occurs. End outcomes are the desired end or ultimate
    results that the agency hopes to achieve through its program
    activities. These results are directly related to the agency's
    mission. Outputs, as defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on
    the Results Act, Outputs              means the products and
    services produced by a program or process and delivered to
    customers, whether internal or external.  Outputs result from
    internal activity or effort.  Outputs are important for measuring
    internal work performance, but they do not in themselves indicate
    the extent to which progress has occurred toward the program's
    mission or what impact a program has had on a particular goal or
    objective. A reporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of
    the National Reporting Agency     Strategy, means the agency
    designated to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving established
    performance targets.  The reporting agency is not necessarily the
    only agency responsible for achieving performance targets. A
    supporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for the purposes of the
    Supporting Agency    National Strategy, means the agency that is
    designated to assist the reporting agency with data collection and
    assessment or that has programs that contribute to achieving the
    performance target. Page 169                              GAO/GGD-
    99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 170    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
    Operations in the 1990s Page 171    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
    in the 1990s Page 172    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the
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