    Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (Chapter
    Report, 07/21/1999, GAO/GGD-99-108).

    High demand for illegal drugs in the United States has persisted
    throughout the 1990s, as has the flow of illegal drugs into this
    country. The cost of illegal drug use in this country has been pegged at
    about $110 billion annually, including lost jobs and productivity,
    health problems, and economic hardships to families. Also, many violent
    crimes are drug related. Funding for federal drug control efforts has
    risen by nearly 50 percent during the 1990s, reaching about $18 billion
    in fiscal year 1999. Funding for the Drug Enforcement Administration
    (DEA) nearly doubled, from $806 million in 1990 to about $1.5 billion in
    1999. DEA staff grew from 6,000 in 1990 to 8,400 in 1998. During the
    1990s, DEA strengthened many of its operations. The agency began to work
    more closely with state and local law enforcement and help combat
    drug-related violent crime in local communities. DEA intercepted the
    communications of drug trafficking groups at home and abroad in order to
    target their leaders and dismantle their operations. DEA began to
    participate in two interagency programs to investigate major drug
    trafficking groups in Latin America and Asia. DEA also changed its
    foreign operations by screening and training special foreign policy
    units to combat drug trafficking in key foreign countries. DEA has major
    responsibilities under the Office of National Drug Control Policy's
    national drug control strategy for reducing the drug supply. However,
    DEA has yet to develop measurable performance targets for its programs
    and initiatives that are consistent with those adopted for the national
    strategy. Consequently, it is difficult to assess how successful DEA's
    programs have been in reducing the supply of illegal drugs into the
    United States. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress;
    see: Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s, by
    Norman J. Rabkin, Director of Administration of Justice Issues, before
    the Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on the Judiciary.
    GAO/T-GGD-99-149, July 29 (13 pages).

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  GGD-99-108
         TITLE:  Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the 1990s
          DATE:  07/21/1999
       SUBJECT:  Performance measures
    	     Drug trafficking
    	     International relations
    	     Narcotics
    	     Strategic planning
    	     National policies
    	     Law enforcement
    	     Federal/state relations
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Organized crime
    IDENTIFIER:  DOJ Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program
    	     DEA Mobile Enforcement Team Program
    	     National Drug Control Policy
    	     DEA State and Local Task Force Program
    	     DEA Kingpin Strategy
    	     National Strategy Performance Measurement System
    	     DEA Vetted Unit Program
    	     DEA Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program
    	     ONDCP High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program
    	     Customs Service/DEA/FBI Operation Reciprocity
    	     Customs Service/DEA Operation Limelight
    	     DEA Operation Tiger Trap
    	     DOJ Violent Crime Reduction Program

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        United States General Accounting Office GAO               Report
        to Congressional Requesters July 1999         DRUG CONTROL DEA's
        Strategies and Operations in the 1990s GAO/GGD-99-108 United
        States General Accounting Office
        General Government Division Washington, D.C.  20548 B-279033 July
        21, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on
        International Narcotics Control United States Senate The Honorable
        Bill McCollum Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime Committee on the
        Judiciary House of Representatives As you requested, this report
        discusses the strategies and operations of the Drug Enforcement
        Administration (DEA) in the 1990s.  Specifically, the report
        discusses (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs,
        initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to
        carry out its mission, including its efforts to (a) target and
        investigate national and international drug traffickers and (b)
        help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug
        offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2)
        whether DEA's goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and
        performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control
        Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing
        needs and allocated the additional staff.  It includes a
        recommendation to the Attorney General regarding the development
        of measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and
        dismantling drug trafficking organizations. We are sending copies
        of this report to the Honorable Janet F. Reno, Attorney General;
        the Honorable Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrator of the Drug
        Enforcement Administration; the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey,
        Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the
        Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director of the Office of Management and
        Budget; and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of
        State. Copies will be made available to others on request. Page 1
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s B-279033 If you have
        any questions, please call me or Dan Harris at (202) 512-8777. Key
        contributors to the report are acknowledged in appendix III.
        Norman J. Rabkin Director, Administration of Justice Issues Page 2
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 3    GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary During the
        1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted
        Purpose               at very high levels and continued to
        adversely affect American society. The Office of National Drug
        Control Policy (ONDCP), in its 1999 National Drug Control
        Strategy, notes that illegal drugs cost our society about $110
        billion annually. The costs of drug abuse include lost jobs and
        productivity, health problems, and economic hardships to families.
        In addition, many violent crimes are drug related, according to
        ONDCP. Funding for federal drug control efforts has increased, in
        constant 1999 dollars, by about 49 percent in the 1990s to the
        fiscal year 1999 level of about $18 billion. Funding for the Drug
        Enforcement Administration (DEA) almost doubled, in constant 1999
        dollars, from about $806 million in fiscal year 1990 to about $1.5
        billion in fiscal year 1999; the number of DEA staff increased
        from about 6,000 in fiscal year 1990 to about 8,400 in fiscal year
        1998. In view of the increased funding for federal drug control
        efforts and the nation's persistent drug problem, the Chairmen of
        the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Senate Caucus on
        International Narcotics Control requested that GAO determine,
        among other things, *  what major enforcement strategies,
        programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the
        1990s to carry out its mission; and *  whether DEA's strategic
        goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance
        measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy.
        During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of
        its Results in Brief      operations, i.e., its strategies,
        programs, initiatives, and approaches. *  DEA expanded its
        domestic enforcement operations to work more with state and local
        law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related violent
        crime in local communities. *  DEA implemented an investigative
        approach, domestically and internationally, focusing on
        intercepting the communications of major drug trafficking
        organizations to target the leaders and dismantle their
        operations. *  DEA started participating in two interagency
        programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking
        organizations in Latin America and Asia. *  DEA changed its
        foreign operations by screening and training special foreign
        police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign
        countries. Page 4                                 GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary DEA has significant
        responsibilities for the drug supply reduction portion of ONDCP's
        National Drug Control Strategy. DEA's strategic goals and
        objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives, in the
        1990s have been consistent with the National Drug Control
        Strategy. However, DEA has not developed measurable performance
        targets for its programs and initiatives that are consistent with
        those adopted for the National Strategy. As a result, it is
        difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Congress, and
        the public to assess how effective DEA has been in achieving its
        strategic goals and the effect its programs and initiatives in the
        1990s have had on reducing the illegal drug supply. GAO is making
        a recommendation to help improve this situation. DEA's overall
        mission is to enforce the nation's drug laws and regulations
        Background                       and to bring drug traffickers to
        justice. DEA is the lead agency responsible for enforcing the
        federal drug control laws and for coordinating and pursuing U.S.
        drug investigations in foreign countries. DEA's primary
        responsibilities include (1) investigating major drug traffickers
        operating at interstate and international levels and criminals and
        drug gangs who perpetrate violence in local communities; (2)
        managing a national drug intelligence system; (3) seizing and
        forfeiting traffickers' assets; (4) coordinating and cooperating
        with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on mutual
        drug enforcement efforts; and (5) working on drug law enforcement
        programs with its counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out
        its responsibilities, in December 1998, along with its
        headquarters offices, DEA had 21 field divisions throughout the
        United States and its territories, each with numerous suboffices,
        and 79 offices in 56 foreign countries. At the end of fiscal year
        1998, DEA had about 8,400 persons on board, including about 4,300
        special agents. Principal Findings Since it was established in
        1973, DEA's top priority has been to disrupt and DEA's Enforcement
        dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. During the 1990s,
        DEA Operations Reach From the broadened the focus of its
        enforcement operations. DEA now focuses on International Level to
        the       what it calls the "seamless continuum" of drug
        trafficking, with programs Local Level                      and
        initiatives directed at major regional, national, and
        international trafficking organizations; violent, street-level
        drug gangs and other local community problems; and domestically
        cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. Page 5
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary
        During the 1990s, DEA increased its emphasis on intercepting
        communications between top-level drug traffickers and their
        subordinates to identify and target the leaders and dismantle
        their operations. DEA also started working with other federal
        agencies on two programs to target and investigate major drug
        trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia. In 1996, to
        improve its effectiveness in several key foreign countries, DEA
        began to screen and train special foreign police units. The intent
        of this effort is to improve the capabilities of foreign police
        and to build trustworthy and reliable foreign antidrug units with
        which DEA can work. At the same time, DEA attempted to improve its
        effectiveness in the 1990s by giving domestic drug trafficking a
        higher priority than in the past, including focusing resources on
        regional and "local impact" drug problems. In this regard, during
        the 1990s, DEA devoted more resources to its State and Local Task
        Force Program. Also, in 1995, DEA established the Mobile
        Enforcement Team (MET) Program to assist local police with violent
        drug gangs and other local drug problems. The principal objectives
        in the National Drug Control Strategy relating to DEA Has Not Yet
        DEA are: Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the *
        combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and
        arrest National Strategy                   the leaders of illegal
        drug syndicates and *  disrupt and dismantle major international
        drug trafficking organizations and arrest, prosecute, and
        incarcerate their leaders. DEA's strategic goals and objectives
        and its enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s have been
        consistent with the National Strategy. Both the National Strategy
        and DEA hope to reduce the illegal drug supply and drug-related
        violence by disrupting and dismantling domestic and international
        drug trafficking organizations. For domestic drug trafficking
        organizations, the National Strategy calls for increasing by 5
        points the percentage of drug trafficking organizations disrupted
        or dismantled by 2002 as measured against the percentage recorded
        in the base year using a prioritized list of designated targets.
        It calls for at least a 10 percentage point increase above the
        base year by 2007. For international drug trafficking
        organizations, the National Strategy calls for achieving by 2002 a
        50 percent success rate in the number of organizations disrupted
        or dismantled as measured against a designated target list
        established in the base year. The Strategy also calls for Page 6
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary
        increasing the success rate to 100 percent by 2007 as measured
        against the base year list. According to ONDCP and DEA, neither
        the domestic nor international designated target lists referred to
        above have been developed. Unlike the National Strategy, DEA's
        performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 do not contain
        performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations. DEA has no annual, mid-, or long-range
        measurable performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations. In the absence of such targets, it is
        difficult to quantitatively assess DEA's overall effectiveness in
        achieving its strategic goals. GAO recommends that the Attorney
        General direct the DEA Administrator Recommendation
        to work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA
        performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets
        in the National Drug Control Strategy. DEA provided written
        comments on a draft of this report. These comments Agency Comments
        and are discussed at the end of chapters 2 and 3. DEA, along with
        ONDCP and GAO's Evaluation               the Office of Management
        and Budget, also provided technical changes and clarifications,
        which have been incorporated throughout this report where
        appropriate. DEA stated that, overall, the report provides a
        detailed and factual background of DEA strategies and special
        operations. Although not directly agreeing with GAO's
        recommendation, DEA agreed with GAO's principal finding that DEA
        had not included measurable performance targets for disrupting or
        dismantling drug trafficking organizations in its fiscal years
        1999 and 2000 performance plans. However, DEA disagreed with GAO's
        draft conclusion that little can be said about DEA's effectiveness
        in achieving its strategic goals in the absence of measurable
        performance targets.  DEA commented that this statement and
        supporting information in chapter 3 implied that DEA had not
        attempted to develop such targets. DEA pointed out various actions
        it was taking relating to GAO's recommendation. DEA said that,
        among other things, it has developed "preliminary performance
        targets," which it included in its fiscal year 2001 budget
        submission to DOJ. Page 7                                 GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Executive Summary DEA's stated
        action is consistent with the intent of GAO's recommendation.
        However, because these targets are preliminary and under review
        within the executive branch, they are subject to change until
        February 2000 when DEA issues its annual budget submission and
        performance plan, as part of DOJ's submission, to Congress.
        Further, DEA indicated that it cannot finalize its performance
        targets and measures until a designated targeted list of drug
        trafficking organizations, as called for in the National Strategy,
        is completed. Therefore, GAO is retaining its recommendation until
        DEA's preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion
        in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency
        with those in the National Strategy. Page 8
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 9    GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents 4 Executive Summary 16
        Chapter 1                      Drug Use and Supply Trends in the
        1990s                                       16 Introduction
        Federal Drug Control Budget in the 1990s
        22 1999 National Drug Control Strategy
        24 DEA's Mission, Role, and Responsibilities
        26 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
        29 32 Chapter 2                      DEA Modified Its Operational
        Strategy in the 1990s                            32 DEA Expanded
        Its               DEA More Involved With State and Local Police
        34 DEA Developed an Investigative Approach Focusing on
        48 Focus in the 1990s to            the Communications of Major
        Drug Trafficking Target Local Drug                Organizations
        Key Changes in DEA's Foreign Operations
        54 Dealers in Addition to         Conclusions
        59 Major Drug Trafficking Agency Comments
        60 Organizations 61 Chapter 3                      DEA's Strategic
        Goals and Objectives, and Its Programs,                       61
        DEA Has Not Yet                  Are Consistent With the National
        Strategy DEA Has Not Developed Performance Targets Consistent
        68 Developed                        With Those in the National
        Strategy Performance Targets            Conclusions
        78 Recommendation
        79 Consistent With the            Agency Comments and Our
        Evaluation                                            79 National
        Drug Control Strategy 81 Chapter 4                      Federal
        Budget Formulation Guidance Provides Basis for
        81 DEA's Staffing Needs             DEA Staffing Needs
        Determination Process Fiscal Year 1998 Process for Determining
        DEA's Staffing                       82 Determination and
        Needs Allocation Process for Congress Added Staff for a New
        Caribbean Initiative and                               95 Changed
        Staffing Recommended for Other DEA Fiscal Year 1998
        Initiatives DEA's Fiscal Year 1998 Allocation Process Considered a
        96 Variety of Factors Page 10
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Conclusions
        97 Appendix I: Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field
        98 Appendixes      Divisions and Foreign Offices Appendix II:
        Comments From the Drug Enforcement                            163
        Administration Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
        Acknowledgments                       167 168 Glossary
        Performance Measurement Terms
        168 Table 2.1:  Budget for and Number of DEA State and
        35 Tables          Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999
        Table 2.2:  Number of Law Enforcement Officers on DEA
        35 State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1998, as
        of the End of Each Fiscal Year Table 2.3: Number of DEA State and
        Local Task Force                         36 Case Initiations,
        Arrests, Convictions, and Seizures, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998
        Table 2.4:  Geographic Scope of State and Local Task
        37 Force Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Table
        2.5: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Years 1995
        39 to 1999 Table 2.6: Selected Data on MET Deployments, Fiscal
        41 Years 1995 Through 1998 Table 2.7:  Geographic Scope of MET
        Program Cases                           44 Initiated During Fiscal
        Years 1995 Through 1998 Table 2.8:  Funding for DEA's Domestic
        Cannabis                             46 Eradication/Suppression
        Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Table 2.9: Domestic
        Cannabis Eradication/Suppression                        47 Program
        Statistical Results, 1990 Through 1998 Table 2.10: Number of
        Electronic Surveillance Orders and                    51
        Facilities Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998 Table 2.11:
        Number of Vetted Units and Officers on Board                    57
        by Country, as of September 30, 1998 Table 3.1:  National Strategy
        Goals and Objectives for                      63 Which DEA Has
        Responsibilities Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals With
        66 National Strategy Goals Page 11
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Table 3.3:
        Comparison of Selected DEA and National
        67 Strategy Objectives Table 3.4:  National Drug Control Strategy
        Performance                       70 Target and Performance
        Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Domestic Drug Trafficking
        Organizations Table 3.5:  National Strategy Performance Target and
        71 Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
        International Drug Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their
        Leaders Table 3.6:  National Drug Control Strategy Performance
        71 Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
        Drug Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs Table 4.1: Comparison of
        DEA and DOJ Estimated                               91 Additional
        DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table
        4.2: Comparison of DOJ's Estimates and the
        94 President's Request for Additional DEA Total and Special Agent
        Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table 4.3: Comparison of the
        President's Request and                         96 Congress'
        Appropriations Guidance for DEA Additional Total and Special Agent
        Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress'
        Appropriations                            97 Guidance and DEA's
        New Staffing Allocation for Additional DEA Staffing and Special
        Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998 Table I.1:  Drug Seizures for
        Washington Division and                       130 Baltimore
        District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 Table I.2:
        Caribbean Field Division's Use of Wire
        159 Intercepts Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean
        Division, by                   161 Case Type, for Fiscal Years
        1997 and 1998 Figure 1.1:  Trend in the Number of Current Drug
        Users,                      17 Figures      Aged 12 and Older,
        Since 1990 Figure 1.2:  Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and
        12th                  18 Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since
        1991 Figure 1.3:  Composition of Total Federal Government
        23 Funding for Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal Years 1990
        Through 1999 Figure 1.4:  Budget Trends in Programs for Federal
        Drug                      24 Control Activities to Reduce Drug
        Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Page 12
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Contents Figure 1.5:
        DEA's Total Budget Authority, Fiscal Years                     27
        1990 Through 1999 Figure 1.6:  DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years
        1990                          28 Through 1998, as of the End of
        Each Fiscal Year Figure 1.7:  Composition by Position Type of
        Total                          29 Number of DEA On-Board Staff, as
        of the End of Fiscal Year 1998 Figure 4.1:  Flowchart of DEA's
        Fiscal Year 1998 Staffing                   84 Needs Determination
        Process Figure 4.1: Continued
        85 Figure I.1:  Los Angeles Division Map
        100 Figure I.2:  Miami Division Map
        108 Figure I.3:  New Orleans Division Map
        118 Figure I.4:  Washington, D. C. Division Map
        125 Figure I.5:  Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map
        133 Figure I.6:  La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map
        141 Figure I.7:  Mexico City, Mexico, Country Office Map
        148 Figure I.8:  DEA Caribbean Division Map
        156 Page 13                              GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Contents Abbreviations ASAC
        Assistant Special Agent in Charge ATF         Bureau of Alcohol,
        Tobacco and Firearms BNP         Bolivian National Police BTF
        Border Task Force CA          country attache CIA         Central
        Intelligence Agency CNP         Colombian National Police DAWN
        Drug Abuse Warning Network DEA         Drug Enforcement
        Administration DOD         Department of Defense DOJ
        Department of Justice FBI         Federal Bureau of Investigation
        FELCN       Fuerzas Especiales Para la Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico
        FMP         field management plan HCL         hydrochloride HIDTA
        High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area IRS         Internal Revenue
        Service JMD         Justice Management Division LSD
        lysergic acid diethylamide MET         Mobile Enforcement Team
        OCDETF      Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force OMB
        Office of Management and Budget ONDCP       Office of National
        Drug Control Policy OPBAT       Operation Bahamas, Turks, and
        Caicos Islands PCP         phencyclidine PME         Performance
        Measures of Effectiveness RET         Regional Enforcement Team
        SAC         Special Agent in Charge SAMHSA      Substance Abuse
        and Mental Health Services Administration SIU         Sensitive
        Investigative Unit or Special Investigative Unit SOD
        Special Operations Division TKO         targeted kingpin
        organization VCRP        Violent Crime Reduction Program Page 14
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 15    GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction During the
        1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted
        at very high levels and have continued to adversely affect
        American society in terms of social, economic, and health costs
        and drug-related violent crime. During the same period, funding
        for federal drug control efforts overall and for the Drug
        Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is dedicated to
        controlling the supply of illegal drugs, increased significantly.
        According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),
        drug Drug Use and Supply    use and its consequences threaten
        Americans of every socioeconomic Trends in the 1990s
        background, geographic region, educational level, and ethnic or
        racial identity. Drug abuse and trafficking adversely affect
        families, businesses, and neighborhoods; impede education; and
        choke criminal justice, health, and social service systems. A
        report prepared for ONDCP showed that drug users in the United
        States spent an estimated $57 billion for illegal drugs in 1995.1
        Other costs to society include lost jobs and productivity, health
        problems, and economic hardships to families. ONDCP, in its 1999
        National Drug Control Strategy, noted that illegal drugs cost our
        society approximately $110 billion each year. On the basis of the
        National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the Substance Abuse and
        Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) estimated that in
        1997 there were 13.9 million current users2 of illegal drugs in
        the United States aged 12 and older, representing 6.4 percent of
        the total population. As figure 1.1 shows, this number has
        fluctuated somewhat but has remained fairly constant overall since
        1990, as have the numbers of current users of cocaine and
        marijuana, with 1.5 million cocaine users and 11.1 million
        marijuana users in 1997. 1 What America's Users Spend on Illegal
        Drugs, 1988-1995; prepared for the Office of National Drug Control
        Policy by William Rhodes, Stacia Langenbahn, Ryan Kling, and Paul
        Scheiman; September 29, 1997. 2 A current user is an individual
        who consumed an illegal drug in the month prior to being
        interviewed. Page 16
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        Figure 1.1:  Trend in the Number of Current Drug Users, Aged 12
        and Older, Since 1990 Source: Preliminary Results from the
        National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, SAMHSA, Department of
        Health and Human Services, 1996 and 1997. Page 17
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        As shown in figure 1.2, current drug use among youth rose
        significantly from 1992 to 1996. The trend then improved, with
        drug use declining for 8th and 10th graders in 1997 and 1998.
        Figure 1.2:  Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and 12th
        Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since 1991 Source: Monitoring
        the Future Study, Institute for Social Research, University of
        Michigan (Dec. 1998). Abuse of illegal drugs has serious
        consequences. For example, SAMHSA's Drug Abuse Warning Network
        (DAWN) reported 9,310 drug-related deaths in 1996, an increase of
        65 percent from the 5,628 deaths reported in 1990. The number of
        drug-related hospital emergency room visits reported to DAWN rose
        42 percent from 1990 to 1997. There were 371,208 emergency room
        episodes in 1990 and 527,058 episodes in 1997. According to DEA
        and ONDCP, illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana,
        and methamphetamine, have inflicted serious damage and continued
        to threaten our nation during the 1990s. National and Page 18
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        international drug trafficking organizations continued to bring
        these drugs into the United States, and certain illegal drugs are
        clandestinely produced in this country. Drug trafficking gangs and
        individuals dealing in drugs, as well as drug users, have caused
        violence in local communities. DEA considers cocaine to be the
        primary drug threat to the U.S. Cocaine      population. Cocaine
        use has remained at a relatively constant high level during the
        1990s, as indicated by the National Household Survey on Drug
        Abuse. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
        reported that the use of "crack," a potent and highly addictive
        form of cocaine that first became widely available in the 1980s,
        also remained at a high level in the 1990s. ONDCP reported in the
        summer of 1998 that crack was failing to attract new users,
        although established users persisted in using it. Regarding
        cocaine trafficking trends, DEA intelligence information shows
        that Colombian trafficking organizations, although more fragmented
        than in the past, continue to control the worldwide supply of
        cocaine. However, Mexican organizations have played an increasing
        role in the U.S. cocaine trade in the 1990s. The Southwest Border
        is now the primary entry point for cocaine smuggled into the
        United States. Heroin is readily available in major cities in the
        United States, and its use is Heroin       on the rise in many
        areas around the country, according to DEA. ONDCP has noted that
        the increasing availability of high-purity heroin has made
        snorting and smoking more common modes of ingestion than
        injection, thereby lowering inhibitions to heroin use. DEA
        intelligence information indicates that the heroin available in
        the United States comes from Southeast Asia (principally Burma);
        Southwest Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and
        Turkey); Mexico; and South America (Colombia). Although Southeast
        Asian heroin dominated the U.S. market in the 1980s and into the
        1990s, Colombian heroin emerged as a significant problem in the
        mid-1990s. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized and analyzed
        in the United States was Colombian. DEA reported that independent
        Colombian drug traffickers established themselves in the U.S.
        heroin market by distributing high- quality heroin (frequently
        above 90-percent pure), undercutting the price of their
        competition, and using long-standing drug distribution networks.
        According to DEA, marijuana is the most readily available and
        commonly Marijuana    used illegal drug in the country. Further, a
        resurgence of marijuana trafficking and use has taken place in
        urban centers across the United Page 19
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        States. ONDCP noted that this market is driven by a high level of
        demand, with users from virtually all age groups, demographic
        groups, and income levels. According to DEA intelligence
        information, most of the foreign marijuana available here is
        smuggled into the country across the Southwest Border. Mexican
        drug trafficking organizations are responsible for supplying most
        of the foreign marijuana, whether grown in Mexico or shipped
        through Mexico from other locations such as Colombia. Marijuana is
        also grown domestically in remote outdoor locations in the United
        States, including on public lands, and indoors. In the 1990s,
        major outdoor marijuana growths have been found in California,
        Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington.
        DEA uses the term "dangerous drugs" to refer to a broad category
        of Methamphetamine and      controlled substances other than
        cocaine, opiates such as heroin, and Other Dangerous Drugs
        cannabis products such as marijuana. The list of dangerous drugs
        includes drugs that are illegally produced; drugs legally produced
        but diverted to illicit use (e.g., pharmacy thefts, forged
        prescriptions, and illegal sales); as well as legally produced
        drugs obtained from legitimate channels (e.g., legally and
        properly prescribed). Some of the dangerous drugs are
        methamphetamine; lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); phencyclidine
        (PCP); diazepam (Valium); and flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), commonly
        called the "date rape" drug. DEA reports that methamphetamine use
        has increased in the 1990s, resulting in a devastating impact on
        many communities across the nation. A powerful stimulant,
        methamphetamine is the most prevalent synthetic controlled
        substance clandestinely manufactured in the United States.
        Historically, methamphetamine has more commonly been used in the
        western United States, but its use has been spreading to other
        areas of the country. According to DEA, methamphetamine suppliers
        have traditionally been motorcycle gangs and other independent
        groups. However, organized crime groups operating in California,
        some with ties to major Mexico- based trafficking organizations,
        now dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and
        distribution in the United States. Mexican trafficking
        organizations use their well-established cocaine, heroin, and
        marijuana distribution networks to smuggle methamphetamine
        throughout the country. Although large-scale production of
        methamphetamine is centered in California, it is increasingly
        being produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States. Page
        20                                 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
        in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction Trafficking organizations have
        continued to supply domestic drug Drug Trafficking
        consumers despite short-term achievements by both federal and
        foreign Organizations                     law enforcement agencies
        in apprehending individuals and disrupting the flow of illegal
        drugs. When confronted with threats to their operations, drug
        trafficking organizations have become adept at quickly changing
        their modes of operation. For example, as we previously reported,3
        when law enforcement agencies have successfully carried out
        efforts to intercept drugs being smuggled by aircraft, traffickers
        have increased their use of maritime and overland transportation
        routes. In another example, DEA reported that a 1989 drug
        enforcement operation, which involved the seizure of nearly 40
        metric tons of cocaine, led to a new arrangement between Mexican
        transportation organizations and Colombian cocaine organizations.
        To reduce the complex logistics and vulnerabilities associated
        with large cash transactions, Mexican organizations started
        receiving part of the cocaine shipments they smuggled for the
        Colombians in exchange for their transportation services. By the
        mid-1990s, Mexican organizations were receiving up to one-half of
        a cocaine shipment as payment. This arrangement radically changed
        the role and sphere of influence of the Mexican organizations in
        the U.S. cocaine trade. By relinquishing part of each cocaine
        shipment, the Colombian organizations ceded a share of the U.S.
        cocaine market to the Mexican traffickers. In addition, although
        overall violent crime has steadily declined during the Drug-
        Related Violent Crime 1990s, many of the violent crimes committed
        are drug-related, according to ONDCP. There are no overall
        quantitative data on drug-related violent crime and the
        relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent crime,
        but ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking
        drug abuse or trafficking and other crimes, including violent
        crimes.4 According to ONDCP, many crimes (e.g., murder, assault,
        and robbery) are committed under the influence of drugs or may be
        motivated by a need for money to buy drugs. In addition, drug
        trafficking and violence often go hand in hand. Competition and
        disputes among drug dealers can cause violence, as can the
        location of drug markets in disadvantaged areas where legal and
        social controls against violence tend to be ineffective. In this
        regard, DEA reported in 1996 that violent drug gangs, which were
        once largely confined to major cities, had migrated to and/or
        emerged in rural areas and small cities throughout the country.
        One example cited was 3 Drug Control: Observations on U.S.
        Counternarcotics Activities (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249, Sept. 16, 1998).
        4 See ONDCP's Fact Sheet: Drug-Related Crime (Apr. 1997, NCJ-
        163928). Page 21
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        Vidalia, GA, where a violent crack cocaine gang was linked to
        numerous homicides and drive-by shootings. Nevertheless, the
        Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that overall violent crime in
        the United States in 1997 had fallen more than 21 percent since
        1993 and had reached its lowest level in at least 24 years.
        Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported in
        its 1997 Uniform Crime Reports that the murder rate in 1997 had
        declined 28 percent since 1993. It also reported that the number
        of drug-related murders decreased by 7 percent between 1996 and
        1997.5 According to ONDCP, from fiscal years 1990 through 1999 the
        federal Federal Drug Control    government spent about $143.5
        billion, in constant 1999 dollars, on four Budget in the 1990s
        functional areas that can be divided between two categories-(1)
        those that are aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs and
        (2) those that are aimed at reducing the availability or supply of
        such drugs in the United States. As figure 1.3 indicates, about
        33.8 percent of the total funds were used for drug demand
        reduction. About 66.2 percent of the total funds were used for the
        three functional areas intended to reduce the drug supply, with
        the largest share-49.5 percent-dedicated to domestic law
        enforcement programs, 3.8 percent to international programs, and
        12.9 percent to interdiction programs. 5 Although the Uniform
        Crime Reports contain data on drug-related murder, they do not
        contain such data for other types of violent crime, such as
        assault, robbery, or rape. Page 22
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        Figure 1.3:  Composition of Total Federal Government Funding for
        Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999
        Note: This figure is based on budget amounts for each fiscal year
        converted to constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from
        ONDCP data. As figure 1.4 indicates, total funds for federal drug
        control activities increased, in constant 1999 dollars, by about
        49 percent-from about $12 billion to almost $18 billion-between
        fiscal years 1990 and 1999. However, funding trends varied for the
        four functional areas. Although funds for the drug demand
        reduction functional area generally increased steadily overall by
        50 percent from about $3.9 billion in 1990 to about $5.8 billion
        in 1999, funding trends for the three drug supply reduction
        functional areas were mixed. Funds for domestic law enforcement
        programs increased steadily overall by about 66 percent from about
        $5.4 billion in 1990 to almost $8.9 billion in 1999. Funds for
        interdiction programs fluctuated within the time period,
        increasing overall by about 9 percent from about $2.2 billion in
        1990 to almost $2.4 billion in 1999. Funds for international
        programs increased by 23 percent from 1990 to 1992, to a peak of
        $759.1 million; they then decreased by 60 percent to a low of Page
        23                                           GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction $303.5 million in
        1996; they rose by 163 percent to about $796.9 million in 1999.
        Figure 1.4:  Budget Trends in Programs for Federal Drug Control
        Activities to Reduce Drug Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal Years
        1990 Through 1999 Note 1: The budget amounts for fiscal years 1990
        through 1998 are actual, and the fiscal year 1999 budget amount is
        as enacted. Note 2: The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in
        constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from ONDCP data.
        The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), as amended,
        established 1999 National Drug                       ONDCP to set
        federal priorities for drug control, implement a National Control
        Strategy                         Drug Control Strategy, and
        certify federal drug control budgets. The act specifies that the
        National Strategy must be comprehensive and research based;
        contain long-range goals and measurable objectives; and seek to
        reduce drug use (demand), availability (supply), and related
        consequences. Page 24
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        ONDCP has produced annual strategic plans since 1989. These
        strategies recognized that no single approach could solve the
        nation's drug problem; rather, drug prevention, education, and
        treatment must be complemented by drug supply reduction actions
        abroad, on our borders, and within the United States. Each
        strategy also shared a commitment to maintain and enforce antidrug
        laws. In 1998, ONDCP's National Drug Control Strategy established
        performance targets to reduce illegal drug use and availability in
        the United States by 25 percent by the year 2002 and 50 percent by
        2007.6 The strategy focuses on reducing the demand for drugs
        through treatment and prevention and attacking the supply of drugs
        through domestic law enforcement, interdiction efforts, and
        international cooperation. ONDCP's 1999 National Strategy includes
        the performance targets and 5 goals along with 31 supporting
        objectives intended to serve as the basis for a coherent, long-
        term national effort. *  Goal 1: Educate and enable America's
        youth to reject illegal drugs as well as tobacco and alcohol. *
        Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially
        reducing drug-related crime and violence. *  Goal 3: Reduce the
        health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use. *  Goal
        4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug
        threat. *  Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.
        As discussed in detail in chapter 3, strategic goals 2, 4, and 5
        address drug supply reduction and involve drug law enforcement
        activities, including those for which DEA is responsible. Goal 2
        seeks, among other things, to reduce the rate of drug-related
        crime and violence in the United States by 15 percent by the year
        2002 and achieve a 30-percent reduction by the year 2007. Goal 4
        seeks a 10-percent reduction in the rate at which illegal drugs
        successfully enter the United States by the year 2002 and a 20-
        percent reduction in this rate by 2007. Goal 5 seeks a 15-percent
        reduction in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries by
        the year 2002 and a 30- percent reduction by 2007. The goal also
        seeks a 20-percent reduction in domestic marijuana cultivation and
        methamphetamine production by 2002 and a 50-percent reduction by
        2007. 6 The National Drug Control Strategy established 1996 as the
        base year for determining percentage reductions in drug use and
        availability. Page 25
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        The mission of DEA, which is a component of DOJ, is to (1) enforce
        the DEA's Mission, Role,      drug laws and regulations of the
        United States and bring drug traffickers7 and Responsibilities
        to justice and (2) recommend and support nonenforcement programs
        aimed at reducing the availability of illegal drugs in domestic
        and international markets. DEA is the lead agency responsible for
        federal drug law enforcement and for coordinating and pursuing
        drug investigations in foreign countries. According to DEA, its
        primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement include the
        following: *  investigating major drug traffickers operating at
        interstate and international levels and criminals and drug gangs
        who perpetrate violence in local communities; *  coordinating and
        cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement
        agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including interstate
        and international investigations; *  managing a national drug
        intelligence system in cooperation with other federal, state,
        local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate
        strategic and operational drug intelligence information; *
        seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers' assets; *  coordinating
        and cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement
        agencies and foreign governments on programs designed to reduce
        the availability of illegal drugs on the U.S. market through
        nonenforcement methods, such as crop eradication, crop
        substitution, and the training of foreign officials; and *
        operating, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and
        U.S. Ambassadors, all programs associated with drug law
        enforcement counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out its
        mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its headquarters
        office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United
        States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of December
        1998. Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by
        a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), were a total of 30 district
        offices, 115 resident offices, and 46 posts of duty in the United
        States, with at least 1 office in every state. Overseas, DEA had
        79 offices in 56 foreign countries. This included 56 country
        offices, each headed by a country attach (CA), and 23 resident
        offices reporting to the country offices. (App. I contains
        profiles 7 Drug traffickers include those organizations and
        principal members involved in the growth, manufacture, or
        distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for
        illicit traffic in the United States. Page 26
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        of the five field divisions and three country offices included in
        our review.) In addition, DEA manages a multiagency intelligence
        center in El Paso, TX; conducts training at Quantico, VA; and
        maintains seven drug analytical laboratories in various regions of
        the country and a special drug testing facility in McLean, VA. As
        shown in figure 1.5, DEA's budget almost doubled, in constant 1999
        dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999 and totaled
        about $11.3 billion during that period. Figure 1.5:  DEA's Total
        Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999 Note 1: The
        budget amounts for fiscal years 1990 through 1998 are actual, and
        the fiscal year 1999 budget amount is as enacted. Note 2: The
        budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.
        Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. Commensurate with its
        increased funding, as shown in figure 1.6, the size of DEA's staff
        also increased during the 1990s by 40 percent-from 5,995 employees
        in 1990 to 8,387 employees in 1998. Page 27
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        Figure 1.6:  DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998,
        as of the End of Each Fiscal Year Note: According to DEA, on-board
        positions are the number of persons employed by DEA at specified
        time periods as opposed to the number actually authorized. Source:
        Developed by GAO from DEA data. During this period, the number of
        intelligence specialists increased by about 116 percent, special
        agents by 40 percent, and other positions8 by 32 percent. As shown
        in figure 1.7, of the total on-board positions in fiscal year
        1998, special agents made up about 51.4 percent, other positions
        about 41.8 percent, and intelligence specialists about 6.9
        percent. 8 These include diversion investigators and various
        professional, administrative, technical, and clerical positions.
        Page 28
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        Figure 1.7:  Composition by Position Type of Total Number of DEA
        On-Board Staff, as of the End of Fiscal Year 1998 Note:
        Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
        Developed by GAO from DEA data. The Chairmen of the House
        Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Objectives, Scope, and
        Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control requested that we
        Methodology                                 determine (1) what
        major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and
        approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its
        mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate
        national and international drug traffickers and (b) help state and
        local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-
        related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA's strategic
        goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance
        measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy;
        and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and
        allocated the additional staff. We did our review at DEA
        headquarters, as well as at DEA offices in five domestic field
        divisions and three foreign countries. We also obtained
        information from officials representing DOJ, ONDCP, the Office of
        Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of State. Because
        the funding and other statistical data we collected from DEA and
        other agencies and used in this report were used primarily for
        background and descriptive purposes and were not directly related
        to our findings, conclusions, and recommendation, we did not
        independently validate or verify their accuracy and reliability.
        Page 29                                         GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction The five DEA
        domestic field division offices we visited are located in Los
        Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans, LA; San Juan, Puerto Rico
        (the Caribbean Division); and Washington, D.C. We also visited one
        DEA district office located in Baltimore, MD, which is part of
        DEA's Washington, D.C., Field Division. The three DEA foreign
        country offices we visited are located in La Paz, Bolivia; Bogota,
        Colombia; and Mexico City, Mexico. In Bolivia, we also visited
        resident offices in Santa Cruz and Trinidad and the Chimore base
        camp. (See app. I.) In Mexico, we also visited the Guadalajara
        Resident Office. These locations were judgmentally selected on the
        basis of geographic location, differences in the drug threat in
        these areas, and a variety of domestic and foreign drug
        enforcement operational characteristics. We also obtained
        information from the U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Baltimore, Los
        Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Puerto Rico; from local police
        agencies in Baltimore; Los Angeles; South Miami, FL; Pine Bluff,
        AR; and Puerto Rico; and from State Department officials in
        Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico. To determine what major enforcement
        strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has
        implemented to carry out its mission in the 1990s, we collected
        and analyzed pertinent DEA, DOJ, and ONDCP documents. We also
        interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials in the
        selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, and
        DOJ and ONDCP officials. We also collected ONDCP and DEA budget
        data for each fiscal year from 1990 to 1999, which we adjusted to
        constant 1999 dollars where appropriate. In addition, we obtained
        and analyzed DEA special agent work-hour statistics; case
        initiation data; statistical results (e.g., arrests, convictions,
        and seizures) of investigations; and other information relating to
        DEA's enforcement programs. We did not evaluate the effectiveness
        of the individual strategies, programs, initiatives, and
        approaches discussed in chapter 2. To determine whether DEA's
        strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and
        performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control
        Strategy, we analyzed and compared DEA's annual performance plans
        for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 with ONDCP's 1998 and 1999 (1)
        National Drug Control Strategies, (2) National Drug Control Budget
        Summaries, and (3) Performance Measures of Effectiveness reports.
        We also reviewed DOJ's (1) Strategic Plan for 1997-2002, (2)
        performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and (3) Drug
        Control Strategic Plan. We interviewed DEA and ONDCP officials
        about their plans and how they interrelated. We used the
        Government Performance and Results Act as our basic criteria along
        with OMB, DOJ, and our guidance Page 30
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 1 Introduction
        on the act, including OMB Circular A-11 and our guides for
        assessing agency annual performance plans and strategic plans. To
        determine how DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing estimates for its
        enforcement programs and initiatives were developed, we collected
        and analyzed information on the process, criteria DEA used, and
        staffing recommendations made during DEA's budget formulation
        process. We interviewed DEA officials in headquarters and in the
        selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, as
        well as DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB officials to obtain information on how
        staffing needs were determined and how the budget review process
        affected staffing estimates, requests, and allocations. We
        reviewed documents dealing with staffing recommendations and
        allocations; policies and procedures; DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB budget
        reviews; and congressional appropriations. We performed our work
        from December 1997 to May 1999 in accordance with generally
        accepted government auditing standards.  In June 1999, we provided
        a draft of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of
        ONDCP for comment. We also provided relevant sections of the
        report to OMB and State Department officials for a review of the
        facts that pertain to those agencies.  We received written
        comments on June 23, 1999, from the Deputy Administrator, DEA,
        which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and reprinted in appendix
        II.  In addition, DEA provided a number of technical changes and
        clarifications, which we have incorporated throughout the report
        where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, ONDCP's Acting Deputy
        Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, orally informed us that
        ONDCP reviewed the report from a factual standpoint because the
        overall conclusions and recommendation are directed at DEA.  He
        stated that the report was factually correct from ONDCP's
        perspective and provided a few technical clarifications, which we
        incorporated where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, OMB officials
        responsible for examining DEA's budget orally communicated a few
        technical comments, which we incorporated in chapter 4.  The State
        Department's liaison for GAO informed us on June 21, 1999, that
        the Department had no comments. Page 31
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Since its creation in 1973,
        DEA has focused its efforts primarily on investigating the highest
        levels of national and international illegal drug trafficking. In
        addition, DEA has supported state and local law enforcement
        efforts directed at the lower levels of drug trafficking. In the
        1990s, however, DEA revised its strategy to focus its operations
        on what it refers to as the "seamless continuum" of drug
        trafficking, from international drug trafficking organizations
        residing outside the United States to local gangs and individuals
        illegally selling drugs on city streets. Consequently, during the
        1990s, DEA gave a higher priority than in the past and increased
        resources to working with and assisting state and local law
        enforcement agencies, including starting a new program to help
        combat drug-related violent crime in local communities.
        Concurrently, in the 1990s, DEA made the following enhancements to
        its already high priority enforcement operations directed at
        national and international drug trafficking organizations. *  DEA
        established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into the Special
        Operations Division (SOD), placing greater emphasis on
        intercepting communications between top-level drug traffickers and
        their subordinates (i.e., attacking the "command and control"
        communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to
        dismantle their entire trafficking operations. *  DEA started
        participating in two interagency programs to target and
        investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America
        and Asia. *  DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign
        police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign
        countries, primarily in Latin America. Since its establishment,
        DEA has directed its resources primarily toward DEA Modified Its
        disrupting or dismantling major organizations involved in
        interstate and Operational Strategy in international drug
        trafficking. DEA has concentrated on investigating those
        traffickers functioning at the highest levels of these
        enterprises, often by the 1990s                        developing
        conspiracy cases for U.S. Attorneys to prosecute and seizing the
        traffickers' assets.  Federal drug control policymakers considered
        this investigative approach to be the most effective for reducing
        the illegal drug supply in the United States. Consistent with this
        approach, DEA's operational strategy in the early 1990s was to
        identify and exploit trafficker vulnerabilities and to disrupt or
        dismantle their organizations by conducting investigations leading
        to (1) the prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of leaders
        and key players in drug organizations and (2) the seizure and
        forfeiture of the assets of these organizations. DEA's enforcement
        operations were to focus and Page 32
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations apply pressure in four
        principal areas: source (production overseas and in the United
        States), transit (smuggling of drugs and essential chemicals),
        domestic distribution (sales of illegal drugs in the United
        States), and proceeds (money and assets derived from
        distribution). DEA operations were also to control the
        distribution of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs and
        prevent the diversion of legally produced controlled substances.
        In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of DEA's
        policies and strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately
        responding to the drug trafficking problem and related violent
        crime. The results of the review included recommendations by DEA
        SACs and senior managers that DEA refocus its investigative
        priorities by increasing its efforts against domestic drug
        trafficking, including violent drug organizations, street gangs,
        local impact issues, regional trafficking organizations, and
        domestically produced illegal drugs, while, at the same time,
        continuing to investigate major national and international
        trafficking organizations.  As a result, in 1995, the DEA
        Administrator established the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET)
        Program, which focuses a small percentage of DEA's resources on
        drug-related violent crime in local communities. Then, in a 1997
        memorandum to DEA's field offices, he indicated that over the next
        5 years DEA was to focus its operations on the "seamless
        continuum" of the organized crime systems that direct drug
        trafficking, with agencywide programs and initiatives directed at
    *  major regional, national, and international cases; *  violent
        drug organizations, gangs, and local impact issues; and *
        domestically cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. According
        to DEA, the international aspects of drug trafficking cannot be
        separated from the domestic aspects because they are
        interdependent and intertwined. The operations of major
        trafficking organizations can involve the cultivation and
        production of drugs in foreign countries, transportation to the
        United States, and eventual distribution on city streets.
        Accordingly, the Administrator emphasized that DEA was to target
        the highest level drug traffickers and their organizations, as
        well as violent, street-level drug gangs operating in communities.
        To implement this strategy, DEA was to pursue a vigorous
        international enforcement program, while domestically using the
        MET Program and other enforcement approaches to combat the threat
        and impact of drugs in local communities. The Administrator cited
        cooperation with other agencies as a guiding principle for all
        aspects of DEA's international operations and domestic operations,
        which included Page 33
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations assisting state and local law
        enforcement agencies with their most serious drug and drug-related
        violence problems. Although DEA has always worked formally and
        informally with state and DEA More Involved             local law
        enforcement agencies, it increased its involvement in, and With
        State and Local          devoted more resources to, task forces
        and other multiagency operations with state and local law
        enforcement agencies in the 1990s. Major DEA Police
        programs for working with and assisting state and local police on
        multiagency operations are the State and Local Task Force Program,
        MET Program, and Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
        Program. Through its State and Local Task Force Program, which
        originated in 1970 State and Local Task Force    with DEA's
        predecessor agency, DEA coordinates with state and local law
        Program                       enforcement agencies, shares
        information, participates in joint investigations, and shares
        assets forfeited federally as a result of cases made against drug
        dealers. In addition, state and local officers often receive drug
        investigation training and enhanced drug enforcement authority.
        Throughout the 1990s, DEA substantially increased the number of
        its state and local task forces and the number of special agents
        assigned to them. DEA's budget for state and local task forces
        also increased substantially during this period. Table 2.1 shows
        DEA's budget for its state and local task forces and the number of
        task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1999. As the table
        indicates, DEA spent $45.7 million, in constant 1999 dollars, on
        this program in fiscal year 1991 and budgeted $105.5 million for
        fiscal year 1999. The total number of DEA-sponsored state and
        local task forces increased by about 90 percent during these
        years. Page 34                                     GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
        the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
        Trafficking Organizations Table 2.1:  Budget for and Number of DEA
        State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999 Fiscal year
        Budget (millions)a      Funded task forces           Provisional
        task forcesb                 Total task forcesc 1991
        $45.7                           71
        23                               94 1992
        58.2                          73
        25                               98 1993
        82.1                          75
        25                              100 1994
        92.7                          83
        20                              103 1995
        107.5                           79
        36                              115 1996
        48.0                          92
        41                              133 1997
        158.0                          100
        51                              151 1998
        146.5                          122
        50                              172 1999
        105.5                          131
        48                              179 aThe budget amounts for each
        fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts are
        based on actual costs for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 and the
        approved budget for fiscal year 1999. The budget amounts for each
        year include DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
        Program, which DEA could not separate out. The budget amounts for
        fiscal years 1997 through 1999 include approximated payroll costs.
        bProvisional task forces are operational in the field with
        assigned full-time agents but awaiting authorized funding approval
        from DEA Headquarters under the State and Local Task Force
        Program. cThe numbers of task forces include DEA's state and local
        task forces in ONDCP's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
        Program. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. Similarly, as
        shown in table 2.2, the number of special agents assigned to DEA-
        sponsored state and local task forces increased by about 84
        percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1998, while the number of
        assigned state and local law enforcement officers increased by
        about 34 percent during the same time period. About 22 percent of
        DEA's 4,309 special agents in fiscal year 1998 were assigned to
        state and local task forces, compared to about 14 percent of the
        total 3,542 special agents at DEA in fiscal year 1991. Table 2.2:
        Number of Law Enforcement      Fiscal year
        DEA special agents                  State and local officers
        Officers on DEA State and Local Task       1991
        511                                     1,153 Forces, Fiscal Years
        1991 Through 1998, as of the End of Each Fiscal Year          1992
        516                                     1,209 1993
        566                                     1,226 1994
        601                                     1,221 1995
        616                                     1,251 1996
        595                                     1,296 1997
        721                                     1,435 1998
        940                                     1,548 Note: The table
        includes the number of DEA special agents and state and local
        officers assigned to DEA's state and local task forces in ONDCP's
        High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program. Source: Developed by
        GAO from DEA data. The amount of time spent by DEA special agents
        overall on state and local task forces also increased steadily in
        the 1990s. DEA special agents spent Page 35
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations about 19.5 percent of all
        domestic investigative work hours on these task forces in fiscal
        year 1998 compared to about 9.2 percent during fiscal year 1990.1
        Table 2.3 shows the number of cases, arrests, convictions, asset
        seizures, and drug seizures that resulted from the state and local
        task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1998. Table 2.3: Number
        of DEA State and
        Fiscal years Local Task Force Case Initiations,     Activity
        1991           1992            1993            1994           1995
        1996           1997            1998 Arrests, Convictions, and
        Seizures, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998              Cases initiated
        5,294          6,323           5,265          4,256
        5,738           5,684          6,622           6,853 Cases closed
        4,992          5,383           5,993          5,167
        5,130           5,172          5,668           5,854 Arrests
        6,648          7,430           6,464          6,036
        7,324           7,757          9,902 11,569 Convictions
        4,524          4,800           4,987          4,274
        4,161           4,597          4,705           5,477 Assets seized
        $265           $149            $159            $122           $118
        $85          $112              N/A (millions)a Heroin seized
        73              77             82              86              72
        172            117             111 (kilograms) Cocaine seized
        8,683 14,102                   5,433          6,031
        6,269           7,460          9,687           8,695 (kilograms)
        Marijuana seized 22,314 32,392 21,646 20,234 25,005 27,726 24,833
        22,933 (kilograms) Methamphetamine                        214
        145            205             192            254             251
        444             464 seized (kilograms) Note 1: Other drugs were
        also seized. Note 2: N/A means not available. aThe amounts of
        assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.
        Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. DEA categorizes each case
        as local, regional, domestic, foreign, or international, according
        to the geographic scope covered. 2  As shown in table 2.4, a
        little over 50 percent of the task force cases initiated in fiscal
        years 1997 and 1998 were local and regional. They involved
        suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas covered
        by the DEA offices conducting the investigations, and most of them
        were local violators. Less 1 The work-hour data that DEA provided
        us for fiscal year 1998 were not yet complete, and the percentage
        of DEA special agent investigative work hours spent on state and
        local task forces in fiscal year 1998 may have actually been
        greater than 19.5 percent. 2 A local case involves a domestic
        target who operates principally within a local geographic area
        less extensive than a regional case; a regional case involves a
        domestic target who is criminally active throughout the geographic
        region of the DEA office conducting the investigation; a domestic
        case is an investigation of a target who is active principally
        within the jurisdiction of the United States; a foreign case
        involves a target active principally outside the jurisdiction of
        the United States; and an international case involves a target
        whose criminal activities are both domestic and foreign. Page 36
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations than 10 percent of the task
        force cases targeted people suspected of drug trafficking on an
        international scale. Table 2.4:  Geographic Scope of State
        Fiscal year 1997                 Fiscal year 1998 and Local Task
        Force Cases Initiated       Scope of case
        Number           Percent         Number        Percent During
        Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998          Local
        2,401                  36.3      2,633             38.4 Regional
        992                  15.0        979             14.3 Domestic
        2,606                  39.4      2,612             38.1 Foreign
        36                   0.5         30              0.4 International
        587                   8.9        599              8.7 Total
        6,622             100.1          6,853             99.9 Note:
        Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
        Developed by GAO from DEA data. The following are examples of
        state and local task force investigations conducted by the Los
        Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; and Washington, D.C., field
        divisions, respectively, that DEA considered to be successful. *
        DEA's task force in Santa Ana, CA, targeted a Mexican
        methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution organization
        operating throughout southern California. The investigation
        employed wiretaps of nine telephones, along with extensive
        surveillance, use of informants, and other investigative
        techniques. Primarily on the basis of information from the
        wiretaps, the task force conducted 11 raids in 4 cities resulting
        in the arrest of 27 Mexican nationals on state drug charges and
        the seizure of 26 pounds of methamphetamine, 25 gallons of
        methamphetamine in solution form (estimated to be the equivalent
        of 50 to 100 pounds of methamphetamine), 100 pounds of ephidrine
        in powder form, an estimated 164 pounds of ephidrine in solution
        form, other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, 3
        ounces of cocaine, and about $93,000 in cash. Two methamphetamine
        laboratories and four ephidrine extraction laboratories were
        seized and dismantled. *  In Operation Emerald City, DEA, along
        with state and local law enforcement agencies and state regulatory
        agencies, targeted a drug trafficking organization that was
        selling drugs in a Riviera Beach, FL, bar in 1997. Some of the
        biggest known drug dealers in the greater West Palm Beach area had
        used the bar and its attached property for drug dealing since the
        1960s; and numerous murders, stabbings, drive-by shootings, and
        robberies had occurred there over the years. Two leaders of one
        drug organization had been arrested, and another organization had
        taken control of the bar. DEA obtained a court order allowing
        surreptitious entry of the bar and installation of covert closed
        circuit television cameras to record drug transactions, identify
        traffickers, and afford undercover Page 37
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations officers the ability to buy
        drugs while under constant camera surveillance. As a result, 38
        people were arrested for violations of federal and state drug
        laws. In addition, the bar's liquor license was revoked, and the
        business and surrounding property were forfeited to the
        government. *  DEA's REDRUM ("murder" spelled backward) task force
        group, which focuses on drug and drug-related homicide cases,
        targeted a violent heroin trafficking organization operating in
        New Orleans, LA. DEA conducted the investigation jointly with the
        New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division and the FBI. As a
        result of the investigation, which included wiretaps,
        surveillance, and debriefings of informants, 13 individuals were
        indicted on a variety of federal drug, firearms, and murder
        charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to trial, and the head
        of the organization was found guilty of all charges and received a
        life sentence. In addition, five homicides in the city of New
        Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-
        related assets were seized. According to DEA, the investigation
        had a significant local impact by reducing violent crime and
        disrupting the flow of heroin into New Orleans. *  DEA's Richmond
        District Office City Strike Force in Virginia learned about a
        trafficking organization bringing Colombian heroin to the Richmond
        and Columbus, OH, areas from New York. Through the arrest and
        debriefing of drug couriers, the task force obtained evidence
        regarding the organization's distribution of more than 100 pounds
        of Colombian heroin in the Richmond area over approximately 1
        year's time. The task force arrested the 2 heads of the
        organization and 24 co-conspirators. Three kilograms of Colombian
        heroin and $17,000 were seized. In February 1995, DEA established
        the MET Program to help state and Mobile Enforcement Teams local
        law enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking
        in their communities, particularly crime committed by violent
        gangs. This was consistent with the Attorney General's Anti-
        Violent Crime Initiative, which was initiated in 1994 to establish
        partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement
        agencies to address major violent crime problems, including gangs.
        The MET Program was also consistent with ONDCP's 1995 National
        Drug Control Strategy, which cited the program as an example of
        how federal agencies would help state and local agencies address
        drug trafficking and associated violence. According to DEA
        officials, federal assistance through the MET Program was designed
        to help overcome two challenges facing state and local agencies in
        drug enforcement: Page 38
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations *  State and local police
        agencies did not have sufficient resources to effectively enforce
        drug laws. *  Local law enforcement personnel were known to local
        drug users and sellers, making undercover drug buys and
        penetration of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous.
        Unlike DEA's traditional State and Local Task Force Program,
        previously discussed, in the MET Program, upon request from local
        officials, DEA deploys teams of special agents (referred to as
        METs) directly to communities affected by drug-related violence.
        The METs are based in DEA field divisions throughout the country.
        The METs are to work cooperatively with the requesting local law
        enforcement agency-sharing intelligence, coordinating activities,
        and sometimes combining staff and other resources-to target drug
        gangs and individuals responsible for violent crime. Since its
        creation in fiscal year 1995, funds for the MET Program have
        totaled about $173 million in constant 1999 dollars. Table 2.5
        shows the MET budget, the number of active METs, and the number of
        agents authorized for those METs from the inception through fiscal
        year 1999. Table 2.5: Selected MET Program Data,      MET Fiscal
        Years 1995 to 1999
        Fiscal years Program data                       1995a
        1996             1997              1998             1999 METs
        19                19               23                24
        24 DEA special                  167              167
        250              250               250 agentsb Budget
        d            $55.1d            $19.7            $46.9
        $51.1 (millions) c aFiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month
        period. bThe number of special agent positions were authorized as
        of the end of each fiscal year, except for fiscal year 1999
        positions, which were as of March 1999. c The budget amounts for
        each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts
        include actual payroll costs for fiscal year 1996 and approximated
        payroll costs for fiscal years 1997 through 1999. Other costs are
        actual for fiscal years 1996 through 1998 and as approved for
        fiscal year 1999. dThe fiscal year 1996 budget includes funds
        spent in fiscal year 1995. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.
        A typical MET is made up of 8 to 12 DEA special agents. Each MET
        operation starts with a request to the local DEA field office from
        a police chief, sheriff, or district attorney for assistance in
        dealing with drug-related violence. DEA then evaluates the scope
        of the problem and the capability of local law enforcement to
        address it. Each assessment is supposed to give particular
        attention to the violent crime rate in the requesting Page 39
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations community and the impact of
        the identified drug group on the violence occurring there. Once
        DEA decides to deploy a MET, an action plan is to be developed,
        including identification of the suspects to be targeted. Following
        this initial planning, the MET is to conduct the deployment
        outfitted with the necessary surveillance and technical equipment.
        During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law
        enforcement officials to investigate and arrest targeted violent
        drug offenders. According to DEA officials, the MET generally
        collects intelligence, initiates investigations, participates in
        undercover operations, makes arrests, seizes assets, and provides
        support to local or federal prosecutors. Evidence developed in MET
        investigations may also be used to prosecute the same individuals
        for related crimes, including murder, assault, or other acts of
        violence. According to DEA, each MET deployment plan establishes a
        time frame of between 90 and 120 days for completing the
        deployment.3 At the time of our review, DEA had 24 METs in 20 of
        its 21 domestic field divisions (with the Caribbean Division being
        the only exception). Table 2.6 shows the number of MET deployments
        and their results from the program's inception in fiscal year 1995
        through fiscal year 1998. 3 In discussing a draft of our report,
        DEA noted that a review of all 187 MET deployments completed as of
        April 20, 1999, showed that the average deployment length was 167
        days. Page 40
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.6: Selected Data on
        MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998 Fiscal years
        Selected data on MET deployments                1995 (6 months)-
        1996                          1997                     1998
        Total Requests
        112                        67                      79
        258 Deployments initiated
        79                       46                      56
        181 Deployments completed
        79                       45                      34
        158 Deployments active
        0                          1                    22
        23 Arrestsa
        1,973                    2,200                     2,199
        6,372 Convictionsb
        240                       415                    1,071
        1,726 Cocaine seized (pounds)
        95                      747                     342
        1,184 Methamphetamine seized (pounds)
        68                      115                     199
        382 Heroin seized (pounds)
        3                       31                      18
        52 Marijuana Seized (pounds)
        158                       493                     646
        1,297 Assets seized (millions)c
        $3.6                       $2.7                    $3.8
        $10.0 aIn addition to DEA arrests, MET deployments from the
        program's inception through 1998 also led to a total of 612
        arrests by other law enforcement agencies. bAccording to DEA,
        actual convictions are higher than these numbers indicate due to
        sentencing delays and the lack of reporting of prosecutorial
        dispositions in the state systems. Also, the conviction totals may
        increase due to the delay between arrest and final disposition. c
        The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999
        dollars. The yearly amounts, when added, do not equal the total
        due to rounding. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. The DEA
        offices in Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C.,
        had completed 33 MET deployments at the time we made our visits
        during 1998. In conducting our work at these offices, we spoke
        with local police officials in selected cities-Baltimore, MD; Los
        Angeles, CA; Pine Bluff, AR; and South Miami, FL-who had requested
        MET deployments. The officials said they were pleased with the
        results of the MET deployments and that the accomplishments met
        their expectations. Following are summaries of the MET deployments
        in these four cities. *  A MET deployment conducted for about 2-
        1/2 months during 1996 in the Rampart area of Los Angeles targeted
        six violent street gangs: 18th Street, Mara Salvatruches, Orphans,
        Playboys, Crazy Riders, and Diamonds. In addition to the MET, the
        Los Angeles Police Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
        Firearms, and the California Department of Corrections
        participated. The operation resulted in 421 arrests, including 144
        by DEA's MET, and seizures of 1,200 grams of heroin, 630 grams of
        cocaine, 104 pounds of marijuana, 28 weapons, and $70,000 in
        currency. According to a Los Angeles Police Department official,
        crime statistics (e.g., homicides and aggravated assaults) in the
        Rampart area fell immediately after the MET deployment was
        completed. However, DEA's post-deployment assessment of violent
        crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment
        ended to the 6 months prior to the Page 41
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations deployment, showed that
        homicides increased from 42 to 47, aggravated assaults increased
        from 738 to 1,008, robberies increased from 1,091 to 1,275, and
        sex crimes increased from 130 to 207. In addition, the assessment
        indicated that drug sales appeared to increase shortly after the
        deployment was completed, approaching levels observed before the
        deployment started. It further indicated that a significant number
        of drug dealers reportedly changed the location of their
        distribution activities while remaining in the Rampart area.4 *
        The South Miami Police Department requested DEA support in going
        after crack cocaine dealers. Initially, the police collected
        intelligence, purchased drugs, and arrested 17 street-level drug
        dealers. DEA's MET then became involved. The MET bought crack
        cocaine from drug dealers who came out to sell the drugs after the
        initial arrests had been made. The MET, which deployed for about 3
        months in 1998, made 13 arrests (7 for federal prosecution and 6
        for state prosecution) and seized 386.7 grams of crack cocaine.
        South Miami police officials said some of those arrested had
        committed weapons violations and some violence (e.g., assaults,
        batteries, and armed robberies) in the past. According to DEA's
        post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area,
        comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6 months
        prior to the deployment, homicides decreased from 1 to 0, assaults
        decreased from 11 to 4, aggravated batteries decreased from 9 to
        3, and robberies decreased from 14 to 5. The assessment noted that
        illegal drug activity in the South Miami area had been greatly
        reduced. The assessment further noted that the availability of
        crack cocaine in the area had been reduced, as well as drug
        distribution in surrounding areas. *  A MET deployment conducted
        for 6 months during 1997 in Pine Bluff targeted violent
        organizations dealing in crack cocaine and methamphetamine. A
        total of 46 people were arrested, including 15 who were indicted
        by a federal grand jury. Four people were suspects in four
        different homicides. Six ounces of crack cocaine were seized,
        along with 15 vehicles and $118,026. The Pine Bluff Police Chief
        told us that the MET deployment had successfully helped reduce
        both the city's homicide rate and its crack cocaine problem.
        However, DEA's post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the
        area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6
        months prior to the deployment, showed that homicides increased
        from 4 to 7, assaults increased from 677 to 1,098, rapes increased
        from 44 to 51, and robberies increased from 168 to 190. 4 In
        discussing a draft of our report, DEA officials said this MET
        deployment was not typical.  It was conducted during a time when
        DEA was refining the program.  The Los Angeles Rampart area
        deployment focused on a specific area, and DEA now requires each
        MET deployment to focus on targeted criminal drug organizations.
        Page 42
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations *  A MET deployed in eastern
        Baltimore for 5 months during 1997 successfully targeted a drug
        organization-the M&J Gang-in a housing project. This case resulted
        in 81 arrests, many of which were already "in the works" before
        the MET deployment, according to Baltimore police officials we
        contacted. The officials said the MET deployment also reduced
        violent crime in that area. DEA's post-deployment assessment
        showed fewer major crimes overall in the area during the 6-month
        period starting about 1 month before the deployment ended compared
        to the 6 months prior to the deployment. Shootings decreased from
        527 to 389, aggravated assaults decreased from 3,273 to 2,950,
        robberies decreased from 4,888 to 3,889, burglaries decreased from
        5,775 to 5,684, larcenies decreased from 16,475 to 15,976, and
        stolen automobiles decreased from 4,851 to 3,213. However, murders
        increased from 143 to 156, and rapes increased from 175 to 202.
        DEA's assessment also reported that narcotic activity in two areas
        covered by the deployment was significantly reduced, and gang-
        related criminal activity had decreased in the sections of
        Baltimore controlled by the M&J Gang and another drug gang. DEA
        officials we met with in the four field division offices told us
        that although MET deployments typically focused on local violent
        drug offenders, they sometimes led to investigations of higher
        level drug traffickers. In response to our request for
        quantitative data on this, a DEA headquarters official responded
        that it is difficult for DEA to provide statistics on the exact
        number of deployments that have led to investigations of higher
        level drug traffickers through MET operations because this
        information was not systematically maintained in an automated
        database. However, DEA did provide us with some examples of MET
        deployments that led to higher level drug traffickers. For
        example, DEA reported that a MET deployed from DEA's Phoenix
        office identified connections in Mexico to MET targets in Lake
        Havasu City, AZ, and family members in southern California. The
        resulting intelligence revealed that this Mexican-based
        organization was responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals
        from Mexico to clandestine laboratory sites in southern
        California, where methamphetamine was produced. Multiple-pound
        quantities of methamphetamine were transported to Lake Havasu
        City. According to DEA, the organization was also transporting
        large shipments of methamphetamine to Oregon, Washington,
        Colorado, and New Mexico. As shown in table 2.7, the MET
        deployments conducted in fiscal years 1995 through 1998 resulted
        in mostly local and regional drug cases. Local and regional cases
        involve suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas
        covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. As
        expected, given the MET program's purpose, local cases were the
        single Page 43                                     GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
        the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
        Trafficking Organizations largest category, making up about 47
        percent of the total during that period. About 6 percent of the
        MET cases involved criminals trafficking in drugs on an
        international scale. Table 2.7:  Geographic Scope of MET Program
        Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998 Fiscal year
        1995a     Fiscal year 1996         Fiscal year 1997
        Fiscal Year 1998         Total Scope of case             Number
        Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
        Number Percent Local                           21      40.4
        52       40.0           87        54.4             69      48.6
        229       47.3 Regional                        18      34.6
        38       29.2           32        20.0             38      26.8
        126       26.0 Domestic                         8      15.4
        30       23.1           36        22.5             23      16.2
        97       20.0 Foreign                          0       0.0
        0         0.0           0             0.0           0      0.0
        0        0.0 International                    4       7.7
        10         7.7           5             3.1         12       8.5
        31        6.4 Other                            1       1.9
        0         0.0           0             0.0           0      0.0
        1        0.2 Total                           52     100.0
        130     100.0         160        100.0            142     100.1
        484       99.9 Note:  Percentages may not total 100 percent due to
        rounding. aFiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period. Source:
        Developed by GAO from DEA data. After completing a MET deployment,
        DEA may carry out efforts to help a community maintain a lower
        level of drug trafficking and violent crime. For example, DEA
        offers follow-up training to those communities carrying out drug
        demand reduction activities.  In addition, if feasible, DEA may
        respond to a request for the re-deployment of a MET to prevent
        drug- related violent crimes from resurging to the level that
        existed prior to the initial deployment. In a June 1998 memorandum
        to all SACs of domestic field offices, DEA headquarters directed
        that the field divisions proactively promote the MET Program to
        increase the number of requests for deployments. The memorandum
        stated that despite the MET Program's success, much more could and
        should be done to stimulate interest in the program on the part of
        state and local law enforcement agencies.  The DEA offices were
        instructed to collect crime statistics in specific areas within
        their geographic boundaries to determine the existence of drug
        trafficking problems related to violent crime. After making such
        determinations, the DEA SAC or a designated assistant was to
        contact the local police chief or sheriff in those areas to
        explain the benefits of a MET deployment in their jurisdictions
        and inform them of the availability of MET resources. The
        memorandum noted that each SAC or assistant was expected to visit
        local police officials each month. The memorandum further noted
        that each office's proactive MET Program activities would be a
        significant factor in the SACs' annual performance appraisals.
        According to DEA, the proactive contacts have generated numerous
        additional requests for MET assistance, Page 44
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations and the majority of recent
        deployments have been the result of such proactive contacts. With
        regard to the results of the MET Program, DEA officials reported
        decreases in the number of murders, robberies, and aggravated
        assaults in local areas covered by the program based on an
        analysis of local crime statistics gathered from the targeted
        geographic locations before and after 133 deployments that had
        been completed as of April 20, 1999.5 According to DEA, its post-
        deployment assessments cumulatively showed a 12- percent decline
        in murders, 14-percent decline in robberies, and 6-percent decline
        in aggravated assaults in the 133 deployment areas during the 6
        months after the deployments ended when compared to the 6 months
        prior to the deployments.  Further, DEA's analysis showed that 28
        of the 133 deployment areas had decreases in all 3 major violent
        crime categories (i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault)
        during the 6 months after the deployments ended, while only 5 of
        the areas had increases in all 3 crime categories. (These five
        deployments included two of the examples summarized above). In
        commenting on these results, DEA noted that the effectiveness of
        MET deployments in removing a specific, targeted violent drug
        gang, for example, cannot by itself eliminate a community's drug
        trafficking problems because DEA cannot continue to control the
        deployment areas to prevent other drug dealers from filling the
        void that a MET deployment might have created. DEA started
        assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in their
        Domestic Cannabis          efforts to control domestically grown
        marijuana in 1979, when it helped Eradication/Suppression
        agencies in California and Hawaii. DEA's Domestic Cannabis Program
        Eradication/Suppression Program was established in 1982 to more
        formally help the states eradicate domestic marijuana while
        building cases leading to the arrest and prosecution of growers.
        The program became active in all 50 states in 1985. To implement
        the program, DEA provides funds to state and local law enforcement
        agencies. The funds are to be used by these agencies for program
        expenses, such as aircraft rentals and fuel, vehicles, equipment,
        supplies, and overtime payments for state and local officers
        working on eradication operations. As table 2.8 indicates, funds
        provided by DEA for the program increased about 177 percent, in
        constant 1999 dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999.
        5 According to DEA, 187 deployments had been completed as of April
        20, 1999. However, DEA only had FBI Uniform Crime Report
        statistical information for the 6-month period following 133 of
        the completed deployments. Page 45
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.8:  Funding for DEA's
        Domestic    Dollars in millions Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
        Fiscal year
        Dollarsa Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999
        1990
        4.7 1991
        16.2 1992
        11.5 1993
        11.2 1994
        10.9 1995
        10.7 1996
        10.5 1997
        13.9 1998
        13.7 1999
        13.0 aThe fund amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999
        dollars. The fund amounts do not include DEA's payroll costs.
        Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. DEA encourages state and
        local agencies to assume the major responsibility for eradicating
        domestic marijuana. In coordinating the program in each state, DEA
        is to assist efforts to detect and eradicate marijuana plants
        (including coordinating the support of other agencies, arranging
        for needed equipment, and helping with surveillance); exchange
        intelligence; investigate marijuana trafficking organizations; and
        provide training. Table 2.9 shows the statistical results of DEA's
        Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program for 1990 through
        1998. Page 46                                          GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus
        in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major
        Drug Trafficking Organizations Table 2.9: Domestic Cannabis
        Eradication/Suppression Program Statistical Results, 1990 Through
        1998 Output                             1990           1991
        1992           1993       1994        1995            1996
        1997      1998a Cultivated outdoor plants            7.3
        5.3         7.5           4.0        4.0         3.1
        2.8       3.8       2.1 eradicated (millions) Indoor plants
        eradicated            N/A                0.3         0.3
        0.3        0.2         0.2             0.2       0.2       0.2
        (millions) Ditchweed plants                   118.5          133.8
        264.2          387.9     504.4        370.3           419.7
        237.1     127.9 eradicatedb (millions) Arrests
        5,729          9,364       12,639          12,397    13,115
        14,274      18,733        17,070    10,507 Weapons
        3,210          4,200         5,541          6,062     5,959
        4,151           4,699     4,713     7,351 seized Assets seized
        (millions)c          $47.7          $62.4         $79.7
        $58.2     $62.1        $47.3           $39.7     $40.7     $20.9
        Note: N/A means not available. aThe 1998 data provided by DEA at
        the time of our work were not complete. bDitchweed is uncultivated
        marijuana that grows wild. c The amounts of assets seized each
        year are in constant 1999 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from
        DEA data. In addition to its State and Local Task Force, MET, and
        Domestic Cannabis DEA Works With State and
        Eradication/Suppression Programs, DEA also participates in other
        Local Agencies on Other                     multiagency task force
        operations involving state and local law Multiagency Operations
        enforcement agencies. These include the following: *  The
        Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program is
        coordinated by U.S. Attorneys. This program is designed to promote
        coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law
        enforcement agencies involved in drug enforcement in each task
        force region. The goal of the OCDETF Program is to identify,
        investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking
        organizations and related enterprises. In fiscal year 1998, DEA
        sponsored 847, or 62 percent, and participated in 1,096, or 81
        percent, of the 1,356 OCDETF investigations that were initiated.
        DOJ reimburses DEA for its expenditures on OCDETF investigations.
        For fiscal year 1998, DEA was reimbursed $94.4 million for the
        OCDETF Program. *  The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
        (HIDTA) Program is administered by ONDCP. The mission of the HIDTA
        Program is to coordinate drug control efforts among federal,
        state, and local agencies in designated areas in order to reduce
        drug trafficking in critical regions of the United States. At the
        time of our work in September 1998, ONDCP had designated 20 areas
        as HIDTAs. According to ONDCP, a HIDTA organization typically
        consists of a major task force led by federal agencies, drug and
        money laundering task forces led by state or local agencies, a
        joint intelligence center and information-sharing network, and
        Page 47                                           GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
        the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
        Trafficking Organizations other supporting initiatives.6 DEA
        receives funds from ONDCP based upon its participation in the
        HIDTA Program. For fiscal year 1998, DEA received $14.8 million in
        direct HIDTA funding. Since it was established, DEA's highest
        priority has been to investigate DEA Developed an
        major drug trafficking organizations, both domestic and foreign,
        Investigative Approach responsible for supplying illegal drugs
        consumed in the United States. Over the years, DEA has adopted
        various techniques for focusing its efforts on Focusing on the
        such investigations. In 1992, DEA started using an investigative
        approach Communications of                designed to identify and
        target drug kingpins and their supporting Major Drug Trafficking
        infrastructures, primarily through the use of wiretaps and other
        types of Organizations                    electronic surveillance
        within the United States and the use of intelligence information.
        DEA called this approach the Kingpin Strategy. This approach,
        which has led to the dismantling or disruption of major
        trafficking organizations, was later adopted by SOD when it was
        established in 1995. More recently, DEA has established the
        Regional Enforcement Team (RET) initiative to address regional,
        national, and international drug trafficking in small towns and
        rural areas within the United States. Developed in 1992, the
        Kingpin Strategy targeted major Colombian cocaine The Kingpin
        Strategy             and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin
        trafficking organizations. This strategy was DEA's top priority
        and its primary enforcement approach for addressing the national
        priority of reducing the availability of illegal drugs in the
        United States. The Kingpin Strategy primarily targeted cocaine
        trafficking organizations operating out of Medellin and Cali,
        Colombia, with most of its focus on one organization referred to
        as the Cali cartel. According to DEA, the heads of the Colombian
        organizations tightly controlled all aspects of their operations
        and telephoned subordinates to give directions. DEA concluded that
        this was a weakness in the operations of these organizations. DEA
        decided to exploit this weakness by monitoring their
        communications and analyzing telephone numbers called to identify
        the kingpins and their key subordinates for U.S. and/or foreign
        investigation, arrest, and prosecution and for seizure of their
        domestic assets. The Office of Major Investigations at DEA
        headquarters was responsible for implementing the Kingpin
        Strategy. Various intelligence, financial, and operational
        functions were consolidated within this office to facilitate
        focusing DEA's investigative resources and capabilities on
        targeted 6 Drug Control: Information on High Intensity Drug
        Trafficking Areas Program (GAO/GGD-98-188, Sept. 3, 1998). Page 48
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations kingpin organizations (TKO).
        The office disseminated tips and leads, collected from
        intelligence sources worldwide, to help agents in the field carry
        out investigations and enforcement activities. The office
        centrally directed, coordinated, oversaw, and funded
        investigations that were being carried out in multiple U.S. cities
        and foreign countries in cooperation with state, local, and
        foreign police. DEA's SOD and its investigative approach evolved
        out of the Office of Special Operations Division Major
        Investigations and the Kingpin Strategy. According to DEA, the
        Kingpin Strategy was enhanced by the creation of SOD as a separate
        division. SOD was established at DEA headquarters in August 1995
        and given its own budget and additional staff.7 As with the
        Kingpin Strategy, SOD's approach focuses on the command and
        control communications of major drug trafficking organizations.
        However, a major difference is that its scope was expanded beyond
        Colombian cocaine and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin
        trafficking organizations to coordinate and support investigations
        of major organizations trafficking in methamphetamine and
        Colombian heroin, as well as organizations trafficking illegal
        drugs along the Southwest Border. SOD's primary emphasis currently
        is Colombian and Mexican organizations responsible for smuggling
        illegal drugs into the United States. Another major difference
        from the Kingpin Strategy is that representatives from other law
        enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S. Customs Service,
        are detailed to SOD. The FBI has had agents detailed to SOD since
        1995, and the Deputy SAC of SOD is an FBI agent. Similarly, the
        Customs Service has detailed agents to SOD since 1996. Most of
        SOD's workload supports cases being conducted by DEA field
        offices. However, the SOD SAC told us that the workload was
        increasingly supporting FBI and Customs Service cases. The
        intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) also
        participate by providing drug intelligence to SOD. In addition,
        DOJ's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section participates by
        providing legal advice to SOD on investigations. Like the Kingpin
        Strategy, SOD's investigative approach and initiatives are to
        support domestic and foreign investigations of major drug
        traffickers and trafficking organizations in two principal ways.
        First, SOD is to disseminate tips and leads collected from
        intelligence sources worldwide to help agents in the field carry
        out investigations and enforcement activities. Second, SOD is to
        assist agents in building and coordinating multijurisdictional
        drug conspiracy cases that are based primarily on the 7 The DEA
        Administrator approved 40 positions, including 31 Special Agent
        positions, for the new SOD. Page 49
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations use of wiretaps.
        Multijurisdictional efforts, such as Operation Reciprocity
        (described later) with 35 wiretaps in 10 U.S. cities, can involve
        many different individual investigations across the country. In
        May 1999, the SOD SAC estimated that SOD was supporting and
        coordinating about 240 cases throughout the United States. He said
        that SOD typically had approximately six to eight ongoing major
        operations at any one time, each having multiple related cases.
        Similar to the Kingpin Strategy, SOD does not control the cases
        that it supports; rather, decisionmaking on cases is left to field
        supervisors and agents. According to DEA officials, if SOD
        determines that field offices in different parts of the country
        are conducting investigations related to the same major drug
        trafficking organization, it attempts to bring the responsible
        agents together to develop the best cases for prosecution. In so
        doing, it is to coordinate and guide the agents' efforts,
        including their intelligence and electronic surveillance
        operations, and assist with intelligence collection and analysis.
        SOD essentially funds the same types of investigative activities
        as the Office of Major Investigations funded under the Kingpin
        Strategy. According to the SOD SAC, SOD provides funds to DEA
        field offices primarily for conducting electronic surveillance in
        support of investigations. It also funds payments for informants
        and drug purchases if doing so is essential to an investigation.
        However, he said it does so only when an electronic surveillance
        is being conducted or planned and only in connection with an
        ongoing case with which SOD is involved. (For example, in the
        course of an investigation, an agent may acquire a phone number
        that is determined to be connected with a current SOD-funded
        investigation.) SOD does not fund individual FBI and Customs drug
        investigations, but it does support some of those investigations
        through its various activities. SOD is responsible for the
        oversight of and guidance for DEA's Title III Collection,
        Analysis, and    (electronic surveillance) program. In Title III
        of the Omnibus Crime Dissemination of             Control and Safe
        Streets Act of 1968, Congress set forth the circumstances
        Intelligence Information     under which the interception of wire
        and oral communications may be Enhanced
        authorized (P.L. 90-351,18 USC 2510, et seq.). SOD is to help
        special agents in the field focus their intercept operations on
        the best available targets, choose the best telephone numbers for
        intercept, correctly conduct the intercepts, make the best use of
        collected information, and make the most efficient use of
        transcribers and translators. SOD also is to send teams to the
        field to assist special agents with their wire intercept
        operations. Page 50                                     GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its
        Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations According to DEA officials
        and data, since the Kingpin Strategy and SOD initiatives have been
        in operation, DEA has greatly increased the number of wiretaps and
        other electronic surveillances it conducts. The number of
        electronic surveillance court orders requested and conducted by
        DEA, as shown in table 2.10,  increased by 183 percent; and the
        number of facilities (e.g., telephone, pager, and fax machine)
        covered by the orders increased by 158 percent, from fiscal year
        1990 to fiscal year 1998. Most noteworthy is that the number of
        orders increased by 30 percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1992
        after the Kingpin Strategy was initiated, and they increased by 65
        percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1996 after SOD was
        established. Table 2.10: Number of Electronic
        Orders requested and Surveillance Orders and Facilities    Fiscal
        year                                          conducted
        Facilities covered Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through    1990
        223                               219 1998
        1991                                                          256
        311 1992
        332                               302 1993
        320                               320 1994
        357                               339 1995
        330                               284 1996
        546                               584 1997
        592                               544 1998
        631                               564 Note: The number of orders
        requested and conducted is sometimes greater than the number of
        facilities covered because some DEA requests were for extensions
        of previous wiretap orders. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA
        data. DEA's Special Intelligence Division is to support SOD's
        operations by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
        intelligence and other information from a variety of sources. For
        example, the unit is to analyze and disseminate information from
        telephone records and access and disseminate information from DEA,
        FBI, and Customs computerized drug intelligence systems. The unit
        has expanded both in size and computer and other technological
        capability. There were 186 staff in October 1998, including DEA,
        FBI, Customs, DOD, and contractor personnel. According to the SOD
        SAC, although DEA did not systematically compile Major
        International Drug              results data on all of the Kingpin
        and SOD operations, cases supported, Trafficking Organizations
        and leads disseminated, DEA has used both initiatives to
        successfully Disrupted                             dismantle or
        disrupt drug trafficking organizations responsible for large
        amounts of illegal drugs brought into the United States. For
        example, according to DEA, the Kingpin Strategy contributed to
        dismantling the Cali cartel, which DEA considered the most
        powerful criminal organization that law enforcement has ever
        faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel Page 51
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations leaders have been captured by
        or surrendered to the Colombian National Police (CNP), with the
        exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the
        time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through
        years of investigations by DEA and other federal, state, and local
        law enforcement agencies and CNP led to the identification,
        indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel
        leaders and some of their subordinates on drug charges in Colombia
        and the United States. According to DEA, a number of other
        successful operations have resulted from the Kingpin Strategy and
        SOD initiatives. These include the following: *  Operation Tiger
        Trap was a joint operation carried out by DEA and the Royal Thai
        Police in 1994. Tiger Trap produced U.S. indictments against
        members of the 20,000-man Shan United Army, a heroin TKO that
        operated the principal trafficking network in the Golden Triangle
        area of Thailand, Burma, and Laos for decades. *  Zorro I and
        Zorro II were multijurisdictional operations involving DEA, the
        FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local law enforcement
        agencies. Zorro I targeted Colombian drug traffickers based in
        Cali, Colombia, and their key subordinates operating in Los
        Angeles, New York, and Miami. Zorro I operated from 1992 to 1994
        and included 10 DEA domestic field divisions. Zorro II targeted
        Mexican transportation groups used by the Colombians, as well as
        Colombian distribution cells located throughout the United States.
        It operated from 1995 to 1996 and included 14 DEA field divisions.
        The two operations relied heavily on the use of wiretaps. There
        were 117 wiretaps conducted, generating leads that identified
        Colombian distribution cells, Mexican traffickers' command and
        control networks, money laundering routes, cocaine cache sites,
        and other important information. According to DEA, these
        operations disrupted both Colombian and Mexican organizations.
        Specifically, Zorro I resulted in 209 arrests, 6.5 tons of cocaine
        seized, and $13.5 million seized. Zorro II resulted in 182
        arrests, 5.7 tons of cocaine and 1,018 pounds of marijuana seized,
        $18.3 million seized, and $2.5 million in assets seized. *
        Operation Limelight was a multijurisdictional operation involving
        DEA, Customs, and numerous state and local law enforcement
        agencies. The operation targeted a Mexican drug transportation and
        distribution organization, which intelligence indicated was
        responsible for importing over 1- tons of cocaine monthly into the
        United States. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997,
        included the use of 37 wiretaps and other electronically generated
        intelligence, which helped identify groups in Houston and McAllen,
        TX; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, CA; New York, NY;
        and Chicago, IL. The operation resulted in 48 arrests, 4 tons Page
        52                                     GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in the
        1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
        Trafficking Organizations of cocaine seized, 10,846 pounds of
        marijuana seized, and $7.1 million seized. *  Operation
        Reciprocity was a multijurisdictional investigation involving DEA,
        the FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local agencies.
        In this operation, DEA combined several independent, but related,
        investigations being simultaneously conducted by federal, state,
        and local agencies into one investigation and helped other offices
        start investigations of other subjects by providing leads. The
        operation focused on two independent group heads based in the
        Juarez, Mexico, area who were responsible for importing,
        transporting, and distributing more than 30 tons of cocaine from
        Mexico to Chicago and New York. The operation involved 35 wiretaps
        and other electronically generated intelligence information in 10
        cities. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997, resulted in 53
        arrests, 7.4 tons of cocaine seized, 2,800 pounds of marijuana
        seized, and $11.2 million seized. According to DEA, information
        from some of the above SOD operations Regional Enforcement
        and other intelligence sources indicates that some major drug
        trafficking Teams                     organizations are adapting
        to drug law enforcement efforts in large U.S. cities by shifting
        their operations to small towns and rural areas within the United
        States. DEA investigations and other information have provided
        evidence that these trafficking organizations have established
        command and control centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment
        points in many small communities. Consequently, according to DEA,
        these communities have become major distribution centers, as well
        as production centers in some cases, for illegal drugs, such as
        cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. To respond to
        this threat, DEA established the RET initiative in fiscal year
        1999, for which Congress provided $13 million and authorized 56
        positions. The RETs are designed to be proactive, highly mobile
        regional investigative teams whose mission is to (1) target drug
        organizations operating or establishing themselves in small towns
        and rural areas where there is a lack of sufficient drug law
        enforcement resources and (2) better develop and exploit drug
        intelligence developed by SOD and other sources. The RET
        initiative's objective is to identify and dismantle these drug
        organizations before they become entrenched in the communities.
        The RETs are similar to METs, previously discussed, only in that
        they are mobile teams.  The RET initiative differs significantly
        from the MET Program in that the RETs are to only target major
        drug violators operating at the regional, national, or
        international level; while the METs, upon Page 53
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations request from local
        authorities, are to assist urban and rural communities in
        investigating and eliminating drug-related violence. DEA is
        implementing two RETs, which are to become operational in
        September 1999, one in Charlotte, NC, and one in Des Moines, IA.
        According to DEA, each RET will consist of 22 personnel, including
        15 special agents. In addition, the RETs are to be provided with
        the investigative equipment and vehicles needed to ensure a high
        degree of mobility and capability to support the performance of
        even the most complex investigations. According to DEA,
        international drug trafficking organizations have Key Changes in
        DEA's    become the most dangerous organized crime forces in the
        world, and Foreign Operations      Colombian and Mexican
        organizations are the most threatening to the United States. DEA
        documents state that such international trafficking organizations
        are often headquartered in foreign countries where there is little
        or no potential for extradition to the United States. Because of
        the international nature of drug trafficking, DEA had 79 offices
        in 56 foreign countries as of December 1998. DEA opened 16 offices
        in 15 foreign countries, and closed 4 offices in 4 countries, from
        fiscal years 1990 through 1998. Each foreign DEA office is part of
        the U.S. Embassy's country team. As a country team member, how DEA
        operates in a foreign country must be consistent with the
        embassy's Mission Program Plan, which is a strategic plan required
        by the State Department for U.S. government activities within each
        country where there is a U.S. Embassy. Mission Program Plans
        discuss the embassies' human rights, democratic, economic, law
        enforcement, and other goals, strategies, and objectives,
        including efforts to combat drug trafficking. The plan for each
        country is to be reviewed and approved by DEA and other agencies
        represented on the country team. DEA cannot operate in foreign
        countries as it does in the United States because of various
        limitations. For example, DEA said its agents cannot make arrests
        or conduct electronic surveillances in any foreign country, nor
        can they be present during foreign police enforcement operations
        without a waiver from the Ambassador.8 DEA's primary goal in the
        countries where it operates is, through bilateral law enforcement
        8 The Mansfield Amendment, Section 481(c) of the Foreign
        Assistance Act, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2291(c), regulates the
        involvement of U.S. government personnel in foreign drug law
        enforcement activities. Page 54
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations cooperation, to disrupt
        and/or dismantle the leadership, command, control, and
        infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations that threaten the
        United States. To accomplish this goal, DEA engages in cooperative
        investigations and exchanges intelligence with its host nation
        counterparts. In addition, DEA provides training, advice, and
        assistance to host nation law enforcement agencies to improve
        their effectiveness and make them self-sufficient in investigating
        major drug traffickers and combating the production,
        transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs. In addition to
        SOD operations, DEA has been a participant in two Interagency
        International    interagency investigative programs that were
        established during the 1990s Investigative Programs       to
        address drug trafficking in certain foreign countries where major
        trafficking organizations were based. They are the Linear and
        Linkage Approach Programs. Linear Approach Program      This
        program was established in 1991 as a U.S. interagency forum to
        disrupt and dismantle the key organizations in Latin America
        responsible for producing and shipping illegal drugs to the United
        States. The program's foundation rests on three basic tenets:
        focus law enforcement and intelligence community resources on key
        targets, foster community collaboration, and enhance host nation
        capabilities. The Washington Linear Committee, which comprises 15
        organizations and is cochaired by DEA, was designed to help better
        coordinate the counterdrug efforts of U.S. Embassy country teams,
        field-based regional intelligence centers, and U.S. Military
        Commands. The Linear Approach Program initially focused on
        Colombian and Mexican cocaine organizations. It has since been
        expanded to include other Latin American trafficking organizations
        that are primary recipients of significant amounts of drugs
        directly from the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
        Some of these organizations may traffic in heroin and/or
        methamphetamine, in addition to cocaine. DEA reported that, for
        the period of 1994 through 1998, 21 main targets of the Linear
        Program and 22 associates had been arrested.9 All of the Cali
        cartel leaders who were arrested as part of the previously
        discussed Kingpin Strategy were also primary targets of the Linear
        Approach Program. This program was established in 1992 and has
        been DEA's principal Linkage Approach Program     international
        strategy to address the heroin threat from Asia. The program is
        cochaired by DEA. It focuses law enforcement and intelligence
        community resources on efforts to disrupt and dismantle major
        Asian 9 DEA did not track the number of Linear Approach Program
        arrests until 1994. Page 55
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations trafficking organizations
        producing heroin for distribution to the United States. Linkage
        Approach Program targets are to have a significant role in one of
        the Southeast or Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations
        and be subject to extradition to, and arrest and prosecution in,
        the United States. According to DEA, prior to this program, which
        was designed to make use of U.S. drug conspiracy laws, major
        Southeast and Southwest Asian traffickers exploited the lack of
        conspiracy laws in their own countries by insulating themselves
        from the actual drugs. The Linkage Program uses a multinational
        and multiagency approach to gather evidence for use in the U.S.
        judicial system, securing indictments in federal courts, and
        pursuing the extradition of the targeted traffickers to the United
        States for prosecution. DEA reported that through 1998, 33 Linkage
        Approach Program targets had been arrested, 10 defendants had been
        extradited to the United States, and 1 defendant was incarcerated
        pending extradition. In 1996, DEA initiated its Vetted Unit
        Program, under which foreign police Vetted Units of Foreign
        participate in special host country investigative and intelligence
        collection Police Established         units in selected foreign
        countries. According to DEA officials, the foreign police
        participants are screened and then trained by DEA with the
        intention of enhancing their professionalism and creating an
        atmosphere of increased trust and confidence between participating
        foreign police and DEA agents working with the vetted units. DEA
        believes that these units will (1) enhance the safety of DEA
        agents in those participating countries and (2) increase the
        sharing of sensitive information between DEA and foreign police.
        All foreign police participating in the DEA program must be
        successfully "vetted," that is, pass a computerized criminal
        background investigation, a security questionnaire and background
        interview, medical and psychological screening, polygraph testing,
        and urinalysis testing. They then attend a 4- to 5-week DEA
        investigative training course in Leesburg, VA. After they are
        screened and trained, the vetted foreign police are to receive
        ongoing training as well as random polygraph and urinalysis
        testing. The Vetted Unit Program initially began in Mexico in May
        1996. After the Government of Mexico approved the concept, 21
        Mexican police were screened and then trained by DEA. The vetting
        process was completed in November 1996, and the Mexico National
        Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) became operational in January
        1997. Page 56                                     GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its Focus in
        the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major Drug
        Trafficking Organizations DEA then expanded the program to other
        countries. For fiscal year 1997, Congress appropriated $20 million
        to support vetted units in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In
        March 1997, the DEA Administrator authorized immediate
        implementation of vetting in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. He also
        authorized programs in Brazil and Thailand for 1998. The $20
        million appropriation for vetted units in fiscal year 1997 is now
        part of DEA's budget base and has recurred each subsequent fiscal
        year. According to DEA, as of October 1998, vetted units, which
        were designed to engage in intelligence collection, investigations
        of drug traffickers, or both, were operational in Bolivia,
        Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Program start-up costs in fiscal years
        1997 and 1998 amounted to a total of $7.4 million for Bolivia,
        $5.3 million for Colombia, $4.6 million for Mexico, and $4.4
        million for Peru.10 According to a DEA official, it took an
        average of about 6 months to complete the screening and training
        of the foreign police from the time they were identified to DEA as
        candidates selected by the host governments for the program,
        although the actual length of time varied because of factors such
        as limited availability of polygraphers. As shown in table 2.11,
        the number of vetted officers varied by country. Each vetted unit
        had one or two DEA agents assigned for assistance, liaison, and
        case support. Table 2.11: Number of Vetted Units and
        Number of                                            Number of
        Officers on Board by Country, as of         Country
        vetted units                                    vetted officers
        September 30, 1998                          Bolivia
        4                                                172 Colombia
        4                                                112 Mexico
        3                                                232 Peru
        2                                                135 Total
        13                                                  651 Source:
        Developed by GAO from DEA data. The following summarizes the
        status and accomplishments of the existing vetted units under the
        program as of September 30, 1998, according to DEA. *  Bolivia had
        four SIUs with vetted personnel. Three SIUs each had 25 Bolivian
        National Police, and a fourth unit had 97 personnel. The SIUs were
        located in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Two of the SIUs
        collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and arrest targeted
        drug traffickers, while the other two SIUs concentrate primarily
        on collecting 10 Program start-up costs for the vetted units
        included expenditures for such items as recruiting, vetting,
        training, equipment, facilities maintenance, salary supplements
        for foreign police, operational support, and conducting
        investigations. Page 57
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations intelligence. DEA reported
        that the Bolivian SIUs' efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted
        in 1,206 arrests and seizures of 3,201 kilograms of cocaine
        hydrochloride (HCL), 5,392 kilograms of cocaine base, and $15.8
        million in assets. *  Colombia had 4 vetted units consisting of
        112 members. The Major Investigations Unit in Bogota had 39
        personnel, including both investigators and prosecutors. This unit
        focused on drug trafficking in the major cities of Colombia, such
        as Cali, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The Financial Investigation
        Unit had 14 investigators who focused on money laundering in
        financial institutions in Colombia's major cities. The
        Intelligence Group consisted of 39 personnel headquartered in
        Bogota and operating in the major drug producing regions. This
        unit collected intelligence to support investigations of Colombian
        drug trafficking organizations by other CNP units. The fourth
        vetted unit, consisting of 20 members, monitors the diversion of
        precursor substances from legitimate manufacturers for the
        production of illegal drugs. DEA reported that the Colombian
        vetted units' efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 63
        arrests and seizures of 6,398 kilograms of cocaine HCL and cocaine
        base, 6 kilograms of heroin, and $250,000 in U.S. currency. *
        Mexico had 3 vetted units made up of 232 vetted and trained
        personnel. The Mexico National SIU, operating out of Mexico City,
        had 14 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators assigned to collect
        intelligence on Mexican drug traffickers. The Border Task Forces
        had 106 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators. The task forces
        operated out of regional headquarters in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez,
        and Monterrey-all along the U.S.- Mexico Border-and Guadalajara.
        The task forces had a mission similar to the SIU, but the task
        force investigators were also responsible for executing warrants
        and making arrests. The narcotics section of the Organized Crime
        Unit was made up of 112 Mexican federal attorney- investigators
        and narcotics investigators. This unit's mission was to use
        information from court-ordered electronic intelligence collection
        to investigate high-level drug trafficking groups, as well as
        drug-related money laundering groups, throughout Mexico. The
        unit's headquarters was in Mexico City, but the assigned personnel
        were often located in other cities. DEA did not report the number
        of arrests or seizures for the Mexican vetted units, but noted
        there had been arrests made in three major organizations,
        including one of the largest drug cartels in Mexico. *  Peru had 2
        vetted units, with a total of 135 personnel. One unit, an
        intelligence group, consisted of 52 vetted personnel and
        specialized in collecting intelligence and targeting drug
        traffickers to support the second unit, the investigation group
        with 83 vetted police. Both units were headquartered in Lima and
        operated throughout the cocaine production regions of Peru. DEA
        reported that the Peruvian vetted units' efforts Page 58
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded
        Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations through fiscal year 1998
        resulted in 199 arrests and seizures of 819 kilograms of cocaine
        HCL, 2,297 kilograms of cocaine base, 4,350 gallons of precursor
        chemicals, and numerous weapons and ammunition. In commenting on a
        draft of our report, DEA officials informed us that as of April
        1999, 2 vetted units with 25 and 75 vetted personnel,
        respectively, were fully operational in Thailand; 1 vetted unit
        with a total of 16 vetted personnel was operational in Brazil; and
        vetted antinarcotics police were expected to be operational in
        Pakistan in early fiscal year 2000.  The officials also noted that
        assessments were scheduled for Ecuador and Nigeria in May and
        June, respectively, to examine the future suitability of vetted
        units in those countries. DEA expanded its enforcement strategy in
        the 1990s to focus its Conclusions    operations on what it refers
        to as the seamless continuum of drug trafficking. It placed
        emphasis on investigating gangs, drug dealers, and drug-related
        violence in local communities while continuing to target higher
        level drug traffickers involved in major national and
        international drug trafficking organizations. DEA's programs and
        initiatives discussed in this chapter-for example, its state and
        local task forces, its MET Program, SOD's initiatives, and its
        foreign operations-are consistent with DEA's mission and
        responsibilities to enforce the nation's drug laws and bring drug
        traffickers to justice, as described in chapter 1. In carrying out
        its strategy, DEA's domestic enforcement efforts placed more
        emphasis on, and devoted more resources to, assisting and working
        with local law enforcement agencies than in the past.
        Consequently, funds and staff devoted to DEA's State and Local
        Task Force Program increased in the 1990s. Also, although not in
        substantial numbers in comparison to DEA's total dollar and staff
        resources, DEA began and continued to fund and dedicate agents to
        the MET Program during the 1990s. These programs targeted drug
        traffickers operating primarily at the local and regional levels.
        DEA provided examples of what it considered to be successful
        program operations at these levels and reported various program
        results, including federal and state arrests and convictions and
        seizures of drugs and assets. To improve the effectiveness of its
        domestic and international efforts directed at national and
        international drug trafficking organizations in the 1990s, DEA
        established and invested increased resources in SOD to continue
        and enhance the investigative approach initiated under its former
        Kingpin Strategy. SOD, like the Kingpin Strategy, emphasizes
        targeting the Page 59                                     GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 2 DEA Expanded Its
        Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to
        Major Drug Trafficking Organizations command and control
        communications of major traffickers. Consequently, the number of
        DEA electronic surveillances rose significantly in the 1990s. DEA
        documented the results of some Kingpin and SOD operations that it
        considered to be successful in disrupting and dismantling major
        national and international trafficking organizations. However, DEA
        did not compile results data on all Kingpin and SOD operations,
        cases they supported, or leads they disseminated. DEA also made
        changes to improve its foreign efforts directed at international
        drug trafficking organizations. In this regard, it has
        participated in two major interagency programs established in the
        1990s to target major organizations in Latin America and Asia. The
        programs have led to the arrests of some high-level drug
        traffickers. In addition, the specially trained vetted units of
        foreign police initiated in recent years by DEA may help increase
        the sharing of information and the trust level between DEA and
        foreign police participating in those units. This, in turn, may
        help DEA and its foreign counterparts in targeting major
        traffickers and disrupting and dismantling trafficking
        organizations based in the participating foreign countries, as
        indicated by the initial results reported by DEA. In its written
        comments on a draft of this report, DEA stated that, overall,
        Agency Comments    the report provides a detailed and factual
        background of DEA strategies and special operations.  DEA also
        provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which
        we incorporated in this chapter and other sections of this report.
        Page 60                                     GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet Developed
        Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control
        Strategy DEA's strategic goals and objectives, along with its
        enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s discussed in
        chapter 2, are consistent with the strategic goals of ONDCP's
        National Drug Control Strategy. Both the National Strategy and DEA
        hope to reduce illegal drug supply and drug- related crime and
        violence by disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
        organizations. The National Strategy contains mid- and long-term
        measurable performance targets1 for 2002 and 2007 that identify
        the extent to which the National Strategy seeks to disrupt and
        dismantle drug trafficking organizations. However, DEA has not yet
        established comparable measurable performance targets for its
        operations. Throughout this chapter, we use footnotes to explain
        various planning and performance measurement terms as defined by
        OMB, ONDCP, and DOJ. We also include a glossary at the end of this
        report, which provides an alphabetical listing of the various
        planning and performance measurement terms used in this report and
        their definitions. DEA's strategic goals and objectives, and
        enhanced programs and DEA's Strategic Goals
        initiatives in the 1990s for carrying out its mission are
        consistent with the and Objectives, and Its National Strategy's
        strategic goals and objectives defining a 10-year commitment to
        reduce drug abuse. DEA's mission, as described in chapter
        Programs, Are                       1, is an important element of
        the National Strategy and DEA, through the Consistent With the
        implementation of its programs and initiatives as discussed in
        chapter 2, is National Strategy                   a major
        participant in the National Strategy. As discussed below, we
        reviewed the National Strategy's strategic goals and objectives,
        and compared them with DEA's strategic goals and objectives and
        its programs for consistency. ONDCP has produced National
        Strategies annually since 1989. Since 1996, National Strategy
        Goals and the National Strategy has included five strategic goals
        (listed in ch. 1) and Objectives                          related
        strategic objectives. These goals and objectives are the basis for
        a long-term national antidrug effort aimed at reducing the supply
        of and demand for illicit drugs and the consequences of drug abuse
        and trafficking. The goals define the major directives of the
        strategy. The objectives, which are more narrowly focused,
        stipulate the specific ways in which goals are to be obtained. The
        1998 strategy provided a 10-year plan to reduce illegal drug use
        and availability by 50 percent by the year 2007. 1 A performance
        target, as defined by ONDCP for the purpose of the National
        Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved; it is a
        measurable level of performance against which actual achievement
        can be compared. Page 61
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy The 1999 National Strategy also continued
        the goals but eliminated 1 objective, reducing the total number of
        objectives to 31. The National Strategy is intended to guide the
        approximately 50 federal agencies with drug control
        responsibilities. DEA has significant responsibilities for helping
        to achieve the following three National Strategy goals.2 *
        Strategy goal 2: Increase the safety of American citizens by
        substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. *
        Strategy goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers
        from the drug threat. *  Strategy goal 5: Break foreign and
        domestic drug sources of supply. For these 3 strategy goals, the
        National Strategy has 15 supporting objectives, at least 10 of
        which relate to DEA. Table 3.1 identifies the strategy goals and
        objectives for which DEA has responsibilities. 2 DEA has a small
        drug demand reduction program ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999)
        that supports strategy goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth
        to reject illegal drugs as well as the use of alcohol and tobacco.
        Page 62
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Table 3.1:  National Strategy Goals and
        Objectives for Which DEA Has Responsibilities Strategy goals
        Strategy objectives Strategy goal 2-Increase the safety of
        American citizens by          Objective 1-Strengthen law
        enforcement-including federal, state, substantially reducing drug-
        related crime and violence.              and local drug task
        forces-to combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal
        organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leaders of illegal
        drug syndicates. Objective 2-Improve the ability of High Intensity
        Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) to counter drug trafficking.
        Objective 3-Help law enforcement to disrupt money laundering and
        seize and forfeit criminal assets. Strategy goal 4-Shield
        America's air, land, and sea frontiers        Objective 1-Conduct
        flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, from the drug
        threat.                                                and seize
        illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at its borders.
        Objective 2-Improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S.
        drug law enforcement programs with particular emphasis on the
        Southwest Border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
        Objective 3-Improve bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico
        as well as other cocaine and heroin transit-zone countries in
        order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
        Strategy goal 5-Break foreign and domestic drug sources of
        Objective 1-Produce a net reduction in the worldwide cultivation
        of supply.
        coca, opium, and marijuana and in the production of other illegal
        drugs, especially methamphetamine. Objective 2-Disrupt and
        dismantle major international drug trafficking organizations and
        arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders. Objective 3-
        Support and complement source country drug control efforts and
        strengthen source country political will and drug control
        capabilities. Objective 4-Develop and support bilateral, regional,
        and multilateral initiatives and mobilize international
        organizational efforts against all aspects of illegal drug
        production, trafficking, and abuse. Source: GAO analysis of
        ONDCP's 1998 Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) document
        and DEA's performance plan for fiscal year 2000. Page 63
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Recently, as part of its reauthorization
        legislation,3 ONDCP became responsible for monitoring the
        consistency between the drug-related goals and objectives of drug
        control agencies to ensure that their goals and budgets support
        and are fully consistent with the National Strategy. In its
        National Drug Control Budget Summary for 1999, ONDCP reported that
        DEA has various programs and initiatives that support strategy
        goals 1,4 2, 4, and 5. DEA's most recent planning document is its
        performance plan for fiscal DEA's Strategic Goals and      year
        2000,5 which it issued in February 1999, in response to the
        Objectives                     Government Performance and Results
        Act of 19936 (the Results Act).7 That plan contains information on
        DEA's vision, mission, strategic goals, strategic objectives, and
        performance indicators.8 DEA listed three strategic goals and nine
        strategic objectives for carrying out its mission: *  DEA
        strategic goal 1-disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command,
        control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and
        traffickers of illicit drugs; *  DEA strategic goal 2-reduce the
        impact of crime and violence that is the result of drug
        trafficking activity by providing federal investigative resources
        to assist local communities; and *  DEA strategic goal 3-
        facilitate drug law enforcement efforts directed against major
        drug trafficking organizations by cooperating and coordinating
        with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and
        intelligence counterparts. 3 Office of National Drug Control
        Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
        2681- 670 (1998). 4 DEA has a small drug demand reduction program
        ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999) that supports strategy goal 1:
        Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well
        as the use of alcohol and tobacco. 5 Drug Enforcement
        Administration GPRA Annual Performance Plan FY 2000, February
        1999. 6 P.L. 103-62. 7 DOJ prepares strategic and annual
        performance plans to meet the requirements of the Results Act and
        requires its component organizations, such as DEA, to prepare
        annual performance plans even though they are not required to do
        so under the Act. DOJ considers its components' performance plans
        to be an integral part of the department's annual summary
        performance plan. 8 A performance indicator, as defined by OMB for
        the purposes of the Results Act, means a particular value or
        characteristic used to measure output or outcome. Performance
        indicators are associated with performance goals in the annual
        performance plan. Page 64
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Along with its strategic goals, DEA listed
        the following nine strategic objectives: *  DEA strategic
        objective 1--attack the command and control of international and
        domestic drug trafficking organizations through the arrest,
        prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of their criminal
        leaders and surrogates; *  DEA strategic objective 2-concentrate
        enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt,
        dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups operating from
        Mexico; *  DEA strategic objective 3-direct enforcement efforts at
        the escalating threat posed by heroin; *  DEA strategic objective
        4-address the dual threats presented by methamphetamine and
        resurgence in marijuana trafficking; *  DEA strategic objective 5-
        assist local law enforcement by deploying METs into communities
        where drug trafficking and related violent crime are rampant; *
        DEA strategic objective 6-prevent the diversion of controlled
        substances and control the distribution of chemicals used to
        manufacture illicit drugs; *  DEA strategic objective 7-enhance
        intelligence programs to facilitate information sharing and
        develop new methods to structure and define drug trafficking
        organizations; *  DEA strategic objective 8-support interdiction
        efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United
        States; and *  DEA strategic objective 9--seize and forfeit assets
        and proceeds derived from drug trafficking. DEA did not align each
        of its objectives with any particular goals. Because DEA is the
        nation's lead drug enforcement agency, its strategic Comparison of
        DEA                goals and objectives and its programs should be
        consistent with the Strategic Goals and              National
        Strategy. Table 3.2 shows DEA's strategic goals compared to
        Objectives, and Its              National Strategy goals for drug
        supply reduction. Programs, With the National Strategy Page 65
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals
        With National Strategy Goals DEA strategic goals
        National Strategy goals for drug supply reduction DEA strategic
        goal 1-In order to safeguard Americans, DEA
        National Strategy goal 2-Increase the safety of American citizens
        will disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and
        by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
        infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of
        illicit drugs that threaten Americans and erode the quality of
        life in our          National Strategy goal 4-Shield America's
        air, land, and sea communities.
        frontiers from the drug threat. DEA strategic goal 2-In order to
        reduce the impact of crime and             National Strategy goal
        5-Break foreign and domestic drug violence that is the result of
        drug trafficking activity, DEA will          sources of supply.
        provide federal investigative resources to assist local
        communities. DEA strategic goal 3-In order to facilitate drug law
        enforcement efforts directed against major drug trafficking
        organizations, DEA will cooperate and coordinate with our federal,
        state, local, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence
        counterparts Source: GAO analysis of ONDCP's 1999 National Drug
        Control Strategy and DEA's performance plan for fiscal year 2000.
        DEA's first strategic goal aimed at dismantling and disrupting
        drug trafficking organizations is consistent with National
        Strategy goal 4, which calls for shielding America's air, land,
        and sea frontiers from the drug threat, as well as with goal 5,
        which calls for breaking foreign and domestic sources of drug
        supply. DEA's goal for dismantling and disrupting trafficking
        organizations applies to all drug trafficking organizations
        regardless of where they operate-in the United States, in drug
        transshipment areas, at U.S. border areas, and in foreign
        countries. Similarly, DEA's strategic goal 2, which calls for
        providing federal investigative resources to local communities for
        reducing drug-related crime and violence, is consistent with
        National Strategy goal 2, which also calls for reducing drug-
        related crime and violence. DEA's strategic goal 3, which calls
        for DEA to cooperate and coordinate with federal, state, local,
        and foreign law enforcement and intelligence counterparts, is
        consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5. By
        coordinating and cooperating with other law enforcement and
        intelligence groups, DEA's coordinated efforts reach out in
        support of the National Strategy's three supply reduction goals.
        As with its goals, DEA's strategic objectives are also consistent
        with the objectives of the National Strategy. For example, as can
        be seen in table 3.3, various DEA strategic objectives for
        dismantling and disrupting domestic and international drug
        trafficking organizations, providing Page 66
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy assistance to local communities to reduce
        drug-related violence, and supporting drug interdiction efforts
        align with National Strategy objectives. Table 3.3:  Comparison of
        Selected DEA and National Strategy Objectives DEA strategic
        objectives
        National Strategy objectives Assist local law enforcement by
        deploying METs into communities               Strengthen law
        enforcement, including federal, state, and local where drug
        trafficking and related violence are rampant (DEA
        drug task forces, to combat drug-related violence, disrupt
        criminal strategic objective 5).
        organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leader of illegal drug
        syndicates (National Strategy objective 1 for goal 2). Concentrate
        enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt,
        dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups
        Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize
        operating from Mexico (DEA strategic objective 2).
        illegal drugs in transit to the United States and U.S. borders
        (National strategy objective 1 for goal 4). Support interdiction
        efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United
        States (DEA strategic objective 8).
        Disrupt and dismantle major international drug trafficking
        organizations and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders
        Attack the command and control of international and domestic drug
        (National Strategy objective 2 for goal 5). trafficking
        organizations through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
        incarceration of their criminal leaders and surrogates (DEA
        strategic objective 1). Source: GAO's analysis of ONDCP's 1999
        National Drug Control Strategy and DEA's performance plan for
        fiscal year 2000. In addition, as with its strategic goals and
        objectives, DEA's programs and initiatives in the 1990s as
        discussed in chapter 2 are also consistent with the goals of the
        National Strategy. During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed
        important aspects of its operations, that is, its strategies,
        programs, initiatives, and approaches. *  DEA gave a higher
        priority than in the past to and increased resources for working
        with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies
        through its State and Local Task Force Program and started the MET
        Program to help combat drugrelated violent crime in local
        communities. *  DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which
        evolved into SOD, placing greater emphasis on intercepting
        communications between top-level drug traffickers and their
        subordinates (i.e., attacking the "command and control"
        communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to
        dismantle their entire trafficking operations. *  DEA started
        participating in two interagency programs-Linear Approach and
        Linkage Approach-to target and investigate major drug trafficking
        organizations in Latin America and Asia. *  DEA helped establish,
        train, and fund special foreign police units to combat drug
        trafficking in certain key foreign counties, primarily in Latin
        America. Page 67
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy These and other drug law enforcement
        programs and initiatives discussed in detail in chapter 2 are
        consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5 previously
        discussed in this chapter and described in table 3.1. For example,
        DEA's MET Program, started in 1995, is consistent with National
        Strategy goal 2, which calls for increasing the safety of American
        citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and
        violence. The 1999 National Strategy established performance
        targets calling for DEA Has Not                     specific
        increases in the percentage of drug trafficking organizations
        Developed                       disrupted and dismantled. These
        targets are measurable and can be used to assess the collective
        performance of drug control agencies responsible Performance
        Targets             for achieving them. However, although DEA is
        the lead drug enforcement Consistent With Those agency, it has not
        established similar measurable performance targets for in the
        National                 its own operations. Strategy
        To measure the effectiveness and performance of the National
        Strategy, ONDCP established 5 and 10 year performance targets and
        performance measures.9  These performance targets and measures are
        intended, in part, to enable policymakers, program managers, and
        the public to determine efforts that are contributing to the
        strategic goals and objectives of the National Strategy. To track
        and measure progress in achieving the strategic goals and National
        Strategy               strategic objectives of the National
        Strategy, ONDCP issued its Performance Measurement
        Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system in February
        1998.10 System                          This system is a 10-year
        plan that identifies performance targets and related performance
        measures as the means for assessing the progress of the National
        Strategy in achieving its strategic goals and objectives. The PME
        system contains 97 performance targets. Although originally
        undertaken as a policy decision to bring more accountability to
        drug policy, the PME system is now grounded in legislation. The
        Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998
        requires ONDCP to submit an annual report to Congress on the PME
        system. ONDCP issued its first annual status report in February
        1999.11 9 A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for the
        purposes of the National Strategy, means data, variables, and
        events used to track progress toward performance targets. Measures
        show how progress toward targets will be tracked. 10 Performance
        Measures of Effectiveness, A System for Assessing the Performance
        of the National Drug Control Strategy, 19982007, Office of
        National Drug Control Policy, Feb. 1998. 11 National Drug Control
        Strategy 1999 Performance Measures of Effectiveness:
        Implementation and Findings, Office of National Drug Control
        Policy, Feb. 1999. Page 68
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Beginning in 1996, interagency working
        groups involving federal agencies, including DEA, along with
        outside experts developed the PME performance targets through a
        consensual process. The performance targets were incorporated into
        the PME plan issued in February 1998. After the initial PME plan
        was issued, interagency working groups, including those involving
        DEA, continued developing, refining, and implementing the PME
        system during 1998. The working groups, among other things,
        focused on *  developing specific action plans identifying the
        responsibilities of each agency in working towards the PME
        performance targets and *  identifying annual targets that
        correspond to the achievement of the 5 and 10 year performance
        targets. For each performance target, the PME system identifies a
        "reporting agency" (or "agencies" when there is shared
        responsibility) and "supporting agencies." A reporting agency(s)
        is required to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving the
        performance target. However, the reporting agency is not
        necessarily the only agency responsible for achieving the target.
        Supporting agencies are to assist with data collection and
        assessment or have programs that contribute to achieving the
        target. The initial 1998 PME system document identified
        performance targets relating to disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations and arresting drug traffickers. These
        performance targets called for specific percentage increases in
        the number of domestic and international drug trafficking
        organizations disrupted or dismantled and the number of drug
        traffickers arrested by 2002 and 2007. DEA was designated as the
        sole reporting agency for performance targets aimed at decreasing
        the capabilities of domestic and international drug trafficking
        organizations and traffickers. DEA shared reporting-agency
        responsibilities with HIDTAs for the performance target aimed at
        drug trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat
        assessments. As a result of the PME implementation process in
        1998, changes were made to performance targets for drug
        trafficking organizations and drug traffickers. These changes were
        reported in the 1999 PME report. The performance target for
        domestic drug traffickers was deleted.  The target for
        international drug traffickers was combined with the target for
        international drug trafficking organizations to focus on one
        manageable Page 69                                   GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet
        Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug
        Control Strategy target. In addition, DEA was deleted as a
        reporting agency for the performance target aimed at drug
        trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat assessments.
        Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the performance targets and related
        performance measures for disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations, along with the current status of
        achieving the targets as reported by ONDCP in its 1999 PME report.
        Table 3.4:  National Drug Control Strategy Performance Target and
        Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Domestic Drug
        Trafficking Organizations Performance target
        Performance measure                            ONDCP current
        status statement Target: By 2002, using a prioritized list
        Measure: The percentage of targeted            Data source: To be
        determined. of domestic drug law enforcement
        organizations on the counterdrug community designated targets,
        increase       community's designated target list that are
        Relevant data: None by 5 points the percentage of drug
        disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise organizations disrupted,
        dismantled, or      rendered ineffective, measured annually.
        Status: ONDCP will charter an interagency otherwise rendered
        ineffective as
        working group to develop a consolidated measured against the
        percentage              Reporting agency: DEA
        Major Drug Trafficking Organization Target recorded in the 1997
        base year. By 2007,
        List. The working group will more clearly increase the target
        percentage by at         Supporting federal agencies: Department
        define what constitutes a major drug least 10 points above the
        base year.         of Defense (DOD), Department of State,
        trafficking organization and what criteria will FBI, U.S. Customs
        Service, and the             be used to determine when an
        organization Department of the Treasury.                    has
        been disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise rendered ineffective.
        Since no such list currently exits, the base year will need to be
        adjusted once the list has been developed. Annual performance
        targets will be constructed after the target list has been
        developed. Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME
        report. Page 70                                       GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet
        Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug
        Control Strategy Table 3.5:  National Strategy Performance Target
        and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling
        International Drug Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their
        Leaders Performance target
        Performance measure                              ONDCP current
        status statement Target: By 2002, measuring against the
        Measure: The percentage of designated            Data Source: To
        be determined. prioritized list of community designated
        drug trafficking organizations dismantled or targets established
        in the 1998 base year,         significantly disrupted either
        through the       Relevant Data: None achieve a 50 percent success
        rate of               incarceration of their principal leaders or
        targeted organizations dismantled or               through the
        substantial seizure of their         Status: This target was
        revised by significantly disrupted by either (1) having
        assets or the incarceration of their network     combining two
        targets-trafficking their principal leaders arrested and
        key associates, measured annually.               organizations and
        traffickers-identified in incarcerated or otherwise rendered
        the initial 1998 PME plan. Annual ineffective; or (2) making
        substantial seizures Reporting agency: DEA
        performance targets are under of those organizations' narcotics,
        money, or
        development. other assets, or arrests of their key network
        Supporting federal agencies: Central associates, that
        significantly impair their        Intelligence Agency (CIA), DOD,
        FBI, and ability to operate at normal levels for an         the
        U.S. Customs Service. extended period of time. By 2007, increase
        the success rate to 100 percent as measured against the 1998 base
        year list. For additional targets added to the list after the 1998
        base year, achieve a similar success rate of at least 10 percent
        per year as measured against the year in which they were added to
        the list. Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME
        report. Table 3.6:  National Drug Control Strategy Performance
        Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Drug
        Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs Performance target
        Performance measure                              ONDCP current
        status statement Target: By 2002, increase the proportion of
        Measure: The proportion of identified drug             Data
        Source: HIDTA threat assessments will drug trafficking
        organizations disrupted or       trafficking organizations
        disrupted or           serve as the foundation of the list.
        dismantled as identified in HIDTA threat          dismantled by or
        within HIDTAs. assessments by 15 percent above the
        Relevant Data: The Bureau of Justice proportion in the 1997 base
        year. By 2007, Reporting agency: Each HIDTA
        Statistics collects data on the number of increase the proportion
        disrupted or
        traffickers convicted and sentenced. In 1991, dismantled to 30
        percent above the base           Supporting federal agencies: DEA,
        DOD,           drug trafficking offenses accounted for 19 year
        ratio.                                       Department of State,
        FBI, U.S. Customs           percent of all defendants convicted.
        Service, and the Department of the Treasury.
        Status: The ONDCP HIDTA Director will develop a consolidated list
        of the number of drug trafficking organizations targeted by each
        HIDTA. This HIDTA target will be prepared prior to the beginning
        of each year. At the end of each year, ONDCP will measure the
        proportion of those targeted organizations that have been
        disrupted or dismantled. After the base year proportion has been
        determined for 1997, the annual target will be revised to reflect
        the target proportion for each year. Page 71
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Source: ONDCP's 1999 National Drug Control
        Strategy PME report. As can be seen in the tables, the National
        Strategy performance targets and measures are quantifiable and
        outcome oriented and can be readily used to assess performance
        following collection of proposed baseline data on lists of drug
        trafficking organizations. DEA, with assistance from supporting
        agencies such as the FBI, is to report progress by the drug law
        enforcement community in dismantling or disrupting a percentage of
        identified domestic and international drug trafficking
        organizations. However, ONDCP, in reporting on the current status
        of the performance targets for which DEA is the reporting agency,
        noted that data on drug trafficking organizations needed to assess
        performance had not been identified nor had annual performance
        targets been established. Further, according to ONDCP and DEA,
        neither the domestic nor international designated target lists
        referred to in tables 3.4 and 3.5 have been developed. According
        to ONDCP officials, DEA and various supporting agencies are
        working toward developing lists of domestic and foreign drug
        trafficking organizations for use in pursuing the performance
        targets. ONDCP officials said that the time frames for reporting
        on performance targets for dismantling and disrupting drug
        trafficking organizations and their leaders are (1) 1999 for
        defining organizations and developing trafficker lists, (2) 2000
        for collecting data, and (3) 2001 for reporting on data and
        gauging performance. According to ONDCP's 1999 report, its PME
        system tracks the performance of the numerous programs that
        support each strategy goal and objective. The accomplishment of
        National Strategy goals and objectives generally require the
        contributions of many agency programs. The PME system does not
        track an individual agency's performance nor is it designed to do
        so. According to ONDCP, agencies such as DEA are required to track
        their own performance through their Results Act plans, and these
        plans should be consistent with the National Strategy and the PME
        system. Over the years, DEA has used arrest and seizure data
        (drugs and assets) DEA Goals Do Not Include    along with examples
        of significant enforcement accomplishments, such as Measurable
        Performance      descriptions of successful operations, to
        demonstrate its effectiveness in Targets
        carrying out its enforcement programs and initiatives. However,
        these data are not useful indicators for reporting on results
        because arrest and seizure data relate to outputs (activities) and
        not to outcomes (results). These arrest and seizure data do not
        present a picture of overall Page 72
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy performance or of DEA's level of success in
        achieving its goals. Further, the use of arrest data as a
        performance indicator can be misleading without information on the
        significance of the arrests and the extent to which they lead to
        prosecutions and convictions. In addition, using arrest data as a
        performance target can lead to undesirable consequences when law
        enforcement agencies place undue emphasis on increasing the
        numbers of arrests at the expense of developing quality
        investigations. More recently, with passage of the Results Act,
        DEA has been attempting to go beyond reporting outputs to
        reporting outcomes. In response to the Results Act, DEA prepared
        annual performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 that
        contain information on its strategic goals and objectives and its
        performance indicators.12 DEA's Performance Plan for    In its
        fiscal year 1999 performance plan issued in January 1998, DEA
        Fiscal Year 1999              described its strategic goals,
        strategies for achieving those goals, annual goals, and
        performance indicators. DEA associated these goals, strategies,
        and performance indicators with its various programs and
        initiatives. For example, DEA's strategic goals for "enforcement"
        provided that DEA will "... disrupt/dismantle the leadership,
        command, control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs,
        and traffickers, of licit and illicit drugs that threaten
        Americans and American interests." Under this goal, DEA's primary
        strategy provided that DEA will "... implement drug law
        enforcement strategies that target and attack the leadership and
        infrastructure of major drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of
        licit and illicit drugs that threaten America." Under its
        strategic goal for enforcement and related strategy, DEA listed
        annual goals for its domestic enforcement program, including its
        Southwest Border, Caribbean Corridor, methamphetamine, and heroin
        initiatives. These annual goals generally stated that DEA would
        continue or increase its investigative efforts leading to
        increased arrests and seizures and a reduction in the trafficking
        capability of drug organizations. For 12 Among other requirements,
        the Results Act requires that performance plans (1) establish
        performance goals; (2) express those goals in an objective,
        quantifiable, and measurable form, unless OMB approves otherwise;
        (3) establish performance indicators for assessing progress toward
        or achievement of the goals; and (4) provide a basis for comparing
        actual program results with the established goals. Page 73
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy example, DEA's annual goal for its general
        enforcement activities, including its Southwest Border initiative,
        stated that: "DEA will continue its investigative efforts,
        including the application of forfeiture laws, especially along the
        Southwest border. This will produce an increase in the number of
        arrests, removals, and seizures. The primary outcome will be a
        reduction in the trafficking capability of drug organizations,
        particularly those associated with the Mexican Federation, that
        use the southwest border in transshipment." To assess the extent
        to which it was accomplishing its strategic and annual goals to
        reduce trafficking capability, DEA's plan listed performance
        indicators that were not results oriented. DEA planned to measure
        performance, using data on total numbers of arrests and total
        number of major criminal enterprises and other drug trafficking
        organizations disrupted or dismantled. However, DEA did not
        identify performance targets for its goals, such as the proportion
        of identified drug trafficking organizations to be disrupted and
        dismantled, against which its performance could be assessed. DEA's
        fiscal year 1999 plan had no annual, mid- or long-range
        performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations. DEA noted in its performance plan for
        fiscal year 1999 that data on the number of drug trafficking
        organizations had not been previously collected and reported and
        would be available by March 1, 1998. But it never reported these
        data in its subsequent performance plan for fiscal year 2000. DEA
        also pointed out that although several of its performance
        indicators were in the developmental stage, their establishment
        would help to provide the framework for future evaluations of
        DEA's efforts. DEA's Performance Plan for    DEA organized its
        fiscal year 2000 performance plan-issued in February Fiscal Year
        2000              1999-differently from its 1999 plan to align it
        with its three major budget activities-enforcement, investigative
        support, and program direction. DEA organized its fiscal year 2000
        plan around what it identified as its three core business systems:
        (1) enforcement of federal laws and investigations, (2)
        investigative support, and (3) program direction. Along with
        information on its 3 core business systems and 15 subsystems, the
        plan, as previously described, listed DEA's strategic goals and
        objectives. However, unlike its 1999 performance plan, the fiscal
        year 2000 plan did not have clearly identifiable annual goals. For
        its core business system for the enforcement of federal laws and
        investigation, DEA listed the following: Page 74
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy "Through effective enforcement effort, DEA
        will disrupt/dismantle the command & control, and infrastructure
        of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit
        drugs that threaten Americans and American interests, including
        providing enforcement assistance to American Communities to fight
        drug-related crime and violence." Related to its core business
        system for enforcement, DEA's fiscal year 2000 performance plan
        listed a strategic goal and objectives for disrupting drug
        trafficking organizations. DEA's description of its core business
        system and its strategic goal and objective are similar. However,
        as with its fiscal year 1999 plan, DEA's fiscal year 2000 plan
        does not include annual, mid- or long-range measurable performance
        targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
        organizations. Although DEA does not have a performance target for
        dismantling international drug trafficking organizations, it does
        have a performance indicator that may lead to a performance target
        that is consistent with the target in the National Strategy. DEA's
        fiscal year 2000 performance plan contains a performance indicator
        specifying that DEA plans to use data on the number of targeted
        organizations disrupted or dismantled as a result of DEA
        involvement in foreign investigations compared to the total number
        of targeted organizations as a basis for measuring performance.
        The plan notes, however, that DEA is currently not collecting data
        for this performance indicator but expects to do so during fiscal
        year 1999. For domestic drug trafficking organizations, DEA's plan
        does not include a performance indicator that is quantifiable and
        results oriented similar to the one it specified for international
        drug organizations. DEA has no performance indicator specifying
        that it will measure performance on the basis of the number of
        targeted domestic organizations disrupted and dismantled compared
        to the total number of targeted organizations. Further, DEA's
        fiscal year 2000 performance plan does not indicate that DEA plans
        to collect data on domestic drug trafficking organizations for
        development of a performance target that is consistent with the
        target in the National Strategy. It is unclear whether DEA plans
        to develop a performance target for its program aimed at
        disrupting and dismantling domestic drug trafficking that would be
        consistent with the performance target and the national effort
        called for in the National Strategy. DEA's fiscal year 2000
        performance plan indicates that DEA will be reporting on prior
        year arrests resulting in prosecutions and convictions as a
        performance indicator for measuring its enforcement efforts. As
        required by DOJ policy, to avoid perceptions of "bounty hunting"
        DEA and other DOJ component organizations cannot specify
        performance targets for arrests. However, DOJ's policy would not
        preclude DEA from developing a Page 75
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy performance target and performance indicator
        for domestic drug trafficking organizations consistent with those
        in the National Strategy. The National Strategy performance
        targets do not involve projecting increased numbers of arrests;
        rather, they call for increasing the percentage of targeted drug
        trafficking organizations dismantled or disrupted. In addition to
        the lack of result-oriented performance indicators and performance
        targets for its programs aimed at domestic drug trafficking
        organizations, DEA's plan lacks performance targets and related
        performance indicators for other mission-critical programs. For
        example, DEA's core business system for enforcement and one of its
        strategic goals call for assistance to local communities to reduce
        drug-related crime and violence. However, DEA has not established
        a performance target and performance indicator that could be used
        to measure the results of its assistance to local communities. In
        this regard, DEA has a strategic objective calling for assistance
        to local law enforcement by deploying METs, discussed in chapter
        2, into communities where drug trafficking and related crime are
        rampant. However, DEA has not identified a performance target and
        performance indicator to measure the results of its MET Program
        even though, as discussed in chapter 2, resources dedicated to
        METs and other forms of assistance to local law enforcement have
        continued to grow in the 1990s. Thus, it is unclear how DEA will
        measure the results of its strategic objective calling for MET
        deployments. In the program accomplishment and highlight section
        of its performance plan for fiscal year 2000, DEA states that
        "[t]he effect of METs in reducing violent crime has been clearly
        established in 1998." The plan further points out that a
        comparison of violent crime statistics before and after MET
        deployments indicated reductions in violent crime in areas where
        MET deployments occurred. Using this type of results-oriented
        data, DEA should be able to specify a performance indicator that,
        when tied to a measurable performance target, could be used to
        assess the results of the MET Program in terms of actual versus
        expected performance. In August 1998, DEA's Chief for Executive
        Policy and Strategic Planning, told us that DEA had not yet
        identified the performance goals and indicators it will ultimately
        use. She told us that at the direction of the Administrator, DEA
        was planning to bring its field representatives together with
        headquarters officials to obtain their views and input on DEA's
        goals, strategies, and performance indicators. In April 1999, she
        told us that the meeting with field representatives, which was
        initially planned for the fall of 1998 but was delayed pending
        hiring of a contractor, was expected to be Page 76
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy held by the summer of 1999. However, with
        the recent resignation of DEA's Administrator, these plans were
        placed on hold and not addressed in DEA comments on a draft of
        this report. In addition, in April 1999, DEA's Chief for Executive
        Policy and Strategic Planning told us that DEA would have to work
        with DOJ in developing performance goals and indicators. In this
        regard, she said that DEA would be following the direction
        provided by DOJ in its departmentwide drug strategy.13 She also
        pointed out that ONDCP had not yet established a baseline (agreed-
        upon target list) for its National Strategy performance targets
        aimed at disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking
        organizations. In commenting on a draft of this report in June
        1999, DEA pointed out that DEA (1) has developed preliminary
        performance targets that were included in DEA's fiscal year 2001
        budget submission to DOJ; (2) had established a working group
        consisting of representatives from its operations, strategic
        planning and executive policy, and resource management staffs to
        further refine its performance targets; and (3) is working with
        other DOJ components to develop performance targets and
        measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the
        National Strategy. Measuring and evaluating the impact of drug law
        enforcement efforts is Difficulties in Measuring    difficult for
        several reasons. First, antidrug efforts are often conducted by
        Drug Law Enforcement         many agencies and are mutually
        supportive. It is difficult to isolate the Outcomes
        contributions of a single agency or program, such as DEA's
        domestic enforcement program aimed at disrupting and dismantling
        major drug traffickers, from activities of other law enforcement
        agencies. Other factors that DEA has little control over, such as
        drug demand reduction efforts, may also affect drug trafficking
        operations. Second, the clandestine nature of drug production,
        trafficking, and use limits the quality and quantity of data that
        can be collected to measure program performance. History has shown
        that drug trafficking organizations continually change their
        methods, patterns, and operations as law enforcement concentrates
        its resources and efforts on a specific region or method. Drug law
        enforcement agencies must continuously deal with unknown and
        imprecise data, such as the number of drug trafficking
        organizations and the amount of illegal drugs being trafficked. 13
        Drug Control Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Justice, March 31,
        1998. Page 77
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy Third, some of the data that are currently
        collected are not very useful in assessing the performance of
        individual programs and agency efforts. As previously mentioned,
        data collected on arrests, drug seizures, and assets forfeited
        generally measure enforcement outputs but not outcomes. Further,
        data collected on drug availability and consumption are generally
        not designed to measure the performance of a single program or
        agency, and such data are influenced by other factors in addition
        to enforcement efforts. DEA's strategic goals and objectives as
        well as its programs and initiatives Conclusions    are consistent
        with the National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA has not
        developed performance targets for its programs and initiatives
        aimed at disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations
        and arresting their leaders. We recognize the complexity and
        difficulty of measuring outcomes and impact for drug law
        enforcement agencies operating in a clandestine drug trafficking
        environment. Nevertheless, without measurable performance targets
        and related performance indicators for its mission-critical
        programs, it is difficult for program managers, policymakers, and
        others to quantitatively assess DEA's overall effectiveness and
        the extent to which DEA's programs are contributing to its
        strategic goals and objectives and those of the National Strategy.
        ONDCP has set specific measurable performance targets in the
        National Strategy for achieving strategic goals that it shares
        with DEA. DEA has worked with ONDCP and other federal drug control
        agencies to develop performance targets for the National Strategy
        and for measuring the progress of federal efforts toward those
        targets. However, although DEA is the lead federal drug
        enforcement agency and reporting agency for several National
        Strategy performance targets, it has not established similar
        measurable performance targets for its own operations. In this
        regard, DEA has not established similar measurable performance
        targets for its operations in either its fiscal years 1999 or 2000
        annual performance plans although, as discussed below, it stated
        in its comments on a draft of this report that it has developed
        preliminary targets for inclusion in its fiscal year 2001
        performance plan. Measurable DEA performance targets, once
        finalized, coupled with continued refinement of the National
        Strategy performance targets on the basis of DEA input and
        leadership, along with DOJ guidance, should bring DEA and ONDCP
        closer in pursuing their shared goals and objectives for
        disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. Such
        Page 78                                   GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not Yet Developed
        Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control
        Strategy performance targets also should provide DEA with a better
        basis for measuring its own progress in achieving its mission and
        for making decisions regarding its resource needs and priorities
        as discussed in the next chapter. We recommend that the Attorney
        General direct the DEA Administrator to Recommendation
        work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA
        performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
        trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets
        in the National Drug Control Strategy. In its written comments on
        a draft of this report, although not directly Agency Comments and
        agreeing with our recommendation, DEA agreed with our principal
        finding Our Evaluation                 regarding measurable
        performance targets.  However, it disagreed with our draft
        conclusion relating to the finding, pointed out actions it was
        taking relating to our recommendation, and requested guidance on
        bringing closure to the recommendation. DEA agreed with our
        principal finding that it had not included measurable performance
        targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking
        organizations in its fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans.
        However, it disagreed with our draft conclusion that "In the
        absence of such targets, little can said about DEA's effectiveness
        in achieving its strategic goals." DEA indicated that this
        statement and supporting information in this chapter gave the
        impression that DEA had not attempted to develop performance
        targets. DEA said that it has developed "preliminary performance
        targets" that have been included in its fiscal year 2001 budget
        submission to DOJ and that are to be refined for inclusion in
        subsequent budgets. To further refine its performance targets, DEA
        said that it had established a working group consisting of
        representatives from its operations, strategic planning and
        executive policy, and resource management staffs. DEA also noted
        that it is working with other DOJ components to develop
        performance targets and measurements that will be consistent with
        the targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. To recognize
        these actions, we added them to the pertinent section of this
        chapter as an update to information previously provided by DEA. We
        also modified our draft conclusion that little can be said about
        DEA's effectiveness without performance targets to clarify our
        intent that it is difficult to quantitatively assess DEA's overall
        effectiveness without such targets. Page 79
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 3 DEA Has Not
        Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National
        Drug Control Strategy DEA's stated actions are consistent with the
        intent of our recommendation. However, because DEA performance
        targets are preliminary and under review within the executive
        branch, they are subject to change until February 2000 when DEA
        issues its annual budget submission and performance plan, as part
        of DOJ's submission, to Congress.  Further, DEA indicated that it
        cannot finalize its performance targets and measures until a
        designated targeted list of international drug trafficking
        organizations, as called for in the National Strategy, is
        completed. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation until
        DEA's preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion
        in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency
        with those in the National Strategy. DEA and ONDCP also provided
        technical comments, which we incorporated in this chapter where
        appropriate. Page 80                                   GAO/GGD-99-
        108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's Staffing Needs
        Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998 In order
        to carry out its mission and operations during the 1990s,
        including the programs and initiatives discussed in chapter 2 and
        the strategies discussed in chapter 3, DEA received funds to staff
        its operations through several sources. These included its annual
        appropriations salaries and expenses budget; DOJ's Violent Crime
        Reduction Program (VCRP);1 and other reimbursable programs, such
        as OCDETF. This chapter focuses on the process used to determine
        and allocate additional DEA positions provided through its
        salaries and expenses budget. Specifically, it discusses the
        process used in fiscal year 1998, which was, according to DEA and
        DOJ officials, generally typical of the approach DEA has used in
        other years. The process used to determine the need for and to
        allocate additional DEA staff is linked to the federal budget
        formulation and execution process and reflects federal laws and
        budget guidelines promulgated by OMB. In fiscal year 1998, the DEA
        process considered field input, changes in drug abuse and drug
        trafficking patterns, and the Administrator's priorities to
        prepare its staffing enhancement estimates for its budget
        submission to DOJ. DEA's submission to DOJ estimated the need for
        989 new total positions, including 399 special agent positions. As
        a result of reviews by DOJ, OMB, and ONDCP and consideration of
        the resources provided in DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation,2
        the President's fiscal year 1998 budget, which was submitted to
        Congress in February 1997, requested a total of 345 new positions
        for DEA, including 168 special agent positions. Congress provided
        531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent
        positions, with guidance as to how the positions were to be
        allocated. DEA senior management then determined the allocation of
        additional staff, considering congressional guidance and such
        other factors as field office prior requests. The process used to
        determine the staffing resources necessary to carry Federal Budget
        out DEA's mission is generally typical of the federal budget
        processes and Formulation Guidance procedures that federal
        agencies are expected to follow. These processes and procedures
        are established in federal law and budget guidelines Provides
        Basis for               promulgated by OMB. DEA Staffing Needs
        Determination Process Each legislative session, the president is
        required by law to submit a budget to Congress. The Budget and
        Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, 1 VCRP was established by the
        Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-
        322, as amended). 2 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
        State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
        1997, P.L. 104-208 and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863 (1996). Page 81
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 provides the legal basis for the president's budget,
        prescribes much of its content, and defines the roles of the
        president and the agencies in the process. During budget
        formulation, the president establishes general budget and fiscal
        policy guidelines. Policy guidance is given to agencies for the
        upcoming budget year and later to provide initial guidelines for
        preparation of agency budget requests. OMB Circular A-11 provides
        instructions on the preparation of agency submissions required for
        OMB and presidential review of budget estimates and for
        formulation of the president's budget. The budget formulation
        process begins at the lowest organizational levels of a federal
        agency and moves to the higher levels. A consolidated agencywide
        budget is prepared for submission to OMB. This approach is typical
        of federal agencies, although some have elaborate planning
        processes that allow for objectives established at the top to
        guide budget preparation. OMB reviews agency requests according to
        a process that includes several stages-(1) staff review, (2)
        director's review, (3) passback, (4) appeals, and (5) final
        decisions. The final budget is prepared and printed by OMB for
        submission to Congress no later than the first Monday in February
        of each year, as required by law. According to DEA and DOJ
        officials, the DEA fiscal year 1998 staffing Fiscal Year 1998
        needs determination process began in the summer of 1995 and was
        typical Process for          of DEA's staffing determination
        process. Prior to the commencement of the official budget
        formulation process, DEA domestic and foreign field Determining
        DEA's    offices provided estimates of their staffing needs to DEA
        headquarters Staffing Needs       program staff.  Program and
        budget staff reviewed and considered these estimates in the
        development of DEA's budget submission with staffing estimates,
        which were sent to DOJ in June 1996. In accordance with the
        federal budget process, DOJ and OMB reviewed DEA's budget
        submission and staffing estimates, which resulted in some changes
        in the estimates. ONDCP reviewed DOJ's budget submission to OMB as
        part of the national drug budget certification process,3 which is
        distinct from, but occurs simultaneously with, the budget
        formulation process and may also affect DEA's staffing estimates.
        Figure 4.1 depicts DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing determination
        process. 3 The Drug Budget Certification process was established
        by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690. The
        act required that the ONDCP director certify, in writing, that
        drug budget submissions to ONDCP from program managers, agency
        heads, and department heads with national drug control program
        responsibilities are adequate to implement the objectives of the
        National Drug Strategy for the budget request year. Page 82
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 [Figure 4.1 begins on the next page.] Page 83
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 Figure 4.1:  Flowchart of DEA's Fiscal Year 1998
        Staffing Needs Determination Process 1995
        1996 Aug.            Sept.           Oct.     Nov.         Dec.
        Jan.          Feb.         Mar.            Apr.         May DEA 12
        3 4 DOJ OMB Legend:                                             1
        DEA: Aug.-Oct.                    3 DEA: Apr.-May
        4 DEA: May Domestic and foreign field         In accordance with
        the              Administrator approved Pre-budget staffing
        estimate                offices prepared and               budget
        formulation process,         the budget submission/ preparation
        process                         submitted staffing estimates
        DEA headquarters program            staffing estimates. to DEA
        headquarters.               and budget staff prepared and revised,
        on the basis of Budget formulation process
        the Administrator's              5 DEA: June 2 DEA: Dec.-Apr.
        comments, DEA's FY 98               Budget submission/ DEA
        headquarters                   initiative-based submission
        staffing estimates were program and budget staff           and
        staffing estimates.             sent to DOJ. reviewed field office
        submissions and began development of staffing
        6 DOJ: June-Aug. DOJ budget staff estimates.
        received, reviewed, and analyzed DEA submission/staffing estimates
        and sent them back to DEA. Page 84
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 Figure 4.1: Continued 1996
        1997 June                July     Aug.           Sept.
        Oct.           Nov.              Dec.          Jan.
        Feb. 5
        11 7 6                         8
        10 12 9
        $ Budget 13       14          15 7 DEA: Aug.                    9
        OMB: Sept.-Dec.                        10 DOJ: Dec.
        14 OMB: Dec.-Jan. DEA reviewed DOJ's            OMB budget staff
        DOJ budget staff reviewed                 OMB prepared final
        budget budget staff analysis.        reviewed and analyzed
        OMB's passback and sent                   submission with
        assistance DEA administrator             DEA's budget submission/
        DOJ's interpretation of the               from and review by DEA
        participated in Attorney      staffing estimates.
        passback to DEA.                          and DOJ. General's
        hearing and subsequently presented        OMB staff sent their
        results DEA's appeal.                 to the OMB Director.
        11 DEA: Dec.                                 15 OMB: Feb. DEA
        prepared its appeal to                OMB transmitted budget the
        OMB passback and                      submission to President 8
        DOJ: Aug.-Sept.                OMB Director reviewed
        sent it to DOJ.                           for submission to
        Congress Attorney General held         examiners' recommendations.
        on Feb. 6th. DEA budget hearing and on receipt of DEA appeal
        OMB Director generally                 12 DOJ: Dec. reviewed it
        and made her      discusses the overall                        DEA
        submitted its appeal, final decision.               federal budget
        with                          including the DEA appeal, to the
        President at this time.                  OMB DOJ sent DEA budget
        submission/staffing           OMB prepared DEA/DOJ
        13 OMB: Dec. estimates to OMB.             passback.
        OMB reviewed DEA/DOJ's passback appeal, including OMB sent DEA/DOJ
        staffing estimates. passback to DOJ
        DOJ and OMB agreed on an overall spending level for the
        department, and DOJ distributed the appeal amounts. Source: GAO
        analysis of DEA, OMB, and other information. Page 85
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 DEA's fiscal year 1998 staffing process began in the
        summer of 1995. Each DEA Domestic and Foreign DEA domestic field
        division submitted a field management plan (FMP), Field Offices
        Provided          and foreign offices followed a less structured
        and more informal staffing Staffing Estimates              request
        process. In an August 1995 memorandum to its domestic field
        divisions, DEA headquarters provided direction and guidelines for
        preparation of the fiscal year 1996-1997 FMPs.  DEA requested
        detailed, specific, and realistic enhancements for fiscal year
        1998 for use in the formulation of DEA's fiscal year 1998
        budget/staffing submission. According to DEA officials, an FMP is
        supposed to be based on the Administrator's vision statement,
        which is provided to the field divisions; the local SAC's vision
        statement, which has previously been reviewed and approved by DEA
        headquarters; and the drug threat that the division expects to
        confront. The 1995 memorandum directed each field division to
        indicate the resources it would need. Through the FMPs, which were
        due in October 1995, DEA's domestic field divisions requested a
        total of 591 positions, including 369 special agent positions.
        According to DEA officials, recommendations and requests for DEA
        foreign office staffing enhancements and new foreign offices for
        fiscal year 1998 came from a variety of sources, including DEA
        country attachs (CA)4 and the foreign country through the U.S.
        Ambassador. Each of the four foreign sections (Central America and
        the Caribbean, Europe and the Middle East, Far East, and South
        America) within the Office of International Operations at DEA
        headquarters was tasked with identifying the issues, including
        staffing needs, within specific countries. In March 1996,
        according to a DEA official, the International Operations staff,
        including the Chief, Deputy Chief, and section heads of
        International Operations, met to discuss recommendations from the
        four sections. The official said that to assess and justify
        staffing requests for their respective regions, DEA foreign
        section staff used regional and individual DEA country plans, as
        well as foreign situation and quarterly trends in trafficking
        reports, which provided context and background. Foreign
        operational needs were discussed in terms of DEA's goals and
        objectives and prioritized. DEA officials told us that
        International Operations 4 DEA provided the following description
        of the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD 38) Process.
        NSDD 38 requires DEA to gain an ambassador's approval prior to
        opening an office or adding additional positions to an existing
        office.  Before seeking ambassadorial approval under NSDD 38, DOJ
        policy requires that DEA obtain approval from DOJ's Executive
        Office of National Security.  Various bureaus within the State
        Department are to provide an ambassador with advice pertaining to
        any NSDD 38 request, but the ambassador is the final approving
        authority.  As a matter of course, an ambassador is to seek host
        nation consent prior to granting NSDD 38 approval. Page 86
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 communicated the results of this meeting (as a
        discussion document) to DEA's budget section. In accordance with
        the federal budget formulation process, DEA budget DEA's Fiscal
        Year 1998      staff prepared the agency's spring budget
        submission to DOJ, including Budget Submission to DOJ    staffing
        estimates. After review and approval by its executive staff and
        the Included Estimates of       Administrator, DEA sent DOJ its
        budget submission, which included 6 Additional Staff Needed
        initiatives with identified additional staffing needs of 9895
        total positions; 399 were special agent positions, and 590 were
        support positions. For preparing DEA's budget submission to DOJ,
        DOJ budget officials said DOJ provides instructions and usually
        guidance; and, according to DEA officials, the DEA Administrator
        also usually provides guidance. Although the documents sent to the
        agencies varied each year, DOJ provides written planning guidance
        and instructions in April, about 17 months prior to the beginning
        of the budget year. However, officials said that informal guidance
        was usually available earlier. The DEA Administrator may also
        issue a budget call memorandum to all program managers listing his
        priorities. According to DEA and DOJ budget officials, for its
        fiscal year 1998 guidance, DOJ used an amended version of its
        fiscal year 1997 guidance. In addition, DEA budget officials said
        that the DEA Administrator sent out a budget call memorandum in
        February 1996 indicating his priorities. However, DEA budget
        officials said that they actually began to develop DEA's fiscal
        year 1998 budget submission/staffing estimates in December 1995,
        prior to the guidance, and continued to work through May 1996. As
        part of this process, officials said that DEA budget staff
        considered the needs of field and headquarters offices, analyzed
        information on emerging drug trends, and held discussions with DEA
        program managers. Budget staff said that after canvassing the
        program managers, they presented the proposed budget submission
        and staffing request to the Administrator in March 1996. According
        to these staff, on the basis of the Administrator's comments, they
        then prepared DEA's final fiscal year 1998 budget
        submission/staffing request to DOJ, which DEA's Executive Staff
        and the Administrator reviewed and approved in May. In June 1996,
        DEA sent its fiscal year 1998 budget request with estimates of
        additional staffing needs to DOJ. In its submission, DEA estimated
        a 5 This number does not include positions to be funded through
        DEA's Diversion Fee Account, which are included in a separate
        program-specific budget request. DEA enforces the Comprehensive
        Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-513) as
        it applies to the registration of handlers of controlled
        substances (e.g., manufacturers, distributors, importers,
        exporters, and others). Page 87
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 need for 989 additional positions, including 399 special
        agent positions and 590 support positions (e.g., diversion
        investigators, chemists, intelligence analysts, and professional
        and clerical staff). DEA identified, prioritized, and requested
        funding, including staffing enhancements, for six specific
        initiatives. *  Countering violent crime: This included staffing
        estimates (193 total/98 special agents) for the MET Program and
        for converting 8 provisional state and local task forces to
        program-funded status. *  Methamphetamine strategy: This
        initiative included estimated staffing enhancements (279 total/127
        special agents), including positions to convert 7 provisional
        state and local task forces to program-funded status, to fund a
        comprehensive approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. *
        Southwest Border project: This included estimated staffing
        enhancements (212 total/96 special agents) to continue DOJ's
        interagency strategy against drug trafficking on the Southwest
        Border. *  Domestic heroin enforcement: This initiative included
        estimated staffing enhancements (104 total/53 special agents) to
        continue implementation of DEA's 5-year heroin strategy. *
        International crime: This included estimated staffing enhancements
        (76 total/25 special agents) to (1) open DEA country offices in
        Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Vientiane, Laos; Abu Dhabi, United Arab
        Emirates; Lisbon, Portugal; and Managua, Nicaragua; (2) provide
        additional support to DEA offices in Mexico City, Panama City, New
        Delhi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong; and (3) establish an International
        Chemical Control Center in order to address the growing
        international aspects of drug production, transshipment, and
        trafficking. *  Investigative shortfalls: This initiative included
        estimates of resources and staffing enhancements (125 total)
        needed to replace lost asset forfeiture revenues, provide support
        staff for domestic field offices, and provide additional basic and
        refresher training for special agents and DEA support staff. The
        submission included justifications for each initiative and
        reflected DEA's internal budget/staffing determination process.
        For example, on the basis of changing trends and input from the
        field, DEA's fiscal year 1998 budget submission proposed a
        methamphetamine initiative,6 including domestic and international
        staff enhancements, to fund a comprehensive 6 According to
        officials, however, DEA did not wait for the completion of the
        fiscal year 1998 budget cycle to address the methamphetamine
        problem. Although DEA had no base budget for the methamphetamine
        problem in 1996, it dedicated 405,000 agent hours, or the
        equivalent of 195 full-time agents, to methamphetamine
        investigations in fiscal year 1995. The hours dedicated to
        methamphetamine were expected to rise in fiscal year 1996. Page 88
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. To justify
        its fiscal year 1998 estimates, DEA provided (1) DAWN data that
        indicated a steady increase in the number of methamphetamine-
        related emergency room episodes and deaths and (2) statistics
        indicating an increased use of and trafficking in methamphetamine
        and the proliferation of clandestine drug laboratories in both
        traditional and new locations. In accordance with the budget
        formulation process, DEA's fiscal year 1998 DOJ Changed Staffing
        budget submission was reviewed by DOJ Justice Management Division
        Estimates for DEA's       (JMD) budget staff and the Attorney
        General between June and August, Initiatives               1996.
        According to DOJ budget staff, as in other years, to assess DEA's
        fiscal year 1998 enhancements and the corresponding
        justifications, the budget staff considered the (1) overall
        illegal drug situation at the time, including drug trends and
        patterns; (2) link between the specific request and ONDCP, DOJ,
        and DEA goals, strategies, and indicators; (3) facts and arguments
        used by DEA to justify the request; and (4) level of resources
        requested relative to the justified need, including prior year
        appropriations. As a result of their analysis of DEA's fiscal year
        1998 budget submission, DOJ budget staff estimated that DEA would
        need 771 additional positions, including 311 special agents, to
        support the 6 initiatives.  This was 218 fewer total positions,
        including 88 special agent positions, than DEA estimated. Over
        half of the difference between DEA's and DOJ's estimates can be
        accounted for by DOJ's not having included positions to convert
        certain state and local task forces to permanent funding status
        under the violent crime and methamphetamine initiatives. DOJ
        argued that (1) local entities must continue to contribute to
        these efforts to maintain the integrity of the intergovernmental
        relationship; (2) additional resources were available to these
        entities through other DOJ state and local grant programs; and (3)
        in the case of the methamphetamine initiative, further assessment
        was needed before conversions were made. DOJ budget staff
        recommended fewer positions than DEA for five of the DEA
        initiatives but concurred with DEA's staffing estimates for the
        investigative shortfall initiative. These recommended changes in
        staffing estimates, including the justifications provided, are
        summarized below. *  Violent crime: In addition to not including
        positions to convert state and local task forces to permanent
        status, as previously discussed, budget staff recommended fewer
        additional agent positions for the MET Program. DOJ staff
        concluded that four new MET teams for deployment to areas with
        higher numbers of outstanding requests were sufficient to keep the
        waiting time for a MET deployment to acceptable limits. Page 89
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 *  Methamphetamine: Most of the difference between DEA's
        and DOJ's staffing estimates for this initiative can be attributed
        to DOJ's not including positions for state and local task force
        conversion. DOJ also did not recommend additional chemists,
        concluding that DEA had sufficient chemist resources; or an
        additional agent for demand reduction to increase public awareness
        of methamphetamine, given DEA's other critical needs. Budget staff
        recommended 2 DEA clandestine lab regional training teams to teach
        26 classes annually, rather than 4 teams to teach 40 classes
        annually. *  Southwest Border: DOJ budget staff did not recommend
        5 additional chemists and 14 additional support staff, which were
        included in DEA's submission. DOJ concluded that DEA had
        sufficient resources to meet these needs. *  Domestic heroin:
        Asserting that DEA had sufficient chemists to meet its desired
        staffing ratio, DOJ budget staff did not recommend the five
        chemists and two clerical support positions included in DEA's
        estimates for this initiative. *  International: DOJ budget staff
        recommended 22 fewer total positions, including 6 fewer special
        agent positions, than DEA estimated for this initiative. More than
        half of these 22 positions (2 chemists, 4 foreign diversion
        investigators, and 6 support staff) were to establish an
        International Chemical Control Center. DOJ argued that DEA could
        use chemists from other places to meet these needs and use
        diversion investigators from key locations in other parts of the
        world to provide intelligence to the Center. DOJ also did not
        recommend opening new DEA offices in Abu Dhabi, United Arab
        Emirates, or Lisbon, Portugal, contending that DEA lacked
        "substantive rationale" for offices in these locations. DOJ's
        estimates also included no staffing enhancements for Bangkok,
        Thailand, asserting that DEA had sufficient staffing resources to
        assist Thai police in collecting intelligence about the emerging
        methamphetamine problem and no additional special agent for
        Panama, concluding that DEA had not provided "substantive reasons"
        for that agent. The DOJ budget staff review was followed on August
        2, 1996, by the Attorney General's hearing7 on DEA's fiscal year
        1998 budget submission. Three working days before the hearing, DOJ
        budget officials provided their analysis to DEA. According to DOJ
        budget officials, during the hearing DEA had the opportunity to
        appeal DOJ's proposed changes in DEA's 7 The hearing is usually
        attended by the Attorney General, the DEA Administrator, the DOJ
        budget analyst, and JMD officials. Page 90
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 submission and to provide additional information to
        justify its budget initiatives and enhancements before the
        Attorney General's final decision. On August 12, 1996, the
        Administrator submitted an appeal to the Attorney General in which
        he requested reconsideration of some of the DOJ budget staff's
        recommended changes. The appeal asserted DEA's need for staff
        positions to convert certain state and local task forces,
        associated with its violent crime reduction and methamphetamine
        efforts, from provisional to program-funded status. It also
        addressed DEA's need for resources for its clandestine laboratory
        cleanup efforts; items previously funded partially by asset
        forfeiture funds, including awards to informants and marijuana
        eradication efforts; and in-service training. Nevertheless, for
        fiscal year 1998, the estimates for additional staffing for DEA
        included in DOJ's OMB submission were the same as those
        recommended by DOJ budget staff and previously discussed. Table
        4.1 shows the differences between DEA's estimates for additional
        staffing and those proposed to OMB by DOJ. Table 4.1: Comparison
        of DEA and DOJ
        Additional total and special agent positions Estimated Additional
        DEA Total and                                                 DEA
        staffing                DOJ's DEA staffing Special Agent Positions
        for Fiscal Year 1998
        estimates to DOJ               estimates to OMB June 1996
        September 1996 Special                      Special Initiative
        Total          agents          Total         agents Violent crime
        193              98             94                  48
        Methamphetamine                            279             127
        208                  96 Southwest Border
        212               96           193                  96 Domestic
        heroin                            104               53
        97                  53 International crime
        76               25            54                  18
        Investigative shortfall                    125                 0
        125                   0 Total
        989             399            771             311 Source: DEA
        Fiscal Year 1998 Spring Planning Estimates, June 1996, and DEA
        Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management and Budget Submission,
        September 1996. DEA's fiscal year 1998 budget submission was sent
        to OMB for review in OMB Specified Minimum
        September 1996 as part of DOJ's budget request. According to OMB
        Funding for Certain DEA                    officials, an OMB
        budget examiner initially reviewed the DOJ budget Initiatives, but
        Indicated No submission, and the results were presented to and
        reviewed by the OMB Staffing Levels
        policy officials. Generally, a complete set of budget proposals is
        presented to the president by early December for his approval.
        Subsequently, OMB staff prepares the agency passbacks. An OMB
        official described OMB's approach to DOJ's fiscal year 1998 budget
        submission as "flexible." That is, as in other years, OMB made
        suggestions regarding specific DOJ activities, providing DOJ with
        an Page 91                                       GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's Staffing Needs
        Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998 overall
        dollar level and specifying minimum funding for certain funding
        floors. OMB officials said that OMB did not make account-level
        recommendations, leaving those decisions to the Attorney General
        to ensure that the budget reflected DOJ's priorities. By early
        December 1996, OMB sent DOJ's fiscal year 1998 passback in which
        it recommended an overall DOJ budget lower than DOJ's submission.
        For DEA, the passback specified minimum funding for the
        methamphetamine strategy, the Southwest Border project, and the
        domestic heroin strategy, but it did not discuss specific staffing
        estimates or foreign enhancements. Prior to the passback, DEA had
        received its fiscal year 1997 appropriation, but we were unable to
        ascertain how it affected the passback. According to DOJ budget
        officials, DOJ reviewed OMB's fiscal year 1998 DEA/DOJ Reviewed
        OMB          DOJ passback to determine what could be funded
        according to the Passback and Appealed It      Attorney General's
        priorities. They said that as a result of OMB's specifying With
        Some Success             funding levels for DEA's methamphetamine,
        Southwest Border, and heroin initiatives, no funds for the
        enhancements in other initiatives were available within the DEA
        budget submission. The DOJ budget officials said that they then
        sent DOJ's interpretation-which was based on the Attorney
        General's priorities-of the OMB passback to DEA. According to DOJ
        budget section officials, DEA developed its appeal to the OMB
        passback and then presented it to OMB, through DOJ, in early
        December 1996. DEA's specific staffing-related appeals and
        outcomes were as follows: *  Methamphetamine initiative: DEA
        requested additional resources, including 131 positions. DOJ and
        OMB agreed to a slight increase in the funded amount to cover 74
        positions. *  Southwest Border initiative: DEA sought 131
        additional positions, including 90 special agents. DOJ and OMB
        agreed to increase the funded amount to cover the additional
        agents. OMB and DOJ officials reported that the method used to
        settle appeals varied from year to year. In fiscal year 1998, OMB
        and DOJ agreed on an overall spending level on appeal and DOJ's
        spread of the increase, which provided DEA with funding to cover
        additional positions for both the methamphetamine and Southwest
        Border initiatives described above. Page 92
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 Concurrent with departmental and OMB reviews of budget
        submissions, ONDCP Certified DOJ/DEA each agency with a drug
        mission is required by the drug budget Budget Submission
        certification process to submit a drug control budget to ONDCP.
        However, in 1996, due to the appointment of a new ONDCP Director
        and the reformulation and consequent late release of ONDCP's drug
        strategy, the national drug budget certification process did not
        follow ONDCP's established procedures and schedule. Specifically,
        ONDCP requested only one fiscal year 1998 budget submission in
        September 1996, coincident with the OMB deadline. On November 8,
        1996, while OMB was reviewing DOJ's budget submission, DOJ sent
        its budget request to ONDCP. On November 18, 1996, for
        consideration before finalizing DOJ's fiscal year 1998 budget
        request, the ONDCP Director advised the Attorney General of two
        DEA program initiatives that did not appear to have been included
        in DOJ's submission. The initiatives in question were (1) the
        continued expansion of vetted law enforcement units in key source
        and transit countries and (2) a request for additional resources
        for DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. The
        Director's letter did not specifically discuss staffing related to
        the initiatives.8 Final ONDCP budget certification was withheld
        until ONDCP reviewed DOJ's final budget submission. According to
        DOJ and ONDCP officials, DEA received sufficient resources in its
        fiscal year 1997 appropriation to address the ONDCP Director's
        concerns. Therefore, on the basis of ONDCP's final review, the
        Director notified the Attorney General on February 7, 1997-1 day
        after the President submitted the fiscal year 1998 budget request-
        that the resources requested by DOJ were certified as adequate to
        implement the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control
        Strategy. The President submitted his fiscal year 1998 budget to
        Congress on The President's Fiscal Year     February 6, 1997. As a
        result of the iterative process between DEA/DOJ 1998 Budget
        Submission          and OMB over DEA staffing estimates and after
        consideration of the resources provided in DEA's fiscal year 1997
        appropriation,9 the President's budget requested 345 new
        positions, including 168 special agents, for DEA domestic offices.
        As shown in table 4.2, the number of total positions requested was
        approximately one-half the number DOJ 8 Although no specific
        mention of DEA staffing was made in the ONDCP certification
        correspondence for fiscal year 1998, DEA officials indicated that
        during fiscal year 1998, DEA acted on the ONDCP Director's
        recommendations for additional staffing for DEA offices in Santo
        Domingo, Dominican Republic; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and Nassau. 9
        DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation, as part of DOJ's
        appropriation, was enacted on September 30, 1996.  See Department
        of Justice Appropriations Act of 1997, P.L. 104-208; and H.R.
        Conf. Rep. No. 104- 863. Page 93
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 initially estimated in its OMB submission. The number of
        special agents requested was approximately 50 percent of the
        original DOJ estimates. Some of the differences between the DOJ
        estimates and the DEA staffing request in the President's budget
        submission reflected changes recommended by DOJ or OMB, which were
        previously discussed. However, other revisions took into account
        DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation. For example, according to
        DOJ officials, although DEA's international crime initiative was
        not included in the President's budget submission for fiscal year
        1998, DEA was able to staff the Vientiane and Managua offices,
        included in that initiative, with fiscal year 1997 funds from the
        Source Country Initiative.10 In addition, because Congress
        provided almost twice the funds for the MET Program requested by
        DEA in fiscal year 1997, the program was fully funded (130 agents
        were provided) as of that year. Additional funds for the MET
        Program, which had been included in the fiscal year 1998 violent
        crime initiative, were no longer necessary. Table 4.2: Comparison
        of DOJ's
        Additional total and special agent positions Estimates and the
        President's Request
        DOJ's DEA staffing                             President's DEA
        staffing for Additional DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for
        Fiscal Year 1998
        estimates to OMB                                  request to
        Congress September 1996
        February 1997 Special
        Special Initiative
        Total                  agents                        Total
        agents Violent crime
        94                         48                           a
        a Methamphetamine
        208                          96                        74
        60 Southwest Border
        193                          96                      192
        96 Domestic heroin
        97                         53                        60
        12 International crime
        54                         18                           a
        a Investigative shortfall
        125                            0                       19
        0 Total
        771                       311                        345
        168 aThe conference report for DEA's fiscal year 1997
        appropriation provided an additional 75 agents for source
        countries and 130 special agents for the MET Program, thereby
        addressing at least some of DOJ's initial estimates for the
        violent crime and international crime initiatives (H.R. Conf. Rep.
        No. 104-863). Source: DEA Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management
        and Budget Submission, September 1996, and DEA Fiscal Year 1998
        Authorization and Budget Request to Congress. 10 The conference
        report for DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation included a source
        country/international strategy, which provided an additional 75
        agents, to increase on-site DEA agents in source countries.  See
        H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863. Page 94
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 As shown in table 4.3, the conference committee
        recommended 531 Congress Added Staff             additional
        positions, of which 240 were special agent positions. On the for a
        New Caribbean              basis of the recommendations of the
        House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the conference
        committee also provided guidance as to how Initiative and Changed
        those positions were to be allocated, including a new Caribbean
        initiative. Staffing Recommended for Other DEA
        During the fiscal year 1998 appropriations process, the House
        Initiatives                      Appropriations Committee
        recommended, and Congress approved as part of the conference
        committee's report on DEA's appropriation, a new Caribbean
        initiative, which was not included in the President's budget.
        According to the House Appropriations Committee report, this
        initiative was proposed to address the increase in drug
        trafficking throughout the Caribbean. The initiative provided 60
        additional DEA special agents for Puerto Rico, the Northern
        Caribbean, and south Florida. In addition, the conference
        committee recommended additional positions, above the President's
        request, for the heroin and investigative shortfall initiatives.
        On the basis of the Senate Appropriations Committee's
        recommendation, the Conference Committee's report included 120 new
        positions, 24 of which were special agents (twice the number of
        total and special agent positions in the President's budget
        request), to continue efforts to reduce heroin trafficking within
        the United States. The Conference Committee also identified the
        need for 85 additional intelligence analysts for the investigative
        shortfall initiative. The President signed DEA/DOJ's fiscal year
        1998 appropriation into law on November 26, 1996. Page 95
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 Table 4.3: Comparison of the President's Request and
        Congress'
        Additional total and special agent positions Appropriations
        Guidance for DEA
        Fiscal year 1998 DOJ Additional Total and Special Agent
        appropriation conference Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
        President's DEA staffing              report with DEA staffing
        request to Congress                        guidance February 1997
        November 1997 Special                            Special
        Initiative                                    Total
        agents              Total           agents Methamphetamine
        74a                 60             74                  60b
        Southwest Border                                192
        96            192                   96 Domestic heroin
        60                  12            120                  24c
        Investigative shortfall                          19
        0              85                    0 Caribbean
        N/A                 N/A             60                   60 Total
        345                 168            531                  240 Notes:
        N/A-Initiative not included at that point in the process.
        aFourteen of the positions were requested through VCRP. bThe
        conference report called for 54 special agents in accordance with
        the House report.  The House report also identified six additional
        agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training.  Fourteen
        positions were provided through VCRP. cThe conference report
        called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate report.
        The Senate language specified that 24 of the positions be special
        agents. Source: DEA FY 1998 Authorization and Budget Request to
        Congress; the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
        Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L.
        105-119 (1997); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-
        207; and S. Rep. No. 105-48. After receipt of its annual
        appropriation, DEA is responsible for budget DEA's Fiscal Year
        1998 execution and the allocation of new staff. In addition to the
        guidance Allocation Process                    provided by
        Congress, DEA officials said they consider factors, such as
        recently changing drug trends, to determine that allocation.
        Considered a Variety of Factors                               For
        fiscal year 1998, according to a DEA official involved in the
        allocation process that year, DEA's Executive Policy and Strategic
        Planning, Operations Division, Financial Management Division, and
        Office of Resource Management staff prepared a draft allocation
        for the additional resources provided in DEA's appropriation. The
        official indicated that among the factors considered in
        determining the allocation of additional staff were congressional
        direction; the number of agents added by Congress, broken out by
        mission and team; FMPs and any other written requests from the
        field divisions; DEA and DOJ strategies, initiatives, and
        priorities, including the Southwest Border and methamphetamine
        plans; actual hours worked by agents on particular types of cases;
        and drug trends that had emerged since the original fiscal year
        1998 budget submission. The recommendations were sent to the DEA
        Administrator for review and final approval. Page 96
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Chapter 4 DEA's
        Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal
        Year 1998 DEA allocated 531 new positions, including 240 special
        agent positions, for the 5 initiatives included in its
        appropriation. As shown in table 4.4, DEA's fiscal year 1998
        staffing allocation followed Congress' appropriations guidance.
        Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress'
        Additional total and special agent positions Appropriations
        Guidance and DEA's
        Fiscal year 1998 DOJ New Staffing Allocation for Additional DEA
        Staffing and Special Agent
        appropriation conference Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
        report and DEA staffing              DEA fiscal year 1998 guidance
        staffing allocation November 1997                       February
        1998 Special                            Special Initiative
        Total          agents              Total              agents
        Methamphetamine                                 74a
        60               74                 60 Southwest Border
        192                 96              192                 96
        Domestic heroin                                120
        24b              120                 24 Investigative shortfall
        85                 0               85                   0
        Caribbean                                        60
        60               60                 60 Total
        531                240              531                240c aThe
        conference report called for the 54 special agents in accordance
        with the House report.  The House report also identified six
        additional agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training.
        Fourteen positions were provided through VCRP. bThe conference
        report called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate
        report.  The Senate language specified that 24 of the positions be
        special agents. cDEA also allocated 45 additional positions
        provided through other funding sources for a total of 576
        positions allocated, of which 245 were special agents. Source: The
        Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
        Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L. 105-119 (1997);
        H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-207; S. Rep. No.
        105-48; and DEA. The process used for determining DEA's staffing
        needs, as carried out in Conclusions
        fiscal year 1998, was systematically linked to its budget
        formulation process. The DEA process was typical of and consistent
        with the processes and procedures that federal agencies are
        expected to follow, according to federal laws and regulations and
        procedures promulgated by OMB. Moreover, the DEA process
        considered factors related to DEA's ability to carry out its
        mission, including emerging drug trafficking trends, staffing
        requests from the field, the Administrator's vision statement, and
        the SAC's vision statement from each field office. Once Congress
        approved DEA's fiscal year 1998 appropriation, DEA senior
        management systematically determined the allocation of the
        additional staff to headquarters and field offices, taking into
        consideration congressional guidance and such factors as field
        office requests. Page 97
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices During
        our review, we visited four Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
        domestic field divisions-Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans,
        LA; and Washington, D.C./Baltimore, MD. We also visited three
        foreign country offices-Bogota, Colombia; LaPaz, Bolivia; and
        Mexico City, Mexico-and the Caribbean (Puerto Rico) Division,
        which has both foreign and domestic responsibilities. The
        following profiles provide a snapshot of each division/office at
        the time we performed our work at those locations between February
        and September 1998. The profiles include information, as of that
        time (unless otherwise noted), on the (1) geographic region
        covered by each division/office and its organizational structure;
        (2) drug trafficking situation and threat faced by each
        division/office; (3) enforcement response of each division/office
        in terms of priorities, programs, and initiatives; and (4)
        enforcement statistics and case examples.  Many of the programs
        and initiatives referred to in the profiles are generally
        described in chapter 2 of this report.  We developed the profiles
        on the basis of information-including various documents and
        statistical data-provided by DEA field officials, although we
        could not always obtain comparable information from all
        divisions/offices. We did not independently verify the accuracy of
        the information provided. Page 98
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Los
        Angeles Division DEA's Los Angeles Division covers a vast
        geographic area that includes Geographic Region and       portions
        of California and all of Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, the
        Organizational Structure    Republic of Palau, and American Samoa.
        Los Angeles has the busiest maritime container port complexes in
        the United States at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. Los
        Angeles International airport is the third busiest in the world.
        In addition, there are major airports in Orange and San Bernardino
        Counties, Las Vegas, and Honolulu. California and Nevada are also
        served by an extensive highway system. The Los Angeles Division is
        headed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), two Associate SACs, and
        seven Assistant SACs (ASACs).  It includes the division office,
        three district offices, four resident offices, and three posts of
        duty, as shown in figure I.1.1 1 The maps included in the profiles
        in this appendix are not drawn precisely to scale. Page 99
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.1:  Los Angeles Division Map Reno Pacific
        South Lake Tahoe Ocean Nevada California Las Vegas Honolulu Maui
        Ventura Hawaii
        Los Angeles Riverside Hilo
        Santa Ana Guam Division office District office Resident office
        Post of duty Source: DEA's Los Angeles Division. Page 100
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
        time of our visit in February 1998, the division was authorized to
        have 445 staff, including 283 special agents. There also were 114
        state and local officers from various law enforcement agencies
        assigned to task forces operated by the division. According to
        DEA, the region covered by the Los Angeles Division is one
        Overview of Drug             of the most significant worldwide
        centers of drug trafficking, money Trafficking Situation and
        laundering, and drug-related violence. The region serves as a
        source, Threat                       transit area and distribution
        site for a variety of illegal drugs. The division's size,
        multiplicity of jurisdictions, and ethnic diversity all pose law
        enforcement challenges, as do its myriad entry points and transit
        corridors. The proximity to the Southwest Border makes the region
        easily accessible to trafficking organizations bringing cocaine,
        heroin, and other drugs into the United States. The region is also
        a major source of methamphetamine clandestinely produced in
        laboratories and high-grade marijuana cultivated in outdoor and
        indoor operations.  In addition, DEA reported that much of the
        region is plagued by drug-related violent crime, often gang
        related, and that most of California's violent gang activity is in
        Los Angeles county. Cocaine                      At the time of
        our review, DEA considered cocaine to be one of the biggest drug
        trafficking problems for the division. Los Angeles is a major
        transshipment point for cocaine en route to other parts of the
        United States and Canada. Cocaine is smuggled into Southern
        California primarily across the U.S.-Mexico border. According to
        DEA, Mexican drug trafficking organizations smuggle most of the
        cocaine coming into and through Los Angeles. Although Colombian
        traffickers control the worldwide supply of cocaine, they prefer
        to move their cocaine into Mexico and sell it to Mexican
        organizations. Cocaine traffickers use various means, such as
        automobiles and tractor-trailers with hidden compartments, to move
        cocaine across the border. Other points of entry for cocaine
        include airports and maritime ports in the region. DEA reported
        that traffickers were using "stash houses" to store cocaine in Los
        Angeles and Riverside counties. From these stash houses, cocaine
        was being distributed locally or moved to other destinations in
        the United States and Canada. Mobile street gangs were involved in
        handling the local cocaine distribution. These gangs were also
        transporting cocaine and crack cocaine to other destinations. Page
        101                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the time of our
        review, Mexican heroin was the heroin of choice for Heroin
        users in the area covered by the Los Angeles Division, according
        to DEA. Heroin was also coming into the region from Southeast Asia
        (principally Thailand and the Philippines) and Canada, and to a
        lesser extent from Southwest Asia/Middle East (Turkey, Pakistan,
        Lebanon) and Colombia. Although heroin was being smuggled into the
        country in a variety of ways, DEA reported that most was arriving
        in maritime containers or aircraft for passengers or cargo. Also,
        according to DEA, black tar heroin and Mexican brown heroin, the
        most available and popular form of heroin in the Los Angeles area,
        were both supplied by Mexican traffickers. Trafficking in
        Southeast Asian heroin, which was being imported into the Los
        Angeles area and transshipped to the East Coast, was dominated by
        Thai nationals and Thailand-based Nigerian traffickers.
        Methamphetamine and Other    At the time of our review,
        methamphetamine was the most manufactured Dangerous Drugs
        and distributed illegal drug in the geographic area covered by the
        Los Angeles division, according to DEA. It is the division's top
        enforcement priority. Although methamphetamine trafficking takes
        place throughout the region, it is predominantly concentrated in
        Riverside and San Bernardino counties, where there has been a
        tremendous increase in clandestine methamphetamine laboratories.
        These two counties have been designated as the methamphetamine
        capital of the nation. The division's most serious methamphetamine
        threat is from Mexican drug trafficking organizations that
        dominate the production of high-quality methamphetamine in
        southern California. At the time of our review, DEA reported that
        the number of Mexican methamphetamine laboratories was increasing
        at an alarming rate. Other individuals were operating small,
        unsophisticated methamphetamine laboratories that made up most of
        the clandestine laboratories in southern California. The diversion
        of legitimately produced controlled substances is also a serious
        threat in the region, particularly in the Los Angeles area.
        Numerous means are used to divert these drugs to local abusers and
        traffickers. At the time of our review, traffickers were shipping
        the drugs throughout the United States and abroad, according to
        DEA. Other dangerous drugs are also trafficked in the area covered
        by the division, including PCP and LSD. Marijuana
        According to DEA, marijuana importation, cultivation, and
        trafficking remain an ongoing enforcement challenge throughout the
        division. Marijuana is prolific throughout the region, and Los
        Angeles is a major Page 102
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        transshipment area for marijuana destined for other parts of the
        United States. Mexican trafficking organizations smuggle marijuana
        into the region. DEA reported that these organizations had
        cornered the wholesale and retail distribution markets for
        marijuana in Southern and Central California. Colombian
        organizations also were involved in marijuana trafficking, using
        Mexican organizations to transport marijuana across the U.S.-
        Mexico border. Domestic cultivation also is a problem, with high-
        grade marijuana being grown in outdoor gardens and on farms in
        Hawaii, California, and Nevada. According to DEA, Hawaii leads the
        nation in domestic marijuana cultivation. The division reported
        seeing an increase in the number of large-scale indoor operations
        in California and Nevada. At the time of our review, the Los
        Angeles Division reported operating Priorities, Programs, and
        various programs and initiatives in response to the drug
        trafficking threat Initiatives                  in the region. The
        division was working with other federal, state, and local law
        enforcement agencies to carry out its programs and initiatives.
        For fiscal year 1998, the division's goal was to focus available
        resources on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting criminal
        drug enterprises, their support systems, and the individuals
        responsible for their origin and proliferation. Another priority
        of the division was to use federal asset forfeiture laws to affect
        criminal organizations by seizing proceeds derived from their
        criminal activity. Division resources to carry out its programs
        and initiatives included task force operations, an asset
        forfeiture group, an intelligence program, a drug diversion
        control program,2 investigative initiatives aimed at gangs
        involved in drug-related violent crimes, Mobile Enforcement Team
        (MET) Program operations, the Southwest Border Initiative, and a
        methamphetamine initiative. At the time of our review, the
        division had planned to continue expanding its Title III
        (electronic surveillance) program; promote greater cooperation in
        developing joint investigations with other federal, state, and
        local agencies aimed at the highest level of drug trafficking; and
        widen the scope of interagency task forces. 2 DEA's drug diversion
        control program is designed to enforce federal laws and
        regulations controlling the legal production and distribution of
        legitimately manufactured controlled substances; prevent and
        detect, through criminal, civil, and administrative actions, the
        diversion of controlled substances from legitimate channels; and
        control the diversion of legally produced precursor and essential
        chemicals to the illicit manufacture of drugs. Page 103
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
        division office in Los Angeles had nine enforcement groups at the
        time of our review. According to the SAC, three of the groups were
        working on the Southwest Border Initiative,3 a major drug
        enforcement operation along and across the Mexican border using
        resources from DEA, FBI, the Customs Service, and state and local
        law enforcement agencies. The office also had groups focusing on
        Southeast Asian heroin, Mexican heroin, drugs primarily from
        Southeast Asia and Europe, methamphetamine, and violent drug
        trafficking groups. In addition to the enforcement groups, the
        division office had support groups, including technical
        operations, asset removal, intelligence, and diversion control.
        The division's district offices, resident offices, and posts of
        duty all had enforcement groups focusing primarily on specific
        drug trafficking problems in their areas. For example, the
        Riverside district office, with four enforcement groups,
        concentrated on methamphetamine trafficking and the Southwest
        Border Initiative. These outlying offices are encouraged to
        cooperate and conduct joint efforts with state and local law
        enforcement agencies in developing cases and conducting other
        operations. The division had state and local task forces in
        Riverside, Santa Ana, Reno, Las Vegas, Honolulu, Saipan, and Guam.
        Though not part of a DEA-funded state and local task force, the
        Ventura office assisted three narcotics task forces in its area.
        Also, DEA's group at Los Angeles International airport was an
        informal task force with officers from the Los Angeles Police
        Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office working
        together with DEA special agents. At the time of our review, the
        division had one MET that it was using to target organizations
        engaged in violent drug-related crimes, particularly with regard
        to cocaine and crack cocaine trafficking. In commenting on a draft
        of our report, DEA officials informed us that a second MET was
        established in October 1998. The officials also informed us that
        as of May 1999, the first MET had 10 special agents assigned to
        it, and the second MET had 11 special agents assigned. Further, as
        of May 1999, the first MET had received 19 requests for assistance
        since 1995 and was deployed for 14.  Since its inception, the
        second MET had received two requests for assistance and was
        deployed for both. 3 In addition, four DEA special agents were
        assigned to a Southwest Border Initiative group located at the Los
        Angeles FBI office. Page 104
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
        division is a major participant in the Los Angeles High Intensity
        Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), which is the largest HIDTA in the
        country. At the time of our review, a DEA Associate SAC headed the
        Southern California Drug Task Force (SCDTF) in the HIDTA, and a
        DEA ASAC headed one of three SCDTF divisions. The SCDTF is a
        multiagency, integrated task force that comprised 105 federal,
        state, and local law enforcement officers, including 40 DEA
        special agents, at the time of our review. SCDTF's primary
        objective is to conduct investigations targeting major drug
        trafficking organizations that operate on a regional, national,
        and international level.  The Los Angeles HIDTA's fiscal year 1998
        strategy referred to SCDTF as the "cornerstone" of the HIDTA. DEA
        also had an intelligence group assigned to SCDTF, as well as staff
        assigned to other Los Angeles HIDTA units. Other major programs
        and initiatives being implemented by DEA's Los Angeles Division at
        the time of our review included the following: (1) the
        Methamphetamine Strategy, which was aimed at major domestic and
        Mexican traffickers involved in producing methamphetamine and
        other dangerous drugs and was being carried out with state and
        local law enforcement agencies; (2) money laundering
        investigations and seizures of criminally derived drug-related
        assets, which were carried out in conjunction with the Federal
        Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Customs Service, Internal
        Revenue Service (IRS), and California Bureau of Narcotics
        Enforcement; and (3) the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
        Program (marijuana program), particularly initiatives conducted in
        cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies in
        Hawaii. Most of the division's resources have been devoted to
        cases involving cocaine, methamphetamine, and other dangerous
        drugs. For example, in fiscal year 1997, the division's special
        agents spent about 35.7 percent of their investigative work hours
        on cocaine cases and about 35.7 percent on cases involving
        dangerous drugs, including methamphetamine. In fiscal year 1998,
        they spent about 33.2 percent of their investigative work hours on
        cocaine cases and about 41.8 percent on cases involving dangerous
        drugs, including methamphetamine. Enforcement activity results
        reported by the  Los Angeles Division Enforcement Statistics and
        indicated that the division initiated 1,573 cases in fiscal year
        1997 and 1,446 Case Examples                 cases in fiscal year
        1998. The division reported 1,892 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and
        2,214 arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division also reported
        seizing approximately 4,500 kilograms of cocaine, 25 kilograms of
        heroin, 16,400 kilograms of marijuana, and 268 kilograms of
        methamphetamine in Page 105
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices fiscal
        year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division reported seizing
        approximately 4,656 kilograms of cocaine, 59 kilograms of heroin,
        9,235 kilograms of marijuana, and 673 kilograms of
        methamphetamine. In addition, the division reported seizing assets
        amounting to $52.4 million in fiscal year 1997 and assets
        amounting to $122.2 million in fiscal year 1998. Further, the
        division reported seizing 87 clandestine laboratories in fiscal
        year 1997 and 90 clandestine laboratories in fiscal year 1998. The
        following are two examples of what the Los Angeles Division
        considered to be successful major investigations. *  DEA's Los
        Angeles Division conducted an investigation targeting a Mexican-
        based cocaine trafficking organization operating in the Los
        Angeles area. The organization was responsible for smuggling large
        quantities of cocaine into the United States from Mexico,
        stockpiling it in the Los Angeles area, and distributing it
        throughout the United States. Members of the organization
        collected drug proceeds and transported the money to Mexico. The
        investigation involved the wire interception of 29 cellular
        telephones and the electronic interception of 19 digital paging
        devices. It resulted in the arrest of 52 individuals and seizures
        of over $15 million, 3.5 tons of cocaine, and 570 pounds of
        marijuana. On the basis of leads developed from this
        investigation, DEA offices in San Diego, San Francisco, Chicago,
        New York, and Calexico, Mexico initiated related investigations
        and wiretaps. Surveillance teams comprising state and local
        agencies assisted DEA with this investigation. *  DEA's Los
        Angeles Division and Islamabad Country Office worked with the
        Pakistan Antinarcotics Force to conduct a controlled delivery4 of
        Southwest Asian heroin. DEA, U.S. Customs agents, local law
        enforcement officers, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were
        subsequently involved in the arrest of several drug traffickers.
        The operation resulted in the seizure of 106 kilograms of
        Southwest Asian heroin and approximately $509,000 in U.S.
        currency, as well as three arrests in the United States, three in
        Canada, and one in Pakistan. 4 A controlled delivery is an
        investigative tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a
        shipment of illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual
        seizure. Page 106
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Miami
        Division DEA's Miami Division is responsible for federal drug law
        enforcement in Geographic Region and       Florida, the Bahamas,
        the Cayman Islands, and Cuba. The division's 8,462 Organizational
        Structure    miles of coastline and 14 deep-water ports have made
        it very attractive for maritime smugglers, and its 18 commercial
        cargo and passenger carrier airports also pose a smuggling threat.
        The Miami Division, which is headed by a SAC, 2 Associate SACs,
        and 8 ASACs, includes the division office, 3 district offices, 10
        resident offices, 1 post of duty, and 1 country office, as shown
        in figure I.2. Page 107
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.2:  Miami Division Map Pensacola
        Jacksonville Tallahassee Panama City
        Gainesville Florida Orlando Tampa Ft. Pierce Freeport W. Palm
        Beach Ft. Myers Ft. Lauderdale Miami
        Bahamas Nassau Key Largo Key West Division office Country office
        District office Resident office Post of duty Cuba Source: DEA's
        Miami Division. Page 108
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
        time of our visit in June 1998, the division was authorized to
        have 600 staff, including 400 special agents. In addition, there
        were 99 staff from state and local agencies authorized for various
        task forces and groups in the division, including 92 law
        enforcement officers. According to DEA, at the time of our review,
        South Florida continued to be Overview of Drug             one of
        the principal gateways for cocaine entering the United States. The
        Trafficking Situation and    Miami Division reported that South
        American drug traffickers were Threat
        shifting their trafficking patterns back to routes in the
        Caribbean, as evidenced by the amount of trafficking activity in
        the Bahamas and Florida. Further, as Colombian traffickers have
        become increasingly involved in heroin trafficking, Miami
        International Airport became the principal port of entry for
        Colombian heroin into the United States. Other drugs were also a
        concern of the division. For example, DEA reported that marijuana
        trafficking through the Caribbean has traditionally been a
        problem, and there had been an increase in the amounts of
        marijuana and methamphetamine from the Southwest Border being
        transshipped through central and northern Florida.  DEA also
        reported an increase in the production of methamphetamine in
        clandestine laboratories in the Florida area. Cocaine
        The Miami Division reported that as drug law enforcement efforts
        increased along the Southwest Border in recent years, South
        Florida became the North American command and control center for
        major South American trafficking organizations. Colombians
        dominate the major South Florida drug-smuggling organizations, and
        they continued to finance and control the wholesale cocaine
        distribution market in the area. The division further reported
        that drug intelligence indicated that the Colombian traffickers
        did not completely trust Mexican trafficking organizations;
        consequently, cocaine trafficking patterns had begun to shift in
        1997 and 1998. Once again, large shipments of cocaine were being
        sent from South America, through Mexico and the Caribbean, to
        South Florida. The Caribbean serves as a major transit zone for
        cocaine from Central and South America, and Florida is a
        significant importation and transit area for cocaine smuggled
        through the Bahamas. According to DEA, airdrops of cocaine from
        planes coming directly from Colombia to the Bahamas were taking
        place at an accelerating rate in 1998. The primary threat,
        however, was "go-fast" boats and pleasure craft. Such vessels were
        being used to carry up to 1,500 kilograms of cocaine through the
        Bahamas to the United States. Small commercial cargo vessels were
        also being used to smuggle drugs through the Bahamas. Page 109
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Cocaine
        was also smuggled in other ways into the area covered by the
        division.  For example, DEA reported that aircraft were used to
        smuggle cocaine directly into Florida from the Eastern Caribbean.
        Maritime smuggling continued to be a significant factor, including
        the shipment of cocaine hidden within containerized cargo on ships
        travelling from South America to Florida. There also were
        indications that the Florida Keys were increasingly being used as
        an off-load point for Cuban traffickers. According to DEA, crack
        cocaine was the most significant problem for the division's
        offices outside South Florida. South Florida traffickers were
        supplying most of the state, except for the Florida panhandle
        area, which was being supplied by trafficking organizations along
        the Southwest Border. Heroin                       According to
        DEA, the drug threat in the area covered by the Miami Division has
        expanded to include increased heroin importation from South
        America to the United States through Florida. Opium poppy
        cultivation and heroin trafficking have become part of the
        Colombian illegal drug trade, and Colombian traffickers were
        increasing their efforts to sell multikilogram quantities of
        heroin to distributors in the United States. Miami International
        Airport replaced New York's John F. Kennedy Airport as the
        principal port of entry for Colombian heroin into the United
        States. Another significant heroin smuggling route was from the
        Caribbean directly to Orlando, where the heroin was then
        transported through Florida and on to large markets in major
        northeastern cities. Methamphetamine and Other    According to
        DEA, methamphetamine trafficking and use had increased Dangerous
        Drugs              throughout Florida, particularly in central and
        northern Florida. Mexican organizations in Florida were the
        primary sources of methamphetamine. DEA reported that most of
        these organizations had ties to similar organizations in Southern
        California and/or Mexico where they were obtaining the drug. In
        addition to smuggling methamphetamine into Florida, local
        organizations were becoming increasingly adept at clandestinely
        manufacturing it. DEA also reported there was a great amount of
        drug-related violence associated with the distribution and use of
        methamphetamine. The diversion of legal pharmaceutical drugs to
        illegal channels continued to be a problem in Florida. Physicians
        and pharmacists were the source of most of these drugs through
        activities such as indiscriminate and illegal prescribing
        practices and forged prescriptions. In addition, numerous chemical
        companies and brokers in Florida were diverting and supplying Page
        110                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices chemicals used by
        clandestine laboratory operators to produce methamphetamine,
        cocaine, and heroin. Marijuana           Marijuana was widely
        available throughout the area covered by the division, according
        to DEA. Although marijuana trafficking through the Caribbean has
        traditionally been a concern, the division also reported an
        increase in the amount of marijuana coming from the Southwest
        Border and being transshipped through central and northern
        Florida. Traffickers were using a variety of smuggling routes and
        methods to bring marijuana into Florida. For example, DEA reported
        that trafficking groups were transshipping marijuana from Colombia
        through Florida using private vessels. Other traffickers were
        using commercial trucks to bring marijuana into Florida from Texas
        and Mexico. Smaller quantities of marijuana were being dispatched
        in luggage on commercial airline flights or via AMTRAK.
        Additionally, Federal Express and other package delivery services
        were frequently used to transport small quantities of marijuana. A
        large percentage of the marijuana consumed in South Florida was
        being grown locally. DEA reported that indoor marijuana
        cultivation had reached record levels. Typically, indoor growing
        operations were located in private residences and consisted of
        about 200 to 300 plants. Larger indoor operations consisting of up
        to 10,000 plants were becoming more prevalent. Outdoor growing
        operations, sometimes amounting to several thousand plants, were
        usually located on private property in more rural areas or on
        protected forest land. Money Laundering    According to DEA, South
        Florida continues to be a major center for Colombian drug
        traffickers' money laundering activities. At the time of our
        review, recent financial investigations indicated that traffickers
        were using electronic fund transfers to move narcotics proceeds
        from the United States to Central and South America. Traffickers
        were also using both legitimate and illegitimate import/export
        businesses to purchase products with illegal drug proceeds for
        export mostly to South America, thus hiding the source of the
        proceeds and providing additional profit. Intelligence also
        indicated that smuggling of large shipments of bulk United States
        currency from Florida to Colombia has continued. In recent cases,
        traffickers wrapped and shipped bulk currency in hollowed
        appliances and containers. At times, these bulk shipments were
        sent to Colombia via third countries, such as Venezuela or Panama.
        Page 111                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The Miami Division's
        traditional priority has been regional, national, and Priorities,
        Programs, and    international investigations aimed at disrupting
        the ability of major South Initiatives                  American
        traffickers to import and distribute cocaine, as well as their
        ability to move the proceeds of their operations to South America.
        The division believes such investigations have become increasingly
        important as drug trafficking through the Caribbean has increased.
        In this regard, the division's management plans, at the time of
        our review, called for it to (1) direct investigative efforts
        towards major international organizations, targeting every aspect
        of their operations; and (2) increase cooperative efforts with
        foreign counterparts as well as other federal, state, and local
        law enforcement agencies.  The plan also called for the division
        to (1) attack street-level drug gangs through the MET Program,
        task forces, and drug enforcement training for state and local
        officers; and (2) continue to take a proactive role with the
        media, business and community groups, and schools to increase
        awareness of DEA's mission and the dangers of drug abuse. At the
        time of our review, the division office in Miami had eight
        enforcement groups as well as four HIDTA task force groups and two
        METs. In addition to these groups, the division office had a
        diversion control group and support groups, including technical
        operations, asset removal, and intelligence. The division's
        outlying district, country, and resident offices had various
        enforcement groups, including eight state and local task forces
        and a HIDTA task force group. Also, the Orlando and Tampa district
        offices each had a diversion control group. The Miami Division
        received 62 new positions in fiscal year 1998. Most of these
        positions resulted from a congressional appropriation designed to
        increase DEA's efforts against drug trafficking in the Caribbean
        and Florida (referred to as the Caribbean initiative). The
        additional positions were added to offices throughout the
        division, particularly in South Florida, the Bahamas, and the
        Florida Keys. The division office's four HIDTA task force groups
        were part of the Miami HIDTA established in 1990. The Miami
        HIDTA's fiscal year 1998 goals were to reduce drug trafficking,
        money laundering, and drug-related crime and violence as well as
        to prevent and reduce drug abuse. DEA officials said that all four
        HIDTA groups focused primarily on Colombian cocaine cases.
        However, one group also investigated indoor marijuana growing
        operations, and another group also conducted "street sweeps" with
        City of Miami and Miami-Dade police.  Miami HIDTA task force group
        participants Page 112                                    GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
        DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices included special
        agents from DEA, Customs, IRS, and the FBI as well as officers
        from various state and local law enforcement agencies. The Central
        Florida HIDTA was established in Orlando, FL, in 1998. Its fiscal
        year 1998 mission was to measurably reduce drug trafficking and
        related money laundering and apprehend violent drug fugitives,
        thereby reducing the impact of drug-related crimes in Central
        Florida. As part of this HIDTA, the Miami Division's Orlando
        District Office operated a multiagency heroin task force, and its
        Tampa District Office managed a multiagency methamphetamine task
        force. Financial investigations are a priority of the division.
        Enforcement groups have carried out investigations targeting money
        launderers, such as Operation Cali-Man, and also initiated
        Operation Greenskeeper to penetrate major trafficking
        organizations by offering money laundering services to
        traffickers. In addition, the division reestablished its asset
        removal group, whose primary goal was to provide asset forfeiture
        training to special agents and task force officers. The division
        planned that this group would expand its role to support the
        division's financial investigations and then eventually assume a
        proactive role in conducting and assisting financial
        investigations. The division's efforts to combat marijuana
        trafficking included investigations of organizations responsible
        for smuggling marijuana into the United States, transporting
        marijuana to Florida from the Southwest Border, and transporting
        marijuana to other locations within the United States. DEA offices
        located in the Florida Panhandle, for example, participated in
        Operation Pipeline with state and local agencies to interdict
        marijuana being shipped on Florida highways. In addition, the
        division participated in DEA's marijuana eradication program to
        assist in the detection and eradication of marijuana plants grown
        in Florida. DEA provided the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
        (FDLE) with $320,000 to implement this program in fiscal year
        1998. The division's marijuana eradication program manager in
        Tallahassee, along with DEA field coordinators in various district
        and resident offices, are to work with the FDLE and maintain
        liaison with the various federal, state, and local agencies
        involved in the program to coordinate their activities. DEA also
        participates in eradication operations and investigations of
        growers and provides program training. The Miami Division had two
        METs at the time of our review. The first was established in
        February 1995 and the second in February 1997. Each MET Page 113
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices had 12
        special agents.  According to the ASAC responsible for the METs,
        in assessing a request from a police chief or sheriff for MET
        assistance, the teams decide whether they can make an impact on
        the drug-related violence in the community. The assessment
        includes, but is not limited to, the extent of drug-related
        violence as measured by criteria such as the murder rate and the
        number of violent gangs.  At the time of our review, the first MET
        had been deployed to four local communities in the geographic area
        covered by the division; the second MET had completed deployments
        to three local communities and was conducting a fourth. At the
        time of our review, another major program conducted by the Miami
        Division was Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands (OPBAT).
        OPBAT was designed to interdict illegal drugs being shipped
        through the Bahamas to the United States. The division's Nassau
        Country Office works with the Bahamian police, U.S. Coast Guard,
        and U.S. Army to carry out this operation.  The DEA ASAC
        responsible for OPBAT said it is basically a response force. Some
        patrols are conducted, but OPBAT personnel primarily react to
        specific intelligence about drug shipments. Most of the division's
        resources have been devoted to cocaine cases.  For example, in
        fiscal year 1997, the division's special agents spent about 71.6
        percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine cases.  In
        fiscal year 1998, they spent about 70.6 percent of their
        investigative work hours on cocaine cases. The Miami Division
        reported 3,945 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 3,417 Enforcement
        Statistics and    arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division
        reported seizing 17,860 kilograms Case Examples                 of
        cocaine, 34.1 kilograms of heroin, and 14,935 kilograms of
        marijuana in fiscal year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division
        reported seizing 24,484 kilograms of cocaine, 96 kilograms of
        heroin, and 26,849 kilograms of marijuana. The division also
        reported that 108,178 marijuana plants were eradicated in calendar
        year 1997, and 55,311 marijuana plants were eradicated in calendar
        year 1998.  In addition, the division reported seized assets
        totaling $142 million in fiscal year 1997 and $68 million in
        fiscal year 1998. Operation Zorro II is an example of what DEA
        officials considered a successful major investigation by the Miami
        Division. Operation Zorro II targeted Colombian drug trafficking
        organization cell or group heads responsible for importing and
        distributing large shipments of cocaine and laundering money
        throughout the United States. The groups were associated with the
        Colombian Cali cartel. Operation Zorro II consisted of joint
        investigations initiated by DEA offices in Miami, New York, and
        Los Page 114                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Angeles in
        coordination with DEA Headquarters' Special Operations Division
        (SOD) and the Department of Justice, targeting the Colombian group
        heads in their respective cities. In addition, DEA's Miami
        Division worked jointly with the City of Miami Police Department
        and received assistance from several other local law enforcement
        agencies during this operation. Operation Zorro II was conducted
        in three phases. During the first phase, Miami Division special
        agents arrested 26 group members responsible for importing and
        distributing throughout the United States multithousand- kilogram
        quantities of cocaine. During the second phase, the special agents
        used Title III (electronic surveillance) intercepts to monitor the
        activities of the money launderers associated with the
        organization. As a result of this phase of the investigation, 11
        Colombian money launderers were indicted and arrested, and over $1
        million in cash and assets were seized. Finally, during the third
        phase, the special agents targeted the distribution networks that
        were assisting the organization in distributing multikilogram
        quantities of cocaine in the South Florida area. An additional 11
        defendants were indicted. At the time of our review, a total of 47
        arrests had been made in Miami as part of Operation Zorro II.
        Another example of what DEA officials considered a successful
        major investigation involved the Miami Division's district office
        in Orlando, FL. Working in cooperation with the division's Fort
        Lauderdale office, special agents in Orlando identified a drug
        trafficking organization headed by two individuals, including a
        transportation specialist for Colombian drug traffickers. The
        transportation specialist's primary role was to accept delivery of
        drugs in Puerto Rico, store the drugs, and later transport the
        drugs to central Florida and other regions of the United States.
        The Orlando office led an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
        Force (OCDETF) investigation targeting this trafficking
        organization, and representatives of the Customs Service, IRS,
        Marshal's Service, Postal Service, and local law enforcement
        agencies participated. The investigation revealed that from 1994
        through June 1998 (the time of our visit), the organization had
        transported over 166,000 kilograms of cocaine and about 200
        kilograms of heroin from Colombia, via Puerto Rico, into the
        United States. Cocaine and heroin were distributed and sold in
        Miami, New York, Orlando, and Charleston, SC, as well as in Puerto
        Rico. The investigation also uncovered numerous acts of violence
        committed by organization members, including three homicides. Page
        115                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the time of our
        review, DEA reported that the investigation had resulted in the
        arrest of 61 individuals, including both of the principal targets.
        Fifty- six of the individuals had been convicted in federal court,
        and 4 were convicted in state court. The drug transportation
        specialist and another individual were each sentenced in federal
        court to life in prison, and several organization members received
        prison sentences exceeding 20 years. Over 800 kilograms of
        cocaine; 1 kilogram of heroin; numerous firearms; over $19 million
        in U.S. currency; and $4 million in real estate, cars, and boats
        were seized. In addition, two of the homicides were solved. Page
        116                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices New Orleans Division
        DEA's New Orleans Division is responsible for federal drug law
        Geographic Region and       enforcement in the states of Alabama,
        Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi Organizational Structure
        and covers an area of 205,882 square miles within 10 federal
        judicial districts. Although largely rural and heavily forested,
        the division has seven metropolitan areas within its jurisdiction.
        Three of the states border the Gulf of Mexico and provide
        substantial maritime access to the interior portion of the region.
        The New Orleans Division, which is headed by a SAC and five ASACs,
        includes the division office, two district offices, eight resident
        offices, and three posts of duty, as shown on figure I.3. Page 117
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.3:  New Orleans Division Map Fayetteville Fort Smith Huntsville
        Little Rock Oxford Arkansas Birmingham Mississippi Alabama
        Shreveport
        Montgomery Jackson Louisiana Mobile Gulfport Baton Rouge Lafayette
        New Orleans Division office District office Resident office Post
        of duty Source: DEA's New Orleans Division. Page 118
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices At the
        time of our visit in March 1998, the division was authorized to
        have 220 staff, including 136 special agents. In addition, there
        were 141 staff from state and local agencies authorized for
        various task forces and groups in the division, including 133 law
        enforcement officers. According to DEA, the major drug-producing
        countries of Central and Overview of Drug             South
        America have a significant impact on the New Orleans Division
        Trafficking Situation and    because of its proximity to the Gulf
        Coast. Ports on the Gulf coastline and Threat
        vast waterways, which are not patrolled, provide opportunities for
        smuggling, thereby making the area potentially attractive to drug
        traffickers. Cocaine                      Cocaine and crack
        cocaine pose the most significant drug threats in the area covered
        by the division, according to DEA. At the time of our review,
        cocaine was readily available, with distribution and use trends
        either stable at high levels or increasing in every metropolitan
        area, while crack cocaine continued to make inroads into rural
        areas. DEA reported that Colombian and Mexican organizations
        operating out of Texas were responsible for bringing in most of
        the cocaine. Local cocaine trafficking organizations varied
        widely. Some organizations were loose- knit local violators with
        ties to traffickers in the source areas, while others were well-
        organized small groups with well-established markets. Some of the
        organizations were in the form of "street gangs" modeled after,
        and affiliated with, certain Los Angeles gangs. Violence common
        with gang activity was occurring in some areas within the
        division. Heroin                       At the time of our review,
        heroin was not considered a significant threat to most of the area
        covered by the New Orleans Division, according to DEA. Heroin
        availability and trafficking were confined mainly to the Greater
        New Orleans area. However, there were indications that higher
        purity Colombian heroin in the New Orleans area was surfacing.
        Methamphetamine and Other    DEA reported that the manufacture and
        use of methamphetamine have Dangerous Drugs              continued
        to grow. DEA identified several organizations that were bringing
        methamphetamine into the area from California, Arizona, and Texas.
        Methamphetamine laboratories have proliferated, especially in
        Arkansas. The diversion of legal drugs to illicit use was
        occurring primarily at the pharmacy and practitioner level,
        according to DEA. Such diversion resulted from indiscriminate
        prescribing and dispensing of drugs, forgeries, illegal call-ins
        of prescriptions, and people "doctor-shopping" to Page 119
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices obtain
        numerous prescriptions. Diverted drugs were either being sold or
        used by individuals. Marijuana                    According to
        DEA, marijuana is the most widely abused drug in the area covered
        by the division, and the profit margin for marijuana trafficking
        is second only to that of cocaine. Although most of the marijuana
        encountered was coming from Mexico, at the time of our review, DEA
        reported that a substantial portion was domestically cultivated,
        and marijuana cultivation was extensive in each of the four states
        in the division's area. The New Orleans Division's management plan
        called for it to focus Priorities, Programs, and    enforcement
        activities, beginning in fiscal year 1998, on (1) disrupting the
        Initiatives                  flow of drugs in the area covered by
        the division and (2) responding more effectively to drug-related
        crime and the attendant violence plaguing its communities. The
        plan's domestic operational strategy attempted to strike a balance
        between major regional cases with interstate ties and local impact
        cases targeting violent drug organizations and gangs. The
        cornerstone of the division's plan is increased cooperation with
        counterpart law enforcement agencies at all levels, making optimum
        use of resources available in programs such as OCDETF, HIDTA, and
        MET. According to the division's SAC, although cooperation with
        state and local police agencies has long been a hallmark of DEA,
        his intent was to make DEA more visible, accessible, and "user
        friendly" to such agencies. He noted that unilateral DEA
        investigations would become a thing of the past, and every
        involved agency would benefit by pooling its resources. As part of
        the plan, the SAC directed all the offices in the New Orleans
        Division to develop a targeting strategy for all types of drugs in
        their areas. Individuals and organizations are to be identified
        and prioritized for joint investigations with federal, state, and
        local agencies. The division's enforcement components are to use
        the various resources available through the OCDETF and HIDTA
        Programs. According to the SAC, he is committed to aggressively
        pursuing joint federal, state, and local investigations where
        productive and practical. At the time of our review, the New
        Orleans Division had 12 state and local task forces in the 4
        states it covers.5  Two of the state and local task forces were at
        the division office in New Orleans, and, according to DEA, one of
        5 Four of the 12 task forces were provisional, awaiting authorized
        funding approval from DEA Headquarters. Page 120
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices these
        worked mostly OCDETF conspiracy cases. This task force was staffed
        by four DEA special agents, including a supervisor, and seven
        officers from local police and sheriff's departments. The other
        state and local task force at the division office was called the
        REDRUM ("murder" spelled backward) task force. It was established
        in 1992 to identify and dismantle the most violent groups involved
        in drug- related crimes in the city of New Orleans. At the time of
        our visit, the task force was staffed by six DEA special agents
        (including a supervisor), a deputy U.S. Marshal, an INS agent, a
        Louisiana state police officer, a New Orleans police department
        homicide detective, and a National Guard intelligence analyst. In
        addition to carrying out the REDRUM mission, the task force
        sometimes conducts drug investigations that do not involve
        violence. The New Orleans Division had two METs at the time of our
        review. According to the division's management plan, the major
        portion of the division's response to the cocaine and crack
        cocaine problems is an enhanced MET Program, with a second MET
        added. The division's first MET was established in 1995, and the
        second MET became operational at the start of fiscal year 1998.
        Each MET was made up of 10 DEA special agents. Between May 1995
        and March 1998, the METs had been deployed to nine local
        communities in the geographic area covered by the division. The
        deployments were short-term operations conducted to identify and
        arrest local violent drug dealers. The division had six HIDTA task
        force groups in three states at the time of our review. In
        December 1996, ONDCP established the Gulf Coast HIDTA in the
        states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana to reduce the impact
        of Gulf Coast drug trafficking on other parts of the United States
        and to reduce violent drug trafficking in the three-state area.
        DEA is one of many agencies participating in the Gulf Coast HIDTA.
        In participating, DEA carries out its own mission and strategies
        in coordination with other agencies participating on multiagency
        teams. The division office had one enforcement group made up
        entirely of DEA special agents who concentrated primarily on
        interstate and international drug investigations. According to DEA
        officials, most of the group's cases involve high-level drug
        traffickers and result in federal drug conspiracy charges. This
        group had more OCDETF cases than any other group in the division.
        The group was staffed with nine DEA special agents, including a
        supervisor. Page 121                                    GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
        DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Most of the
        division's resources have been devoted to cocaine cases. For
        example, in fiscal year 1997, the division's special agents spent
        about 68.6 percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine
        cases. In fiscal year 1998, they spent about 71.9 percent of their
        investigative work hours on cocaine cases. The division made 1,864
        arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 2,286 arrests in Enforcement
        Statistics and    fiscal year 1998. In addition, the division made
        688 seizures of assets Case Examples                 valued at
        $12.5 million in fiscal year 1997 and 644 seizures of assets
        valued at $11.5 million in fiscal year 1998. In fiscal year 1997,
        the division opened 839 cases and closed 563 cases. In fiscal year
        1998, it opened 950 cases and closed 356 cases. An example of what
        the New Orleans Division considered a successful major
        investigation involved the REDRUM task force. In 1996, the task
        force initiated an investigation targeting a violent heroin
        trafficking organization operating in the city of New Orleans.
        This case evolved into an OCDETF investigation and was worked
        jointly with the New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division
        and the FBI.  Various investigative techniques were used,
        including conducting two federally court-authorized wiretaps. As a
        result, 13 people were indicted by a federal grand jury in the
        Eastern District of Louisiana for violations including murder,
        engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise,6 conspiracy, and
        other drug-related charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to
        trial. In June 1997, the head of the organization was found guilty
        of all charges and received a life sentence. According to DEA, as
        a result of this investigation five homicides in the city of New
        Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-
        related assets were seized. DEA also reported that this
        investigation significantly reduced violent crime locally and
        disrupted the flow of heroin into the inner city. Another example
        of what the division considered a successful major case involved
        the Mobile, AL, resident office. In 1997, the resident office
        collaborated with a U.S. Customs Service undercover group in
        "Operation Skymaster" to initiate an investigation of an
        individual who was seeking transportation for a multikilogram
        shipment of cocaine from South America to the United States. After
        a series of undercover meetings in Alabama and Florida, a fake
        delivery of cocaine took place. Since that time, the investigation
        has resulted in the arrest of 26 individuals and the 6 The federal
        Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (21 U.S.C. 848) is directed
        at major drug traffickers and the forfeiture of their assets. A
        person is considered as engaging in a continuing criminal
        enterprise if he or she occupies a position of authority over five
        or more people engaged in a series of drug violations from which
        substantial income is derived. Page 122
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices seizure
        of approximately $145,000 in U.S. currency and 8 vehicles. The
        investigation identified international smugglers of multikilogram
        quantities of cocaine as well as the recipients of the cocaine in
        Alabama, Florida, and Michigan. The case led to several domestic
        investigations in Florida, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.
        Page 123                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Washington Division
        and Baltimore District Office The Washington Division is located
        on the East Coast corridor between Geographic Region and       two
        major drug import cities, Miami and New York. Its area of
        Organizational Structure    responsibility extends through
        Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Colombia.
        Three international airports, two international seaports, railway
        systems, and an extensive interstate highway network provide
        commercial and noncommercial transit to and through the region.
        The area's population is ethnically diverse and international,
        with urban, suburban, and rural communities. At the time of our
        July 1998 visit, the division, which was headed by a SAC and five
        ASACs, comprised the division office in Washington, D.C.; two
        district offices; three resident offices; and seven posts of duty,
        as shown on figure I.4. Page 124
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.4:  Washington, D. C. Division Map Wheeling Hagerstown Maryland
        Clarksburg                                            Baltimore
        Winchester West Virginia
        Washington, D.C. Charleston Salisbury Virginia Richmond Roanoke
        Newport News Abingdon
        Norfolk Division office District office Resident office Post of
        duty Source: DEA's Washington Division. As of March 1998, the
        Washington Division had 262 staff, including 158 special agents.
        In response to the interests of the congressional requesters, this
        section also provides information on the Baltimore District
        Office, which is part of the Washington Division. At the time of
        our review, the office included two of the division's seven posts
        of duty, as shown on figure I.4. As of March 1998, it had 60
        staff, including 39 special agents. Page 125
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
        Washington region, according to DEA officials, is both a drug
        transit Overview of Drug                    zone between Miami and
        New York and a final destination point for drugs, Trafficking
        Situation and           serving as a secondary distribution
        region. Cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and Threat
        methamphetamine are available throughout the area. The most
        significant threat is cocaine and crack distribution, dominated
        primarily by Dominican traffickers, and the violence associated
        with these activities. However, the division has recently seen a
        dramatic increase in heroin trafficking and distribution. Jamaican
        traffickers also threatened the region because of their wide-
        ranging distribution of marijuana and other drugs. Also available
        are LSD, MDMA (Ecstasy), Rohypnol, Ketamine, and GHB,7 drugs that
        are consumed at "raves,"8 in nightclubs, and on college campuses.
        According to DEA officials, three levels of drug violators operate
        in the Washington division's area of responsibility. These include
        (1) major international organizations; (2) mid-level
        organizations, which include major national and regional
        organizations, usually made up of longtime local traffickers; and
        (3) retail groups, including street-level violators and violent
        drug gangs. The majority of the violators are mid- and retail-
        level. Small neighborhood-based drug trafficking groups or "crews"
        use violence to control their areas and protect their drug
        trafficking enterprises from rival groups. Baltimore Overview
        Baltimore, according to DEA, although primarily a consumer drug
        market, is also a drug source for smaller Maryland cities and
        towns, including Annapolis, Hagerstown, and Salisbury. Cocaine,
        heroin, and marijuana are the primary drug threats to the area.
        Typically, drugs are transported into Baltimore from Miami, New
        York, and other source states by car, train, airline, bus, or
        sometimes via ship through the port. However, DEA officials
        indicated that airports are relied upon less, possibly due to past
        enforcement successes. Traffickers tended to be street- to mid-
        level violators. Cocaine Trafficking in Baltimore At the time of
        our review, according to DEA, cocaine was a major drug of choice
        in the Baltimore area, and the urban crack threat was migrating to
        smaller towns and cities throughout the surrounding suburban
        jurisdictions. Generally, local independent dealers go to New York
        City 7 MDMA (methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine) has hallucinogenic
        effects. Rohypnol (flunitrazepam), smuggled primarily from Mexico,
        is a depressant not approved for sale in the United States.
        Ketamine is an animal tranquilizer with legitimate uses in
        veterinary medicine. GHB (gamma hydroxy butyrate) is used as a
        date rape drug. 8 A rave is a party designed to enhance a
        hallucinogenic experience through music and behavior. Page 126
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices weekly,
        buy 2 to 3 kilograms of cocaine from Dominican sources, bring the
        drugs back to Baltimore, and distribute them over a several block
        area. These distributors have no ties to larger organizations. Law
        enforcement officials reportedly believed that youth gangs were
        increasingly involved in drug distribution and related criminal
        activity, primarily violent crime. Heroin Trafficking in Baltimore
        Baltimore is also one of the largest and most active heroin
        markets in the country, according to both DEA and ONDCP. Dominican
        traffickers bring wholesale quantities of high-quality Colombian
        heroin into the city, and Nigerians distribute Southeast Asian
        heroin from Thailand. Traffickers are street- to mid-level
        violators, distributing drugs in open-air drug markets and in
        housing projects. Violence has increased, even at the lower level
        of drug street sales. Moreover, in 1996, the Drug Abuse Warning
        Network9 (DAWN) reported that Baltimore had the highest rate of
        heroin-related emergency room episodes per 100,000 population.
        Marijuana Trafficking in           According to DEA, marijuana is
        transported into the Maryland area from Baltimore
        the Southwest border states and Mexico. Much of the marijuana
        entering the area is conveyed by individuals using highways and
        mass transportation. Jamaicans supply wholesale quantities of
        marijuana in Baltimore. In addition, marijuana is also cultivated
        along Maryland's Eastern Shore. At the time of our review, the
        majority of the Washington Division's efforts Priorities,
        Programs, and          were, according to DEA, directed toward
        violent drug trafficking gangs. In Initiatives
        Baltimore, an Assistant U.S. Attorney said that since the mid-
        1990s, that office had received cases involving violence from DEA.
        Moreover, DEA and the U.S. Attorney were responding to requests
        for assistance and now prosecuting cases from the state's
        attorneys' offices in order to obtain higher federal penalties for
        defendants. The division's and Baltimore district office's
        targeting of drug trafficking gangs was reflected in the
        distribution of its investigative work hours. By geographic scope,
        combined domestic and local cases for fiscal years 1997 and 1998
        accounted for about two-thirds of the total investigative work
        hours expended each year by the division and more than one-half
        and two- thirds of the total investigative work hours,
        respectively, for those years, expended by the district office.
        Investigative work hours expended on international and regional
        cases, in contrast, accounted for approximately 30 percent of the
        division's investigative work hours and almost 40 percent 9 Since
        the early 1970s, DAWN has collected information on patients
        seeking hospital emergency room treatment related to illegal drug
        use or nonmedical use of legal drugs. Page 127
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices and 30
        percent of the district's investigative work hours in those years,
        respectively. By type of organizations targeted, the division
        expended the greatest portion of its investigative work hours on
        independent traffickers (31 percent and 42 percent for fiscal
        years 1997 and 1998, respectively). The Baltimore Office expended
        the greatest portion of its investigative work hours on violent
        organizations (almost one-third) in both fiscal years 1997 and
        1998. As indicated above, cocaine and heroin presented the major
        drug threats to the region. By drug, both the division and the
        Baltimore district work- hour statistics for fiscal years 1997 and
        1998 reflect the cocaine and heroin threats.  Each year, the
        division expended more than half its investigative work hours on
        cocaine-related cases and about 20 percent of its investigative
        work hours on heroin-related cases. The Baltimore office also
        spent about half its investigative work hours each year on
        cocaine-related cases and 33 percent on heroin-related cases. As
        proposed in its 1998-2000 Field Management Plan, the number of
        Washington Division cases accepted as OCDETF cases increased in
        fiscal year 1998. During that year, the division had 73 of its
        cases accepted as OCDETF cases compared to 36 cases in 1997, an
        increase of 103 percent. Similarly, the percentage of the
        division's investigative work hours, by source of case, expended
        on OCDETF cases increased from about 29 percent in fiscal year
        1997 to 31 percent in fiscal year 1998. Most of the division's
        higher level cases were handled through OCDETF. The Baltimore
        District Office reported 6 cases accepted as OCDETF cases in
        fiscal year 1997 and 22 in fiscal year 1998. The Washington
        Division's 1998-2000 plan also called for the continued targeting
        of violent drug traffickers through the MET Program. The division
        had 1 MET team that had 10 special agents. In fiscal years 1997
        and 1998, the team conducted deployments in Washington, D.C.;
        Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA. Division
        officials emphasized to us the importance of their undertaking
        enforcement efforts with state and local law enforcement agencies
        to address the drug problems of the region. According to these
        officials, the division worked with approximately 240 state and
        local law enforcement agencies in Washington, D.C., and the 3
        states in its area of responsibility. In addition, the division
        was involved in training state and local law enforcement personnel
        throughout the division. The Baltimore District Office had a task
        force, including DEA agents and Baltimore City police Page 128
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        officers, which investigated major heroin distribution networks or
        distributors in open-air markets. In fiscal year 1998, 10 HIDTA
        task forces were operating within the division's area of
        responsibility, including 3 led by the Baltimore District Office.
        The latter three comprised law enforcement officers from DEA, the
        Baltimore Police Department, the Baltimore County Police
        Department, the Maryland State Police, and other local police
        agencies. One task force investigated violent drug traffickers and
        trafficking organizations that affected safety in the Baltimore
        metropolitan area; the second concentrated on major heroin and
        cocaine traffickers and targets of opportunity; and the third
        conducted interdiction operations-"hit and runs"-targeting the
        movement of drug and currency shipments at the
        Baltimore/Washington International Airport and the train and bus
        stations. During fiscal year 1998, the Washington Division also
        participated in several special enforcement programs coordinated
        by DEA Headquarters. The Division reported that in fiscal year
        1998, 20 investigations had resulted from its participation in a
        special enforcement program that focused on traffickers operating
        in the United States under the direction of Colombian, Dominican,
        and/or Mexican drug organizations. As part of another such
        program, the Baltimore District Office investigated West African
        drug trafficking organizations dealing in heroin, their foreign
        sources of supply, and their distributors within the United
        States. In addition, the division participated in DEA's Domestic
        Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. However, this effort was
        undertaken state by state. The Baltimore and Richmond District
        Offices and the Charleston, WV, Resident Office each provided
        assistance to drug enforcement groups in their respective states.
        As a result of its efforts, the Washington Division reported 2,056
        Enforcement Statistics and    defendants arrested in fiscal year
        1997 and 2,156 defendants arrested in Case Examples
        fiscal year 1998. Approximately 60 percent of those arrested in
        both years were categorized as being involved in cocaine-related
        cases. In fiscal year 1997, almost 50 percent (985) of the
        defendants arrested were categorized as independent traffickers,
        19 percent as associated with violent crime organizations (382),
        and 15 percent (309) as involved in criminal organizations. Fiscal
        year1998 data showed the continued predominance of independent
        traffickers, 51 percent (1,093), among defendants arrested; this
        compared to defendants associated with violent crime
        organizations, 13 percent (275), or criminal organizations, 12
        percent (251). Page 129
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
        Baltimore Office reported 745 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 705
        arrests in fiscal year 1998. For these fiscal years, respectively,
        55 and 61 percent of these arrests were cocaine-related, and 22
        and 20 percent were heroin-related. In addition, DEA reported
        defendants arrested in OCDETF cases in which the Washington
        Division participated-409 in fiscal year 1997 and 729 in fiscal
        year 1998. Over half of the arrests each year were cocaine-
        related. The Baltimore Office reported 100 and 248 defendants
        arrested in OCDETF cases in fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
        respectively. For fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the division and the
        Baltimore Office reported drug seizures of cocaine, heroin, and
        marijuana, as well as other dangerous drugs. These data are
        presented in table I.1. Table I.1:  Drug Seizures for Washington
        Division and Baltimore District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and
        1998 Washington Division                      Baltimore District
        Office Fiscal year                                 Fiscal year
        Drug seized                                                   1997
        1998                   1997                   1998 Heroin (Kgs)
        17.7                 14.8                   12.4
        9.6 Cocaine (Kgs)
        1,158.2                125.9                1,053.6
        56.8 Marijuana (Kgs)
        254.8                401.4                  159.3
        127.8 Hashish (Kgs)
        1.0                 5.7                    1.0
        1.4 Stimulants (D.U.)
        313,328              303,602                 15,988
        27,637 Depressants (D.U.)
        10,936                1,799                    782
        587 Hallucinogens (D.U.)
        13,922               10,860                    305
        43 Other narcotics (D.U.)
        7,886                4,083                  7,231
        38 Note: D.U. refers to dosage unit. Source: DEA. As a result of
        its fiscal years 1997 and 1998 MET deployments in Washington,
        D.C.; Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA, at the
        time of our visit, the Washington Division reported 165 arrests,
        in total. These deployments resulted in the seizure of about 2.5
        kilograms of crack, 1.8 kilograms of cocaine, 176 grams of heroin,
        and 1.2 kilograms of marijuana, as well as a number of weapons,
        more than $34,000 in cash, and over $120,000 in assets. This
        included the Baltimore deployment, which accounted for 81
        defendants arrested and 950 grams of crack, 501 grams of cocaine,
        176 grams of heroin, and 453.5 grams of marijuana seized. The
        Washington Division's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression
        Program, carried out by the DEA office with state and local law
        enforcement within the three states in the division's area of
        responsibility, resulted in the eradication of marijuana plants
        and arrests. For example, in Page 130
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices calendar
        year 1997, with the support of DEA's Baltimore Office, DEA
        reported that 4,826 marijuana plants (836 cultivated indoors and
        3,990 cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 120 persons were
        arrested in Maryland. In calendar year 1998, DEA reported that
        3,442 marijuana plants (2,724 cultivated indoors and 718
        cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 89 persons were
        arrested. In addition, the Division also provided the following
        examples of cases it considered successful. *  The Baltimore
        Office conducted an investigation with the Baltimore City Police
        and the Offices of the U.S. Attorney and local State's Attorney
        that led to the conviction of local drug dealer on such charges as
        conspiracy to murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering
        enterprise, murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise, attempted
        murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise, conspiracy to
        retaliate against a witness, and conspiracy to distribute heroin
        and cocaine.  In addition, nine other members of the organization
        were found guilty of a variety of charges, including conspiracy to
        murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering enterprise and
        conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine.  Evidence of 10
        murders was presented at the trials.  Moreover, according to DEA,
        witnesses testified that the dealer sold $30,000 worth of heroin
        and cocaine a day in the Eastern District of Baltimore City.
        Sixty-six arrests were made during this investigation. The
        Division identified this case as an OCDETF case. *  According to
        DEA, in the investigation of one trafficker, DEA, with other state
        and local agencies-the Fairfax County, VA, Police Department;
        Arlington County, VA, Police Department; Washington, D.C.,
        Metropolitan Police Department; and Maryland State Police-
        dismantled a violent drug distribution organization in the
        Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and solved the attempted
        murder of a Maryland State trooper.  In December 1995, while
        transporting a kilogram of cocaine from New York to Washington,
        D.C., in a vehicle owned by the trafficker, a long-time kilogram-
        level cocaine distributor in the District was stopped and arrested
        by a Maryland State trooper.  Subsequently, the distributor
        conspired with other individuals to kill that trooper to eliminate
        him as a witness in an upcoming trial; however, the wrong trooper
        was shot. During March 1997, investigations by the Fairfax,
        Arlington, and Washington, D.C., Police Departments focused on the
        trafficker's cocaine activities.  DEA reported that the
        distributor was involved in a conspiracy, with others, to
        distribute cocaine in the Washington, D.C., area, and launder the
        proceeds through legitimate businesses.  As a result of this
        investigation, a total of 18 individuals were found guilty of
        various charges, and nearly half a million dollars in criminally
        acquired assets were seized. Page 131
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Bogota,
        Colombia, Country Office At the time of our visit in July 1998,
        DEA's Bogota, Colombia Country Geographic Regional and     Office
        was the second largest DEA office in South America. It covers the
        Organizational Structure    country of Colombia, which is bordered
        by the Caribbean Sea, Pacific Ocean, and four other countries and
        divided by the Andes Mountains. The Bogota Country Office, which
        is headed by a Country Attach, includes a DEA resident office in
        Barranquilla, Colombia, as shown in figure I.5. Page 132
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.5:  Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map Caribbean Sea
        Barranquilla Venezuela Bogota North Pacific Ocean Colombia Brazil
        Ecuador Peru Country office Resident office Source: DEA's Bogota,
        Colombia, Country Office. The country office was staffed with 65
        DEA personnel, including 43 special agents. Also, representatives
        from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Customs
        Service, FBI, IRS, Secret Service, and the Department of Defense
        (DOD) were working with DEA in Colombia. DEA had two enforcement
        groups and an intelligence group located in Bogota and one
        enforcement group in the Barranquilla office. Page 133
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA is a
        member of the U.S. Embassy's Bogota Country Team, which is headed
        by the Ambassador and consists of U.S. agencies attached to the
        embassy in Colombia. DEA works with Colombian law enforcement
        authorities, primarily the Colombian National Police (CNP), to
        carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. However,
        DEA agents in Colombia do not have police authority and cannot
        make arrests or seize drugs in that country.10 According to DEA,
        Colombian drug traffickers continue to supply most of Overview of
        Drug             the world's cocaine. However, Colombian
        trafficking organizations had Trafficking Situation and    become
        much more fragmented in the 1990s. In the past, large Colombian
        Threat                       cartels controlled the cocaine
        industry. There are now numerous independent traffickers and
        organizations with decentralized operations. According to DEA,
        clandestine laboratories in Colombia are used to convert cocaine
        base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) for eventual export to the
        United States and Europe. The cocaine base is either imported from
        other countries, primarily Peru, or made from coca leaves grown in
        Colombia. The cocaine laboratories are primarily located in jungle
        areas southeast of the Andes Mountains in Colombia, referred to by
        DEA as the Colombian Source Zone. After processing, the cocaine is
        typically flown across the Andes mountains to northwest Colombia
        for further transport out of Colombia. The major cocaine
        transportation points in northwest Colombia, according to DEA, are
        located in an area that includes the Pacific and Caribbean coasts
        and all of Colombia's major population centers. The transportation
        points include clandestine airstrips, major airports, seaports,
        and locations from which small "go-fast" boats and commercial
        containerized cargo vessels can transport cocaine. Preferred
        transshipment areas for drugs originating from Colombia are Costa
        Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, and Puerto
        Rico. Mexico- and Caribbean-based transportation groups are
        involved in shipping cocaine to the United States. The diversion
        of chemicals essential to cocaine production continues to increase
        in Colombia, according to DEA. For the most part, these chemicals
        are legally imported into Colombia from the United States, 10 We
        recently reported on the narcotics situation in Colombia, U.S. and
        Colombian efforts to address drug trafficking activities in
        Colombia, and the continuing challenges each government faces to
        combat these activities: Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From
        Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/NSIAD-99- 136, June 22, 1999).
        Page 134
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Europe,
        and the Far East. They are then diverted for the production of
        cocaine. The availability of heroin produced in Colombia and
        smuggled into the United States dramatically increased in recent
        years, according to DEA. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized
        and analyzed in the United States was Colombian. The Colombian
        heroin trade is dominated by trafficking groups operating
        independently of the major cocaine trafficking organizations.
        Colombia's climate allows for year-round cultivation of opium
        poppies, from which opium gum is processed into heroin in
        clandestine laboratories throughout the country. At the time of
        our review, according to DEA, the majority of the heroin produced
        in Colombia was being exported through the international airports
        in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and, to a lesser extent, Barranquilla.
        DEA estimated that about 90 percent of the Colombian heroin
        destined for the United States was transported via couriers (also
        known as "mules") on commercial airlines. Miami, Dallas, and New
        York City were principal "gateways" for Colombian heroin entering
        the United States. Heroin traffickers were also transporting
        heroin into the United States through other countries in South and
        Central America and the Caribbean. The primary method of smuggling
        heroin was ingestion or concealment on the couriers' bodies.  The
        heroin might also have been concealed in such items as false-sided
        luggage, clothing, food, or equipment. Insurgent guerrilla groups
        have been associated with cocaine and heroin trafficking in
        Colombia. Guerrillas have provided security for cocaine
        laboratories, opium poppy fields, and clandestine airstrips. They
        have also been known to charge a "tax" for guarding coca and opium
        poppy fields, for permission to transport opium gum or morphine to
        sites for sale within the guerilla territory, for kilograms of
        coca leaf sold to produce cocaine base, and for kilograms of
        cocaine exported from the Colombian Source Zone. The "tax" has
        often been paid in weapons instead of currency. According to DEA,
        the guerillas have increased the risk of conducting drug
        enforcement operations. For example, a guerilla ambush of a CNP
        unit at a clandestine airstrip and cocaine storage complex in
        March 1998 left one CNP officer dead, two officers wounded, and
        five officers captured. According to DEA, marijuana is exported in
        tons from Colombia to the United States and Europe. It is
        reportedly grown in mountain ranges near the Colombian Caribbean
        coast and is usually compressed into bales. The primary method of
        transportation is containerized commercial cargo and commercial
        cargo vessels departing from ports on the northern coast of Page
        135                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Colombia. It might be
        off-loaded at sea onto smaller ships or speedboats for delivery to
        locations in Mexico and onward transport to the United States. The
        Bogota Country Office is involved in activities to combat the
        Priorities, Programs, and      Colombian drug trafficking threat
        and support DEA's South America Initiatives
        Regional Plan.11  The September 1997 South America Regional Plan
        contains the following seven objectives: *  identify, investigate,
        and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; *  support
        U.S. domestic investigations; *  enhance host nation counterdrug
        capabilities; *  develop a country intelligence program; *
        control essential chemicals; *  conduct financial investigations;
        and *  promote regional counterdrug cooperation. DEA's Bogota
        Country Office also supports the U.S. Embassy's Flow Reduction
        Strategy, which is designed to reduce the flow of cocaine and
        heroin from Colombia. This strategy is carried out by the
        embassy's Bogota Country Team. The goal of the strategy, which
        focuses on the Colombian Source Zone southeast of the Andes
        Mountains, is to reduce the amount of cocaine crossing the Andes
        into northwest Colombia by 50 percent. The Flow Reduction Strategy
        concentrates on eradicating coca plants and opium poppies,
        destroying cocaine laboratories, and controlling the
        transportation of cocaine base and HCL into and out of the
        Colombian Source Zone by aircraft or rivercraft. For its part, DEA
        focuses primarily on the organizations responsible for controlling
        the manufacture and transportation of cocaine, while the State
        Department is responsible for eradication efforts. At the time of
        our review, DEA was involved in three intelligence initiatives
        focused on the Colombian Source Zone. *  Information
        Analysis/Operations Center (IA/OC): The IA/OC was created to
        collect drug intelligence from U.S. and Colombian agencies and
        other sources, particularly regarding the production and
        transportation of cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone; serve as a
        focal point for U.S. and Colombian agencies' requests for
        information; and support drug enforcement operations in the
        Colombian Source Zone. The center was 11 DEA's South America
        Regional Plan, which is updated periodically, provides strategic
        guidance for DEA's operations in South American countries,
        including Colombia and Bolivia. Page 136
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices staffed
        by DEA, Customs, and U.S. military personnel at the time of our
        review. *  Operation Papagayo: The objective of this operation is
        to intercept traffickers' communications in the Colombian Source
        Zone to help identify organizations controlling the manufacture
        and transportation of cocaine. The operation is conducted by a
        vetted or screened CNP unit that is to share the collected
        intelligence with DEA. *  Operation Selva Verde: The objective of
        this operation is to identify the organizations manufacturing
        cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone, locate and destroy their
        laboratories, collect evidence and intelligence, and arrest those
        involved. CNP, Colombian military, and DEA personnel operating in
        the Colombian Source Zone collect intelligence and provide it to
        IA/OC. Using this and other intelligence, IA/OC identifies targets
        for enforcement operations. CNP jungle units, in coordination with
        the Colombian military, then raid the targeted cocaine
        laboratories. Evidence and intelligence collected at the raided
        laboratories are used to help identify the trafficking
        organizations involved. The DEA office in Bogota had committed one
        of its enforcement groups to investigations of major drug
        traffickers, including those on DEA's list of major targets in
        Colombia. The DEA agents in this group work with a CNP Special
        Investigative Unit (SIU), which was vetted by DEA. The SIU
        collects intelligence and targets and investigates major
        traffickers. At the time of our visit, another Colombian SIU had
        been vetted by DEA and was starting to work with this DEA
        enforcement group. This SIU was established to target major money
        laundering organizations, and an IRS agent assigned to the embassy
        was slated to assist the SIU. There were three vetted Colombian
        prosecutors assigned to work with the two SIUs. At the time of our
        review, DEA's other enforcement group in Bogota was committed to
        working with CNP on several different programs, including the
        major programs discussed below. *  Aircraft Control Program
        (Operation Gemini Clipper): This is a CNP- operated general
        aviation aircraft inspection and enforcement program designed to
        help identify trafficking organizations using aircraft to
        transport illegal drugs. The program is based on a requirement by
        the Colombian government that all general aviation aircraft in
        Colombia be registered and inspected. Under the program, CNP
        inspects aircraft and their registrations, immobilizes or seizes
        aircraft found to be illegal, and collects information to help
        identify those responsible for using the aircraft to transport
        drugs. Page 137                                    GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices *  Chemical Control
        Program: A DEA diversion investigator and special agent were
        working with a CNP chemical control unit. This unit, which was
        vetted by DEA in 1998, audits companies authorized to legally
        import the chemicals essential to cocaine processing and companies
        that distribute chemicals in Colombia. The unit is authorized to
        seize or immobilize unauthorized or illegal chemicals and can
        coordinate with another Colombian government agency to revoke the
        licenses of chemical importers violating the law. *  Heroin
        Program: DEA and CNP established a heroin task force to focus on
        Colombian heroin trafficking organizations. The CNP on this task
        force were not vetted at the time of our visit. Although the task
        force primarily concentrates on heroin transportation
        organizations, it has also identified and targeted heroin
        laboratories, according to DEA. The Bogota Country Office reported
        the following as significant Enforcement Statistics and
        accomplishments for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Case Examples *
        Operation Papagayo was established, and CNP officers assigned to
        this operation identified 13 different drug trafficking
        organizations. *  Operation Selva Verde destroyed 189 cocaine
        laboratories. *  CNP vetted units carried out 10 major
        investigations with DEA domestic offices. One of the vetted units'
        investigations produced the first two "controlled deliveries"12 of
        cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the United States. This
        investigation resulted in 17 arrests in Cali, Colombia, as well as
        wiretaps in Miami and Newark. *  The vetted units had a total of
        17 investigations; 30 arrests that DEA considered significant; and
        seizures of 2,666 kilograms of cocaine, 1.5 kilograms of heroin,
        520 real estate properties, 17 vehicles, and $4.6 million in U.S.
        currency. *  The Aircraft Control Program resulted in 29 aircraft
        seized by CNP in calendar year 1997, with a value estimated at $57
        million. During calendar year 1998, 81 aircraft were grounded or
        seized, 10 of which were returned due to innocent third party
        ownership. In addition, 5 stolen aircraft were recovered in 1998.
    *  The Chemical Control Program produced the first two arrests of
        chemical diverters in Colombia. In addition, the Colombian
        government revoked five chemical licenses during this period. In
        fiscal year 1997, 26.7 tons of chemicals were seized by the CNP
        chemical control unit; and in fiscal year 1998, the CNP unit
        seized 2,191 tons of solid chemicals and about 1.5 million gallons
        of liquid chemicals. 12 A controlled delivery is an investigative
        tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a shipment of
        illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual seizure.
        Page 138
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices *  The
        heroin task force destroyed 11 heroin laboratories and seized 237
        kilograms of heroin, 55 kilograms of morphine, and 85.5 kilograms
        of opium. *  Since its inception in October 1997, the Airport
        Passenger and Cargo Inspection Program had yielded 175 arrests and
        seizures of 911 kilograms of cocaine and 58 kilograms of heroin. *
        The Barranquilla Resident Office reported drug seizures of 16,133
        kilograms of cocaine, 18 kilograms of heroin, 22 kilograms of
        morphine, 17 kilograms of opium, and 17 metric tons of marijuana.
        This office also contributed to the seizure of 12,741 kilograms of
        cocaine, 2 kilograms of heroin, and 2 tons of marijuana being
        smuggled outside of Colombia. According to DEA, a major success in
        Colombia was the dismantlement of the Cali cartel, which DEA
        considered to be the most powerful criminal organization that law
        enforcement had ever faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel
        leaders have been captured by or surrendered to CNP, with the
        exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the
        time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through
        years of investigations by DEA, CNP, and other federal, state, and
        local law enforcement agencies led to the identification,
        indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel
        leaders on drug charges in Colombia. Page 139
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices La Paz,
        Bolivia, Country Office At the time of our visit in July 1998, the
        La Paz, Bolivia, Country Office was Geographic Region and
        DEA's second largest foreign office worldwide.  The Office covers
        the Organizational Structure    country of Bolivia, which is
        surrounded by the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
        and Peru.   The Office, which is headed by a Country Attach,
        included resident offices in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Trinidad,
        Bolivia, as shown on figure I.6. Page 140
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.6:  La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map Brazil Peru Trinidad
        Bolivia La Paz Cochabamba Santa Cruz Chile
        Paraguay Argentina Country office Resident office Source: DEA's La
        Paz, Bolivia, Country Office. The country office was staffed with
        114 personnel, including 43 special agents.  Some of these
        personnel were located at a Bolivian police camp in the Chapare
        region where coca is grown.  In addition, representatives from DOD
        were assigned to work with DEA in Bolivia. The U.S. Ambassador is
        responsible for the drug control efforts of all U.S. agencies in
        Bolivia. The U.S. Embassy gives a high priority to drug control
        activities, such as the State Department's crop eradication
        efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development's support
        for alternative Page 141
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        development activities enabling farmers to support themselves and
        their families without the need to cultivate coca, and DEA's drug
        enforcement programs and operations. In carrying out its
        responsibilities, DEA works with and assists Bolivian law
        enforcement authorities. However, DEA special agents in Bolivia do
        not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize drugs
        in that country. DEA reported that coca leaf cultivation continues
        in Bolivia. Bolivia is also Overview of Drug             a source
        country for cocaine, which is processed from coca leaves and
        Trafficking Situation and    smuggled into the United States and
        Europe.13 Threat Coca cultivation in Bolivia occurs primarily in
        two areas-the Chapare region in the Cochabamba Department and the
        Yungas region situated in the Altiplano of the La Paz Department.
        DEA estimated that 90 to 95 percent of the coca leaves produced in
        the Chapare region, Bolivia's major cultivation area, is illegally
        processed into cocaine products. Most of the coca leaf cultivated
        in the Yungas region is cultivated in accordance with Bolivian law
        for legal consumption. After Bolivian peasants harvest their coca
        fields, the leaves are dried and packaged in 100-pound bags. Low-
        echelon producers or the coca growers themselves process the dried
        leaves into cocaine base in clandestine laboratories, mostly in
        the Chapare region. The cocaine base is sold to buyers who act as
        agents for cocaine trafficking organizations and consolidate
        shipments for transport out of the Chapare. In the past, according
        to DEA, the cocaine base was primarily transported out of Bolivia,
        usually to Colombia, for further processing into cocaine HCL. In
        recent years, however, Bolivian trafficking organizations have
        begun producing cocaine HCL in clandestine laboratories as well as
        distributing Bolivian-produced cocaine. At the time of our review,
        DEA reported that traffickers were moving cocaine base out of the
        Chapare region, primarily to the Santa Cruz and El Beni regions of
        Bolivia, using a variety of land, river, and air transportation
        methods. Once the cocaine base reaches the Santa Cruz and El Beni
        regions, it is either processed locally into cocaine HCL or
        transported into Brazil or Colombia for processing. 13 Coca has
        deep cultural roots in Bolivia, where it has been cultivated for
        at least 2,000 years. Today, coca cultivation and consumption
        still have considerable cultural and economic importance, and even
        legal acceptance, in Bolivia. At the time of our review, it was
        estimated that 400,000 to 500,000 Bolivians chewed coca leaf to
        alleviate the effects of cold, hunger, fatigue, and altitude
        sickness. A type of tea is also brewed from coca. In general, the
        leaf is a focus for rituals and social occasions. Page 142
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        According to DEA, at the time of our review, several Bolivian
        family-based transportation/production networks dominated cocaine
        trafficking in the country. The networks were managing the
        majority of cocaine moved within Bolivia as well as the cocaine
        shipped out of the country. The trafficking networks were
        financing cocaine base purchases from Chapare- based suppliers,
        arranging for transportation from the Chapare, operating base
        purification and/or cocaine laboratories, and consolidating large
        shipments for international transport. A few of these networks
        still dealt with Colombian drug organizations; but Bolivians were
        also working with traffickers from other countries, such as
        Brazil, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, and Nigeria. During the
        1990s, the La Paz Country Office shifted from conducting
        Priorities, Programs, and      predominantly "jungle operations"
        in Operation Snowcap-which Initiatives
        identified and destroyed cocaine base laboratories and interdicted
        cocaine base shipments-to placing increased emphasis on
        identifying, targeting, and investigating cocaine trafficking
        organizations. Using funds appropriated for DEA's Andean Ridge
        Initiatives and vetted Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) of the
        Bolivian National Police (BNP), DEA reported that drug
        intelligence collection efforts in Bolivia have been enhanced; and
        the investigative capabilities of BNP's  Special Forces for the
        Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (Fuerzas Especiales Para la
        Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico, or FELCN) have been improved with more
        personnel, additional equipment, and better training. The La Paz
        Country office's programs and initiatives were designed to combat
        the Bolivian drug trafficking threat and support DEA's South
        America Regional Plan.14 The South America Regional Plan contains
        the following seven objectives: *  identify, investigate, and
        dismantle major drug trafficking organizations; *  support U.S.
        domestic investigations; *  enhance host nation counterdrug
        capabilities; *  develop a country intelligence program; *
        control essential chemicals; *  conduct financial investigations;
        and *  promote regional counterdrug cooperation. According to DEA,
        at the time of our review, the country office's priority was
        investigating Bolivia-based drug trafficking organizations with 14
        DEA's South America Regional Plan, which is updated periodically,
        provides strategic guidance for DEA's operations in South American
        countries, including Bolivia and Colombia. Page 143
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        connections to the United States. However, DEA officials said this
        has become more difficult. In the past, there was a link from
        Bolivia to the United States through Colombia. At the time of our
        review, however, fewer Colombian drug traffickers were involved
        with the Bolivian cocaine trade, and Bolivian traffickers were
        dealing with people from a number of different countries. The
        country office was focusing most of its operations in two areas:
        the Chapare region, where most of the cocaine base comes from, and
        the Santa Cruz area, where most of the cocaine HCL comes from. The
        country office, according to DEA, was working closely with FELCN
        to carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. FELCN
        exercises operational control over various Bolivian drug law
        enforcement units, such as the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (Unidad
        Movil de Policia Rural, or UMOPAR); Financial Investigative Unit
        (FIU); Grupo de Inteligencia y Operaciones Especial (GIOE),
        FELCN's intelligence arm; and Grupo Investigaciones de Substancias
        Quimicas (GISUQ), FELCN's Chemical Investigations Group. The
        police units are supported by the Bolivian Air Force's Red Devil
        Task Force, which provides aviation support, and the Bolivian
        Navy's Blue Devil Task Force, which patrols rivers. At the time of
        our review, FELCN/UMOPAR units were stationed throughout Bolivia
        and were based primarily in the Chapare region, Trinidad, and the
        Yungas region. Members of UMOPAR are considered specialists in
        paramilitary counterdrug operations, including jungle patrol and
        reconnaissance, air insertions, mobile roadblocks in rural areas,
        and river operations. DEA started Operation Gatekeeper primarily
        to focus UMOPAR resources on interdicting cocaine base leaving the
        Chapare. With specialized teams of police conducting mobile
        roadblocks on highways, Operation Gatekeeper provides a rapid
        response in areas of Bolivia where intelligence indicates the
        movement of large quantities of drugs or chemicals. In 1998,
        UMOPAR established new mobile enforcement teams (called Border
        Enforcement Teams), headquartered in La Paz, to conduct
        intelligence-driven drug interdiction operations, including
        roadblocks, along Bolivia's borders with Chile, Peru, Brazil, and
        Argentina. DEA refers to this program as Operation GRIRMO. At the
        time of our review, FELCN/GIOE had 3 SIUs with approximately 75
        vetted personnel. The SIUs were located in Cochabamba, La Paz, and
        Santa Cruz. They were collecting information through surveillance
        operations, with special emphasis on violators operating at the
        highest levels. The intelligence was being used to help
        investigate and dismantle Page 144
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices major
        drug trafficking organizations in support of both Bolivian and
        U.S. drug enforcement objectives. The La Paz, Bolivia, Country
        Attach told us that he believed the Bolivian SIUs are helping to
        create a DEA-like organization in Bolivia. He said the vetting
        process for members of these units is similar to DEA's hiring
        process, and the SIUs consist of police with integrity, training,
        expertise, equipment, and other tools needed to successfully
        conduct drug enforcement operations. He said DEA is building the
        infrastructure of FELCN and trying to do more intelligence-driven
        investigations of drug trafficking organizations. In addition, the
        following efforts were ongoing at the time of our review,
        according to DEA: *  The country office had established a Major
        Violators Task Force with FELCN officers. This program focused on
        arresting high-level traffickers involved in transporting cocaine
        and dismantling their organizations.  Task force operations were
        being carried out in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa Cruz. *
        Operation Argus had consistently been the most valuable
        intelligence resource in Bolivia, according to DEA. This FELCN
        intelligence operation was feeding actionable intelligence to
        FELCN/GIOE, which led to arrests and seizures in numerous cases.
        The program has been funded almost entirely by DOD and the State
        Department and was expanded to several locations in Bolivia. *
        Operation Camba is an enforcement and intelligence-gathering
        program that was targeting drug traffickers who used trains in
        Bolivia's Santa Cruz and Tarija Departments to transport cocaine
        and precursor chemicals to and from the Bolivian frontiers with
        Brazil and Argentina. According to DEA, Operation Camba enabled
        the country office and FELCN to gather extensive intelligence
        that, combined with enforcement operations, significantly
        increased seizures of cocaine and precursor chemicals being
        transported on Bolivian trains. *  FELCN/FIU is responsible for
        investigating money laundering and other links between finances
        and drug trafficking and for providing case support when financial
        assets are seized in drug investigations. According to DEA, the
        country office has been working with the FIU to refine a 1998
        Bolivian money laundering law to help make it fully functional. *
        According to DEA, the country office had a diversion investigator
        working with FELCN/GISUQ, which is responsible for investigating
        violations of Bolivia's laws against trafficking in chemicals
        essential to processing cocaine. GISUQ intercepts contraband
        chemicals entering Bolivia from Page 145
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices foreign
        countries, develops intelligence concerning precursor chemical
        diverters throughout Bolivia, has operated checkpoints to seize
        precursor chemicals in the Chapare, and investigates established
        chemical handlers in conjunction with the Bolivian National
        Directorate for the Control of Chemicals. *  Operation Mugshot is
        an airport intelligence program that was being conducted by the
        country office. In the program, names from passengers' passports
        and airport employee lists were being run through DEA's worldwide
        computer database containing information on known and suspected
        drug traffickers. *  Operation Civic Action Plan is a television,
        radio, and poster campaign that advertised rewards for information
        about drug trafficking. *  Operation Education was designed to
        develop schools for Bolivian law enforcement personnel to enhance
        their investigative capability through specialized training. *
        Through Operation Night Watch, the country office assisted in
        restructuring FELCN to make it a more effective and less
        bureaucratic organization. The La Paz Country Office provided us
        with the results of drug Enforcement Statistics and
        enforcement operations in Bolivia during fiscal years 1997 and
        1998. Case Examples In fiscal year 1997, the country office
        initiated 219 investigations. Of this total, 99 investigations
        involved cocaine HCL, 90 involved cocaine base, 26 involved
        cocaine-related chemicals, 3 involved marijuana, and 1 involved
        heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident Office initiated 94 of the
        investigations; the Cochabamba Resident Office initiated 93
        investigations; and the office in La Paz initiated 32
        investigations. The country office reported that BNP made 1,483
        arrests and seized 11,452 kilograms of cocaine HCL and base during
        fiscal year 1997 in association with DEA's activities in Bolivia.
        In fiscal year 1998, the country office initiated 487
        investigations. Of these, 483 investigations involved cocaine, 3
        involved marijuana, and 1 involved heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident
        Office initiated 262 of the 487 investigations, the Cochabamba
        Resident Office initiated 156 investigations, the Trinidad
        Resident Office initiated 12 investigations, and the office in La
        Paz initiated 57 investigations. BNP made 2,112 arrests and seized
        11,554 kilograms of cocaine base and HCL during fiscal year 1998
        in association with DEA's activities in Bolivia. An example of
        what DEA officials considered a successful investigation involved
        the Santa Cruz resident office. In May 1997, DEA and BNP's FELCN
        initiated an investigation into the cocaine air shipment
        activities of Page 146                                    GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected
        DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices a Bolivian
        trafficking organization. Intelligence revealed that the
        organization was shipping multihundred-kilogram loads of cocaine
        to a Brazilian organization located in Campo Grande, Brazil,
        several times a month. In addition, through intelligence, DEA and
        FELCN were able to identify the majority of the members of the
        organization and their operating areas. In October 1997,
        information surfaced about a scheduled air shipment of cocaine by
        the Bolivian organization. On the basis of this information, in
        November 1997 a joint operation resulted in the arrest of the
        Bolivian organization's head and 17 members of his organization.
        In addition, 354.4 kilograms of cocaine base and $1.4 million in
        trafficker- owned assets were seized. In another example provided
        by DEA officials, 602 kilograms of cocaine base were seized in
        July 1997 at a checkpoint in the Yungas region. This drug seizure,
        along with subsequent arrests and document seizures, led to the
        discovery of a large, multifaceted trafficking organization.
        Document analysis and related research of personal telephone
        directories, financial documents, business papers, and personal
        papers seized from members of the organization revealed a network
        of drug and illicit chemical traffickers numbering over 100
        persons. Investigative developments revealed that the organization
        was responsible for the full range of cocaine trafficking,
        including obtaining cocaine-essential chemicals, operating cocaine
        base laboratories, transporting cocaine base out of the Chapare
        region for further processing into HCL, and shipping the drugs out
        of Bolivia. Although the majority of the organization members
        identified were Bolivian nationals, other possible targets were
        located in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
        United States. Arrests tied to this cocaine trafficking
        organization numbered over 55, and the value of seized assets
        exceeded $1 million. Page 147
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Mexico
        City, Mexico, Country Office DEA's Mexico City Country Office
        covers all of Mexico, which is Geographic Region and
        approximately 761,600 square miles in size, or about three times
        larger Organizational Structure                     than Texas.
        Mexico has a 2,000-mile border with the United States, 5,804 miles
        of coastline, and is situated between the United States and the
        South American countries that supply much of the illegal drugs
        smuggled into the United States. At the time of our visit in
        September 1998, the Mexico City Country Office, which was headed
        by a Country Attach, included seven resident offices spread
        throughout Mexico, as shown in figure I.7.15 Figure I.7:  Mexico
        City, Mexico, Country           Tijuana Office Map Ciudad Juarez
        Hermosillo Gulf of Mexico
        Mexico Monterrey Mazatln Guadalajara
        Merida Pacific Ocean
        Mexico City Country office Resident office Source: DEA's Mexico
        City, Mexico, Country Office. 15 The country office had resident
        offices in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Ciudad Juarez, Mazatl n,
        Merida, Monterrey, and Tijuana. Page 148
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices There
        were 88 DEA staff authorized, 45 of which were special agent
        positions. The Government of Mexico limits the number of special
        agents DEA can have in Mexico, and it permitted DEA to increase
        the number of special agents in the country from 39 to 45 in July
        1997. Also, representatives from the FBI and DOD were assigned to
        the country office. DEA is the principal U.S. agency for drug
        investigation and drug intelligence coordination in Mexico. DEA
        works with Mexican law enforcement authorities to carry out drug
        enforcement and intelligence operations. DEA agents in Mexico do
        not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize drugs
        in that country.16 According to the State Department, no country
        poses a more immediate Overview of Drug             drug threat to
        the United States than Mexico. Mexico is the principal Trafficking
        Situation and    transit country for cocaine entering the United
        States, with an estimate of Threat                       almost 60
        percent of the U.S. cocaine supply smuggled across the U.S.-
        Mexico border in 1998, typically coming from Colombia through
        Mexico. Mexico is also a major source country for heroin,
        marijuana, and methamphetamine. Since the late 1980s, according to
        DEA, the Mexican/Central American corridor has been the primary
        smuggling route for cocaine destined for the United States from
        source countries in South America. Cocaine is shipped to Mexico in
        various ways (e.g., in fishing vessels, in containerized cargo on
        commercial ships, and on small planes and trucks). Once in Mexico,
        most of the cocaine is smuggled into the United States by vehicle.
        In recent years, Mexican drug trafficking organizations have
        expanded their cocaine operations. According to DEA, Mexican
        trafficking groups were once solely transporters for Colombian
        cocaine traffickers. In the early 1990s, however, major Mexican
        organizations began receiving payment in cocaine for their
        services. These organizations ultimately emerged as wholesale
        distributors of cocaine within the United States, significantly
        increasing their profit margin. Mexico has been a significant
        source of heroin used in the United States for many years,
        according to DEA. Analysis of drug seizures indicates that 14
        percent of the heroin available in the United Sates is produced in
        Mexico. Opium poppy cultivation takes place in the central and 16
        In June 1998, we reported on the status of counternarcotics
        activities in Mexico: Drug Control: U.S.- Mexican Counternarcotics
        Efforts Face Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30,
        1998). We later updated that report in congressional testimony:
        Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities
        (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-98, March 4, 1999). Page 149
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        southwestern parts of the country. Clandestine laboratories are
        used to produce heroin from opium with essential chemicals that
        are widely available in Mexico. DEA reported that Mexico has also
        been increasingly used as a transit country for heroin from other
        source countries. According to DEA, Mexico is the primary foreign
        supplier of marijuana to the United States, and Mexican
        organizations have been involved with marijuana trafficking for
        decades. Marijuana is cultivated in Mexico, with the heaviest
        concentration in the western states. In recent years, growers have
        increased their efficiency and are cultivating higher grade
        marijuana, which commands a higher price in the United States.
        Mexican drug trafficking organizations, according to DEA, have
        expanded their methamphetamine operations, using their well-
        established cocaine, heroin, and marijuana distribution networks
        to dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and
        distribution in recent years. At the time of our review, DEA
        estimated that the majority of the methamphetamine available in
        the United States was either produced in Mexico and transported to
        the United States or manufactured in the United States by Mexican
        drug traffickers. DEA reported that Mexican drug trafficking
        organizations are becoming stronger. According to DEA, Mexican
        organizations have billions of dollars in assets and have at their
        disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications
        equipment, and weapons that rival the capabilities of some
        legitimate governments. One such Mexican organization generated
        tens of millions of dollars in profits per week. The State
        Department reported that Mexico has become a major money
        laundering center. Drug trafficking organizations launder the
        proceeds of illegal drug sales in legitimate businesses in both
        Mexico and the United States. They favor transportation and other
        industries that can be used to facilitate drug, cash, and arms
        smuggling and other types of illegal activities. DEA reported that
        Mexican traffickers are also a growing threat to citizens within
        Mexico and the United States because of their willingness to
        murder and intimidate witnesses and public officials. According to
        the Justice Department, the number of threats to U.S. law
        enforcement officials in Mexico has also increased. Page 150
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices The
        Mexico City Country Office maintains liaison with Mexican law
        Priorities, Programs, and      enforcement and intelligence
        organizations, and it promotes interagency Initiatives
        cooperation and coordination in the areas of drug law enforcement
        activities and intelligence collection and dissemination. The
        country office's mission is to (1) coordinate with Mexican law
        enforcement authorities on investigations directed against major
        drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, (2) collaborate in
        developing a connection to the United States for the
        investigations initiated in Mexico, and (3) engage in cooperative
        "institution building" to improve the capabilities and
        effectiveness of Mexican drug law enforcement authorities. The
        office's work plan cited the following priorities for fiscal year
        1998: *  develop focused intelligence-gathering activities, *
        increase the impact of counterdrug efforts in Central America on
        drug trafficking in the United States, *  enhance host nation
        counterdrug capabilities, and *  initiate regional counterdrug
        cooperation. According to DEA's Country Attach, the country office
        focuses on investigating major drug trafficking organizations in
        Mexico involved in supplying illegal drugs to the United States.
        He said that at the time of our visit, the Mexico City Country
        Office had a list of 10 major targets, and virtually all of the
        office's efforts were devoted to investigations of these targets.
        In these investigations, the country office was attempting to
        attack the "command and control" communications of targeted
        organizations and was working closely with DEA's Special
        Operations Division at headquarters. Another priority of the
        Mexico City Country Office has been the attempt to locate a
        fugitive accused of participating in the June 1994 murder of a DEA
        special agent in Arizona. According to DEA, the country office has
        dedicated all available staff and equipment, in coordination with
        and in support of the Mexican government, to apprehend this
        fugitive. The Country Attach told us that the key change to DEA's
        operations in Mexico in the 1990s was the establishment of Mexican
        vetted units for drug law enforcement. He said this was a dramatic
        departure from the way the country office previously operated and
        coordinated with Mexican law enforcement authorities. At the time
        of our review, DEA's Mexico office was essentially working only
        with the vetted units, which are part of the Mexican Special
        Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) and include personnel
        assigned to the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) and the Page 151
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Border
        Task Forces (BTF). FEADS reports to Mexico's Office of the
        Attorney General (PGR). OCU, located in Mexico City, is the
        principal agency responsible for enforcing a Mexican organized
        crime law passed in November 1996 covering drug trafficking, money
        laundering, conspiracy, electronic surveillance, and organized
        crime corruption. The narcotics section of OCU has vetted
        personnel whose mission is to investigate high-level drug
        trafficking groups, as well as drug-related money laundering
        groups, throughout Mexico. OCU is also the umbrella agency for the
        Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), which has vetted personnel.
        The SIU collects and analyzes intelligence from various sources,
        develops investigations against major organizations, and
        disseminates actionable information to other law enforcement
        units. At the time of our review, the BTFs were investigating what
        DEA considered the most significant drug trafficking organizations
        along the U.S.-Mexico border as well as a major organization in
        Central Mexico considered key to the booming U.S. methamphetamine
        trade.17 The primary work of the BTFs is intelligence; i.e., they
        gather, analyze, integrate, and interpret information from various
        sources. The FEADS officers assigned to the BTFs are vetted; and,
        at the time of our work, they were assigned to BTF locations in
        Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, and Guadalajara and their
        respective suboffices in several other locations in Mexico. Mexico
        passed a law in May 1996, and expanded it in December 1997,
        establishing trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals as a
        criminal offense. These chemicals can be used in the production of
        heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs of abuse. The implementation
        of the law and development of an administrative infrastructure for
        enforcing it were under way at the time of our visit. As part of
        the U.S. assistance and training to Mexico for carrying out the
        law, the country office was participating in a Bilateral Chemical
        Control Working Group and encouraging the establishment of Mexican
        chemical control programs. The country office was also working
        with specialized chemical control units in FEADS and CENDRO, a
        Mexican intelligence unit, to exchange chemical import/export
        information and other intelligence. In addition, the BTF that 17
        The Guadalajara BTF was instrumental in apprehending two brothers
        who headed this organization in June 1998. As of May 1999, the
        brothers were incarcerated in Mexico awaiting extradition to the
        United States. Page 152
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        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA
        works with in Guadalajara was considered to be the first Mexican
        chemical task force and had targeted the Amezcua-Contreras
        organization, which DEA reported as the most powerful and dominant
        methamphetamine trafficking organization in Mexico. The country
        office also participates in the U.S. Embassy's Money Laundering
        Task Force. Membership includes the FBI, Customs, IRS, and the
        Economic, Political, and Narcotics Affairs sections of the
        embassy. The task force oversees joint financial investigations,
        provides training to Mexican counterparts, and coordinates an
        exchange of information with Mexico. In addition, the task force
        encouraged the Mexican government to develop major investigations
        to test Mexico's May 1996 law making money laundering a criminal
        offense. Also located at the country office is an Information
        Analysis Center (IAC) that develops tactical intelligence for
        interdicting drugs and chemicals being smuggled. According to DEA,
        the IAC interacts daily with CENDRO and an antismuggling unit of
        the Mexican military. The IAC is staffed with DEA intelligence
        analysts, DOD analysts and computer support personnel, a Customs
        air officer, and assigned liaison personnel from an intelligence
        agency. At the time of our review, DEA special agents in the
        Mexico City Country Office were spending the majority of their
        investigative work hours on programs and initiatives involving
        cocaine.  During fiscal year 1997, cocaine operations accounted
        for 71.4 percent of the special agents' reported investigative
        work hours. In fiscal year 1998, the special agents reported
        spending 62.8 percent of their investigative work hours on
        operations involving cocaine. The Mexico City Country Office
        provided us with a statistical summary of Enforcement Statistics
        and    the results of its operations during fiscal years 1997 and
        1998. Case Examples In fiscal year 1997, the country office
        initiated 90 investigations. The office's operations resulted in
        57 arrests, 26 of which were related to cocaine and 23 of which
        were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures of
        approximately 4,025 kilograms of cocaine, 3 kilograms of heroin,
        24,290 kilograms of marijuana, and 264,314 dosage units of
        dangerous drugs such as amphetamines. In fiscal year 1998, the
        country office initiated 77 investigations, 44 of which were
        related to cocaine and 23 of which were related to marijuana. The
        office's operations resulted in five arrests, of which three were
        related Page 153                                    GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices to cocaine and two
        were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures of 573
        kilograms of cocaine, 26 kilograms of heroin, 860 kilograms of
        marijuana, and 64,000 dosage units of dangerous drugs. An example
        of what DEA considered a successful major investigation involved
        the Mexican drug trafficking organization known as the Gulf
        cartel. This organization transported cocaine, marijuana, and
        heroin into the United States from Mexico and was closely aligned
        with the Colombian Cali cartel. The organization was headquartered
        in both Matamoros and Monterrey, Mexico, and had significant
        influence in the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Quintana
        Roo, and Veracruz. DEA, in conjunction with the FBI and the
        Customs Service, initiated an investigation that was expanded to
        include task forces from U.S. federal, state, and local agencies
        and international agencies. The Mexican Attorney General's Office
        took the lead in the investigation, arrested several key
        organization members, and provided valuable information from
        cooperating defendants and intelligence sources. DEA's Monterrey
        resident office cultivated and used informants, resulting in the
        arrest of other organization members and, eventually, the head of
        the organization. The individuals were indicted on 30 counts of
        drug and money laundering violations. After the arrest of the Gulf
        cartel's leader, another individual took control of the
        organization. DEA's Monterrey office took the lead in an
        investigation that involved DEA domestic offices, the FBI, U.S.
        Attorneys' Offices, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. The
        new organization head was arrested and charged with numerous drug
        and money laundering violations. At the time of our review, he was
        incarcerated in a Mexican prison. Despite the incarceration of the
        second leader, the Gulf cartel continued to bring ton quantities
        of cocaine into the United States, according to DEA. Thus, at the
        time of our review, investigations of the remaining organization
        members were being conducted and coordinated by U.S. and Mexican
        law enforcement agencies, including DEA's Monterrey office. Page
        154                                    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of Selected DEA
        Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Caribbean Division
        Established in October 1995, the Caribbean Division is unique in
        that it has Geographic Region and       both foreign and domestic
        responsibilities. The Division's area of Organizational Structure
        responsibility is the entire Eastern Caribbean Corridor, including
        the commonwealth of Puerto Rico;18 the U.S. Virgin Islands; and
        the countries of Barbados, the Netherlands Antilles (Curacao), and
        Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Hispaniola (the Dominican Republic
        and Haiti) in the Central Caribbean and Jamaica in the Western
        Caribbean. At the time of our visit in September 1998, the
        division's field office, which was headed by a SAC and two ASACs,
        was located in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It also had six foreign
        county offices and three domestic resident offices, as shown in
        figure I.8. 18 Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth, in
        union with the United States. Page 155
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Figure
        I.8:  DEA Caribbean Division Map Cuba Haiti Dominican
        San Juan Republic
        St. Thomas Jamaica
        Puerto                                                      U.S.
        Virgin Port-Au-Prince               Santo Domingo
        Rico                                              Islands Kingston
        Ponce                    St. Croix Barbados Bridgetown Division
        office
        Curacao (Netherlands Antilles) Country office Resident office Port
        of                 Trinidad Spain                       and
        Colombia
        Venezuela
        Tobago Source: DEA's Caribbean Division. As of March 1998, the
        division's 161 staff (140 in domestic offices, 21 in foreign
        offices) included 105 special agents (87 domestic and 18 foreign),
        12 domestic intelligence staff, 13 diversion staff, and 31 other
        support staff.19 According to DEA, in recent years the Caribbean
        Corridor has reemerged Overview of Drug
        as a major trafficking route between Colombia and the continental
        United Trafficking Situation and                    States. In
        1995, the El Paso Intelligence Center estimated that Threat
        approximately 100 drug trafficking organizations were working in
        the Caribbean area. Caribbean drug organizations are generally
        multinational, but dominated primarily by Colombians, who were the
        command and control managers, and Dominican nationals, who
        operated the 19 DEA's Fiscal Year 1998 appropriation included a
        Caribbean initiative, which increased the number of staff in the
        division (see ch. 4). Page 156
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        transportation networks. The traffickers transport cocaine,
        heroin, and marijuana through the Caribbean corridor using private
        planes and yachts; commercial airlines; cargo air;  "motherships";
        fishing vessels; small, motorized, high-performance "go-fast"
        boats; cruise ships; and cargo container vessels. Once in Puerto
        Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the southernmost entry points of
        the United States, drugs are more easily smuggled into the
        continental United States, because no additional Customs
        inspections are required. Cocaine    According to DEA, cocaine, in
        both powder and crack forms, continues to be the drug of choice of
        both traffickers and users in the region. The Caribbean basin is a
        major transshipment point for cocaine destined for the continental
        United States and Europe.  The primary routes are the Western
        Caribbean (Jamaica-Bahamas), the Central Caribbean (Hispaniola),
        and the Eastern Caribbean (Lesser Antilles-Puerto Rico). The El
        Paso Intelligence Center has estimated that 140 tons of cocaine
        flow through the Eastern Caribbean each year and, according to the
        Interagency Flow Assessment Committee, approximately one-third of
        the cocaine arriving in the continental United States comes
        through Puerto Rico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. DEA also
        reported the emergence of new local markets in Puerto Rico and the
        Caribbean due to Colombian traffickers paying for services using
        drugs, not currency. Cocaine traffickers use a variety of
        smuggling methods-via air, land, and sea, according to DEA. For
        example, cocaine destined for the United States may be dropped
        from private planes to waiting maritime vessels or smuggled in
        "go-fast" boats into the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the
        U.S. Virgin Islands. From Puerto Rico cocaine may be transported
        into the continental United States in airfreight cargo. Couriers
        on commercial airlines from Colombia and Panama are also used to
        move cocaine through the Dominican Republic, from Haiti to Miami,
        and from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland. DEA attributed the
        dramatic rise in drug-related violence in Puerto Rico to the
        increased influx of cocaine into the region. Competition for
        control of the domestic Puerto Rican cocaine market, which makes
        up an estimated 10 to 20 percent of the total cocaine smuggled
        onto the island, accounted for some of the drug-related violence,
        according to DEA. Citing statistics from the Puerto Rico Police
        Department (PRPD), DEA officials reported that between 1995 and
        1998, the percentage of homicides in Puerto Rico that were drug-
        related had risen from 63 to 81 percent. Page 157
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices DEA
        sources indicated that Puerto Rico has become an arrival area and
        a Heroin                       major transshipment point for high-
        purity Colombian heroin entering the United States. The Eastern
        Caribbean island nations are used as transshipment points for
        heroin, which is then transshipped through Puerto Rico to the
        continental United States. Heroin is also transshipped through
        Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic, with Puerto Rico as a
        second transshipment point, and on to the United States. According
        to DEA, heroin from Colombia may be transported through Central
        America into Haiti via couriers on commercial airlines. Moreover,
        the availability of heroin in Puerto Rico itself has also
        increased. Marijuana                    According to DEA,
        marijuana continues to be cultivated throughout the Eastern
        Caribbean islands (particularly on St. Vincent and the
        Grenadines), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Puerto Rico.
        Jamaica is one of the major marijuana producers in the world.
        Marijuana grown in other parts of the Eastern Caribbean is
        transshipped through Puerto Rico to external markets. In Puerto
        Rico, marijuana is not only cultivated both indoors and outdoors
        in its central mountains, but also smuggled onto the island from
        the continental United States. Containerized cargo ships have been
        the preferred concealment and transportation method for large-
        scale, well-established marijuana traffickers. Express mail is
        another method used to smuggle marijuana into Puerto Rico. At the
        time of our review, both the domestic and foreign priority of the
        Priorities, Programs, and    Caribbean Division was to stem the
        flow of drugs through the region into Initiatives
        the United States. In 1998, the division's overall objective was
        to reduce the capabilities of major drug trafficking organizations
        by immobilizing their command and control centers and distribution
        networks through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
        incarceration of both leaders and members. Puerto Rico was
        considered to be the "linchpin" of DEA's strategy in the Caribbean
        because it is the outermost entry-point to the continental United
        States. As noted above, the Caribbean Division included both
        domestic and foreign offices.  The Domestic Subdivision included
        eight enforcement groups and the diversion program.  The Foreign
        Subdivision included six Country Offices and the Foreign
        Operations Group. The division's response to the international and
        transit character of the drug threat in the region was underscored
        by its work-hour statistics. During fiscal years 1997 and 1998,
        more than 50 percent of its investigative work hours, categorized
        by geographic scope of the case, were expended on international
        cases, which involve both foreign and U.S. domestic Page 158
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices
        components. Moreover, during those same fiscal years, 52.6 percent
        and 39.9 percent, respectively, of the division's investigative
        work hours, categorized by case target, were expended on
        transportation-related cases. In order to stem the flow of drugs
        into the region, the division's investigative priorities for
        fiscal year 1998 included: (1) cocaine-related investigations
        involving violent organizations, (2) the initiation of major
        heroin investigations, and (3) marijuana-related investigations.
        The division's investigative work-hour statistics for fiscal year
        1998, categorized by the drug involved indicated that 71 percent
        of investigative work hours were expended on cocaine-related
        cases; 19 percent on heroin- related cases (about double the
        previous year); and 10 percent on other drugs, including
        marijuana. The increased investigative work hours expended on
        heroin investigations corresponded to the changing drug threat-the
        increased availability and use of heroin within, and transshipment
        through, the region. According to DEA officials, although the
        Caribbean Division used a variety of investigative methods to
        accomplish its priorities, during the late 1990s the division
        pursued a strategy that included the use of wire intercepts. For
        example, in a 1995 DEA-led OCDETF case (See ch. 2 for discussion
        of OCDETF), "Operation Omega," DEA used undercover buys, on-site
        surveillance, liaison with local law enforcement, confidential
        source information, and cooperating defendant testimony to
        investigate the Ponce-based Angela Ayala-Martinez cocaine-
        trafficking organization. However, the 1996 DEA-led OCDETF
        investigation, "Operation Santa Isabel," used Title III
        (electronic surveillance) telephonic intercept orders extensively
        in Puerto Rico. As in DEA generally (see ch. 2) and as shown in
        table I.2, the division increased its use of wire intercepts from
        1995 through 1998. Table I.2: Caribbean Field Division's Use
        Fiscal year
        Wire intercepts of Wire Intercepts                           1995
        0 1996
        6 1997
        12 1998
        30 Source: DEA. During 1998, the division worked domestically with
        various task forces that included other federal and/or
        commonwealth and local agencies. In Page 159
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices Puerto
        Rico, DEA carried out investigations with PRPD,20 Hacienda
        (Treasury Department), and the Special Investigations Bureau21 of
        the Attorney General's Office. One DEA-led enforcement group,
        which included FBI agents and officers from PRPD, worked at the
        airport. A task force group, comprising DEA agents and members of
        PRPD, targeted lower level individuals in drug organizations with
        the objective of working toward the upper echelons of the
        organization. In addition, in San Juan and Ponce, DEA led task
        forces, supported by HIDTA funds from ONDCP (see ch. 2 for
        discussion of HIDTA). The San Juan task force, which included DEA
        and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service among
        other federal agencies as well as officers from the Puerto Rico
        Police Department, focused on major drug organizations in San Juan
        and along the northern coast of Puerto Rico. The Ponce task force,
        which included agents from DEA, FBI, IRS, and the Customs Service,
        among others; a Coast Guard investigator; an Assistant U.S.
        Attorney on site; local officials from PRPD and Hacienda; and a
        special local prosecutor, focused on major drug organizations in
        the Ponce area. Investigative work-hour statistics for the
        division, when analyzed according to source of cases, highlight
        the significance of its cooperative efforts. State and local task
        force efforts accounted for 36.4 percent and 28.8 percent of the
        division's investigative work hours expended in fiscal years 1997
        and 1998, respectively. Joint state and local cases accounted for
        another 5.5 and 12.9 percent of its investigative work hours
        expended during those years, respectively. In addition,
        investigative work hours dedicated to OCDETF cases by the division
        almost doubled, from 7.9 to 15.1 percent, between fiscal years
        1997 and 1998. Internationally, the division's six country offices
        in the islands worked with their foreign counterparts in those
        countries to respond to the drug threat in the region. Cooperative
        law enforcement efforts varied from country to country. For
        example, in Haiti, DEA was engaged in vetting (see ch. 2 for
        discussion of vetting) local law enforcement personnel. The
        division was involved in a number of special operations. For
        example, Operation Buccaneer, an ongoing campaign to eradicate
        marijuana, was 20 In Puerto Rico, the police are primarily
        commonwealth police, and law enforcement matters are handled
        through them. 21 According to its director, the Special
        Investigations Bureau was formed 20 years ago and focuses on
        organized crime and public corruption in Puerto Rico. At the time
        of our review, it had 250 agents, of whom 40 were assigned to
        federal task forces. The bureau has a drug section, which develops
        cases. Some of these cases are worked with DEA. Page 160
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices carried
        out by the Jamaicans and supported by DEA, DOD, and the State
        Department. In Operation Summer Storm, the division and DEA's
        Belize Country Office worked with the 26 Caribbean nations,
        Belize, Suriname, and Guyana to conduct a combined, coordinated
        air, land, and maritime counternarcotics operation within each
        nation's territorial borders to interdict, disrupt, and dismantle
        the flow of drugs. In the Dominican Republic, the DEA country
        office provided wire intercept assistance. During fiscal years
        1997 and 1998, joint federal foreign efforts accounted for 35.3
        percent and 24.2 percent, respectively, of investigative work
        hours categorized by source of cases. The Caribbean Division
        provided enforcement statistics for fiscal years Enforcement
        Statistics and               1997 and 1998. These data indicated
        the division's involvement in 654 Case Examples
        arrests in 1997 and 1,147 arrests in 1998. DEA also provided
        arrest data reported by type of case-international, national, and
        foreign. Domestic arrests were categorized as international or
        national and included arrests related to OCDETF cases. Table I.3
        below shows the distribution of the division's arrests by type of
        case. Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean Division, by
        Case Type, for
        Number of arrests Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998
        Type of cases Fiscal year              International a
        National a            Foreigna                    Total 1997
        403                  182                    69
        654 1998                                  483                  556
        108                   1147 aAn international case includes targets
        involved in U.S. domestic and foreign criminal activities; a
        foreign case includes targets operating principally outside the
        jurisdiction of the United States. Source: DEA. The division
        reported seizures of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in both
        domestic and foreign cases. For fiscal year 1997, the division
        reported total seizures of 7,780.2 kilograms of cocaine, 25.3
        kilograms of heroin, and 18,835.8 kilograms of marijuana. For
        fiscal year 1998, the division reported cocaine seizures of
        5,442.2 kilograms, heroin seizures of 40.2 kilograms, and
        marijuana seizures of 5,910.8 kilograms. DEA also provided
        information on the results of specific cases mentioned above.
        Operation Omega, which targeted the Ponce-based Angela Ayala-
        Martinez cocaine-trafficking organization, resulted in 77 arrests
        and the seizure of more than $1 million in drug-related assets.
        Indictments against another 20 defendants were expected in late
        1998. In Operation Santa Isabel, the Ponce Resident Office used
        information gathered through traditional investigative techniques
        to apply for Title III wiretap orders for 12 telephones associated
        with the Rivera-Rosa cocaine importation and Page 161
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix I Profiles of
        Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices cocaine
        and heroin distribution organization. These intercepts produced
        more than 60 calls related to drug trafficking and resulted in a
        seizure of 1,300 kilograms of cocaine in November 1996. With
        information on Rivera- Rosa's activities in the Dominican Republic
        gathered from these intercepts, DEA's Santo Domingo Country Office
        worked with Dominican officials to arrest 25 members of the
        organization, including Rivera-Rosa, and to seize cocaine, heroin,
        marijuana, and drug-related assets. As of August 1998, DEA
        reported 81 arrests and the complete dismantling of this drug
        organization. Page 162                                    GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the
        Drug Enforcement Administration Note: GAO comments supplementing
        those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. See
        comment 1. Now on pp. 6. Page 163    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
        in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug Enforcement
        Administration See comment 2. See comment 3. Now on p. 7. See
        comment 4. Page 164                                GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug
        Enforcement Administration We did not reproduce the enclosure.
        Page 165                                GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Appendix II Comments From the Drug
        Enforcement Administration The following are GAO's comments on the
        Drug Enforcement Administration's letter of  June 23, 1999. 1.  We
        inserted the word "measurable" to cover any measurable level of
        GAO Comments    performance, whether numerical or percentage,
        against which actual achievement can be compared. 2.  We added the
        phrase "against the base year list" and a statement to indicate
        that neither the domestic nor the international target lists of
        drug trafficking organizations called for by the National Strategy
        have yet to be developed. 3.  We did not add DEA's suggested
        statement.  However, in our evaluation of DEA's comment at the end
        of chapter 3, we noted DEA's inference that it cannot finalize
        performance targets and measures until a designated targeted list
        of drug trafficking organizations, as called for in the National
        Strategy, is completed. 4.  We revised the statement that little
        can be said about DEA's effectiveness without performance targets
        to clarify our intent that it is difficult to quantitatively
        assess DEA's overall effectiveness without such targets. Page 166
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Appendix III GAO
        Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Norman J. Rabkin, (202) 512-
        8777 GAO Contacts       Daniel C. Harris, (202) 512-8777 In
        addition to those named above, Ronald G. Viereck, Samuel
        A.Caldrone, Acknowledgments    Lemuel N. Jackson, Barbara A.
        Stolz, Michael H. Little, Barry J. Seltser, Ann H. Finley,
        Katherine M. Raheb, and Donna M. Leiss made major contributions to
        this report. Page 167                              GAO/GGD-99-108
        DEA Operations in the 1990s Glossary This glossary contains
        definitions of performance measurement terms Performance
        used in this report.  Because limited standard definitions exist,
        we used Measurement Terms        definitions from a variety of
        sources, including OMB's circular A-11, DOJ's guidance to
        components on the preparation of fiscal year 2000 budget estimates
        and related annual performance plans, and ONDCP's 1998 performance
        measure of effectiveness plan.  Essentially, OMB and DOJ
        definitions relate to measuring agency performance as provided for
        in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results
        Act). ONDCP definitions relate to assessing the performance of the
        National Drug Control Strategy (the National Strategy). A
        performance goal, as defined by OMB for purposes of the Results
        Act, Performance Goal         means a target level of performance
        expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which
        actual achievement can be compared.  As used in this report, the
        terms performance goal and performance target (defined below) are
        largely interchangeable.  DEA uses the term performance goal, and
        ONDCP uses performance target. A performance indicator, as defined
        by OMB for purposes of the Results Performance Indicator    Act,
        means a particular value or characteristic used to measure output
        or outcome (defined below).  Performance indicators are associated
        with performance goals in annual performance plans.  As defined by
        DOJ, performance indicators are signs that point to success or
        failure in performance and answer the question, "How will we know
        when we have been successful?"  They refer to what specifically is
        to be measured.  As used in this report, the terms performance
        indicator and performance measure (defined below) are largely
        interchangeable.  DEA uses the term performance indicator, and
        ONDCP uses performance measure. A performance measure, as defined
        by ONDCP for purposes of the Performance Measure      National
        Strategy, means data and variables and events used to track
        progress toward performance targets.  Measures show how progress
        toward performance targets will be tracked.  As used in this
        report, the terms performance measure and performance indicator
        are largely interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance
        measure, and DEA uses performance indicator. A performance target,
        as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National Performance
        Target       Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved.
        It is a measurable level of performance against which actual
        achievement can be compared. As used in this report, the terms
        performance target and performance goal are largely
        interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance target, and DEA
        uses performance goal. Page 168
        GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Glossary Outcomes, as
        defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on the Results Act,
        Outcomes             means an event, occurrence, or condition that
        indicates progress toward achievement of the mission of the
        program.  Outcomes can be measured in terms of the extent to which
        they are achieved, or they can reflect the quality of service
        delivery or customer satisfaction.  Intermediate outcomes are
        expected to lead to the desired ends but are not in themselves
        ends.   In many programs, a progression or sequence of outcomes
        usually occurs. End outcomes are the desired end or ultimate
        results that the agency hopes to achieve through its program
        activities. These results are directly related to the agency's
        mission. Outputs, as defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on
        the Results Act, Outputs              means the products and
        services produced by a program or process and delivered to
        customers, whether internal or external.  Outputs result from
        internal activity or effort.  Outputs are important for measuring
        internal work performance, but they do not in themselves indicate
        the extent to which progress has occurred toward the program's
        mission or what impact a program has had on a particular goal or
        objective. A reporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of
        the National Reporting Agency     Strategy, means the agency
        designated to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving established
        performance targets.  The reporting agency is not necessarily the
        only agency responsible for achieving performance targets. A
        supporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for the purposes of the
        Supporting Agency    National Strategy, means the agency that is
        designated to assist the reporting agency with data collection and
        assessment or that has programs that contribute to achieving the
        performance target. Page 169                              GAO/GGD-
        99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s Page 170    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA
        Operations in the 1990s Page 171    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations
        in the 1990s Page 172    GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the
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