Identity Fraud: Information on Prevalence, Cost, and Internet Impact is
Limited (Briefing Report, 05/01/98, GAO/GGD-98-100BR).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on various
issues relating to identity fraud, focusing on: (1) law enforcement's
responsibilities for investigating identity fraud and the difficulties
in tracking such crime; (2) statistics or other data showing the
prevalence of identity fraud; (3) the costs of identity fraud; and (4)
identity fraud on the Internet, including the status of self-regulation
by computerized database services that collect and disseminate personal
identifying information.

GAO noted that: (1) identity fraud may be an element in a variety of
financial crimes; (2) no federal agency has overall or primary
jurisdiction for the investigation of such fraud; (3) identity fraud is
difficult to track because there is no standardized definition; (4) GAO
found no comprehensive statistics on the prevalence of identity fraud,
although it did obtain limited statistics from selected federal
agencies; (5) a Secret Service official provided GAO arrest statistics
for the agency's financial-crimes investigation cases considered to be
directly associated with identity fraud; (6) officials at the Social
Security Administration's Office of the Inspector General stated that
the agency's investigations of social security number misuse in
connection with program fraud increased from 305 in fiscal year (FY)
1996 to 1,153 in FY 1997; (7) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Criminal Investigation Division officials stated that IRS annually
detects thousands of questionable refund schemes, many involving
personal and business identity fraud; (8) in the private sector, an
official with Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., stated that the
occurrences of credit fraud appear to have increased; (9) an official of
Trans Union Corporation, one of the national credit bureaus, stated that
two-thirds of all consumer inquiries to the company's Fraud Victim
Assistance Department involve identity fraud; (10) officials at VISA
U.S.A., Inc., and MasterCard International, Inc., indicated that overall
fraud losses from their member banks are in the hundreds of millions of
dollars annually, but these losses constitute a small part of the banks'
overall billing transactions processed; (11) a recent American Bankers
Association survey of the bank-card industry reported that lost and
stolen cards represented the largest single source of fraud losses in
1996, which marked the sixth consecutive year of this trend; (12) GAO
found no comprehensive estimates of the costs of identity fraud; (13)
many of the officials that GAO contacted stated that Internet growth
increases opportunities for criminal activity; (14) in recent years,
concerns have been raised about such risks associated with computerized
database services, an industry that is widely used by both public- and
private-sector entities to locate or verify the identity of individuals;
and (15) regarding the amount of money credit bureaus earn from selling
personal identifying information, an official with Associated Credit
Bureaus, Inc., told GAO that members do not disclose revenue data, but
aggregate figures are in the tens of millions of dollars annually.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GGD-98-100BR
     TITLE:  Identity Fraud: Information on Prevalence, Cost, and 
             Internet Impact is Limited
      DATE:  05/01/98
   SUBJECT:  Fraud
             Social security number
             Law enforcement
             Data bases
             Credit sales
             Organized crime
             Credit bureaus
             Statistical data
             Computer crimes
             Privacy law
IDENTIFIER:  Internet
             Internet Fraud Watch
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters

May 1998

IDENTITY FRAUD - INFORMATION ON
PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET
IMPACT IS LIMITED

GAO/GGD-98-100BR

Identity Fraud

(182049)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  IRS - Internal Revenue Service
  SSA - Social Security Administration
  SSN - Social Security number

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-279537

May 1, 1998

The Honorable Charles E.  Grassley
Chairman
Special Committee on Aging
U.S.  Senate

The Honorable Barbara B.  Kennelly
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Social Security
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives

The Honorable Gerald D.  Kleczka
House of Representatives

This report summarizes the substance of our briefing today to your
offices in response to your request that we provide information on
various issues relating to identity fraud.  Generally, identity fraud
involves "stealing" another person's personal identifying
information, e.g., Social Security number (SSN), date of birth, and
mother's maiden name.  Criminals use such information to fraudulently
establish credit, run up debt, or to take over existing financial
accounts.  The methods used to obtain personal identifying
information can range from basic street theft to sophisticated,
organized crime schemes involving the use of computerized databases
or the bribing of employees with access to personal information on
customer or personnel records. 

As agreed with your offices, this document provides information on
(1) law enforcement's responsibilities for investigating identity
fraud and the difficulties in tracking such crime; (2) statistics or
other data showing the prevalence of identity fraud; (3) the costs of
identity fraud; and (4) identity fraud and the Internet, including
the status of self-regulation by computerized database services that
collect and disseminate personal identifying information.  Also,
although not specifically related to identity fraud, we agreed with
your offices to ask credit bureaus for revenue figures associated
with selling personal identifying information and to discuss the
effects on businesses or commerce if such sales were restricted. 

In developing information on these issues, we conducted a literature
search and contacted officials at various federal agencies, including
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Secret Service, the
Executive Office for U.S.  Attorneys, the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) Office of the Inspector General, the Postal
Inspection Service, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Criminal
Investigation Division, and the Federal Trade Commission.  Also, we
contacted state and/or local officials in Arizona and California, two
states that have enacted identity-fraud legislation in recent years. 
Further, we interviewed representatives of the three largest credit
bureaus (Equifax, Inc.; Experian Corporation; and Trans Union
Corporation); the major credit-card companies; and various research,
consumer interest, privacy rights, and other groups. 

Our work generally consisted of (1) synthesizing information from
existing studies, reports, or other publications and (2) interviewing
relevant public and private sector officials, as previously
indicated, to obtain available statistics, other applicable
documentation, and testimonial evidence.  We did not independently
verify the accuracy of the statistical and other information provided
to us by the various public and private entities.  Appendix I
provides more details about our objectives, scope, and methodology. 
We performed our work from November 1997 to March 1998, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Identity fraud may be an element in a variety of financial crimes. 
No federal agency has overall or primary jurisdiction for the
investigation of such fraud.  Identity fraud is difficult to track
because there is no standardized definition.  Also, the scope or
types of identity fraud can range from unauthorized use of a credit
card to total takeover of a person's identity.  Generally, the law
enforcement officials we contacted told us that their respective
agencies historically have not tracked identity fraud. 

We found no comprehensive statistics on the prevalence of identity
fraud, although we did obtain limited statistics from selected
federal agencies.  Several sections of the U.S.  Code closely related
to identity fraud appear to be section 1028 of title 18, which
addresses fraud in connection with identification documents; section
1029 of title 18, which addresses fraud in connection with access
devices (e.g., credit cards); and section 408 of title 42, which
addresses misuse of SSNs in connection with fraud.  The Executive
Office for U.S.  Attorneys provided data over the past 6 years for
all 94 federal judicial districts that show the annual number of
cases filed under these 3 statutes.  For the most current year, 1997,
the data show 387 cases involving code section 1028, 848 cases
involving section 1029, and 305 cases involving section 406. 
However, this office's senior counsel advised us that these
statistics do not capture cases prosecuted under other criminal
statutes--such as mail fraud and bank fraud statutes--that involve
elements of identity fraud. 

A Secret Service official provided us arrest statistics for the
agency's financial-crimes investigation cases considered to be
directly associated with identity fraud.  As reported by the Secret
Service, arrests in these cases totaled 8,806, 8,686, and 9,455,
respectively, for fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997. 

Also, officials at SSA's Office of the Inspector General told us that
the agency's investigations of SSN misuse in connection with program
fraud increased from 305 in fiscal year 1996 to 1,153 in fiscal year
1997.  SSA officials said this increase was due, in part, to the
agency's hiring of additional investigators.  According to the Postal
Inspection Service, another federal investigative agency, its arrests
in fraud cases involving credit-card applications remained steady
during fiscal years 1995 to 1997, while arrests involving
change-of-address fraud--which involves the surreptitious diversion
of a person's mail to addresses controlled by the criminals--more
than doubled from 53 in fiscal year 1996 to 115 in fiscal year 1997. 
Also, Postal Inspection Service investigations show that identity
fraud is perpetrated by organized criminal enterprises or groups and
has a nationwide scope. 

IRS Criminal Investigation Division officials told us IRS annually
detects thousands of questionable refund schemes, many involving
personal and business identity fraud.  For 1993, for example, IRS
reported detecting a total of 5,438 schemes that sought to obtain
$137 million in refunds.  The statistics that IRS reported for 1996
and 1997 were down considerably from the 1993 figures.  However, for
the first 9 months of 1997, the number of questionable refund schemes
detected was higher than the 1996 total.  We have previously reported
that a major reason for the decrease in 1996 was because of a
reduction in IRS staff.\1

In the private sector, an official with Associated Credit Bureaus,
Inc., told us that the occurrences of credit fraud appear to have
increased.  An official of Trans Union Corporation, one of the
national credit bureaus, told us that two-thirds of all consumer
inquiries to the company's Fraud Victim Assistance Department involve
identity fraud.  According to this official, the total number of
inquiries increased from 35,235 in calendar year 1992 to 522,922 in
1997.  The official attributed this trend to company growth and
outreach efforts to consumers as well as increasing occurrences of
identity fraud. 

Officials at VISA U.S.A., Inc., and MasterCard International, Inc.,
indicated that overall fraud losses from their member banks are in
the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, but these losses
constitute a small part (about 0.1 percent) of the banks' overall
billing transactions processed.  Nevertheless, an official from
MasterCard told us that dollar losses relating to identity fraud
represented about 96 percent of its member banks' overall fraud
losses of $407 million in 1997. 

A recent American Bankers Association survey of the bank-card
industry reported that lost and stolen cards (excluding mail
intercepts) represented the largest single source of fraud losses in
1996, which marked the sixth consecutive year of this trend.  On
average, nearly 113,000 lost and stolen credit cards and about 16,800
cases involving credit-card fraud were reported for each of the 10
large banks surveyed.  The survey also noted that large banks had
dollar losses averaging about $20 million per bank in 1996. 

We found no comprehensive estimates of the costs of identity fraud. 
As previously mentioned, the two largest credit-card companies told
us that their member banks' total fraud losses were several hundred
million dollars each in 1997.  A Secret Service official told us that
actual losses--to the victimized individuals and
institutions--associated with the agency's investigations of
financial crimes involving identity fraud totaled $442 million in
fiscal year 1995, $450 million in fiscal year 1996, and $745 million
in fiscal year 1997.  Moreover, officials at other federal law
enforcement agencies we contacted said that identity fraud can be an
element of various financial crimes.  In this sense, the costs of
identity fraud can be very high, even though not specifically
quantifiable.  Moreover, on an individual level, the "human" costs of
identity fraud can be quite substantial.  These costs include
emotional costs, as well as various financial and/or opportunity
costs.  For example, the victims may be unable to obtain a job,
purchase a car, or qualify for a mortgage. 

Many of the officials we contacted said that Internet growth
increases opportunities for criminal activity.  While no one provided
us any specific trend data, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
Internet can be used for crimes relating to identity fraud.  The
federal law enforcement officials we contacted recognized that
Internet growth creates risks relating to identity fraud. 

In recent years, concerns have been raised about such risks
associated with computerized database services, an industry that is
widely used by both public and private sector entities to locate or
verify the identity of individuals.  In 1997, with encouragement from
the Federal Trade Commission, industry members adopted
self-regulatory principles, which are to go into effect not later
than December 31, 1998. 

Regarding the amount of money credit bureaus earn from selling
personal identifying information, an official with Associated Credit
Bureaus, Inc., told us that members do not disclose revenue data, but
aggregate figures are in the "tens of millions of dollars" annually. 
This official commented that restrictions on selling such information
would have various adverse effects.  He noted, for example, that
restrictions would make it more difficult to authenticate a
consumer's application data, thus increasing the creditor's risk of a
fraudulent account being opened. 


--------------------
\1 Tax Administration:  Earned Income Credit Noncompliance
(GAO/T-GGD-97-105, May 8, 1997). 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal
Trade Commission, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Social
Security Administration.  We received either written or oral comments
during the period April 8 to 14, 1998. 

We received written comments from the (1) Department of Justice,
which indicated that the draft was reviewed by representatives of the
Civil Division, Criminal Division, Executive Office for U.S. 
Attorneys, FBI, and Office of Justice Programs; (2) Postal Inspection
Service; and (3) SSA.  We received oral comments from (1) Treasury
Department components, i.e., IRS and the Secret Service and (2) the
Federal Trade Commission. 

Generally, the various agencies provided technical comments and
clarifications, which have been incorporated in this report where
appropriate.  Also, the Federal Trade Commission and SSA commented
that the report could have a stronger emphasis on the human costs of
identity fraud.  We expanded our discussion of this topic in briefing
sections I and IV. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.1

We hope this information is helpful to you.  And, as agreed with your
offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan
no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date
of issuance.  We will then send copies of this briefing report to the
Ranking Minority Member, Senate Special Committee on Aging; the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, House Committee on Ways
and Means; the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee
on Social Security and Family Policy, Senate Committee on Finance;
the Attorney General; the Director, FBI; the Under Secretary of the
Treasury (Enforcement); the Director, U.S.  Secret Service; the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; the Commissioner, Social Security
Administration; the Chief Postal Inspector, U.S.  Postal Inspection
Service; the Chairman, Federal Trade Commission; the Director, Office
of Management and Budget; and other interested parties.  We will also
make copies available to others on request. 

Major contributors to this briefing report are listed in appendix II. 
If you have any questions about the information in this report,
please call me on (202) 512-8777. 

Richard M.  Stana
Associate Director
Administration of Justice Issues


Briefing Section I INTRODUCTION
AND BACKGROUND
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   IDENTITY FRAUD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3


IDENTITY FRAUD

There is no one universally accepted definition of identity fraud. 
Typically, identity fraud refers to the illegal use of personal
identifying information--such as name, address, Social Security
number (SSN), and date of birth--to commit financial fraud.  Identity
fraud can encompass a host of crimes, ranging from the unauthorized
use of a credit card to a comprehensive takeover of another person's
identity and financial accounts.  In short, an identity thief can
fraudulently use personal identifying information to take over a
person's identity and open new accounts; apply for loans, credit
cards, and social benefits; rent apartments and establish services
with utility companies; and engage in many other types of fraudulent
activities, which can result in the loss of assets or
creditworthiness. 

Identity fraud can claim many victims.  Credit grantors, such as
banks and retail merchants, can be victims because they finance the
selling of goods and services that ultimately are not paid for.  The
individuals whose identities are stolen are victims too, even though
they may be protected in some instances from personal financial
loss--e.g., by insurance coverage or credit card maximum-loss and/or
reimbursement provisions.  Even if they have no out-of-pocket costs,
individual victims can nonetheless suffer from injuries to their
reputations and must undergo a sometimes very lengthy and agonizing
process of clearing up their credit history.  In the interim, these
individuals may be unable to keep or find a job, obtain a home
mortgage, or secure other time-critical loans, such as tuition loans
for college-age children. 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   BRIEFING OBJECTIVES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4


BRIEFING OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this briefing report are to provide information on
the following issues and questions related to identity fraud: 

Law enforcement responsibilities and tracking.  (1) What government
agency, if any, has primary jurisdiction for investigating identity
fraud crimes?  (2) From the law enforcement viewpoint, what are the
difficulties in tracking the extent of identity fraud; e.g., is such
tracking feasible? 

Prevalence of identity fraud.  (1) How many identity-fraud cases
occur in the United States every year?  (2) By what percentage have
identity-fraud claims increased over the last 5 years? 

Costs of identity fraud.  (1) How much does identity fraud cost
federal and state governments, businesses, credit bureaus, and
individuals? 

Identity fraud and the Internet.  (1) How has the growth of the
Internet contributed to trends in the reported or estimated cases of
identity fraud?  (2) What is the extent or status of industry
self-regulation regarding computerized database services ("individual
reference services") that collect and disseminate personal
identifying information about consumers? 

Also, although not specifically related to identity fraud, we were
asked to address two questions about selling personal identifying
information:  (1) How much money do credit bureaus earn from selling
personal identifying information, such as SSNs and dates of birth? 
(2) How would businesses or commerce be affected if credit bureaus
could not sell personal identifying information? 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

In developing information on the issues and questions, we conducted a
literature search and contacted law enforcement or other officials of

  -- selected federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of
     Investigation (FBI), the Executive Office for U.S.  Attorneys,
     the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Office of the
     Inspector General, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue
     Service's (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division, the Postal
     Inspection Service, and the Federal Trade Commission, and two
     states, Arizona and California, that have enacted identity fraud
     legislation in recent years;

  -- the three national credit bureaus (Equifax, Inc.; Experian
     Corporation; and Trans Union Corporation); three major
     credit-card companies (American Express Company; MasterCard
     International, Inc.; and VISA U.S.A., Inc.); and

  -- various research, consumer interest, privacy rights, and other
     groups. 

Given the number and scope of the issues and questions, we did not
undertake any detailed or comprehensive analyses of the information
provided.  Rather, our work generally consisted of (1) synthesizing
information from existing studies, reports, or other publications and
(2) interviewing relevant public and private sector officials, as
indicated above, to obtain available statistics, other applicable
documentation, and testimonial evidence.  We did not independently
verify the accuracy of the statistical and other information provided
us by the various public and private entities.  Appendix I provides
more details about our objectives, scope, and methodology. 


Briefing Section II LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND
TRACKING
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   FEDERAL AGENCIES'
   RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
   IDENTITY FRAUD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6


FEDERAL AGENCIES' RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING IDENTITY FRAUD

According to the law enforcement officials we interviewed, identity
fraud can be an element in a variety of financial crimes, such as
bank fraud, credit-card fraud, social program fraud, tax refund
fraud, and mail fraud.  Thus, while the Secret Service has primary
jurisdiction for investigations involving credit-card fraud, we found
that no federal agency has overall jurisdiction regarding identity
fraud.  Rather, various agencies can have a role in investigating
identity fraud as an enabling crime that resulted in another crime
for which they had jurisdiction.  These agencies, in addition to the
Secret Service's Financial Crimes Division, include the FBI, the
Social Security Administration's Office of the Inspector General, the
IRS' Criminal Investigation Division, and the Postal Inspection
Service. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   SELECTED FEDERAL STATUTES THAT
   ADDRESS IDENTITY FRAUD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

While identity fraud may be an element of various types of financial
crimes, at least three sections of the U.S.  Code address identity
fraud--18 U.S.C.  1028, 18 U.S.C.  1029, and 42 U.S.C.  408(a)(7). 

Under section 1028, title 18 of the U.S.  Code, it is a criminal
offense (punishable by up to 15 years in prison, or a fine, or both)
to, among other things, knowingly possess with intent to use
unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification
documents or false identification documents.  As used in this
section, the term "identification document" is defined to mean a
document (1) made or issued by or under the authority of the U.S. 
government, a state, a political subdivision of a state, or certain
other governmental and quasi-governmental entities and (2) which,
when completed with information concerning a particular individual,
is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of
identification. 

Under section 1029, title 18 of the U.S.  Code, it is a criminal
offense (punishable by up to 15 years in prison, or a fine, or both)
to, among other things, knowingly and with intent to defraud, traffic
in or use one or more unauthorized access devices (such as credit
cards) during any 1-year period and by such conduct obtain anything
of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period. 

Under section 408(a)(7), title 42 of the U.S.  Code, a penalty for up
to 5 years in prison, or a fine, or both, can result from, among
other things, falsely representing--with intent to deceive--a number
as the Social Security account number assigned by the Commissioner of
Social Security to him or to another person. 

The above is not an all-inclusive listing of U.S.  Code sections
relating to identity fraud.  For example, other statutory provisions
that could involve elements of identity fraud include 18 U.S.C.  287
(false, fictitious or fraudulent claims), 18 U.S.C.  1341 (mail
frauds and swindles), 18 U.S.C.  1342 (fictitious names or address),
18 U.S.C.  1343 (fraud by wire, radio, or television), and 18 U.S.C. 
1344 (bank fraud). 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   DIFFICULTIES IN TRACKING
   IDENTITY FRAUD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

Identity fraud is difficult to track.  Generally, the law enforcement
officials we contacted told us that their respective agencies
historically have not tracked identity fraud for various reasons. 
One reason is the lack of a standardized definition of identity
fraud.  Another reason is that identity fraud cuts across the
statistical categories tracked by law enforcement agencies because it
is an element of many crimes.  A third reason is the mere possession
of another person's personal identifying information is not a crime
in itself.  Rather, the use of that information to deceive is a
crime.  As a result, law enforcement classifies its cases according
to how the information is illegally used, rather than by the
possession of someone's personal identifying information.  In
reference to bank-fraud investigations, for example, FBI officials
told us that

  -- identity fraud may be an element of any given bank-fraud
     investigation.  But, the FBI's inquiries will focus on the
     primary or core violations, that is, the bank-fraud violations. 
     In conducting and developing investigations, FBI agents may not
     specifically include identity fraud among the list of charges. 
     Even if the use of false identification documents is among the
     initial list of charges, there is a possibility that this charge
     could be dropped or negotiated away during the prosecutive
     process. 

However, we found that two agencies--the Postal Inspection Service
and the Secret Service--are attempting to track certain types of
identity fraud.  In fiscal year 1995, the Postal Inspection Service
began tracking mail-theft cases involving fraudulent credit-card
applications and change of addresses.  In October 1997, also in
reference to fraudulent credit-card activity, the Secret Service
began tracking cases involving identity takeover.  Later in this
briefing, we present more details regarding the results of these
tracking efforts. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

We identified two states, Arizona and California, that have passed
legislation criminalizing the act of taking the identity of another
person. 


   SELECTED STATE LEGISLATION ON
   IDENTITY FRAUD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

Arizona Legislation.  In 1996, Arizona passed legislation adding
section 2708 to title 13, Arizona Revised Statutes.  Under this new
section, a person commits identity fraud by knowingly taking another
person's name, birth date, or SSN without the consent of that person,
with the intent of obtaining or using the person's identity for any
unlawful purpose or for causing financial loss to the person. 
Further, under Arizona's statute, taking the identity of another
person is a class 5 felony, punishable with imprisonment of 1-1/2
years, plus a fine of not more than $150,000.  According to an
Arizona official, from the time of the 1996 enactment of the state's
law to February 1998, 142 investigative cases have been forwarded by
the police to county prosecutors, who have subsequently filed 89
court cases. 

California Legislation.  In 1997, California added section 530.5 to
the California Penal Code.  Section 530.5, which became effective
January 1, 1998, makes it a public offense to (1) willfully obtain
the personal identifying information of another person without the
authorization of that person and (2) use that information to obtain,
or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, or services in the name of
another person without consent of that person.  Under this law,
"personal identifying information" is defined as the name, address,
telephone number, driver's license number, SSN, place of employment,
employee identification number, mother's maiden name, demand deposit
account number, savings account number, or credit-card number of an
individual. 

Conviction under section 530.5 is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail not to exceed 1 year, or a fine not to exceed $1,000, or
both.  According to a California official, at the time of our review,
no cases had been filed under the new statute. 


Briefing Section III PREVALENCE OF
IDENTITY FRAUD
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   IDENTITY-FRAUD CASES AND TRENDS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

We found no comprehensive national statistics on the prevalence of
identity fraud collected by any organization in the public or private
sectors.  However, we did obtain limited statistics from five federal
agencies, one of the three national credit bureaus, two major
credit-card companies, and an American Bankers Association survey,
which illustrate different ways that identity fraud is being
reported: 

  -- From the Executive Office for U.S.  Attorneys, we obtained
     statistics on the number of cases filed under selected statutes
     related to identity fraud. 

  -- From the Secret Service, we obtained arrest and cost statistics
     for financial crimes cases that agency officials considered to
     be directly associated with identity fraud. 

  -- From the SSA, we obtained information on the number of
     investigations involving SSN misuse. 

  -- From the Postal Inspection Service, we obtained information on
     the number of arrests in relevant types of mail-theft cases. 

  -- From the IRS, we obtained information on certain questionable
     refund schemes. 

  -- From a credit bureau, we obtained information on the volume of
     consumer inquiries relating to identity fraud. 

  -- From two major credit-card companies, we obtained information on
     the amount of dollar losses relating to identity fraud by
     association members. 

  -- From an American Bankers Association survey of the bank-card
     industry, we obtained information on credit-card fraud cases and
     dollar losses. 

The following briefing charts respectively discuss each of these
information sources, including the specific relevance of the
information as an indicator of identity fraud. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   U.S.  ATTORNEYS:  CASES FILED
   UNDER STATUTES RELATED TO
   IDENTITY FRAUD
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11

   Source:  Data from Department
   of Justice.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


U.S.  ATTORNEYS:  CASES FILED
UNDER STATUTES RELATED TO IDENTITY
FRAUD

For all types of federal crimes, the Department of Justice files
about 40,000 criminal cases per year, according to the Senior
Counsel, Executive Office for U.S.  Attorneys.  At our request,
regarding three U.S.  Code sections--sections 1028 and 1029 of title
18 and section 408 of title 42--the Executive Office for U.S. 
Attorneys provided us information showing the number of times each of
the statutes was charged in a case in all federal judicial districts
during fiscal years 1992 to 1997.  Section 1028 deals with fraudulent
activity in connection with identification documents; section 1029
deals with unauthorized use of access devices (e.g., credit cards);
and section 408 deals with misuse of SSNs. 

The number of times charges were filed under these U.S.  Code
sections includes all cases where the statute was used, although it
may not have been the primary charge.  In fiscal year 1997, the data
show 387 cases involving code section 1028, 848 cases involving code
section 1029, and 305 cases involving section 408.  The Senior
Counsel stated that these statistics do not reflect cases where the
facts would reflect an identity fraud or have elements of such fraud
but are prosecuted under mail fraud, wire fraud, and other statutes. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   SECRET SERVICE:  ARRESTS AND
   COSTS RELATING TO IDENTITY
   FRAUD
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12

   Source:  Secret Service data.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


SECRET SERVICE:  ARRESTS AND COSTS
RELATING TO IDENTITY FRAUD

In response to our questions about the prevalence of identity fraud,
a Secret Service official told us financial crimes generally involve
identity fraud, which is reflected in the arrest statistics of the
agency's Financial Crimes Division.  For example, in fiscal year
1995, according to a Secret Service official, the Financial Crimes
Division made a total of 9,470 arrests, of which 8,806 (93 percent)
involved identity fraud.  Similarly, the official reported that
financial crimes arrests in fiscal year 1996 totaled 9,220, of which
8,686 (94 percent) involved identity fraud and that financial crimes
arrests in fiscal year 1997 totaled 10,066, of which 9,455 (94
percent) involved identity fraud. 

Also, according to a Secret Service official, the actual costs
associated with these identity-fraud cases were $442 million, $450
million, and $745 million, respectively.  The official explained that
these figures represent the actual costs or losses to victimized
individuals and financial institutions.  Further, the official noted
that the large increase from 1996 to 1997 is attributable to various
reasons, such as the agency's efforts to focus on high-dollar cases,
improved training for agents, and emerging technologies that create
new opportunities for criminals. 

Also, a Secret Service official told us that the agency has a lead
role in 29 fraud-related task forces that have investigated numerous
cases that involve identity fraud.  The official noted that 12 of the
29 task forces focus primarily on organized criminal enterprises
composed of an ethnic group widely engaged in fraudulent activities. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: 
   SSN-RELATED INVESTIGATIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :13

   Source:  SSA data.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: 
SSN-RELATED INVESTIGATIONS

Officials at SSA's Office of the Inspector General told us that the
agency's SSN-related investigations consist of various categories
that usually involve identity fraud.  According to SSA officials, the
largest category, "SSN misuse" investigations in connection with
program fraud, almost always involves identity fraud.  The number of
SSN misuse investigations increased from 305 in fiscal year 1996 to
1,153 in 1997.  SSA officials said this increase was due, in part, to
the hiring of additional investigators after SSA became an
independent agency in March 1995. 

The officials told us that four other types or categories of
SSN-related investigations are not restricted to but also involve
identity fraud; these categories cover (1) counterfeiting of SSN
cards, (2) trafficking in counterfeit cards, (3) trafficking in and
selling SSN data, and (4) trafficking in legitimate SSN cards.  The
number of investigations in these four categories increased from 119
in fiscal year 1996 to 160 in fiscal year 1997.  SSA officials said
this increase was also due, in part, to the hiring of additional
investigators. 




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   edition.)


   POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE: 
   ARRESTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :14

At our request, in reference to mail theft, diversions, or other
misuse, the Postal Inspection Service's Office of Criminal
Investigations provided us an overview of its investigative
activities and its perspectives regarding the extent of identity
fraud.  According to the Postal Inspection Service

  -- the theft or diversion of mail contributes significantly to the
     problems of identity fraud.  Nearly all mail-theft cases in
     which a financial transaction device (e.g., credit card) or
     document is stolen can lead to a legitimate person's credit
     history and name being assumed. 

  -- Identity-fraud crimes most often are synonymous with the
     compromise of a person's credit history.  About 2 years ago, the
     Service began tracking its investigations involving the
     submission of fraudulent credit applications that result in the
     issuance of a credit card.  More recently, the Service began to
     track criminal activity associated with change-of-address fraud,
     which involves the surreptitious diversion of a legitimate
     person's mail to addresses controlled by criminals, such as
     private mail boxes at Commercial Mail Receiving Agencies.  These
     two arrest categories (credit-card application fraud and
     change-of-address fraud) most closely measure the Postal
     Inspection Service's activity regarding identity-fraud cases. 

  -- Regarding the first category, fraud involving credit-card
     applications, the Service has seen a stabilized pattern of
     activity over the last 3 fiscal years, 1995 to 1997.  During the
     first 4 months of fiscal year 1998, arrests in this category
     totaled 48, down from the total of 59 arrests for the first 4
     months of fiscal year 1997. 

  -- However, arrests in the other category (change-of-address fraud)
     have more than doubled in recent years, from 53 in fiscal year
     1996 to 115 in 1997.  Moreover, during the first 4 months of
     fiscal year 1998, arrests in this category totaled 54, up from
     the total of 33 arrests for the first 4 months of fiscal year
     1997. 




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   edition.)


   POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE: 
   ORGANIZED CRIME INVOLVED IN
   IDENTITY FRAUD
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :15


POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE: 
ORGANIZED CRIME INVOLVED IN
IDENTITY FRAUD

Investigations conducted by the Postal Inspection Service show that
organized criminal activity involving identity fraud has a nationwide
scope.  To illustrate, the following is a paraphrased description of
selected case summaries presented in a 1997 report.\1

  -- Investigations of criminal enterprises consume many Inspection
     Service resources.  For theft of mail and related offenses,
     arrests were made in various cities across the United States,
     including Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Jacksonville, Houston,
     Miami, New Orleans, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, San
     Francisco, and Tampa. 

  -- Mail theft and credit-card fraud activity frequently support
     drug trafficking.  Large amounts of money may be obtained
     through such fraud. 

  -- A sophisticated crime ring involving the theft of identities of
     credit-worthy individuals, and the subsequent use of
     fraudulently obtained credit cards, was investigated in New
     York.  Losses to the card-issuing banks were over $1.8 million. 

  -- The Postal Inspection Service has combined its resources with
     other law enforcement agencies to form task forces in 10 U.S. 
     cities.  Postal inspectors participating in a task force in
     Florida assisted in arresting 32 people suspected of working in
     a credit-card fraud ring responsible for losses of at least $1.5
     million. 

An official of the Postal Inspection Service told us that often the
illegally diverted mail in identity-fraud schemes is sent to private
mail boxes located at Commercial Mail Receiving Agencies rented by
the criminals. 




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   edition.)


--------------------
\1 U.S.  Postal Service, Office of Inspector General, Semiannual
Report to Congress (fiscal year 1997, Vol.1), Oct.  1, 1996 - Mar. 
31, 1997, p.  25-26. 


   IRS:  QUESTIONABLE REFUND
   SCHEMES DETECTED
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :16

   Source:  IRS data.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


IRS:  QUESTIONABLE REFUND SCHEMES
DETECTED

IRS Criminal Investigation Division officials told us IRS annually
detects thousands of questionable refund schemes, many of which
involve personal and business identity fraud.  For example, the
officials described one scheme whereby an individual fraudulently
used the actual SSNs of 1,000 students to file refund-due tax
returns. 

For calendar years 1993 through 1997, IRS provided us statistics
covering all questionable refund schemes that IRS classified as
involving a "high frequency" of identity fraud.  In 1993, for
example, IRS detected a total of 5,438 schemes, consisting of 77,840
questionable tax returns that claimed a total of $137 million in
refunds.  According to IRS officials, the agency's detection efforts
prevented payment of $102 million of the claimed refunds. 

The number of schemes detected--and the related statistics--decreased
after 1995.  For instance, the number of questionable schemes
detected in 1996 was 2,458, down considerably from the 4,487 schemes
detected in 1995.  However, for the first 9 months of 1997, the
number of questionable refund schemes detected was higher than the
1996 total.  We have previously reported that a major reason for the
decrease in 1996 was a reduction in IRS staff.\2




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   edition.)


--------------------
\2 Tax Administration:  Earned Income Credit Noncompliance
(GAO/T-GGD-97-105, May 8, 1997). 


   THREE NATIONAL CREDIT BUREAUS'
   FRAUD UNITS:  OVERVIEW
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :17

   \ a Some data are tracked.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Data from Associated
   Credit Bureaus, Inc.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


THREE NATIONAL CREDIT BUREAUS'
FRAUD UNITS:  OVERVIEW

The Vice President of Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., provided us
overview information on the fraud units of the three national credit
bureaus--Equifax, Inc.; Experian Corporation; and Trans Union
Corporation.  The overview information covered, for example, the year
that the respective fraud unit was created and the year that a
toll-free number was available to consumers.  According to this
official, all of the fraud units have increased their staffing levels
in recent years due to various reasons, including more referrals from
the creditor community and a greater incidence of credit fraud. 

Also, this official commented that one national bureau does track
some fraud statistics, but the other two national bureaus do not.  He
added that, the three bureaus may be willing to consider the
feasibility of systematically and consistently tracking various forms
of fraud, including identity fraud, if the value of such an effort
outweighs the costs. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   A CREDIT BUREAU: 
   IDENTITY-FRAUD INQUIRIES
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :18

   Source:  Data from Trans Union
   Corporation.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


A CREDIT BUREAU:  IDENTITY-FRAUD
INQUIRIES

A Trans Union official told us that the total number of consumer
inquiries to Trans Union each year can be classified into three
categories, with each having about one-third of the total inquiries. 
According to the Trans Union official, all inquiries in two of the
three categories involve identity fraud.  One category is what Trans
Union calls "true person fraud." This category covers incidents
whereby someone assumes a "true" person's identity and applies for
credit using that identity.  A second category is account takeover
fraud, which covers incidents involving fraudulent access to an
existing account.  The final or third category is labeled
"precautionary." This category, according to the Trans Union
official, consists of inquiries from consumers who would rather be
safe than sorry. 

According to a Trans Union official, the total number of consumer
inquiries to the company's Fraud Victim Assistance Department has
increased significantly over time, rising from 35,235 in 1992 to
522,922 in 1997.  The Trans Union official attributed this upward
trend to various factors, including company growth and outreach
efforts to consumers as well as increasing occurrences of identity
fraud. 

The other two national credit bureaus were unable to provide us
information about consumer inquiries relating to identity fraud. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   VISA:  PERSPECTIVES ON
   IDENTITY-FRAUD PREVALENCE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :19

   Source:  Data from VISA U.S.A.,
   Inc.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


VISA:  PERSPECTIVES ON
IDENTITY-FRAUD PREVALENCE

According to an official we contacted at VISA U.S.A., Inc., within
the credit-card business, there is no standardized or industrywide
definition of identity fraud.  In response to our inquiries about the
prevalence or significance of identity fraud, the VISA official told
us that

  -- VISA member banks' fiscal year 1997 fraud losses in the United
     States totaled $490 million, or about 0.097 percent of the
     banks' business volume, as measured by the value of billing
     transactions processed ($504.9 billion). 

  -- VISA has six categories of fraud losses, each of which could
     have elements of identity fraud.  Of the six categories,
     "fraudulent applications" most closely involve identity fraud. 
     For fiscal year 1997, this category represented about 5 percent
     of VISA member banks' total fraud losses in the United States. 

  -- Another of the six categories is "account takeovers," a category
     that VISA began using in fiscal year 1997.  Generally, this type
     of fraud could be considered mail theft, in that one person may
     steal another's mail, which could include a credit-card
     application.  The thief may then request a change of address. 
     For fiscal year 1997, the account takeover category represented
     about 6 percent of VISA member banks' total fraud losses. 

  -- The fraudulent applications component of 1997 fraud losses is
     about 19.5 percent lower than for fiscal year 1996.  VISA
     attributes this decline in losses to its antifraud efforts,
     which include development of fraud detection and avoidance
     programs as well as close cooperation with law enforcement. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   MASTERCARD:  PERSPECTIVES ON
   IDENTITY-FRAUD PREVALENCE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :20

   Source:  Data from MasterCard,
   Inc.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


MASTERCARD:  PERSPECTIVES ON
IDENTITY-FRAUD PREVALENCE

In response to our inquiries about the prevalence or significance of
identity fraud, an official at MasterCard International, Inc.,
commented substantially as follows: 

  -- In calendar year 1997, MasterCard member banks' fraud losses
     worldwide totaled $407 million, which represented about 0.11
     percent of the banks' billing transactions processed ($365
     billion). 

  -- About 96 percent of the $407 million total fraud losses involved
     identity fraud-related categories, such as account takeovers,
     fraudulent applications, counterfeit cards, and lost and stolen
     cards. 

In summary, in terms of dollar losses, the MasterCard official said
that identity fraud losses are a significant part of overall fraud
losses.  Another MasterCard official noted that identity fraud can
have long-term negative impacts on consumers' purchasing power and,
in turn, on business.  Therefore, according to this official,
MasterCard has taken steps in recent years to educate merchants about
ways to perform identity checks. 




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   edition.)


   AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION: 
   SURVEY OF BANK-CARD INDUSTRY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :21

   Source:  Data from American
   Bankers Association.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION: 
SURVEY OF BANK-CARD INDUSTRY

The American Bankers Association surveyed the bank-card industry in
1997 and reported on various aspects of credit-card fraud, along with
other issues.  The survey covered banks of various sizes based on
asset portfolios--community (58 banks), medium (11 banks), and large
(10 banks).\3 According to the American Bankers Association's report,
which presented information on the bank-card industry's 1996
financial fraud losses: 

  -- For the sixth consecutive year, lost and stolen credit cards
     (excluding mail intercepts) was the biggest single source of
     fraud loss for all size banks in terms of both case volume and
     dollar losses.  Counterfeit credit cards rose significantly for
     community banks while fraudulent applications became a more
     significant issue for medium banks. 

  -- The average number of stolen credit cards reported for each of
     the 10 large banks surveyed was 112,720.  The average number of
     credit-card fraud cases in 1996 for each large bank was 16,801. 
     Certain credit-card fraud categories have a larger dollar impct
     than other categories.  Among cases involving credit-card fraud
     at large banks, counterfeiting, fraudulent applications,
     intercept in mail, and account takeover accounted for 23 percent
     of the cases but 44 percent of the dollar losses.  Lost and
     stolen credit cards made up 66 percent of the fraud cases but 49
     percent of the dollar losses. 

Briefing Section IV

--------------------
\3 According to an official of the American Bankers Association,
community banks have less than $50 million in credit-card
outstandings or less than 50,000 credit-card accounts with balances
(58 banks); medium banks have $50 million to $749 million in
credit-card outstandings or 50,000 to 749,000 credit-card accounts
with balances (11 banks); and large banks have $750 million or
greater in credit-card outstandings or 750,000 or more credit-card
accounts with balances (10 banks). 


COSTS OF IDENTITY FRAUD
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   IDENTITY-FRAUD COSTS ARE
   DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :22

We did not find any comprehensive estimates of the costs of identity
fraud--to either the federal or state governments, businesses, credit
bureaus, or individuals.  Some information is available, but
difficulties in estimating costs are compounded by limited tracking
of the prevalence of identity fraud and lack of agreement on a
definition of such fraud. 

In 1997, the Federal Reserve Board reported that (1) fraud involving
use of sensitive identifying information is often not tracked
separately from other types of fraud and (2) although anecdotal
information seems to suggest that this type of fraud is increasing,
these losses likely play a relatively small role in overall fraud
losses and pose no significant threat to insured depository
institutions.\1

The American Bankers Association reported in its 1997 survey of the
bank-card industry that credit-card fraud losses for 10 large banks
averaged about $20 million per bank in 1996.  Also, a Secret Service
official told us that actual losses--to the victimized individuals
and financial institutions--associated with the agency's
investigations of financial crimes involving identity fraud totaled
$745 million in fiscal year 1997.  Other law enforcement officials
said that identity fraud can be an element of various financial
crimes and the costs can be substantial. 

On an individual level, the "human" costs of identity fraud should be
acknowledged.  Emotional costs are associated with identity-fraud
incidents as well as the time and effort required to repair a
compromised credit-history.  One Secret Service field agent told us
that victims of identity fraud feel they have been violated. 
Although not easily quantified, the financial and/or opportunity
costs to victims can also be substantial.  For example, the victims
may be unable to obtain a job, purchase a car, or qualify for a
mortgage. 

Briefing Section V

--------------------
\1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the
Congress Concerning the Availability of Consumer Identifying
Information and Financial Fraud, (Mar.  1997). 


IDENTITY FRAUD AND THE INTERNET
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNET
   CREATES IDENTITY-FRAUD RISKS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :23

Many of the officials we contacted said that Internet growth, which
enhances the availability and accessibility of personal identifying
information, obviously creates greater risks or opportunities for
criminal activity, including identity fraud.  However, in February
1998, the Director of the Internet Fraud Watch,\1 testified that no
one, including the Internet Fraud Watch, knows the full extent of
Internet fraud.\2 According to the Director's testimony, the Internet
Fraud Watch received a total of 1,152 reports of possible Internet
fraud in 1997, which represented a threefold increase over 1996. 
Also, regarding the 1997 reports, the Director listed the top 10
types of Internet fraud.  In reviewing this list, we found no
specific mention of identity fraud-related crimes or scams.  However,
additional testimony at the February 1998 hearing included anecdotal
information illustrating that the Internet can be used for identity
fraud-related crime. 

Further, although the federal law enforcement officials we contacted
had no specific trend data, they recognized that Internet growth
creates identity fraud-related risks.  Secret Service officials told
us, for example, that numerous instances of identity fraud have been
perpetrated using the Internet.  These officials opined that, without
effective encryption measures, Internet-related identity fraud will
increase. 

Also, at an earlier congressional hearing (September 1997), an FBI
official testified that: 

     "Technological advances have also facilitated 'identity theft,'
     the availability and misuse of electronic account and personal
     information.  Identity theft poses significant risks to
     financial institutions and individuals alike.  The Internet is
     also engendering other bank-related frauds."\3




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   edition.)


--------------------
\1 The Internet Fraud Watch was created in 1996 by the National
Consumers League to operate in tandem with the League's National
Fraud Information Center. 

\2 Statement of Susan Grant, Director, National Fraud Information
Center, in a hearing on Fraud on the Internet:  Scams Affecting
Consumers, held by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S.  Senate, Feb.  10, 1998. 

\3 Statement of Charles L.  Owens; Chief, Financial Crimes Section,
FBI; in a hearing on Financial Instrument Fraud held by the
Subcommittee on Financial Services and Technology; Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; U.S.  Senate; Sept.  16, 1997. 


   STATUS OF SELF-REGULATION IN
   THE "INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE
   SERVICES" INDUSTRY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :24


STATUS OF SELF-REGULATION IN THE
"INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES"
INDUSTRY

Computerized database services--frequently referred to as "individual
reference services" or "look-up services"--are used widely by both
public and private sector entities to locate or verify the identity
of individuals.  These services--which collect and disseminate
personal identifying information--have raised privacy rights issues
as well as concerns about increased risks of identity fraud. 

In 1997, the Federal Trade Commission began working with industry
representatives (the Individual Reference Services Group) to
encourage adoption of a self-regulatory framework.  The results of
this effort are presented in a December 1997 report to Congress.\4 As
reported, the Individual Reference Services Group developed and
agreed to implement a set of self-regulatory principles.  Among other
things, the principles prohibit distributing certain nonpublic
information (e.g., SSN, mother's maiden name, and date of birth) to
the general public.\5 Also, industry members agreed to undergo an
annual compliance review by a third party. 

The self-regulatory principles are to go into effect not later than
December 31, 1998.  Thus, at the time of our inquiry, a Federal Trade
Commission official told us it was too soon to measure or determine
the effectiveness of the principles.  However, the official said that
the principles show promise because they contain provisions not
normally seen in other self-regulating efforts. 

Briefing Section VI

--------------------
\4 Federal Trade Commission, Individual Reference Services - A Report
to Congress, Dec.  1997. 

\5 The principles do not restrict the sale of this information
obtained from public sources, such as state departments of motor
vehicles, according to an official at the Federal Trade Commission. 


PERSPECTIVES ON SELLING PERSONAL
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   SELLING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING
   INFORMATION:  NO PROHIBITION;
   MILLIONS OF REVENUE DOLLARS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :25


SELLING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION:  NO PROHIBITION;
MILLIONS OF REVENUE DOLLARS

According to the Federal Trade Commission, credit bureaus are not
statutorily prohibited from releasing or selling noncredit-related,
consumer-identifying information.  Such information--commonly
referred to as "credit header" information in reference to the top
portion of a credit-history report--typically consists of an
individual's name, aliases, birth date, SSN, and current and previous
addresses.  In a March 1997 report to the Congress, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System also noted that consumer
reporting agencies are not restricted from selling this header
information.\1

The proposed Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997, H.R.  1813,
which was introduced in the 105th Congress, is intended to protect
consumers' privacy by preventing credit bureaus from selling any
identifying information of the consumer except the name, address, and
telephone number if listed in a telephone directory.  The bill would
also prohibit the use of SSNs for commercial purposes without the
prior written consent of the consumer.  Further, H.R.  1813 would
restrict the release of SSNs by state Departments of Motor Vehicles. 

In response to our inquiry about how much revenue is earned from the
selling of personal identifying information, an official with
Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., told us that pricing strategies are
proprietary and members do not share revenue data on specific product
lines.  However, the official stated that aggregate revenues are in
the "tens of millions of dollars" annually. 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the
Congress Concerning the Availability of Consumer Identifying
Information and Financial Fraud (Mar.  1997), submitted pursuant to
section 2422 of the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996. 


   RESTRICTION ON SALE OF PERSONAL
   IDENTIFYING DATA COULD AFFECT
   BUSINESS/COMMERCE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :26


RESTRICTION ON SALE OF PERSONAL
IDENTIFYING DATA COULD AFFECT
BUSINESS/COMMERCE

The scope of our work did not permit a comprehensive or quantitative
answer to the question of how businesses or commerce would be
affected if personal identifying information could not be sold. 
Quite obviously, however, personal identifying information has a
market value, and such information is widely used for many purposes
within both the public and private sectors.  The insurance industry,
for instance, accesses databases of personal identifying information
to investigate potentially fraudulent claims.  Also, credit grantors
in the retail industry use such information to confirm the identity
of credit applicants.  Some observers say that the resulting "instant
credit" plays a significant role in the continuing robustness of the
economy.  Law enforcement agencies also use this information in the
investigation and prosecution of financial crimes. 

An official with Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., told us that some
proposals to limit the availability of SSNs and other personal
identifying information would make it more difficult to authenticate
a consumer's application data, thus increasing the risk of a
fraudulent account being opened. 


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

By letters dated February 26, 1998, September 30, 1997, and June 23,
1997, respectively, the Chairman, Senate Special Committee on Aging;
the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Social Security, House
Committee on Ways and Means; and Representative Gerald D.  Kleczka
asked us to review various issues related to identity fraud. 
Specifically, our review focused on the following issues and
questions: 

Law enforcement responsibilities and tracking.  (1) What government
agency, if any, has primary jurisdiction for investigating
identity-fraud crimes?  (2) From the law enforcement viewpoint, what
are the difficulties in tracking the extent of identity fraud; e.g.,
is such tracking feasible? 

Prevalence of identity fraud.  (1) How many identity-fraud cases
occur in the United States every year?  (2) By what percentage have
identity-fraud claims increased over the last 5 years? 

Costs of identity fraud:  (1) How much does identity fraud cost the
federal and state governments, businesses, credit bureaus, and
individuals? 

Identity fraud and the Internet:  (1) How has the growth of the
Internet contributed to trends in the reported or estimated cases of
identity fraud?  (2) What is the extent or status of industry
self-regulation regarding computerized database services ("individual
reference services") that collect and disseminate personal
identifying information about consumers? 

Also, although not specifically related to identity fraud, we were
asked to address two questions about the selling of personal
identifying information:  (1) How much money do credit bureaus earn
from selling personal identifying information, such as SSNs and dates
of birth?  (2) How would businesses or commerce be affected if credit
bureaus could not sell personal identifying information? 


   OVERVIEW OF OUR SCOPE AND
   METHODOLOGY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

To address these issues and questions, we conducted a literature
search; and we contacted federal law enforcement officials and
officials of (1) other relevant federal agencies; (2) two states,
Arizona and California, that have enacted identity-fraud statutes in
recent years; (3) credit bureaus and credit-card companies; and (5)
various research, consumer interest, privacy rights, and other
groups.  See table I.1 at the end of this appendix for a list of the
public and private sector entities we contacted. 

Given the number and scope of the issues and questions, we did not
undertake any detailed or comprehensive analyses of the information
provided.  Rather, our work generally consisted of (1) synthesizing
information from existing studies, reports, or other publications and
(2) interviewing relevant public and private sector officials, as
previously indicated, to obtain available statistics, other
applicable documentation, and testimonial evidence.  We did not
independently verify the accuracy of the statistical and other
information provided us by the various public and private entities. 


   LITERATURE SEARCH
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

We conducted a literature search to identify published articles,
reports, studies, and other documents dealing with the various
issues.  Some of the more recent, relevant materials we identified
are the following: 

  -- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the
     Congress Concerning the Availability of Consumer Identifying
     Information and Financial Fraud, March 1997. 

  -- Federal Trade Commission, Individual Reference Services - A
     Report to Congress, December 1997. 

  -- Fraud on the Internet:  Scams Affecting Consumers, hearing
     before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee
     on Governmental Affairs, U.S.  Senate, February 10, 1998. 

  -- U.S.  Public Interest Research Group, Theft of Identity II: 
     Return to the Consumer X-Files, September 1997. 


   FEDERAL AGENCIES CONTACTED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

Within the Department of Justice, we contacted the Executive Office
for U.S.  Attorneys to obtain statistics regarding the number of
cases filed under selected statutes related to identity fraud.  That
office provided us data for fiscal years 1992 through 1997 for all
federal judicial districts.  Also, we contacted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to determine whether it had any investigation
statistics or other information regarding identity fraud. 

Within the Department of the Treasury, we contacted the Internal
Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation Division and obtained
statistics on questionable refund schemes detected from January 1,
1993, through September 30, 1997.  Also, we contacted the U.S. 
Secret Service to determine whether it had any investigation
statistics or other information regarding identity fraud. 

We contacted the Social Security Administration's Office of the
Inspector General to obtain statistics on investigations involving
(1) misuse of Social Security numbers and (2) other types of identity
fraud-related cases.  The Office of the Inspector General provided us
relevant investigation statistics covering fiscal years 1993 through
1997, plus the first 4 months of fiscal year 1998. 

We contacted the Postal Inspection Service to obtain arrest
statistics for mail theft or mail diversion cases involving identity
fraud.  The Inspection Service provided us statistics for two
relevant categories--credit-card application fraud and
change-of-address fraud.  However, trend data are limited in that the
Service could not provide us arrest data in both categories for
periods before fiscal year 1996.  Also, we reviewed the agency's
recent semiannual reports, which presented case summaries of
investigations showing that organized criminal activity involving
identity fraud has a nationwide scope. 

We contacted the Federal Trade Commission to obtain its views on
related issues.  In particular, however, we were interested in the
Commission's views on questions regarding identity fraud and the
Internet. 


   STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
   AGENCIES CONTACTED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4

To determine which states had enacted identity-fraud laws, we
contacted the Council of State Governments (Washington, D.C.) and the
National Conference of State Legislatures (Denver, CO).  We then
contacted officials in Arizona and California, the two states
identified as having enacted applicable laws in recent years.  In so
doing, among other inquiries, we asked about the availability of any
state or local data showing the prevalence or costs of identity
fraud. 


   CREDIT BUREAUS CONTACTED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5

We contacted the three national credit bureaus--Equifax, Inc.;
Experian Corporation; and Trans Union Corporation--to obtain
information on related issues.  Similarly, we contacted Associated
Credit Bureaus, Inc., a trade association with membership consisting
of 661 credit reporting agencies and more than 650 mortgage reporting
and collection services companies. 


   CREDIT-CARD COMPANIES CONTACTED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6

We contacted the three largest credit card companies--American
Express Company; MasterCard International, Inc.; and VISA U.S.A.,
Inc.--to obtain information on related issues.  According to an
industry representative, based upon the total number of credit and
debit cards issued worldwide, the two largest companies are VISA (1
billion cards) and MasterCard (850 million cards), followed by
American Express (40 million cards) and Discover (35 million cards). 


   OTHER GROUPS CONTACTED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7

Also, as table I.1 shows, we contacted various research, consumer
interest, privacy rights, and other groups.  Generally, we asked for
relevant information regarding all of the issues. 



                               Table I.1
                
                     Organizations Contacted by GAO

Federal government agencies:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D.C.)

Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.):

--Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

--Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of the Treasury (Washington, D.C.):

--Internal Revenue Service

--Secret Service

Federal Trade Commission (Washington, D.C.)

Social Security Administration (Baltimore, MD)

U.S. Postal Inspection Service (Washington, D.C.)

State and local government agencies:

Arizona:

--Arizona State Legislature (Phoenix, AZ)

--Arizona Law Library (Phoenix, AZ)

--Association of Arizona County Attorneys

California:

--Anaheim Police Department (Anaheim, CA)

--Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office

--Los Angeles City Housing Authority Police Department

Council of State Governments (Washington, D.C.)

National Conference of State Legislatures (Denver, CO)

Credit bureaus:

Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc. (Washington, D.C.)

Equifax, Inc. (Atlanta, GA)

Experian Corporation (Orange, CA)

Trans Union Corporation:

--Fraud Victim Assistance Department (Fullerton, CA)

--Department of Consumer Relations (Cleveland, OH)

--Office of General Counsel (Chicago, IL)

Credit-card companies:

American Express Company (Los Angeles, CA) (New York, NY)

MasterCard International, Inc. (Huntington Beach, CA)

VISA U.S.A., Inc. (McLean, VA)

Research, consumer interest, privacy rights, and other groups:

American Bankers Association (Washington, D.C.)

American Prosecutors Research Institute (Alexandria, VA)

California Public Interest Research Group (Sacramento, CA)

Center for Law and Public Interest (Los Angeles, CA)

Electronic Privacy Information Center (Washington, D.C.)

International Association of Chiefs of Police (Alexandria, VA)

International Association of Financial Crimes (Novato, CA)

National Consumer Law Center (Boston, MA)

National White Collar Crime Center (Richmond, VA)

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (San Diego, CA)

U.S. Public Interest Research Group (Washington, D.C.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II

GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Danny R.  Burton, Assistant Director
David P.  Alexander, Senior Social Science Analyst
Michael H.  Little, Communications Analyst

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ann H.  Finley, Senior Attorney

DALLAS FIELD OFFICE

Ronald J.  Salo, Evaluator-in-Charge

LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

Daniel R.  Garcia, Senior Evaluator
Carla D.  Brown, Evaluator

*** End of document. ***